Update on Conflict and Diplomacy Author(s): Michele K. Esposito Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Autumn 2011), pp. 147-188 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2011.XLI.1.147 . Accessed: 30/03/2015 11:09
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16 May–15 August 2011
Compiled by Michele K. Esposito
The Quarterly Update is a summary of bilateral, multilateral, regional, and international events affecting the Palestinians and the future of the peace process. More than 100 U.S., Israeli, Arab, and international print, wire, television, and online sources are surveyed to compile the Quarterly Update. The most relevant sources are cited in JPS’s Chronology section, which tracks events day by day.
Highlights of the Quarter: Obama’s 2d major Middle East policy speech, Netanyahu addresses a joint session of Congress, the 9/2011 Palestinian statehood bid at the UN approaches, the U.S. and Israel angle to revive open-ended peace talks, Dennis Ross back in charge, the Fatah- Hamas unity deal stalls, the 2012 U.S. presidential campaign begins, the Arab Spring hits Syria, Lebanon agrees on a Hizballah-majority government.
THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT economy and undermining quality of life. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) enforced a This quarter, almost all attention on 300-m no-go zone inside the full length of the Palestinian-Israeli track was focused the Gaza border and limited the Palestin- on whether the Palestinians would seek ian fishing zone off Gaza to 500–1,000 m UN recognition of a Palestinian state at the off Bayt Lahiya and Rafah and 3 naut. mi. UN in 9/2011; even implementation of last elsewhere—restrictions that placed 17% of quarter’s Fatah-Hamas reconciliation agree- Gaza’s total landmass, including vast agri- ment was derailed. As the quarter opened, cultural areas, off limits to Palestinians. In the Palestinian leadership was consider- the West Bank, Israeli restrictions and IDF ing the statehood option but had not yet military operations remained relatively low decided, while other players to varying but seemed increasingly geared toward degrees were urging resumption of peace preparing for a potential crisis in 9/2011 talks. As of 5/16/11, positions, proposals, surrounding the statehood bid at the UN. and policies were loose and amorphous As of 5/15, at least 7,813 Palestinians (in- across the board (Israeli, Palestinian, U.S., cluding 51 Israeli Arabs and 19 unidenti- and international). Slowly came a realiza- fied Arab cross-border infiltrators), 1,111 tion that no one saw a real prospect for Israelis (including 354 IDF soldiers and serious talks, and when the Palestinians de- security personnel, 226 settlers, and 531 cided to go ahead with the statehood plan civilians), and 66 foreign nationals (includ- as their best option, Israeli and interna- ing 2 British suicide bombers) had been tional positions quickly jelled into a drive killed since the start of the al-Aqsa intifada to create enough goodwill on the track to on 9/28/00. convince the Palestinians to delay their bid, some fearing the unknown (absence Prelude to Maneuvering and of a process and what a statehood bid Diplomacy might bring) and others opposing in princi- As the quarter opened, the absence ple a declaration of statehood. The popular of movement on the peace process since uprisings that continued across the region 9/2010, Israel’s refusal to halt settlement (the “Arab Spring”) did not have a direct expansion in the West Bank and East impact on the peace process, though all Jerusalem, and refusal by the Palestinian parties watched them closely. Authority (PA) in such circumstances to On the ground, Israel maintained its engage in further talks together made Pal- tight siege on Gaza, severely restricting its estinian pursuit of international diplomacy
Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. XLI, No. 1 (Autumn 2011), pp. 147–188, ISSN: 0377-919X; electronic ISSN: 1533-8614. © 2011 by the Institute for Palestine Studies. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: jps.2011.XLI.1.147.
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in anticipation of the upcoming UN Gen- It was against this background that, eral Assembly (UNGA) session in 9/2011 all as the quarter opened, U.S. pres. Barack but inevitable. The Palestinian diplomatic Obama was set to deliver (on 5/19) the drive, launched last quarter to test interna- second major Middle East policy speech of tional support for a PLO bid for UN recog- his presidency and Israeli PM Netanyahu nition of Palestinian statehood, was met by was to come to Washington (5/20–24) to an Israeli diplomatic counteroffensive urg- meet with Obama, address a joint session ing UN members to oppose the initiative of Congress, and speak before the an- (see Quarterly Update [QU] in JPS 160 for nual American-Israel Public Affairs Comm. background). While the PA diplomatic of- (AIPAC) conference, possibly unveiling his fensive had made some inroads in the in- own peace initiative during the visit. ternational community, concerns about the The quarter opened with Netanyahu’s possible fallout of a UN move led the Euro- speech to the Knesset (5/16), apparently pean states to look to the Quartet to lead intended to show positive Israeli move- the way back to talks by offering a new ment before his U.S. visit, which laid out peace initiative, but the U.S. had blocked his latest conditions for peace (see Doc. the effort (see QU in JPS 160). Israel and C1). Though these were fundamentally un- the U.S. were both more concerned with modified, he framed them as the terms un- reasserting their individual control over der which he would “accept a Palestinian the process: Israeli PM Benjamin Netan- state,” a willingness that he had not explic- yahu largely favored delaying any action itly expressed since his first such declara- until regional conditions were more favor- tion in 6/2009 (see Doc. C1 in JPS 153). able to Israel, while the U.S. admin. was While reaffirming that Israel would keep divided over whether to wait (as Israel Jerusalem and large West Bank settlements, desired) or to launch a dramatic new U.S. he suggested that he would give up the peace initiative (appeasing its allies in the rest of the West Bank for a demilitarized Quartet while maintaining U.S. leadership Palestinian state, but then reiterated the of the process). essential components of any peace deal: Meanwhile, international attention was Palestinian recognition of Israel’s right to focused primarily on the prodemocracy exist as the homeland of the Jewish peo- uprisings across the region known as the ple, resolution of the Palestinian refugee Arab Spring (see QU in JPS 160 and the problem exclusively within a Palestinian “Regional Affairs” section below). This state (i.e., giving up the right of return), movement had spurred increasingly popu- and maintenance of a long-term Israeli lar calls among Palestinians for national military presence in the Jordan Valley—all reconciliation to end the Fatah-Hamas/ points the Palestinians had rejected previ- West Bank-Gaza divide. In response to ously. He also repeated that Israel would these calls, and believing that a unified not deal with a Palestinian government national front would bolster the UN state- that included Hamas. hood initiative, Fatah and Hamas, after With regard to the PA statehood initia- years of foot-dragging, toward the end of tive, “dueling” Palestinian and Israeli op- last quarter had suddenly signed (5/4/11) eds appeared in the New York Times in a reconciliation agreement and were plan- mid-5/2011. PA pres. Mahmud Abbas’s ning their first meeting on implementation 5/16 op-ed definitively confirmed plans to to discuss quick formation of a transitional put a resolution to the UNGA in 9/2011 government of independent technocrats seeking international recognition of a Pal- that would oversee new elections, the re- estinian state on 1967 borders and admis- unification of West Bank and Gaza institu- sion of Palestine as a full member of the tions, and the rebuilding of Gaza (see more UN (see Doc. B). Two days later (5/18), under “National Reconciliation” below). Israel’s dep. Knesset speaker Danny Danon The move had surprised and concerned Is- (Likud) warned of grave consequences of rael and the U.S.; while Israel warned that such a move, including the immediate sus- it would not cooperate with a Palestinian pension of all diplomatic and security coor- government that included Hamas, the U.S. dination with the PA and the “permanent” formally adopted a wait-and-see position halt of transfers of VAT taxes collected while cautioning that it would support on the PA’s behalf (which cover 80% of only unity efforts that “promoted peace” the PA’s recurrent expenses). Cautioning (see QU in JPS 160 for details). that “this alone could threaten the very
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existence of the Palestinian Authority,” he of permanent borders, division of Jerusa- added that Israel might “rectify the mis- lem, and compromise on whether Palestin- take we made in 1967 by failing to annex ian refugees would have the right to return all of the West Bank” (see Doc C2). Mean- to Israel. The other camp, led by Obama’s while, Abbas met (5/18) in Ramallah with chief Middle East adviser Dennis Ross and U.S. Dep. Secy. of State James Steinberg supported by his long-time colleagues and Asst. Secy. of State for Near East Affairs National Security Adviser (NSA) Thomas Jeffrey Feltman to brief them on the Fatah- Donilon and VP Joe Biden, argued against Hamas unity deal and to stress that peace mentioning the peace process at all, saying talks could not resume without both a set- that Israel should be given more time to as- tlement freeze and defined “principles to sess regional changes before being pressed guide negotiations.” to resume negotiations. On the international front, moves aimed In fact, Obama’s 5/19 speech (see Doc. at generating a dialogue that could lead D1) did address at some length the Israeli- to a resumption of peace talks and in turn Palestinian conflict and peace process. Its defuse a 9/2011 conflict were underway. primary purpose, however, was to provide On 5/16–18, French FM Alain Juppé met a broad, relatively general reassessment of with senior Israeli and Palestinian officials U.S. Middle East policy priorities in light in the region to invite Abbas and Netan- of still evolving regionwide changes, with yahu to meet in Paris in 6/2011 to discuss emphasis on the need to strike a better resuming peace talks. (Neither side replied balance between maintaining regional sta- formally before Netanyahu’s Washington bility and preserving the people’s right visit.) UN Secy.-Gen Ban Ki-Moon phoned to self-determination, suggesting that pre- (ca. 5/18) Netanyahu and Abbas, urging serving stability should not be an excuse Netanyahu to be more flexible with the for tolerating oppression (see “Obama’s Palestinians and offer “incentives” to re- 5/19 Speech as Policy Reassessment” in vive peace talks (including lifting the siege the United States section below). With re- of Gaza), and Abbas to return to the table gard to the peace process, he began by “without preconditions” (i.e., demands reprimanding Israel for continued settle- to halt settlement construction). He also ment construction and the Palestinians for pressed Abbas to get Hamas to recognize “walking away from negotiations,” adding Israel and renounce violence, but said that pointedly that “symbolic actions at the UN even without this the international com- in September will not create a Palestin- munity should give the Palestinian unity ian state” and that Palestinians “will never deal a chance to work. UN Special Coor- achieve their independence by denying dinator for the Middle East Peace Process Israel the right to exist.” Robert Serry had the same message for the While reiterating the U.S. goal of 2 UN Security Council (UNSC) in his briefing states for 2 peoples, Obama for the first (5/19) on the situation in the Middle East, time defined this as “Israel as a Jewish state advising that the Fatah-Hamas unity deal and the homeland for the Jewish people, “should not be undermined in its infancy.” and a State of Palestine as the homeland He also stated that regional unrest gener- for the Palestinian people.” For several ated by the Arab Spring had made it more years, but especially since Netanyahu re- important to put forward a credible initia- turned to office, Israel had been demand- tive to revive the peace process before the ing that wording, which the Palestinians 9/2011 UNGA session. had strongly opposed, and Obama’s en- dorsement was seen as a major blow to Obama’s 5/19 Speech and the the Palestinian position and an impor- Peace Process tant boost for Israel. Obama also defined As late as 5/18, Obama had not de- the 2-state solution as a scenario that in- cided whether he would even mention the cludes “a viable Palestine and a secure Israeli-Palestinian issue in his 5/19 Middle Israel,” borders “based on the 1967 lines East policy speech at the State Dept. Ac- with mutually agreed swaps,” an Israel cording to insiders (e.g., Washington Post that is “able to defend itself by itself from [WP] 5/19), one camp, led by Secy. of any threat,” and “agreed” resolutions to State Hillary Clinton, urged him to lay out the hardest issues of Jerusalem and refu- specific principles to serve as basis for a gees. While Obama’s statement on borders peace agreement, including a declaration was extremely similar to, and intended to
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convey the same message as, Pres. George and that Bush’s 4/2004 position be reit- W. Bush’s 4/2004 statement that 1967 erated. Meanwhile, apparently timed to borders are unworkable and mutual land coincide with Obama’s speech, Israel’s swaps must be agreed (see QU in JPS 132), Jerusalem planning commission gave initial Obama’s phrasing outraged Netanyahu approved construction of 1,600 new settle- and many right-wing Israelis, who accused ment housing units in East Jerusalem’s Har Obama of endorsing the Palestinian nar- Homa/Jabal Abu Ghunaym and Pisgat Ze’ev rative by accepting the basic legitimacy settlements. of the 1967 lines, whereas Bush’s state- The only support for Obama’s vision of ment was viewed as fundamentally reject- the Israeli-Palestinian peace was expressed ing the 1967 lines (for detailed analyses of (5/20) by the U.S.’s Quartet partners (the how the statements differ, see Jewish Tele- EU, Russia, and the UN). The EU, in par- graphic Agency [JTA] and NYT 5/23). ticular, hoped that this could somehow Obama urged the sides to resume ne- become the basis of a new international gotiations immediately with an initial fo- peace initiative. cus on territory and security only, though stressing that all core issues must be dis- The Obama-Netanyahu Meeting cussed eventually; any agreement must Obama met with Netanyahu at the constitute an end of claims (Israel’s de- White House on 5/20, the day after the mand) and include final, recognized bor- speech. The meeting, described as difficult ders (a Palestinian demand). The “duration but productive, was scheduled to last less of the transition” to final status, however, than 1 hour but went on for more than “must be agreed” (raising Palestinian con- 2. After a brief meeting with advisers, the cerns that Israel could drag out implemen- leaders met for most of the time alone, tation indefinitely). Though calling for scrapping to that end a planned working talks to resume immediately, Obama also lunch with their teams. Afterward, Obama stated that negotiations could not move stressed as a point of agreement that Is- forward if a Palestinian government in- rael’s security as “a Jewish state” was the cluded Hamas, unless Hamas endorsed the “ultimate goal” of any peace agreement. Quartet principles (recognizing Israel’s Netanyahu, declaring that Obama was right to exist, accepting all previous peace “unrealistic” about peace, emphasized that agreements, and denouncing all forms of Israel would never return to 1967 borders violence, including incitement). and would never allow Palestinian refugees Palestinians were deeply angered by to return to Israeli soil: “Everybody knows Obama’s emphasizing the importance of it’s not going to happen. And I think it’s self-determination over oppression in the time to tell the Palestinians forthrightly, it’s regional context (Arab Spring) while re- not going to happen.” The PA denounced jecting that principle in the Palestinian (5/20) Netanyahu’s statements as “an of- case: opposing the Palestinian statehood ficial rejection of Mr. Obama’s initiative, bid at the UN and demanding restric- of international legitimacy, and of interna- tions on Hamas’s participation in a na- tional law.” tional unity government. Immediately after At this stage, the overwhelming per- Obama’s address, Abbas ordered (5/19) an ception generated by the Israeli and U.S. emergency session of the Palestinian lead- media was that a new Obama-Netanyahu ership to be convened within 48 hours to rift had opened because Obama had laid discuss ramifications of the speech. (This out a “new U.S. policy detrimental to Is- was later delayed until 5/25 in anticipation rael” by suggesting 1967 borders as basis of Netanyahu’s address to Congress; see of peace talks. Long-term observers noted below). (see WP 5/23), however, that 1967 lines Meanwhile, Netanyahu publicly de- had long been considered the baseline for nounced (5/19) Obama’s reference to any future agreement, with Israeli analysts 1967 lines as jeopardizing Israeli security saying Netanyahu seized on Obama’s state- and putting Jewish settlers at risk. He also ment “with domestic politics in mind” and revealed that he had been informed in with the purpose of “consolidating his advance of Obama’s plans to refer to the position as leader of the Right in Israel.” 1967 lines and that in an angry exchange In an Israeli radio interview on 5/22, Dov with Secy. Clinton just before the speech Weisglass, a chief Israeli negotiator under had urged that the reference be dropped PM Ariel Sharon, said that “anyone here
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deluding himself . . . that the drawing of was not in reaction to Israel but to domes- the new map will be based on any refer- tic oppression by Arab regimes, highlight- ence point other than the 1967 boundaries ing Israel as a democracy and bastion of is simply disconnected from reality.” Still, freedom and equality. the intensely negative mood prompted On 5/23, Obama left for a 6-day Euro- Obama to scrap (5/21) tentative plans to pean tour, ensuring that he would not be make a Middle East trip in late 6/2011 that present for Netanyahu’s address before likely would have included a visit to Is- Congress. Administration officials said rael. The White House quickly organized Obama would tell his European counter- a conference call between senior admin. parts that the Palestinians statehood initia- officials and Jewish leaders and made other tive was a “mistake” that would “not serve outreaches to the Jewish community to al- the interests of the Palestinian people and lay concerns about Obama’s positions on will not achieve their stated goal of achiev- Israel and the peace process and to seek ing a Palestinian state.” “advice on repairing ties.” Netanyahu Addresses Congress The AIPAC Speeches Netanyahu had aggressively sought Obama’s first address to AIPAC as presi- the invitation to address Congress several dent (5/22) generally reiterated the posi- times in 3/2011 and 4/2011, and his prefer- tions laid out in his 5/19 speech but was ence for this venue over the Knesset for a tailored to the pro-Israel American voters, major speech on the peace process was in- lobbyists, and U.S. lawmakers attending terpreted by analysts as an indication that the conference. With regard to the 1967 its purpose was primarily as a public rela- lines as the starting point for discussing tions exercise aimed at winning members final borders, he clarified that, given the of Congress over to his positions rather need for land swaps, the resulting bor- than announcing new policy directions der would certainly be “different than the (see QU in JPS 160 for background). This one that existed on June 4, 1967,” and indeed proved to be the case: Netanyahu’s noted (without referring to Netanyahu di- 5/24 address to a joint session of U.S. Con- rectly) that any controversy over his 5/19 gress (see Doc. C3) largely echoed his 5/16 speech was “not based on substance.” Knesset speech, but with more emotion- While pledging U.S. “ironclad” support ally charged language. He offered to “give for Israel and acknowledging Israel’s secu- up parts of the Jewish ancestral home- rity concerns in light of the Arab Spring, land” (undefined) for creation of a Palestin- he insisted that Israel should make “hard ians state if the Palestinians would simply choices” for peace now rather that delay, “accep[t] a Jewish state alongside it.” Pal- warning that Israel’s failure to take serious estinian unwillingness to accept the exis- steps to advance peace undermined U.S. tence of a Jewish state was the crux of the efforts on its behalf. He also called once problem, though throughout the course again for the creation of 2 states as sepa- of the address demands for Palestinian ac- rate homelands for Jews and Palestinians, ceptance of modifications to the “indefen- denounced the Palestinian statehood ini- sible” 1967 borders, Jerusalem as Israel’s tiative at the UN, and criticized the Fatah- undivided capital, and a long-term Israeli Hamas unity agreement, saying that Israel military presence along the Jordan River could not be “expected to negotiate with a were also noted. Further specified was the terrorist organization sworn to its destruc- requirement that Abbas abandon Fatah’s tion” (ignoring statements by Fatah and unity deal with Hamas. Hamas that the PLO would remain solely in Observers described (e.g., NYT, WP control of peace talks; see QU in JPS 160). 5/21) Netanyahu as receiving a “raptur- Netanyahu’s speech on 5/23, which ous welcome” from the “hugely friendly explicitly left discussion of the peace pro- crowd” of U.S. lawmakers. Members of cess for the address to Congress on 5/24, Congress gave Netanyahu 59 rounds of focused on the U.S.-Israeli relationship— applause, including 28 “thunderous ova- areas of cooperation, shared ideals, and tions,” during the 50-minute speech—so especially the importance of a secure many standing ovations that one observer Israel—and emphasized Israelis’ gratitude said (NYT 5/25) that “at times it appeared to the U.S. for its assistance in strengthen- that the lawmakers were listening to his ing Israel. He stressed that the Arab Spring speech standing up.” Senators on both
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sides of the aisle warmly praised the Israeli FMin. ordered all diplomats to can- speech: Senate Foreign Relations Comm. cel vacations planned through 9/2011 and Chairman John Kerry (D-MA) said that issued a classified cable (excerpts leaked Netanyahu’s “very powerful” speech had by Ha’Aretz 6/9) instructing its embassies “opened . . . potential avenues if the Pal- to convey to host governments that en- estinians want to take them up”; Senate dorsement of Palestinian statehood would minority leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) “delegitimize Israel and foil any chance for found “almost nothing in it with which I future peace talks.” To reinforce the mes- disagree.” In Israel, however, the YESHA sage, diplomats were urged to mobilize settlers council declared Netanyahu’s “the relevant force multipliers [i.e., local terms for peace “unacceptable” for appar- Jewish communities and nongovernmen- ently considering giving up some settle- tal organizations (NGOs)], using the me- ments and for limiting Israel to a military dia, influencing local public opinion, and presence along the Jordan River, as op- public diplomacy aimed at all the relevant posed to annexing the Jordan Valley. The communities.” PA, meanwhile, called the address a “decla- At this point, all signs indicated that ration of war.” without external intervention, the Israelis After the joint session, Netanyahu held and Palestinians were headed for a diplo- (5/24) an off-the-record meeting with matic clash when the UNGA convened in Jewish members of Congress in what was 9/2011. France and the EU began efforts referred to by insiders (JTA 5/26) as a to craft an alternative way forward based “mishpacha meeting” (i.e., a meeting of on Obama’s 5/19 policy speech (to ensure the Jewish “family network”). The follow- U.S. backing), hoping that reviving serious ing day (5/25), in effort to stress Israel’s peace talks would encourage the Palestin- intention to maintain a unified Jerusalem, ians to drop or delay the statehood initia- several high-ranking Israeli officials (includ- tive. The U.S. and Israel, initially reluctant, ing the speaker of the Knesset) attended quickly saw viability in linking resumption the opening of an apartment complex in of talks to suspending the UN bid. The two East Jerusalem’s Ras al-Amud neighbor- approaches (French/EU and U.S./Israeli) hood, declaring the site as Israel’s newest evolved simultaneously between early Jewish settlement, Ma’ale HaZeitim. 6/2011 and mid-7/2011.
Facing a Crisis in 9/2011 Revival of the French Initiative With the Washington events concluded, On 6/2, French FM Juppé returned to Abbas convened (5/25) the PLO and Fatah Israel and Ramallah to reiterate France’s leaderships in Ramallah to discuss how to offer the previous month to host a con- proceed given that Obama and Netanyahu ference on relaunching peace talks. This had offered “nothing that we can build time, however, he said that France would on” and that the U.S. had hardened its po- call on the sides to resume talks with 2 sitions both on Hamas participation in a conditions: (1) the starting point would unity government and on Palestinian state- be Obama’s vision of 2 states based on hood efforts. The leadership decided to 1967 borders with agreed land swaps, and move ahead with the statehood initiative (2) the 2 sides would pledge to refrain despite awareness that it could result in a from creating facts on the ground while suspension of PA funding and a rift with talks were ongoing (i.e., the Palestinians Washington. Fatah’s Nabil Shaath traveled would suspend their statehood initiative, (5/26–29) to Gaza to brief Hamas leaders, and Israel would suspend all settlement smaller Palestinian factions, and others on construction). On 6/4, Abbas accepted the decision and to discuss implementation the invitation to discuss the proposal. On of the national unity agreement in light 6/5, Netanyahu told his cabinet that he of recent events (see more in “Palestinian was weighing the invitation, but since Is- Reconciliation” below). At the same time, rael would not deal with a Palestinian gov- Abbas met (5/28) with Arab League FMs ernment that included Hamas, his reply in Qatar to urge them to endorse and help depended on the composition of the tran- support the Palestinian plan and to fill po- sitional Palestinian unity government, still tential funding gaps. under debate (see “Palestinian Reconcili- Israel also ramped up its diplomatic ation” below). He also stated that Hamas counteroffensive. In early 6/2011, the must prove a change in attitude toward
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Israel by immediately releasing IDF sol- a viable alternative, emphasizing that he dier Gilad Shalit, adding that if Abbas had could “not enter negotiations blindly, with- “such a good connections with Hamas,” he out guarantees or a freeze on settlements.” should be able to secure the release. On Netanyahu, meanwhile, said (6/22) that he 6/6, U.S. Secy. of State Clinton met sepa- would agree to resume negotiations with rately in Washington with Israeli and Pal- the Palestinians based on 1967 lines with estinian negotiators and Juppé to discuss agreed land swaps, as Obama suggested, the French proposal, afterward stating the provided Abbas first recognized Israel as belief that it would “take a lot of persua- a Jewish state and agreed that no refugees sion and preliminary work in order to set would be allowed to return to Israel. Later, up a productive meeting between the par- apparently floating a trial balloon, a senior ties” on lines France envisioned. Juppé Palestinian official speaking anonymously said (6/6) that he was “rather pleasantly told the Associated Press (6/23) the Pales- surprised because the Palestinians have re- tinians could be willing to ease demands acted positively, the Israelis did not say no, for a full settlement construction freeze and the secretary of state said ‘let’s wait to resume peace talks if Israel accepted and see.’” up front that 1967 lines with agreed land swaps would be the basis of talks; Israel U.S. Envoys Re-Engage did not respond. Meanwhile, the EU was lobbying hard behind the scenes to convene the Quartet. The U.S. and Israel Draft a Quartet The U.S. initially argued against a Quartet Statement initiative on the grounds that conditions A week later (on 6/28), the EU an- for success were absent, but ultimately nounced that the Quartet would hold a agreed under EU pressure to a Quartet ses- senior-level meeting in Washington on 7/11 sion, but pushed off the date as far as pos- aimed at presenting a new international sible. In the interim, it dispatched Obama’s peace plan based on Obama’s 5/19 speech senior Middle East adviser Ross and acting as a final bid to jumpstart peace talks and U.S. special envoy to the peace process Da- prevent the Palestinians from seeking rec- vid Hale to the region twice (on 6/16 and ognition of statehood at the UN. The State 6/22) to meet with Abbas and Netanyahu Dept. tried to keep expectations low, how- in what anonymous American sources ever, calling the meeting a chance for the called (e.g., NYT 6/17) an effort “to find members to “compare notes about where a formula for talks that would entice the we are and plot a course forward.” Palestinians to drop their bid for unilateral At the 7/11 session, the U.S. presented recognition of a Palestinian state” and yet a draft Quartet statement drawn up in be acceptable to Israel; no details were re- close consultation with Israel (apparently leased. The Ross-Hale visits were the first largely during the Ross-Hale visits) that peace process–related visits by U.S. diplo- attempted to include all the highlights of mats to the region since George Mitchell Obama’s 5/19 speech modified in keeping resigned as U.S. special envoy in 4/2011 with his 5/22 AIPAC speech, with the basic (effective in 5/2011; see QU in JPS 160). message that the Palestinians had no alter- For Ross (considered strongly pro-Israel), native but to resume negotiations and drop they also marked his de facto assumption the UN initiative. (Israeli insider David of the lead on peace process diplomacy Levy, writing for Foreign Policy online on within the Obama admin., a position he 7/22, said the draft “looked rather like an had held under former pres. Bill Clinton exercise in cherry picking Obama’s recent and had actively sought to resume under speeches by the Israeli Prime Minister’s Obama (see QU in JPS 158). office . . . [and] it is reasonable to specu- The Ross-Hale prodding elicited cre- late that that is precisely what happened,” ative nonresponses from the parties, who adding that “the text was quite clearly pre- wanted to appear eager to achieve peace cooked with the Israeli leadership.” He re- without actually modifying their stands. produced extensive excerpts of the draft, Abbas stated publicly (6/19, 6/21) that though the full text was never released.) the PLO would consider suspending its The U.S. argued that since the Quartet had statehood initiative if Israel, the U.S., and endorsed Obama’s 5/19 speech, it should Europe were able to revive serious nego- therefore endorse the U.S. draft statement tiations or present the Palestinians with based on that speech. The other Quartet
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partners, however, felt that they could not West Bank and East Jerusalem in “an effort endorse it since the additions from the to find a formula that would bypass the 5/22 speech contradicted their policy. In dispute over establishing the June 4, 1967 particular, they objected to wording stat- border as a basis for negotiations toward a ing: (1) that “the parties themselves will final settlement.” Though the PA strongly negotiate a border between Israel and Pal- denied (7/29) that any contacts had taken estine that is different than the one that place, rumors persisted. Days later, al- existed on June 4, 1967, to take account of Jazeera (8/1) and the Jewish Telegraphic changes that have taken place over the last Agency (8/2) reported that Abbas had been 44 years, including the new demographic en route to Amman to meet with Peres on realities on the ground and the needs of 8/1 to discuss a new Israeli proposal when both sides” (opposed as possibly prejudg- Peres canceled, saying he did not have any- ing the final status of Jerusalem); (2) that thing new to offer. The reports hinted that Israel should be defined as “a Jewish state Netanyahu had stopped the talks, possibly and the homeland of the Jewish people” because they had been made public. On (opposed as possibly precluding the right 8/13, an anonymous senior Fatah official of return); (3) that “no country can be ex- told Agence France-Presse that Abbas and pected to negotiate with a terrorist organi- Peres had recently held 4 secret meetings zation sworn to its destruction” (opposed in Amman and London in effort to revive as undermining Palestinian unity efforts); peace talks. and (4) that the parties should immedi- At the same time, the U.S. and Israel ately “return to direct negotiations, begin- were apparently in deep discussions on ning with preparatory work to maximize how to draw the Palestinians back to the their chances of success” (the reference table, with an anonymous U.S. source to “preparatory work,” coming after Secy. (Washington Times [WT] 8/3) describ- Clinton used the same phrase in discussing ing the U.S. and Israel as “desperate . . . to the French proposal, raised concerns that avert a diplomatic showdown at the UN.” Israel and the U.S. sought to extend the Netanyahu told (8/1) a Knesset comm. interim phase indefinitely). UN Secy.-Gen. that his government was working with the Ban particularly opposed wording stat- U.S. to draft a document laying out a new ing, “[N]or can the two-state solution be “framework” for restarting peace talks us- achieved through action in the United Na- ing language from Obama’s 5/22 AIPAC tions,” which could be used to deny exist- speech. Other U.S. sources described (WT ing UN resolutions as a basis of peace talks. 8/3) the talks as aimed at crafting a “pack- Ultimately, the Quartet members were un- age” or “framework agreement” that would able to agree even on a basic statement on persuade the Palestinians to resume talks how to proceed, though Russian FM Sergei and drop the UN initiative. At the same Lavrov stressed later that the stalemate did time, an anonymous senior Israeli official not imply that the Quartet would abandon said (8/1) that Israel could accept a for- its efforts to achieve peace. mula for restarting talks based on 1967 lines with agreed swaps, stating: “While Intensive Behind-the-Scenes Efforts we would have difficulty endorsing that There was no further mention of the language, we wouldn’t reject it” provided French initiative or a Quartet statement that the package include Palestinian rec- through the end of the quarter, although ognition of Israel’s right to exist as a Jew- there were signs that significant diplomatic ish state. Meanwhile, Netanyahu appeared discussions (not necessarily coordinated) (7/21) on al-Arabiya TV to appeal directly were still underway. to the Palestinian public to return to peace On 7/27, the Israeli daily Ha’Aretz talks, stating that he was willing to negoti- broke the story that Israeli pres. Shimon ate with anyone who recognized Israel’s Peres, in consultation with Netanyahu, had right to exist as a Jewish state. Together been holding intensive secret talks with the statements seemed to suggest that Is- Palestinian officials in effort to resume rael and the U.S. believed that a formula negotiations and head off the Palestinian wherein each side would meet 1 precon- statehood bid. The latest meeting, accord- dition of the other (providing ostensible ing to Ha’Aretz, had been held on 7/26 balance and showing goodwill) could con- between Peres and Palestinian chief nego- stitute a basis for reconvening talks: the tiator Saeb Erakat to look at maps of the Palestinians would recognize Israel’s right
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to exist as a Jewish state, and Israel would abroad in Madrid (early 7/2011) and Tur- affirm that talks would be based on 1967 key (7/22–23) to strategize on how best to borders with land swaps (also appeasing lobby foreign states. The Arab League FMs the U.S.). re-endorsed (7/14) the Palestinian plan The U.S.-Israeli talks seemed unlikely and met (8/3–4) with Palestinian officials to succeed for several reasons: (1) Pales- to help draft the formal statehood request tinian exclusion, basically a replay of the to be presented to the UNGA in 9/2011; 2010 Obama-Netanyahu negotiations over no details were released. Netanyahu sent a settlement freeze incentives package to (8/14) a letter to 40 heads of state, urging revive talks, which failed because, absent them to oppose the Palestinian bid and Palestinian input, the steps on which the explaining that “by turning to the UN, the U.S. and Israel agreed were completely Palestinians are trying to avoid negotiations out of sync with the Palestinians’ basic that are based on mutual compromises. demands (see QU in JPS 158); (2) lack of This violates the existing agreements be- equivalency between agreement to rec- tween Israel and the Palestinian Authority ognize Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish and casts in doubt the existence of direct state and agreement that the 1967 lines be negotiations—which are the only way to a starting point for negotiations; and (3) resolve this conflict.” repeated mention of a “framework agree- Israel also warned of dire consequences ment,” which sparked memories of the if the statehood initiative proceeded. Anon- 9/2010 U.S.-Israeli proposed framework ymous Israeli officials stated (7/22) that the agreement whose stated aim was to cre- government, in such an event, was con- ate a new interim period extending final sidering declaring the Oslo accords void. status talks for another 10 years (see QU Israeli FM Avigdor Lieberman stated (8/7) in JPS 158). (For an analysis of a possible that Israeli intelligence agencies had evi- U.S. scenario for engaging the Palestinians dence that the PA was planning “unprece- in a partial or open-ended peace effort ex- dented bloodshed” after the UN session in tending through the 2012 U.S. presidential 9/2011 and was going to send 10,000s of elections, see Jordan’s Marwan Muasher protesters to storm Israeli checkpoints; his in Carnegie Endowment for International spokesman affirmed that “the Palestinians Peace online 7/29.) are getting ready for bloodshed on a scale After the U.S.-Israeli discussions be- we haven’t seen before. . . . The more they came public, the U.S. took steps to involve speak about nonviolent action, the more the Palestinians, dispatching Hale to meet they are preparing for bloodshed.” The (8/2) with Erakat (no details released) and PA, for its part, insisted that its intention inviting (8/4) Abbas and Erakat to Wash- in 9/2011 was to “request the international ington for talks. The PA accepted (8/4) community’s help—legally and according the invitation, but no date was set and to law.” At the same time, an internal Knes- the meeting apparently did not take place set report based on intelligence reports before the end of the quarter. On 8/10, that was released in early 8/2011 con- Obama spoke by phone with Netanyahu, cluded the likelihood of violence was low but no details were released. “because the Palestinians believe it would be counterproductive to their cause.” Scenarios for Seeking Recognition As 9/2011 neared, it became evident at the UN that there was some confusion over what Parallel with these high-level diplo- precisely the UN process was for recog- matic efforts to revive negotiations, the nizing a new state and what recognition Palestinians and Israelis continued to pre- would mean. UNGA pres. Joseph Deiss pare as if the statehood bid would go for- affirmed (5/29) that according to the UN ward in 9/2011. During 6/2011 and early bylaws, the UNGA could not table a mo- 7/2011, senior Palestinian and Israeli of- tion to grant Palestine member-state sta- ficials toured Eastern European and Latin tus without a recommendation from the American states, which were considered UNSC. After the U.S. stated explicitly likely swing voters on the statehood issue (7/26) that it would veto any such resolu- at the UNGA. The Palestinian leadership tion, many questioned whether statehood reaffirmed (6/26) its intention to go to the could truly be denied if a single permanent UN following the Ross-Hale Ramallah visits member of the UNSC vetoed a petition de- and convened Palestinian representatives spite the overwhelming support of UNGA
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members. (By the close of the quarter, at Palestinian cause. (For information on the least 112 of the UNGA 193 member states small weekly nonviolent protests in the had recognized a Palestinian state, with as territories, see “Nonviolent Protests in the many as 118 poised to endorse a statehood Territories” below.) Though some of them petition in 9/2011.) generated considerable media attention, Many experts believed that if the U.S. most did not succeed for various reasons, vetoed a Palestinian request in the UNSC, including the intervention of host govern- the Palestinians could successfully lobby ments and an apparent wariness on the the UNGA to invoke UNGA Res. 377 of part of Palestinians to take part in protests 1950 (“Uniting for Peace”) which allows sponsored by factions. the UNGA to override the UNSC with a two-thirds majority vote of the 193 UNGA Naksa Day Rallies members (129 votes) if it determines both By late 5/2011, Palestinian activists or- (1) that the UNSC has failed “to exercise its ganizing on Facebook and eager to repeat primary responsibility for the maintenance the success of the Nakba Day “March to of international peace and security in any Palestine” were calling for massive demon- case where there appears to be a threat to strations on 6/5 in Jordan, Lebanon, and the peace, breach of the peace, or act of Syria to mark Naksa Day (the anniversary aggression” and (2) that UNGA action is of the “setback” of the 1967 war). In the necessary “to maintain or restore interna- territories, activists planned parallel dem- tional peace and security.” Though success onstrations in the West Bank and Gaza. In of this maneuver was not guaranteed, the the run-up to 6/5, the IDF reinforced its Palestinian leadership certainly saw this as northern borders by digging new trenches, a viable recourse. erecting fences, and laying minefields in But the possibility that a “Uniting for expectation that there could be violent Peace” appeal might fail was disquiet- protests along its borders; preparations ing. By mid-7/2011 some senior Palestin- were also made to defend West Bank set- ian officials were questioning privately tlements. The IDF cautioned (5/29) that whether the statehood initiative was wise while it would ignore nonviolent dem- and whether it should be reconsidered or onstrations outside its borders and settle- postponed. (PLO Central Council mem- ments, it would take military action if ber and former PC member Nabil Amr was protesters attempted to cross into Israel or the first to speak out publicly against the enter settlements. plan on 7/19.) On 7/12, PLO amb. to the Shortly before Naksa Day, Fatah and U.S. Maen Areikat confirmed that a third Hamas declared (ca. 6/3) 6/5 a “day of option was being considered: seeking popular rage” against the Israeli occupa- an upgrade of Palestine’s UN status from tion and in support of the statehood drive “permanent observer” to “observer state,” in what many saw as an effort to co-opt which would put Palestine on the same the activists’ plans. In Lebanon, Fatah of- footing as the Vatican, with all the rights of ficials in ‘Ayn al-Hilwa refugee camp (r.c.) a state (including the right to petition the announced (5/31) they would rally more International Criminal Court) but without than 50,000 refugees to 2 demonstra- the ability to vote. Opting for this status tions in Marun al-Ras and Naqura near the seemed to be gaining favor at the close of Israeli border. However, the Lebanese the quarter but was still largely seen as a army immediately (5/31) vowed to pre- fall-back option, if other UNSC and UNGA vent anyone from reaching the border efforts failed. (For a deeper discussion of and the government declared (6/2) the these and other hybrid options the Pales- s. Lebanon border area a closed military tinians could pursue, see Camille Mansour, zone. Under intense pressure from the “Palestinian Options at the United Nations” Lebanese government, Fatah officials and on the JPS website.) Ca. 8/11, UN Secy.- Palestinian activists in Lebanon rescinded Gen. Ban told Abbas that the UN was ready (6/3) plans to take part in the Naksa Day to receive a membership request “any time marches, saying they would instead hold from now until 9/20.” commemorative rallies inside the camps. In Syria, Palestinian factions worked with Nonviolent Protest Actions Syrian authorities to organize (as of 6/3) This quarter, several major nonviolent 100s of buses to take demonstrators to actions were called in support of the the border.
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Ultimately, the 6/5 Naksa Day demon- participating in the flotilla could be strations were much smaller than those charged with providing material support marking Nakba Day on 5/13–15, with no to terrorists (which can carry fines and a protests reported in Egypt, Jordan, or Leba- life sentence), while Secy. of State Clinton non. Serious clashes took place on the Syr- separately cautioned (6/24) that “by enter- ian border, however, where IDF troops ing into Israeli waters” the flotilla would opened fire on 100s of unarmed Palestin- “creat[e] a situation in which the Israelis ian refugees and supporters who tried to have the right to defend themselves.” cross a trench and an earthen berm 150 m Flotilla activists soon ran into other ob- on the approach to the border fence across stacles. On 6/17, IHH withdrew its partici- from the town of Majdal Shams inside the pation, saying that Israel’s damage to the occupied Golan Heights. Syrian authori- Mavi Marmara (which Israel had returned ties reported 22 killed and more than 350 to Turkey in 12/2010) was too extensive wounded, which would mark the worst vi- to allow the ship to sail again. Soon after, olence on the Syrian border since the 1973 it was revealed (6/20) that Turkish-Israeli war; Israel said the numbers were exagger- talks were currently underway to repair ated. Additional protests were held inside strains caused by the first flotilla incident Syria near the border at Qunaytra; there, (see “Turkey” below). Israel also quietly the IDF fired tear gas and stun grenades pressed Cyprus and Greece to prevent flo- when protesters began to march toward tilla ships from using their ports as depar- the border, but no injuries were reported ture points for Gaza. In mid-6/2011, Israeli (see more in the Syria section below). In and Greek officials met in Athens for talks the West Bank, the IDF clashed with up on bilateral relations, during which ana- to 200 stone-throwing Palestinian protest- lysts suspected (e.g., The Nation 6/24) ers at the Qalandia crossing (using tear that Israel threatened to cut back trade re- gas and stun grenades to disperse them) lations with Greece (already facing a major and blocked Palestinian marchers from economic crisis) if it allowed flotilla boats approaching Elon Moreh settlement near to sail. Ca. 6/23, Greece formally banned Nablus. In Gaza, Hamas-affiliated police sea departures for Gaza. blocked 10s (possibly 100s) of demonstra- Meanwhile, Israel threatened (6/26) to tors from approaching the Erez crossing to ban entry for 10 years to any foreign jour- Israel. nalist who rode along with the flotilla, though it quickly backed down (6/27) The Freedom Flotilla II amid international protests. At the same On 5/30, the 1st anniversary of Israel’s time, the Israeli press widely reported 2010 attack on the aid flotilla to Gaza that anonymous Israeli military officials citing killed 9 Turkish activists aboard the Mavi intelligence reports of activists loading Marmara (see QU in JPS 157), the flotilla’s sacks of chemicals onto flotilla ships and organizers, the U.S.-based Free Gaza Move- vowing to “shed the blood” of Israeli sol- ment and the Turkish charity Humanitarian diers. (One such story in the Israeli daily Relief Foundation (known by its Turkish Ma’ariv on 6/28 appeared under the head- acronym IHH), announced that at least line “Coming to Kill.”) The Israeli Govern- 1,000 activists and 10 boats were prepar- ment Press Office (IGPO) widely circulated ing to set sail from undisclosed ports in a video purporting to show flotilla orga- late 6/2011 as part of the “Freedom Flotilla nizers praising Hamas and barring partici- II” to again challenge the Gaza siege. Each pation of a gay rights activist, calling gays boat would carry nationals from a differ- “a minority of perverts”; this was quickly ent country, with boats so far representing revealed (WP 6/28) as a fake made by an Canada, France, Ireland, Spain, Switzer- Israeli actor and put online by an intern in land, Turkey, and the U.S. (The U.S. group PM Netanyahu’s office. named its boat The Audacity of Hope, af- In parallel, the Israeli advocacy group ter Obama’s memoir.) Israel denounced Shurat HaDin—Israel Law Center warned (6/1) the flotilla action as a political state- (ca. mid-6/2011) at least 30 major maritime ment to support a “terror organization” insurance companies that insuring flotilla (i.e., Hamas) and warned (6/16) that it boats could result in charges of abetting would use force if necessary to stop the terrorism. Just before the boats were to set flotilla from reaching Gaza. Soon after, the sail (ca. 6/28), the group falsely told Greek State Dept. warned (6/24) that Americans authorities that flotilla boats docked there
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were without maritime insurance, leading lists) to fly to Ben-Gurion Airport between 2 boats to be detained until the matter was the given dates and tell immigration offi- clarified. Meanwhile, 2 boats docked in cials that the purpose of their trip was to Greece (ca. 6/28) and Turkey (6/30) were “visit Palestine”; the hope was that Israel sabotaged (their propeller shafts severed). would deport them en masse, generating Flotilla organizers reiterated (e.g., 6/27) an international media spectacle. As of 7/1, their nonviolent intentions, saying “all our Israel, concerned that as many as 700 pro- passengers sign a declaration of nonvio- Palestinian activists from around the world lence. We are training for nonviolence.” might participate in the event, had circu- American activists sent (6/28) a letter to lated updated no-fly lists (compiled by Is- Pres. Obama, pledging there would be “no raeli intelligence searching Facebook and weapons of any sort on board,” nor would other social networking sites) to European they deliver anything to Gaza, stressing airlines, along with a letter warning that theirs was a nonviolent mission to show “pro-Palestinian radicals” planned to use solidarity with Gazans. Organizers showed commercial flights “to disrupt order and proof that their boats held insurance and confront security forces at friction points.” blamed Israel for sabotaging their vessels By 7/11, at least 6 European air carriers but, ultimately, as a result of the hostile ac- had denied boarding to unspecified num- tions, delayed the flotilla’s departure date bers of passengers based on the lists, while by a week, until ca. 7/5. This prompted Israeli authorities at Ben-Gurion Airport the Quartet to issue a 7/1 statement urging had detained more than 300 arriving pas- governments to “discourage” Gaza-bound sengers on suspicion of taking part in the flotillas, saying efforts to breech the block- flotilla; at least 118 were deported as activ- ade would escalate regional tensions. ists, while the rest were deemed legitimate Anticipating problems, The Audacity of tourists and allowed entry. A handful of ac- Hope (7/1) attempted to slip out of Athens tivists made it through airport security and undetected before the new departure date, joined a separation wall protest n. of Jeru- as did 2 other boats from Corsica (7/3) and salem on 7/9. The air flotilla spectacle gar- Crete (7/4), but all were detained before nered short-term media notice but quickly they could reach international waters. A fell off the radar. French boat made it out of Greek waters on 7/5 but surrendered to Israeli forces The Palestine 194 Campaign without incident on 7/19. Meanwhile, flo- Toward the end of the quarter, as the tilla organizers had formally ended their 9/2011 UNGA session approached, senior effort on 7/7, sending remaining activists Fatah officials began calling for mass dem- home to “share their experiences” and onstrations to show popular support for claiming that they had successfully redi- the statehood bid at the UN. The first to do rected international focus to Gaza’s plight so was jailed Fatah figure Marwan Bargh- and shown “the lengths Israel is willing to outi, who urged (7/20) “our people in the go to stop . . . unarmed peaceful activists.” homeland and in the diaspora to go out in On 7/11, Israeli pres. Shimon Peres a peaceful, million-man march during the received visiting Greek pres. Karolos Pa- week of voting in the United Nations in poulias, praising his efforts to stop the flo- September.” On 7/27, Abbas called, with- tilla and heralding “the opening of a new out giving a timeframe, for massive nonvio- chapter in Greece-Israel relations” and “a lent public rallies in support of statehood. great future.” On 8/1, his spokesman Yasir ‘Abid Rab- buh said that mass marches against Israel’s “Welcome to Palestine” Air Flotilla occupation would begin on 9/20/11, the Meanwhile, some 40 Palestinian NGOs eve of the UNGA session, the hope being had endorsed an online call by Palestin- that they would culminate in a “million ian activists launched on 2/1/11, inviting man march” just before the vote. The PA supporters worldwide to visit Palestine dubbed this the “Palestine 194” campaign, between 7/8/11 and 7/10/11 as part of since Palestine would become the 194th a nonviolent solidarity action, called the UN member state, and stated: “The appeal “Welcome to Palestine Air Flotilla,” to raise to the UN is a battle for all Palestinians, awareness about the occupation. Organiz- and in order to succeed, it needs millions ers urged activists (particularly Europe- to pour into streets.” Palestinians repre- ans who are not on Israel’s security watch senting civil society groups, unions, and
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youth activists met in Ramallah on 8/9 to was “a grain of truth” to the Palestinian re- form a preparatory comm. to oversee a na- ports, while Egyptian mediators said (8/15) tional campaign to support Palestine 194, that the sides were still far from finalizing but no details were released. a deal. Nonetheless, Hamas announced (8/15) that its leader Khalid Mishal would Prisoner Release Talks head to Cairo on 8/16 to take part in a 3d Last quarter, Hamas officials noted that round talks, indicating at least some signifi- Israel had treated prisoner swap talks more cant progress. seriously since Pres. Husni Mubarak’s fall on 2/11/11 and hoped that a breakthrough Intifada Data and Trends could be announced soon. Hamas had al- During the quarter, at least 15 Palestin- ready approved a new Egyptian-draft pris- ians and no Israelis were killed as a result oner release agreement, but Israel had not of Israeli-Palestinian violence (compared to yet responded (see QU in JPS 160). While 64 Palestinians, 9 Israelis, and 1 foreigner no details about the new proposal were last quarter), bringing the toll at 5/15 to made public, the deal reached in principle at least 7,828 Palestinians (including 51 by Hamas and Israel at their last serious Israeli Arabs and 19 unidentified Arab round of talks in 2010 involved as many as cross-border infiltrators), 1,111 Israelis (in- 1,000 Palestinians in exchange for IDF sol- cluding 354 IDF soldiers and security per- dier Gilad Shalit (seized in 2006), but had sonnel, 226 settlers, and 531 civilians), and bogged down over Israel’s rejection of a 66 foreign nationals (including 2 British handful of names on Hamas’s proposed list suicide bombers). These numbers include it called “mass murderers” (see QU in individuals who died in noncombat-related JPS 158). incidents if their death was a direct re- On 6/2, after indications surfaced that sult of Israel’s occupation and the ongo- Israel had rejected the Egyptian-draft pro- ing conflict (e.g., ailing Palestinians who posal, Hamas negotiators went to Cairo to died when denied access to medical care consult with Egyptian mediators; on 6/5, and Palestinians killed in smuggling tunnel Israeli DM Ehud Barak followed up with accidents). a phone call to Egyptian military leader Muhammad Tantawi. On 6/26, Netanyahu Overview of the Violence stated that Israel had accepted a German- Overall, Israel-Palestinian violence mediated bridging proposal to secure in the occupied territories was low this Shalit’s release, which Hamas quickly re- quarter (see Chronology for details), with jected (6/27) as an endorsement of Israel’s neither Israeli assassinations nor major Pal- demands, adding it would no longer work estinian attacks. with the “biased” German mediator. In East Jerusalem, the quarter’s only Nothing further was reported until clash took place after Friday prayers on early 8/2011, when a very senior Hamas 6/10, when Palestinians at the al-Aqsa delegation (including the head of Hamas Mosque threw stones at nearby Israeli po- military wing Ahmad Jaabari and Hamas lice to protest a 6/9 incident in which the Politburo Dep. Dir. Musa Abu Marzuq) vis- IDF escorted a group of Jews into the al- ited (ca. 8/8) Cairo for talks with Egyptian Aqsa Mosque compound to pray. Israeli intelligence officials on the prisoner issue. police then raided the mosque courtyard According to Abu Marzuq, Hamas at the and fired tear gas and stun grenades to dis- meeting insisted on the release of prison- perse the demonstrators. No serious inju- ers who were sentenced to life terms and ries were reported. on the number of prisoners to be released Most of Israel’s actions in East Jerusa- and said it would reject deportation of any lem were aimed at intensifying the “Jewish prisoner (suggesting this had been an Is- character” of the city and deepening Isra- raeli compromise proposal for freeing pris- el’s physical hold to ensure continuation of oners connected to major attacks). After a its present status in any agreement. In ad- 2d round of Cairo talks on 8/15 (Egypt me- dition to settlement expansion efforts (see diators meeting separately with Israeli and “Settlers and Settlements” below), Israel’s Hamas delegations), Palestinian sources Interior Min. issued building permits for said that Israel had shown flexibility on is- the Simon Wiesenthal Museum of Toler- sues that it previously rejected (no details ance on the site of the ancient Mammilla released). Israeli sources stated that there cemetery in Jerusalem, saying work could
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begin immediately. Palestinians denounced members and local Hamas leaders who (7/12) the decision to go forward with were originally arrested ca. 6/06 as part desecration of a historic Muslim site. On of Israel’s round-up of elected Hamas of- 6/25, Jerusalem municipal authorities be- ficials after the 1/2006 PC elections and gan clearing 100 graves in the cemetery to later released. The trend seemed to be- make way for the museum car park. gin with the breakdown of peace talks in Israeli authorities also began (6/12) ar- late 2010 (see QUs in JPS 159 and 160 for cheological excavations at al-Sultan Pool, background). Those detained this quarter a registered Islamic holy site near the Old included: Hamas-affiliate PC members ‘Abd City’s walls in East Jerusalem. al-Rahman Zidan (6/1 nr. Tulkarm), Aziz In the West Bank, 3 Palestinians were Dweik (6/2, no location reported), Ahmad killed by the IDF during late-night or pre- al-Haj Ali (6/6 in Nablus), Samir al-Qadi dawn incursions into Palestinian refugee (6/16 in Hebron), Nassir ‘Abd al-Jawwad camps (r.c.): 1 was shot while running away (6/27 in Salfit), and Khalid Abu Tous (7/28 from incoming forces in al-Fara‘a r.c. near nr. Tubas), as well as Hamas politburo Tubas (7/12); 2 were felled by live ammuni- member Aysha Dar Suleiman (5/22 nr. Ra- tion when they threw stones at advancing mallah), local Hamas leader Ghassan Thou- IDF vehicles. A 4th West Bank Palestin- gan (6/1 in Nablus), and Wasfi Qabaha (6/9 ian died (7/1) in Israel’s Hadassah Hospital in Jenin). The IDF also raided and searched of injuries sustained on 1/20/11 when he the Hamas-affiliated Change and Reform failed to heed orders to stop near an IDF party offices in Nablus on 6/6, confiscating checkpoint near Hebron. The IDF also shot, a computer and files. wounded, and arrested (6/19) a Palestin- A major IDF operation on 5/30 targeted ian near the Israeli military liaison office in Islamic Jihad in and around Jenin. Troops Qalqilya, claiming he attempted to stab a raided and searched the homes of at least a soldier. Palestinians disputed the incident. A dozen local Islamic Jihad figures (arresting Palestinian shepherd (8/12) and 2 Palestin- all but 1) and raided, searched, and confis- ian children (5/20) were injured when they cated the files of 2 charities affiliated with accidentally triggered unexploded IDF ord- Islamic Jihad. The same night, the Jenin nance. Most other Palestinian injuries in the offices of the Palestine People’s Party were West Bank this quarter occurred during the also searched. weekly protests against settlement expan- Fatah members were also targets: The sion and the separation wall (see “Nonvio- IDF arrested Fatah PC members Yasir al- lent Protests in the Territories” below) Badrasawi (6/1 in Balata r.c.) and Hussam Of particular note: The IDF intercepted Khader (ca. 6/1 in Nablus), as well as local (7/25) 2 Palestinians in a rubber dinghy Fatah official Muhammad Walawil (6/14 in ferrying 10 assault rifles and ammunition Qalqilya). across the Dead Sea from Jordan to the The Israeli human rights group West Bank; Israel said it was treating the B’Tselem reported (ca. 6/17) that the IDF case as a smuggling incident and not an at- had been conducting nighttime house- tempted terrorist attack. to-house searches in Nabi Salih, photo- The IDF conducted an average of 90 graphing children and young adults for a operations per week in the West Bank, as database identifying stone throwers. recorded by the UN Office for the Coordi- B’Tselem also reported (7/18) that be- nation of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)— tween 2005 and 2010, 835 Palestinian unchanged from last quarter and likely children were indicted for rock throwing, the minimum needed to maintain “intelli- with only 1 acquitted. Moreover, 93% of gence dominance and freedom of action” the teens and youths convicted of hurling (see “Security Coordination” below). Once stones were sentenced to prison terms, again this quarter, most IDF incursions including 19 children under the age of 14. into Palestinian population centers were Israeli civil law forbids, but military law patrols as a show of force without arrest permits, imprisonment of children younger raids or house searches. The IDF also often than 14. issued Palestinians summons to appear for In Gaza, a total of 10 Palestinians died interrogation rather than detaining them in conflict-related incidents this quarter: immediately. 3 were Palestinian militants hit by IDF air The IDF stepped up efforts to rearrest strikes while preparing to launch rockets Hamas-affiliated Palestinian Council (PC) into Israel (2 on 7/5, 1 on 8/15); 1 was
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killed (7/13) in an IDF air strike on a smug- Palestinian fishing vessels to keep them gling tunnel on the Rafah border carried close to shore (wounding 1), but incidents out in retaliation for Palestinian rocket fire were down slightly this quarter. Unlike on Israel; 1 was a teenager fatally shot by previous quarters, there were no reports troops when he strayed near the Gaza bor- of the IDF firing warning shots at Palestin- der fence; and 5 died in accidents in smug- ian civilians scavenging for construction gling tunnels (5/23, 6/6, 6/11, 7/16, 7/21). materials near the border, possibly because An 11th Gazan civilian died in an Israeli Israel allowed more construction imports hospital where he was being treated since this quarter (see “Movement and Access he was wounded in the 1/15/09 Israeli air Issues” below). IDF cross-border gunfire strike that assassinated Hamas leader Said targeting suspicious movement near the Siyam. border killed a Palestinian teenager and Palestinian rocket and mortar fire was wounded a mentally disabled woman. The low. In total, Palestinians fired 4 manufac- IDF also made a handful of brief incursions tured Grads, 29 homemade Qassams, and to level land and clear sight lines along the 5 mortars (compared to 32 Grads, around Palestinian side of the border fence. 70 Qassams, and some 200 mortars last quarter); 2 of the Qassams landed inside Movement and Access Issues Gaza, damaging a home and injuring 1 Pal- This quarter, Palestinian freedom of estinian in 1 instance, while inside Israel, movement in the West Bank remained rela- only 1 bedouin woman was lightly injured tively good (i.e., it was possible to go al- and only 2 instances of light damage were most anywhere, though not necessarily by reported. In addition, 1 IDF soldier was the most direct route). In general, travel lightly injured (7/7) when an IDF tank between major population centers con- patrolling the Gaza border fence inside tinued to be easier than travel to outlying Israel triggered a roadside bomb laid by villages. As of 7/27, the Palestinian Center Gazans. It was unclear who was respon- for Human Rights reported 585 manned sible for most of the fire, though the Isla- and unmanned roadblocks across the West mist Tawhid and Jihad group was behind Bank, most of which were earthen mounds at least 3 Qassams (all on 7/9), and the and unmanned barriers; only a few dozen Salafist Abdullah Azzam Brigades was re- permanent manned checkpoints were in sponsible for 2 Grads (both on 8/3). Hamas place. (The IDF’s checkpoint infrastructure was believed to be keeping a tight rein on remained intact, however.) the fire (its own and overall) to avoid jeop- During Ramadan, Israel limited Pales- ardizing the national unity agreement. tinian access to East Jerusalem for Friday Israel routinely responded to serious prayers (8/5, 8/12) to women over age 35 rocket firings with Israeli air and (on 1 oc- and men ages 45–50. casion) artillery strikes and regularly car- In Gaza, Israel maintained near total ried out helicopter or drone air strikes control of borders except at the Rafah on Palestinian rocket-launching teams it crossing, which Egypt declared “fully re- could identify. In total, Israel carried out opened” on 5/28 for the first time since at least 44 air strikes (warplanes, helicop- the Hamas takeover in 6/2007. This was an ters, and drones combined, compared to exaggeration: Under Israeli pressure, Egypt more than 115 last quarter) and 2 artillery had heavily restricted passage through the strikes targeting armed units, smuggling crossing between 6/2007 and 1/29/2011. tunnels, suspected weapons manufacturing On 1/29/11, Egypt shut it in light of its and storage sites, and Hamas sites (Hamas, own domestic unrest and partially re- as the leadership authority in Gaza, being opened it on 2/18/11 (after Mubarak’s fall) held responsible for any attacks); in total 4 to allow Palestinians stranded in Egypt to Palestinians were killed (at least 3 of them return to Gaza. As of 5/28, most Palestin- militants) and 19 were wounded (at least ians with passports were initially permitted 11 of them militants and 3 of them inno- to cross into Egypt from 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 cent children). p.m. daily, except for Fridays and holidays; The IDF also continued routinely to fire only men ages 18–40 were required to se- warning shots at farmers and shepherds cure an additional visa in advance to enter straying too near the border (wounding 3), Egypt. From the time Egypt announced at protesters staging nonviolent marches the new plans (5/25), Israel said that un- to the border fence (wounding 2), and at restricted passage through Rafah would
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be “very problematic” but that it would commercial goods were allowed to enter, not violate bilateral agreements. Egyptian less fodder and wheat could cross, mean- authorities quickly assured Israel that it ing Gaza faced wheat shortages throughout would not allow the crossing to be used the quarter. Construction imports (for UN, to transfer goods and that it would impose donor-funded, and public works projects restrictions and take other steps to ensure only) remained limited to cement, aggre- that “terrorist elements” did not pass. gate, iron, and steel. Commercial goods, When the number of Palestinians en- initially limited to foodstuffs, later included tering Egypt from Gaza in the first 2 days clothing, shoes, washing machines, re- (5/28–29) exceeded pre-6/2007 levels (ca. frigerators, electricity generators, water 660/day) and neared 770/day, Egyptian tanks, pumps, cars, and machines for fac- border guards began (ca. 5/30) rejecting tories (e.g., candy making, nylons). Israel a high number of travelers at the cross- said (8/2) that it would allow textile and ing’s Egyptian entry point and returning furniture imports for the first time since them to the Gazan side, keeping the num- 6/2007, but this did not happen before the ber entering Egypt to 350–400/day (only close of the quarter. slightly above the average 300/day in re- On 6/21, Israel authorized the United cent months), which effectively undid Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) the “permanent opening.” On 6/4, a day to build 1,200 new homes and 18 new before the planned Naksa Day rallies (see schools in Gaza, pledging to allow passage “Naksa Day Rallies” above), Egypt tempo- of the necessary construction materials for rarily closed the Rafah crossing for “main- what would be Gaza’s largest construction tenance work,” without notifying Hamas project since Operation Cast Lead (OCL) officials in Gaza in advance and demanded in 2008–9. (Saudi Arabia funded the $70 that all travelers apply for a transit visa a m. cost.) UN Secy.-Gen. Ban welcomed day in advance; Hamas protested. Egypt (6/21) the decision but noted that this was backed off the new visa requirement and only a fraction of what was needed, since reopened the crossing on 6/8, after reach- some 60,000 Palestinian homes had been ing an agreement with Hamas to limit the destroyed or heavily damaged during OCL. number of Gazans entering Egypt to 550/ UNRWA spokesman Christopher Gunness, day in exchange for extending operating referring to Israel’s past record on the sub- hours. Through the end of the quarter, ject, cautioned (6/21) that praise for Israel Egypt allowed around 500/day out of Gaza should be withheld until the materials ac- and around 550/day in. tually arrive. Israel continued to restrict use of the Meanwhile, smuggling of goods through Erez crossing to urgent medical cases, the Rafah tunnels remained high. At the VIPs, and employees of international orga- close of the quarter, sources noted (e.g., nizations on a case-by-case basis. NYT 6/26 and 8/15, WT 7/12) that since Movement of goods was entirely re- Egypt had pulled security forces from the stricted to the Israeli-controlled Kerem Rafah area in recent months to deal with Shalom crossing in s. Gaza, which Israel its domestic unrest, smuggling to Gaza had opened on average 5 days/week. (Israel mushroomed: smugglers were bringing had closed Sufa crossing in 9/2010 and 250 cars/week through the tunnels until Qarni crossing in 3/2011, though the in- Hamas officials limited car imports to 30/ frastructure remained.) On average, 1,047 week in light of Gaza’s traffic congestion. truckloads of goods per week entered Gaza Meanwhile, an estimated 3,000 tons/day of (up slightly from last quarter, but still 37% cement and other construction materials of the weekly average before Hamas’s take- came through the tunnels for private con- over of Gaza in 6/2007), with food items struction projects. constituting 47% of imports on average (compared to 20% before the siege)—an Nonviolent Protests in the Territories indication that imports were still providing Regular Palestinian popular protests, subsistence rather than economic stimula- often with the participation of Israeli and tion. With strawberry and flower seasons international activists, against the separa- over, Israel allowed no exports from Gaza. tion wall and land confiscations continued The range of imports continued to this quarter at favorite sites such as Bil‘in expand but, because of Israeli limita- and Ni‘lin near Ramallah, Nabi Salih in the tions, as more construction material and north central West Bank, al-Ma‘sara near
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Bethlehem, and outside Karme Tzur settle- 215 Palestinian structures in the West Bank ment near Hebron. In addition, similar pro- and 13 in East Jerusalem, displacing more tests were held in Bayt Umar near Hebron, than 300 West Bank Palestinians (including Kafr Qaddum near Qalqilya, and Iraq Burin 200 children) and 35 East Jerusalem Pal- near Nablus (see Chronology for details). estinians (including 16 children); at least The IDF routinely fired warning shots, stun 78 of the structures were residential units. grenades, and tear gas at the demonstra- B’Tselem reported (6/22) that Israel had tors, frequently causing light-to-moderate razed 103 structures in the Jordan Valley injuries (see Chronology for details). In since the beginning of 2011, putting the Gaza, 4 nonviolent protest marches toward total number of displaced at 700. the border fence were reported to protest This quarter, the IDF bulldozed (6/14) Israel’s imposition of a no-go zone. Two the entire bedouin village of Fasayil al- Palestinians were wounded by IDF warn- Wusta in the Jordan Valley, claiming it was ing shots to disperse the marchers. erected on state land and too near a settler- On 6/24, Palestinians in Bil‘in held what only bypass road; 103 bedouin were dis- they said would be their last weekly dem- placed, including 63 children. onstration against the separation wall, not- On 6/20, the IDF demolished 8 houses ing that the IDF was about to implement and several tents in Khirbat Bir al-‘Abid vil- (on 6/26) Israel’s High Court decision to lage near Hebron, displacing 50 residents remove the part of the separation wall that and damaging surrounding village crop cut off the village from two-thirds of its land. agricultural land. Michael Sfard, lawyer for On 7/11, the IDF demolished a grocery the Bil‘in residents, praised the village’s store, sheep farm, and garage on land in 6-year protest movement as the first Pales- al-Jib village near Jerusalem (strategically tinian nonviolent popular struggle that had located between Givat Ze’ev and Givon brought “tangible results that can be mea- settlements) and declared a Palestinian ol- sured in acres.” While the IDF did in fact ive grove in the Wadi Qana area near Salfit implement the court decision (see “Separa- a closed military zone, uprooting 600 trees. tion Wall” section below), Bil‘in residents The IDF also demolished (6/23) 2 barn- resumed weekly protests on 7/15. yards in the Wadi Hassasa area near Beth- Of note: On 7/15, the group Shaykh lehem, dismantled a Palestinian irrigation Jarrah Solidarity organized a march in the network along a settlers-only bypass road East Jerusalem neighborhood to show sup- near Hebron (7/19), and bulldozed 8 wells port for Palestinian statehood. Estimates of near Jenin (5/29). the crowd size varied from 2,000 to 4,500, with around 80% of participants Israeli Settlers and Settlements Jews and the rest Palestinians, mostly from On 6/19, the Israeli cabinet voted to Shaykh Jarrah. move oversight of the World Zionist Or- On 8/11, 1,200 international activists ganization’s settlement division from the from 22 countries took part in a peace rally Agriculture Min. (where it was effectively in Nablus to show solidarity with the Pal- controlled by DM Barak’s opposition party) estinians. It was organized by Los Angeles back to the Prime Minister’s Office. The di- Cable International Center in coordination vision has an annual budget of $7.25 m. for with Nablus’s governor. developing West Bank settlements (much of which has gone to unauthorized settle- House Demolitions and Other Leveling ment outposts since 2005) and $14 m. for “House” demolitions per se were down developing the Galilee and Negev. Former this quarter, although the IDF targeted bed- Israeli PM Ehud Olmert had moved the di- ouin communities, Jordan Valley areas, and vision to Agriculture Min. control in 2007, areas linking or running along Jewish set- hoping the division’s efforts would shift tlements for clearing. As a result, reports to the Galilee and Negev and away from now referred more frequently to demoli- the West Bank. The division’s return to tions of “structures” (including not only Netanyahu’s control, as the settler move- residential buildings but also temporary ment had hoped, resulted in renewed at- tents, farm buildings, fences, wells, etc.) tention to the West Bank, and, on 7/10, rather than houses. the settlement division allocated 54,000 UNRWA reported (6/9) that between dunams (d.; 1 acre = 4 d.) of agricultural 1/1/11 and 5/31/11, Israel had demolished land to 21 Jewish settlements in the Jordan
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Valley, nearly doubling the total farmland The Israeli government reached (7/31) under their control to 110,000 d.; it also in- an $87 m. settlement with the former creased water allocations to Jewish farmers residents of Gaza’s Gush Katif settlement in the Jordan Valley. bloc and of the 4 small West Bank settle- As mentioned above, Israel approved ments evacuated during the 2005 Gaza 1,600 new settlement housing units in Je- disengagement. rusalem’s Har Homa/Jabal Abu Ghunaym Israel’s Jerusalem Magistrate’s Court and Pisgat Ze’ev settlements (5/19) timed ruled (6/15) that a Palestinian family (the with Obama’s major Middle East policy Farhans) could not be evicted from the speech. In 7/2011, 900 new units were home in Shaykh Jarrah, East Jerusalem, approved (7/5) for Jerusalem’s Gilo settle- where they have lived since 1948. A com- ment, and tenders were issued (7/18) for mittee that had taken over ownership construction of 294 units in Jerusalem’s of land owned by Jews before 1948 had Beitar Ilit and Karnei Shomron near Nab- sought to evict the family for failing to pay lus. Toward the end of the quarter, as Isra- rent and for making changes to the prop- el’s July 14 movement denouncing housing erty. The court said the charges could not costs picked up steam (see “The July 14 be proven and ordered the plaintiffs to re- Movement” below), Israel accelerated imburse the family for its legal fees. planning and construction of a large num- Settler violence against Palestinians was ber of new housing units in settlements down significantly this quarter (25 inci- that Israel intended to keep under status: dents compared to 90 last quarter). The final approval of 930 units in East Jerusa- breakdown of incidents by region was as lem’s Har Homa/Jabal Abu Ghunaym (8/4); follows: Hebron (9); Ramallah (6); Nablus final approval of 1,600 units in East Jerusa- (5); Qalqilya (2); East Jerusalem (2); and lem’s Ramat Shlomo (8/11; first announced Bethlehem (1). Settler actions included: during U.S. VP Biden’s visit to Israel in attempting to seize Palestinian land to ex- 3/2010; see QU in JPS 156); preliminary pand existing settlements and outposts approval of 277 units in Ariel, deep in the (5/23, 6/10, 6/24, 7/17); entering Palestin- West Bank; and intention to approve an- ian population centers to pray (5/30, 6/9, other 2,700 new units in East Jerusalem’s 6/14, 6/16, 6/29, 8/9); beating, stoning, or Givat HaMatos and Pisgat Ze’ev. (The Har harassing Palestinians (5/17, 5/22, 5/26, Homa/Jabal Abu Ghunaym and Pisgat Ze’ev 6/7, 6/18, 6/24, 7/18, 7/22, 2 on 8/6); units approved in 8/2010 appeared to be vandalizing property, including a mosque separate from those approved on 5/19.) (5/22, 6/7, 6/14, 6/24, 7/23); uprooting or On 6/2, the Israeli army and border po- setting fire to trees and crops (5/22, 5/30, lice demolished 4 structures at the unau- 6/2, 6/6, 6/13, 6/15, 7/15); killing livestock thorized settlement outpost of Aley Ayin (6/7, 7/22); and obstructing Palestinian near Nablus. Later, the Israeli High Court traffic (6/7, 7/23). ordered (8/2) the government to remove Senior Israeli army commander Maj. Migron, the largest unauthorized outpost Gen. Avi Mizrahi warned (7/18) in an inter- in the West Bank (300 settlers in 60 mobile view with Israeli television that unchecked homes on private Palestinian land), by the “Jewish terror” against West Bank Pales- end of 3/2012. tinians threatened to spark another major Israel’s Macro Center for Political Eco- conflict. He specifically denounced ex- nomics, a formerly government-funded tremist Jewish settlers from the yeshiva in center, issued (5/27) an updated report Yitzhar settlement, calling it “a source of valuing West Bank settlements beyond terror against Palestinians” that should be the 1967 lines (excluding unauthorized closed immediately. According to Mizrahi, outposts) at $18.8 b. When the original “What’s happening in the field is terrorism report was commissioned in 2004 by the . . . [that] needs to be dealt with.” government to assess “the efficiency of the ‘evacuation-compensation’ law to be of- Separation Wall fered to settlers and collect data to assess On 7/11, OCHA released the following what we are actually ceding” in the event facts about the separation wall: total pro- of a West Bank withdrawal, the value was jected length 707 km (more than twice assessed to be $12.6 b. The $6.2 b. differ- the length of the Green Line between the ence, the authors stated, reflected settle- West Bank and Israel) of which approxi- ment expansion since 2004. mately 61.4% is completed, 8.4% under
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construction, and 30.5% planned but not and “a welfare state now.” By 8/6, as many yet built. When completed, 85% of the as 320,000 Israelis took part nationwide, wall will be inside the West Bank, and marking the largest protest in Israel’s his- 9.4% of West Bank lands will be on the tory. In the early stages, the demonstrators Israeli side of the wall, off-limits to Pal- were politically mainstream young Israeli estinians. The report concluded that the Jews ranging from center-right to far-left, primary reason for the deviation from the but by early 8/2011, right-wing and settler Green Line is to enable Israel to effectively groups joined in, demanding settlement annex 80 East Jerusalem and West Bank expansion in the West Bank and East Jeru- settlements (i.e., over 85% of the total set- salem as the solution to the housing crisis. tler population), along with areas zoned (Starting on 8/4, several settlement con- for their expansion. struction plans were accelerated largely in On 6/21, the IDF began dismantling a response to this call; see “Settlers and Set- section of the wall near Bil‘in in keeping tlements” above.) with a 2007 Israeli High Court ruling that Responding to the mass protests, Ne- its path was illegal. Even with modifica- tanyahu’s government and the Knesset tions, however, more than 100 d. of village pledged new housing construction, hous- land will remain cut off between the sepa- ing reform, streamlined bureaucracies, ration wall and the Green Line. In keeping and a crackdown on monopolies but of- with another 2007 Israeli High Court deci- fered few specific action plans. Netanyahu sion, the IDF had begun (6/2) rerouting a pledged (7/26) inter alia to accelerate ap- section of the wall near Tulkarm’s Khirbat proval for construction of 50,000 new Jubara village, which when completed will housing units and the allocation of land restore access to the West Bank for some for construction of 10,000 new units of 300 village residents currently trapped university housing, but the offers were re- between the wall and the seam line, but jected as insufficient, and at the end of the 600 d. of village crop lands will remain quarter the protests continued unabated. off-limits to them. On 7/26, the IDF began leveling land Legislation and Government Affairs for the construction of a new segment of The Knesset Comm. on Immigration, the separation wall near al-Walaja near Absorption and Diaspora held (5/17) a Bethlehem. meeting to discuss “the effects of the spread of the Palestinian narrative on Euro- Inside Israel pean and American public opinion” as well as “how Israel and the Diaspora should The July 14th Movement meet the challenge of the Palestinian nar- The most important domestic event in rative regarding the establishment of the Israel this quarter was the eruption of the State of Israel.” The meeting reportedly July 14th Movement, which, while relating (IGPO 5/16) included a presentation on only tangentially to the Palestinian-Israeli “how the wave of Palestinian propaganda conflict, merits passing mention because it leads to anti-Semitic attacks on Jewish insti- was cited by right-wing Jewish groups as a tutions, schools, and synagogues,” but no reason to expand settlements and by Israeli details were released. Palestinians to call for true democracy and On 7/4, a Knesset comm. disqualified equality in Israel. The movement began (3-5) a bill submitted by Israeli Palestin- on 7/14 when dozens of young Israelis, ian MK Ahmad Tibi (United Arab List) to inspired by the Arab Spring, set up a tent amend the 3/2011 “Nakba Law” such that camp in a high-end shopping district of Tel it would bar state funding to any organiza- Aviv to protest rising housing costs. Soon, tions or authorities that denied the Nakba tent camps had sprung up elsewhere in (the exact opposite of the law’s meaning Israel to complain not only about housing as passed; see QU in JPS 160). The deci- but about the cost of gasoline and other sion was not only the first time the Knesset basic goods. After strong endorsement by disqualified a measure in 7 years but also the Histadrut labor federation, anywhere the first time ever that a bill was disquali- from 60,000 to 150,000 protestors turned fied on the grounds that it “rejects Israel as out (7/30) in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Beer- a Jewish and democratic state.” sheba, Haifa, and 6 other cities demanding On 7/11, the Knesset passed (47-38) broader economic reforms, “social justice,” a law to sanction individuals and
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organizations calling for a boycott of Is- the bedouin population presently living rael or its settlements, including by de- on those lands (around 30,000; 40% of the nying them tax breaks and barring them total bedouin population in unrecognized from working on government contracts. villages) be relocated to the 7 existing gov- The Knesset’s legal adviser warned (7/11), ernment-built “bedouin townships,” which however, that the measure was “borderline would be expanded. The Israeli govern- illegal” because of possible impact on free ment would offer compensation estimated political expression, and on 7/14, 32 Israeli at $1.7 b.–$2.4 b. (including $365 m. for ex- law professors sent a letter to Israel’s Atty. panding the townships), with the amount Gen. Yehuda Weinstein declaring the law offered to be reduced to zero over a 5-year to be unconstitutional and doing “grievous period to encourage the bedouin to agree harm to the freedom of political expres- quickly. After 5 years, any designated land sion and freedom of protest.” The same that has not gone through the compen- day (7/14), the Israeli rights group Gush sation claim process would be consid- Shalom submitted a formal petition asking ered forfeited and registered as state land. the High Court to overturn the law. There The government was supposed to vote was no further movement before the end on whether to endorse the plan in early of the quarter. 6/2011, but right-wing parties pressed Knesset failed to pass (by a vote of for a delay, arguing that the plan gave too 28–57) 2 bills calling for parliamentary in- much land to the bedouin. quiries into left-wing NGOs: one called for In an unprecedented move, Israel sued an investigation of the damage done by (7/27) the bedouin villagers of al-Arakib in left-wing NGOs to IDF by their focus on the Negev for $500,000 to cover the IDF’s IDF repression of Palestinians; the other cost of repeatedly demolishing their vil- called for investigating the source of for- lage, declaring that the residents had “not eign contributions received by left-wing respected legal rulings and continue to NGOs. build illegally” and that the government MKs Avi Dichter (Kadima) and Ze’ev must protect “the public purse.” Since the Elkin (Likud) and 42 cosponsors submit- IDF demolished the 45 structures in the vil- ted (8/4) a bill that would amend Israel’s lage in 7/2010, it has returned to level the Basic Laws to define Israel as a democratic village 20 times, but each time the bedouin and Jewish state and the homeland of the return to rebuild. Jewish people. The bill would also cancel Former Mossad head Meir Dagan, who Arabic’s status as one of Israel’s two offi- harshly criticized Netanyahu last quarter cial languages; order the state to develop for threatening war on Iran and rejecting communities for Jews only; and declare serious peace talks (see QU in JPS 160), that in the absence of a civil law on a given warned (6/2) that his retirement combined issue, the courts should rule in the spirit of with the resignations of IDF chief of staff halakha ( Jewish religious law). The mea- Gabi Ashkenazi and Shin Bet dir. Yuval sure, which needs 61 votes to become law, Diskin in recent months had created a dan- did not proceed further this quarter. gerous void in Israel’s decision-making pro- Israeli MK Tzipi Hotovely (Likud) put cess, stating: “when I was in office, Diskin, forward (5/30) a bill to refer to neighbor- Ashkenazi, and I could block any danger- hoods in East Jerusalem by Hebrew names ous adventure. Now I am afraid that there only. No further action was reported. is no one to stop Bibi [PM Netanyahu] and Israel’s Prawer Commission (headed [DM Ehud] Barak.” Soon after, Israeli TV by Netanyahu’s director of planning Ehud reported (6/19) that the government had Prawer) issued (6/2) its final report on ordered Dagan to relinquish his diplomatic how best to implement the 2008 Goldberg passport in what was believed to be retalia- Commission’s recommendation that Israel tion for his statements. legalize unrecognized bedouin villages in the Negev provided their territory does not overlap with existing land settlement plans Intra-Palestinian Dynamics benefiting the Jewish population (see QU in JPS 151 for background). The Prawer re- This quarter, internal Palestinian issues, port essentially determined that 50% of the including implementation of the new na- unrecognized village lands lie within Jew- tional unity accord, took a back seat to ish planning areas and recommended that the Palestinian statehood efforts at the
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UN. Though tensions between Fatah and (5/24), Hamas’s Mahmud Zahar, a senior Hamas increased as a result, both sides Hamas official in Gaza, denounced Abbas’s were reported to be determined to avoid 5/22 and 5/24 statements, suggesting that an internal crisis. Mishal had used questionable judgment in entering into a deal with Abbas and stating National Reconciliation that Hamas’s power structure should be At the close of last quarter, Fatah and “reassessed.” Asked for comment, Mishal’s Hamas signed (5/4/11) a milestone na- office said (5/24) that Zahar “spoke out tional reconciliation agreement to form a of turn,” whereas a Hamas spokesman in transitional unity government of indepen- Gaza claimed the statements attributed to dent technocrats with a limited mandate: Zahar had been fabricated. On 6/1, Zahar (1) to oversee new presidential and legisla- stated that Abbas’s effort “to make the new tive elections, (2) to take immediate steps government . . . his own government, in- to unify West Bank and Gaza institutions stead of a government of national accord” divided since 2007, and (3) to rebuild Gaza jeopardized the unity deal. from the devastation of Israel’s 2008–9 The controversy died down but revived Operation Cast Lead (see QU in JPS 160). again ca. 7/2011 over how a temporary Their first meeting was to be held on government would be installed: Abbas 5/16–17 in Cairo to discuss implementa- wanted it appointed by himself as presi- tion and with hopes of announcing the dent, to underscore that it would be his transitional government within 10 days. government; whereas Hamas wanted it to At the 5/16–17 talks, the sides agreed be endorsed by a PC vote to make it truly on an “implementation mechanism.” The a government of national consensus (and understandings were written up, approved also to force Abbas to win approval of a by Abbas and Mishal personally, and signed body in which Hamas had a majority). by Fatah and Hamas delegations in Moscow Meanwhile, Fatah and Hamas could not on 5/22, though no details were released. agree on a slate of independent techno- Differences quickly emerged, however— crats for the cabinet. The greatest sticking often as Abbas tried to spin his comments point was over Salam Fayyad as PM: Fatah about implementation so as to allay Israel insisted that he must stay on in his role and and U.S. fears of Hamas participation in a that he was technically unaffiliated with government. Commenting (5/22) on the any party, but Hamas saw him, after years Moscow signing, Abbas reaffirmed that the as PM, as too closely aligned with Abbas transitional government would comprise and U.S. interests to be considered truly only independents, but his statement that independent. Hamas did acknowledge “Hamas . . . will take part . . . as [the] op- (6/9), though, that international donors position” raised concerns. On 5/24, he trusted and preferred Fayyad and that the complained about a popular misunder- U.S. had explicitly threatened to cut aid standing that the transitional government to Abbas’s government if Fayyad was re- would be “a power-sharing government placed (see QU in JPS 159). Consequently, between Fatah and Hamas. The govern- some sources (e.g., WAFA 5/23) indicated ment will be my government and will fol- that Hamas would accept Fayyad as finance low my strategies and policies. It will be a minister but not as PM. Zahar stated (ca. government of independents that does not 6/12) that the greater issue was that Ab- include anyone who belongs to any Pales- bas had presented Fayyad’s candidacy as tinian faction.” Days later (ca. 5/26), Abbas an ultimatum, which violated the spirit of said that he aimed by mid-6/2011 to form a the unity accord. Fayyad said (6/14) he government of technocrats that would ac- would abide by whatever decision the fac- cept the Quartet demands, including rec- tions reached, stating: “What is important ognition of Israel’s right to exist (not part is unity and reconciliation; I won’t be a of the unity deal). hurdle to reaching any solution.” The statements left at least some in On 6/9, Hamas officials said that they Hamas uncertain about whether Abbas was were seriously considering not taking an actually trying to adjust the unity deal to active role in future Palestinian govern- give Fatah an upper hand or whether the ments, even if they won elections, in order aim was to soothe international concerns, to avoid international scrutiny and preserve apparently causing some division within economic aid to the Palestinians. They said Hamas. In the Lebanese daily al-Akhbar that this had been discussed in leadership
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meetings in Gaza, the West Bank, Egypt, On 7/18, Hamas official Ahmed Yousef and Damascus and had been part of the rea- denied that Fatah had formally asked son Fatah was able to accept a unity deal Hamas to delay implementation of the with Hamas in 5/2011. The officials said unity deal. Yousef said that while it might the push for a change in strategy had origi- be understandable, if Abbas wanted to stall nated with Mishal in Damascus. Though ini- the implementation to protect the state- tially opposed by the political leadership in hood bid, he should have briefed Mishal the territories, which wanted to keep po- on his strategy and tried to work on other litical power, this line of thinking had been aspects of the unity deal (i.e., the prisoner growing along with the sense that Hamas release, rehabilitating Gaza, unifying West would never be allowed to govern fully Bank and Gaza institutions, security ser- and that continued participation in the PA vice reform, preparing for PA and Palestine (with its failed peace policy) had become National Council elections, even drafting delegitimizing. The implication was that a national unity platform). The same day if Hamas was prevented by outside forces (7/18), Egyptian mediators invited the from testing its mettle within a democratic sides to Cairo for talks. system, it would fall back on the original Senior Fatah and Hamas officials met source of its popularity and legitimacy— in Cairo on 8/7 to identify aspects of their armed resistance. reconciliation agreement that could be Implementation talks resumed in Cairo implemented quickly, agreeing that within on 6/14, with Fatah and Hamas exchang- the coming week they would: (1) set up a ing lists of prisoners they wanted freed committee to identify all political prisoners agreed under the reconciliation deal. for release as soon as possible; (2) form a While the 2 sides had hoped to announce committee to issue passports to Gaza resi- an interim government at the close of the dents before the end of Ramadan on 8/30 session, instead they said that Abbas and (the PA had stopped issuing passports for Mishal would meet in Cairo on 6/20 to Gazans after Hamas’s 6/2007 takeover); try to finalize the government make-up. and (3) form a task force to reopen institu- Some Palestinian analysts (see NYT 6/14) tions that were shut down in the territo- were deeply pessimistic, however, with ries because of political animosities. Abbas one saying: “It’s not a question of ap- phoned (8/11) Hamas’s acting PM in Gaza pointing a prime minister, but of the po- Ismail Haniyeh to discuss the Cairo meet- litical will to share power. I don’t see it.” ing, stressing the importance of moving Another said, “There is an atmosphere of forward where possible and pledging to reconciliation” but “a lack of determina- make quick progress on political prisoners tion” on both sides. Indeed, Hamas and and passports issues. Haniyeh emphasized Fatah canceled (6/19) without explana- the importance of maintaining a “positive tion the 6/20 meeting, which was never atmosphere” around the national unity rescheduled. process. Nonetheless, there was no indica- On 6/30, a senior Fatah official con- tion the goals set at the 8/7 meeting were firmed the swirling rumors that Fatah and achieved by 8/15. Hamas had quietly agreed to delay the for- On the last day of the quarter (8/15), mation of the transitional government un- Abbas reactivated the PLO’s constitution til after the 9/2011 UNGA session. Abbas comm. (headed by Palestinian National apparently made the suggestion to Mishal Council speaker Salim Za‘nun, with Fatah through Turkish intermediaries when Central Comm. member Nabil Shaath as his both were in Turkey the week before deputy; dormant since 2006) to draft the (see “Turkish Mediation Efforts” below), constitution of a future Palestinian state arguing that the statehood bid at the UN before 9/2011, so it would be ready if the would have a greater chance of success statehood bid won endorsement. PLO of- if the first stage of reconciliation was de- ficials had urged Abbas to reactivate the layed and the status quo maintained until comm. in 3/2011, before the reconcilia- after 9/2011. This marked a strategic shift tion agreement with Hamas was reached. for Abbas, who originally felt strongly that Hamas did not immediately comment, but the international community would be it would likely oppose the unilateral move more likely to endorse statehood if a unity as violating the spirit of the unity accord. government was in place (see QU in Of note: At a meeting with business JPS 160). leaders in Gaza, Palestine Investment Fund
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(PIF) pres. Muhammad Mustafa announced to cover expenses and had reached its bor- (5/25) the establishment of a $1 b. invest- rowing limit. ment fund for the reconstruction of the When no new money was received by Gaza Strip to position private investors in 7/27, Fayyad declared the situation “with- anticipation that the new unity govern- out a doubt, the worst financial crisis the ment would, as pledged, make rebuilding Palestinian authority has ever faced.” By Gaza a top priority. The PIF is an indepen- then, PA employees were threatening to dent organization. strike if they were not paid in full, and some West Bank ministries had temporar- PA Elections ily lost electricity because they could not Under the national unity accord signed pay their bills. The PA ordered a cut in last quarter, Fatah and Hamas agreed to bread prices to help families weather their hold legislative and presidential elections loss of income, but this sparked a strike within a year, with the expectation that by bakers, who argued that the PA should this would not occur until after the 9/2010 subsidize bread prices instead of shifting UNGA session. In 3/2011, Abbas had an- the economic burden to them. The PA nounced that municipal elections (to be feared that the public mood would worsen held in several rounds) in the West Bank in 8/2011 during Ramadan (when house- and Gaza would begin on 7/9/11, but hold spending typically increases) and Hamas had said it would not participate. 9/2011 (when schools start and education After signing the unity deal in 5/2011, fees kick in). Hamas did not say whether its position on Sources said (NYT 7/28) that some Arab municipal elections had changed. countries were withholding pledged funds On 5/17, the PA postponed the start of pending formation of a national unity gov- municipal elections until 10/22/2011 to ernment as leverage to ensure that U.S. and allow time to organize voting in Gaza (up- Israeli did not follow through on threats date voter rolls, etc.) and to prevent politi- to cut aid/VAT transfers if Hamas joined cal distractions in the run-up to the UNGA the government. Palestinian analysts noted session in 9/2011. On 7/27, however, the (e.g., NYT 7/8) that the economic crisis PA declared that local elections set for was politically problematic for the U.S. and 10/22/2011 would be held in the West Israel insofar as it undermined their favor- Bank only, because Hamas was “hampering ite, Fayyad. Israeli military officials further preparations in Gaza” (no details released). feared that the PA security forces (PASF) Hamas accused (8/14) Fatah of violating might rebel or become unreliable if they the national unity agreement by taking de- did not get their salaries. cisions unilaterally. After the PA government workers union in the West Bank warned of an open-ended PA’s West Bank Rule strike if member salaries were not paid by 8/2, Fayyad met (7/26) with Arab League Facing a Financial Crisis reps. to ask Arab donors to disperse $300 On 7/3, PM Fayyad announced that the m. in pledged funds for 2011 and vowed PA would pay government employees only (7/31) to pay PA employees’ salaries in full half their salaries for 7/2011 because of in 8/2011, though this would “greatly limit “the failure of donors, including our Arab the ability of the PA to meet other needs brothers, to fulfill their pledges.” Donors during the coming month.” As of 8/15, had pledged $971 m. for 2011, of which when the quarter closed, no response from only $330 m. had been received. Fayyad Arab donors had been reported, and the noted that the only Arab countries to fulfill salaries had not been paid. their pledges were Algeria, Oman, and the On 5/31, the PA had announced that it UAE. (Privately, PA officials expressed par- had allocated $428 m. for East Jerusalem ticular frustration with Saudi Arabia, which development in its 2011–13 budget with had just given Jordan $1 b. [on top of $400 the aim of helping Palestinian residents to m. earlier in 2011] to support it in light of remain in the city and develop economi- the Arab Spring, but which had not come cally. The PA hoped that Arab and interna- through with $30 m. it pledged to the PA tional donors would fund the project, even for 2011.) The PA’s budget deficit as of though it violated Israel’s unilateral ban on 6/30 amounted to $500 m. The PA had official Palestinian activity in the city, but already taken out bank loans worth $1 b. no donor pledging conference was held
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this quarter and no country immediately law it was the PA Interior Min. in Ramallah volunteered. that should undertake the audits, noting that most foreign charities had already sub- Corruption Probes mitted their own private audits to the min- On 6/12, the Fatah Central Comm. ex- istry. The U.S. warning came after Hamas pelled its former Gaza security chief Mu- authorities forced the International Medi- hammad Dahlan, who had been stripped cal Corps to suspend operations in Gaza of his party privileges in 12/2010 for until it submitted to an audit; several other criminal, financial, and other misdealings, international charity groups subsequently including attempting to oust Abbas and as- suspended their operations in protest. sume the PA presidency himself (see QU in Hamas never explained its motives, but an- JPS 159). Dozens of Fatah members threat- alysts believed (e.g., NYT 8/12) that it was ened (6/13) to quit the party in protest concerned that the foreign funds given to over his removal, but apparently none did. these charities were being diverted to ri- On 7/28, a day after a PA court rejected an val political factions (especially Fatah) and appeal challenging Fatah’s decision to ex- were being used to run covert intelligence- pel Dahlan, PASF raided Dahlan’s Ramallah gathering operations against Hamas. When home, arresting 23 guards and assistants Hamas did not immediately respond to and confiscating 16 guns, a computer, and the 8/11 U.S. warning, the U.S. “paused” 2 cars; Dahlan himself was in Jordan. Then, its funding, but restored it on 8/14 when on 8/6, the Fatah commission charged Hamas backed down. with investigating allegations of Dahlan’s Meanwhile, officials in Gaza’s Finance corruption issued its final report conclud- Min. announced (8/7) that civil servants ing not only that Dahlan had embezzled in Gaza would not receive their 7/2011 upward of $300 m. and plotted to unseat salaries until the end of 8/2011 due to Abbas, but that he helped poison Palestin- government cash shortages. It was un- ian leader Yasir Arafat. (Arafat died of a clear whether the budget shortfall in Gaza mysterious illness in 1994 after months of was linked to the PA shortfall in the West being besieged in his Ramallah headquar- Bank (see “PA’s West Bank Rule” above) or ters by Israel; many at the time accused whether Hamas was having its own prob- Israel of secretly poisoning him.) Despite lems funding operations in Gaza. the magnitude of the charge, the report Of note: A Gaza military court sen- generated almost no comment either on tenced (5/31) a Palestinian man to death the Palestinian street or in the media. The for collaborating with Israel; according to commission was headed by senior Fatah the Palestine Center for Human Rights in officials Azzam al-Ahmad, Tayyib ‘Abd al- Gaza, 116 people had been sentenced to Rahim, Othman Abu Gharbiyya, and Nabil death since the PA was created in 1994. Shaath. Of these, 93 were from Gaza, of whom 17 The PA’s anticorruption comm. referred had been executed (6 of them since 2010). (8/14) PA Economics M Hassan Abu Libdeh On 7/26, Hamas authorities hanged 2 Pal- to the PA atty. gen. for questioning on cor- estinians convicted of collaborating with ruption charges, including mismanagement Israel; the men, a father and son, had been and receiving bribes. arrested in 2003 and convicted and sen- tenced in 2004 by the Fatah-led PA. Hamas in Gaza On 8/11, the U.S. publicly warned that Security Coordination it would cut off around $100 m. in aid for Israeli-PA security coordination con- healthcare, agriculture, and water proj- tinued to be strong this quarter, with no ects in Gaza if Hamas authorities did not disruptions. As the 9/2011 UNGA session back off recent demands to audit, register, approached, the PA ordered (8/4) its secu- and monitor the finances of the charities rity forces to prevent violence surrounding funded by the U.S. The U.S. argued that the UN vote in 9/2011 and informed Is- laws forbidding contact with Hamas (as rael that it intended to keep the peace and a U.S.-designated terrorist organization) avoid confrontation. would legally oblige it to suspend aid to An anonymous senior IDF officer stated the charities if Hamas audited them. Nor- (8/2) that IDF troops in the Ramallah way sent a similar message at about the area were averaging 6 raids per night in same time, arguing that under Palestinian Palestinian-controlled area A (where the
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PASF has security control during the day recognition of a Palestinian state. but the IDF insists on the “right” to en- Do you support or oppose this ter at night), explaining that to maintain Palestinian intention? “intelligence dominance and freedom of West action, this is the minimum number of Bank Gaza Total entries we have to make per night,” and a. Certainly support 19.7% 23.0% 20.9% that to reduce the number further would b. Support 56.5% 53.0% 55.3% require a political decision and pose a se- c. Oppose 18.2% 19.0% 18.5% curity risk. He also said that since the Pal- d. Certainly oppose 2.9% 1.5% 2.4% estinian national unity deal was signed in e. D on’t know/ 2.7% 3.5% 3.0% 5/2011 (see QU in JPS 160), the PASF’s No answer arrest rate had declined while the num- ber of Hamas members it had released had 2. If Palestinians pull out of the cur- gone up, adding that: “They tell us who rent talks or if peace negotiations fail, they are going to release in hopes we will would you support or oppose going not go after them, but we are not going to the UNSC to obtain recognition of a along with that. We have had to step up Palestinian state? our arrests because of their pulling back.” West Nonetheless, Israel released (8/4) 200 Pal- Bank Gaza Total estinian prisoners who were soon to com- plete their sentences as a goodwill gesture a. Certainly support 22.7% 25.8% 23.7% b. Support 56.3% 56.5% 56.4% to mark the start of Ramadan. The group c. Oppose 17.2% 14.0% 16.1% included senior Hamas official Shaykh Has- d. Certainly oppose 2.1% 2.9% 2.4% san Yousef (arrested in 2006 and set for e. D on’t know/ 1.8% 0.8% 1.5% release in 9/2011). No answer The IDF continued to be aggressive about entering area A (under full PA secu- rity and civil control), including making 3. If at the end of 2011 the Palestinian uncoordinated entries into Jericho (5/19, side unilaterally declares the establish- 5/26, 5/31, 6/7, 6/9, 6/16, 6/19, 6/25, ment of a Palestinian state without an 7/12, 7/14, 7/16, 7/29, 8/7), which until agreement with Israel, do you think such a declaration will lead to actual last quarter had been rare (see QU in JPS 160). For the 3d straight quarter, the IDF change in the current conditions in also photographed PA security sites, cul- the Palestinian areas with regard to tural heritage sites, and other buildings settlements and control of the occupa- during patrols in Silat al-Dahir nr. Jenin tion forces over roads and crossings (5/30), Hebron 6/21), and Jericho (7/29). in the West Bank? West Bank Gaza Total Palestinian Opinion a. Certainly will lead 2.0% 7.8% 4.0% to positive change The following data are excerpted b. Will lead to a 20.8% 27.3% 23.0% from a poll conducted by Palestinian change for the Center for Policy and Survey better Research (PCPSR) between 16 and c. Will not lead to 25.6% 33.3% 28.2% 18 June 2011. Results are based on any change, a survey of 1,200 men and women positive or from the West Bank (including East negative Jerusalem) and Gaza. The poll, the d. Will lead to 37.1% 24.3% 32.8% 40th in a series, was taken from negative change PCPSR’s Web site at www.pcpsr.org. e. Certainly will 11.1% 5.7% 9.3% lead to negative 1. President Abbas says that there change is no point in returning to negotia- f. Don’t know/ 3.3% 1.6% 2.7% tions without an acceptable term of No answer reference or a freeze on settlement construction and that he intends 4. If you use the internet to surf to go to the UN in 9/2011 to seek a social sites like Facebook, Twitter, and
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various groups or to access email, on Egyptian police in the Sinai, Egypt sent how often do you normally do that? (8/13) 250 tanks and armored vehicles, West 1,000 special forces, and 1,000s police into Bank Gaza Total the n. Sinai (including the Rafah area) to a. M ore than once 6.7% 14.1% 9.2% secure the region. It was unclear if Israel a day approved the increased military presence, b. Once a day 17.8% 20.1% 18.6% which is limited under the 1979 peace c. 2 –5 times per 8.6% 13.6% 10.3% treaty. week Egyptian authorities arrested (6/12) d. Once a week 6.1% 8.2% 6.8% a U.S.-born Israeli man, Ilan Grapel, on e. Once a month 3.9% 5.7% 4.5% charges of inciting Egyptian protesters to f. Other 0.3% 1.7% 0.8% riot and of spying and recruiting for the g. Not interested/ 56.6% 36.6% 49.8% Mossad. Grapel’s family said he was a law No access student in Atlanta who came to Cairo in 5/2011 to intern for a legal aid group and had merely attended some of the recent popular demonstrations. Israel denied Gra- FRONTLINE STATES pel was a spy, saying he was in Egypt un- der the jurisdiction of the U.S. consulate. Egypt Egypt’s interim military government Jordan (in place since 2/11/11) kept up efforts previously undertaken by the Mubarak This quarter, Jordan’s involvement in regime to mediate a Palestinian reconcili- the peace process was limited to remain- ation agreement (see “National Reconcili- ing in contact with the parties and occa- ation” above) and Hamas-Israel prisoner sional mediation. King Abdallah and Abbas swap (see “Prisoner Release Talks” above). met twice in Amman: on 5/23 to discuss Israel, however, expressed concerns over the Fatah-Hamas unity deal and on 8/9 to policy changes that seemed to be under- discuss the Palestinian statehood bid at the way. In particular, Israeli PM Netanyahu UN. Toward the end of the quarter, Jordan pointed to a “popular delegation” of 40 reportedly hosted secret talks between Egyptian public figures who visited (5/30) Israeli pres. Peres and Abbas aimed at re- Tehran for talks on resuming Egyptian- viving peace talks (see “Intensive Behind- Iranian relations, noting that Egypt’s Mus- the-Scenes Efforts” above). lim Brotherhood (not represented in the King Abdallah visited Washington ca. group) had already sent its own delegation 5/16–17 for talks with Obama and his se- for similar talks. Netanyahu also alleged nior Middle East experts on regional affairs (5/30) that Hamas had transferred some of and bilateral relations, strongly urging the its activities from Damascus to Cairo due U.S. to take the lead in reviving the peace to violence in Syria, warning that “interna- process. Following the visit, he stated con- tional terror organizations are stirring in Si- cerning discussions on the peace process nai and their presence is increasing due to that with admin. officials, Arab leaders felt Sinai’s connection to Gaza.” Hamas denied “we get good responses” from the State (5/30) that it had shifted its operations. Dept. and Pentagon “but not the White Israel continued to have heightened House, and we know the reason why is concerns about Egyptian border security because of Dennis Ross.” Commenting given the unstable political situation in on Obama’s speeches and meeting with Egypt. The Israeli DMin. announced (6/2) Netanyahu in a 5/22 appearance on ABC that it had completed the 1st segment of News, Abdullah stated: “My instincts tell a permanent border fence between the me not to expect much over the next cou- countries (see QU in JPS 155), and that ple of months. . . . [I] have the feeling that with a stepped-up work pace, the 135-mi. we’re going to be living with the status fence would be completed by mid-2012. quo for 2011.” Unidentified assailants attacked Egypt’s Of note: Right-wing Israeli MK Aryeh El- natural gas pipeline in the Sinai 3 times dad (National Union) tried (5/24) to submit this quarter (7/4, 7/11, and 7/30), cutting a petition to the Jordanian embassy in Tel supplies to Israel and Jordan. Responding Aviv asking King Abdallah to declare Jor- to these incidents and increased attacks dan a state for the Palestinian people. The
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Jordanian ambassador declined to meet Before seeking parliament’s endorse- him or receive the petition. ment, Makati’s new team drafted its policy statement, which recognized “the people, the army, and the resistance” (a nod to Lebanon Hizballah) and pledged to follow the path Lebanon’s main focus this quarter was of the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (a on forming a new government and prevent- nod to Sa‘ad Hariri’s Future Party). After ing a crisis over the UN Special Tribunal this was approved by parliament on 6/30, for Lebanon’s sealed indictments that were the new cabinet won a vote of confidence expected to implicate Hizballah in the 2005 on 7/7. In total, only 68 of 128 MPs voted assassination of former PM Rafiq Hariri. in favor; Future Party members and allies walked out as voting began. A New Government Is Sworn In On 6/13, after a delay of almost 5 The UN Tribunal months, Lebanon’s PM-designate Najib The UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon Mikati was able to propose a government had handed down its sealed indictments in slate to parliament. Of 30 cabinet seats, 1/2011 for extended review in the Hague, 18 were allotted to Hizballah and its al- and on 6/30 it delivered them to prosecu- lies. Though Hizballah’s majority worried tors in Lebanon. The accused were not Western governments, short of a clear publicly named, but an anonymous Leba- two-thirds majority (which Hizballah had nese judicial official read them to an As- sought), it could not block an opposition sociated Press reporter, who published veto. Domestically, therefore, the division them; the Information Min. later confirmed was seen as a victory for Mikati, who had them. The four persons sought were Hiz- fought hard to keep a one-third-plus-one ballah members previously mentioned bloc for himself, the president, and their al- as suspects in the 2005 Hariri assassina- lies (including Druze leader Walid Jumblat) tion: senior members Mustafa Badr al-Din to give them a constitutional veto on major (brother-in-law of former Hizballah cmdr. decisions. Another reason for the delay had Imad Mughniyah, assassinated in 2007) and been sparring over control of the interior Salim Ayyash; and lower-ranking members and defense ministries, which Gen. Michel Hassan Anaissy (also reported as Oneissi) Aoun (Free Patriotic Movement [FPM], and Asad Sabra. The details of the charges a Christian group allied with Hizballah) against them were not leaked. Lebanon sought to control. In the end, the DMin. promptly issued the arrest warrants, but on went to Maronite leader Suleiman Franjieh 8/9 informed the tribunal that it had been Jr. (a close ally of Syria) and the Interior unable to serve warrants to or detain the Min. went to a retired internal security suspects. officer who was jointly named by Gen. Meanwhile, Hizballah leader Hassan Aoun and Pres. Michel Suleiman. Hizballah Nasrallah vowed (7/2) that the 4 Hizballah opted to keep only 2 minor cabinet port- members would never be arrested, dis- folios, while its ally, the FPM, came away missing the charges against them as a U.S.- with the most cabinet seats (8). Parliament Israeli conspiracy to fuel sectarian strife. speaker Nabih Birri (Amal) helped broker He also claimed to have material, including the government deal by offering 1 of the 6 videos, that would help the tribunal find Shi‘i cabinet seats to the Sunni community, the true culprits. On 7/4, UN special tri- meaning that for the first time in decades bunal prosecutor David Bellemare invited the cabinet had 7 Sunni ministers and 5 Hizballah to submit such material, and on Shi‘i ministers rather than the 50-50 split 7/13, Hizballah officials hand delivered a guaranteed under Lebanon’s confessional package to his office. system. Some analysts (e.g., Carnegie Mid- dle East Center 6/15) believed that Mikati Palestinians in Lebanon deliberately drew out the government for- On 7/11, PM Mikati received Abbas’s mation process, hoping that Syria’s domes- personal envoy and senior Fatah official tic unrest would undermine Hizballah’s Azzam al-Ahmad in Beirut for talks on bargaining position; instead, Hizballah Lebanese-Palestinian relations. Afterward, seemed to maintain its strength, and Mi- Mikati stated that while Lebanon would kati was left “on very cool terms with the not naturalize Palestinians living in the Aounist camp,” Hizballah, and Amal. country, he would work to improve the
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conditions of the Palestinian camps in Palestine (see QU in JPS 160). On 7/26, 5 Lebanon. In line with Lebanese policy, he French UNIFIL members were wounded in stated that the Palestinian “right to return a similar roadside bombing of their convoy to their independent country with its capi- near Sidon; no group took responsibility. tal Jerusalem” must be preserved. After Friday prayers on 6/17, residents Palestinian refugees in Lebanon’s ‘Ayn of Tripoli rallied in support of antigovern- al-Hilwa r.c. demonstrated (6/6) against ment demonstrators in Syria (see “Regional the killing of Naksa Day protesters on the Affairs” below), sparking clashes between Syrian border on 6/5, but it was unclear residents of the Sunni neighborhood of whether the protests were against Israel, Bab al-Tabbana (against the Syrian regime) Syria, or the Palestinian leadership. (See and the Allawi neighborhood of Jabal “Syria” below for related information.) Mohsen (supporting the Syrian regime) that left at least 7 dead and 20 wounded. The Maritime Border with Israel The Lebanese army set up checkpoints On 7/10, the Israeli cabinet approved around the city until violence abated. maps demarcating Israel’s maritime border Of note: A World Press Photo exhibit with Lebanon in a move to assert its eco- in Beirut opted to close on 5/16, 10 days nomic rights in offshore areas (particularly ahead of schedule, after Lebanese authori- in potentially lucrative off-shore natural ties ordered the removal of photos by an gas fields). Netanyahu said (7/10) that the award-winning Israeli photographer, stat- move was necessary in light of a maritime ing that Lebanon was still in a state of war map recently submitted by Lebanon to the with Israel. UN that shows the border further south in what Israel considers its territory. By 8/11, Syria Israel was using unmanned drones to mon- itor its declared maritime boundaries to Syria was almost entirely focused on “protect” disputed natural gas fields from its own domestic unrest this quarter, as Hizballah, which had repeatedly vowed to state violence against antigovernment defend Lebanon’s natural resources (see protesters spiraled (see “Regional Affairs” QUs in JPS 158, 159 for background). In below). A senior U.S. admin. official speak- response, the Lebanese parliament passed ing anonymously stated (6/21) that there (8/4) an act formally delineating Lebanon’s was currently no plan to attempt to revive maritime areas in line with the map sub- Syrian-Israeli peace talks, adding in refer- mitted to the UN. ence to Syrian pres. Bashar al-Asad: “We can’t really contemplate a peace negotia- Other Security Issues tion with someone who is actively killing Israeli and Lebanese troops briefly ex- their own people.” changed fire across their common bor- Meanwhile, the Asad regime stirred up der on 8/1, causing no injuries. Lebanese trouble on its border with Israel to draw troops fired first, stating that the IDF patrol attention away from its internal crack- strayed into Lebanese territory (which the down. Following the Nakba Day violence IDF denied). last quarter (see QU in JPS 160), this quar- Six members of the UN Interim Force ter it was the Naksa Day march (see “Na- in Lebanon’s (UNIFIL) Italian contingent ksa Day Rallies” section above), which were wounded (5/27) when their con- involved cross-border clashes between the voy triggered a roadside bomb planted IDF on the Israeli side and Palestinian refu- outside Sidon in s. Lebanon. No group gees and their Syrian supporters on the took responsibility for the attack, the first Syrian side, resulting in perhaps the most against UNIFIL forces since 1/2008. UNIFIL deadly border violence since the 1973 war. members offered (5/27) as possible ex- Analysts noted (NYT 6/6) that protesters planations (1) the political instability in could not have approached the border Lebanon, (2) Syria’s possible desire to flex fence, normally a Syrian closed military its muscles or create a distraction from its zone, without the acquiescence of the Syr- internal violence (see “Regional Affairs” ian government and that the march was below), and (3) anger in the Palestinian covered live on Syrian television, which refugee camps over UNIFIL’s perceived had been blocking coverage of Syria’s na- failure to prevent the IDF from firing on tionwide antigovernment uprising. Syrian protesters during the Nakba Day March to opposition groups claimed (6/5) that the
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government paid Palestinian refugees as busloads of protesters to approach and much as $1,000 to take part in the march even cross the border into the Golan and promised to pay as much as $10,000 Heights and engage with Israeli troops on to the family of anyone killed, but this Nakba Day on 5/15/11, stressing that pro- could not be corroborated. Hamas in Gaza testers must be thoroughly checked to and Fatah in the West Bank condemned make sure that they did not carry military (6/5) the deaths but in a muted tone, and IDs or weapons. The authenticity could the PA released no official statement, signs not be corroborated, but analysts empha- experts believed (e.g., NYT 6/7) indicated sized (e.g., WT 6/15) that the protesters that the Palestinians felt Syria exploited the never could have organized or moved to- refugee issue to its own ends. ward the border fence without govern- Netanyahu publicly accused (6/6) Asad ment foreknowledge. Israel declined to of abetting Palestinian protesters in “an comment. attempt to divert international attention On 8/15, PLO and UNRWA officials re- from the wholesale killing of civilians that ported for the first time that the Syrian is happening in Syrian cities.” He defended military had hit a Palestinian area, stating IDF actions, saying the army complied that attacks on Latakia in recent days had with international law by warning protest- included assaults on Raml, a Palestinian ers not to approach the border and that refugee neighborhood there. The PLO ac- sharpshooters opened fire “as a last resort” cused the Asad regime of “a crime against after nonlethal means failed to halt their humanity,” but provided no details of the approach; the U.S. State Dept. agreed (6/6) incident. Other Palestinian officials said with Netanyahu’s assessment. The IDF that Raml, while harmed, did not appear to later warned (8/10) that it would engage have been a specific target of the security Syrian military forces if Palestinians in Syria forces. UNRWA said some 10,000 Palestin- attempted to storm the border with the ian refugees had fled the area and that it Golan in connection with the 9/2011 UN had no idea where they were, speculating vote, noting (8/14) that Israel had begun that they had headed into the countryside reinforcing the border fence and laying or to Aleppo. new mines. Of note: An International Atomic En- When funerals for some of the Naksa ergy Agency (IAEA) investigation con- Day victims were held (6/6) in Yarmuk r.c. cluded (5/24) that Syria had very likely near Damascus, 10,000s of angry mourn- been building a secret nuclear reactor at ers attacked the Popular Front for the Lib- Dayr al-Zur when Israel struck in 9/2007 eration of Palestine-General Command (see QU in JPS 146), saying the targeted (PFLP-GC) headquarters and drove away site was probably a reactor intended for Hamas’s Khalid Mishal and the PFLP-GC’s making fuel for nuclear bombs. On 6/9, the Ahmad Jibril, who had come to express IAEA’s governing board voted (17-6, with condolences. They denounced camp lead- 11 abstaining, 1 absent) to report Syria to ers (particularly the PFLP-GC, close to and the UNSC, saying the covert construction strongly supported by Asad’s regime) for at Dayr al-Zur violated its nuclear agree- inciting the youth and putting them in ments. Throughout the quarter, Britain harm’s way to be used as “cannon fodder” and France pressed for a UN res. condemn- against Israel and called for the downfall ing Syria based on the report, but Russia of all political factions. PFLP-GC members threatened a veto, blocking the effort. fired on protesters outside the headquar- ters, sparking clashes that left 14 dead and 43 injured; Mishal and Jibril were not REGIONAL AFFAIRS harmed. The PFLP-GC blamed (6/6) the PA in Ramallah for orchestrating the clash. Regional attention this quarter was di- Meanwhile, with regard to Nakba Day vided between the Arab Spring and the last quarter (see QU in JPS 160), blogger intense diplomatic activity surrounding the Michael Weiss (with London’s Telegraph) Palestinian statehood initiative planned for released (6/14) what he said seemed to the UN in 9/2011. Arab League FMs were be an authentic Syrian government docu- in constant contact with the Palestinians ment dated 5/14/11 that he obtained coordinating and helping to advance the from a well-connected Syrian. The docu- initiative. In total, the Arab League held 4 ment showed orders to the army to allow major meetings on the issue: on 5/28 and
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7/14 to endorse Abbas’s plans to pursue of Latakia on 8/14). Reports emerged of a the initiative, on 8/3–4 to help the PLO mass grave found in Dara‘a (revealed 5/16, begin drafting the formal petition it would unconfirmed) and the brutal torture kill- submit to the UN, and on 7/26 to discuss ing in detention of a 13-yr.-old protester financial contingencies if Israel and the (revealed 5/29, confirmed). The fighting U.S. retaliated by cutting off funds to forced some 30,000 Syrians to flee to Tur- the PA. key and 100s to cross into Lebanon and In terms of regional reactions to displaced 10,000s if not 100,000s inter- Obama’s 5/19 speech, an op-ed in the nally. Activists kept up nationwide daily Washington Post on 6/10 by Saudi Arabia’s protests (up to 100,000 strong on Fridays) Prince Turki al-Faisal (former Saudi intel- but these efforts were localized and ad ligence chief and ambassador to the U.S.) hoc, showing no signs of galvanizing into summed up what seemed to be the com- a coordinated effort to overthrow the re- mon Arab view. After criticizing Obama for gime, and Damascus and Aleppo remained praising democracy movements across the relatively quiet. region while “conspicuously fail[ing] to de- Meanwhile, a group of 300 exiled Syr- mand the same rights to self-determination ian opposition figures met (5/31–6/2) in for Palestinians,” the op-ed was especially Turkey to call for the formation of a tran- harsh about the lead given to Netanyahu to sitional committee and immediate transfer “set the terms of the agenda.” In particular, of power, and 190 domestic opposition Turki emphasized that Obama’s reference figures met (6/27) in Damascus, but there to 1967 lines as a starting point for negotia- was no effort to link up either together or tions represented no change in U.S. policy with the grassroots activists leading the and had long been accepted by Israel as demonstrations on the ground. Local ac- well. Given a U.S. policy “unduly beholden tivists reportedly (NYT, WP 7/1) felt some to Israel,” the op-ed also applauded the Pal- anger that the exiles in particular were at- estinian move to “bypass” the U.S. and Is- tempting to assume the lead role in transi- rael by seeking endorsement for statehood tioning Asad from power. at the UN. During the quarter, the U.S. firmly and repeatedly called for Asad to reform Popular Protests Regionwide or step aside (Obama in his 5/19 policy The regional protests that began in speech, Clinton on 6/2, 7/11, 8/10). Tur- 12/2010 continued this quarter but lost key did likewise (most forcefully on 8/9, some of their idealistic sheen as realization 8/10). The EU and U.S. at several points set in that it would be a long road to true (e.g., 5/18, 5/23, 6/21, 8/10) increased reform. There were no more quick succes- sanctions, and the U.S. froze (7/3) some sions, as in Egypt and Tunisia (see QU in Syrian assets. Up to the end of the quarter, JPS 159). By the end of the quarter, with however, there was no UN action or other lessening focus on the Arab Spring, the im- coordinated international effort to halt As- mediate repercussions of the protests for ad’s crackdown. (Chinese and Russian op- the Palestinian situation and the Arab-Israeli position blocked Britain and France from conflict diminished, though instability in introducing a UNSC resolution to condemn Egypt and Syria was a major concern for the violence.) Israel, the Palestinians, and the U.S. Asad briefly expressed willingness to In Syria, there were reports for the first work with the opposition (in a speech on time of civilians using rocket-propelled 6/20, followed by allowing internal op- grenades and automatic weapons against position leaders to meet on 6/27 and a soldiers (late 5/2011 in the Homs area); of temporary pull-back of troops ca. 6/29), security forces firing on fleeing civilians but the opposition groups were skepti- from helicopter gunships, burning crops, cal and did not seriously engage. Syrian strafing cattle with machine-gun fire, and VP Faruq al-Shara‘a held (7/10–12) a “na- poisoning water sources (early 6/2011 in tional dialogue forum,” offering to discuss the Jisr al-Shughur area near the Turkish a transition to democracy and crediting border in what Amnesty International said demonstrators with forcing the regime to seemed to be “some kind of scorched- consider reforms, but stated that protests earth policy” to drive residents from the must cease before a transition could be- area); and of fire from navy gunboats gin. Some opposition members attended (launching a “sustained bombardment” the session, but many boycotted, calling
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the dialogue a charade. Attendees issued a provide cover for the rebels allied with the final statement calling for various political provisional government in Benghazi to un- and constitutional reforms to promote a seat Col. Mu‘ammar Qaddafi (see NYT 5/27 transition to a multiparty system. The gov- for anonymous NATO officials discussing ernment followed up by passing (7/25) a these unstated goals). However, the NATO new law permitting the formation of oppo- effort was poorly orchestrated and suffered sition parties, but new parties would have without the U.S. oversight and full military to be vetted by a government committee participation it had during the first days of and pledge allegiance to the constitution, the campaign (3/19–23). Without direct which currently guaranteed Ba’ath party U.S. offensive military support and funding supremacy. The law also barred parties from the broader international community, based on tribal, religious, denominational, the NATO intervention only created a vio- or professional affiliation, which would ex- lent stalemate; fierce fighting raged non- clude Islamist parties. Opposition groups stop, with the advantage swinging back and activists dismissed the move as not se- and forth between the Qaddafi loyalists rious and insufficient. and the opposition, with no end in sight as A sharp escalation at the end of 7/2011 the quarter closed. marked a turning point. Following a 7/28 Meanwhile, the international commu- call by grassroots activists for stepped-up nity took further steps to pressure Qaddafi nightly demonstrations during Ramadan to step down and allow the rebels to take (8/1–30), the government launched (7/31) power. The International Criminal Court in major military operations in Hama (7/31–ca. the Hague issued (5/18) arrest warrants for 8/9), Homs (ca. 8/2–5), Dayr al-Zur (8/7–ca. Qaddafi, his son and chosen successor Saif 8/12), Latakia (beginning 8/13, ongoing al-Islam, and his intelligence chief Abdullah at the end of the quarter), and other res- al-Senussi on charges of murdering civil- tive towns to crush the opposition there ians. Western and Middle Eastern countries and stepped up arrest sweeps nationwide approved (6/9) the transfer of frozen Lib- to get as many protesters off the streets as yan government assets to the rebel’s Tran- possible. The worst violence was in Hama, sitional National Council (TNC), pledging where tanks and snipers shelled residen- to send $1 b. immediately and significantly tial areas and fired on anything that moved, more in the coming weeks. At an interna- killing scores. In response to the new tional conference on 7/15, the U.S. and bloodshed, Bahrain (8/9), Kuwait (8/9), 29 other nations recognized the TNC as and Saudi Arabia (8/8) recalled their am- Libya’s legitimate representative; Germany, bassadors; the UNSC finally passed (8/3) Turkey, and several other nations had a tepid resolution expressing “profound done so before and at least 2 (Britain and regret” over the killings in Syria; and Tur- Italy) did so after. The U.S. also transferred key and the U.S. issued (8/10) warnings (ca. 8/3) control of the Libyan embassy of a stiff international response if govern- in Washington (shut down by the U.S. on ment violence did not immediately stop. 3/10/11) to the TNC. On 8/8, Asad had named his army chief The 7/28 assassination in Benghazi of of staff as DM, citing “health reasons” of Gen. Abdul Fattah Younis, head of the TNC the former as cause. Analysts, however, and the rebels’ top military leader, appar- attributed (see NYT 8/9) the change to ently by his own men (who suspected that the former DM’s increasing unhappiness he had never truly cut ties with Qaddafi) about the military crackdown, which con- greatly reinforced existing concerns about tinued through the end of the quarter. As the nature and stability of the transitional of 8/15, the estimated toll stood at more rebel leadership and sparked immediate than 2,000 dead (including around 370 se- worries (e.g., WP 7/29) about the impact curity forces), 1,000s injured, and 15,000 of the assassination on international sup- currently jailed (up from 900 dead, 1,000s port for the rebel movement. The TNC’s injured, and 10,000 jailed at the close of dismissal (8/8) of its entire cabinet follow- last quarter). ing internal disputes over the assassination In Libya, the protests had escalated led some NATO officials to suggest (8/13) into full civil war. NATO-led air strikes be- that concerns over the capabilities of the gun in 3/2011 were extended (6/1) for 90 rebels given interfactional and tribal rifts days, ostensibly to defend a no-fly zone to might jeopardize the renewal of the NATO protect Libyan civilians but essentially to mission beyond 9/2011.
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As of 8/14, NATO reported having car- declared (7/16) formation of a shadow ried out a total of 18,884 sorties, includ- government (“transitional council”) that ing 7,174 strike sorties, since operations would be prepared to take control if Saleh began. The death toll of the conflict was stepped down. Nothing more was heard estimated to be in the low 10,000s, with about the initiative before the quarter’s 10,000s more injured and some 1 m. hav- end. ing fled the country. Elsewhere in the region, the antigov- In Yemen, popular protests (num- ernment protests were on the wane. In bers ranging from the 10,000s to 100,000) Bahrain, the 3-month state of emergency continued during the quarter, but by late imposed on 3/15/11 broke the momentum 5/2011 were largely overshadowed by of protesters. In light of the quiet, the king fighting between government forces, ri- lifted the emergency regulations 2 weeks val tribes, and Islamist groups seeking to early, on 6/1, and announced plans to capitalize on the unrest sparked by anti- open “a comprehensive, serious dialogue” government protests to oust a weakened with the opposition in 7/2011 aimed at Pres. Ali Abdullah Saleh. Last quarter, Gulf relaunching political reforms, but warned Cooperation Council (GCC) mediators had that he would not tolerate a resumption presented Saleh with a deal involving a of demonstrations. (Small demonstrations power transition to Yemen’s formal oppo- were held in some 20 villages around Ma- sition parties (see QU in JPS 160), which nama that day, but very few thereafter. The he resisted. His refusal to sign and fears largest was a rally of 30,000 in Manama on of the fallout from rapid deterioration of 7/15 calling for reforms and democratiza- the situation led the U.S. and EU to reas- tion.) The national dialogue talks began on sess (late 5/2011) their military and eco- 7/2, but the main opposition party broke nomic support for Saleh’s regime, while them off on 7/17, saying the government the EU called (5/23) on Saleh to “transfer was not serious about reform. Meanwhile, power now.” On 6/3, however, Saleh was a special military court convicted (6/22) 21 severely wounded in an assassination at- mostly Shi‘i activists of trying to overthrow tempt by tribal forces aligned with his ri- the government during recent demonstra- val, Gen. Sadiq al-Ahmar. On 6/4, he was tions, sentencing 8 to life in prison and the evacuated (6/4) to Saudi Arabia for treat- others to terms up to 15 years. Another ment and convalescence, vowing to return 137 detained protesters who were facing soon and not to cede power. From Saleh’s military trials were freed on 8/10, though departure through the end of the quarter, the government said some would still face many of the largest demonstrations (e.g., charges in civil court. On 6/29, Saudi Ara- 6/14, 6/17, 6/26, 6/27, 7/17, 8/12) were bia began a “gradual withdrawal” of the popular calls denouncing Saleh’s pledge to 1,000 troops that it sent Bahrain in 3/2011 return and calling for his resignation. (though stating it would not withdraw By early 7/2011, Saudi efforts (begun all); it was unclear how many remained at 6/6) to press the convalescing Saleh to ac- the close of the quarter. Kuwait removed cept the GCC deal and allow his VP and its small contingent on 7/2. The status acting pres. Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi of the 500-member UAE contingent was to begin the transition had failed, while a unknown. cabinet split (6/6) in Sana’a and leadership Protesters in Jordan continued to hold disagreements over how to go forward small weekly Friday antigovernment rallies heightened worries about the situation calling for reform and a halt to corruption, as violence among the political and tribal but protesters were too divided in their factions continued. On 7/10, Obama dis- aims and too easily dispersed by security patched his chief counterterrorism adviser forces to be effective. Only 3 incidents of John Brennan to Riyadh to meet with Saleh serious violence were connected to the to urge him to step down, and then to protest movement: On 6/13, King Abdal- Sana’a (7/11) to urge Hadi to publicly en- lah’s motorcade was stoned by angry pro- dorse the GCC transition plan. The State reform demonstrators in Tafila (south of Dept. later issued (8/8) a statement urg- Amman) who were denied a meeting with ing Hadi to “move forward without” Saleh. the king; riot police intervened, sparking Meanwhile, senior figures in the protest clashes that left as many as 30 police of- movement (many of whom were at odds ficers injured and 5 police cars destroyed. with Yemen’s formal opposition parties) On 6/15, a group of about 10 government
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loyalists raided and vandalized the Agence religious organizations to neutralize oppo- France-Presse offices in Amman as punish- sition. Some small protests in the Eastern ment for reporting the attack. On 7/15, Province by Shi‘i activists demanding ba- club-wielding police officers beat 100s sic rights and release of political prisoners nonviolent protesters marching after Fri- were reported but were apparently minor. day prayers in Amman, as well as several By the end of the quarter, the interim journalists covering the event, causing no governments in Egypt and Tunisia were serious injuries. slowly working their way forward. Tunisia In response to widespread calls for delayed (6/8) its first democratic elections democratization, King Abdallah pledged from 7/2011 to 10/23/11, citing the work (6/12) that the government would be needed to organize the vote and make sure elected, not appointed, in the future, but that all 3 million eligible Tunisians were he did not set a timetable. (Currently, properly recorded in the electoral database the lower house of parliament is elected and had valid identity cards. No major pro- and the upper house and cabinet are ap- tests were reported. pointed.) On 7/2, he shuffled the cabinet Egypt’s transitional military council ef- to replace 3 ministers involved in bribery ficiently handled day-to-day governance, and corruption scandals. At the close of but progress on implementing reforms the quarter, Abdallah unveiled a proposal was slow. As a result, and in response to for constitutional reforms ceding some of unpopular decisions, mass rallies in Tahrir his powers to parliament and enhancing Square were often held (e.g., 5/27, 6/28, civil liberties, but activists said the pro- 6/29, 7/6, 7/23, 7/29) as reminders of the posed changes did not go far enough. people’s expectations and as warnings In Kuwait and Morocco, leaders rec- of “The Revolution, Part 2.” A small tent ommended political reforms, increased camp was revived in the square on 7/8 subsidies on basic goods, and approved but dispersed by security forces on 8/1. salary increases for civil servants aimed The only serious violence was reported on at warding off antigovernment protests. 7/23, when 100s of protesters engaged in While this succeeded in Kuwait, in Mo- hours of street clashes with security forces rocco 10,000s protested (6/26, 7/3), call- in Cairo, leaving 150 injured and marking ing the king’s proposed constitutional the worst violence since Mubarak fell. reforms inadequate. Meanwhile, progress on elections was Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia was (in WP also slow. Parliamentary elections had 5/29’s words) “flexing its financial and dip- been targeted for 9/2011 and presidential lomatic might across the Middle East in elections for 10/2011 or 11/2011, but by a wide-ranging bid to contain the tide of the end of the quarter no exact dates had change” in the region sparked by the Arab been set and no logistical preparations Spring, seeking to protect itself and its al- reported, though the council declared lies (particularly Sunni Arab monarchies) (7/20) that it would not allow international from popular discontent and to counter monitors, saying (as Mubarak had done Iran. Besides granting (ca. 5/20) $4 b. in before) they would undermine Egypt’s aid to Egypt, reportedly to shore up the sovereignty. Under popular pressure, the military council against the Muslim Broth- transitional military council swore in a erhood, there was continued though re- new cabinet led by PM Essam Sharaf that duced military presence in Bahrain (see includes 12 new members and 13 old above), a proposal to include the king- members, removing long-standing cabinet doms of Jordan and Morocco in the GCC ministers with ties to Mubarak who had (preliminary talks were underway at the not yet been purged. end of the quarter), and construction of The trial of Mubarak and several mem- a massive new, self-contained, bunkered bers of his inner circle opened on 8/3 embassy complex in Amman (strategi- but was not concluded before the end cally located near Amman’s airport). The of the quarter. Initially, it was aired on New York Times reported (6/9) that since live TV and on giant screens outside the the start of the Arab Spring, the kingdom courthouse, but after fights broke out had spent $130 b. domestically on new between Mubarak supporters and oppo- salary subsidy programs (giving all gov- nents watching the proceedings, the chief ernment employees an extra 2 months’ justice announced on 8/15 that the trial salary), housing projects, and donations to would no longer be televised, outraging
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democracy advocates, who had pushed for Turkey said this was not intended. Mean- transparency. while, Turkey prepared 4 Red Crescent refugee camps along the border to care for Turkey some 30,000 Syrians fleeing the violence and 1,000s more camped on the Syrian Turkish Mediation Efforts side of the border considering whether to Turkey continued to promote itself as flee. The number of refugees inside the a regional peace broker this quarter, inter- camps seemed to fluctuate throughout the jecting itself into several issues, including quarter, with refugees entering and return- trying to help advance Palestinian recon- ing depending on the level of violence. ciliation and the formation of a transitional Turkey said (6/20) it had the capacity to Palestinian unity government, and efforts care for 250,000 refugees, though it hoped to halt the bloodshed in Syria. it would not come to that. On the Palestinian front, Turkish FM Ah- Turkey also offered (6/10) Qaddafi a met Davutoglu met with Hamas’s Mishal in “guarantee” to leave Libya (no details re- Istanbul on 6/21 and with Fatah’s Abbas in leased) and end the fighting, but there was Ankara on 6/22 to discuss implementation no response. of the national unity agreement reached in 5/2011. Though Abbas and Mishal were in Turkish-Israeli Reconciliation Effort Turkey at the same time, they did not try On 6/20, an anonymous senior Israeli to meet. Turkish PM Tayyib Recep Erdo- official revealed that Israel and Turkey gan received Abbas on 6/24 and pledged were engaged in intensive secret talks to Turkey’s help in mobilizing support for the try to prevent a further diplomatic crisis Palestinian statehood initiative at the UN. over Israel’s 5/2010 attack on the Turkish On the sidelines of a 2-day conference of aid flotilla to Gaza that killed 9 Turkish ac- Palestinian ambassadors held in Istanbul tivists aboard the Mavi Marmara (see QU (ca. 7/22) to discuss the UN statehood ini- in JPS 157). The final report of the UN’s tiative, Abbas met with Erdogan and Davu- Palmer Commission investigating the flo- toglu again to discuss regional affairs, the tilla attack had been scheduled for release Palestinian statehood initiative, Palestinian in early 7/2011, but the preliminary con- national reconciliation, and bilateral rela- clusions shown to the Turkish and Israeli tions. In a 5/20 interview with the Wall representatives to the commission had Street Journal, Turkish pres. Abdullah Gül sparked anger on both sides that threat- called on Hamas to recognize Israel’s right ened to deepen the divide, leading to the to exist to facilitate the national unity ac- convening of the talks (confirmed 6/20 by cord, stating that he had already privately Turkish FMin and U.S. officials). Accord- pressed the movement to do so. ing to UN insiders, the draft shown had Turkey repeatedly called on Syria to concluded that Israel’s siege of Gaza was institute massive, radical reforms quickly legal under international law but that Is- and halt violence to save the regime. raeli commandos had used excessive and When Syria ignored the appeals, Turkey disproportionate force to halt the flotilla; first hosted (5/31–6/2) 300 exiled Syrian Turkey was faulted for not doing enough opposition figures in Antalya for a 3-day to prevent its departure. “Syrian Conference for Change” to discuss On 7/6, the UN announced postpone- establishing a “transitional council” for ment of the Palmer report’s release until Syria. On 8/9, Turkish FM Davutoglu held 7/27 to give Israel and Turkey time to for- a 6-hour meeting with Asad in Damascus, mulate a joint statement to be issued at the delivering a strong message from Secy. of same time as the report that could convey State Clinton and warning that continued a sense of reconciliation, disperse tensions, assaults would give the West cover for and put the issue in the past. (An Israeli stronger action. When no immediate con- official stated: “We were looking for [this] cessions were forthcoming, Erdogan pub- to be . . . a ladder where everyone could licly warned (8/10) that Asad had 2 weeks climb down.”) Turkish and Israeli posi- to implement reforms or face serious con- tions, however, seemed stuck where they sequences. Some Syrian activists (e.g., WP were last quarter (see QU in JPS 160), with 8/13, 8/15) complained that this appeared Turkey demanding an apology for the at- to give Asad a green light to carry out his tack on the Mavi Marmara, and Israel say- crackdown for another 2 weeks, though ing that at most it would express regret.
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(Diplomats said [7/6] that they were trying above). The EU expanded (5/23) travel to find wording that would come across as sanctions and froze assets of another 100 an apology in Turkish but not in Hebrew.) Iranian companies, entities, and individu- With discussions apparently still far from als, while the U.S. barred (5/24) American agreement on 7/25, the UN postponed re- interaction with an additional 7 foreign lease of the report to 8/20. firms (including 1 Israeli company and its On 7/28, Israeli DM Barak, visiting Singapore affiliate) that had helped Iran to Washington, told U.S. officials that Israel’s import gasoline in contravention of exist- current proposal to Turkey was that Israel ing sanctions. The U.S. also imposed (6/9) would apologize to Turkey for “mistakes new bilateral sanctions on Iran’s police made, if there were any” in exchange for chief, the Republican Guard Corps, the Turkey barring legal action against the Is- Basij militiamen, and law enforcement bod- raeli troops involved. Barak said that U.S. ies that claimed to be involved in attacks Secy. of State Clinton endorsed the for- on Iranian voters in 2009. At the close of mula, but the State Dept. said that while the quarter, Washington was considering Clinton and Barak had discussed the issue, new sanctions against Iran’s police force it was up to Israel and Turkey to decide. and several senior security officials in con- Later, on 8/11, anonymous Israeli nection with Iran’s alleged role in the vio- sources said that Israel had made an “infor- lence in Syria. mal offer” to pay $100,000 in restitution As in previous quarters (e.g., QUs in JPS to the families of each of the 9 Turks killed 158 and 160), credible rumors circulated during the Mavi Marmara assault. In ex- that the Western powers and Israel had ac- change, Israel wanted Turkey to rescind tive covert programs to undermine Iran. demands for an apology over the incident The German daily Der Spiegel cited (8/2) and accept a statement that Israel “deeply anonymous Israeli intelligence sources as regrets” the deaths. Meanwhile, the Israeli confirming that the Mossad was responsi- Foreign Min. said the government had yet to ble for the late-7/2011 assassination in Teh- decide whether it would send a new ambas- ran of Iranian nuclear scientist Darioush sador to Ankara when the current ambassa- Rezaei. Rezaei’s killing marked the 3d as- dor’s term ran out at the end of 2011. sassination of an Iranian nuclear physicist in 20 months as “part of a campaign to sab- Iran otage, or at least slow down, Iran’s nuclear With international attention focused on program,” according to Israeli intelligence the Arab Spring and the Israeli-Palestinian sources quoted by Der Spiegel. Israel did peace impasse, there was no serious di- not officially confirm or deny the report. plomacy on Iran by the P5+1 (the 5 UNSC Iran stated (5/21) that it had arrested 30 permanent members and Germany) this people on charges of operating a CIA spy quarter. Just before the quarter opened (on network; the U.S. did not comment. 5/10/11), Iran had accepted in principle Meanwhile, Tehran announced (6/8) EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton’s that it was moving production of highly 2/2011 invitation to renew talks on halting enriched uranium from Natanz to a facility Iran’s nuclear program but apparently only in a mountain bunker where it planned to if the key issue of uranium enrichment was triple output and quality. The Natanz fa- off the table (see QU in JPS 160). Ashton cility currently enriched uranium to 3.5% made no effort this quarter to revive the purity, adequate for energy purposes; the talks. On 7/11, Iran said that it would be new facility would enrich to 20% purity, willing to expand cooperation with the which the government said would be bet- IAEA, but only if the agency dropped its ter for producing nuclear isotopes for investigation into claims that Iran had a medical purposes, but Western sources secret nuclear weapons program; the IAEA noted could also be a step toward produc- immediately rejected this as contrary to its ing weapons grade uranium (90% enrich- basic mandate. ment). Iran also held (6/27–7/6) 10 days The U.S. and EU did expand sanctions of naval, ground, and missile exercises, against Iran aimed at forcing greater ac- including tests of short-, middle-, and long- commodation on the nuclear issue and to range missiles (some capable of carrying punish it for allegedly aiding the Syrian nuclear warheads), drones, and air defense government crackdown on domestic un- systems. In the process, Tehran unveiled rest (see “Popular Protests Regionwide” (6/27) underground missile silos designed
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to make missiles less vulnerable to attack. stressed that each case must be weighed In addition, the IAEA concluded (5/24) individually, apparently to counter inter- that Iran had carried out research to build national criticism that the U.S. response to a triggering device that could only be used the uprisings, ranging from military inter- for a nuclear weapon. vention in Libya to ignoring crackdowns in Saudi Arabia, had been inconsistent and self-serving.) INTERNATIONAL On this basis, Obama stated, the U.S. would support transitions to democracy United States even in places where transition “has yet This quarter, the Obama admin. was to take place.” Here he pointed to Syria, primarily concerned with the Palestinian stating for the first time that Pres. Bashar statehood bid at the UN, the possibility al-Asad “can lead the transition or get of reviving direct Israeli-Palestinian nego- out of the way,” and that until then the tiations, the long-term effects of the Arab U.S. would actively “challenge” him from Spring, and the upcoming 2012 presiden- abroad. He also urged Yemen’s pres. Ali tial elections. Abdullah Saleh to transfer power and U.S. ally Bahrain to take serious steps toward Obama’s 5/19 Speech as Policy democratic reform and to open a credible Reassessment dialogue with its opposition. As alluded to above (see “Obama’s Emphasizing the importance of parallel 5/19 Speech and the Peace Process” in political and economic reform, Obama an- the “Palestinian-Israel Conflict” section), nounced major new economic initiatives Obama’s major Middle East policy speech to foster democratic change, including bil- at the State Dept. on 5/19 (see Doc. D1) lions of dollars in debt relief, loan guaran- was meant to redefine U.S. interests in tees, and trade and development offers for the region in light of the Arab Spring and Egypt and Tunisia. (The EU, meanwhile, the 5/1/11 U.S. assassination of al-Qa‘ida announced billions of dollars in develop- leader Osama Bin Laden. (The address was ment aid for Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and timed for noon in Washington, which was other regional states.) He also promised to evening prime time in the Middle East, to reward states or movements that work for reach both domestic and regional audi- a transition to democracy by helping them ences.) Obama argued that the regional to integrate into the global economy, with uprisings coinciding with the end of U.S. special emphasis on building a regional combat missions in Iraq, the pending draw- trade and investment regime in the Middle down of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and the East, similar to efforts in the EU and former growing irrelevance of al-Qa‘ida created a Soviet states. (This model strongly rein- moment of opportunity for a “new chapter forced existing U.S.-Israeli demands, not in American diplomacy.” He stressed that explicitly repeated in this speech, for Arab the U.S. would continue to pursue its his- states to normalize relations with Israel to toric core interests in the region (e.g., halt- encourage Israel to make peace.) ing nuclear weapons, ensuring free flow The above messages (with the excep- of trade, guaranteeing Israel’s security, and tion of Obama’s first call for Syria’s pres. pursuing peace), which are in the interests Asad to step aside) were largely lost in the of all nations, but that now more atten- ensuing uproar over Obama’s statements tion must be paid to the needs and desires on the peace process and the dispute be- of the region’s masses. Thus, while the tween Obama and Netanyahu over 1967 theme of his 2009 Cairo speech that U.S. lines. Overall, Obama’s speech was gener- relations with the Middle East and Muslim ally seen (e.g., Brookings, Huffington Post world must be based on mutual interest 5/19) as weak and lacking substance or and mutual respect (see Doc. D2 in JPS vision. 153) was still valid, the U.S.’s top priori- ties must now include weighing the stabil- 2012 Election Jockeying Begins ity of nations against the citizens’ right to By the opening of the quarter, a number self-determination; while repression might of Republicans had declared their intention provide short-term stability, only political to run for president in 2012 and were po- and economic reform and democratization sitioning themselves for the 8/2012 Iowa could ensure long-term stability. (He also straw poll. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
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though often an issue in elections, became Hoyer [D-MD]) joined Republicans in cen- a prime focus for the Republicans in light suring Obama for repeating his position of the stalled peace process and difficult on 1967 lines, saying the president was relationship between Obama and Netan- forcing Israel to give away too much, too yahu. As such, the Republicans pounced soon. on the 5/19 speech to make themselves seem “more reliable protectors of Israel U.S.-Israel Relations than the Democrats,” stressing that Obama Israeli DM Barak visited Washington should “not be trying to push Israel into a 7/26–28 to meet with senior U.S. officials deal that is not good for Israel.” Republican (including VP Biden, Secy. of State Clinton, presidential front-runner Mitt Romney ac- Defense Secy. Leon Panetta, and NSA Doni- cused (ca. 5/24) Obama of throwing Israel lon) as part of the regular U.S.-Israel stra- “under the bus,” and presidential candidate tegic dialogue. Issues discussed included Tim Pawlenty said (ca. 5/24) the president Iran, the Arab Spring, and the Palestinian had made a “mistaken and very dangerous statehood initiative at the UN; the only demand” in calling for 1967 lines as the ba- detail released was that Israel reiterated its sis of peace talks. The tumultuous applause long-standing position that it would not Netanyahu received when he appeared rule out a preemptive strike on Iran’s nu- before Congress on 5/24 (see “Netanyahu clear sites. On 7/29, Barak traveled to New Addresses Congress” above) could be seen York to meet with UN Secy.-Gen. Ban, who as an effort by Democrats and Republicans urged Israel to halt settlement construction to outbid each other in support for Israel, and return to negotiations. with the 2012 elections in mind. On 7/8, Daniel Shapiro replaced James In the same vein, some sources sug- Cunningham as ambassador to Israel. Sha- gested (e.g., JTA, WP 5/23) that Obama’s piro had previously coordinated Jewish 5/22 AIPAC speech was aimed especially outreach for Obama’s 2008 presidential at Jewish voters and donors in light of the campaign and when named ambassador 2012 presidential elections. In addition was director for the Middle East and North to clarifying his positions on the peace Africa at the National Security Council process in the 5/19 speech to make them (NSC). He was replaced at NSC by Steve seem more in line with Netanyahu’s Simon, who held (ca. 6/19) an “introduc- views (see “The AIPAC Speeches” above), tory phone call” with leaders of the U.S. Obama stressed his “ironclad” support Jewish community to “establish [a] Jewish for Israel, Israel’s security as a personal rapport,” according to a participant in the and national priority, and the efforts he conference call, who also noted Simon’s has made on Israel’s behalf, including: stress on his personal visits to Israel as well supporting funding for the Iron Dome as his work experience, which includes anti-missile defense system, guaranteeing stints at the NSC under the Clinton admin. Israel’s qualitative military edge, working and as Middle East expert at RAND Corp. to curb Iran, and opposing attempts to and the Council on Foreign Relations. He delegitimize Israel. Specifically, he cited has also written a book on the Iranian nu- his opposition to the Palestinian state- clear threat (recommending a containment hood initiative at the UN, his refusal to policy until Iran halts its program) and has attend the upcoming Durban review con- recommended opening a quiet dialogue ference (see “United Nations” below), his with Hizballah to urge it to disarm. rejection of the UN’s 9/15/09 Goldstone report on Operation Cast Lead (see QU Congress in JPS 154), his continual support for Is- There was an overwhelming push this rael’s right to self-defense, and his veto quarter in Congress to pass legislation to of the 2/18/11 UN resolution on the il- punish the Palestinians if they took their legality of Jewish settlements (see QU in statehood initiative to the UN or allowed JPS 160), which he described as a Pales- Hamas to join a unity government. To this tinian “effort . . . to insert the United Na- end, 1 measure was introduced in the Sen- tions into matters that should be resolved ate and 5 were introduced in the House; of through direct negotiations.” Even some these, 2 went to vote and were passed, 1 senior Democrats at the conference (in- was sent to the full House for debate, and cluding Senate majority leader Harry Reid 3 were referred to committee for further [D-NV] and House minority whip Steny consideration.
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All but 6 members of Congress voted to the PA unless the secy. of state can cer- in favor of nonbinding Senate and House tify to Congress PA compliance with a companion measures (S.Res.185 and number of demands, including: excluding H.Res. 268) vowing to “consider restric- Hamas from government (unless Hamas tions on aid to the [PA] should it persist in recognizes Israel and renounces violence), efforts to circumvent direct negotiations recognizing Israel as a Jewish state, dis- by turning to the United Nations or other mantling and “bring[ing] to justice” any international bodies” (quoting the Senate group that takes part in terrorism or incite- version) and vowing to oppose the inclu- ment against Israel, and ceasing all par- sion of Hamas in any Palestinian unity gov- ticipation in boycotts of Israel (including ernment unless it accepted peace with boycott of settlement-made goods). Israel and renounced violence. S.Res.185, On 6/21, Rep. Thaddeus McCotter sponsored by Sens. Ben Cardin (D-MD) and (R-MI), with 1 cosponsor, introduced H.R. Susan Collins (R-ME), passed unanimously 2261 to withhold funding to the UN or any on 6/28. H.Res. 268, endorsed by AIPAC UN agency if the UN or any UN body sup- and sponsored by House majority leader ports recognition of an independent Pal- Rep. Eric Cantor (R-VA) and minority whip estinian state. Rep. Steve Chabot (R-OH) Rep. Hoyer, passed by 406-6 on 7/7. introduced (6/3) H. Res. 297 expressing a Similarly, Republicans in the House, led similar sense of Congress. by Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), sub- Other House measures on Isra- mitted (7/19) to the House Foreign Affairs el-Palestine initiated this quarter but sent Comm. the draft FY 2012 Foreign Rela- to committee for further consideration tions Authorization Act (H.R. 2699) with were: (1) H.R. 2589, known as the “Antiboy- proposed amendments that would: (1) cott Act,” that would make permanent the expand the existing U.S. ban on dealing ban against participation in the Arab League with PA governments that include Hamas boycott of Israel (introduced on 7/7); (2) in the cabinet to include barring the U.S. H. Res. 314 declaring that it is U.S. policy to from dealing with any “member of Hamas support Israel in seeking peace that results or any other foreign terrorist organization in a 2-state solution with a “nonmilitarized serv[ing] in any policy position in a minis- Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace try, agency, or instrumentality of the [PA]”; and security with the Jewish State of Israel, (2) condition U.S. funding to the PA on the home of the Jewish people” (intro- White House certification to Congress that duced on 6/16); and (3) H.Res. 317 marking the PA had halted all anti-Israel incitement the 5th anniversary of IDF Cpl. Gilad Shalit’s in every PA-controlled venue and publica- capture and calling for his immediate re- tion; (3) set 1/1/2014 as the deadline for lease (introduced on 6/21). moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem; (4) The House Defense Appropriations ban all military aid to Lebanon until presi- Comm. approved (6/3) a recommenda- dential certification that the Lebanese gov- tion to increase aid to Israel for the David’s ernment was dismantling terrorist groups Sling and Arrow 3 missile defense pro- (especially Hizballah); and (5) limit the grams $235.7 m. in FY 2012 from $217.7 president’s ability to waive these clauses m. in FY 2011. The change must still be for national security reasons. The amend- incorporated into the FY 2012 defense ap- ments were debated by the committee on propriations act to become final, though 7/21 and 7/22, and, after the Democrats this was expected to occur. blocked amendments 2 and 4 as undermin- The State Dept. granted (6/29) ing the president’s ability to make foreign $500,000 for a study to examine incite- policy, the revised draft was sent to the ment in Israeli and Palestinian textbooks to full House for consideration. When de- be conducted by the Council of Religious bate on the act started in the full House on Institutions of the Holy Land, a Jerusalem- 7/26, the only point on which Democrats based organization of Islamic, Jewish, and and Republicans concurred was on increas- Christian religious leaders. The study will ing aid to Israel to $3.075 b. (as previously involve a team of 6 bilingual researchers agreed by Israel and the U.S. as part of the (3 Israeli Jews, 3 Palestinians) examining existing 10-year aid plan). the poems, narrative descriptions, maps, On 7/7, Rep. Joe Walsh (R-IL) and 34 stories, photographs, and illustrations in cosponsors introduced the Palestinian Ac- 141 Palestinian and 486 Israeli textbooks countability Act (H.R. 2457) to bar funding used from grades 1 to 12. The State Dept.’s
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grant comes from a $4 m. fund appropri- funds benefit the terrorist organization Hiz- ated by Congress for work pertaining to ballah or any party that allies itself with religious freedom. The results, due in 2011 Hizballah.” or early 2012, will be used to make educa- More than 90 senators signed (8/4) a tional reform recommendations to the Pal- letter urging Obama to implement sanc- estinian and Israeli governments. tions targeting Iran’s central bank. The let- As of 8/8, at least 81 House reps. ter was initiated by Sens. Charles Schumer planned to tour Israel during summer (D-NY) and Mark Kirk (R-IL). recess. The trips were to be funded by AIPAC’s affiliate, the American Israel Edu- Lobbies cation Foundation (AIEF). Of the partici- As noted, the most influential lobby- pants, two-thirds were Republicans and 47 ing venue this quarter was AIPAC’s an- were freshmen. AIEF specifically targeted nual conference in Washington (5/22–24), Republicans because they had pushed where Obama and Netanyahu were main hardest for deep budget cuts to stem the speakers (see “The AIPAC Speeches” U.S. debt crisis, and AIEF wanted to press above). A main purpose of the confer- them to protect aid to Israel from the ence was to identify the most important spending cuts. Of note: Rep. Eric Cantor themes to be addressed by pro-Israel activ- (R-VA) said (8/15) that the fact that “the ists during their lobbying day on Capitol White House and president have not been Hill (5/24). This year, the themes were: as clear” as possible in support of the U.S. containing Iran, isolating the PA if unity special relationship with Israel “has added plans with Hamas were pursued, blocking interest on the part of the members” to the Palestinian statehood initiative at the show solidarity with Israel, particularly UN, and maintaining aid levels to Israel de- against the security threat from Iran. At spite the economic downturn. More than least 1 of the delegations met (8/11) in 10,000 activists representing all 50 states Ramallah with Abbas, who urged them to attended the conference, and congressio- support the statehood initiative. nal turnout included 67 U.S. senators and On 8/5, 221 members of Congress 286 representatives attending the gala ban- signed (8/5) letters to Obama urging him quet (5/23). Republican presidential con- to impose stronger sanctions on Syria. The tenders Newt Gingrich and Rep. Michele House letter was initiated by Reps. Ros- Bachmann (MN) and newly appointed Lehtinen (R-FL) and Berman (D-CA), the Democratic Party chairwoman Rep. Deb- senior members of the House Foreign Af- bie Wasserman Schultz (FL) held “after fairs Comm.; the Senate letter was orga- parties” to fete conference delegates and nized by Sens. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) and dignitaries. Jim DeMint (R-SC). In addition, the Senate Coinciding with the AIPAC confer- and House introduced companion drafts ence (5/21–24), the U.S. Campaign to of the Syria Sanctions Act of 2011 (S.1472 End the Occupation and Code Pink to- introduced on 8/2, H.R. 2106 introduced gether held their own conference titled on 6/3) that would penalize companies “Move Over AIPAC” to offer a more criti- that invest in Syria’s energy sector to pun- cal view of Israeli and U.S. policies. The ish the Asad government for its ongoing conference focused on “the extraordinary domestic crackdown and its long-standing influence AIPAC has on U.S. policy and material support to regional “terrorist” how to strengthen an alternative view groups (e.g., Hamas, Hizballah). that respects the rights of all people in In mid-6/2011 (after a new Lebanese the region.” Speakers included interna- government with a Hizballah majority was tional law experts Stephen Walt and John formed), Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA), who Mearsheimer and veteran journalist Helen is Jewish, and Reps. Darrell Issa (R-CA), Thomas. Charles Boustany (R-LA), and Nick Rahall More than 5,000 people attended (D-WV), who are Lebanese-Americans, (7/18–20) the 6th annual Christians United formed an unusual bipartisan alliance to for Israel (CUFI) conference in Washing- cosponsor the Hizballah Anti-Terrorism Act ton. CUFI declared that it was now the (H.R. 2216) that would eliminate U.S. aid largest pro-Israel organization in the U.S. to Lebanon if Hizballah was in the ruling with 700,000 members and 100s of pro- government. The draft stated that the bill Israel events across the country each would “make certain that no U.S. taxpayer year. CUFI also touted its college campus
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coordination program that arranges some and some 30 injured. While the Popular 350 pro-Israel campus events per year “to Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) counter anti-Israel activity by groups sup- claimed responsibility for the bombing, porting the Palestinians.” Netanyahu ad- the families sought $300 m. in damages dressed the conference by video, while from the PA, arguing that the PA as govern- Israeli amb. to the U.S. Michael Oren spoke ing body bore responsibility. The PA ini- in person. Right-wing commentator Glenn tially would not contest the case, arguing Beck, keynote speaker at the main “Night that U.S. courts had no jurisdiction, and to Honor Israel” banquet, told attendees allowed the court to rule in favor of the that “every person will be judged by God plaintiffs by default. In the 7/10 ruling, the by how they treat Israel.” The capstone judge dismissed the default judgment on event—modeled (like the entire confer- the grounds that the PA was now willing ence) on AIPAC—involved a day (7/20) on to mount a defense. Capitol Hill, urging their representatives A U.S. appellate court in Washington, to oppose Palestinian statehood efforts at DC, overturned a previous ruling to allow the UN. the family of a U.S. security contractor J Street brought Israeli generals (re- killed in a roadside bombing attack on a tired and reserve) to Washington on 7/26 State Dept. convoy in 2003 (see QU in JPS to meet with high-ranking U.S. officials 130) to sue the PA for damages. The suit (including the White House, State Dept., alleged that PASF abetted “terrorism” by Pentagon, and NSC) and with members of giving the bombers the explosives and the Congress to urge the U.S. to make a greater planned timing and route of the convoy effort to broker Israeli-Palestinian peace. and by failing to prevent the attack. At the They also urged opening direct talks with time, the Popular Resistance Committees Hamas, stating that “you negotiate with (an umbrella group comprising all Palestin- whoever is on the other side of the table.” ian factions) took responsibility. The group included Gens. Nehemiah Da- In late-5/2011, an American-Lebanese gan (former IDF chief education officer), couple, Hor and Amera Akl, agreed to a Shlomo Gazit (former military intelligence plea deal in which they would confess to chief), and Natan Sharoni (former IDF plan- planning to courier $1 m. to Hizballah in ning chief). exchange for sentences of 7 years or less. In mid-6/2011, American supporters of (A conviction of providing material sup- jailed spy for Israel Jonathan Pollard shut port to a designated terrorist organization down the White House switchboard by could have resulted in life sentences.) The flooding it with calls urging Pollard’s re- couple was arrested in 6/2010 after they lease to attend his father’s 6/20 funeral. accepted the first $200,000 from an FBI The Netanyahu admin. also officially re- agent, with plans to hide the cash in an quested that the Obama admin. grant SUV imported to Lebanon. Pollard a leave from prison to attend the The FBI added (7/6) to its most wanted funeral. The Conference of Presidents of list Fouzi Ayoub, a Canadian citizen and Major American Jewish Organizations is- native of Lebanon who once lived in Michi- sued (6/20) a statement “regretting” the gan and was charged in 2009 with plotting administration’s decision not to allow him to travel to Israel to detonate a bomb on to attend. Pollard had been estranged from behalf of Hizballah. His whereabouts were his family since 1996, so the move was unknown. seen (e.g., JTA 6/20) as purely political. On 7/26, Israeli amb. Oren visited Pollard Russia in prison to hear his latest plea for Israel to appeal to Obama for clemency and Russia’s hosting of the 5/22 Fatah- release. Hamas meeting to sign their under- standings on implementing their unity Legal Action agreement (see “National Reconciliation” A U.S. federal judge dismissed (7/10) a above) marked one of Russia’s most signifi- default judgment against the PA in a case cant interventions in the peace process in brought by survivors and families of vic- years; Mustafa Barghouti, of the Palestin- tims of a 2002 bombing in Karnei Shomron ian National Initiative, stated (5/22) that it settlement in which 3 teenagers (includ- elevated Russia to cosponsor (along with ing 2 with U.S. citizenship) were killed Egypt) of reconciliation talks.
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On 5/18, Israel acknowledged that foreign policy adviser Catherine Ashton Russia had expelled its military attaché, urging the EU to oppose the Palestinians’ Vadim Leiderman, from its Moscow em- unilateral bid for statehood. Ashton was bassy for spying, stating that the charges in Washington for the senior-level Quartet were unfounded. Russia said (5/18) that meetings to discuss possibly launching a it had warned Israel 3 times that Leider- new initiative to revive the peace talks (see man had inappropriately contacted Rus- “The Quartet Meets” above). sian military officials without coordinating with the Russian FMin. and had expelled United Nations him the 4th time he did so. Russian se- curity officials said Leiderman attempted Though the upcoming 9/2011 UNGA to obtain information on secret military session was of major interest this quarter sales to Arab states, recruited Russian ci- because of the Palestinian statehood initia- vilians as spies for Israel, and inappro- tive, few actions affecting the peace pro- priately lobbied on behalf of an Israeli cess took place in UN bodies. defense company. Soon after, a senior Rus- The UN issued (7/6) a report on the Na- sian government minister canceled (5/23) kba Day bloodshed on the Israel-Lebanon a planned visit to Israel for defense talks border on 5/15, concluding that Israeli amid tensions over the issue. troops “used direct live fire against un- armed demonstrators” and that “other than firing initial warning shots, the [IDF] European Union did not use conventional crowd control EU efforts on the peace process this methods or any other method than lethal quarter focused on reviving Palestinian- weapons against the demonstrators,” call- Israeli peace talks and on the anticipated ing Israel’s actions disproportionate and in 9/2011 Palestinian statehood bid at the violation of UN Res. 1701, ending the 2006 UN. European parliament pres. Jerzy Buzek Lebanon war. The report, based on UNIFIL toured (ca. 6/13–15) Israel and the Pal- reports, dealt only with the marches on estinian territories. In his address to the the Lebanon border, where the IDF killed Knesset on 6/15, he stated that the EU sup- 7 protesters and wounded 111 (see QU in ported both Obama’s call for negotiations JPS 160 for details). based on 1967 borders with agreed swaps For the first time since its creation in and France’s proposal for a conference in 12/1968, the UN Special Committee to Paris to explore reviving peace talks (see Investigate Israeli Practices in Occupied “Revival of the French Initiative” above). Territories gained entry (mid-7/2011) to Buzek also visited Gaza (6/13), where he Gaza, facilitated by the new Egyptian gov- called on Israel to lift its blockade immedi- ernment via the Rafah crossing. Previously, ately; and Ramallah (6/14), where he told the committee had been barred by Israel PA officials that while the EU does not op- from entering any of the occupied terri- pose Palestinian unilateral efforts at the tories—a restriction Egypt had observed, UN, it strongly favors negotiations as the forcing the committee to interview West best route to a viable, long-standing peace Bank and Gaza Palestinians twice a year with Israel. in Cairo, Amman, or Damascus. On 7/29, As was the case last quarter (see QU in the committee released a report express- JPS 160), Palestinian and Israel officials lob- ing dismay at Israel’s “continuing disre- bied EU members throughout the quarter gard of its obligations under international to either support or oppose the Palestinian law” and condemning Israel’s “oppressive statehood initiative at the UN. In addition, restrictions imposed on Gaza” as having 20 prominent Israelis (including former “the effect of collectively punishing the Knesset speaker Avraham Burg, former population.” FMin. dir-gen. Alon Leil, and Nobel laure- The Obama admin. formally confirmed ate Daniel Kahneman) signed a 5/27 letter (6/1) that the U.S. would not participate to European leaders urging them to sup- in the international gathering marking the port a Palestinian declaration of statehood 10th anniversary of the 2001 World Con- as a “positive, constructive step” given the ference Against Racism (WCAR) in Dur- peace impasse. ban to be held at the UN in 9/2011, as the On 7/11, 106 of 736 members of the meeting was expected to reinforce the European parliament sent a letter to EU original WCAR summit’s “ugly displays of
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This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 30 Mar 2015 11:09:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 188 Journal of Palestine Studies
intolerance and anti-Semitism” toward Is- DONORS rael. Senior U.S. officials had suggested for months that the U.S. would boycott the No major donor meetings were held conference but had not officially informed this quarter. Even the Local Development organizers (see QU in JPS 159). Forum, the body that oversees donor co- In late-6/2011, UNESCO’s World Heri- ordination on the ground, did not appear tage Committee condemned Israel over to convene as it typically does quarterly or planned renovations at the Mughrabi Gate monthly to assess how the PA is meeting its in East Jerusalem based on a complaint budget and development goals. A special do- filed by Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, the nor’s session to discuss the Palestinian civil UAE, and others. Israel expressed particu- defense system was held on 7/26 in Ramal- lar anger at Jordan, saying the kingdom lah, but no details were publicly released. Of signed an agreement with Israel endorsing the 4 main donor “strategy groups” (SGs), the construction. only the governance and reform SG met (7/5). Various SG subcommittees did hold Other regular follow-up meetings, however. These included the economic SG’s fiscal sector At the 50th anniversary ministerial con- working group (SWG; 6/30), agriculture ference of the Organization for Economic SWG (7/6, 8/3), micro and small finance task Cooperation and Development (OECD) in force (6/14), and the private sector develop- Paris (5/25–26), organizers refused to al- ment and trade SWG’s Gaza thematic group low right-wing Israeli FM Avigdor Lieber- (5/26); the governance SG’s judicial reform man to make a Middle East policy speech, SWG (5/31) and security SWG (7/21); the in- saying it would be inappropriate for him frastructure SG’s water and sanitation SWG to stray from discussing economic issues. (7/5), municipal development and local gov- Israeli sources also said that U.S. Secy. of ernance SWG (7/18), and solid waste the- State Clinton refused to meet Lieberman matic subgroup (12/4); and the social and during the OECD meeting; the U.S. did not humanitarian assistance SG’s health SWG comment. (8/8) and education SWG (6/28).
Bedouin evacuate livestock as the Israeli military demolish their homes and struc- tures in the village of Hadidiyya, located in area C of the West Bank on 21 June 2011. (Saif Dalah/AFP/Getty Images)
JPS4101_13_Quarterly Updated.indd 188 28/10/11 5:42 PM
This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Mon, 30 Mar 2015 11:09:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions