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Unfinished Business? the WTO's Doha Agenda

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Unfinished Business? the WTO's Doha Agenda “I really admire the authors, who – in a time of political impasse – provide a strong and well argued analysis of the WTO Doha Round. It becomes crystal clear that there are solid economic benefits from concluding the Doha Round, a but even clearer that there are strong political benefits in terms of openness, security and positive effects on multilateral negotiations. This is exactly what Doha Agenda Unfinished Business? The WTO’s the world needs in a time of crisis!” Christian Friis Bach, Minister for Development Cooperation, Denmark; Unfinished Business? Affiliated Professor at the University of Copenhagen. “The World Bank, led by the troika of outstanding trade economists Aaditya The WTO’s Doha Agenda Mattoo, Will Martin and Bernard Hoekman, has established itself as an important player in trade negotiations through excellent research. This splendid volume on the Doha Round shows why. Read it to see why failure to close the Round would be a tragedy.” Jagdish Bhagwati, University Professor, Economics and Law, Columbia University; Senior Fellow in International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations “This is an excellent book which reflects one of the most comprehensive analyses done on the draft agreements by an excellent team of renowned trade experts. The Doha Development Agenda is still as relevant as ever to achieve trade and development, and thus this body of work comes at a timely juncture as we search for a way forward in these very important negotiations. I recommend this book for all those who are serious about achieving the end game, especially the middle D in DDA — development.” Mari Pangestu, Minister of Trade, Indonesia “This book reviews the Doha Round negotiations and offers lessons relevant to the current stalemate. No important topic is omitted, the information provided is extremely rich, the calculations are presented in a simple way, and the analysis is rigorous. The book is a must for a very wide audience – from negotiators and economists to anyone interested in the fate of the trade regime which is so critical for the economic recovery of rich countries and for the continued growth of developing countries.” Patrick Messerlin, Professor of Economics at Sciences Po, Paris a THE WORLD BANK ISBN 978-1-907142-45-1 edited by Will Martin and Aaditya Mattoo a THE WORLD BANK 9 781907 142451 i i “doha” — 2011/10/26 — 12:03 — page iv — #4 i i i i i i i i “doha” — 2011/10/26 — 12:03 — pagei—#1 i i UNFINISHED BUSINESS? THE WTO’S DOHA AGENDA i i i i i i “doha” — 2011/10/26 — 12:03 — page ii — #2 i i Unfinished Business? The WTO’s Doha Agenda Copyright © 2011 by The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA ISBN: 978-1-907142-45-1 All rights reserved The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Rights and Permissions The material in this publication is copyrighted. Copying and/or transmitting portions or all of this work without permission may be a violation of applicable law. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank encourages dissemination of its work and will normally grant permission to reproduce portions of the work promptly. For permission to photocopy or reprint any part of this work, please send a request with complete information to the Copyright Clearance Center Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA; telephone: 978-750-8400; fax: 978-750-4470; Internet: www.copyright.com. All other queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to the Office of the Publisher, The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2422; e-mail: [email protected]. Copyedited and typeset by T&T Productions Ltd, London Published in association with the London Publishing Partnership www.londonpublishingpartnership.co.uk The cover image is a painting titled Multitudes (2006) by Iliana Emilia Garcia. Reproduced with permission of the artist. i i i i i i “doha” — 2011/10/26 — 12:03 — page iii — #3 i i Centre for Economic Policy Research The Centre for Economic Policy Research is a network of over 700 Research Fellows and Affiliates, based primarily in European universities. The Centre coordinates the research activities of its Fellows and Affiliates and communi- cates the results to the public and private sectors. CEPR is an entrepreneur, developing research initiatives with the producers, consumers and sponsors of research. Established in 1983, CEPR is a European economics research organization with uniquely wide-ranging scope and activities. The Centre is pluralist and non-partisan, bringing economic research to bear on the analysis of medium- and long-run policy questions. CEPR research may include views on policy, but the Executive Committee of the Centre does not give prior review to its publications, and the Centre takes no institutional policy positions. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and not those of the Centre for Economic Policy Research. CEPR is a registered charity (No. 287287) and a company limited by guarantee and registered in England (No. 1727026). Chair of the Board Guillermo de la Dehesa President Richard Portes Chief Executive Officer Stephen Yeo Research Director Mathias Dewatripont Policy Director Richard Baldwin The World Bank The World Bank Group is a major source of financial and technical assis- tance to developing countries around the world, providing low-interest loans, interest-free credits and grants for investments and projects in areas such as education, health, public administration, infrastructure, trade, financial and private sector development, agriculture, and environmental and natural resource management. Established in 1944 and headquartered in Washington, DC, the Group has over 100 offices worldwide. The World Bank’s mission is to fight poverty with passion and professionalism for lasting results and to help people help themselves and their environment by providing resources, sharing knowledge, building capacity and forging partnerships in the public and private sectors. i i i i i i “doha” — 2011/10/26 — 12:03 — page iv — #4 i i i i i i i i “doha” — 2011/10/26 — 12:03 — pagev—#5 i i Unfinished Business? The WTO’s Doha Agenda edited by WILL MARTIN AND AADITYA MATTOO i i i i i i “doha” — 2011/10/26 — 12:03 — page vi — #6 i i i i i i i i “doha” — 2011/10/26 — 12:03 — page vii — #7 i i Contents List of Figures xii List of Tables xvi List of Boxes xvii List of Abbreviations xix Contributors xxi Foreword xxiii Acknowledgements xxv 1. Introduction 1 Will Martin, Aaditya Mattoo and Deborah Winkler 2. Agricultural Market Access 35 David Laborde and Will Martin 3. Non-agricultural Market Access 55 David Laborde and Will Martin 4. The WTO Agricultural Modalities Proposals and Their Impact on Domestic Support in the EU and the United States 69 David Blandford and Tim Josling 5. Services in Doha: What’s on the Table? 115 Ingo Borchert, Batshur Gootiiz and Aaditya Mattoo 6. Duty Free, a Round for Free and the Least-Developed Countries 145 Antoine Bouët and David Laborde 7. The Special Safeguard Mechanism: Previous Studies and Present Outlook 179 Jason Grant and Karl Meilke i i i i i i “doha” — 2011/10/26 — 12:03 — page viii — #8 i i viii Unfinished Business? The WTO’s Doha Agenda 8. Doha and Trade Facilitation: Lending Specificity to the Multilateral Trade and Development Agenda 213 Benjamin J. Taylor and John S. Wilson 9. Aid for Trade: Why, What, and Where Are We? 233 Bernard Hoekman 10. Potential Real Income Effects of Doha Reforms 255 David Laborde, Will Martin and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe 11. Sectoral Initiatives in the Doha Round 277 David Laborde 12. The Hidden Gain of the Doha Round: Lowering the Cost of Trade Wars by Reducing Binding Overhang 299 Antoine Bouët and David Laborde 13. What’s the Appropriate Agricultural Protection Counterfactual for Trade Analysis? 325 Kym Anderson and Signe Nelgen 14. U.S. Anti-dumping: Much Ado about Zeroing 355 Chad P. Bown and Thomas J. Prusa 15. Multilateralism Beyond Doha 393 Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian Index 413 i i i i i i “doha” — 2011/10/26 — 12:03 — page ix — #9 i i List of Figures 1.1 Existing commitments, Doha offers and actual policy (by region). 11 2.1 The pattern of tariff cuts under the tiered formula: developed countries (in percent). 38 3.1 Results of the Swiss formula for tariff cutting (in percent). 58 4.1 U.S. notifications of domestic support, 1995–2008. 88 4.2 European Union notifications of domestic support, 1995–6 to 2007–8. 89 4.3 Current total AMS in the United States relative to WTO AMS binding, 1995–2008. 90 4.4 Current total AMS in the EU relative to WTO AMS binding, 1995–6 to 2007–8. 91 4.5 Actual and projected notifications of domestic support: United States, 1995–2016. 92 4.6 Actual and projected notifications of domestic support: EU, 1995–6 to 2015–16. 93 4.7 Projected notifications of domestic support in the United States (2009–16) and proposed limits to OTDS, AMS and blue-box (revised draft modalities).
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