Official Repatriation from Malawi to Mozambique: A View Fkom the Top Olaf TamJuergensen

Under a seriesof Tripartite agreements 1. the terms agreed to in the 1992 and potentially dangerous postpone- between the Mozambican Govern- Peace Accord are being observed ments. This has led to an increased at- ment, the UNHCR and the various and implemented, specifically; rec- mosphere of intransigence on the part countries hosting Mozambican refu- ognition of the ceasefire, demobili- of both RENAMO and FRELIMO. The gees, a comprehensive repatriation zation of armies, and the observation of the ceasefire, the arrival and reintegration Plan of Operation introduction of a national demining of approximately 7,000 UN peacekeep- has been developed. According to the program; ers, and the drafting of election laws Plan, several key criteria must be met 2. basic essential services ranging are promising events. Unfortunately, before the UNHCR will sign a Joint from sanitation and primary health there are several other episodes that Declaration on the Right to Return and care, to road reconstruction and threaten the Peace Accord. Reintegrate with the Government of food distribution, are available. First, the demobition of solders Mozambique (FRELIMO) and These concerns are important, and is one of the most serious pending is- RENAMe-Officially signalling that must be addressed as Mozambique sues. Career personnel who have conditions are suitable for repatia- moves into a new post-conflict phase, served on either side of the conflict for tion. For the UNHCR this means the however, they do not appear to be years and who will find civilian life creation of a climate of irreversible re- problematical for the majority of refu- difficult (lack of skills and education) patriation in which the refugees can gees. Although conditions in Mozam- present a unique challenge. Already voluntarily return under conditions of bique are still tenuous and the above there have been strikes and demon- "dignity and safety." Thus, it is ulti- preconditions have not been met, it is strations by the army demanding sev- mately the UNHCR and the various estimated that over 80 percent of the erance pay and compensation for government representatives who de- approximately 600,000 refugees who being demobilized. It is expected that fine when and where return migration fled Tete Province have already repat- it will not be until the end of the year oficially takes place. Unfortunately riated. This migration is partially that the Government will begin dis- this top-down bureaucratic approach based on the ability of refugees to self- charging between 16,000 and 24,000 to repatriation often breaks down in repatriate easily across the land border soldiers of its 40,000 person army. the African context because it is not between the two countries and the fact There is speculation that RENAMO sensitive to the "everyday needs" of that several NGOs and UN agencies has broken into sub-cells which it does the majority of the refugee population, have already moved into Tete Prov- not control and reports of the emer- namely the rural peasantry. The objec- ince (which is the place of origin for 70 gence of UNAMO (Unilo Nacional tive of this brief paper is to illustrate percent of all refugees in Malawi). Mogimbicana) and many less organ- how concerns outlined in the tripartite Apart from the introduction of aid and ized marauding groups of "bandits" approach have had little impact on the relief schemes that are designed to help are of concern. Of those troops who are migration activity between Malawi stayees and displacees, the agency still under RENAMO control (approxi- and Tete Province in Mozambique. presence provides a degree of legiti- mately 20,000) the leadership has macy to the notion that it is "safe" to stated that they will not be de-armed The Tripartite Vision return. until after the general elections, which Based on a working framework, have been delayed until the fall of 1994. agreed upon by the Tripartite Com- Repatriation and the Peace Accord Several ceasefire violations have been mission, several key issues must be At the moment, the Peace Process has reported. The Government has ac- resolved before the UNHCR will pro- stalled because of the inability (or un- cused RENAMO of continuing troop vide logistical and financial support willingness) of the international com- and arms movements; while for Mozambican repatriation from munity to place a priority on events in RENAMO has countered with allega- Malawi: Mozambique. The delay in appointing tions that the Government has contin- a special country representative by the ued to push into RENAMO-held Olaf Tataryn Jucrgensen is a doctoral candidrrte UN Security Council and the alloca- territory. in the Department of Geography at Queen's tion of only $9.5 million of a promised Second, the issue of land mine Universi& Kingston, Ontario. He is currently $150 million for the operation of the awareness and eradication is of con- in Mozambique conducting jkld research on Peace program for the first six months cern to the UNHCR and local govern- repatriation and reconciliation. of 1993, has resulted in unnecessary ment officials. There is a master plan,

- - - - 22 Wge,Vol. 13, No. 6 (October 1993) which is to be organized under a Tri- Province, they should be supported Refuge-Host.. . Continued from uam 26 partite Subcommittee of the Cease-Fire through the provision of basic tools Commission (CCF), which calls for the and household goods, seeds, pre-de- headquarters were the first to get jobs training of approximately 2,000 former parture immunizations, food, cash when the settlement was established RENAMO and FRELIMO soldiers grants and transportation for the sick and are still renting houses to supple- who will conduct the actual demining and aged. Currently the UNHCR and mentary staff. Women brew beer for exercise. This program was to be fully the NGO community in Tete is at- the workers and sell sugar-cane to operational before the refugees started tempting to provide some primary school children. to return, however, as of August 1993 health, material and nutritional assist- In Ukwimi, Zambia, refugee-host both training and demining had not ance, however they are unable to cope relationships would have been much commenced. [Editors note: UN Special with the magnitude and pace of re- better if post-emergency assistance, Envoy for Mozambique, Aldo Ajello, turn. principally donations which occur af- stated on September 3 that demining had ter the official two year assistance pe- begun in Tete Province with 66 demobi- Recognizing Priorities riod, had been distributed equally to lized soldiers (Foreign Broadcaster's In- The refugee relief program in Malawi refugees and their hosts. The localinte- formation Service. Sub-Saharan Africa. has access to more resources then its gration of refugees is partially im- 1993(171)]. The majority of land mines counterpart in Mozambique. Even peded by the agencies themselves who are concentrated in specific areas such though there has been a dramatic shift excessively segregate refugees from as Mutarara and Mandimba, while the in the refugee population, there has their hosts. a border regions of Dedza-Angonia, not been a corresponding movement Ntcheu-Tsangano, and Mwanza- in the emergency assistance effort. In- Notes Moatize for example, have had few re- stead of transferring financial and lo- 1. There are no official statistics of Mozam- ported mine incidents. However, as gistical programs to Mozambique (as bican refugees in South Africa because notedearlier, there hasbeena dramatic the majority of NGOs have done) they are considered "illegal aliens" and subject to deportation. In 1992, the coun- rate of repatriation over the past sev- displacees are forced to return to Ma- try deported 61,000 Mozambicans. (see eral months despite the fact that the lawi for their bimonthly food distribu- World Refugee Survey 1993:72). demining program is behind schedule. tion. Some refugees travel for several Third, basic infrastructural con- days, which has a disruptive impact on References struction and rehabilitation to accom- their ability to rebuild their homes and Black, R., andT. Mabwe (1992)."Planningfor modate returnees has also been prepare the lands for the upcoming Refugees in Zambia: The Settlement highlighted as a precondition for suc- growing season. Given the agrarian Approach to Food Self-sufficiency," Third World Planning Review, 14(1). cessful return. The tenet that refugees background of the displaced popula- Black, R., T. Mabwe, F. Shumba, and K. must have access to basic social serv- tion, all efforts should be made to help Wilson (1990). "Ukwirni Refugee Settle- ices (health care, education, and roads) the refugees become productive land ment: Livelihood and Settlement is valid, but should fall under the aus- holders. Any further delays in re- Planning," Report to Government of pices of development agencies that allocating resources could hamper the Zambia. have a mandate for such long-term short-term ability of the country to be- Chambers, R. (1979). "Rural Refugees in project coordination. If refugees are gin the difficult process of rehabilita- Africa: What the eye does not see," returning en masse, as is the case in Tete tion and reconciliation. Disasters, 3(4):381-392. Chambers, R. (1986). "Hidden Losers? The Impact of Rural Refugees and Refugee Programs on Poorer Hosts," International Migration Review, 20(2):245-263. Hansen, A. (1990). "Refugee self-settlement versus settlement on government schemes:The long-termconsequencesfor security, integration and economic development of Angolan refugees (1966- 1989) in Zambia," UNRISD, Discussion Paper 17. Sullivan, S. (1992). "Utilisation of and ecological impact on wild resources by Mozambican refugees and local Zambians at Ukwimi Refugee Set- tlement, Zambia," Fieldwork Report, University College, London. World Refugee Survey (1993). U.S. Committee For Refugees, Washington.

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