Barings Bank and Its Rogue Trader

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Barings Bank and Its Rogue Trader CASE STUDY BARINGS BANK AND ITS ROGUE TRADER Barings Bank background: Barings Bank plc was a British bank and previously as a merchant banker it was known as Baring Brothers & Co. It was one of the oldest merchant banks in Britain having been founded in the year 1762. As a bank, it was much respected in the United Kingdom and had a long history of successful merchant banking operations. The bank in fact, maintained close business relationship with British monarchy till its failure in February 1995. It started Barings Securities Ltd. (BSL) in 1984 by acquiring a small stock broking firm Henderson Crosthwaite, with a staff of 15 based in London, Hong Kong and Tokyo. The idea was to take advantage of the stock market boom in 1980. BSL was separately and liberally managed company and proved to be very successful by trading in Japanese equity warrants – kind of bonds sold with warrants, which were exercisable into shares. Encouraged by the success in Asian market, it decided to diversify into the field of derivatives. They considered that making profits through arbitrage was a good opportunity in Asian markets. They therefore established Barings Futures (Singapore) Pte Ltd. (abbreviated as “BFS”) as a subsidiary of Barings Bank. The subsidiary was set up to trade in derivative products on Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) in 1986. The subsidiary started its operations in SIMEX from July 1992. The Exchange was trading in futures and options in currencies, equities & commodities. Mr Nicholas (Nick) Leeson, who had earlier been successful in making profits for BSL on currency and stock derivatives – mainly through arbitrage, was promoted and posted in Singapore as the trader in charge of BFS operations on SIMEX. The bank aspired to become one of the first banks to trade on derivatives in this region and the Board gave Nick Leeson considerable freedom for his activity though the terms given to him was to make money through arbitrage which was considered to be risk less profit. In 1993, Nick was appointed General Manager of BFS and was authorized to trade proprietary as also Clients’ accounts on far east exchanges and on behalf of many Baring Group companies. Nick Leeson dealt with mainly six futures and some options on them: 1. Nikkei 225 contract traded on SIMEX; 2. Nikkei 225 contract traded on OSE (Osaka Stock Exchange) Japan; 3. 10-year JGB (Japanese Government Bonds) contract traded on SIMEX; 4. 10-year JGB contract traded on TSE (Tokyo Stock Exchange) Japan; 5. 3-month euroyen contract traded on SIMEX and 6. Three-month euroyen contract traded on TIFFE (Tokyo Financial Futures Exchange), Japan. [Please note that the euroyen refers to yen currency traded in the global market outside Japan. It has nothing to do with the currency Euro, which came into existence much later.] Arbitrage business made significant contribution to the profitable business of BFS. Initially, it was in the form of cash / futures arbitrage in Tokyo. However, soon Nick Leeson started studying and exploiting the arbitrage between SIMEX and OSE on Nikkei 225 futures contracts. He would buy and sell these futures contracts simultaneously on SIMEX and OSE platforms taking advantage of the small difference between identical contracts. He would buy at a lower price and sell at a slightly higher price. This made tremendous business sense since SIMEX and OSE had different market conditions. While OSE had business from mainly local participants, SIMEX dealt mainly with international clients or “off-shore” business. Even the speeds of operations were different on these exchanges. OSE operations were slower vis-à-vis those of SIMEX. As a result of these circumstances, there were plenty of opportunities for making gains through trading on arbitrage. Similarly, market for JGB also offered opportunities since it witnessed considerable volatility. Leeson would make profits by trading on JGB futures contracts simultaneously on SIMEX and TSE platforms. He also encashed on arbitrage opportunities on euroyen futures contracts traded on SIMEX and TIFFE platforms to make profit. Arbitrage is strictly “risk less” profit and hence, everything was going in positive direction for Leeson and BFS as long as Leeson matched (squared off) positions. However, Leeson started keeping unmatched positions (whenever they went wrong i.e. whenever they could have incurred a loss) open for a long time. He was also able to conceal such unauthorized open positions for over a year. This was possible because he was allowed to manage both, the front office and back office functions of the trading activities of BFS carried through the Simex. Also the senior managers at Barings could not find out about the correct position of BFS on these futures since they came mostly with a merchant banking background and knew very little about trading. Even when Leeson showed huge profits through arbitrage, the management did not become alert or think that substantial risks were taken. Large profits, which are usually not possible in arbitrage, failed to alert the senior management about the accumulated open positions on futures contracts. On the contrary, they believed that Nick Leeson was making low risk profit and held only matched positions on the SIMEX and the OSE and hence was making a low- risk profit. However, the reality was altogether different. Though Leeson started with arbitrage profits, he had started keeping his loss making positions open for a long time. Not only this, he started trading derivatives contracts on the two exchanges that were of different types or in mismatched amounts. For example, he resorted to a trading strategy known as a "straddle," with the objective of making a profit by selling put and call options on the same underlying financial instrument i.e. Nikkei 225 Index. A Straddle involves selling call and put options simultaneously on the same underlying asset practically at the same strike price. Selling options ensures that you are earning premium on them, though it also means that you are taking unlimited risks (while selling call options) and almost unlimited risks while selling put options. While selling a straddle can make money for the investor when the markets are stable, the strategy is almost suicidal when the markets become volatile!! As shown in the diagram above a short straddle will generally produce positive earnings when markets are stable i.e. when the markets move within a very small / narrow range of price for the underlying. In other words, when the markets are not Payoff diagram for Short Straddle volatile and remain more or less close to strike price, the speculator stands to gain. However, the strategy could result in to huge losses if markets become volatile and the price of the underlying goes on either side. As the General Manager of the subsidiary, Nick Leeson was running the bank’s trading activities on Simex. Unfortunately, Leeson kept his unmatched positions Profit Net Payoff X Price Short Put Short Call Loss and concealed them for over a year since he was managing both the trading and back office operations himself without any supervision or auditing by his seniors. Trading and Back office functions: While the front office actually puts through all the trading transactions, like buy / sell orders, the back office keeps track of settlement process and accounting records of all transactions. Mr Nick Leeson, thus, had responsibilities both for trading and the accounting and settlement activities. As a matter of fact, the prudent business policy dictates that the functions of front office (trading) and back office are to be segregated and different persons were put in charge of the two sections to avoid any fraudulent activity. This had not been done in the case of Singapore subsidiary of Barings. It was an error of judgment on the part of the bank’s management to entrust both types of activities to Mr Leeson, who later brought down the bank through unauthorized deals and became known as the “rogue trader” Account No. 88888: Mr Leeson, as a trader in July 1992 itself (remember that he became the general manager of the BFS in 1993) had opened an account titled 88888 in the Exchange. On the BFS system, this account was described as an Error account. It is a common practice for a trader to maintain similar accounts with exchanges for the purpose of netting minor trading differences. As a routine practice, banks and other institutions sometimes maintain suspense account to temporarily put through transactions which could not be reconciled immediately. However many times the suspense account itself would be the beginning for bigger fraud. No body imagined that the so called error account 88888 would seal the very existence of the bank itself in a matter of few years. Leeson’s intentions: Leeson’s intention to open account 88888 seems to be with different idea. In the first month of its opening itself, a large number of transactions were booked through the account. Normally, error account should have fewer entries and should be used only for reconciling small value differences. Further, the error account should be closed on daily basis and net difference – positive (gain) or negative (losses) should be recorded as profit or loss. However, account number 88888 was used to put through a large number of transactions on daily basis from the beginning itself. In other words, the account did not seem to be intended to serve as an error account. The error account itself was operated as a regular trading account. Shuting out account 88888 from the system: In fact, Leeson gave specific instructions to his staff, right in the beginning of the opening of ‘error’ account, to modify the office software to exclude transactions in account 88888 from the system and from all market activity reports.
Recommended publications
  • Barings Bank Disaster Man Family of Merchants and Bankers
    VOICES ON... Korn Ferry Briefings The Voice of Leadership HISTORY Baring, a British-born member of the famed Ger- January 17, 1995, the devastating earthquake in Barings Bank Disaster man family of merchants and bankers. Barings Kobe sent the Nikkei tumbling, and Leeson’s losses was England’s oldest merchant bank; it financed reached £827 million, more than the entire capital the Napoleonic Wars and the Louisiana Purchase, and reserve funds of the bank. A young rogue trader brings down a 232-year-old bank. and helped finance the United States government Leeson and his wife fled Singapore, trying to “I’m sorry,” he says. during the War of 1812. At its peak, it was a global get back to London, and made it as far as Frankfurt financial institution with a powerful influence on airport, where he was arrested. He fought extradi- the world’s economy. tion back to Singapore for nine months but was BY GLENN RIFKIN Leeson, who grew up in the middle-class eventually returned, tried, and found guilty. He was London suburb of Watford, began his career in sentenced to six years in prison and served more the mid-1980s as a clerk with Coutts, the royal than four years. His wife divorced him, and he was bank, followed by a succession of jobs at other diagnosed with colon cancer while in prison, which banks, before landing at Barings. Ambitious and got him released early. He survived treatment and aggressive, he was quickly promoted settled in Galway, Ireland. In the past to the trading floor, and in 1992 he was “WE WERE 24 years, Leeson remarried and had two appointed manager of a new operation sons.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 5 Role of Cognitive and Other Influences on Rogue Trader
    Chapter 5 Role of Cognitive and Other Influences on Rogue Trader Behaviour: Findings from Case Studies 5.1. Introduction One of the key findings from Chapter 4 was the lack of significant difference in the financial decision-making behaviour of investment professionals compared with retail investors in the survey sample. However, there was a distinctive pattern in the odds ratio in Table 4.5 where investment professionals were seen to be more likely to be affected by behavioural biases when the choices were risky ones. The aim of the discussions and analyses of the selected case studies in this chapter (the qualitative element of the mixed methods approach), therefore, was to investigate the reasons behind the seeming inability or reluctance of investment professionals to ignore the influence of behavioural biases under high risk situations; where their actions could result in either extremely large monetary gains or losses. The discussion in this chapter consisted of three main sections. The first section was a brief account of the events behind five high-profile financial scandals caused by individuals who engaged in unauthorised trading or investment activities on behalf of their financial institutions, or rogue traders as they were popularly known. Section two highlighted some common characteristics of the rogue trading incidents, and section three was an analysis of the behavioural biases and related emotional influences behind the conduct of rogue traders. 132 5.2. Case Studies on Rogue Trading Rogue trading is the term popularly used to describe unauthorised proprietary trading activities by financial market professionals. These trading activities which resulted in significant monetary losses and severe reputational damage to the affected financial institutions more often than not involved transactions in derivative products.
    [Show full text]
  • Société Générale and Barings
    Volume 17, Number 7 Printed ISSN: 1078-4950 PDF ISSN: 1532-5822 JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY FOR CASE STUDIES Editors Inge Nickerson, Barry University Charles Rarick, Purdue University, Calumet The Journal of the International Academy for Case Studies is owned and published by the DreamCatchers Group, LLC. Editorial content is under the control of the Allied Academies, Inc., a non-profit association of scholars, whose purpose is to support and encourage research and the sharing and exchange of ideas and insights throughout the world. Page ii Authors execute a publication permission agreement and assume all liabilities. Neither the DreamCatchers Group nor Allied Academies is responsible for the content of the individual manuscripts. Any omissions or errors are the sole responsibility of the authors. The Editorial Board is responsible for the selection of manuscripts for publication from among those submitted for consideration. The Publishers accept final manuscripts in digital form and make adjustments solely for the purposes of pagination and organization. The Journal of the International Academy for Case Studies is owned and published by the DreamCatchers Group, LLC, PO Box 1708, Arden, NC 28704, USA. Those interested in communicating with the Journal, should contact the Executive Director of the Allied Academies at [email protected]. Copyright 2011 by the DreamCatchers Group, LLC, Arden NC, USA Journal of the International Academy for Case Studies, Volume 17, Number 7, 2011 Page iii EDITORIAL BOARD MEMBERS Irfan Ahmed Devi Akella Sam Houston State University Albany State University Huntsville, Texas Albany, Georgia Charlotte Allen Thomas T. Amlie Stephen F. Austin State University SUNY Institute of Technology Nacogdoches, Texas Utica, New York Ismet Anitsal Kavous Ardalan Tennessee Tech University Marist College Cookeville, Tennessee Poughkeepsie, New York Joe Ballenger Lisa Berardino Stephen F.
    [Show full text]
  • The Return of the Rogue
    THE RETURN OF THE ROGUE Kimberly D. Krawiec∗ The “rogue trader”—a famed figure of the 1990s—recently has returned to prominence due largely to two phenomena. First, recent U.S. mortgage market volatility spilled over into stock, commodity, and derivative markets worldwide, causing large financial institution losses and revealing previously hidden unauthorized positions. Second, the rogue trader has gained importance as banks around the world have focused more attention on operational risk in response to regulatory changes prompted by the Basel II Capital Accord. This Article contends that of the many regulatory options available to the Basel Committee for addressing operational risk it arguably chose the worst: an enforced self- regulatory regime unlikely to substantially alter financial institutions’ ability to successfully manage operational risk. That regime also poses the danger of high costs, a false sense of security, and perverse incentives. Particularly with respect to the low-frequency, high-impact events—including rogue trading—that may be the greatest threat to bank stability and soundness, attempts at enforced self- regulation are unlikely to significantly reduce operational risk, because those financial institutions with the highest operational risk are the least likely to credibly assess that risk and set aside adequate capital under a regime of enforced self-regulation. ∗ Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. [email protected]. I thank Susan Bisom-Rapp, Lissa Broome, Bill Brown, Steve Choi, Deborah DeMott, Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati, Donald Langevoort, Marc Miller, Eric Posner, Steve Schwarcz, Jonathan Wiener, David Zaring, and workshop participants at the University of Arizona James E.
    [Show full text]
  • Price Discovery During Periods of Stress: Barings, the Kobe Quake and the Nikkei Futures Market*
    Price Discovery during Periods of Stress: Barings, the Kobe Quake and the Nikkei Futures Market* Stephen Brown New York University Onno W. Steenbeek Erasmus University Abstract This paper examines price discovery of Nikkei stock-index futures both on the Osaka Securities Exchange (OSE) and the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX), around the Kobe earthquake in January 1995, and the collap- se of Barings bank six weeks later. First, we examine the effect of a shock to the economy on a securities market. We study individual variables and conclude that the above-mentioned events did have a large impact. Volume and volatility rise significantly after both events. Interestingly, the earthquake does not have a large impact on the bid-ask spread on SIMEX, while Barings’ collapse does seem to have an effect. An interesting aspect of this paper is the fact that we investigate a financial product that is traded simultaneously on two markets. Prices on SIMEX are slightly higher throughout the sample, indicating an impact of Leeson’s massive purchases on SIMEX, as well as a perceived absence of systemic risk in the aftermath of Barings’ failure. Second, we examine Leeson’s trading strategy more closely. We find evidence months before the actual collapse, that Leeson could be described as a ‘doubler.’ By continuously doubling his position, he tried to trade his way out of the moun- tain of losses. If you do recognize such a trader, you could take him out of the market sooner, limiting systemic risk. An important aspect of doublers is that their trading strategy produces normally distributed returns with a high mean for an extended period of time, followed by a very bad event.
    [Show full text]
  • The Motivations for the Behavior of Rogue Traders
    The motivations for the behavior of rogue traders Thesis By Zuzana Dančová Submitted in Partial fulfillment Of the Requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Science In Business Administration State University of New York Empire State College 2020 Reader: Tanweer Ali Statutory Declaration / Čestné prohlášení I, Zuzana Dančová, declare that the paper entitled: What are the motivations for the behavior of rogue traders? was written by myself independently, using the sources and information listed in the list of references. I am aware that my work will be published in accordance with § 47b of Act No. 111/1998 Coll., On Higher Education Institutions, as amended, and in accordance with the valid publication guidelines for university graduate theses. Prohlašuji, že jsem tuto práci vypracoval/a samostatně s použitím uvedené literatury a zdrojů informací. Jsem si vědom/a, že moje práce bude zveřejněna v souladu s § 47b zákona č. 111/1998 Sb., o vysokých školách ve znění pozdějších předpisů, a v souladu s platnou Směrnicí o zveřejňování vysokoškolských závěrečných prací. In Prague, 23.4.2020 Zuzana Dančová Acknowledgement I wish to thank all the people whose assistance was a milestone in the completion of this project. I wish to express my sincere appreciation to my mentor, Tanweer Ali, who convincingly guided and encouraged me through the process of completing this project. I also wish to acknowledge my family – my caring parents, great brothers, and my patient partner. They kept me going on and this work would not have been possible without their support. I would like to recognize the invaluable assistance that you all mentioned provided during my study.
    [Show full text]
  • Barings Bar None: the Financial Service Agreement of the GATS and Its Potential Impact on Derivatives Trading Vincent Presti
    Maryland Journal of International Law Volume 21 | Issue 2 Article 2 Barings Bar None: the Financial Service Agreement of the GATS and Its Potential Impact on Derivatives Trading Vincent Presti Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil Part of the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Vincent Presti, Barings Bar None: the Financial Service Agreement of the GATS and Its Potential Impact on Derivatives Trading, 21 Md. J. Int'l L. 145 (1997). Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol21/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ARTICLES BARINGS BAR NONE: THE FINANCIAL SERVICE AGREEMENT OF THE GATS AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON DERIVATIVES TRADING VINCENT PRESTI* TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 146 II. THE ROLE OF DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS .......................................... 148 A. A Functional Definition for Derivative Instruments in International Transactions .................................... 149 1. Derivatives Markets ..................................... 150 2. Derivatives Players ..................................... 153 3. Basic Settlement Systems and Procedures for Exchange-Traded Derivative Instruments ........... 157 III. THE BARINGS CRISIS: MARKET AND MANAGERIAL CIRCUM- STANCES AND THEIR IMPACT ON UNAUTHORIZED TRADING ACTIVrrY .............................................................. 160 A. Barings and Its "Old-Boys" Management Style ......... 160 B. The Role of Derivative Trading in the Expansion and the Collapse of the Barings Group's Structure ........... 164 IV. SOME LESSONS FROM CURRENT DERIVATIVE REGULATORY RE- GIMES AND THEIR ROLE IN FUTURE INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS 171 A.
    [Show full text]
  • Banking and Bookkeeping
    CHAPTER 10 Banking and Bookkeeping The arguments of lawyers and engineers pass through one another like angry ghosts. — Nick Bohm, Brian Gladman and Ian Brown [201] Computers are not (yet?) capable of being reasonable any more than is a Second Lieutenant. — Casey Schaufler Against stupidity, the Gods themselves contend in vain. — JC Friedrich von Schiller 10.1 Introduction Banking systems range from cash machine networks and credit card processing, both online and offline, through high-value interbank money transfer systems, to the back-end bookkeeping systems that keep track of it all and settle up afterwards. There are specialised systems for everything from stock trading to bills of lading; and large companies have internal bookkeep- ing and cash management systems that duplicate many of the functions of abank. Such systems are important for a number of reasons. First, an under- standing of transaction processing is a prerequisite for tackling the broader problems of electronic commerce and fraud. Many dotcom firms fell down badly on elementary bookkeeping; in the rush to raise money and build web sites, traditional business discipline was ignored. The collapse of Enron led to stiffened board-level accountability for internal control; laws such as 313 314 Chapter 10 ■ Banking and Bookkeeping Sarbanes-Oxley and Gramm-Leach-Bliley now drive much of the investment in information security. When you propose protection mechanisms to a client, one of the first things you’re likely to be asked is the extent to which they’ll help directors of the company discharge their fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders. Second, bookkeeping was for many years the mainstay of the computer industry, with banking its most intensive application area.
    [Show full text]
  • CASE2 Barings Bank 2
    Barings Bank http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barings_Bank History Barings had a long and storied history. In 1802 , it helped finance the Louisiana Purchase , despite the fact that Britain was at war with France , and the sale had the effect of financing Napoleon 's war effort. Technically the United States did not purchase Louisiana from Napoleon. Louisiana was purchased from the Baring brothers and Hope & Co. The payment for the purchase was made in US bonds, which Napoleon sold to Barings at a discount of 87 1/2 per each $100. As a result, Napoleon received only $8,831,250 in cash for Louisiana. Alexander Baring , working for Hope & Co., conferred with the French Director of the Public Treasury François Barbé-Marbois in Paris , went to the United States to pick up the bonds and took them to France. Later daring efforts in underwriting got the firm into serious trouble through overexposure to Argentine and Uruguayan debt, and the bank had to be rescued by a consortium organized by the governor of the Bank of England , William Lidderdale , in the Panic of 1890 . While recovery from this incident was swift, it destroyed the company's former bravado. Its new, restrained manner made it a more appropriate representative of the British establishment, and the company established ties with King George V , beginning a close relationship with the British monarchy that would endure until Barings' collapse. The descendants of the original five male branches of the Baring family were all appointed to the peerage with the titles Baron Revelstoke , Earl of Northbrook , Baron Ashburton , Baron Howick of Glendale and Earl of Cromer .
    [Show full text]
  • Analysing the Cases of Nick Leeson, Jérôme Kerviel, and Kweku Adoboli in Light of the Control Balance Theory
    Behavioural patterns in rogue trading: Analysing the cases of Nick Leeson, Jérôme Kerviel, and Kweku Adoboli in light of the control balance theory Hagen Rafeld (Vice President, Divisional Control Office, Global Markets Division at a Frankfurt based Financial Institution) Dr. Sebastian Fritz-Morgenthal (Expert Principal, Bain & Company, Inc.) Agenda 1 Introduction p. 3 2 Charles Tittle’s Control Balance Theory (CBT) p. 5 3 The Rogue Traders Leeson, Kerviel, and Adoboli p. 7 4 Applying CBT p. 11 5 Conclusions p. 13 References & Further Reading p. 15 Rafeld & Fritz-Morgenthal Behavioural Patterns in Rogue Trading 2 1 _ Rogue Trading: Historic Overview Rafeld & Fritz-Morgenthal Behavioural Patterns in Rogue Trading 3 1 _ Rogue Trading: Historic Overview (cont.) Source: Hornuf and Haas (2014), Skyrm (2014), and Wexler (2010, p. 6); enriched with own research. Source: Hornuf and Haas (2014), Skyrm (2014), and Wexler (2010); enriched with own research. Global nature & reoccurring phenomenon rogue trading; appearance in various markets and jurisdictions Re-occurring typology/profile: Average rogue trader is male, in its mid-thirties, un- detected for more than 2 and a half years, creates a financial damage of more than $ 1.5bn, and is sentenced to jail for about 5 years Rafeld & Fritz-Morgenthal Behavioural Patterns in Rogue Trading 4 2 _ Tittle’s Control Balance Theory (CBT) Integrated criminological theory, drawing elements from learning, anomie, conflict, social control, labelling, utilitarian, and routine activities theories Equipped with interdisciplinary components, CBT is designed to explain and account for all types of deviant behaviour but also for conforming behaviour (Piquero 2010, p.
    [Show full text]
  • European CGMA® Conference
    EUROpeaN CGMA® CONfereNce Wednesday 13 November 9.00 – 9.30am Registration and coffee 9.30 – 9.45am Welcome and introduction 9.45 – 11.00am Keynote Robert Peston, Award winning Business Editor Over the last five years, the challenges of the economy have had a great impact on businesses across the world, and have changed the way in which organisations conduct themselves. Although the world economy appears to be on the road to recovery, are businesses enjoying the full effect of this? What are the biggest problems that businesses are facing today? This keynote from award winning business editor, Robert Peston, will evaluate the economic climate for companies at home and abroad, both now and in coming years, the risks and opportunities, and set the scene for the conference theme - Beyond the financials. Including Q and A 11.00 – 11.30am Coffee 11.30 – 12.30pm Breakout Essential soft skills Clare Haynes, Soft skills and organisational psychology specialist, Wildfire Ltd Mastering the right soft skills can help gain a decisive edge in modern business, whether you’re presenting to clients, at interview or seeking to impress the executive board. This session will explore how to integrate the tactics necessary for team and the top table. Clare will discuss the vital communication and people skills required to stand out, as well as providing insight into simplifying up-skilling effectively. Attracting talent in times of scarcity Kevin Green, Chief Executive at Recruitment and Employment Confederation (REC) Kevin will look at the current developments in the professional jobs market. The talent war that’s been talked about for over a decade is just about to become a reality.
    [Show full text]
  • Barings Bank Collapse
    Investment News Monthly Bulletin from the Insurance & Investment Team February 2018 Last Month in Brief On 15th January Carillion, the UK’s second biggest construction company, entered into liquidation. Carillion had run up large debts of around £1.5bn and accrued a pension scheme deficit of around £600m. Just two weeks after the collapse of Carillion, rival outsourcing firm Capita, one of the UK’s largest employers providing public services, announced a profit warning and suspended its dividends to shareholders. This saw its share price fall to a 15-year low and its pension deficit stands at £381m. Figures released in January 2018 showed sustained strong economic performance in the Eurozone over 2017 resulting in a 10-year high for growth. Eurostat revealed the Eurozone economy grew by 2.5% which is its strongest growth since 2007. This performance outstripped the US and UK economies, which expanded by 2.3% and 1.8% respectively in 2017. Measures of economic sentiment remained high, although fell slightly from record levels reached in 2017. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell to 23,860 after falls of more than 1,000 points twice in one week at the start of February. This decline followed the average having hit a record high level above 26,000 in January. The sharp fall has largely been attributed to investors’ fear that inflation might rise more quickly than expected, leading policymakers to raise interest rates. Both Asian markets such as Japan’s Nikkei 225 and the UK’s FTSE 100 saw declines in response to the market movement seen in the US.
    [Show full text]