Rising Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Central Asia: a Harbinger of Regional Unrest?
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DISCUSSION PAPER Rising Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Central Asia: A Harbinger of Regional Unrest? Aruuke Uran Kyzy DISCUSSION PAPER Rising Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Central Asia: A Harbinger of Regional Unrest? Aruuke Uran Kyzy Rise of Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Central Asia: Evolving Regional Unrest? © TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE ALL RIGHTS RESERVED WRITTEN BY Aruuke Uran Kyzy PUBLISHER TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE June 2020 TRT WORLD İSTANBUL AHMET ADNAN SAYGUN STREET NO:83 34347 ULUS, BEŞİKTAŞ İSTANBUL / TURKEY TRT WORLD LONDON PORTLAND HOUSE 4 GREAT PORTLAND STREET NO:4 LONDON / UNITED KINGDOM TRT WORLD WASHINGTON D.C. 1819 L STREET NW SUITE 700 20036 WASHINGTON DC www.trtworld.com researchcentre.trtworld.com The opinions expressed in this discussion paper represent the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the TRT World Research Centre. 4 Rise of Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Central Asia: Evolving Regional Unrest? Abstract he novel coronavirus pan- Sinophobia, and Beijing’s capabilities, are of demic has affected the world critical importance for projecting the geopolit- in an unprecedented way, ical future of the region. This discussion paper affecting production, sup- is divided into three parts. The first section de- ply chains and the mobility tails China’s strategic logic behind its interests in of people and goods. This Central Asia by providing historical context, and Tincludes China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). its stated geopolitical and economic objectives. While Beijing’s soft power is expanding in Cen- The second section evaluates the characteristic tral Asia, economic and diplomatic depend- of China’s Central Asian Projects. The third sec- ence on Beijing has given rise to a widespread tion sheds light on up-to-date local reactions anti-Chinese sentiment among the local popu- of the Central Asian countries and identifies lation. This paper suggests that understanding the reasons for rising anti-Chinese sentiment China’s broad strategy, the reasons for rising amidst rising geopolitical rivalry in the region. Introduction Central Asia is witnessing a significant rebalancing of of trade links. Via the BRI, China may acquire the ca- power with European, Russian and Chinese interests pability to shape the region’s economic potential by being in a battle over the influence in the region. Since providing significant opportunities for Central Asian 2001, China’s diplomatic and eco-nomic expansion in states which need considerable investment to main- Central Asia has grown dramatically. It is likely to con- tain growth rates. It is imperative to bear in mind that tinue to grow in coming years, perhaps even to a point Beijing engages with Central Asia primarily on regional where Beijing politically and economically dominates economic issues and international diplo-matic cooper- the area. This strategic posturing raises questions ation; it has made no overt push into political or military about the possible geopolitical shifts with the consol- issues. China’s influence in Cen-tral Asia is not limited idation of China’s power in Central Asian countries. to changing the international environment of these By ‘Central Asia’, this paper refers to the following five five states or structuring their economic development. states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmeni- However, it plans to partially structure the domestic or- stan, and Uzbekistan. In the last decade, Central Asian ders, social changes, and national narratives of the do- nations have also been in search of viable partners, main (Peyrouse, 2007). According to Baker McKenzie’s particularly in economic and security sec-tors. While report (2017), amid China’s rearrangement of the social there are a growing number of actors in the area, such and economic fabric of the neighbouring countries, its as the United States and Russia, the primary catalyst growing presence and influence were described as ‘de- to Central Asia’s reintegration process has been the fensive’. Some initiatives raised primary debates about advocation of the Great Silk Road initiative. Having be- high-level corruption and demands for transparency in come the major partner, or at least one of the key trad- government financial activities. Beijing’s growing clout ing partners, of each of the Central Asian state, China for the last two decades has given it considerable lev- has translated its greater intentions through the Belt erage over the regional order and national narratives and Road Initiative (BRI). The move was first revealed (Chung, 2004). While it is still early to make any author- by Chinese President Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan in 2013 itative forecasts, the public in Central Asian countries and aimed to enhance and command a new network harbours a deep fear of Chinese expansion. 5 Rise of Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Central Asia: Evolving Regional Unrest? 1. China’s Strategy in Central Asia With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, or “historical enemy” have become frequent in the Ka- the five Central Asian states stepped out for the first zakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik newspapers. Central Asia be- time into the outside world and commenced a process came critically essential and a key element to China’s of limited global integration. The accelerating rise of imagination of its Silk Road Project, border security, China changed both the domestic and international energy supply, and the geopolitical and economic cor- agendas of these ‘stan’ countries, as establishing direct ridor, with substantial deposits of rich natural resourc- bilateral relations with Beijing required overcoming so- es and minerals. The region connects not only China to cieties’ longstanding perceptions engendered by Sovi- Europe but also Russia to South Asia. To these ends, the et-era propaganda. These constructions and discours- expansion and details of China’s strategic influence can es, which rested on eschatological notions of “threat be analysed by three main factors: from the East”, “Chinese expansion” (tikhaia ekspansiia) 1.1 Economic Strategy The first strategic-level concept was built around Chi- countries in the region. Trade between China and the na’s economic ambition to become an indis-pensable five Central Asian countries rose from $527 million in commercial partner of the five states whose presence is 1992 to $40 billion in 2011 (Ministry of Commerce, Peo- translated into different infrastructure projects. Chinese ple’s Republic of China, n.d.). Trade relations between interest has been structured around the concept of a China and Central Asia improved further after 2002 “voluntary implantation policy” in essential economic and turned into a mutually advantageous economic sectors in order to consolidate its political influence in cooperation. Between 2002 and 2003, trade increased Central Asia (Peyrouse, 2007, p.9). Thus, it is imperative by more than 200 per cent, going from about $1 billion to bear in mind that the geopolitical and economic ob- per year to more than $3 billion. Bilateral trade between jectives are in-trinsically linked, as Beijing sees Central China and the Central Asian countries continued to rise Asia not only as a border region, but also as an interme- between 2007 and 2015, with the Chinese-Kazakh rela- diary and transit area which facilitates trade with Iran, tions composing the strongest economic ties (Gussa- Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. rova, 2018). According to the Europe-an Commission, in 2017, China estimated for 20 per cent of the Kyrgyz In 2009, shortly after the global financial crisis and dur- trade (2nd place), 20 per cent of the Uzbek trade (1st ing the Great Recession, Beijing engaged in the mas- place), and 10 per cent of Tajikistan (3rd place) (Gussa- sive internal stimulus (The Impact of China, 2016). This rova, 2018). created massive export opportunities for resource-rich Table 1: China Export Share in Total Products, 2016-2018 Trade Flow: Export Indicator: Export Share in Total Products (%) Partner Name 2016 2017 2018 Kazakhstan 58.18 61.26 62.05 Uzbekistan 52.55 57.52 59.01 Kyrgyzstan 44.78 45.72 46.60 Tajikistan 38.99 37.85 42.73 Turkmenistan 29.82 29.94 42.73 Source: TRT World Research Centre 6 Rise of Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Central Asia: Evolving Regional Unrest? Table 2: China’s Total Trade with Central Asia (in $ billion) 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Krgyzstan Tajikistan Source: IMFYear China’s economic growth in Central Asia took Russia nese expansion and influence established in 2001. and Western countries by surprise. While Russia’s es- Throughout the years, the SCO regularly emphasised tablished presence in the region has been dominant, economic cooperation in the region by challenging the growing Chinese involvement has thus posed a trade protectionism’ and by supporting the strength- difficulty for Central Asian nations. A decade ago, the ening of a transparent and non-discriminatory multi- region depended on Russia for exporting its goods lateral trading system (Filippov, 2018). These regional and natural resources to international markets. How- policies were followed by the Chinese idea of estab- ever, Beijing now challenges Moscow’s monopoly over lishing an SCO bank. Dragging Central Asia into its Central Asian energy export routes, for example, with influential circle through the economic pillar of SCO Central Asia–China pipelines (Stronski & Ng, 2018). As became of prime importance for China. For instance, at both sides compete for influence, Moscow’s reaction the June 2009 SCO summit in Yekaterinburg, Chinese towards BRI project was apprehensive, driven by fears officials proposed the establishment of a US$10 billion that China will expand into Russia’s sphere of influ- anti-crisis fund within the SCO which granted cheap ence. A further response came through the Eurasian and short-term financing for Central Asian energy and Economic Union (EEU), where Russia was at the centre infrastructure (Laruelle, 2018).