Siting and Approval Process for an LNG Terminal at Wilhelmshaven: a Case Study on Decision Making Concerning Risk-Prone Facilities in the Federal Republic of Germany
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Siting and Approval Process for an LNG Terminal at Wilhelmshaven: A Case Study on Decision Making Concerning Risk-Prone Facilities in the Federal Republic of Germany Atz, H. IIASA Collaborative Paper October 1982 Atz, H. (1982) Siting and Approval Process for an LNG Terminal at Wilhelmshaven: A Case Study on Decision Making Concerning Risk-Prone Facilities in the Federal Republic of Germany. IIASA Collaborative Paper. Copyright © October 1982 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/2056/ All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting [email protected] NOT FOR QUOTATION WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR SITING AND APPROVAL PROCESS FOR AN LNG TERMINAL AT WILHELMSHAVEN: A CASE STUDY ON DECISION MAKING CONCERNING RISK-PRONE FACILITIES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY Hermann Atz October 1982 CP-82-62 Collaborative Pape~sreport work which has not been performed solely at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and which has received only limited review. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Insti- tute, its National Member Organizations, or other organizations supporting the work. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 2361 Laxenburg, Austria PREFACE This case study was performed in the context of a larger research project at IIASA: the Study on Liquefied Energy Gas Terminal Siting (~un- reuther, Linnerooth, et al, 1982). A comparison of four concrete decision processes in four countries (namely the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States), is an intrinsic part of this project. All the studies are concerned with siting decisions on major energy gas import or export facilities that were made in the last decade. The comparative evaluation of these case studies seeks, in par- ticular, a greater insight into the way technical studies succeed or fail to influence political decisions. In the FRG the selected decision concerns the siting of an import ter- minal to unload, store, and regasify liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipped in special tankers from distant producing countries. This project was con- ceived around 1970 by German energy companies. Approximately ten years later, in July 1979, the plans for an LNG terminal at Wilhelmshaven had received all the necessary approvals, licenses, and permits for con- struction to be started. The description and analysis of the public decision-making process leading to this approval is the topic of the study presented here. Since the main goal of this research is a deeper under- standing of the events leading up to such a decision, it does not matter that the project has yet to be realized. It would have been impossible to carry out this study without the obliging support of representatives from most of the institutions involved in the decision process under consideration. I wish to express my thanks to all these individuals for giving us their time and providing us with important material and information on the siting process. Furthermore, I am indebted to my colleagues from the Risk Task Group at IIASA, in particular to Joanne Linnerooth and Howard Kun- reuther, who, through numerous discussions, suggestions, and comments contributed substantially to this case study. Among the various persons reviewing the first draft of this report, Volker Ronge played an outstand- ing role by the depth of his theoretical remarks and his familiarity with political decision making in the FRG. Moreover, he participated in a cou- ple of key meetings with representatives from industry. Special thanks also go to Eryl Ley and Derek Delves for smoothing my English, and to Noel Blackwell and Rhonda Starnes who patiently endured numerous revisions in producing this final manuscript. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the continuous active interest in this case study of Werner Salz, of the Bundesministerium fiir Forschung und Technologie (Federal Ministry for Research and Technology), who was responsible for the entire Liquefied Energy Gas study. It is not necessary to mention that this project was made possible only through the Ministry's financial support. Hermann Atz June 1982 CONTENTS CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 2: OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE DECISION 2.1. National Characteristics 2.2. ~escriptionof Project and Policy Context 2.3. The Main Parties to the Decision 2.3.1. Definition 2.3.2. Gas Companies and DFTG 2.3.3. The Federal Minister of Transport (FMT) 2.3.4. Water and Shipping Board North-West (WSB) 2.3.5. The Lower Saxony Ministry for Economic Affairs - - and Transport (ME&T) 2.3.6. The District Government Weser-Ems (DGWE) 2.3.7. The County of Friesland 2.3.8. The City of Wilhelmshaven 2.3.9. Neighboring Municipalities 2.3.10. Public Interest Groups 2.3.11. Other Parties 2.4. The Decision Process CHAPTER 3: DIMENSIONS AND POLICY CONTEXT OF THE DECISION 3.1. Statement of Dimensions 3.2. Energy Policy 3.3. Regional Socioeconomic Effects 3.4. Health and Safety Aspects 3.5. Environmental Impact CHAPTER 4: PARTIES PERSPECTIVES ON THE MAIN DIMENSIONS OF THE DECISION 4.1. Introduction 4.2. Gas Companies and DFTG 4.3. The Federal Minister of Transport (FMT) 4.4. The Water and Shipping Board North-West (WSB) 4.5. The Lower Saxony Ministry of Economic Affairs and Transport (ME&T) 4.6. The District Government Weser-Ems (DGWE) 4.7. The City of Wilhelmshaven 4.8. The County of Friesland 4.9. The Municipality of Wangerland 4.10. The Hooksiel Citizen Group 4.11. The Importance of the Safety Dimension CHAPTER 5: The Decision Process 43 Introduction Description of Approval Procedures in General 5.2.1. Town and Country Planning 5.2.2. Plan ~etermination 5.2.3. License According to Federal Immission Control Law The Selection of the Site at Wilhelmshaven Settlement Contract The Preparation of the Applications Town and Country Planning in Wilhelmshaven The Plan Determination Procedure The Decision Concerning the Acceptability of LNG Shipping Preliminary License According to Federal Immission Control Law Post Decision Events CHAPTER 6: PARTY PERSPECTIVES ON THE DECISION PROCESS 65 6.1. Party Perspectives on the Roles of Key Actors in the ~ecision 65 6.2. Party Evaluation of Decision Outcome 68 6.3. Party Evaluation of ~ecisionProcedures in General 69 . CHAPTER 7: ANALYSIS OF SEEECTED ASPECTS OF THE LNG SITING DECISION 71 7.1. Special Features and Noteworthy Events in the Decision 71 7.2. Evaluation of the Decision Structure 75 CHAPTER 8: SAFETY QUESTIONS AND THE ROLE OF RISK ANALYSIS 79 8.1. The Importance of the Risk Issue 79 8.2. Expert Studies Dealing with Population Risk 81 8.2.1. Expert Studies Commissioned by the Applicant 81 8.2.2. Expert Studies Commissioned by Intervenors in the Licensing Procedures 84 8.2.3. Expert Studies Commissioned by Licensing Agencies 85 8.3. Final Assessment of the Population Risk Related to LNG Tankers 87 8.4. Summary Remarks on the Use and Impact of Technical Analysis 88 REFERENCES 91 APPENDIX A:. ~istof Institutions Contacted APPENDIX B: Abbreviations SITING AND APPROVAL PROCESS FOR AN LNG TERMINAL AT WILHEL?dSHAVEN: A CASE STUDY ON DECISION MAKING CONCERNING RISK-PRONE FACILITIES IN THE FEDERAL REX'UBLIC OF GERMANY Hermann Atz CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Siting decisions on large-scale technical installations have been a source of societal conflict for a number of years now. The sensitivity of health and safety issues, the possibility of catastrophic accidents, and uncer- tainty about the long-term consequences of certain industrial activities have resulted in technological risks frequently being at the center of pub- lic debate. As a consequence, the development of methods to assess the effects of technical installations, in particular those relating to health and safety, has become a focus of scientific interest. For more than a decade risk assessment and, more generally, risk research has developed as an independent field of scientific activity (Conrad 1980, Kunreuther 1982). Yet most of this research has been normative in nature. Further research has been devoted to psychological aspects of risk perception, but the reality of societal decision making with regard to risk-prone activities is as yet only poorly understood (Kunreuther and Ley 1982). Clearly, this lack of knowledge limits the effectiveness of prescriptive risk research. The case study presented here attempts to reduce precisely that gap by accounting rather extensively for a concrete decision making process in the FRG. Having stated the descriptive emphasis of this study, we can explain its goals by contrasting the idealized model of decision making that underlies prescriptive analysis with societal reality. Normative decision theory usually assumes a situation where a single decision maker has to make one particular decision on the basis of clear objectives, preferences and framing conditions. Actual public decision making involves a variety of actors with different interests. It is a sequence of partial decisions in a complex institutional setting whose final outcome may be influenced in an unpredictable way by external information, unexpected events, or changes in the societal environment. The decision problem itself is not even well defined but may be changed during the process according to particular parties' interests. These and similar factors are likely to influ- ence the actual use and impact of technical analysis in ways not con- sidered in the idealized normative model of rational decision making. For our purposes it is very important to obtain a better understanding of pre- cisely those relations in order to contribute to an explanation of why cer- tain kinds of technical analysis are preferred to others, or why they do not have the effects promised by their promoters.