MIDDLE EAST

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APRIL-JUNE

MIDDLE EAST REVIEW IMO3

HEADQUARTERS ROYAL AIR FORCE MIDDLE EAST Contents

Tunisian Finale ... Page 5

Prelude to Invasion ... • )t 41 Tables Showing Scale of Effort „ 59 Tables of Operations in the Mediterranean „ 63 Malta Prepares „ 69 Air/Sea Rescue '... „ 75

The Axis Air Forces in the Middle East, 1940-1943 ;, 88 Flying Control ti 98 The Fight for the Mediterranean „ 107 S.A.A.F. in the Western Desert „ 125 Maintenance and,Supply „ 138 From the 540s „ 145

Acknowledgment M 151 Maps :- The Battle Area—1st April to 14th May, 1943 ...... „ 4 Strategic Bombing „ 40 German Air Force Arrival in Mediterranean Area, 1941 „ 90 Axis Air Force Range—June to November, 1941 ... „ 93 „ „ „ „ July to October, 1942 „ 95 „ „ „ „ at evacuation of Tripolitania, February, 1943 „ 96 The Eastern Mediterranean „ 108

WFrw.^ liddle East Review is Secret (•= American Confidential). It isTHI/Kh'ded for the information of all officers and flying crews, under conditions of security approved by the Commanding Officer, who is to ensure that within those limits it has as wide a circulation as possible. No quotation may be made from it without the authority of S.A.S.O., H.Q., R.A.F., M.E.; neither are any of its contents to be communicated to anyone out­ side the Services. All persons are hereby warned that the unauthorised retention or destruc­ tion of this document is an offence against the Official Secrets Act, 1911-1920. Any unauthorised person obtaining possession of a copy should immediately forward it in a closed unstamped envelope to H.Q., R.A.F., M.E. Foreword

T>he events reported in this number of the R.A.F. Middle East Review were not only the most favourable, but also the most important for,,the Allied cause which had so far materialised in the Mediterranean area. The complete clearance of all Axis forces from North Africa finally removed any threat to the Middle East, opened the. Mediterranean Sea once more to Allied shipping from Gibraltar to Haifa, and restored the short sea route via the Suez Canal to India and the Far East. The period reviewed, the second quarter of 1943, is thus a conclusive one, and advantage has been taken of the fact to include articles which begin with Italy's entry into the war,, and to end them as preparations are made to divorce her from the Axis partnership. In view of the movement of operations westward and northward from the Middle East theatre {using that term in its narrowest sense), it lias been decided to clxange the name of the R.A.F. Middle East Review to the R.A.F. Mediterranean Review commencing with the next issue, No. 4. Thus all Mediterranean operations, including those in Italy and southern Europe, will be legitimately covered in the historical narratives, although the Review will continue to include domestic aspects of the Middle East opera­ tions from which so many valuable lessons have been learned in the last three years. PRINCIPAL ROADS SECONDARY ROADS AND MOTOR TRACKS R Al LWAY 5 SALT LAKES AND MARSHES &? NAME OF PLACE UNDERLINED INDICATES EXISTENCE OF AIRFIELD OR LANDING GROUND

THE BATTLE AREA 1ST APRIL TO 14TH MAY 1043 Tunisian Finale 1st APRIL TO 14th MAY, 1943

BY THE END of March, 1943, as recounted in about 210 were JU.88/HE.III bombers and tor­ the previous issue of the R.A.F. Middle East pedo-bombers. The Italian air forces in Sardinia, Review, the Allied armies, supported by the Corsica, Sicily and Pantellaria totalled approxi­ North-west African and Western Desert Air mately 545 aircraft; of these the majority of the Forces, were closing in on the enemy's Tunisian fighters was based in* Sicily and torpedo bombers forces. Meanwhile, Allied bombers based in in Sardinia. Serviceability was estimated at 50 North-west Africa and Cyrenaica continued their to 55% for German and 50% for Italian air­ attacks on the enemy's ports, airfields and con­ craft. voys, and naval co-operation and defence'•squa­ The Allied air forces were now immeasurably drons controlled the Mediterranean sea-ways. stronger than those of the Axis. The Western The following account treats of tRe air activity Desert Air Force squadjpns under the>operational during the last six weeks of the Tunisian cam­ control of the North-west African Air Forces) paign, which ended in the enemy's relinquishment were located in the Gabes area, as near the of his remaining foothold in Africa. enemy's Akarit positions as possible. In Continuing the practice previously adopted, the this forward area the Force consisted of eight Kittyhawk and five U.S. Warhawk fighter-bom­ operations of ilfaZta-based aircraft during this ber squadrons; four Spitfire squadrons (including period are considered separately elsewhere in the the Polish Flight) and four U.S. Warhawk squa­ "Revidw." drons; one night-flying and one "tank-busting" The Enemy's Unenviable Position Hurricane squadrons; five R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. light bomber and two U.S. Mitchell squadrons; By the beginning of April, 1943/the enemy's and tactical, strategical and photographic recon­ position in Tunisia was unenviable. naissance squadrons. Following the Vinth Army's outflanking of the Mareth Dine in the last week of March, Rom­ Further east four Wellington squadrons were mel's battered remnants withdrew to their next located at Bir el Gardabia. Two Liberator Groups delaying point — the Oued Akarit; our pursuing of the Ninth U.S. Air Force had bases at Berka land forces immediately established contact with and Solluch and the R.A.F. Liberator and Halifax the enemy at this new position. squadrons, under the operational control of the Meanwhile, north of the Gafsa - Gabes road Ninth U.S. Air Force, operated from airfields American forces, operating east of Guettar, near Solluch and Bir el Gardabia, respectively. maintained pressure on the enemy's perimeter, No. 201 (Naval Co-operation) Group continu­ although for the moment their advance was ed to control the sea-ways of the Eastern Medi­ checked by enemy armoured units in that area. terranean and A.H.Q., Air Defences Eastern Me­ In the central sector the Allied forces which diterranean, controlling four groups of fighters had advanced north-east from Sbeitla on 26th based in the Tripoli, Benina, Alexandria and March, and had occupied Fondouk] were now Haifa areas, was responsible for the safety of threatening Kairouan, the focal point of the road our land and sea communications from Tunisia system of the central Tunisian pj^in. to the Levant. In the north, our land forces had captured To the west of the enemy's Tunisian perimeter Sedjenane on 30th March and occupied Cap Ser­ squadrons of the North-west African Tactical Air rat two days later. The advance along the Sed- Force were disposed in order to give full support jenane-Mateur road, however, was rendered dif­ to our land forces. In particular, six U.S. Spit­ ficult not only by the enemy's mining of the rold fire squadrons, three Hurricane-bomber squa­ and blowing-up of bridges but by the exceedingly drons, and seven squadrons of U.S. Warhawks heavy going and bad weather. and Airacobras, located in the Thelepte-Sbeitla area, were ready to give close support in the The Opposing Air Forces central sector and to the south. Ten R.A.F. Spitfire squadrons were available for operations At this stage the German Air Force strength in in the central and northern sectors and a total Tunisia was estimated at 325 aircraft, including of thirteen squadrons of U.S. Bostons U.S. 180 single-engined fighters and 55 fighter-bom­ Mitchells, and R.A.F. Bisleys were located at berg. The Italian Tunisian force comprised ap­ Canrobert, Berteaux and Oulmene, respectively. proximately 100 MC.200/MC.202S. In Southern Italy, Sardinia and Sicily the German Air Force The Strategic Air Force included three groups comprised approximately 405 aircraft, of which of U.S. Fortresses, two of U.S. Mitchells, and one of U.S. Marauders; night bombing was carried southern battlefield, and "softened", to some ex­ out by two Wellington squadrons. The American tent, the enemy's Akarit defences. bombers operated principally from the Constan­ On 1st April attacks were renewed on Sfax el tine area and the Wellingtons from Blida. Bom­ Maou airfield, the enemy's most southerly Tuni­ ber escort and fighter-bomber commitments were sian landing ground, in order to limit the opera­ met by six squadrons of U.S. Lightnings. tions of ME.109s and MC.202s over the Akarit The Coastal Air'Force was responsible for the area. At this time, also, Sicilian-based JU.88s safe passage of our Central Mediterranean con­ and ME.210s were probably using Sfax as an voys, coastal protection and night shipping stri­ advanced landing ground when operating in the kes. A total of five Albacore, Hudson and southern sector. Our attack was carried out by Slwordfish squadrons operated from Tafaroui and eighteen iS.A.A.F. Bostons, 54 R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Blida and a Marauder squadron was also based Baltimores and fourteen U.S. Mitchells, flying in in the last named area; three Beaufighter squa­ three formations; escort was provided by Spit­ drons operated from Maison Blanche and Setif; fires, Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks. Bombs and four fighter squadrons1* of Hurricanes and hurst across the landing and dispersal areas, Spitfires had operational bases at Maison Blan­ causing fires, and near misses were scored on che, Jemmapes and Taher. aircraft and buildings. The following day, 2nd April, the light bombers Rommel's Forces at Akarit and fighter-bombers turned their attention to the At the end of March, Rommel's retreating army enemy's Akarit positions. Five attacks were was establishing itself at^its next delaying posi­ made, by a total of 98 escorted Allied bombers tion — the line of natural anti-tank barriers and three by Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawk formed by the Oued Akarit and the Fatnassa and fighter-bombers. In general, results were not Zemlet el Beida hills. In some respects the Aka­ observed, although some fires were seen to break rit position can be compared with that at Mareth; out and at least one hit was scored on an 88 mm. in particular, the eastern obstacle in each case gun position. Proof that targets were difficult was formed by a deep wadi. The water channel to locate is shown by the fact that later 63 U.S. in the wadi Akarit was extremely narrow, how­ Warhawks made seven armed reconnaissances ever, unlike the 50 foot stream in the wadi Zig­ over the Akarit area without making any at­ zaou which proved such a formidable obstacle tacks. during the frontal attack on the Mareth .Line. For the follpwing three days bad weather limit­ Above all, the artificial defensive works at Akarit ed our air attacks on military targets. Apart were vastly inferor to those at Mareth. from small-scale fighter-bomber attacks on The Axis troops were disposed in much the enemy transport vehicles and a raid on Zitouna same way as at Mareth. The coastal area was landing ground, the only attack of note was that held by Italian troops and the junction between made by five Halifaxes and 31 Wellingtons, with them and a further Italian division on their right Albacore illumination, on Sfax (the principal was cemented by elements of the German 90th coastal town behind the Akarit position) on the Light Division. The rest of the line was held by night 4th/5th April. Hits were scqred on the predominantly Italian forces, with elements of railway station, barracks and factories north of the 90th Light Division guarding the main pass the town. between Djebel Zemlet el Beida and Djebel Hai­ R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Spitfires definitely held doudi. The immediate armoured reserve behind the upper hand in the days before the VIHth the Akarit line was provided by the 21st Armour­ Army's attack. On 2nd April, Spitfires on of­ ed Division, while the 15th Armoured Division, fensive patrols over the southern battle area shot located south-west of Skhirra, formed the strate­ down five ME.109s and damaged three others gical reserve which could be switched to the without loss, and two days later they destroyed Akarit or Guettar areas as required. In its tank two ME. 109s and damaged a FW.190, again wit.-i strength, however, the two divisions were in a no Spitfire casualties. bad way and at this stage it was estimated that Meanwhile, .No. 40 Squadron S.A.A.F. main­ about 50 runners only were available. An even tained its reconnaissances of the Akarit defences greater weakness was the paucity of German and No. 680 Squadron covered the enemy's land­ infantry in the front line. ing ground and Sfax harbour.

Air Activity Prior to VHIth Army's Advance Enemy Resistance in the El Guettar Sector For the first five days of April, after the bustle While the VHIth Army was preparing to of the withdrawal and chase from the Mareth launch its attack, the American forces operating Line, both Rommel's forces and the VIHth Army east of El Ghiettar continued to press on the concentrated on preparing for a renewal of the enemy's western flank. Rommel, well aware of battle. the seriousness of the threat from this quarter, During this short lull the Western Desert Air switched over armoured units which checked any Force limited the enemy's fighter activity by further advance of the American forces and, in attacks on his landing grounds behind the Akarit fact^ regained some high ground in the vicinity position, retained mastery of the air o\ " bel Kreroua. U.S. Spitfires of the Tactical Air Force main­ Jmerit • during the first tained air superiority over the El Ghiettar battle three months oT

and after In the course of the afternoon 54 U.S. light­ Mark III tank only was located and forthwith nings covered the Sicilian Straits, but no enemy destroyed. enemy aircraft were sighted. Towards evening, vehicles began to retire north­ wards from Oued Akarit and by nightfall the Results of First Operation enemy's withdrawal was in full swing. The de­ As a result of the day's operations 40 enemy fection of the Italians, of whom 5,000 were cap­ aircraft were shot down and, after an examina­ tured on the one day, and the defeat of the in­ tion of photographs taken by reconnaissance air­ adequate German infantry had rendered the po­ craft, it was estimated that a further 161 air­ sition untenable. craft, including many transport types, were des­ The enemy transport vehicles moving north­ troyed on the Tunisian and Sicilian airfields. wards along the coast during the evening were Allied losses were three aircraft definitely des­ straffed by Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks of troyed and six missing. the Western Desert Air Force, and Spitfires pa­ On several other occasions in April the same trolling the area reported nine large fires burning principles of timing and interception were used simultaneously among vehicles near Skhirra. One as in the original operation recounted above and Kittyhawk and four U.S. Warhawks failed to equally striking results were achieved. These return. supplementary operations against the enemy's During the one-day battle continuous offensive air transport system are dealt with chronologi­ patrols over the Akarit area were maintained by cally. 161 R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Spitfires. One large escorted formation of Stukas was intercepted and The Akarit Defences Stormed their attack broken up and there were several In the early morning of 6th April the Vlllth engagements with small formations of enemy Army launched a frontal attack on the enemy's fighters. In all, the Spitfires shot down two Akarit defences. Although the enemy had de­ ME.109s and one MC.202, probably destroyed two voted six days to the final strengthening of the ME.109s and damaged three others without loss; line the position was held for one day only. in addition three JU.87s and one ME.109 were The action was by no means a "walk-over" for destroyed by our anti-aircraft fire. the VTIIth Army, however, and fierce opposition The collapse of Axis resistance before the was encountered, particularly at the pass over Vlllth Army compelled the enemy in the El Guet­ the Djebel Fatnassa and the northern end of the tar and Faid sectors to join in the retreat and Djebel Roumana. This latter point, in fact, was left the 2nd U.S. Corps in possession of the battle­ in the enemy's hands until the late afternoon, due field. The Allied armies in Tunisia were now to the resistance of the German armoured units, able to form one continuous front, with a resul­ including the 15th Armoured Division which had tant improvement in co-ordination and flexibility. moved south from Skhirra when the battle was joined. The Pursuit to Enfidaville While our land forces were making their initial Rommel's forces were on the move again, this attack 78 Kittyhawk and U.S. Warhawk fighter- time to EnfidaviUe, where a natural defensive bombers, escorted by Spitfires, all of the Western line was provided by the hills which run west­ Desert Air Force, carried out armed reconnais­ wards to join the Grande Dorsale ridge in the sances over the enemy's positions; trucks filled Djebel Fkirine area. This line of defence, made with troops were machine-gunned west of Oued more formidable by anti-tank ditches and pro­ Akarit and transport vehicles and gun. positions tective works, linked up with the enemy's posi­ were bombed in the hills 25 miles east of El tions to the north-west, thus forming the final Gruettar. Confirmation was also obtained of the bridgehead. Within lay the coastal plain — and reports made by tactical reconnaissance aircraft Tunis. of No. 40 Squadron S.A.A.F. on the enemy's reac­ On 7th April the VIII Army began its six day tions to the Vlllth Army's attacks. pursuit which covered 150 miles. The advance Later in the day, when the enemy attempted was delayed more by the difficulties of the terrain to counter-attack at two points north of Oued and problems of supply than by enemy rearguard, Akarit, five attacks were delivered on enemy actions. The stages of the pursuit were marked concentrations in these areas by 54 R.A.F. and by our occupation of the coastal towns; Mahares S.A.A.F. Bostons and Baltimores and eighteen fell on the 9th, Sfax on the 10th and Sousse on U.S. Mitchells, escorted by Spitfires, Kittyhawks the 12th. and U.S. Warhawks. Five additional attacks From the commencement of the enemy's with­ were carried out by over 100 Kittyhawk and U.S. drawal on the night of 6/7th April until the night Warhawk fighter-bombers. Apart from a number of the 8/9th the Western Desert Air Force light of fires which were seen to break out, however, bombers and fighters attacked the retreating details of the damage inflicted could not be ob­ enemy columns by day and heavy and medium served. bombers of No. 205 Group bombed both the ene­ "Tank-busters" of No. 6 Squadron had a rather my's vehicles and coastal towns by night. On 9th disappointing day: three armed reconnaissances and 10th April targets had thinned out in the were made for reported enemy tanks, but one southern sector and, in addition, bad weather limited offensive operations. Therea t targets were loca- were switched to the enemy's airfieldsTbehln El Guettar to J3fax, Enfidaville defences. along which ~enemy*ffWeP^ere retiring in order During the night 6/7th April attacks were de­ to avoid being cut off by our troops advancing livered by 69 Wellingtons; 21 of the medium from the south. Hurricane "tank-busters" also bombers concentrated on bombing Sfax where operated on this day, setting on fire at least two the railway sidings, the phosphate quay and stores tanks; anti-aircraft fire, however, was intense depot were hit and the remainder attacked enemy and three Hurricane IIDs did not return. The transport, particularly in the Mahares area. Dur­ following day, the attacks were intensified on the ing the night, also, eight Bisleys of the Tactical enemy vehicles withdrawing to Sfax along the Air Force bombed vehicles on the roads near Sfax coastal road and over the tracks from Mezzouna. and Sousse but results were unobserved. Five Eleven attacks were made by 162 Allied bofribers Halifaxes and 53 Wellingtons repeated their pro­ while 300 Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks straff­ gramme on the following night, with the help of ed and bombed the retreating columns from dawn flare-dropping Albacores; on this occasion, how­ to dusk. One Kittyhawk and four U.S. War- ever, Sfax town received less attention, the main hawks- did not return. A conservative estimate attacks being made against vehicles and convoys of the damage inflicted on enemy vehicles by the en route. The next night, 8/9th April, five Hali­ bombing and machine-gun attacks on 7th and 8th faxes and 50 Wellingtons extended the attacks to April was 130 destroyed and 200 damaged. Sousse, again with the help of flare-dropping Al­ During these two days enemy air opposition in bacores. The heavy bombers and a fifth of the the southern coastal area was slight, due to the medium bombers attacked targets in the town abandonment of forward landing grounds. Such itself and the remainder attacked a landing fighters as did appear, however, were engaged ground, transport, roads and camps in the vici­ by patrolling Western Desert Air Force Spitfires; nity of El Djem and Djemmal. three ME.109s and one ME.110 were shot down, Meanwhile, during the hours of daylight on 7th one ME.109 probably destroyed and three da­ and 8th April, the Western Desert Air Force maged for the loss of one Spitfire. bombers and fighters harassed the enemy's re­ In addition to the attacks mentioned in the treating columns incessantly. On the 7th, conti­ preceding paragraphs American aircraft of the nuous attacks were delivered by a total of 124 Tactical Air Force on 7th April attacked the Allied light-bombers, heavily escorted by Kitty- enemy forces which were forced to withdraw from

Road and rail bridges over the wadi Akarit destroyed by the enemy before retreating.

11 the El Guettar sector when the A karit defences escorted by Spitfires. The Hurricane-bomber at­ had been over-run. tack was particularly successful; after dropping Most of the attacks were delivered against the their bombs the Hurricanes and escorting Spit­ enemy columns retreating through the Djebel fires shot up about 50 vehicles and left them in Chemsi Pass, east of El Guettar. In this restrict­ flames. Intense flak was now being encountered ed area attacks were made by two formations of over the Enfidaville area and three Hurricane- escorted Warhawk-bombers, twelve escorted Bos­ bombers were shot down. When the day raids tons and twelve escorted Mitchells. In particular, had finished, fifteen Wellingtons took over and the Bostons dropped bombs on 40 to 50 closely- attacked general targets in the area Enfidaville packed trucks and a large column of black smoke - Bou Ficha - Zaghouan. was seen issuing from the burning vehicles when Rommel's retreating forces had now completed the American aircraft left the scene. their long trek from Oued Akarit to Enfidaville. The Allied air attacks in this battle area were Even more effective were two attacks delivered then turned against those enemy landing grounds by twelve escorted Bostons and 36 Warhawks on which had acquired importance due to the ene­ enemy columns east of Maknassy. The Bostons my's loss of airfields in the south. These attacks bombed two large concentrations of vehicles held up by a road block and reported damage to are considered on pages 15 to 17. nearly 100 vehicles. The Warhawks bombed and straffed a column of vehicles, causing over twenty Allied Advance in the Central Sector fires; five Warhawks failed to return from this During the first week in April the Allied land mission. forces had maintained a steady pressure against the enemy in the Pichon and Fondouk areas, in Attacks on Enemy Columns Continued the central sector of the Tunisian battlefield. From the afternoon of 9th April Rommel's re­ There were, however, no major engagements. The treating forces sought to escape the attacks of air activity on either side was also subdued: the Western Desert Air Force by accelerating the U.S. Airacobras, Warhawks and Spitfires of the rate of their withdrawal. The enemy columns Tactical Air Force carried out offensive sweeps approaching Enfidaville and those vehicles con­ over the area, extending as far as Kairouan to tinuing northwards were then attacked by aircraft the east and Faid to the south, but, in general, of the North-west African Air Forces. there was "nothing to report." Reconnaissance missions over the area were also carried out by These fresh attacks on the enemy's retreating the U.S. 3rd Photographic Group. columns were initiated on 9th April by fifteen Hurricane-bombers, escorted by Spitfires; bursts While the retreat of the Axis troops in the were observed on transport vehicles and among south was in progress after the battle of Akarit, troops. During the night the attacks' were con­ our pressure in the central sector increased. In tinued by fifteen Wellingtons of the Strategic spite of strong enemy resistance, the high ground Air Force which dropped 21 tons of bombs on dominating Fondouk was occupied on 9th April. troops and vehicle concentrations on the roads During the day U.S. Spitfires and U.S. War- around Enfidaville. Attacks on road junctions in hawks of the Tactical Air Force carried out of­ the area were also made by two French Leo 45s fensive sweeps over the Pjchon - Fondouk - Kai­ of the Huitieme Groupement. rouan area, but no enemy air activity was re­ • ported until the evening, when 24 U.S. Spitfires The following day, 10th April, the attacks on intercepted sixteen JU.88s. Eight enemy bombers Rommel's forces were intensified. Six attacks were destroyed, three probably destroyed and one were made by well-escorted formations of Hur­ damaged for the loss of one Spitfire. ricane, Spitfire and U.S. Warhawk fighter-bom­ The following day, 10th April, British armour­ bers, and U.S. Marauders and U.S. Bostons flew ed units advanced along the Fondouk - Kairouan ten and 45 sorties respectively. The fighter- road and successfully engaged a force of enemy bombers concentrated particularly on troop car­ tanks south of Kairouan. On the 11th our arm- riers which were first bombed and then straffed; our routed another enemy tank force to the north the results observed indicated that numerous ve­ of the town; later in the day Kairouan was oc­ hicles, including petrol bowsers, were destroyed cupied and our forward units reached Sbikha. or immobilised and many casualties inflicted on troops. The Marauders attacked vehicle concen­ American aircraft of the Tactical Air Force trations on the coastal road from Sousse to Bou rendered support by attacks on enemy transport Ficha and scored hits on a supply dump and gun vehicles and communications. On the 10th, eleven emplacements. The Bostons, escorted by Spit­ Bostons bombed vehicles on the road near El fires, successfully attacked truck convoys approa­ Alem, north-east of Kairouan. The next day, 24 ching Enfidaville. Throughout the night the escorted Warhawk-bombers attacked enemy attacks on the enemy columns were continued by transport, including troop carriers, on the roads 59 Bisleys and four French Leo 45s. north-east of Kairouan, nine escorted Bostons On the 11th, the attacks were renewed by two attacked vehicles north of El Alem and twelve escorted formations of Hurricane and U.S. War- escorted Bostons bombed a bridge in the same hawk fighter-bombers and over area. Our Threat From Medjez aircraft and the upper flight destroyed eight of The threat to the enemy did not come from the the enemy fighters. south only. While the Allied armies were ad­ Shortly after noon, eighteen U.S. Mitchells of vancing in the southern and central sectors our the Strategic Air Force, escorted by 21 U.S. land forces operating north-west of Medjez el Bab Lightnings, on a shipping sweep ten miles north were making steady progress. Spectacular ad­ of Cape Bon, intercepted a formation of 25 vances, however, could not be expected in such JU.52s, accompanied' by a number of JU.88s, mountainous country. M.E.llOs, JU.87s and ME. 109s, heading for Tunis. On 9th April Chaouach was captured and the The Mitchells shot down ten JU.52s and two next day an advance was also made in the high JU.88s without loss to themselves, and the Light­ ground south-east of Medjez. The enemy realis­ nings destroyed ten more JU.52s, a JU.88, a ed the seriousness of our threat and rushed up ME.110 and a ME.109. One Lightning collided his best remaining reserves in the northern with the ME.110 and crashed. Most of the trans­ sector. In spite of the enemy's increased re­ port aircraft attacked burst into flames and ex­ sistance, however, our troops had pushed north­ ploded, indicating that they were carrying oil and wards to Djebel Ang by the 15th. Thereafter petrol which were more than ever urgently re­ our advance was halted for a time. quired by the Axis' forces after the battle of The Allied air activity over the Medjez area Akarit. during the first fortnight in April consisted prin­ In addition to the two operations recounted cipally of fighter sweeps and tactical and pho­ above, R.A.F. Spitfires of the Tactical Air Force tographic reconnaissances by R.A.P. Spitfires of on a fighter sweep in the Tunis - Bizerta area the Tactical Air Force. In the absence of large shot down four more JU.52s. Two Spitfires fail­ concentrations of enemy vehicles the Allied ed to return. bombers were not required to render close sup­ The following morning, 11th April, nineteen port to our land forces; ground attacks, how­ U.S; Lightnings of the Strategic Air Force, dur­ ever, were delivered by R.A.F. Hurricane-bom­ ing a fighter sweep over the Sicilian Straits, bers and Spitfires whenever suitable targets met about 20 JU.52s and an unidentified transport could be located. aircraft, with an escort of miscellaneous aircraft, The Spitfires' most successful interceptions off Cape Bon en route to Tunis. All 21 transports over the Medjez area occurred on 7th April. and five other enemy aircraft were destroyed During the afternoon twelve Spitfires were within a few minutes. Three Lightnings were scrambled to intercept fifteen JU.87s, escorted lost in this encounter. by ME.109s, north-west of Oued Zarga. On Later in the morning, another U.S. Lightning sighting the Spitfires, the Stukas jettisoned their formation shot down five JU.52s south of bombs and in the ensuing combats five of them Marettimo Island for the loss of one Lightning. were destroyed, four probably destroyed and one Thus, on 10th and 11th April, at the time when damaged. A few minutes later, twelve Spitfires the Axis armies were being pushed back into of No. 232 Squadron, on a fighter sweep over the Tunisian Tip, 71 enemy transport and eighteen Medjez, sighted three more Stukas and shot them escorting aircraft were destroyed. This further down. After this engagement the Squadron massacre of the JU.52s seriously hindered the turned southwards to Pont du Fahs, where two enemy's attempt to rush in supplies to his hard- more Stukas were seen; one of the enemy dive- pressed Tunisian forces. bombers was destroyed- and the other was damag­ Sinking of the "Trieste" ed. In the above-mentioned combats there were no Spitfire casualties. At the beginning of April there were three heavy cruisers, each with a standard displace­ During the last week in April our threat from ment of 10,000 tons and having a main battery Medjez became more serious. The heavy fight­ of 8 inch guns, left in the Italian navy—the ing which then broke out in this area is referred "Trieste", "Gorizia" and "Bolzano". The last- to on page 21. named ship, however, had been previously damag­ ed and was undergoing repairs. Massacre of Enemy's Air Transport Continued Following reports received from the North­ While the enemy was retreating from the south west African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing and was being hard pressed in the central and that the heavy cruisers "Trieste" and "Gorizia" northern sectors the plan for .dislocating the were located at La Maddalena Naval Base, enemy's air transport system was again put info Northern Sardinia, three attacks were made by operation. U.S. Fortresses of the Strategic Air Force on During the morning of 10th April a fighter 10th April. sweep was made over the Sicilian Straits by In all, 84 effective Fortress sorties were carried U.S. Lightnings of the Strategic Air Force in out: the first two formations comprising 60 air­ two flights, twelve aircraft on the deck and eight craft dropped a total of 360 x 1,000 lb. (.1 and at 1,000 feet. A formation of about 50 JU.52s, .025 delay) bombs on the two cruisers and the with a fighter cover of approximately fifteen remaining bombers dropped 287 x 500 lb (.1 and MC.200S and FW.190S, was encountered. The .025 delay) bombs on the submarine base and lower flight of Lightnings shot down 20 transport harbour installations. Both cruisers received 1H several direct hits and near mis | Where the "Bolzano" was caused the sinking of the "Trieste" and damage being repaired. Attacks on this port were then to the "Gorizia". made by aircraft of the R.A.F. Bomber Command Three days later, on 13th April, three U.S. on the night 13/14th April. Lightnings of the Strategic Air Force made a Thus, due to the successful attacks of the further attack on the "Gorizia" dropping three Strategic Air Force on the 10th and 13th April 1,000 lb. (.1 and .025 delay) bombs from 3,000 the Italian fleet was left without a single service­ feet. One hit on the cruiser's stern and two able heavy cruiser. near misses were scored. The other successful shipping strikes by air­ The "Gorizia", although badly damaged by the craft of the North-west African Air Forces dur­ Fortress and Lightning attacks, managed to ing April are dealt with on pages 22 to 24.

The "Trieste" protected by tor

14 The Blitz on Tunisian Airfields Marie du Zit, Oudna, Korba, As a result of the withdrawal to Enfidaville liman and Megrine (Fochville) now acquirer! in­ and his loss of territory in the Kairouan area the creased importance. Advantage was accordingly enemy was obliged to abandon at least 22 landing taken of the lull m the ground fighting to deliver grounds in the southern and central sectors. heavy air attacks on these landing grounds, so Many unserviceable aircraft were perforce left that the enemy's air effort would be at a mini­ behind in the lost areas; the remainder was trans­ mum when the final battle commenced. Aircraft ferred principally to landing grouds which already under the operational control of the Western De­ existed, or were hastily prepared, in the rear of sert Air Force concentrated solely on the landing the Enfidaville defences and in the Cape Bon pe­ grounds in N.E. Tunisia while the North-west ninsula. In particular1, the landing grounds at St, African Air Forces attacked the main air bases at BisefW eRKTfunis in addition to these landing weather caused the cancellation of operations, the grounds. enemy's landing grounds received nightly visits Apart from an attack on Enfidaville landing from our bombers. In the course of the twelve ground by eighteen U.S. Mitchells on 10th April nights bombers under the operational control of and one on Korba south landing ground by 35 the Western Desert Air Force flew four heavy, R.A.F. Baltimores and eighteen U.S. Mitchells on 423 medium and 168 light bomber effective sorties the 19th, all the attacks of the Western Desert against the enemy's landing grounds in N.E. Tu­ Air Force light bombers and heavy and medium nisia. The heaviest attacks were delivered bombers of No. 205 Group were carried out at against the airfields at St. Marie du Zit and night. From the night 10/llth to 23/24th April, Korba. Against the former, where dive-bombers with the exception Qf two occasions when bad as well as fighters were based, two heavy, 140

ste" after bombing.

16 medium and 105 light bomber sorties were made, to. Accordingly, apart from the heavy' and against the latter 101 medium and seventeen attacks on La Marsa airfield (near Tunis) and light bomber sorties. Other landing grounds at­ Sidi Ahmed airfield (Bizerta) the weight of the tacked included those at Creteville, Menzel Temi­ attacks were against the landing grounds at Prot­ me and 8 oilman. ville (northwest of Tunis), Mabtouha (west of Although there was sometimes difficulty in lo­ Protville), La Sebala (north-west of Tunis) and cating the target and haze and low cloud often Creteville (south-east of Tunis). hampered the observation of results, it was ' La Marsa and Sidi Ahmed were each attacked evident from the fires and explosions caused and by 23 U.S. Fortresses, escorted by Spitfires; an­ the subsquent reports of reconnaissance aircraft other Fortress formation which set out later to that considerable damage was inflicted on dis­ bomb Sidi Ahmed encountered solid overcast from persed aircraft, petrol dumps, buildings and run­ 8,000 to 28,000 feet over the target and was oblig­ ways. ed to abandon the mission. During the attacks Meanwhile, from the 11th to 22nd/33rd April on La Marsa and Sidi Ahmed bomb bursts were attacks were being delivered on the enemy's land­ observed in each case all over the target area ing grounds, both by day and night, by the North­ and at Sidi Ahmed, where visibility was good in west African Air Forces. The night attacks were the morning, many fires were seen. An exami­ delivered principally by Bisleys and the day at­ nation by N.A.C.I.U. of the results achieved in tacks by American bombers—Fortresses, Mit­ the attacks on the 20th revealed that the attack chells, Marauders, and Bostons. In addition, two on La Marsa airfield was the most successful of attacks were delivered by Hurricane and U.S. the whole series. Meanwhile, U.S. Mitchells made Warhawk fighter-bombers. Cover and escort for four attacks on the landing grounds at Mabtou­ the day bombers was provided by Spitfires of the ha, La Sebala and Protville and U.S. Marauders Tactical Air Force. attacked Creteville landing ground. A feature of the Fortress and Mitchell attacks was the dropp­ With the exception of one attack on Megrine ing of thousands of pamphlets, chiefly in German, (Fochville) airfield by nineteen Wellingtons on in the target areas. The most frequent attacks 12/13th April and a few sorties by French Leo during the day, however, were carried out by 45s, the North-west African ^ Air Forces' night escorted formations of U.S. Bostons, which main­ attacks were carried out by Bisleys, which flew tained a shuttle-service principally against the approximately 150 ^effective sorties. The Bisleys' landing grounds in the Mabtouha and Protville main targets were the landing grounds at La areas. In general, although some of the landing Sebala and La Marsa but their heaviest, and per­ grounds were difficult to locate, the results haps most successful, attack was that on Sidi achieved were good and .many hits and near misses Ahmed (Bizerta) airfield during the clear night were scored on aircraft on the ground. Qf 19/20th April, when -56 effective sorties were flown. The excellent work of the escorting Spitfires From 11th to 19th April a daily average of two is shown by the fact that only one Mitchell fail­ U.S. Mitchell formations (each of eighteen air­ ed to return and another forced-landed; neither craft) made attacks and these were supplemented casualty, however, appeared to be due to enemy on several days by U.S. Marauder and U.S. Bos­ air action. In combats with the enemy the es­ ton attacks; the bombers were escorted by Spit­ corting Spitfires shot down at least six fighters fires in all case. Oudna landing ground, south and probably destroyed several more; four Spit­ of Turns, was the main target, but the landing fires were reported missing. In addition to pro­ grounds at St. Marie du Zit and La Sebala also viding escort for the bomber formations through­ received attention. In addition, on the 14th, out the day, Spitfires of the Tactical Air Force 24 U.S. Fortresses attached El Aouina. (Tunis) flew nine fighter sweeps aggregating 162 sorties. airfield, dropping 2,742 x 20 lbs. fragmentation In all, on 20th April, aircraft of the North-west bombs. In practicallly all the attacks the land­ African Strategical and Tactical Air Forces flew ing grounds were covered with bursts and many over 1,000 sorties. The attacks seriously limited fires were caused. Enemy fighter opposition the enemy's air effort at a critical period: during was slight, but on several occasion damage was the remaining weeks of the campaign the ene­ inflicted on the bombers by intense flak. my's Tunisian airfields were attacked on a num­ ber of occasions but heavy concerted attacks The North-west African Air Forces' attacks were never again necessary. reached their climax on 20th April, when an all- out effort was made to pin down and destroy Further Blows to Enemy's Air Transport enemy aircraft during the vnith Army's attack recounted on page 18. Throughout the day co­ During the latter half of April fighters of the ordinated attacks were made by heavily-escorted Western Desert Air Force carried out a series formations of bombers and fighter-bombers. The of attacks which virtually gave the coup de gra­ enemy had now withdrawn many aircraft from ce to the enemy's Mediterranean air transport his landing grounds immediately behind the Enfi­ system. davtile defences and in the Cape Bon peninsula On the afternoon of the 18th, 46 U.S. War- and had dispersed them on numerous landing hawks, with R.A.F. Spitfires as high cover, on grounds in the territory between Turns and Bizer­ offensive patrol ,pver the Gulf qf Tunis* intercept­

17 ed about 100 JU.52s, strongly escorted by" "ahS" eight ME.323 trips were made daily, re­ fighters, heading north-east near Cape Bon. In presenting the transport of 455 tons per day. all, 74 enemy aircraft were shot down, compris­ During the second half of April it was estimated ing 58 JU.52s, fourteen ME.109s and 110s and that the enemy required a minimum of 40,000 two MC.202s. The beaches and sea were litter­ tons of supplies monthly to sustain his effort in ed with wreckage and eighty per cent of the air­ Tunisia. If the enemy's transport aircraft sorties craft shot down burst into flames. Allied los­ had been maintained on the scale mentioned ses were six U.S. Warhawks and one Spitfire. above nearly a third of the minimum tonnage The following day, 19th April, formations of could have been transported by air. In the last Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks, with a Spitfire week of April, however, the enemy's air trans­ top cover, again carried out fighter sweeps over port traffic had practically ceased as a result the Gulf of Tunis with the object of intercepting of the attacks mentioned in the preceding para­ enemy transport aircraft. About 20 well-escort­ graphs and on pages 7 and 13. Ilie risk had ed JU.52s were encountered in the early morn­ to be taken of transporting more and more ing: twelve of the transport aircraft and three supplies by sea. The Allied air attacks on the of the escort were destroyed and four more JU. Axis shipping and ports, which prevented a large 52s and one S.79 were probably destroyed. We part of the supplies and reinforcements from lost one Kittyhawk. As a result of subsequent reaching the enemy's forces, are dealt with on engagements with smaller formations of enemy pages 22 to 28 and 30. aircraft, one JU.87 towing a glider and one JU. 88 and two ME.109S were destroyed, one JU.87 Enemy Resistance on Villth Army Front was probably destroyed and one ME.109 damag­ During the night 19/20th April the VIHth ed. Five Spitfires and two U.S. Warhawks did Army launched an attack on the enemy's Enfida­ not return from these later operations. ville positions. The enemy's chief centres of re­ These further blows gainst the enemy's JU.52s sistance were the Takrouna Hill and the Djebel practically stopped their traffic by day; during Garci. Takrouna Hill, on account of its preci­ the remander of the campaign their main em­ pitous sides, proved a difficult obstacle; the ployment was by night and on a limited scale enemy units holding it, in fact, had had to use only. Night-flying Hurricanes and Beaufighters rope ladders in some places to scale the rocks. then made these night trips exceedingly hazar­ For two days the enemy resisted stubbornly, but dous. by the 22nd the feature was entirely in our hands. In view of the heavy land fighting mentioned Meanwhile, Enfidaville, which was not strongly in the following pages, the enemy was now in held, was occupied by our troops on the 20th and the utmost need of supplies, particularly fuel. As patrols were pushed out in the flat country to a result of the Allied fighters' successful attacks the north. , on 18th and 19th April, the enemy feared to risk The attack on Djebel Garci proved even more his depleted JU.52 force for the transportation difficult than that on Takrouna Hill. In spite of supplies; on the other hand, the requirements of fierce enemy counter-attacks our land forces of his Tunisian forces were too pressing to be retained their hold on the southern slopes but entrusted entirely to sea-transport, which, more­ the enemy, who were mainly Italians, continued over, was susceptible to both naval and air at­ to occupy the summit and northern side. tacks. The Villth Army's initial attack, unlike those The decision was taken to rush in immediate of the previous six months, was not preceded or supplies and reinforcements by ME.323s. The supported by heavy air attacks. Reconnaissances enemy's venture failed entirely, however, as this of the enemy's positions were carried out by No. heavily escorted formation of 31 huge transport 40 Squadron S.A.A.F. and fighter-bombers of the aircraft was intercepted over the Gulf of Tunis Western Desert Air Force made a few armed on 22nd April by an offensive patrol of two and reconnaissances without incident; there were no a half squadrons of Spitfires and five squadrons concentrations of transport and enemy positions of Kittyhawks. All the ME.323s were shot down were concealed in difficult country. In addition, and nine ME.109s, one MC.202 and one RE.2001 low cloud over the battle area further limited were also destroyed. These successes were gain­ offensive operations. During these days a better ed for loss of four Kittyhawks. Most of the dividend was paid by the attacks on the enemy's ME.322s were obviously carrying petrol as they landing grounds and air transport already con­ immediately burst into flames when attacked. sidered. The enemy thus lost the greater part of his total ME.323 force in a single day. When enemy resistance" stiffened on the Djebel Garci, however, the Western Air Force Allied The seriousness of the loss to the enemy of at light bombers and fighter-bombers carried out least 70 JU.52s and 31 ME.323s at this juncture attacks on the enemy's gun emplacements and can hardly be over-emphasised. The load of a dug-in positions. During this period, however, JU.52 making the Sicily to Tunis trip was ap­ the principal employment of the fighter-bomber proximately two and a half tons and that of a force, was in attacks on enemy shipping In or ME.323 approximately ten tons. In the early near the Gulf of Tunis." The success achieved days of April an estimated average of 150 JU.52 in this activity is Indicated on page 23. Korba landing ground (south) during an attack by Allied aircraft on 29th April, 1943.

19 THONARA PECHERIt

BOATS

WRECKED DESTROYER

^ west of Cape Bon. The six crash­ JU.S2s, circled in white, are some of the 58 transport aircraft shot down on ISth April, 1943. The Allies Advance any further During the last ten days in April, while the stalemate continued on the VTIIth Army's front, .The last week in April was a period of solid fighting flared up along the rest of the front in if, at first glance, unspectacular gains. To a the northern sector. The North-west African considerable degree our successes were due to Tactical Air Force gave the fullest support to the air operations mentioned in the following the simultaneous attacks of our land forces and paragraphs. The Allied armies were now ready covered the entire northern sector battlefield. to make their final attacks which eliminated the Owing to the innumerable targets attacked in Axis forces in Tunisia. all battle areas it is beyond the scope of this short account to relate each air attack to the Air Support appropriate land thrust. A clearer picture in While the land operations mentioned in the this instance can lae given by first mentioning the previous section were proceeding the North-west main attacks of .the Allied armies and then in­ African Air Forces carried out their heaviest air dicating the scale and direction of the air effort. attacks to date against military targets. A summary of these air operations is given in the following section. On 21st and 22nd April light bombers and fighter-bombers flew nearly 250 sorties, medium On the night 20/21st April, in order to bombers 24 sorties, and fighters over 700 sorties forestall an expected British advance, the Her­ on offensive sweeps, tactical reconnaissances and man Goering Armoured Division launched an bomber escort duries. Most of the air attacks attack in the Goubellat plain between Medjez were in support of our land forces in the Medjez and Sidi Mahmoud*. The enemy employed three area. In particular, on the 21st, R.A.F. Bostons battalions of infantry supported by 50 to 70 tanks. attacked enemy positions to the north-east of Heavy fighting took place by moonlight, but the Medjez and to the south-east at Longstop Hill. enemy made little progress and lost 30 tanks. On the following day, R.A.F. and U.S. Bostons Desultory fighting took place on the, 21st, but attacked the Longstop Hill positions ; troops, it was evident that the 1st Army had the si­ camps, and a suspected headquarters at Ksar tuation well in hand long before the day drew Tyr, east of Medjez; enemy positions in the Crich to a close. The following day our land forces el Oued area, north-east of Medjez; and build­ counter-attacked in the area between Goubellat ings at Ain el Asker, south-east of Ksar Tyr. On and Bou Arada. In the north of this sector good several occasions fires and explosions were re­ progress was made, but in the south strong re­ ported. On the same day U.S. Mitchells made sistance was encountered and fierce tank battles two attacks on a suspected headquarters eleven were fought. The enemy then reinforced his miles north-east of Pont du Fahs and R.A.F. and positions in the Djebel Bou Kournine area, and U.S. Bostons also attacked enemy positions in stopped any further advance during April. the same, area. Meanwhile, on 23rd April, our troops operating The next day, 23rd April, the fighter-bomber east of Medjez had pushed along the Medjerda and light bomber effort rose to approximately valley and occupied. Crich el Oued. Heidous, 260 sorties, medium bombers flew 52 sorties and north of Medjez, was captured two days later. fighters, in addition to bomber escort and tactical Enemy resistance then stiffened; east of Medjez reconnaissance commitments, carried out sixteen we were held up by the Sidi Abdullah feature Spitfire sweeps over the entire battle area. In and enemy tank reinforcements prevented further addition to increased attacks in the areas men­ progress in the Medjerda valley sector. tioned above a considerable part of the bombing U.S. forces were also on the move. As part of and straffing effort was directed to helping the the preparations for our general offensive aimed American land forces advancing towards Mateur. at breaking through the enemy's Enfidaville-Pont Escorted U.S. Mitchells effectively bombed the du Fahs - Medjez el Bab - Sedjenane perimeter marshalling yards at Mateur and tracks east of at several points, the American 2nd Corps had the town and escorted U.S. Marauders attacked moved across the 1st Army's communications and targets along the Beja - Mateur road. U.S. War- had taken over the northern sector. The Ame­ hawks made low-flying bombing and straffing ricans made good progress along the axis of the attacks over the entire northern battlefield and, Beja-Mateur road and in the coastal area. The in particular, many "targets of opportunity" were enemy's forces in the latter area, particularly, located near Sidi Nsir, south-west of Mateur, and had been weakened in order to strengthen his Jefna, west of Mateur. The main R.A.F. and vulnerable central front and accordingly in the U.S. Bostons effort, supplemented by two U.S. early days of May the rate of the American ad­ Mitchell attacks, was directed to close support vance was accelerated. in the Medjez sector, with enemy positions at Ksar Tyr as the primary objective, but targets - On the vmth Army's left flank, at the north­ south of Beja and in the Pont du Fahs sector ern end of the Grande Dorsale, French troops were also attacked. In the latter area attacks advanced on 24th April with little opposition on gun emplacements were particularly effective. from the enemy, who withdrew towards Pont du Fahs. By the 28th our Allies had crossed the l, adverse Pont du Fahs - Enfidaville road; from that! ff»«but a number fighter sweeps were made over a attack. Above all, the moral influence was wide area in the course of which gun emplace­ enormous. Enemy troops were on edge and ments, troops and transport were successfully hampered in their movements while the Allied attacked. armies could move freely, knowing that attacks With the improvement in the weather tne from the air were extremely unlikely. Tactical Air Force attacks during the next four It was evident that the Allied fighters were days, 25th to 28th April inclusive, were inten­ complete masters of the air over the battlefield. sified. Over 700 sorties were flown by bombers Few enemy fighters could be spared for low- and fighter-bombers and Spitfires maintained flying attacks or patrols over the battle area as complete supremacy over the entire battle area. the comparatively small enemy fighter force now On the 25th, U.S. Warhawks bombed and left in Tunisia was more urgently neded to pro­ straffed military targets over a wide area; in tect shipping in the Gulf of Tunis which had to particular, their attacks on transport and fortifi­ run the gauntlet of our naval and air attacks. ed hill positions in the Mateur sector were Combats were therefore few. On the 21st, enemy especially successful. The R.A.F. and U.S. Bos­ fighter-bombers were prevented from attacking tons, meanwhile, concentrated mainly on enemy our troops in the Medjez area and in this and positions to the north of Pont du Fahs and they other combats during the day three FW.190s and were helped in this activity by Hurricane-bombers. three ME.109s were destroyed and two ME.109s The following day, the Allied light bombers' probably destroyed for the loss of two Spitfires. principal effort was directed against tank and On the 23rd one FW.190 and five ME.109s were transport concentrations near Ksar Tyr, in the destroyed and one FW.190 probably destroyed Medjez area, and U.S. Mitchells delivered an ef­ without loss. Thereafter, even fewer combats fective attack on the marshalling yards at took place until during the last two days of the Mateur. On the 27th, R.A.F. and U.S. Bostons month one encounter only with enemy aircraft made many effective attacks on enemy concen­ over the battle area was reported. trations in the Medjez area", particularly in the The Allied armies now preparing to make their vicinity of Ksar Tyr; U.S. Warhawks attacked final attacks were assured of complete local air tanks and transport, especially in the Pont du supremacy in every sector. Moves of whole Fahs sector; and Hurricane-bombers attacked a formations on a few roads and the massing of variety of targets west of Tebourba and tanks troops at selected points of attacks could ac­ near Ksar Tyr. The main effort on the 28th was cordingly be made with every chance of tactical again the Allied light bombers attacks on enemy surprise. positions at Ksar Tyr, with subsidiary attacks against concentrations to the north at St. Cyprien. Attacks on Central Mediterranean Shipping The weather had deteriorated somewhat on tne As was emphasised in a previous issue of the 29th and 30th and our light bomber and low R.A.F. Middle East Review, the campaign in flying attacks were reduced; in all, U.S. Mitchells Tunisia was above all a war of supplies. From flew 36 sorties and Allied light bombers and November, 1942, the enemy's Tunisian forces had fighter-bombers approximately 145 sorties. A been sustained by a flow of supplies borne by feature of the attacks on the 29th was the ac­ sea and air transport from Sicily/Italy; from the curate bombing of enemy positions and tanks beginning of 1943 Rommel's retreating army also near Ksar Tyr: our land forces in the vicinity drew from the enemy's Tunisian bases. It follow­ reported that the bombing was extremely ac­ ed that once this flow of supplies was stemmed curate and greatly assisted their operations. The Axis resistance in Tunisia would become an im­ light bombers, meanwhile, paid most attention practicability. to enemy positions at Derdouri. On the follow­ Mention has already been made of the Allied ing day U.S. Warhawks attacked gun positions air attacks which succeeded in dislocating the in the Mateur sector and R.A.F. and U.S. Bostons enemy's air transport system: in April, also, the and U.S. Mitchels attacked the enemy's positions Royal Navy's and Allied air forces' attacks on near Ksar Tyr and concentrations further north enemy shipping were intensified and these suc­ around Furna. ceeded in depriving the enemy of vital supplies, In addition to the above-mentioned attacks, particularly fuel, during the most critical phase Bisleys on several occasions made night attacks of the land battle. on roads and transport. The results of the at­ The aircraft employed on counter-shipping tacks were, in the main, unobserved through missions by day in the Sicilian Narrows and poor visibility, but the attacks undoubtedly Tyrrhenian Sea from the African mainland were hampered the enemy's night movements. U.S. heavy and medium bombers and U.S. and It is impossible to estimate the total material R.A.F. fighter-bombers; in general, the bomber damage inflicted in the course of these attacks. and fighter-bomber formations had strong fighter Most of the operations were carried out over escort. mountainous country and often in cloudy weather. U.S. Fortresses were employed against shipping On many occasions when fires and explosions in harbours and less regularly against large con­ were not observed it was,reported that the bomb voys; in certain cases, also, operations were pattern was icarried out against pin-pointed sea targets as when the Italian heavy cruisers were a_ Ises were scored La Maddalena. Against vessels at sea high1 titude bombing was found to be extremely ef­ fective and it was estimated that the Fortresses JH1§S needed to drop on an average 28 tons of bombs H.Q. North-west" Africa Mwb*orces' assessment to sink a medium-sized merchant ship. The usual of the damage inflicted on shipping was based formation of eighteen Fortresses could therefore on the following rules:— Ships were only claimed be expected, given favourable conditions, to sink as "sunk" when they were seen to explode or two vessels. sink; "severely damaged" implied that the vessel was last seen heavily listing, in a sinking posi­ U.S. Mitchells continued to be the aircraft most tion, or observed in flames; when direct hits generally used for day shipping sweeps, but dur­ were scored but other results were unobserved ing the month U.S. Lightning fighter-bombers the vessel was classed as " damaged"; near were employed on an increased scale against ships misses were ignored unless additional evidence and convoys at sea, but not, as a rule, against indicated that damage had been caused. The shipping in harbour. It became the practice also totals given below include vessels which received for some of the Lightnings which escorted the damage in attacks on harbours. medium bombers to carry bombs; having dropped Adverse weather conditions prevented shipping their bombs these fighters became part of the strikes being made during the first three days ordinary escort. Ships at sea were normally of April, but as a result of six air attacks during attacked from the rear. When a convoy was the next five days two vessels were sunk, eight sighted, each flight of six aircraft attacked one severely damaged, and eighteen damaged. The vessel, the aircraft being staggered at altitude vessels sunk were a destroyer blown up by U.S. intervals of 300 to 500 feet to provide freedom Mitchells on the 5th and a merchant vessel of of movement for evasive action. 6,000 tons, probably a munition carrier, blown In practically every case escorts for the heavy up by U.S. Fortresses on the 6th. The "severely and medium bombers employed in attacks on damaged" ships were principally merchant shipping were provided by U.S. Lightnings of vessels and barges left in flames. the Strategic Air Force. From 10th to 16th April two vessels were sunk, six severely damaged and seven damaged. The During April aircraft of the North-west African sinking of the Italian cruiser "Trieste" on the Air Forces delivered nine attacks on enemy 10th has already been dealt with on page 13 ; the shipping in the vicinity of Tunis, involving the other vessel sunk was a large barge blown up expenditure of nearly 238 tons of bombs, and by U.S. Lightnings on the 15th. The remaining carried out sixteen effective shipping sweeps, in casualties included merchant vessels hit by U.S. the course of which just under 161 tons of bombs Fortresses and smaller beached vessels attacked were dropped. Nearly 90% of the U.S. Fortress by U.S. Lightnings. sorties were effective as the heavy bombers were During the next week, 17th to 23rd April, briefed to attack shipping in harbours and select­ adverse weather conditions often prevented sight­ ed convoys or particular ships whose locations ings and successes against enemy shipping fell were known. Of the U.S. Mitchell and U.S. to one sunk, four severely damaged and five Lightning sorties, however, flown almost entirely damaged. in shipping sweeps, about 50% resulted in no at­ tacks being made due to lack of sightings, return The volume of enemy shipping to Tunisia in of escorting fighters owing to the jettisoning of the last week of April was on an increased scale. long-range tanks, and other causes. On several Apart from the fact that weather conditions occasions, however, when no enemy shipping was were favourable for the successful passage of sighted escorted Mitchell formations attacked shipping, it was imperative for the enemy to rush enemy aircraft en route to Tunis with consider­ in supplies in readiness for his last stand. The able success. In the course of several effective annihilation of the enemy's air transport also shipping attacks, also, casualties were inflicted necessitated the increased use of sea transport. on enemy aircraft escorting convoys. An all-out effort was made by aircraft of the North-west African Air Forces in attacks on In addition to the North-west African Air enemy shipping at sea. In particular, U.S. Light­ Forces' attacks, towards the end of April large nings successfully attacked Siebel ferry convoys formations of Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawk on the 26th and 29th and U.S. Mitchells scored fighter-bombers of the Western Desert Air Force direct hits on two merchant vessels on the 28th had outstanding success in attacks on shipping and left a destroyer in a sinking condition on the in the Gulf of Tunis. 30th. The most successful attacks of the week, On a number of occasions during the month however, were those delivered by Kittyhawk and successful night shipping sweeps were carried U.S. Warhawk fighter-bombers of the Western out by Albacores of the North-west African Desert Air Force on shipping in the Gulf of Tunis Coastal Command. On the night 4/5th April during the last three days of the month. On one near misses were scored on an 8,000 ton mer­ day alone, 30th April, Kittyhawks and U.S. War- chant vessel; on the 10/llth near misses were hawks operating from Cape Bon to the Gulf of scored on a beached vessel; on the 1©/I7feh a, Tunis csank a destroyer, an_ escort vessel, a mer­ tanker was hit by torpedoes and left stationary; chant vessel of 1,000 tons, .a Siebel ferry, an ASSIFIED E-boat and an F-boat, apart from damage in­ aircraft against enemy shipping during April are flicted on other vessels. The total shipping mentioned in the article " Malta Prepares." losses inflicted on the enemy by the North-west Throughout the month, also, the Royal Navy African Air Forces (including the Western Desert made incessant attacks; the success achieved by Air Force) from 24th to 30th April as originally our surface vessels and submarines is indicated reported were:— one destroyer, three merchant in the article " The Fight for the Mediterranean,5' vessels, one Siebel ferry, two E-boats and two elsewhere in this number of " Review." F-boats sunk ; two destroyers, four merchant Our air and sea attacks on enemy shipping vessels and one E-boat severely damaged; and were not primarily aimed at the destruction ut four merchant vessels, two Siebel ferries, two his sea transport; it was a war against cargoes E-boats and two F-boats damaged. and troops. By the end of April the enemy was The final figures for the month of April, after in the utmost need of supplies and reinforce­ due adjustment in the light of photographic inter­ ments to support his hard-pressed land and air pretation respecting vessels located in harbour, forces, due to the success of our anti-shipping were 20 vessels sunk, sixteen severely damaged, attacks, our destruction of his air transport, and and 32 damaged. The successes of MaZfa-based our blasting of his supply ports.

ck a convoy off Bizerta "#*.*, %

leading ship disintegrates under.direct hits, and the second is damaged by near misses. the primary objectives have already been consi­ dered in the previous section. Supplemental^ &o:, t#^jsh>ppin;| Meanwhile, heavy attacks were being made by ! t Cyrenaican and North-west African-based aircraft tacls .^ni&sKippfngf 'in iTiajbour aW pn- *'t>eached against the main Axis ports of on-loading. Apart Sis ^already men&onea, air attacks were con- from the attacks of No.178 Squadron Liberators April against the Axis ports of off- and a few sorties by Wellingtons of the Strategic loading and on-loading. Air Force, all the attacks were delivered by day The general procedure for the enemy's small by American aircraft of the North-west African' and medium-sized merchant vessels and Siebel Air Forces and the Ninth U.S. Air Force. ferries was to load and depart principally from Naples, the Axis' main supply port, received Palermo, Marsala and Trapani and put in at the greatest attention from the Allied bombers. Bizerta, Tunis or La Goulette; cargoes for these Eighty-three effective sorties were carried out vessels were brought by rail and road down the against the port by Liberators of the Ninth U.S. west coast of Italy and taken by train ferries A.F., sixteen by Liberators of No. 178 Squadron, across to Messina and then to the Sicilian ports and 64 by U.S. Fortresses of the Strategic Air mentioned. Large' merchant vessels loaded Force. The Fortress sorties were all flown on chiefly at Naples and made the long sea-trip to 4th April, when more than 100 tons and appro­ the northern Tunisian ports. Some hugged the ximately 56 tons of bombs were dropped on coast of Sicily and made a quick dash to their shipping facilities and the marshalling yards, appointed port of off-loading; others took a cour­ respectively. Apart from the extensive damage se westwards towards Sardinia, to avoid the to the shipping in the harbour, the power and gas night strikes of MaZta-based aircraft, and made plants, barracks and docks were all hit. Over the longer last dash to Tunisia. half of the Middle East aircraft's total sorties During the month, the enemy employed shal­ were flown by U.S. Liberators on the 10th and low draught vessels such as E and F-boats on a 11th. Hits were scored on a torpedo boat and greatly increased scale. The (hilf of Tunis af­ merchant vessel and on the harbour moles and forded excellent beaches for the use of these ves­ quays; during the two attacks five enemy figh­ sels and they could make the passage to and ters were shot down, and seven probably destroy­ from Sicily over-night. Moreover, some mer­ ed for the loss of one Liberator. This aircraft chant vessels were being unloaded by lighters was destroyed by small bombs dropped from from off-shore anchorages. It followed that at­ above by enemy fighters. This was the first tacks on the installations of the northern Tuni­ success achieved by "air to air" bombing in the sian ports were not of such importance as Mediterranean area. hitherto. Palermo was attacked on three occasions from Wellingtons of the Strategic Air Force attack­ North-west Africa and five times from the Mid­ ed the docks and marshalling yards at Tunis on dle East; in all, 95 effective sorties were flown three occasions, during April, carrying out by U.S. Fortresses, 43 by U.S. Liberators and 50 effective sorties and dropping 117 tons of seven by R.A.F. Liberators. All the attacks of bombs. The Wellingtons also made two effecti­ the Strategic Air Force Fortresses were deliver­ ve attacks on Bizerta, dropping a total bomb ed on the 16th, 17th, and 18th; the examination load of nearly 56 tons. The medium bomber at­ of photographs taken during the attacks re­ tacks were delivered principally in the dark pe­ vealed that six vessels and the power station riod. "Path-finders" marked the target by drop­ had been hit, and in the attack on the marshal­ ping incendiary bombs and the remaining air­ ling yards on the 18th nearly all the bombs craft dropped their loads, including an appre­ burst in the target area. The attacks of the ciable number of 4,000 and 1,000 lb. bombs, in R.A.F. and U.S. Liberators were aimed primari­ the lit-up areas; large fires were caused on prac­ ly at inflicting damage on the quays and moles: tically every occasion. The most effective U.S. in practically every case direct hits were observ­ Fortresses attacks on Tunis and Bizerta were ed and many fires were started. made during the second week of the month: Messina was attacked six times by Middle eighteen effective sorties were flown against East-based aircraft during' April; thirteen effec­ Tunis and 27 against Bizerta. In addition, U.S. tive sorties were flown by R.A.F. Liberators and Fortresses made one very successful attack on 71 by U.S. Liberators. In particular, considera­ harbour facilities at Ferryville, comprising six­ ble damage was caused to train ferry berths, teen effective sorties. On several occasions, the building housing the operating gear and rail­ however, heavy bomber attacks on these ports way sidings. The attacks appreciably increased were abandoned owing to bad weather over the the enemy's difficulties in transmitting supplies target area. A feature of the above-mentioned from the Italian mainland to the Sicilian ports of attacks was the dropping of thousands of leaflets departure to Tunisia. in German, Italian and Arabic over a wide­ spread area. Trapani was attacked on three occasions dur­ ing April from North-west Africa; twice by The U.S. bomber attacks which had the des­ U.S. Fortresses and once by Wellingtons. The truction of shipping in the Tunisianjj^^purs as American heavy bombers flew 52 effective sor­

26 Inset shoivs Ferryville before attacks began. The large photograph shozvs the harbour after attack by U.S. Fortresses on 7th April, 1943.

&8» a*.\­

,

•if q • - , * i <, arbour; 88s and fighters were based), was attacked on on mer­ three occasions, Monseratto (where fighters were based) twice, and Elmas (a JU.88 base) and *%Towafrciis jfcheLdjjfliSdle*' of April it was discovered Villacidro (used by JU.88s and HE.llls) once .it-feat there ^was increased shipping activity at Ca­ each. tania. Accordingly, attacks .were delivered by It is impossible to give an accurate assessment Middle East Liberators; U.S. Liberators of the of the effect of these raids but observed results Ninth Air Force and R.A.F. Liberators flew 56 indicated that wide-spread damage was inflict­ and six effective sorties respectively. Hits were ed on aircraft on the ground, runways, hangars scored on shipping in the harbour, on the docks, nd buildings. Some idea of the damage caused and in the vicinity of the oil storage tanks and in these raids is given by photographic inter­ port railway station. pretation reports on two of the airfields attack­ ed. For example, on 13th April Milo and Castel­ In addition to the attacks on the supply ports vetrano airfields were attacked. The reports on mentioned above, a few sorties were carried out these attacks show that at Milo out of approxi­ by Middle East heavy bombers against the Ita­ lian bases at Bari, San Giovanni, Crotone, Co­ mately 120 aircraft on the ground at least four­ senza and Pizzo. Bombers of the Strategic Air teen received direct hits and fourteen others were Forces also attacked port facilities at Maddalena damaged; at Castelvetrano, of the 90 aircraft and Carloforte in Sardinia and Marsala harbour present at least three. ME.323s, seventeen other Sicily, on a few occasions during the month. transport planes, and 22 additional aircraft were hit. Even these estimates of damage are in­ The co-ordinated attacks of the Middle East complete as photographic cover and interpreta­ and North-west African Air Forces on the Axis tion cannot provide a complete assessment of da­ ports of off-loading and on-loading, convoys, and mage inflicted on aircraft bombed with fragmen­ air transport during April contributed greatly to tation bombs. the rapid collapse of the enemy's Tunisian for­ During the following week, 17th to 23rd April, ces which were left without sufficient supplies Bocca di Falco (Palermo) airfield was attacked to withstand our offensive launched in the first twice by U.S. Fortresses and Alghero airfield, week in May. Sardinia, once by U.S. Mitchells. On the former Attacks on Mediterranean Air Bases. nearly 84 tons of bombs were 'dropped and on In addition to the constant raids on the enemy's the latter a little over 10 tons. Photographic Tunisian landing grounds already considered, the interpretation revealed that ten aircraft, the fuel Allied air forces delivered heavy air attacks dur­ storage and explosive dumps, hangars and build­ ing April on the Axis air bases in Italy, Sicily ings were hit at Bocca di Falco and at least five and Sardinia. Apart from a devastating attack aircraft and a large hangar were hit at Alghero. on Bari airfield by Liberators of the Ninth Air In the last week of April, the Italian airfield Force the entire effort against the airfields was at Grosseto and Villacidro airfield, Sardinia, made by the North-west African Strategic Air were attacked by 43 and nineteen U.S. Fortresses Force. respectively. The results at Grosseto were main­ The attacks opened on 4th April when Capodi­ ly unobserved due to cloud over the target but chino airfield, near Naples, one of the main ba­ at Villacidro the airfield and revetments were re­ ses of the German air transport fleet, was at­ ported to be completely covered by bomb bursts.' tacked by 27 U.S. Fortresses. It was reported Photographic interpretation based on partial that 25 of the 50 aircraft seen on the ground cover only of Grosseto revealed that of 21 air­ were destroyed or damaged. On the following craft on the ground three were destroyed by di­ day, as part of the plan to dislocate the enemy's rect hits and at Villacidro it was evident that air transport system, the Sicilian airfields at three medium bombers were destroyed and one Bocca di Falco (Palermo) and Milo (Trapani) damaged, and previously damaged aircraft were were attacked: these attacks have already been also hit. In addition, damage was caused to considered on page 9. buildings and anti-aircraft posts. Decimoman­ nu airfield was also attacked by 24 Wellingtons. During the week 10th to 16th April, when over A great explosion and several fires were caused 70 JU.52s were shot down in air combat, heavy in the target area. attacks were made on the Axis airfields in order to destroy aircraft (particularly transport types) The Ninth U.S. Air Force's attack on the Ita­ on the ground. In all, U.S. Fortresses flew 100 lian air base at Bari was carried out on 26th and Wellingtons 43 effective sorties. A total April by 62 Liberators, which dropped 234 x 500 bomb load of nearly 200 tons was dropped on lb. and 1,008 x 20 lb. fragmentation bombs. Direct these targets; the types of bombs used varied hits were seen on all hangars, which were left from 20 lb. fragmentation to 4,000-sjMJunders and in flames, and the whole of the airfield was co­ included a large number of dej ion types, vered by bomb bursts. Fires and explosions In Sicily, Castelvetrano ransport were also caused in the dispersal areas and and torpedo-bomber !ransport among oil tanks. aircraft intermedia! were at­ tacked; in The above-mentioned air attacks on the Medi­ (where JU. terranean airfields, together with the attacks on

28 Attack on Xaplrs by ('S. Liberators on 2X//? April, 1943. the enemy's Tunisian landing grounds previously Agadir to Tunisia. On the offensive side, Ma­ mentioned, played a considerable part in the rauders and Beaufighters by day and Hudsons achievement of the Allies' air supremacy in the and Albacores by night (in co-operation with Central Mediterranean theatre of \Var. Malta-based aircraft) watched the enemy's ship­ ping lanes. On the basis of the information si­ The Coastal Air Force gnalled back the air and naval staffs briefed While the operations recounted in the foregoing forces against the enemy shipping sighted. When pages were in progress aircraft of the North­ co-operating with naval forces our aircraft often west African Coastal Air Force carried out its remained and shadowed enemy vessels to the many and diverse duties. By the use of air limit of endurance and in the face of attacks by power in the closest co-operation with sea power enemy fighter escorts. The shipping strikes at the Allies now controlled the sea-ways of the night carried out by Fleet Air Arm Albacores Central Mediterranean. under N.A.C.A.F. control are mentioned on page On the defensive side, fighter protection was 23. provided for our convoys; anti-submarine patrols N.A.C.A.F. fighters had comparatively few were constantly flown; fighter protection was decisive combats with enemy aircraft. There is given to our ports, harbours and land commu­ no doubt, however, that the enemy was deter- nications; and air-sea rescue work was under­ our ship- taken. The coastal area covered stretched of the op­ position always awaiting During these four days, also, escorted fighter was done, in particular, by night-flying Beau­ bombers of the Western Desert Air Force, which fightersV. The following are three of the April made extensive offensive reconnaissances of the "high-lights". On the evening of 18th April Gulf of Tunis, also met with little success, due abdnt fifteen JU.88s attacked Algiers. Four to bad visibility, although a beached destroyer, Beaufighters were scrambled to intercept them. previously damaged, was attacked and the jetties Three of the enemy aircraft were destroyed and in the Cape Bon peninsula were effectively one probably destroyed. In the early morning of bombed. 21st April fifteen JU.88s approached a convoy On 5th May the weather improved and the off Algiers. Their attack was broken up by Strategic Air Force shipping sweeps paid a di­ Beaufighters and the convoy sustained no da­ vidend again. Twenty-seven escorted U.S. Fort­ mage; in addition, four of the JU.88s were des­ resses covered the Sicilian Straits and southern troyed. During the last week in April, in an part of the Tyrrhenian Sea. A large merchant attempt to lessen the danger of interception by vessel, presumably carrying munitions, exploded Allied fighters, bases in Sardinia were used for when attacked and smoke and flames were seen the first time as intermediate landing grounds rising from it for 60 miles on the Fortresses' for enemy transport aircraft. Small formations return journey. Escorted U.S. Mitchells encoun­ then made the journey to Northern Tunisia in tered an unescorted convoy of one medium and the early morning. Beaufighters made this a two small merchant vessels, west of Marettimo hazardous proceeding. Just before dawn on 30th Island; one small merchant vessel was sunk, the April a Beaufighter operating from Bone was other damaged and the largest ship was left in vectored on to JU.52s flying north-west 30 miles flames. Escorted U.S. Marauders during the day south of Cagliari. The Beaufighter destroyed scored direct hits on a beached merchant vessel five of the enemy transport aircraft in ten minu­ east of Cape Zebib. A by-product of another tes; four of them exploded in the air and the escorted U.S. Mitchell sweep was the destruction other crashed into the sea. The total score of of six SM.82s and three escorting fighters for the night fighter squadrons during the six months the loss of two escorting U.S. Lightnings. Mean­ of the Tunisian campaign was 100 enemy aircraft while, escorted Kittyhawks and Warhawk fight­ destroyed. er-bombers of the Western Desert Air Force con­ The achievement of both defensive and offen­ tinued their offensive reconnaissances over the sive sides of the Coastal Air Force should not be Gulf of Tunis and off Cape Bon. Direct hits judged only according to the number of enemy were scored on two merchant vessels and the submarines, aircraft or ships destroyed. It is Cape Bon peninsula jetties were bombed. Two more truly indicated by the safe arrivals of our ME.109s were shot down in combat. own convoys, without which our armies and air On the 5th, also, U.S. Fortresses flew 26 and forces would have been ineffective, and the help 27 sorties against Tunis harbour and La Goulet­ given to our naval and air forces which resulted te harbour, respectively. At Tunis, damage was in the destruction or turning back of enemy caused to the phosphate and south quays and supplies. marshalling yards and leaflets in German were The activity of the Middle East formations dropped; at La Goulette, hits were scored on which controlled the sea ways from the Turkish shipping and bombs burst in the barracks, oil to the Tunisian borders is mentioned on page 38. storage and oil loading areas. On the following day, 6th May, the attacks of Attacks on Shipping and Ports Continued the Strategic Air Force met with even greater In readiness for the decisive battles recounted success and also prevented troops escaping from in the following pages the enemy, during the first Tunisia. U.S. Lightning-bombers sank three weefc in May, continued to make desperate ef­ Siebel ferries and four other small boats, and a forts to push across supplies to the Northern few minutes later U.S. Marauders sank three Tunisian ports. Although, as shown below, his Siebel ferries and damaged five other small ves­ shipping losses were heavy, considerable tonnage sels. All the vessels attacked were filled with was unloaded at the ports. In addition to some troops and heading for Sicily at points 30 to 45 small merchant vessels many Siebel ferries and miles south-west of Marettimo Island. Later in T.L.Cs made the passage from the western Si­ the morning escorted U.S. Mitchells sank another cilian harbours during the week, but towards the Siebel ferry and damaged others in the same end of it this traffic was disrupted by successful area as the above-mentioned attacks, but this air attacks. time the vessels were heading for Tunisia. For the first four days of May bad weather Meanwhile, attacks were made on the western and poor visibility prevented U.S. Lightning figh­ Sicilian ports of Marsala, Trapani, and Favigna­ ter-bombers and U.S. Marauders and Mitchells, na, whence shallow-draught vessels were making which carried out several shipping sweeps^ the dash to Northern Tunisia. At Marsala, 21 making sightings. An attack by escorted U.S. Fortresses scored hits and near on shipping facilities at misses on six Siebel ferries and two medium ed largely sized merchant vessels, a merchant vessel was probably sunk and another was left burning. At Favignana, 36 escorted U.S. Mitchells scored PerhapsthB Htdtfr^YpeflActfgess of near misses on two merchant vessels and dock our sea and air blockade is provllJfcfc^Pe fact installations were hit. At Trapani, attacks were that in the last days of the campaign the enemy's delivered by 28 escorted U.S. Fortresses against stocks of artillery ammunition were exhausted the docks, naval base, marshalling yards and oil and the total amount of M.T. and diesel fuel left storage. The entire target area was left in fla­ in stock at the completion of the final battles mes and emitting black smoke. was 40 tons only. Other damage was inflicted by medium bom­ bers and fighter-bombers of the Strategic Air Prelude to Final Attack Force during the day on beached vessels at Ca­ During the first five days of May the Allied pes Zebib and Fortass. armies took up their positions for their final Fighter-bombers of the Western Desert Air attacks. As already mentioned the considerable Force continued the search for enemy shipping troop movements involved were completed under in the Gulf of Tunis, carrying out over 100 escorted air cover. Kittyhawk and U.S. Warhawk fighter-bomber In the north the German land forces continued sorties. In the evening, two destroyers, believed to withdraw, evidently with the intention of re­ to be carrying troops were sighted off La Gou­ ducing the length of their line by cutting off the lette heading north-east. One of the destroyers Bizerta sector and taking up positions along the blew up after receiving three direct hits and the line of hills running north-west of the Medjerda other was set on fire. The latter, however, was valley. They aid not intend, however, that their later observed continuing on its course. withdrawal should be so precipitate as it eventual­ That night, 6/7th May, thirteen Wellingtons ly became and after the capture of Mateur by of the Strategic Air Force bombed docks and U.S. forces on 3rd May our Allies encountered shipping at Trapani as a diversion for a mine- increase resistance east and north-east of the laying mission by Malta-hased aircraft. town. On the 5th, the Americans, after hard On the 7th the weather deteriorated and ham­ fighting, occupied the western slopes of the pered our shipping attacks. U.S. Warhawk­ AchJcel ridge and on the following day captured bombers of the Strategic Air Force, however, the rest of the feature. straffed three motor-boats and a 150 foot yacht Meanwhile, there were no major changess in off Tunis, sinking the latter. Western Desert the Enfidaville sector. South of Pont du Fahs, fighter-bombers, which operated at full strength, however, the French continued their drive against despite bad weather, against shipping in the Gulf the enemy's well-sited positions, and in spite of of Tunis, reported direct hits and near misses the intense artillery fire they continued to make on a number of vessels. satisfactory progress. In all, during the first week in May, as a re­ In the Medjez sector preparations were in hand sult of the Allied air attacks 20 enemy vessels for our final break-through to Tunis. In this were sunk, seven probably sunk and twelve da­ connection the 7th Armoured Division, the 4th maged. The vessels sunk comprised two mer­ Indian Division and the 201st Guards Brigade chant ships (one small and one of unreported had been transferred from the Vlllth Army to size), one destroyer, four Siebel ferries, three the 1st Army's front. It was now decided not T.L.Cs, and ten small unidentified vessels. to persist with our attack launched in the Bou The attacks by Middle East-based heavy bom­ Arada—Goubellat area, which had been halted bers during the same week, apart from seven by the enemy's anti-tank guns, minefields and XL®, Liberator sorties flown against Taranto, armour, but to concentrate our main strength were all delivered against Reggio di Calabria in for a decisive thrust towards Tunis along the the toe of Italy, against which six R.A.F. Libe­ axis of the Medjez—Tunis road. rator and 67 U.S. Liberator effective sorties were For the first four days in May our air attacks carried out. The Ninth U.S. Air Force attack on on military targets were on a reduced scale, due the 6th was particularly heavy and devastating; to bad flying weather. Fighter sweeps, how­ 51 sorties were flown by two formations. The ever, were maintained by R.A.F. and U.S. Spit­ first formation scored direct hits on two mer­ fires on the Tactical Air Force. chant vessels and caused many fires and explo­ The Western Desert Air Force during the four sions in the harbour area. The second forma­ days under review made only one attack of note tion scored direct hits on a large ship, and se­ in the battle area. This was against enemy posi­ veral other merchant vessels were destroyed; tions at Djebibina, west of Enfidaville on 4th May; huge explosions were observed around the har­ effective sorties were flown by 34 S.A.A.F. Bos­ bour. tons, 36 R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Baltimores and 35 Meanwhile, particularly by night, the Royal U.S. Mitchells, but observation of results was Navy was also on the look-out for enemy ship­ obscured by haze. ping: their most striking success reported dur­ The Tactical Air Force attacks consisted of a ing the week was the sinking, on the night 3/4th few R.A.F. and U.S. Boston sorties against the May, of a 7,000 ton merchant vessel laden with enemy's positions at Ksar Tyr, and tank con- bombs and land-mines, and an escorting a particularly yer, off Kelibia. ck by eighteen Attack on Messina by U.S. Liberators on 28//; April, 1943.

progress on 5th April, 1943.

32 aircraft on troop concentrations west of Tebour­ U.S. Mitchells flew 24 sorties; U.S. "Warhawks ba; eight Spitfire-bomber sorties in attacks in the carried out 120 sorties in straffing and bombing Massicault area and 60 Hurricane and Spitfire attacks; and Hurricane and Spitfire fighter-bom­ fighter-bomber attacks, on the 4th, on transport bers made 72 and 36 sorties, respectively. In figh­ and gun positions in the Zaghouan and Massicault ter sweeps, escort duties and miscellaneous re­ areas. connaissance missions R.A.F. and U.S. Spitfires Meanwhile, R.A.F. and U.S. Spitfires, in spite flew approximately 600 sorties. The majority of of bad weather, swept the entire battle area, these sorties were flown in support of the advance and carried out tactical and artillery reconnais­ from Medjez, but some, which are specified on sances; few enemy aircraft were sighted and on page 34, were carried out in the northern sector. some days none at all. The light bomber effort in the early morning With an improvement in the weather on the was directed against the enemy's positions at night 4/5th May our air attacks in the battle Bordj Frendj, which constitued the first objecti­ area were intensified. Thirty-four Wellingtons, ves of our infantry attack. The Boston attacks, under the operational control of the W.D.A.F., coupled with our heavy artillery barrage, softened bombed enemy communications west and north opposition to such an extent that our infantry west of Tunis, starting fires, and seventeen Tact­ made a speedy advance and cleared the way for ical Air Force Bisleys bombed transport on the our armoured thrust. Later, the light bombers roads between Tebourba and Cheylus. The fol­ went ahead of our advance and attacked enemy lowing day the Tactical Air Force flew twelve concentrations in the area between Furna and U.S. Mitchell and 59 R.A.F. and U.S. Boston St. Cyprien and in the Djedeida area. The U.S. sorties, with Spitfire escorts, against enemy troop Mitchell attacks were delivered against enemy concentrations and enemy strongholds on the positions in the Furna - St. Cyprien area and on north-eastern and eastern slopes of Djebel Bou vehicles at St. Cyprien. The Tactical Air Force Aoukaz, against which our forces had instituted bomber attacks caused widespread damage at all an attack as an essential preliminary to the points of resistance in the line of our advance. drive on Tunis. The attacks materially helped Perhaps the most successful individual attack was our ground forces to clear these hills on the l.eft that delivered in the early evening by twelve Bos­ ol our imminent attack. No enemy aircraft were tons of No. 38 Squadron on a convoy of 100 ve­ encountered during the day. hicles in the St. Cyprien - Djedeida area: all the During the night Tactical Air Force Bisleys vehicles were left stationary after the bombing and French Leos flew seventeen and seven sor­ and thick clouds of smoke rose from the target ties respectively against airfields at El Aouina, area. No light bombers were lost during the La Sebala and Ariana, in the Tunis area, to limit day's operations but 21 were damaged by the the effort of the enemy's fast-dwindling Tunisian intense flak encountered. air forces, and 46 Wellingtons (under W.D.A.F. The most effective U.S. Warhawk attack was control) attacked road and dispersed transport made by 72 aircraft in the early evening on traf­ vehicles near Cheylus, north-east of Pont du fic jammed on the road south-west of Tunis; Fahs, and Djedeida, north-east of Tebourba. troops and vehicles were bombed and straffed with good results. Meanwhile, Hurricane-bom­ The Drive on Tunis bers made seven attacks in the Massicault - At dawn on 6th May our main attack was St. Cyprien area and along the Cheylus - Dje­ launched on a 3,000 yard front along the axis of deida - Tunis roads, and Spitfire-bombers carried the Medjez—Tunis road. The initial advance was out free-lance missions, chiefly in the St. Cy­ made by infantry, supported by concentrated ar­ prien area. tillery fire ajid the direct air support mentioned Enemy air opposition was on an increased scale below. but there were no serious attempts to interfere Our first objectives were soon taken and dur­ with our escorted bomber formations and there ing the morning our armour passed through the was, in fact, a definite reluctance to fight. In the infantry, successfully engaged enemy tanks, and course of the day R.A.F. Spitfires destroyed eight pushed on to Furna. Meanwhile, another British ME.109s and probably destroyed two ME.109s and armoured force had by-passed Furna and oc­ one FW.190 for the loss of one of our fighters; cupied our main objective, Massicault, in the U.S. Spitfires destroyed eight ME.109S, two FW. afternoon and had contacted enemy positions at 190s and one MC.202 and probably destroyed two St. Cyprien by the evening. Thus, in a single ME.109s without suffering any casualties. The day our troops had broken through the enemy's only offensive action by enemy aircraft was a line and had reached points fifteen miles from morning attack by six FW.190 fighter-bombers 1 \nis. east of Medjez el Bab. The Tactical and Western Desert Air Forces The Western Desert Air Force's effort in the provided full air support throughout the entire battle area consisted of two concentrated attacks day. by Allied bombers in the Furna and St. Cyprien The Tactical Air Force's effort was made up as areas, in support of the thrust of our land forces, follows:— light bombers flew 227 sorties, com­ and Kittyhawk and U.S. Warhawk fighter-bom­ prising 153 U.S. and 74 R.A.F. Boston sorties ; ber attacks on road traffic west and south of 1 Tunis. In all," 89 effective sorties were flown by had to be maintained for six divisions during the R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Baltimores, 54 by S.A.A.F. advance. The result was a great traffic conges­ Bostons and 51 by U.S. Mitchells; R.A.F. and U.S. tion which constituted a sitting target — but the fighter-bombers made 55 and 45 effective sorties enemy air forces were unable to attack it. The respectively. Escort for the bombers was pro­ more obvious help afforded by the Allied air vided by over 200 Spitfires, Kittyhawks and U.S. forces' co-ordinated bomber and fighter-bomber Warhawks, and for the fighter-bombers by 90 attacks in softening resistance before the break­ Spitfires and Kittyhawks. through, and later in support of our armoured The Allied bombers' attacks were extremely forces, was yet another example of how air power accurate and after the second attack over twenty can blast the way for advancing land forces. fires were seen burning in the target area. Our Occupation of Bizerta losses were one Baltlimore and one Mitchell. The fighter-bombers found good targets scarce, but While the main thrust towards Tunis was to inflicted casualties on small groups of transport progress U.S. 2nd Corps, which included French vehicles over a wide area. Of the few enemy troops in the coastal area, were approaching Bi­ aircraft encountered during the day Western De­ zerta. Armoured units succeeded in out-flanking sert Air Force Spitfires shot down one ME. 109 enemy positions east of Mateur, where resistance without loss to themselves. was still strong, and entered Ferryville during the early afternoon of 7th May. A few hours later The Fall of Tunis , Bizerta was occupied. The American forces also cleared the enemy from the Chouigui Gap and During the night 6/7th May, six Halifaxes and 43 Wellingtons, operating under the control of from the high ground west of Chouigui. By that the Western Desert Air Force, bombed the main time the enemy had already evacuated Tebourba. roads converging on Tunis from Bizerta and from As already mentioned, bad flying weather over the west and south. Electrical storms, rain and the battle area limited our air activity on the 7th. low cloud were encountered, but many bombs Spitfires, however, flew fighter sweeps covering were seen to burst on the roads and four fires the roads Djedeida-Mateur and , Bizerta-Tunis were observed. A Halifax and a Wellington failed and at points where traffic congestion was ob­ to return. served vehicles were machine-gunned with grood The speed of our land forces' drive to Tunis on effect. In addition, as already mentioned the 6th and the destruction caused by our air and U.S. Mitchells and R.A.F. and U.S. Bostons at­ artillery attacks completely upset the enemy's tacked vehicles on the Tunis-Bizerta road. defensive plans. On the 7th our advance was continued in the face of disorganised and scat­ The Round Up tered resistance and our armoured cars entered Our armies now began their extensive mop­ Tunis in the afternoon. ping-up operations, backed by the Allied air for­ Bad weather limited the scale of the Tactical ces which, as recounted in the following section, Air Forces' attacks against land targets during attacked the retreating enemy at will and in con­ the day and several missions had to be abandoned. junction with our naval forces prevented any at­ Three attacks on transport vehicles on the Tunis- tempt to stage an Axis "Dunkirk". Bizerta and other roads leading into Tunis were On 8th May our land forces cleared the Marsa made by escorted formations of R.A.F. and U.S. peninsula, north-east of Tunis, and. occupied La Bostons and U.S. Mitchells; 55 Hurricane-bom­ Goulette. In Bizerta there was still some desul­ bers attacked troops withdrawing towards Tunis; tory opposition in the morning, but resistance in and 48 U.S. Warhawk fighter-bombers bombed the area as a whole ended during the day with the and straffed aircraft on the ground at El Aouina surrender of German forces, including elements airfield and troop concentrations in the vicinity. of the 15th and 10th Armoured Divisions, in the Spitfires which swept the entire battle area Protville area. throughout the day encountered no enemy air­ Our armoured forces continued their advance craft but, together with Spitfire-bombers, they from Tunis and captured Hammam Lif in the attacked transport vehicles over a wide area. morning and continued south-east in order to cut Four Spitfires were destroyed by the enemy's off the enemy's retreat into the Cape Bon penin­ anti-aircraft fire. sula. Enemy resistance on the hills south of Hammam Lif and around Creteville was not fi­ The Decisive Factor nally overcome until the afternoon. Our advance In the final drive to Tunis the influence of our was then continued along the axis of the .Grom­ air power on the land operations was decisive. balla - Hammamet road. Hammamet itself was The Allies' air supremacy made possible the rapid occupied during the night of 10/11th May and movement of large troop formations and concen­ columns branched south and north to Nabeul and trations at the point of attack. The break Bou Ficha, respectively. through from Medjez necessitated tne massing of The Axis troops between Zaghouan and the sea our land force on an extremely narrow front,, at first intended to obey orders to fight until their volving the bottle-neck of a singtf ammunition was exhausted, but with the ap­ Medjez over which the i proach of our column advancing south from Bou Castelvetrano airfield, Sicily, shotting l\IE.323s and other transport aircraft, and the elaborate dispersal pens, before the attacks by N.A.A.F. in April.

Fichu, the Italian First Army was now directly make night trips to bring stores or evacuate per­ threatened from the rear as well as in front. In sonnel from Cape Bon peninsula but night-flying the afternoon of 12th May the Army Comman­ Hurricanes and Beaufighters made this a hazar­ der, after a bombing attack, asked for terms and dous undertaking. A few bombers, also, made a formally surrendered unconditionally on the night raid on Algiers which proved disastrous for morning of 13th May. them. Meanwhile, Africa Corps on the west flank On 8th May Allied light bombers and fighter- had surrendered on the 11th to the French bombers of the Tactical Force flew approxima­ forces west of Zaghouan. tely 300 and U.S. Mitchells over 50 sorties in sup­ port of our advancing ground forces and fighters Unopposed Air Attacks carried out approximately 600 sorties in escort From 8th to 12th May, while our land forces duties, offensive sweeps, and straffing missions in were overcoming the enemy's last resistance, the the battle' area. Allied Air Forces bombed and straffed the demo­ Most of the R.A.F. and U.S. Boston attacks ralised Axis troops who were left without even were made in the Hamman Lif area and to the the semblance of an air arm, and units of the east, in support of our land forces' push from Royal Navy bombarded points of resistance in Tunis; attacks on transport vehicles were parti­ the Cap Bon peninsula. On the 8th the enemy cularly heavy near Soliman and these were sup­ air forces had only the Menzel Temime and Korba plemented by U.S. Warhawk-bomber attacks. landing grounds in the Cape Bon peninsula from Other light bomber sorties were flown against which to operate. Throughout the day only about the enemy's armoured division in the Protville 60 sorties were flown over Tunisia by enemy air­ area prior to its surrender. Eight Hurricane- craft, including some by fighters, fitted with bomber missions and one by Spitfires over the long-range tanks, which operated from Sicily and Cape Bon peninsula and in the Protville area Pantelleria. On the following day enemy air ac­ were especially successful. Troops, emplacements, tivity was even less, and for the remaining days transport and landing grounds were all attacked of the campaign there was none at all over the with good results and eight vessels were also battle area. A few JU.52s, however, attempted to bombed and shot up. Meanwhile, Spitfires car­ Temime landing ground, and a landing ground base of the Caji£"JB

36 bases ended. During the last week of the cam­ paign, as the enemy was unable to attempt an destroyed on the ground and a large~petrol fire evacuation, there was little Axis shipping in the was started jp the north-west corner of the air­ Sicilian Narrows. Until the final collapse, how­ field. Shortly afterwards, sixteen escorted Light­ ever, a few small craft crossed daily in a fruitless ning-bombers of the Strategic Air Force made a effort to bring in certain supplies and evacuate further attack and reported the destruction of personnel. more aircraft on the ground. In the course of The Allied air supremacy over northern Tunisia the following two days the attacks were inten­ and the control of the Sicilian Narrows by the sified by escorted bombers of the Western Desert Royal Navy whittled down the enemy's "Dun­ Air Force: in all, R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. light bom­ kirk" to vest-pocket size. bers flew 175, and U.S. Mitchells 66 effective sorties. Many fires and explosions were caused On the 8th, Western Desert fighter-bombers, as a result of the attacks. operating in strength against enemy shipping off the Tunisian coast, and helped by Baltimore sor­ The Strategic Air Force bombers, meanwhile, ties, severely damaged a medium-sized merchant attended to the Sicilian and Sardinian air bases. vessel and damaged three others. When, in the On the night 8/9th May, 25 Wellingtons success­ evening, enemy fighters tried to interfere with fully bombed the airfields at Villacidro, Elmas this activity, seven were shot down and several and Decimomannu in southern Sardinia, where our others damaged for the loss of one Kittyhawk. reconnaissance aircraft had reported the pre­ sence of many bombers. On the 10th, two for­ During the day, also, U.S. Marauders and U.S. mations of U.S. Fortresses, totalling 45 aircraft Lightning-bombers of the Strategic Air Force bombed Milo {Trapani) airfield, setting on fire probably sank a small merchant vessel and sank or destroying at least fifteen aircraft, including a small trawler; both ships were heading for an ME.323, and causing fires and explosions. On Sicily. On the following day, U.S. Spitfires set on the same day 46 more U.S. Fortresses attacked fire a barge north-east of Tunis and R.A.F. and Bo Rizzo airfield, further south, causing many U.S. Boston «cored near misses on two vessels fires. Considerable enemy fighter opposition was off the Tunisian coast and U.S. Warhawk-bom­ encountered in the last-mentioned attack and as bers straffed barges, with unreported results. On a result of combats two were shot down and two the 10th, Hurricane-bombers intercepted a schoo­ more probably destroyed for the loss of one U.S. ner laden with troops north-east of Bizerta, head­ Fortress. ing for Sicily; as a result of the fighter-bomber attacks the schooner was seen to break into Attacks on Italian Forts pieces. Meanwhile, Royal Navy units, on constant pat­ Extensive reconnaissance of the enemy's Me­ rol around the Tunisian coast, sank a barge laden diterranean ports during the last week of the with men and ammunition, and two small mer­ Tunisian campaign revealed greatly increased chant vessels off Cape Bon on the night 8/9th shipping activity in the Sicilian, Sardinian and May; six small coastal vessels filled with evacu­ western Italian ports. Attacks on these bases ated troops on the 10th; and damaged an E-boat, were now made as part of the necessary preli­ capturing most of its occupants, on the 11th. minaries to our imminent assault on the south­ ern bastions of Hitler's European " fortress." It is likely that some key personnel were evacuated by JU.52s at night during the last Apart from attacks by 70 R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. phase of the campaign but, as already indicated, light bombers and 38 U.S. Mitchells of the West­ ern Desert Air Force on shipping in the Pantel­ night flying Hurricanes and Beaufighters took laria harbour on the 10th, the Middle East squad­ their toll of these also. rons confined their attacks during the second Attacks on Air Bases week in May to the bombing of Messina, Augusta and Catania. These attacks were carried out by Just prior to the fall of Tunis and Bizerta the the Ninth U.S. Air Force. enemy withdrew as many aircraft as he could from the Tunisian landing grounds. As a result Two attacks were made on the train ferry ter­ more aircraft were now located on the Sicilian minus at Messina by seven R.A.F. and 44 U.S. and Sardinian airfields and the force on Pantel­ Liberators, respectively. In particular, hits were leria was also increased. In addition, more bomb­ scored on the ferry ships and railway yards. On ers were present on the Sardinian airfields in 11th May 48 U.S. Liberators, escorted by Malta- readiness for attacks on our Algerian ports and based Spitfires, made a very successful attack shipping. Accordingly, during the last week of on Catania harbour; hits scored on shipping re­ the Tunisian campaign heavy attacks were de­ sulted in the sinking of an ammunition ship and livered by the North-west African Air Forces and the setting on fire of a tanker. At Augusta, on Middle East-based aircraft on the above-mention­ the 13th, 48 U.S. Liberators scored hits and near ed airfields. misses on several ships in the harbour and bursts were observed among seaplanes. In addition, The attacks on Pantelleria aerodrome were be­ fires_ were causedat^he oil installations. gun on 8th May by escorted bombers of Western Desert Air Force: 89 effective sor extremely were flown by R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Bostons the Sicilian ports 6$T Palermo and Marsala "and" Cagliari, Enemy Aircraft Losses in southern Sardinia. During the last six weeks of the Tunisian cam­ On 9th May, Palermo was attacked twice by paign, apart from the vast number of aircraft a total of 122 U.S. Fortresses and 89 U.S. Mit­ destroyed and abandoned on the ground, the Al­ chells and Marauders, escorted by U.S. Light­ lied air forces based on the African m'ainland nings, and 23 Wellingtons followed up the attack destroyed over 800 enemy aircraft in combat; our at night. A total of 458 tons of bombs was losses, by comparison, were low. dropped in the course of the three attacks. Large fires and- explosions were caused, parti­ The Eastern Supply Line cularly in the areas of the docks, railway yards and Army Headquarters. Two additional ex­ Mention has already been made on page 29 of plosions were caused through the blowing up of the work of the North-west African Coastal Air a ship in the harbour and a gas holder. A by- Force, operating to the west of the enemy's Tu­ product of the day attacks was the destruction nisian perimeter. At the same time units operat­ of seventeen enemy fighters which attempted ing under A.H.Q., Air Defences Eastern Mediter­ interception. Some indication of the intense and ranean and H.Q., No.201 (Naval Co-operation) accurate heavy flak encountered over the target Group, continued to control the sea-ways to the is given by the fact that one U.S. Fortress was east from the Tunisian to the Turkish borders, shot down and over 50 others damaged. thus protecting the supply line of the Vlllth Army and the supporting Allied air forces. Marsala was attacked twice on 11th May by From 1st April to 14th May Hurricane, Spit­ a total of 180 U.S. Fortresses, Mitchells and Ma­ fire and Beaufighter squadrons flew 329 sorties rauders; U.S. Lightnings provided the escort. in defence of harbours and 1,991 sorties in pro­ Once again Wellingtons followed up the attacks tection of convoys. This intensive effort dis­ during the night, flying 22 sorties. During the suaded enemy aircraft from attempting to inter­ three attacks, approximately 435 tons of bombs fere with our shipping and few attacks were were dropped. In the course of the day attacks reported. Constant sorties were also flown in hits were observed on warehouses, docks, rail­ defence of our land lines of communication to way yards, repair shops and in the city; in both Tunisia; enemy raiders and reconnaissance air­ the day and the night attacks, also, fires were craft usually made off when our defence fight­ started which could be observed by our aircraft ers were airborne and accordingly few decisive crossing the Tunisian coast 90 miles away. combats were reported. 13th May was an unlucky day for the Sardini­ Middle East naval co-operation units flew over an port of Cagliari. Two attacks were delivered 600 sorties on anti-submarine (close cover) pat­ by 107 U.S. Fortresses and 96 U.S. Mitchells rols and approximately 350 on anti-submarine and 22 Wellingtons continued the bombing (area) patrols during the six weeks under review. during the night. In all, 438 tons of bombs This increased activity was necessary owing to were dropped. Direct hits on ships in the the increase in shipping in convoy in the East­ harbour resulted in a vessel exploding and four ern Mediterranean. Thus, in April 122 convoys catching fire. Smoke from the larger fires caus­ were given anti-submarine protection as compar­ ed by the day attacks was visible for 100 miles ed with the March figure of 94. During May, by aircraft flying at 15,000 feet and smoke fol­ with convoys beginning to pass through from lowing a series of loud explosions caused by the Gibraltar to Port Said even greater anti-sub­ Weflington attacks rose to a height of 6,000feet marine and fighter protection was necessary. and was visible for 80 miles on the return jour­ Very few submarines were sighted, however, ney. Prior to the heavy bombing attacks on from 1st April to 14th May and no positive Cagliari the port had an estimated daily capa­ claims in respect of damage inflicted on them city of 3,400 tons, with dockage accommodation were made. for twelve vessels ranging from 200 to 400 feet. The above-mentioned attack on 13th May prac­ Meanwhile, offensive reconnaissances for ene­ tically completed the process of neutralising my shipping were made by Wellingtons, Balti­ Cagliari as a port. mores and Beaufighters in the Aegean and along the west coast of Greece. During April the Wel­ In addition to the above-mentioned attacks, lingtons and Baltimores were unable to find U.S. Fortresses attacked Civitavecchia, south­ suitable targets, but the Beaufighters carried west of Rome ; U.S. Marauders attacked Porto Ponte Romano and targets in the vicinity ; U.S. out attacks on five occasions, resulting in the Mitchells attacked Olbia, at this stage Sardinia's destruction of a caique, the setting on fire of busiest port; and U.S. Lightning-bombers attack­ three 120 ton schooners, and the scoring of near ed Alghero and Porto Torres, north-west Sardi­ misses and cannon strikes on two merchant ves­ nia. In the course of these supplementary at­ sels. In May both Baltimores and Beaufighters tacks more than 252 tons of bombs were dropped. carried out successful offensive shipping sweeps. One merchant vessel of 80Q tons and a 150 ton It is evident from the weight of the above- steamer were sunk and two other merchant mentioned attacks, delivered during the last vessels damaged; in addition fourteen sailing week of th^'f unjj&i&i^ 7 ""* iels, with a total tonnage of 1,120 tons, were invasion air -* ey and 36, totalling 3,385 tons, were damaged. The work of the A.H.Q., Air Defences Eastern (and will Mediterranean and No. 201 Group squadrons in be, dealt with in separate articles protecting our land and sea lines of communi­ The final victory in Africa could not have been cation from Tunisia to Turkey ensured the safe achieved without full co-operation between the transit of supplies to our land and air forces land, sea and air services. The Air Commander­ operating to the south and east of the enemy's in-Chief, Mediterranean Air Command, made ''co­ Tunisian forces. The enemy was *not strong operation" the theme of his message to personnel enough to offer any appreciable opposition to of the Allied air forces on the completion of the this passage of supplies and the sorties by sneak Tunisian campaign:,— raiders, operating either above or below the wa­ ters, were rendered ineffective through the cons­ "To all ranks of the Allied Air Forces.— By tant vigilance of both air and naval forces. magnificent team work between nationalities, commands, units, officers and men from Teheran " From Morocco to the Indian Ocean .... " to Takoradi, from Morocco to the Indian Ocean, The accounts of the air effort during the you have, together with your comrades on land "Battle for Egypt" and the Tunisian Campaign and sea, thrown the enemy out of Africa. You given in the first three issues of the R.A.F. have shown the world the unity and strength of Middle East Review have been mainly concerned air power. A grand job, well finished. We face with the activity of operational units. Other our next job with the knowledge that we have aspects of the manifold activities of the Allied thrashed the enemy, and the determination to air forces connected with maintenance, supply, thrash him again."

Attack on Catania harbour on Uth May, 1943. The M/V on fire received at least two direct hits; rolling shock is on fire on the mole and the Pozver STRATEGIC

HEAVY ATTACK.5 ON FER.O.V TEHMlNALb BOMBING iQIM TO 3OIM JUNf 99O BOMBtfi. SORTIES I4'I5THMAY-3OTHJUNE 1043

S65/ FiOnTER. BOMBER. AND BOMBER SORTIES 8TH MAY 1I1H JUNE 44 BOMBER SOR.TIES ATTACKS IN NORTHERN ITALY SUMMARY OF EFFORT "/Or SHOWN o/v MAP . 15TH MAV-< ATTACKS ON AIRFIELDS: 2292 FICnTE.R/BOMBER SPEZlA iTiiJUNf, 112 BOMBER SORTIES AND BOMBER. SORTIES LEGHORN 28TH MAY, 92 BOMBER SORTIES MALTA ATTACKS ON PORTS, BASES L COMMUNICATIONS. LEGHORN * 28THJUNE 96 BOMBER SORTIES 263 8 FIGHTER/BOMBER AND BOMBER. SORTIES GROSSETO (A,rf,tia). 30THMAY. 54 BOMBER SORTIES LAMPEDUSA (EXCLUDING ATTACKS ON PANTEUERIA AND LAMPtOUSA) 6O4 FlGMTtR BOMBER AND BOMBER S0RTI15 II TH AND 12THJUNE Prelude to

THE OPERATIONS OF the Allied Air Forces the last week of the Tunisian campaign by based in North-west Africa and the Middle East thirteen U.S. Lightning-bombers and ten U.S. during the period from 14/15th May to 30th June, Warhawk-bombers of the North-west African 1943, did much to weaken the enemy's strength Air Forces on 8th and 11th May, respectively. in Italy and the Italian islands prior to our The attacks on the airfield were aimed primarily attack on Sicily in the following month. Our at limiting the activity of enemy long-range intensive air activity during these six weeks may fighters, which operated from the island after best be summed up, therefore, as the "Prelude the loss of the northern Tunisian airfields, and to Invasion." the attacks on small vessels in the harbour was The Allied Air Forces' attacks are classified part of the Allied plan to prevent a Tunisian under the following headings:— Fall of the Is­ " Dunkirk." Accordingly, these initial attacks lands; Attacks on Enemy Air Bases; Attacks are more properly regarded as part of the on Ports, Bases and Lines of Communication. Tunisian war than the beginning of the blitz on The attacks are dealt with chronologically, the Pantelleria. reasons for making the attacks are indicated, and the scale of effort is mentioned in all cases. The Air Plan against Pantelleria Assessments of the damage caused in all large- A plan was then formulated to subdue Pan­ scale raids are given and wherever possible re­ telleria by air attacks. The fact that this was ference is made to photographic interpretation the first attempt to subjugate enemy territory reports. A fourth section deals with Shipping by air action only indicates the formidable air Sweeps, Protection of Convoys and Coastal De­ power which could now be brought to bear on fence during the period. the enemy from the North African mainland. The attacks considered in the first three Intelligence, particularly photographic intel­ sections were carried out by the North-west ligence, played an essential part in the planning. African Air Forces (including tha Western Desert The island's defensive positions were carefully Air Force and No. 205 Group, operating under studied and each one's importance to the entire H.Q., N.A.A.F's control) and the Ninth U.S. Air defensive system was assessed. The neutralisa­ Force (including the Middle East Halifax and tion of the island's defences by area bombing Liberator squadrons under its operational con­ would have been a lengthy and wasteful business: trol). As regards the fourth section, operations this was obviated by an analysis of the defensive in the Central Mediterranean area as far east system which allowed the planners of the ope­ as the Tunisian-Tripolitanian border were carried ration to allocate priorities to specific pin-pointed out by the North-west African Coastal Air Force, objectives. and those east of Tunisia to the Turkish frontier The port and airfield played only a minor part by the Middle East squadrons controlled by in the defences of Pantelleria and a comparative­ A.H.Q., Air Defences Eastern Mediterranean, and ly slight effort was sufficient to put them out No. 201 (Naval Co-operation) Group. of commission. Fixed coastal batteries were the The activity of Malta-hased aircraft during the primary targets. It was planned to neutralise period is covered elsewhere in the "Review". the northern batteries first, in order to allow our surface craft to approach the island without opposition. After each attack on selected gun I. FALL OF THE ISLANDS positions photographic interpretation reports en­ As an essential preliminary to our invasion abled the planners to re-direct the air effort as of Sicily the Italian islands of Pantelleria, Lam­ required. Apart from one day—19th May when pedusa, Linosa and Lampione, which lay across adverse weather conditions prevented air activity the Allies' path, had to be liquidated. against the island — Pantelleria was attacked Even before the Tunisian campaign had finish­ daily with increasing severity from 18th May ed our air attacks had already begun against until its complete subjugation on 11th June. Pantelleria. On 8th May 89 R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Night attacks were delivered by Wellingtons and light bombers and 33 U.S. Mitchells, all of the day attacks by Allied heavy, medium and fighter- Western Desert Air Force, attacked the airfield bombers, escorted #by U.S. Lightnings and War- and on the following day the attack was renewed hawks, many of which added to the weight of by 87 light bombers and 34 U.S. Mitchells. On the attacks by dropping 500 and 1,000 lb. bombs. the 10th, 70 light bombers and 34 U.S. Mitchells attacked shipping in the harbour and 88 addition­ The Early Effort al light bombers and 32 Mitchells bombed the to 6th June, inclusive, the airfield again. Other attacks were made during able

41 S.A A.F. Bostons making one of the early attaeks on Pantelleria landing ground. weight were slight compared with the heavy of­ sufficient small craft had reached the island for fensive of the following week. In the course of the unloading of 630 tons of supplies. » Evidently the twenty days and nights mentioned, effective more than this total was received as some craft sorties were carried out by 38 heavy, 607 medium, probably arrived and departed between our re­ 53 light and 967 fighter-bombers. The total connaissances and on the two days when the bomb-load dropped was a little under 1,339 tons. island was not covered. Several small vessels Before our blockade and air attacks rendered were hit in the course of the air attacks mention­ the endeavour fruitless, supplies were brought to ed above, however, and considerable damage was the Pantellerian garrison by sea transport and inflicted on the harbour facilities. JU.52s. Shallow-draught c^aft such as T.L.Cs In order to prevent supplies reaching the gar­ and Siebel ferries, which made the short crossing rison an appreciable number of our early attacks from Sicily, were principally used and most of were aimed at the port and airfield. The best them unloaded in the small inner harbour of the evidence of the increasing effectiveness of our Porto di Pantelleria, which cannot accommodate blockade and air attacks is provided by the fact vessels of more than a ten foot draught. During that during the week 29th May to 4th June, the week 22nd to 28th May photographic cover­ when photographic coverage of the port was age (carried out on five days only) revealed that carried out at least once daily, the only supplies

42 HEM A light bomber attack on gun positions on Pantelleria, shortly before the surrender. ,. 5a -were carried by over, well-placed charges could have detonated one?.T|.L;b., dne'smalf fishing boat and a 185 foot the hundreds of tons of high explosive in the coaster. bomb store. Actually, no demolitions were carri­ The success of our air attacks on the airfield ed out. was also confirmed by aerial reconnaissance. On In all, from 8th May to 11th June, inclusive, 29th May a JU.52 was the only undamaged air­ Allied bombers and fighter-bombers carried out craft on the airfield; on the following day no 5,657 effective sorties against Pantelleria, in the serviceable aircraft were present and this was course of which more than 6,570 tons of bombs the case for practically every remaining day of were dropped. Of this total about 30% was the the offensive. As regards the island's under­ dropped by U.S. Fortresses, 18% by U.S. Mit­ ground hangar, this at last paid a dividend as chells, nearly 15% by U.S. Marauders, and over an air-raid shelter. 13% by R.A.F. Wellingtons. The remainder of the total bomb-load was dropped by R.A.F., The Offensive Intensified S.A.A.F. and U.S. Bostons, R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Baltimores, UJS. Lightning and Warhawk From 7th to 11th June the Allied air attacks fighter-bombers, U.S. A.36s (dive-bombers) and were intensified; during these five days effective R.A.F. Hurricane-bombers. Although the Ame­ sorties were flown by 641 heavy, 1,375 medium, rican fighter-bombers dropped less than 11% of 862 light and 661 fighter-bombers. Practically the total bomb-load they carried out 1,615 sortie3, the entire weight of the attacks was directed representing approximately 30% of the total against the enemy's coastal batteries, especially sorties flown against the island; their devastat­ on the northern shore of the island. Enemy long- ing attacks against specific targets, particularly range fighters operating from Sicily offered op­ in the early stages of the offensive, were of im­ position on .several days but achieved negligible mense help. success and suffered considerable losses. Considering the intensity of our air offensive By the evening of 8th June the key batteries and the fact that a fortified island, long vaunted on the north side of the island had been almost as impregnable, was subjugated by air attacks, completely reduced. An increased air effort was supplemented only by naval bombardment, the then made on the 9th, 10th and the morning of Allied air forces losses were slight: four aircraft the 11th, which resulted in the complete elimina­ were definitely destroyed, ten failed to return, tion of the northern defences and the utter de­ and sixteen were damaged. moralisation of practically all other positions. U.S. Fortresses were now operating in force: on Occupation of the Islets each day from 8th to 11th June inclusive the The moment Pantelleria had been liquidated American heavy bombers carried out well over the Allied air forces switched their attacks to 100 sorties and on one day — the 10th — flew the island of Lampedusa, about 100 miles to the the record number of 258 sorties, dropping 695 south-east. From the afternoon of 11th June tons of bombs. until the following evening this island of about Meanwhile, units of the Royal Navy effecti­ fourteen square miles was subjected to a severe vely bombarded the island, several of the night aerial and.naval bombardment. bombardments being aided by illumination pro­ In all, the Allied air forces carried out 174 vided by flare-dropping Albacores, operating from medium, 114 light and 120 fighter-bomber ef­ Malta. fective sorties against the island ; 20 attacks On the morning of 11th June the first landing were delivered, in the course of which approx­ party, which had left Sousse the previous night, imately 268 tons of bombs were dropped. The landed on Pantelleria under cover of our heavy Allied light bombers and fighter-bombers attack­ air attacks. Shortly after noon a wireless mes­ ed the harbour and gun positions while British sage was received at Malta from the Commander naval forces shelled other military targets. In of the island asking for terms of surrender. The the course of the air attacks fourteen enemy moment these terms had been accepted all further long-range fighters, attempting interception, bombing missions were cancelled. The prisoners were shot down for the loss of three Allied taken on the island amounted to 12,000 Italians fighters. The final air attack was delivered in and 78 Germans. It was found that tremendous the early evening about an hour before the gar­ material damage had been inflicted on the island, rison ran up the white flag; at dawn on 13th and the town and harbour could only be described June the captain of a British destroyer accepted as a shambles. Nevertheless, enemy casualties the formal surrender. About 500 Italian pri­ were comparatively few, owing to the fact thai soners, only, were captured on the island. the greater part of the garrison and inhabitants On the 13th, also, the small garrison on the made use of the underground hangar and gal­ island of Linosa surrendered to a British des­ leries tunnelled into the hills as air-raid shelters. troyer; a naval party was put ashore and round­ That the break-down of Italian morale was com­ ed up 140 Italian prisoners. The following day, a plete, however, is, showj^h* tfBflffl^fAt the naval party was landed at Lampione, the small ft n&|iftS .OOO island to the west of Lampedusa. It was found nth that the garrison and inhabitants had already lore- been evacuated.

44 Immediately Pantelleria surrendered the Allied air forces switched their attacks to the island of Lampedusa.

All enemy points of resistance between Tuni- land in arms. Behind this outpost which fell so sia and Sicily had now been eliminated. The way honourably stands an army and this army, more was clear for the first stage in the Allies' inva- determined than ever to fight and win, is the sion of Hitler's Europe. entire Italian people." Without Comment H. ATTACKS ON ENEMY AIR BASES Statement by Umberto Gugliemotti of the Na- tional Council of Fascists on 12th June:— "Let Intensive Effort against Sicily and Sardinia the Anglo-Americans take care as far as their During the second week in May aerial recon- blind and sanguinary arrogance allows them, not naissance revealed that increased numbers of to draw dangerous and ridiculous deductions from long-range bombers were present oh the main the inevitable fate of Pantelleria which fulfilled Sardinian and Sicilian airfields. As anticipated, the arduous mission entrusted to it by the Father- these enemy bombers in the following week in­

45 5ir night attacks on -our ports at Bone, were dropped on Comiso airfield; the main dam­ Djidjelli and Oran. Some damage was inflicted age inflicted was on hangars and in the barracks at Djidjelli and Oran but the raids, judged by area. Castelvetrano was attacked three times Allied standards, were small-scale affairs. Enemy by Allied medium bombers, which dropped nearly casualties were high, fifteen bombers being des­ 45 tons of bombs; hits were scored, in particular, troyed by our night-fighters and anti-aircraft on dispersed single-engined aircraft. The other fire. Sicilian landing grounds attacked were those at Further discouragement was given to the ene­ Milo, Biscari, Bo Rizzo, Ponte Olivio, Bocca di my's bomber effort by the North-west African Falco and Sciacca, on which a bomb load of 89 Air Forces' attacks on his Sardinian and Sicilian tons was dropped by Allied medium bombers, air bases. suppremented in some instances by U.S. fighter- bombers. The greatest damage in the course of From 15th to 21st May, inclusive, our air at­ these subsidiary attacks appeared to be caused tacks were aimed chiefly at the enemy's Sardi­ nian airfields, as most of the bombers operat­ by the attack on Bo Rizzo airfield by 29 U.S. ing against our ports and shipping were then Mitchells on 28th May, when many hits were located on that island. The heaviest attacks scored on dispersed aircraft and revetments, and were delivered against the airfields at Decimo­ fires were started at the fuel dumps. mannu and Villacidro. Against the former, four Meanwhile, attacks were continued against attacks were delivered by Wellingtons and U.S. the Sardinian airfields of Decimomannu and Marauders, which dropped over 89 tons of bombs; Villacidro. Two attacks were delivered against against the latter, five attacks were made by the former airfield by Allied medium bombers, U.S. Mitchells and Wellingtons, in the course which dropped 45 tons of bombs. The attack by of which more than 72 tons of bombs were drop­ 36 U.S. Marauders on 27th May was particularly ped. Photographs revealed" that at Decimo­ effective, despite the enemy's attempt to screen mannu, as a result of a Wellington raid on the the airfield by the use of smoke: 4,032 x 20 lb. night 19/20th May and a U.S. Marauder raid fragmentation bombs were accurately dropped on the following morning, the target was well on dispersed aircraft and wide-spread havoc was straddled with bombs, which severely damaged caused. At Villacidro, the Wellingtons' night administrative buildings and three Italian bomb­ bombing was hindered by intense darkness and ers; another U.S. Marauder attack on the 21st haze, but U.S. Mitchells, by day, caused large caused the destruction of nine medium bombers, fires and bursts were observed among dispersed the firing of petrol stores and other damage. At aircraft and aircraft in revetments. Other suc­ Villacidro, our pilots reported the starting of cessful attacks on ISardinian airfields during the fires in each attack and, in particular, in the week under review included one by 36 U.S. case of a raid by U.S. Mitchells on the 20th one Mitchells, on 24th May, on Olbia-Venafiorita air­ ME.323 was set on fire on the ground, two other field, which photographic reconnaissance had aircraft were seen to explode and other dispers­ shown was being used extensively by transport ed aircraft were well covered by bursts. aircraft; many dispersed aircraft, including a ME.323, were hit. An attack on Alghero airfield Less heavy attacks were made by Allied me­ by 26 U.S. Marauders on the same day, resulted dium bombers during the week on the Sardi­ in direct hits being scored on a hangar and six nian airfields at Alghero, MUis, Monserato and aircraft on the ground. Elmas. These attacks on the Sicilian and Sardinian Three Sicilian airfields were also heavily at­ airfields above aH seriously hindered the enemy's tacked during the week under review, namely those at Sciacca, Castelvetrano and Milo (Tra­ night bomber effort against our Algerian and pani). Sciacca was bombed on 21st May by 48 Tunisian ports. In addition, during the week U.S. Fortresses, which dropped 6,666 x 20 lb. 22nd to 28th May, inclusive, sixteen enemy fragmentation bombs on dispersed aircraft: at raiders were shot down by our night-fighters and Castelvetrano, on the same day, 45 U.S. anti-aircraft fire, representing at least 20% of Fortresses scored hits on many parked aircraft, of the enemy bombers operating. The continued including three ME.323s; and in a smaller-scale losses sustained by enemy raiders, the damage U.S. Fortress attack on Milo, on the 19th, photo­ inflicted by our air attacks on his airfields, graphs showed one ME.322, two ME.llOs, and and the need to meet increased supply and 35 medium and small aircraft in the area well maintenance commitments for the strengthened covered by the bursts of 500 pounders and fighter forces based on the islands led to a with­ fragmentation bombs. drawal of many enemy bombers, particularly JU.88s, from SicUy and Sardinia to airfields in During* the next week, 22nd to 28th May, in­ Southern Italy. clusive, the main weight of the Allied air offen­ sive on enemy airfields was directed against Attacks on Italian Airfields those in Sicily, as aerial reconnaissance had During the second half of May, as mentioned shown that the largest bomber concentrations above, the main attacks on airfields by the North­ were now to be found there. west African Air Forces were delivered against The heaviest attack was made by 44 U.S. those in Sicily and Sardinia. In the third week Fortresses on the 26th, when 70 tons of bombs of the month one large-scale attack only was

46 made on an Italian airfield, namely that deliver­ attempted\ ed by 54 U.S. Fortresses on 20th May against tacking the air base at Grosseto, approximately half-way between Rome and Pisa. The attack was ex­ somewhat tremely effective: photographs showed clusters type, but the success achieved was negligibl of fragmentation bombs bursting on and around Offensive Against Sicilian Airfields Continued a long line of 59 aircraft, a large percentage of During June the main weight of the Allied air which was evidently destroyed or seriously forces' attacks on enemy airfields was directed damaged. In addition, 20 Wellingtons on the against those in Sicily. The attacks had as imme­ night 16/17 May bombed the sea-plane base at diate aim the destruction of the increased fighter Lido de Roma, scoring hits on hangars and force now based on the island and the impair­ machine-gunning the aircraft. ment of airfield facilities in order to hinder the When many of the German long-range bombers employment of the enemy's long-range bombers, were removed during the last days of May from wheh were now almost entirely based in Italy Sicily and Sardinia to bases in Southern Italy and used the Sicilian airfields as advanced land­ our air attacks were then switched to that area. ing grounds. Some enemy bombers were caught On 28th May, 45 U.S. Liberators of the Ninth on the ground during the raids in June, but not U.S. Air Force bombed Foggia airfield, where to the same extent as formerly. Above all, the photographic reconnaissance had revealed the June attacks, followed by a more intensive effort presence of a JU.88 concentration; bursts were in the first .ten days of the following month, seen among aircraft in dispersal areas and direct were intended to prevent the enemy being in a hits were scored on hangars. Two days later position to put up effective air opposition to our the attacks were renewed by 51 LT.S. Liberators; landing parties, when the invasion of Sicily began numerous aircraft were destroyed and damaged on 10th July. on the ground, including some six-engined air­ craft which were seen to be ablaze, and many From Cyrenaica fires were started. One Liberator was shot down The Cyrenaican-based Liberators of the Ninth by anti-aircraft fire, but no enemy air opposition U.S. Air Force, and the R.A.F. Halifax and was reported. The following day, 31st May, Liberator squadrons operating under its control, Foggia airfield was attacked from North-west concentrated during June on the airfields on the Africa by a force of 68 U.S. Fortresses ; the east side of the island, namely those at Catania, target area was well covered with the bursts of Gerbini, Cotniso and Biscari. In all, U.S. Libe­ 500 pounders and fragmentation bombs and many rators carried out 140 and R.A.F. Liberators and large fires were caused. Halifaxes 34 effective sorties against these air­ Meanwhile, on 30th May, U.S. Fortresses at­ fields during • the month. Cover for the day tacked airfields in the Naples area: 29 operated attacks of the U.S. Liberators was provided by against Capodochino and 25 against Pomigliano. Spitfires from Malta. Catania airfield was at­ At Capodochino, the headquarters buildings and tacked twice by U.S. Liberators and twice by hangars were hit and three aircraft were seen R.A.F. heavy bombers, representing a total of ablaze on the ground before dust and smoke 71 effective sorties. The most successful attacks obscured the target; at Pomigliano, many bursts appeared to be those delivered by seven Halifaxes from fragmentation bombs were seen among and four Liberators on the night of 12/13th June dispersed aircraft. and on the following morning by 22 U. S. Liberators. In the course of the night attacks Enemy Air Opposition many fires accompanied by explosions were In addition to the intense flak encountered caused; on the next day the American bombers during most of the above-mentioned attacks dropped 51 tons of bombs, and in addition to considerable enemy air opposition, particularly bursts observed over the greater part of the air­ over Sicily and Southern Italy, was also met. field's surface, fires were caused at the hangars The enemy's increased fighter strength in the and in the southern dispersal area and direct hits Mediterranean theatre indicated that he was now were scored on the main runway. The U. S. definitely on the defensive. Liberator attacks on Gerbini airfield, where In the course of the North-west African Air twin-engined fighters and night-fighters were Forces' attacks on enemy airfields in the second known to be based, were especially damaging. Tn half of May the Allied bombers claimed the particular, on 13th June, in an attack by 24 destruction of 60 enemy intercepting fighters for American bombers direct hits were scored on a the loss of six aircraft, and escorting U.S. hangar, the dispersal areas and runways were completely covered by bomb bursts, three enemy Lightnings and U.S. Warhawks shot down 55 aircraft about to take off were blown up, and enemy fighters for the loss of 23 fighters shot fires and explosions were caused in practically down or missing. In addition, American fighter- every part of the airfield. Comiso airfield suf­ bombers shot down ten enemy fighters for the loss of one aircraft. On a few occasions — notably during our attacks on Castelvetrano on the 21st and on Bo Rizzo on the 21st and 28th—enemy fighters

47 A^FIED

U.S. Liberator attack on Catania airfield, 13th June, 1943. runways, and fires broke out in the northern covered by the bursts and, in addition, five flre3 dispersal area and at the airfield workshops. were started, including two caused by burning aircraft. At Castelvetrano, attacked by 34 U.S. From North-west Africa Fortresses, there were 87 aircraft on the ground; The North-west African Air Forces' attacks photographs showed bursts starting at the south on Sicilian airfields in June were directed entire­ ana extending north along the perimeter tracks, ly against those in the north-west part of the through the dispersal areas and across the land­ island. For the first eleven days of the month ing ground. Within the areas covered by the the main effort of the North-west African Air bursts were at least fourteen aircraft and eight Forces was directed against Pantelleria and only more were within range of fragmentation bombs; a few fighter-bomber attacks were made against other bursts covered the areas of the under­ the Sicilian landing grounds; in particular, Milo ground stores, repair and service section and airfield was attacked by 24 American fighter- billets. bombers on the 4th. The heaviest attacks by the day medium bomb­ During the next week, however, apart from ers during the week under review were made on the bombing of Lampedusa, attacks on the north­ Bo Rizzo and Sciacca airfields on the 15th; west Sicilian airfields constituted the main effective sorties were flown against these targets bomber effort. The day attacks were carried out by 66 U.S. Marauders and 71 U.S. Mitchells, by U.S. Fortresses, Mitchells and Marauders, respectively. In each case the target area was supplemented by a few fighter-bomber sorties, well covered with bomb bursts and aircraft were and the night attacks by Wellingtons. In the destroyed on the ground. Perhaps the most course of this week, 12th to 18th June, inclusive, successful Wellington attack was carried out on 220 tons of bombs were dropped on Bocca di the night of 14/15th June against Castelvetrano Falco airfield, 163 tons on Castelvetrano, 78.4 airfield by ten aircraft of No. 330 Wing; fires tons on Sciacca, 76.2 tons on Bo Rizzo and 72.6 and explosions were caused in the vicinity of tons on Milo. petrol tanks and the flames could be seen for 50 The attacks of the U.S. Fortresses on Bocca miles on the return journey. di Falco and Castelvetrano airfields on the 12th During the following week, 19th to 25th June, were particularly devastating. At the first-nam­ inclusive, the North-west African attacks on Si­ ed airfield, attacked by 41 American bombers, cilian airfields were on a reduced scale, as the photographs revealed that bomb bursts covered main bomber effort was directed against the the entire airfield and dispersal areas and the enemy's ports and bases. Attacks were delivered, western perimeter where aircraft were parked. however, against the airfields at Castelvetrano, Forty-six aircraft were present in the areas Bo Rizzo and Milo, on which bomb loads of 40.5 tons, 22.8 tons and 15.2 tons were dropped. No landing iP^l.^fcMlnrflWtBewafclfaTl. night attacks were made against these objectives covered by bomb bursts and buildings and anti­ The heaviest attacks were delivered on 20th June aircraft positions were hit. when Bo Rizzo was bombed by 19 U.S. Marauders The Allied air forces' attacks on the Sicilian and Caatelvetrano by 36 U.S. Marauders; in each airfields in June played a great part in the case the target area was well covered by bomb achieving of our complete air supremacy in readi­ bursts. A feature of the Bo Rizzo attack was ness for the Sicilian landings. the attempted "air to air" bombing of the Marauders by enemy fighters, which proved un­ Attacks on Italian and Sardinian Airfields successful. Although the main weight of our attacks on During the last five days of June five attacks airfields in June was directed against those in were made by the North-west African Air Forces Sicily, the enemy's Sardinian and Italian landing against Sicilian airfields: 66.8 tons of bombs grounds were not neglected. were dropped on Sciacca, 50.4 tons on Bocca di During the first three weeks of June the Falco, 18 tons on Bo Rizzo and 15 tons on Milo. North-west African Air Forces made three The heaviest attacks were made on the last day small-scale attacks only on the enemy's Sar­ of the month, when attacks were made on the dinian airfields. Capoterra airfield, an important four airfields mentioned above by a total of 21 fighter base in the south of the island, was at­ heavy and 137 medium bombers. The U.S. tacked on 5th June by 24 U.S. Lightning-bombers Fortresses concentrated on Bocca di Falco air­ and twelve dispersed aircraft were hit. The air­ field, where extensive damage was done to bar­ field at Villacidro was attacked on the 8th by racks, the stores depot, oil storage and hangars; eleven U.S. Lightning-bombers and on the 18th the main medium bomber effort was directed by sixteen Warhawk-bombers. In the former against the airfield at Sciacca, where the entire attack one bomber on the ground was seen to

Foggia airfield under attack, 30th May, 1943 cond teen intercepting fighters: two U.S. Liberators lestroy­ were lost in the course of these missions. ed. Villacidro was now no longer used extensively as a bomber and bomber reconnaissance base, Scale of Effort however, and further attacks were not consider­ From 15th May to 30th June, inclusive, the ed necessary. North-west African Air Forces (including No. 205 On 24th June the attacks on the Sardinian Group's Wellingtons) carried out the following airfields were renewed by 36 U.S. Mitchells which sorties against enemy airfields, excluding those bombed the Venafiorita (Olbia) airfield. Five against Pantelleria airfield, which have already fires were seen burning as the formation left the been considered:— Heavy bombers 593: medium target. This airfield, apart from being a base bombers 1,181: fighter-bombers 182. U.S. and for fighters was at this date being used on an R.A.F. heavy bombers under the control of the increasing scale by transport aircraft. Ninth U.S. Air Force flew a total of 336 effective On the 28th concerted attacks were made by a sorties against airfields in Italy and Sicily. In total of 119 U.S. Mitchells and Marauders, which addition, during the last week in June U.S. dropped 739 tons of bombs on the airfields at Liberators flew a total of 94 effective sorties Alghero, Decimomannu, Mills and Venafiorita against the enemy's Greek airfields in the Salo­ (Olbia). In all cases bomb bursts were seen to nika and Athens areas. cover the dispersal areas and at Alghero and Venafiorita hangars were set on fire. IU. ATTACKS ON PORTS, BASES AND Aircraft under the operational control of the LINES OF COMMUNICATION Ninth U.S. Air Force made three attacks on Italian airfields during June—a day attack by During the week following the end of all re­ 45 U.S. Liberators on Grottaglie, the large JU.88 sistance in Tunisia most of the North-west base in the heel of Italy, on 4th June, and two African Air Forces' attacks, as already mention­ night attacks on the airfield at Reggio di Cala­ ed, were directed against the enemy's Sardinian bria, across the Messina Straits, by a total of and Sicilian airfields. Although for the time 21 R.A.F. Halifaxes and Liberators on the nights being the limiting of the enemy's bomber activity of the 10/llth and 28/29th. The U.S. Liberators was our prime consideration, his supply ports in their attack on Grottaglie scored many direct were not neglected: indeed, the port of Trapani, hits on hangars and buildings, bombs were seen Sicily, received a heavier bomb-load during the to burst in the main dispersal areas and several week 14/15th to 21st May, inclusive, than any aircraft were destroyed on the ground. At other single target. The port was attacked on Reggio, the R.A.F. heavy bombers blew up a the night 15/16th May* by sixteen Wellingtons hangar and caused fires over a wide area. and on the 18th by 33 U.S. Fortresses: in all, nearly 123 tons of bombs were dropped. In the There were no attacks on Italian airfields by course of the night attack bomb bursts were the North-west African-based bombers during observed near the railway station and barracks the month; Cancello air depot was attacked by in the north and a huge explosion, believed to be 37 U.S. Fortresses on the 21st, but this is more a direct hit on the gas works, was caused in the properly regarded as part of the general offensive centre of the town. The U.S. Fortresses scored against the important base of Naples. hits in the town and on the docks and railway Enemy Fighter Opposition yards and of several vessels hit in the harbour one exploded. The Sicilian port of Palermo was There seemed to be no uniformity in respect of was also attacked during the week by nineteen the quality or quantity of the enemy's fighter Wellingtons on the night 14/15th May, when opposition to our attacks on the Axis airfields several fires, including one in the docks area, during June. On some occasions determined op­ were caused. In addition, 51 Wellingtons of No. position was put up by out-numbered enemy 205 Group on the night 21st/22nd May bombed fighters which refused to break off in spite of the Messina area, concentrating particularly on heavy losses; this was particularly the case over the railway ferry terminus; fires were caused western Sicily. On other occasions the enemy with smoke rising to 1,000 feet. fighters either made no attacks or merely some ineffective passes and fled. It was evident that The provisioning of Sardinia was also hindered the morale of German and Italian pilots alike by attacks on Alghero by sixteen Wellingtons on was subject to fluctuation and more often than the night 17/18th May and in the Cagliari area not was low. generally by eighteen U. S. Marauders on the In the course of the North-west African Air 19th. An interesting feature of the Wellington Forces' attacks on enemy airfields'during June attack, where bursts were observed in the port 45 enemy fighters were reported shot down; our area and near the main railway station, was the losses from enemy air opposition and flak were fact that the town was bombed from the low four bombers and fourteen fighters and fighter- height of 200 feet; one Wellington, in fact, nar­ bombers. A number of bombers, however, were rowly missed striking a church steeple. damaged, in ^^gg JpMffe During the week under review the heavy Ihe HuttffllDl WOW L £g|

50 Italy. On the 20th/21st in this connection it should rators attacked the ferry and railway yards at be noted that our air attacks on ^Sardinia were Messina and another extended the attacks across of importance not only because of its strategical the Straits to Reggio di Calabria. The following value to the enemy but due to the fact that the day 45 U.S. Liberators successfully bombed the Sardinian coal, lead and zinc industries provided railway ferry terminals at Reggio di Calabria the major part of the Italian output of these and San Giovanni in the toe of Italy. essential minerals. Terranova harbour, in the Intensive Attacks north-west, was attacked on 24th May by 52 U.S. Fortresses of the Strategic Air Force. Two During the following week, 22nd to 28th May, merchant vessels exploded, one was set on fire inclusive, the Allied air offensive against the and another was hit; explosions and fires were enemy's ports, bases and lines of communication also caused at the harbour installations, ware­ was intensified. In all, aircraft controlled by houses and ammunition dumps; On the same day H.Q., North-west African Air Forces carried out La Maddalena was bombed by 50 U.S. Fortresses; 214 heavy, 140 medium and 233 fighter-bomber in addition to damage inflicted on a munition effective sorties arid the heavy bombers control­ ship, photographs showed that extensive damage led by the Ninth U.S. Air Force flew 94 effective was inflicted on the main fuel storage depot. A sorties against these objectives. The above totals very successful attack was made on Olbia by exclude the attacks on Pantelleria. sixteen Wellingtons on the night 24th/25th May, when" a 450 foot merchant vessel was blown up Messina received most attention during the and fires and explosions were caused at the week. No. 205 Group's Wellingtons flew a total docks and marshalling yards. Meanwhile, U.S. of 53 effective sorties on the nights 23rd/24th fighter-bombers made attacks on Carlo forte har­ and 24/25th May, causing, in particular, damage bour, Gulfo Aranci harbour, Porto Scuso, Alghe­ to the railway sidings south of the terminus, and rOj Porto Torres, the Iglesias zinc works, the these attacks were followed up on the 25th by Tirso dam and other Sardinian targets. In par­ 90 U.S. Fortresses of the Strategic Air Force ticular, at Carlo forte seven small boats 'were and 45 U.S. Liberators of the Ninth U.S. Air sunk, and a merchant vessel was probably sunk; Forces. Photographs taken during the Fortress' at Porto Scuso a merchant vessel was probably attacks showed that two merchant vessels re­ sunk; and at Gulfo Aranci a small ship was also ceived direct hits, and near misses were scored claimed as a "probable". on a torpedo-boat, destroyer, tanker, and an­ other merchant vessel ; direct hits were also "'The total tonnage of merchant ships sunk as scored on the freight sheds and engine house, a result of the Allied air attacks on ports and the railway station, the ferry terminus, the re­ harbours from 22nd to 28th May was 8,000 tons; fuelling pier and the marshalling yards. The in addition 16,000 tons were probably sunk and Liberators bombed*the marshalling yards, the 15,000 tons damaged. These totals exclude the ferry terminus, the eastern arm of the harbour small fry, such as coasters, E-boats, T.L.Cs, etc. and the naval oil depot, causing many fires. Attacks on Italian Bases Other attacks on Sicilian ports and bases in­ cluded attacks on Porto Empedocle and Licata During the following week, 29th May to 4th harbour on 25th May. The 34 U.S. Liberators June, inclusive, the Allied air forces' main effort which bombed Porto Empedocle damaged two was directed against Pantelleria. In spite of this E-boats in the harbour and scored hits on the preoccupation, however, increased attacks were sulphur refinery and a railway junction; at made on enemy bases and lines of communication Licata, 31 U.S. Mitchells destroyed a small ship in Southern Italy. in the harbour and bombed several factories. On 30th May 61 U.S. Fortresses of the Stra­ From the Cyrenaican side, also, five R.A.F. heavy tegic Air Force attacked targets at Pornigliano, bombers attacked Augusta on the night 27th/28th north-east of Naples. The attack made by 25 of May. Fortresses on the landing ground has already On the 28th, 92 U.S. Fortresses of the Strategic been mentioned on page 47 ; the remaining 36 Air Forces attacked Leghorn, Northern Italy. aircraft attacked the aircraft factory, dropping Three formations bombed the harbour area, scor­ 404 x 500 lb. bombs. Photographic interpretation ing hits on railway yards, oil storage tanks, and showed that one large workshop was destroyed, shipbuilding yards: photographic reconnaissance another half-destroyed and the main factory showed, moreover, that three naval and two small building seriously damaged; many other small merchant vessels were sunk and three more factory buildings and ten huts for workers were merchant vessels were damaged. One formation also destroyed. concentrated entirely on the oil refinery, inflict­ On the same day 23 U.S. Fortresses bohabed ing such severe damage that the plant was pro­ Naples. One quay was practically destroyed and bably put out of action. The fires caused in the another became silted up; a tanker, a merchant Leghorn area generally could be seen by the vessel and a small ship were damaged; the rail­ Fortresses for 100 miles on the return journey. way marshalling yards were severely damaged; Numerous attacks were also made on the and industrial installations, including airframe works, oil storage, and engineering works were enemy's ports and bases in Sardinia during the a on 2lst May, 1943.

52 hit. Two nights later, lst/2nd June, in spite of San Giovanni terminus and a near mission a intense darkness and ground haze, seventeen ferry boat. General damage was also caused in Wellingtons continued the attacks on the docks the three towns mentioned. and city at Naples, scoring hits on port buildings and industrial plants. From 13th to 18th June, inclusive, the North­ west African Air Forces made comparatively few Another successful attack in Southern Italy attacks on enemy bases and lines of commu was that made by 26 U.S. Fortresses against the nication. marshalling yards at Foggia on 31st May; the target was well covered with 312 x 500 lb. bombs The main effort was against Messina as part and many fires were visible at 20,000 feet. of the plan to hinder the reinforcement of SicUy. On 13/14th June 23 Wellingtons of No. 205 Group U.S. Fighter-bomber Effort and ten Wellingtons of No. 330 Wing attacked Very successful attacks on the enemy's Sar­ the harbour and ferry terminus respectively; the harbour area was covered with bomb bursts and dinian and Sicilian bases during the week under two fires were caused but observation of re­ review (29th May to 4th June, inclusive) were sults in the pecond attack was hindered by a carried out by U.S. Lightning and Warhawk smoke screen. On the 18th the attack was re­ fighter-bombers. The Lightnings dropped loads newed by 76 U.S. Fortresses. The ferry slips of 1,000 lb. bombs on power stations, railway were'well covered with bomb bursts and fires and yards and bridges in a number of Sicilian and explosions were caused in the area of warehouses. Sardinian towns and effectively bombed shipping Naples was also attacked once during the week in the smaller Sardinian ports. In addition, in a when 27 Wellingtons on the night 16th/17th June straffing attack at Stagnone, Sicily, on 1st June, covered the docks and marshalling yards with Warhawks destroyed or damaged eighteen sea­ 37 tons of bombs, including three 4,000 pounders. planes and set fire to several small ships. There were two attacks on shipping in Sar­ In addition to the fighter-bomber attacks men­ dinian ports on 18th June; one by 36 U. S. tioned above, the Sicilian bases at Augusta and Mitchells against Gulfo Aranci and the other by Catania were attacked twice and once respective­ 85 U.S. Mitchells against Olbia. At Aranci the ly by a total of 24 R.A.F. Cyrenaican-based heavy jetty and warehouses were bombed and two bombers. The best results were observed at medium-sized merchant vessels were hit. At Augusta on the night 31st May/lst June, when Olbia four merchant ships were hit, resulting in bombs burst in the vicinity of the fuel storage one being set on fire and the other exploding; tanks and in the area of the seaplane base. above all, the commercial mole, formerly the principal facility for the debarkation of Sardi­ Reduced Effort against Ports and Bases nian supplies was rendered useless by direct hits During the following fortnight, 5th to 18th which broke it in three places. June, the Allied air forces' attacks on the enemy's ports, bases and communications were reduced, Intensive Attacks against Italy and Sicily, as from 5th to 12th June, the effort was directed 19th to 30th June almost entirely against Pantelleria and Lampe­ For the remainder of the period under review, dusa and during the next six days the majority 19th to 30th June, inclusive, the main weight of of the air attacks were made against enemy the Allied air forces' attacks was switched against landing grounds. the enemy's bases and communications, with the While the final blitz on Pantelleria was in object, primarily, of hindering the reinforcement progress the North-west African Air Force made of Sicily. Aircraft controlled by H.Q., North­ one large-scale attack only on an enemy port, west African Air Forces carried out 317 heavy namely that against the Naval base of Spezia, and 566 medium bomber effective sorties and Cyrenaican-based heavy bombers made 107 effec­ Northern Italy on 5th June by 112 U.S. For­ tive sorties against these targets. tresses. Photographs showed that a large hole was made in the side of a "Regolo" class cruiser, Particular attention was paid to the ferry ter­ a naval hulk made fast to the cruiser had its minals, marshalling yards and harbour facilities stern blown off, and a "Littorio" class battleship at Messina, Beggio di Calabria and Saw Giovanni. apparently received damage to its bows. Ex­ From North-west Africa, Messina was attacked tensive damage was also done to the docks, on five nights by a total of 177 Wellingtons, and workshops and oil storage installations. Mean­ on 20th June by 170 U.S. Fortresses; in addition, while, the U.S. fighter-bombers continued their one night attack was made on San Giovanni by attacks on Porto Ponte di Romano and other 58 Wellingtons. Sardinian targets and Wellingtons carried out a From Cyrenaica, U.S. Liberators made two at­ few sorties against Syracuse, Sicily. tacks on Beggio and San Giovanni, carrying out From Cyrenaica, 50 U.S. Liberators on 6th 85 effective sorties, and R.A.F. Liberators and June again attacked the ferry termini at Messi­ Halifaxes supplemented these attacks with thir­ na, Beggio di Calabria and San Giovanni; at teen night sorties and an additional nine sorties Messina hits were scored on railway sidings and against Messina. bursts covered the area of the oil tanks, and The Wellington attacks on Messina were di­ across the Straits direct hits were scored on the rected in great part against the marshalling yards, where bombs ranging from 4,000 lb. H.E. Other successful attacks in Southern Italy in­ to 30 lb. incendiaries caused widespread damage cluded one by 29 Wellingtons on the night 25/; and disorganisation. In addition, on the night 26th June on the oil refineries at Bari. 27/28th June, Wellingtons flew a total of 58 ef­ On 28th June, 96 U.S. Fortresses struck fur­ fective sorties in attacks against the ferry slips ther north at Leghorn, dropping a total of over and marshalling yards at San Giovanni, causing 261 tons of bombs. Photographic interpretation fires which could be seen for 80 miles on the re­ showed that most' of the damage was concen­ turn journey. Forty-four U.S. Liberators on 21st trated in the industrial area to the north of the June, following up the R.A.F. heavy bomber at­ town. The factories and installations hit includ­ tacks of the previous night, covered the ferry ed the Italian American Petroleum Company, the termini, moles and railway sidings at Reggio main explosive and chemical works, the torpedo and San Giovanni with bomb bursts" and scored factory, the Metallurgi Italiana (copper-smelt-), direct hits on a west-bound ferry boat and Siebel ing works), the main railway station and engine ferry. Photographs taken after the heavy at­ tack by 170 U.S. Fortresses on 20th June showed yards, and the swing bridge near the power a merchant vessel of 400 feet damaged and with station. her stern on fire, a large fire burning in the main Reduced Effort against Sardinia station and much smoke and flame issuing from Medium bombers of the Strategic Air Force subsiding buildings of the old fort, south of the continued their attacks against the enemy's Sar­ main railway line. dinian ports and bases, but these were now on a In addition to the attacks on Messina the Si­ reduced scale. Olbia was attacked on two nights^ 22nd/23rd and 24/25th June, by a total of 44 cilian base at Palermo was attacked on 30th June Wellingtons, when fires and explosions were by 40 U.S. Fortresses; 480 x 500 lb. bombs were caused in the marshalling yards, the town area j dropped on the barracks, oil storage installations, and at the docks. At Gulfo Arand, on 24th­ the railway station and the southern and eastern June, 36 U.S. Mitchells scored hits on two mer­ area of the city. Among other Sicilian targets chant vessels, setting one on fire, and bombed attacked may be mentioned a successful attack the shore installations; on the same day 34 ad--j by ten Wellingtons on the night 23rd/24th June ditional Mitchells attacked the railway junction| against the marshalling yards at Catania and at Chilivani. the industrial area of lAcata. Enemy Air Opposition Heavy attacks were also made by the North­ The enemy's fighter opposition to our bomber west African Air Forces on bases in Italy during formations attacking, his ports and bases during the last ten days in June. On the night. 20th/ the period 15th May to 30th June, inclusive, was, 21st, 28 Wellingtons attacked Naples, dropping as previously mentioned in connectiqn with our bombs ranging from 4,000 to 250 lbs. in the area attacks on enemy airfields, neither consistent in between the marshalling yards and the Central quantity nor quality. The greatest number of Station. On the 21st, 51 U.S. Fortresses attack­ enemy fighters encountered was over Messina ed targets in Naples and 37 bombed Cancello, to and Southern Italy, due to the presence of fighter; the north-east; meanwhile, to the south-east, 36 bases at Reggio di Calabria, Bari, Brindisi, Gro-\ U.>S, Mitchells attached Battipaglia and another tone and CapodicMni (Naples). Enemy air op­ 36 bombed Salerno. Photographs taken during position over Northern Italy, however, was slight: | and immediately after these attacks of 21st June on 5th June, when Spesia was attacked, threes revealed much smoke and a detailed assessment enemy fighters only were seen and easily driven! of damage could not be made; in respect of the off and at Leghorn on 28th June the enemy's air- Naples attack, however, it was apparent that at opposition was again negligible. least 25 fires had been caused, including a very In the course of the North-west African Air large one in the north-eastern industrial part of Forces' attacks on the enemy's ports, bases and the city, and considerable damage had been in­ lines of communication from mid-May to the end flicted on the main railway station. Photographs of June, the American bombers shot down 62 ene­ taken on the following day showed that at Naples my fighters for the loss of seven aircraft; a few 40% of the Royal Arsenal had been destroyed, more bombers crash-landed, however, and a consi­ three direct hits had been scored on the torpedo derable number, were damaged, mainly by anti-air­ factory and severe damage had been caused to craft fire. Wellington casualties, as a result of their the airframe works; at Cancello the entire M.T. six weeks intensive operations, were twelve air­ Storage Depot had been devastated and about craft destroyed or missing. American fighters 50% of the railway tracks rendered useless; at engaged on escort duties and ground straffing Battipaglia 25 hits put out of commission all the shot down 27 enemy aircraft for the loss of thir­ approaches to the railway sidings; and at Saler­ teen, and American fighter-bombers destroyed no a large fire was seen to be still raging and five enemy aircraft and lost four. U.S. Libera­ hits were apparent on the railway sidings. As tors of the Ninth U.S. Air Force in the course far as Salerno was concerned, however, addi­ of their attacks against Messina, Reggio and San tional damage had been inflicted during the night Giovanni claimed the destruction of 41 enemy 21st/2J fighters without incurring any losses. U BOATS. u TANKER TS\Z. 8" CRUISER BOLZANO. 8" CRUISER GORI^IA. OBSOLETE CRUISER TARANTO. L1TTORIO CLASS BATTLE5WIP5. DESTROYERS ^TORPEDO BOATS REGOLO CLA55 CRUiSER %• HULL. GUEPARD CLASS CONTRETORPlLLEUR. 19 APRIL 1943 From 23rd April to the end of the month searches for enemy shipping in the Aegean and ^ clusive, to the west of Greece were carried out by i-west ,A-frican Afr Forces (i Wellingtons, Baltimores and Beaufighters. The Group) carried out the following effective sorties latter aircraft, only, succeeded in locating suit­ against the enemy's ports, bases and lines of able targets and as a result of five attacks scor­ communication:—Heavy bombers 907; medium ed near misses with bombs and cannon strikes bombers 1,104; fighter-bombers 295. on two small merchant vessels, set on fire a 120 Heavy bombers operating under the control of ton schooner, sank one caique and left two others the Ninth U.S. Air Force flew 332 effective in a sinking condition. sorties. During May 183 sorties were flown against The above totals are exclusive of attacks the enemy's Eastern Mediterranean sea transport. against Pantelleria and Lampedusa, which have Wellingtons were again unable to find suitable already been considered. targets but Beaufighters and Baltimores, operat­ ing in the Aegean and Ionian Seas, achieved IV. SHIPPING SWEEPS, PROTECTION considerable success. One merchant ship of 800 OF CONVOYS AND COASTAL DEFENCE tons and another of 150 tons were sunk and two more of 800 tons and 250 tons, respectively, were Central Mediterranean Shipping Strikes damaged. Fourteen sailing vessells of a gross With the elimination of all Axis resistance in tonnage of 1,120 tons were also sunk and 36, Tunisia by the middle of May the Sicilian Narrows totalling 3,385 tons, were damaged. and the southern Tyrrhenian Sea no longer pro­ During the following month, June, 144 sorties vided a hunting ground for U.S. Fortresses, were flown against enemy shipping in the Aegian Mitchells and Marauders of the Strategic Air ' and Ionian Seas and once again the day strikes Force on day shipping sweeps. Strikes on shipping of Beaufighters and Baltimores met with success. at sea in the Central Mediterranean were now on One passenger type of vessel of 3..800 tons was a reduced scale and operations from the African damaged, sixten sailing ships (totalling 1,840 mainland were carried out entirely by aircraft tons) were sunk, two more probably sunk and of the North-west African Coastal Air Force. 29 damaged. Subsequent reconnaissance showed Night strikes were made by torpedo-carrying that the damaged 3,800 tons ship had run aground Wellingtons and by day a number of successful in the northern end of the Levkas Canal, thus attacks were delivered by Marauders, U.S. War- dislocating traffic between the Ionian and Aegean hawks and Lightnings and torpedo-carrying Seas. In addition to the successes against ship­ Beaufighters. ping the Beaufighters shot down an appreciable number of enemy aircraft in the course of their From 15th May to 30th June, inclusive, a offensive sweeps. tanker and a merchant vessel were sunk by Beaufighters; a tanker and a merchant vessel Proof of the success of our air attacks in the were damaged by Wellingtons; two T.L.Cs were Aegean is provided by the fact the Italian Com-, damaged by U. S. Lightnings ; and Marauders mand in the latter half of June ordered motor and U. S. War hawks inflicted damage on two caiques based on the Dodecanese to sail only at schooners and a small sailing vessel. night and banned entirely the movement of sail­ ing vessels. The caique service between Crete The heaviest casualties on enemy shipping in and the mainland was also seriously curtailed. the Central Mediterranean during the period Moreover, because of the reluctance of crews to under review, however, were inflicted in the serve in caiques a German order was issued for­ course of the attacks on enemy ports and har­ bidding any seaman to sign off until a substitute bours recounted in the previous section. As a was found. results of these attacks sixteen enemy vessels were sunk, six probably sunk anVi 35 damaged; Shipping Protection these totals include an appreciable number of merchant ships, tankers and escort vessels. From the middle of May to the end of June our convoys in the Central and Eastern Mediter­ Attacks in the Eastern Mediterranean ranean suffered little interference from the ene­ my, due to the excellent protection afforded by On 23rd April, 1943, naval co-operation units our naval units and aircraft of the North-west of No. 201 Group ~ began their air offensive African Coastal Air Force and the Middle East against enemy shipping in the Aegean Sea and Naval co-operation squadrons controlled by A.H. along the west coast of Greece, in order to hinder Q., Air Defences Eastern Mediterranean and No. the enemy's plan of strengthening his hold on 201 Group. The end of the enemy's resistance south-east Europe in anticipation of an Allied in Tunisia was quickly followed by the complete attack. In view of the consistency of our air opening of the Mediterranean to our east-bound effort and the success attending it, it is intended and west-bound convoys: our first through con­ in this instance to indicate the results achieved voys eastwards completed their passage in the from the inception of the tf^ week ending 29th May and these were followed June, rather than to kee£ rJpidldiRtwne lAts by the first west-bound through convoy in the of the set period week ending 19th June.

56 UECIM

Enemy ships aground in the Levkas canal after an attack by Beaufighters.

During the period 15th May to 30th June, in­ tection. During the following week, 17th to 23rd clusive, R.A.F. and U.S. fighter aircraft of the June, inclusive, 27 convoys were afforded air Coastal Air Force flew over 4,000 sorties on protection: a merchant vessel and a L.S.T. were shipping protection and approximately the same lost, but this was possibly due to striking mines. number on local defence, including harbours. During the last week in June, 29 convoys were Aircraft engaged in anti-submarine area and protected by the Coastal Air Force; one vessel closercover patrols flew over 1,100 sorties. Dur­ only, an oiler, was torpedoed by an enemy sub­ ing the four weeks ending 16th June none of marine and two vessels were lost through air our ships in convoy in the Central Mediterranean attacks. area was sunk or damaged by enemy air or sub­ During the period under review Hudsons of marine action; in particular it should be noted the Coastal Air Force sank one submarine and that during the last week of the period men­ damaged . another and Marauders damaged a tioned seventeen convoys were given air pro­ third; several more submarines were attacked, llts,,achieved were not fully observed. damaged a Cant. Z.1007 near St. Jean; Beau- Defence fighters ensured that shipping in our fighters on similar duties destroyed a JU.88 over Algerian and Tunisian ports was protected from Tripoli, damaged another near Tobruk, and des­ the enemy's air attacks. In particular, from 14/ troyed a Cant. Z.1007 off Haifa; Hurricanes des- 15th May to 30th June, inclusive, night-flying toyed a Cant. Z.1007 south of Cyprus. Beaufighters claimed the destruction of fifteen With the relinquishment of the enemy's last JU.88s, six HE.llls, three Cant. Z.1007s, one foothold in Africa it was evident that our ship­ SM.76 and one SM.79. ping could ply the Central and Eastern Mediter­ In the Eastern Mediterranean area fighters ranean sea-ways with virtual immunity from under the control of A.H.Q., Air Defences Eas­ enemy attack. tern Mediterranean and No. 201 Group flew 4,209 sorties on shipping protection and the squadrons TAILPIECE. engaged in close-cover anti-submarine protection In answer to the Allied air forces' heavy blows and area patrols flew over 1,300 sorties. In ad­ and as a substitute for the inability to offer effec­ dition, constant fighter patrols were flown in de­ tive opposition to these and to our Mediterranean fence of our harbours. sea traffic the enemy fell back on their old expe­ Enemy submarine activity in the Eastern Me­ dient of issuing false statements to bolster up diterranean was extremely limited during the six morale. The following are typical examples: weeks under review and consequently few attacks Radio Vienna, 2^th May. "British and Ameri­ were delivered against them. On 25th May two can ship traffic passing through the Straits of Beaufighters attacked a submarine, which was Sicily after the conquest of Tunisia is constantly on the surface, with cannon fire and probably caused some damage to its oil tanks and pipes. watched by Axis forces and kept under pressu­ On the 16th of the following month a Hudson re." of No. 459 Squadron made a perfect kill west of Radio Roma, 4th June. "The air attacks car­ Haifa by making an unobserved approach up the ried out regardless of military objectives on the wake of a surfaced submarine and sinking it by nuemous small localities of Southern Italy and depth charges. the islands cannot be regarded as strategic." Enemy air action against our convoys and har­ Radio Roma, 21st June. "The war on enemy bours in the Eastern Mediterranean area was ne­ shipping in the Mediterranean continues to be gligible, but there was a certain amount of re­ carried out methodically by our air forces which, connaissance activity. A good illustration of the in conjunction with submarines, seek to intercept enemy's inactivity is afforded by the fact that enemy convoys ploughing this sea in order to Beaufighters of No. 201 Group during June flew supply their forces in North Africa. Successes are 164 sorties on fighter protection for convoys in scored almost daily and often include ships sunk the Gulf of Sirte and had no decisive engage­ during reconnaissance flights." ments. In the following months the Allied air forces During the period mid-May to the end of June proved that Herr Hitler's dictum that a people Spitfires on interception patrols shot down a will believe any lies provided that they are big ME.109F (or G) off Ras Azziz, damaged three enough does not hold good when bombs give clear JU.88s near Tripoli, Aboukir and Alexandria and evidence to the contrary.

58 Tables Showing Scale Of Effort

The follozving Tables show in fortnightly periods the scale of air force effort in effective sorties by R.A.F. and Allied aircraft of the North-west African Air Forces, the Middle East Command and Malta, from 27/2&th March to 3rd July, 1943. The Tables dealing with operations at sea cover the Mediterranean effort by aircraft of the same Commands. The complete effort from Malta is also tabulated separately with the article entitled "Malta Prepares" on pages 72-74. For the sake of convenience and comparison, the Tables are divided into sorties made by U.S.A.F. aircraft and by R.A.F., etc., aircraft, the latter including sorties by the Royal Naval Air Squadrons, the S.A.A.F., R.A.A.F., R.C.A.F., the Fighting French Air Force, the Royal Hellenic Air Force, the Rhodesian Squadron, and the Polish Flight.

59 RECONNAISSANCE BY R!A.F. AND ALLIED AIRCRAFT OF THE NORTH-WEST AFRICAN AIR FORCES, THE MltfDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA (27/28 March — 3 Jul^ 1943) Key: U.8.A.F. Tactical and Strategical R.A.F., etc.

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS Tac/R Strat/R TOTALS

57 66 27/28 March — 10 April 134 125 259 6 79 85 10/11 — 24 April ... . 156 147 303 76 76 24/25 April — 8 May . 318 153 471 8 83 91 8/9 — 22 May 76 138 214 81 81 22/23 May — 5 June 186 186 106 5/6 — 19 June lkk 6 187 193 62 19/20 June — 3 July 12 Ik 227 227

73 5U 617 GRAND TOTALS 690 1163 1853 In addition there were 8 U.S.A.F. and 29 R.A.F. reconnaissance sorties from Malta on special tasks, 4th June — 3rd July.

Eastern and Central Mediterranean Submarines (area FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS Anti-shipping and close cover TOTALS searches)

27/28 March — 10 April 36 36 124 412 536 10/11 — 24 April ... . 123 123 227 536 763 24/25 April — 8 May 158 158 116 497 613 8/9 — 22 May 12 12 171 504 675 22/23 May — 5 June

5/6 — 19 June

19/20 June — 3 July ATTACKS ON LAND TARGETS BY R. A. F. AND ALLIED BOMBER AND MINE-LAYING AIRCRAFT OF THE NORTH-WEST AFRICAN ADS FORCES, THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA. \ U.S.A.F. (27/28 March — 3 July, 1943) y : ) R.A.F., etc.

ENEMY CAMPS, PORTS and BASES AIRFIELDS and POSITIONS, and LINES (including Mine-laying) LANDING GROUNDS of COMMUNICATION FORT­ FORTNIGHTLY NIGHTLY PERIODS m TOTALS Ligh t Ligh t Ligh t Total s Total s

Heav y - 4 Heav y Heav y Mediu m Mediu m Mediu m F/Bombe r F/Bombe r F/Bombe r

275 32 6 313 183 195 119 l 152 902 1196 2228 27/28 March — 10 April 341 141 23 126 12 36 197 1 61 198 60 320 9 210 447 1043 1709

383 89 26 546 192 328 105 72 697 27^ 789 10/11 — 24 April 48 2 469 28 46 38 61 173 6 491 393 48 938 1 22 260 266 549 16MM

316 161 71 78 626 124 117 40 281 1 201 660 601 1463 24/25 April — 8 May 15 21 52 117 205 65 230 57 352 6 142 834 654 1636 21^^2

580 459 — 109 1148 283 295 — 16 594 29 36 164 610 839 8/9 22 May 12 175 88 37 312 — 79 197 66 342 6 147 277 391 821

501 175 220 902 301 319 219 839 96 256 738 1090 Off^^^^^^r 22/23 May — 5 June 29 222 13 11 275 51 — 12 63 1 7 5 1 14

167 121 — 12 300 316 225 — 51 592 685 1328 272 1076 3311 5/6 19 June . 11 254 39 44 348 36 39 — 39 114 — 56 496 39 591

160 36 196 257 534 11 802 224 106 22 352 19/20 June — 3 July 26 369 2 39 436 19 14 24 83 140 1 221 — 38 260 836

2388 1073, $018 457 398 988 2112 1522 9040 17595 GRAND TOTALS US* **\ •$65$. 4524 44is ' 14.4 * 1213" •244 v. 62 . 800 1042 365 2269 24 805 2319 2432 5580 9795 : #;' ;fi>46-: •i it OPERATIONS OVER LAND HTER AND FIGHTER-SOMBER AIRCRAFT OF THE NORTH-WEST EAST COMMAND AND MALTA U.S.A.F. (27/28 Key: July, 1943) R.A.F., etc.

Offensive sweep Ground Intruder Land Bomber & Local FORTNIGHTLY attack— Ground Ground patrol & sea S. & T.E. attack— attack— (from reconnais­ Defence Anti- Shipping PERIODS Land (from (including F/Bomber Anti-tank MALTA sance (incl. Shipping protection MALTA cannon) only) escort harbour) only)

1015 16k 908 1654 29 392.8 27/28 March — 10 April kk in 1959 75 111 1139 11 41 1276 1671 29 1022 7334

879 567 800 115 263 2995 10/11 — 24 April S71 3713 179 180 374 63 2187 1385 69 1022 913S

1080 719 172k 101 1781 24/25 April — 8 May 2k 195 3630 129 171 828 31 3084 953 749 930 10505

378 3U 735 1677 200 195 8/9 — 22 May 631 321 115 129 493 27 699 1079 148 1275 4286

22 243 1177 770 388 U 439 3053 22/23 May — 5 June ... 9 112 40 24 39 57 1249 62 1437 3029

781 16 1139 3583 701 8 1156 738k 5/6 — 19 June 76 365 55 122 35 295 1156 34 1959 4097

108 97 22 1390 930 88 19/20 June — 3 July ... 1016 36*5 9 450 9 160 25 412 1197 27 2215 4504

888 5267 11598 2k79 2378 3922 30789 1425 695 3140 11 261 8010 8690 1118 9860 42927 a s Tables Of OperWns In The Mediterranean The following six Tables cover operations in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean by R.A.F. and Allied aircraft of the North-west African Air Forces, the Middle East Command and Malta, from 27/2Sth March to Zrd July, 1943.

RECONNAISSANCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN BY R.A.F. AND ALLIED AIRCRAFT OF THE NORTH-WEST AFRICAN AIR FORCES, THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA . ( U.8.A.F. (37/28 March — 3 July, 1943) 6 y : i R.A.F., etc.

SUBMARINE FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS ANTI­ (area and close TOTALS SHIPPING cover searches)

36 36 27/28 March — 10 April 124 412 536 123 123 10/11 — 24 April 227 536 763 158 158 24/25 April 8 May ... 116 497 613 • 12 12 8/9 22 May 171 504 675

22/23 May — 5 June 135 636 771

5/6 — 19 June 94 859 953

19/20 June — 3 July 99 1020 •lllS'

329 'W GRAND TOTALS 966 4464 5430

SORTIES FLOWN BY AIRCRAFT ON PROTECTION OF FRIENDLY SHIRPING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

(27/28 March — 3 July, 1943)

BY AIRCRAFT FROM N. AFRICA 3922 U.S.A.F. 9003 R.A.F., etc. »» »> " " „ MALTA 857 R.A.F.

63 EFFECTIVE SORTIES AGAINST SHIPPING AND SUBMARINES AT SEA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BY R.A.F. AND ALLIED ADJCRAFT OF THE NORTH-WEST AFRICAN AIR FORCES, THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA Attacks on shipping ini (27/28 March — 3 July, 1943) Key : Attacks on submarines

• Number of Effective Sorties

FORTNIGHTLY F/Bomber Heavy Medium Light TOTALS PERIODS and cannon O U.S.AJF. R.A.F. U.S.A.F. R.A.F. U.S.A.F. R.A.F. U.S.A.F. R.A.F. U.S.A.F. R.A.F. U

9 29 25 124 35 159 27/28 March — 10 April 2 2 2

21 17 289 43 332 10/11 — 24 April 3 3 3

27 ISO 16 1 485 1928 502 2430 24/25 April — 8 May 1 1 2 2

11 12 52 223 115 235 178 413 ,8/9 — 22 May s 4 12 2 12 6 18

23 4 IS S3 27 50 77 22/23 May — 5 June 3 8 1 12 12

7 SI 39 5/6 — 19 June 1 15 16 16

36 11 5 88 26 124 42 166 19/20 June — 3 July 4 4 4

136 220 55 12 103 2361 723 27S5 881 S616 9 12 35 1 12 45 57 RESULTS OF ATTACKS (BY EFFECTIVE SORTIES) AGAINST SHIPPING AND SUBMARINES AT SEA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BY R.A.F. AND ALLIED AIRCRAFT OF THE NORTH-WEST AFRICAN AIR FORCES, THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA t Shipping (27/28 March — 3 July, 1943) KeTr y : ** i Submarines

Results of attacks from N. AFRICA, LEVANT and MALTA Effective FORTNIGHTLY Sorties Sunk or Probably Results beached sunk Damaged unknown TOTALS PERIODS O USAF | RAF USAF RAF USAF I RAF USAF I RAF USAF | RAF USAF | RAF

124 35 19 4 27/28 March — 10 April 2 1 1 1 1

43 1 18 39* 48* 10/11 — 24 April U* 3 3 3 3

1928 502 19 11 15 16 n n 44 58 84 142 24/25 April — 8 May 2 1 l 2 2

235 178 22 19 11 70 81 8/9 — 22 May 12 6 4 5 5

27 50 4 22/23 May —>• 5 June 12 1

31 4 j 5/6 — 19 June 16 4

12k ••* 19/20 June — 3 July 3

2735 881 26 19 52 79* 25 99 102 GRAND TOTALS ' 12 45 5 1 16 1 Symbol indicates an estimate of 1 plus vessels where number attacked is unknown. . ^ „ ifflPPING (BY TYPES OF VESSEL) AND SUBMARINES AT SEA BY EkF? AND ALLIED ADJCRAFT OF THE NORTH-WEST AFRICAN AIR FORCES, THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA U.S.A.F. (27/38 March — 3 July, 1943) Key: R.A.F., etc.

Probably Results TYPE OF VESSEL Sunk Sunk Damaged Unknown TOTALS

CARGO VESSELS

k 7 13 •4 28 5 14 21 32 72 Tankers . . 1 — 2 3 6 Trawlers — 1 1 — 4 1 5 — 1 1 Coasters and Freighters —

"F"-Boats 3 3 6 1 1 3 5 Siebel Ferries and T.L.C 11 2 8 21 2 6 16 24 Barges and Tugs — 2 2 •4 3 19 22 Schooners and Sailing Vessels 1 1 11 29 32 7 79 Miscellaneous and Unidentified 5 k 2 11 4 4 6 14 Train Ferry — — 1 1

NAVAL VESSELS

Battleships — — — — —

Cruisers Heavy , Cruisers Light

5 Destroyers to 1 •4 •4 16 1 t o 1 8 12

Submarines 1 1 2 2 5 16 25 2 Minelayers and M.T.Bs 2 1 1 2 , 1 3 «E"-Boats •4 2 3 5 Escort Vessels, etc 1 6 7 1 4 2 3 • 10

TOTALS 26 19 32 26 103 28 55 84 115 282 IFIED RESULTS OF ATTACKS ON SHIPPING (BY TYPES OF VESSEL) IN HARBOUR BY R.A.F. AND ALLIED AIRCRAFT OF THE NORTH-WEST AFRICAN AIR FORCES, THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA U.S.A.F. (27/28 March — 3 July, 1943) Key: R.A.F., etc.

Probably Results TYPE OF VESSEL Sunk Sunk Damaged Unknown TOTALS

CARGO VESSELS 22 19 21 Merchant Vessels 5 6 3 15 6 9 Tankers 1 1

Trawlers

Coasters and Freighters

"F"-Boats 3 20 Siebel Ferries and T.L.C.

Barges and Tugs ... 6 6 Schooners and Sailing Vessels 8 25 10 49 16 8 3 Miscellaneous and Unidentified 2 5

> NAVAL VESSELS

Battleships

Cruisers — Heavy

Cruisers — Light

Destroyers*-1'.", 1 ') k Submariners >: -4.;. ••

«.,V ii"-­ 5

Minelayers^wk M.T.Bs 6

«E"-Boats':: -f.1:

Escort Vessels, etc AIR/SEA RESCUE OP ANEAN BY R.A.F. AIRCRAFT OF THE NORTH-WEST AFRICAN AIR FORCES, T COMMAND AND MALTA

irch — 3 July, 1943) U.8.A.F. Key: Total number of personnel rescued during this period : 101 plus. R.A.F., etc.

Number of Sorties Effective location of aircrew or wreckage

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS Rescues Wreckage, Bomber Fighter Totals (1 or more empty dinghy, Totals persons) etc.

27/28 March —'- 10 April .. . 2 2 15 22 37 1 1 2

10/11 April 24 April 2 2 28 53 81 5* 1 6

24/25 April — 8 May 22 29 51 6* 4 10

2 2 8/9 — 22 May 25 55 80 5* 1 6

8 8 22/23 May — 5 June 11 83 94 21 8 29

— 36 — • — , 5/6 — 19 June 36 32 162 194 14* 9 23

1 53 — .19/20 June 3 Julv 52 2 2 49 206 255 22* 11 33

D 1 102 103 2 2 182 610 792 74* 35 109 Includes co-operation with H.S.L. in certain cases. aircraft on search. In addition, certain of these rescues were effected by Naval vessels directed to scene by Malta P

THE THREE MONTHS of April, May and June, Greco, Bagnoli and Baia. Taranto almost ceased 1943, saw the continuation of Malta's policy of to be used for merchant vessels, but Brindisi and aggression that had begun in the previous Nov­ Bari were still embarkation ports for supplies ember. No longer was the island fighting for its bound for Axis bases in Greece and Crete. Of the life against what had at one time looked like im­ Sicilian ports, Palermo was seen by reconnais­ possible odds. Instead, it was about to become sance in April to be full of wrecks and Trapani the stepping-stone for the invasion of Axis was almost clear of active ships of any size. In Europe. After all that Malta had suffered, what May it was noticed that most cargo vessels berth­ could be a sweeter revenge? ed in the east coast ports of Catania, Augusta or In these three months bombs fell,on the island Syracuse. on only two occasions. Tankers, colliers and car­ The enemy still had plenty of smaller craft and go vessels arrived from both the east and the for larger craft he was helped by a number of west with almost monotonous regularity, bringing vessels taken over from the French. At the end many thousand tons of material for the coming of April, for instance, four French ships—two offensive. In April a small commando force tankers and two large merchantmen — were seen from Malta, by occupying the Kerkennah Islands to have arrived in Naples from Genoa, by way off the Tunisian coast, had the distinction of tak­ of Leghorn and Spezia. ing the first Axis-held territory outside Africa. Against enemy shipping bound for Tunisig, or The Axis collapse in Tunisia on 14th May made Sicily Malta maintained armed night searches by little difference to the general trend of Malta's Wellingtons, Beauforts and Albacores, some car­ air effort. It deprived the ship-hunters of a cer­ rying torpedos, some bombs. During daylight tain amount of prey, but targets, although never Spitfires, Beaufighters and Mosquitoes took over plentiful during the three months, continued to the task; normally they contented themselves be found round the Sicilian coasts. On the whole, with the smaller vessels, although in June Mos­ however, the majority of activity was all along quitoes damaged with cannon shells a destroyer directed towards (a) protecting our convoys and that they caught close inshore off Cape Rizzuto, (b) operating against Sicily and Southern Italy on the foot of Italy, and a merchant vessel of as part of the pre-invasion "softening" process, about 1/1,500 tons. developed jointly with aircraft from North-west Ships seldom ventured far away from the coast, Africa. On three occasions, indeed, aircraft from so offered poor targets. Nevertheless, Malta's the two commands operated in unison, Malta's aircraft, in 102 effective medium, light and Spitfires covering U.S.A.F. Liberators during fighter-bomber sorties, accounted for three ves­ daylight attacks on targets in east Sicily and sels sunk, ten probably sunk, 26 damaged arid an­ south Italy. Towards the end of the period Mal­ other 31 of which the results of attacks were ta's striking power was enormously increased in unknown. readiness for the zero day, Spitfires swarming in Flare-carrying Albacores on several occasions like flies. assisted the Navy in shipping strikes. On the night of 3/4th May, for example, an Albacore Enemy Shipping Activity /provided illumination for units attacking two During April enemy shipping activity was merchant vessels, protected by a destroyer, near slight; it seemed as though the Axis realized Cape Bon. Before leaving the area, the Albacore even then thaj; any chance of keeping a foothold joined in the attack, dropping a couple of bombs on North-west Africa was a forlorn hope. Only and starting a fire in one of the ships. On 2nd a few ships. and those mainly of small size — June one Albacore dropped flares to help a Naval attempted ^fe-crossing to Tunisia. Those that bombardment of Pantelleria harbour, while an­ made the attempt' did not sail direct from Italy, other spotted the fall of the shells. but risked, only the shortest passage from Sicily across the Narrows; this meant, of course, that Activity by Bombers and Fighter-Bombers Sicily was fceing used as an advanced dumping- The scale of bomber effort against land targets ground and a great strain was inevitably thrown was much the same as in the previous three on the Southern Italian and Sicilian railway sys­ months — 648 as against 710 sorties. Of these tems and dff the Messina train-ferry. the great majority — 521 sorties — were again Naples was still the busiest port in Italy, al­ flown by fighter-bombers. though, as a.result of bombing, vessels loading The medium and light bomber activity largely there continued to disperse to such neighbouring consisted of "alternative target" attacks by Wel­ small harbours as Torre Annunziata, Torre del lingtons and Albacores on their way back from shipping ^earches.­ patrols north of Malta and east, south-east and the weatner was bad J£ it was south-west of Sicily — but found little action. for this time of the year — aircraft deposited They did, however, intercept and damage the their bombs on the harbours at Trapani, Marsala only enemy aircraft — a JU.88 — to cross the and Porto Empedocle, in Sicily, or during April coast of Malta at night during the month of May. on Mahdia and Ras Mostefa, in Tunisia. Dama­ Day-flying Beaufighters, on armed reconnaissan­ ge was done to dock installations, railway sta­ ces, attacked both sea and land targets, but their tions and so forth; on other occasions mines were main task consisted in supplying long-range laid by Beauforts and Albacores in the approa­ cover for the many incoming and outgoing ches to Catania and Trapani harbours. convoys. Ships at anchor were attacked whenever they Spitfires escorted Spitfire-bombers and carried were found. The most striking attack was made out offensive sweeps on their own over Pantelle­ by a single Albacore which, on the night of 19/ ria, Lampedusa, southern and eastern Sicily and, 20th June, penetrated the strong defences of Sy­ fitted wih long-range tanks, as far as the Sici­ racuse harbour and bombed two merchant ves­ lian Narrows and beyond Messina. Two long- sels from 1,000 feet. Intense A.A. fire prevent­ range Spitfires, when they destroyed two JU.52s ed full observation of results, but it was thought in the Messina area, brought the total of enemy that both ships sustained almost certain damage. aircraft destroyed by Malta aircraft since the beginning of the war over the thousand mark. Fighter-bombers found a variety of targets on land, which they attacked in 521 sorties. The Malta Spitfires also provided escort within a Spitfire-bombers carried 250 lb. bombs, normal­ hundred miles radius of the island for heavy ly G.P., fused instantaneous, and flew with an bombers from North-west Africa on three occa­ escort of other Spitfires. Industrial targets, sions in May. Objectives were Catania and Au­ railway systems and airfields were attacked in gusta harbours and airfields in Southern Italy; Sicily and, before their capture in June, the air­ in all cases rendezvous was made and escort fields on the islands of Pantelleria and Lampe­ given as planned, two ME.llOs being damaged dusa received their share of bombs. and other opposition driven off. On other occa­ sions, when bomber attacks were outside Spitfire Mosquitoes and, occasionally, Beaufighters also made attacks with 250 lb. bombs on railway sta­ range, diversionary sweeps were laid on or diver­ tions, harbour installations, factories, power sta­ sionary fighter-bomber raids made on Sicilian tions and airfields in Sicily and south Italy. The airfields. fitting of wing bomb-racks on the Mark VI Mos­ Malta's fighters flew 5,453 sorties on all duties quito added to its offensive armament, making it during the three months under review. a more valuable all purposes aircraft than ever. Enemy Activity Against Malta As in the previous three months, Mosquitoes, Beaufighters and Spitfires played havoc with the Compared with the bad old days, enemy acti­ railway systems running down the west coast of vity against Malta was hardly worthy of the Italy and in Sicily. At least 25 locomotives were name. In April there were seven alerts for put permanently or temporarily out of action, enemy aircraft — reconnaissance patrols or high- and damage was done to station buildings, goods flying fighters — some of which turned back be­ yards, signal boxes and other railway adjuncts. fore reaching the coast. In May enemy aircraft crossed the coast eleven times, on two of which Bombs, cannons and machine-guns were all bombs fell. used against these targets; Spitfires, as before, operated by day and Mosquitoes by night. On the 21st over 35 FW.190 fighter-bombers, with ME.109 escort, approached the island early Other Operations by Fighters in the morning. On being intercepted by Spit­ In addition to "train-busting", Mosquitoes per­ fires, half of them turned tail, but others drop­ sisted in their successful intruder patrols against ped bombs at Hal Far and Ta Kali. Spitfires Sicilian and Italian airfields, although they were shot down two FW.190s and damaged another often hampered by mist and sea-fog. In June three and two ME.109s, without loss to themsel­ they extended their activities as far north as ves. On the last day of the month, almost the Foggia, an important target for its marshalling same number of raiders approached and split yards as well as for its landing grounds. Al­ up into groups. Some succeeded in crossing the though -few enemy aircraft were encountered on coast and one bomb hit Valetta, while a few these patrols, the enemy showed his disquiet at others fell harmlessly in the sea off the Grand the unwelcome visitors by employing a nuimber Harbour. of decoy tactics. Lights were shown and flares fired from otherwise inactive airfields and search­ The increase in enemy activity in May was lights and flarepaths switched on — all with the due to the withdrawal of aircraft from Tunisia object of persuading the Mosquito to make it­ to Sicily before the Axis collapse. On the first self into a target for hidden ground defences. of the month photographic reconnaissance show­ These devices, however, met with no success. ed approximately 360 enemy' fighters in Sicily; by the end of the month the number had risen Night-flying Beaufighters concerned them­ to over 500. On the other hand, the total of selves mainly with interception and free-lance bombers declined from approximately 215 to 175 by 31st May, as they fell back to bases in Italy. a R^golq class cruiser; the destroyer station was, In June several formations of six aircraft tried however, occupied only by a few torpedo-boats. similar tactics to those used in May, two air­ The battle fleet was shaken during the month craft usually attempting to photograph shipping when heavy bombers from North-west Africa in the harbour, while the other four acted as high raided .S'pesia, hitting two of the battleships and cover. These tactics achieved little and during sinking a destroyer and an obsolete cruiser. the month 'Spitfires destroyed three, probably Altogether during April, May and June Mal­ destroyed two arid damaged a further five of ta's aircraft flew 571 sorties on harbour recon­ those that made the attempt. naissance (432 R.A.F. and 139 U.S.A.F.) and 440 On 20th June King George VI arrived on the1 sorties on land reconnaissance (328 R.A.F. and island at the end of his tour of North-west Africa 112 U.S.A.F.). On anti-shipping reconnaissance — and on the first evening of his visit heard the 510 sorties were made. alert sounded when three plus enemy fighters Other reconnaissance" effort was maintained to approached, but were driven off when twelve give protection from submarines to convoys ap­ miles from the Grand Harbour. proaching or leaving the island. On this task At the end of June the total number of enemy 177 sorties were flown on area and close cover aircraft in Sicily was estimated at 480, of which searches. Fighters added to the convoys' safety over 400 were S..E. fighters. Backing them up by putting up 857 sorties in their defence. in Southern Italy were some 1,115 aircraft — 464 G.A.F. and 651 I.A.F. — of which 350 were Ready for the Next Move S.E. fighters. In June all preparations for the coming offen­ Malta's total bag of enemy aircraft for the sive against Sicily were stepped-up. Five con­ three months comprised 52 destroyed, 6 probably voys — merchant vessels, tankers and troop ships destroyed and 45 damaged. — made harbour without loss and unloaded their cargoes safely. Fighter strength was increased Watching the Italian Fleet by the arrival of four Spitfire wings, and an­ In addition to watching enemy airfields and other squadron of Mosquitoes and another of shipping movements, Malta's reconnaissance air­ night-Beaufighters came in. Reconnaissance air­ craft also systematically checked up dn the Ita­ craft, as already indicated, watched for any sus­ lian fleet. In June particularly, when the inva­ picious moves on the part of the Italian fleet, sion of Sicily was imminent, the P.R.U. squadrons and airfields in Sjcily and Southern Italy were covered the Italian naval bases almost daily to photographed nearly every day. An additional see what preparations, if any, the Italian fleet landing ground, built in the record time of twen­ was making to defend its country. ty days, was opened on Gozo island on 28th June A certain amount of activity was seen. At and the existing ones on the main island extend­ Spezia the three Littorio class battleships and a ed. Finally, improvements were made in the number of destroyers were^ ready for action, R.D.F. facilities and new Fighter Control and while two heavy cruisers and a six-inch cruiser Filter Rooms set up to handle the vastly increas­ were undergoing repairs. In support of the bat­ ed air force. tleships were three six-inch cruisers at Genoa, From being a battered fortress with a half- where the liner "Roma" was being converted into starved garrison, Malta, fully equipped and arm­ an aircraft carrier. At Taranto were the two ed, was ready for the next move — with, instead Cavour class battleships, a seaplane-carrier and, of a handful of tired squadrons, a force of 600 until it left to join the main battlefleet at Spezia, aircraft at readiness. RECONNAISSANCE BY AIRCRAFT BASED ON MALTA (27/28 March — 3 July, 1943) i U.S.A.F. Key: R.A.F.,. etc. Land and Harbour

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS Land Harbour Totals

10 15 25 27/28 March — 10 April 21 46 67 16 21 10/11 — 24 April 26 51 77 11 19 30 24/25 April — 8 May .. 21 50 71 25 26 51 8/9 — 22 May 56 68 124 19 19 23/23 May — 5 June .. 79 88 167 27 29 56 5/6 — 19 June 61 65 126 k h 19/20 June — 3 July 64 64 128

112 139 GRAND TOTALS 328 432 760

In addition, there were 8 U.S.A.F. sorties and 29 R.A.F. sorties on special tasks during the period 4th June—3rd July.

Eastern and Central Mediterranean

Submarine (area FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS Anti-shipping and close cover TOTALS searches)

27/28 March — 10 April 80 11 91

10/11 — 24 April ... 141 20 161

24/25 April — 8 May 55 34 89

8/9 — 22 May 116 15 131

22/23 May — 5 June 72 30 102

5/6 — 19 June 24 38 62

19/20 June — 3 July 22 29 51

GRAND TOTALS 510 117 687 ATTACKS ON LAND TARGETS BY R. A. F. BOMBER AND MINE-LAYING AIRCRAF1 (27/28 March — 3 July, 1943)

PORTS and BASES AIRFIELDS and and LINES (including Mine-laying) LANDING GROUNDS COMMUNICATION FORTNIGHTLY FORT­ PERIODS NIGHTLY TOTALS

27/28 March — 10 April 10/11 — 24 April ... . 24/25 April — 8 May . 8/9 — 22 May 22/23 May — 5 June . 5/6 — 19 June 19/20 June — 3 July GRAND TOTALS

OPERATIONS OVER LAND AND SEA BY R.A.F. FIGHTER AND FIGHTER-BOMBER AIRCRAFT BASED ON MALTA (27/28 March — 3 July, 1943)

Local Ground defence and Offensive Bomber attack — Ground Recce. — Intruder Anti- Shipping FORTNIGHTLY cover to S. & T/E. attack — and Recce. TOTALS PERIODS returning Land and Patrol Shipping protection (including F/Bomber Sea escort offensive cannon) recce.

27/28 March — 10 April 129 2 50 75 41 33 5 46 381 10/11 — 24 April ... . 64 17 97 179 63 91 7 87 605 24/25 April — 8 May 142 3 88 129 31 39 6 113 551 8/9 — 22 May 214 32 61 115 27 149 23 113 734 22/23 May — 5 June 495 12 13 112 39 55 1 254 981 5/6 — 19 June ...... 366 14 69 365 35 260 6 154 1269 19/20 June — 3 July 352 4 143 450 25 388 1 90 1453

GRAND TOTALS ... 1762 84 521 1425 261 1015 49 857 5974 hter Squadrons (ex N.A.A.F.) operating from MALTA during this period. EFFECTIVE SORTIES AGAINST SHIPPING AND SUBMARINES AT SEA IN THE EASTERN AND CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN BY AIRCRAFT BASED ON MALTA

(27/28 March — 3 July, 1943) ( Attacks on shipping {, \ „ „ submarines..

Number of Effective Sorties

FORTNIGHTLY F/Bomber TOTALS PERIODS Heavy Medium Light and Cannon

1 1 1 3 27/28 March — 10 April

k 15 7 26 10/11 — 24 April

1 5 10 24/25 April — 8 May k

6 13 23 Jf2 8/9 — 22 May 1 1 — 2 2 1 5 22/23 May — 5 June 1 1 6 9 ; 5/6 — 19 June 3 1 1 1 1 k 19/20 June — 3 July 2

22 33 99 GRAND TOTAL'S — u 2 1 3

RESULTS OF ABOVE ATTACKS

CD Results of attacks > M FORTNIGHTLY £ O Sunk 3 Probably Results TOTALS or Damaged Totals Beached Sunk unknown

2 27/28 March — 10 April

6* 16 28* 10/11 — 24 April ... .:. 26

1 24/25 April — 8 May ... 10

12 8/9 — 22nd May 1 , 1

2,2/23 May — 5 June 2

5/6 — 19 June 1

19/20 June — 3 July ... 3

99 25.* 31 69* GRAND TOTALS 10 3 1 1

* Indicates an estimate of 1 plus vessels where number attacked is unknown.

74 MANY PILOTS AXD AIRCREWS in the Middle rine Section of six high-speed launches and a car­ East owe their lives to the efficient and energetic rier pigeon service. Operational control was work of the Air/Sea Rescue Flight, which was under No. 201 Group and administrative con­ formed in the midsummer of 1941. Before that trol under Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle time no definite system existed to locate missing East. aircraft or personnel; searches were either made The first aircraft supplied were three "opera­ by such aircraft as were available for release tionally tired" Wellington ICs, fitted with long from other operations, by Sunderlands, of which range tanks which increased their endurance to there were but few, or not at all. fourteen hours, and the choice of Wellington air­ The following account of the work of the Flight craft was a wise one in view of the arduous na­ is divided into three phases, which coincide with ture of the work. The plan of action was for the development and 'expansion of the organiza­ the aircraft to drop supplies, and rubber dinghies tion, dictated partly by the growth of the En­ if necessary, to survivors, and then to shadow force as a whole and partly by the location of the them until they were rescued by surface craft unit which was in turn governed by the fluctuat­ or amphibians. , ing fortunes of our land forces. On 15th September the flight moved to Burg- el-Arab, sharing a landing ground with No. 203 PHASE I. JULY, 1941 - FEBRUARY, 1942 Squadron, which was equipped with General Re­ connaissance Blenheims. The Air/Sea Rescue Formation Flight thus became a Western Desert Unit. THE ORGANIZATION of the Air/Sea Rescue The Flight was not ready to operate, however, Flight was undertaken by No. 201 Group, before until 26th September, owing to delay in the arrival that Group became the Naval Co-operation Group, of the ground equipment. The time was occupied and the Plight formed at R.A.F. Station, Kabrit, in changing the camouflage of the Wellingtons on 13th August, 1941, with an establishment of six from that of bombers to that resembling the blue, officers and 71 airmen. Two pilots were drawn grey and silver scheme adopted by flying-boats. from 108 Squadron, one from 203 Squadron, and the balance made up of Sergeant Pilots. The Teething Troubles and Training Unit was to devote itself to air sea rescue work, In the early days of the Flight much of the and to operate in co-operation with R.A.F. Ma­ time was spent in training and in eradicating the inevitable teething troubles. Inexperienced ope­ The third successful effort came at the end of rators, technical difficulties, and the lack of per­ the year, when on 29th December the survivors sonnel trained in the wireless and electrical trade of a Swordfish which had come down 20 miles left much to be desired in wireless communica­ north of El Amiad were located, and a high speed tions. Navigational and W/T exercises were launch effectively directed to the position. The therefore arranged, and although the early ones time between receipt of call and take-off on this were unsatisfactory the standard gradually im­ occasion was reduced to thirteen minutes. proved. In order to continue training with a use­ Of the remaining seven search sorties made ful purpose, and to keep crews vigilant and alert during this period three were in search of miss­ with a definite incentive, anti-submarine patrols ing Blenheims of the neighbouring 203 Squadron, were introduced into the training flights. The which at this time was active on the Crete-Libyan first of these patrols, however, met with disaster patrols; another was for a Hurricane pilot "in the to the aircraft, for as it returned from a seven drink" twelve miles north of Alexandria who hour patrol with a load of 6 x 250 lb. A.S. bombs was, however, picked up by a launch before the starboard engine caught fire, due to oil leak­ the aircraft arrived.' A false alarm was ing from the airscrew and blowing back onto the responsible for another sortie, it being found hot engine. A crash landing was made with after the aircraft had left that the small boat re­ wheels up, but fortunately all the crew escaped, ported 100 miles north of Mersa Matruh was injury. a fishing vessel amply provisioned. Experiments were also carried out with various types of supply dropping equipment, and with Aircraft Reinforcements long-burning flares and lights. On 25th November the Flight received two am­ In order that calls should be answered with phibians, a Fairchild and a Grummon, which had minimum delay one aircraft and crew, complete originally been presented to the R.A.F. for am­ with rescue equipment ready in place, were held bulance work in the Middle East by subscribers at stand-by day and night. The average delay in the U.S.A. They were soon fitted with R.A.F. before take-off, even so, could not be reduced to W/T and navigational equipment for co-opera­ less than 40 minutes, there being no M.T. avail­ tion with the Wellingtons in sea rescue work. able'to transport the crew to their aircraft. This A flying boat pilot was loaned from 230 Squa­ system was, however, greatly improved later. dron to train personnel in using these aircraft, but it was soon found that the Grummon was Early Successes — and Reverses intended for landing on inland waterways; the airscrews had insufficient clearance from the Ten sorties on searches, of which three were water, and the action of sea-water on them caused successful, were made in the first four months. pitting to a dangerous degree. It was therefore The first effective response to a call was on decided that the Grummon should be used only 4th October. A reconnaissance aircraft had for sea rescue in emergency. sighted and reported a ship's lifeboat with a crew of ten in a position 100 miles north of Ras-el- During December two replacement Wellingtons Kanayis. The sea rescue aircraft located the were received bringing the Flight up to its ori­ lifeboat and, after dropping supplies and instruc­ ginal strength. tions on the course to steer, remained shadowing Forward Detachments until dusk. It was found later that the boat carried escapees from Crete. On 28th December, 1941, as a result of our mili­ tary successes (it was the middle of our "Crusa­ The second success occurred on 25th November, der" advance, and Benghazi had just been cap­ following a report received the previous evening tured), it was decided to send a detachment to (which only allowed a 30 minute search in fad­ cover the forward areas; two Wellingtons*were ing light), that a dinghy holding three men lay accordingly despatched, first to El Gubbi (which some thirty miles north of Sollum. Following a landing ground was found too small for them), signal by the sea rescue aircraft giving position, and then to El Adem. a Walrus was despatched to pick up the dinghy's occupants, but after landing it was unable to take On 9th January, 1942, the whole Flight moved off with the overload, so, shadowed until dusk by by air and road up to El Adem, with the inten­ the Wellington, it taxied to the shore. tion of moving into Derna as its base directly the During the return flight to base, the petrdl fill­ supply situation improved. The Unit had to be ing cap on the port wing of the sea rescue Wel­ fully mobile for this move, and twelve more M.T. lington broke off causing that wing to have a vehicles were obtained. The road convoy arrived higher stalling speed than normal, and in conse­ at El Adem on the 13th, and a detachment of quence while making a left hand circuit prepara­ two aircraft was despatched to operate from tory to landing in the dark the aircraft slipped in Berka for several days, in view of increased on its final turn and hit the ground, immediately shipping activity off that coast. bursting into flames. The second pilot was In order to provide regular flying practice for thrown clear, but the remaining five members of all aircrews, and to relieve the monotony of con­ the crew were killed. An unhappy ending to a tinous stand-by with but few calls, a regular bi­ good day's work. weekly mail and passenger service was started •• • 1 Fairchild amphibian on a Western Desert airfield.

A rescued pilot being hauled aboard a Walrus amphibian. on 19th January for 201 Naval Co-operation Group (d) Every officer was placed in charge of and 235 Wing, using Wellingtons and amphibian some section of work other than his aircraft alternately, the Wellington landing at normal duties. There was only one Burg-el-Arab and the amphibian at Dekheila. non-G.D. officer in the Flight, and he t was fully engaged in cypher duties. On 21st January the enemy began his recon­ naissance in strength from Agheila, which ra­ Method of Answering Calls pidly turned into an offensive as he exploited our The following method of answering calls was weakness in the forward area and eventually instituted, and reduced the time-lag between the forced us back to Gazala. receipt of signals and the take-off of aircraft In view of the deterioration in the ground si­ to a minimum. One crew always remained at tuation the Air/Sea Rescue Flight was ordered stand-by for two days and saw,. before their to move back to Gambut on 31st January, and period of duty began, that' their aircraft contain­ to L.G. 16 at Fuka on 2nd February. ed the necessary sea rescue and pyrotechnical During this month of advance and retreat equipment ready for instantaneous take-off. which opened the year 1942, the Flight made Two other crews, one "available" and the other only five search sorties, all of which were disap­ "next for duty", were also on duty with their pointingly unsuccessful. aircraft fully equipped, thus being ready to answer a second or third call, or if more than PHASE II. FEBRUARY - JULY, 1942 one aircraft was required on one search., At the end of the two days, the "available" crew THE SECOND PHASE in the history of the became the stand-by, the "next for duty" became Air/Sea Rescue Flight saw changes in the or­ the "available", and a new crew become "next ganization of sea rescue in the Middle East, for duty". An alarm gong summoned the crews which brought a new conception of the work for action, and, in these days, a lorry was always both in scope and methods. at readiness outside the Operations Room to An experienced officer arrived from the Unit­ transport the crew to the aircraft. ed Kingdom at No. 201 Naval Co-operation Group in mid-February as Director of Sea Rescue Increases in Strength work in the Middle East, and immediately set The Flight steadily increased the strength of about the task of securing proper recognition its personnel; from sixteen officers and 117 air­ and equipment for the Flight. men in February the numbers increased to 25 At the same time the Officer Commanding the officers and 152 airmen in June. The strength Flight, who had done well in the face of many in aircraft also improved; in February the Flight difficulties, was posted away as tour expired, held five Wellingtons and two amphibians, but and a new Commanding Officer appointed. The by the end of this second phase in June the new CO. possessed great experience as a G.R. strength was six Wellingtons, one Fairchild, and pilot and navigator, and he realised at once one Fleet Air Arm Walrus loaned for operations that if the Flight was to fulfil its special func­ by 700 iS'quadron. The Grummon was withdrawn tion at maximum efficiency many alterations in March. were necessary, that G.R. qualifications amongst pilots and crews were essential, and that the work Training called for a special technique which could be Intensive training was undertaken in April and evolved only by experiment, experience and hard May, the programme consisting of both a theo­ training. The following measures were there­ retical and practical syllabus. Two Wellington fore taken. aircraft and one amphibian were allotted as a (a) Commitments were examined, and a Training Flight, and lectures and progressive suitable establishment drafted and for­ flying exercises carried out to a strict time-table. warded to the parent Group, with an Examinations were held in most subjects, '65% immediate request for additional Air being the minimum for a pass. Gunners and Wireless Operators. Special attention was paid to newly arrived (b) Aircrews were addressed by the Com­ and inexperienced pilots. "Dry swims" were in­ manding Officer and told that anyone cluded, when the methods of square searches, who had been sent to the Unit for a creeping line ahead and parallel track searches rest from operations should say so and were practised in training flights. a posting would be arranged, because The mail-run by a Wellington every Wednes­ flying Wellington aircraft in daylight day and Saturday from Fuka satellite to Burg- hours, often in forward areas and near el-Arab, then to Sidi Barrani and back to Fuka enemy occupied bases, was work which was also utilised for training pilots and navi­ taxed even the resources of aircrews gators. fully experienced in offensive operations. (c) An intensive training scheme was drawn Handling of Signals up; personnel were drafted into six crews During its short stay at El Adem the Flight and began to fly as teams on operations had set up its own wireless van, supervised by and in practice. an aircrew officer with a small staff of four. The van moved back with the Unit toXGamtiM: secori% tot5k place on 22nd March al and then to Fuka, where it remained a|f &• j$|­ ed by an aircraft of 231 Wing returning from a manent Signals Section, and the staff, some of raid. The sea rescue Wellington again found whom were only on attachment, was made up nothing in the position given. In the meantime to eleven bodies including aircraft operators, 231 Wing had also sent two Wellingtons to inves­ ground-staff operators and wireless-electrical tigate this rather uncertain report of a flashing mechanics. At Fuka the Flight handled not light; an unnecessary duplication of effort which only its own signals, but also those of 889 Squa­ had disastrous consequences, as one of the two dron and the "Alsace" Fighting French Squadron aircraft went into the sea, and another sea rescue with whom it now shared L.G. 16. The Flight, Wellington had to be despatched to search for it. also, before the end of its stay at Fuka, took Although the Wing was able to give a fix from most of the signals of 234 Wing stationed at an S.O.S., the rescue aircraft's search was unsuc­ Bagush and with whom it was connected by cessful. Nine and three quarter hours were spent Fullophone. The daily average number of cypher on these searches in exceptionally hard flying con­ groups handled during this period was 1,600, but ditions over a rough sea, and the majority of the during the rush of the retreat in mid-June it aircrews were violently sick. grew to 6,000 groups per day, when signals for other units withdrawing were sent yia the Flight. Ships in Distress A number of sorties were made to investigate Operations and report on friendly ships in distress. On 7th During this second phase of approximately six April, for example, a Wellington was despatched months in the life of the Flight the calls upon to locate the hospital ship "Somersetshire", which its services were far more numerous than during was believed torpedoed north of Sidi Barrani. The the first period of its existence. It had now ship was found, somewhat low in the water become firmly established, due to the hard work and apparently abandoned, with fourteen life­ of the Commanding Officer, loyally backed up by boats of survivors in the vicinity accompanied by both aircrews and ground staff, and was recog­ a destroyer. At the request of the latter the Wel­ nised as a unit doing a valuable job due to the lington carried out an anti-submarine search results achieved. round the area, and sighted a mine five miles away which it identified with smoke floats. Then, Between the beginning of February and mid- rather surprisingly, those in the aircraft saw the July 67 calls were answered, an average of lifeboats return to the "Somersetshire", and the twelve per month. Sixteen searches were suc­ "survivors" re-embark, although the ship was now cessful, and 75 personnel rescued or assisted to lower by the bows than she had been. The da­ safety. Twenty-two sorties were made in March, mage proved to be less extensive than at first thus giving that month the record so far. The thought, and she was able to reach Alexandria total flying hours per month over the period under her own steam. averaged 135, with an average of 21 per Wel­ Five weeks later a bombed destroyer was re­ lington aircraft. ported in distress 100 miles north of the Ishaila The Flight Operations Record Book shows rocks (known to all Middle East crews at this sortie after sortie in search of a missing aircraft .time as "Bomb Alley"). The rescue aircraft or a sighted dinghy, and consequently many of found nothing but wreckage and an oil patch. the flights undertaken bear a close resemblance On 12th June a Wellington was sent to in­ to each other. From time to time, however, calls vestigate the cause of a large fire and smoke were received which differed from the usual run, seen out at sea: The aircraft found one tanker or an unusual event happened, of which the fol­ on fire well down in the water and a second lowing examples are. of interest. partly burnt tanker being taken in tow. These On 22nd February the Wellington "Z" was facts were reported, and two days later the sent to Bu Amud where it was to take-off on the Flight was asked to ascertain that the first following morning in search of a dinghy reported tanker had definitely sunk. No further trace was to hold survivors; of a Blenheim. Information seen. This last search was combined with one for was received, however, that the survivors had al­ a high speed launch which was overdue, but the ready been picked up by the enemy and "Z" launch arrived safely later and was not seen by therefore left to return to Fuka. While crossing the aircraft. the coast near Sidi Barrani it was attacked by In April the Flight made its first overland two M.E.109FS, who each got in a short burst. The rescue search, but the call was a false alarm. A aircraft was hit in many places and a solitary month later another overland search was made shot unfortunately killed the rear gunner. The for a Wellington which had crash-landed in the Captain of "Z" took violent evasive action and desert, four miles south of the Ishaila rocks, as it returned safely to base, landing with a burst returned from a night operation. The rescue air­ wheel. craft successfully located it and landed alongside; In March two instances of flashing lights on the second pilot had been killed, but the remain­ the sea were reported and investigated. The ing five members of the crew were safe. One of first occurred on the 3rd, but the aircraft des­ these flew back to the Flight, and arrangements patched to the position given saw nothing. The were made for an ambulance to pick up two who The rescue score-board of the Air/Sea Rescue Flight, framed by a dmghy, in the Officers' Mess. regained by the aircraft; the other twp &adSal­ te"*? Wrong .positions: retoor-te^ were comparati­ ready commenced to walk in. vely rare; the prize in tne.se goes to the unit It was obvious that this was but the beginriing which reported a Wellington as crash-landed of the Flight's employment on overland rescue, twenty miles south of Mersa Matruh, whereas it and to meet these new conditions the rescue kits was really 150 miles south of Heliopolis. were adapted by suitable changes in their con­ tents and the addition of parachutes which would The Flight Retreats prevent the containers from bursting when drop­ The military situation had become grave by ped from the aircraft. Ten out of the eleven land 25th June. Tobruk had fallen; Axis forces had searches made during the period were successful. crossed the Egyptian frontier and were threaten­ ing Sidi Barrani and Mersa Matruh. Various A German Crew Rescued squadrons had called at L.G. 16 on their way During May and June enemy aircraft were back, but no signal or message was received or­ fairly active at night in the vicinity of the Plight's dering the withdrawal of the Air/Sea Rescue landing ground, but very little damage resulted. Flight. On the evening of the above date, there­ On the night of the 22/23rd one JU.88 was seen fore, the Commanding Officer of the Flight called to fire its guns and then dive down towards the a meeting of the Officers and Senior N.C.Os and sea, the noise of its engines suddenly ceasing. The explained that in view of the threatening situa­ following morning a Wellington and the Fair- tion he considered it advisable the Flight should child amphibian went out to investigate, and the move, and that the movement order, previously latter located the crew of four Germans in a prepared to meet such a situation, should be put rubber dinghy north-east of Mersa Matruh. They into effect at once. were picked up, brought back, and given food and Within an hour of the movement order being clothing. This was the first time the Fairchild given all the aircraft had left for Burg-el-Arab, had landed in open waters, and its take-off with and the rest of the Flight was hard at work eight persons on board in a fair sea proved its breaking camp and loading lorries to facilitate suitability for rescue work. an early departure next morning. The problem The defence measures of the Unit were check­ of inadequate transports was solved by another ed in the first week of June and proved satisfac­ squadron, already at Burg-el-Apab, lending some tory. Two triangles of cross fire and a mobile of its vehicles. All equipment was safely removed striking force were established. On the night of and nothing left for the enemy. In spite of the 8th June an enemy aircraft flew overhead very congested road the Flight arrived safely at L.G. low headed towards the sea; a short while later 40 by 16.00 hours on the 26th. the noise of its engines was drowned by a crash, The stay at L.G. 40 was of only three days followed by complete silence. The Fairchild took duration, during which a successful search and off at dawn to investigate and found a Heinkel rescue was made for the survivors of an A.S.V. HI in ten to twelve feet of Water some 400 yards Wellington which had come down in the sea off the shore at Bas-el-Kanayis'. An empty rubber twenty miles north of El Amiad. On 30th June the dinghy was on the rocks, but there was no sign Flight moved again to a landing ground near Abu of the crew. The alarm was raised, and four hours Sueir. later five German airmen were captured by the The second phase thus ends with the Flight Libyan Arab Force as they attempted to pass established and recognised as an independent the wire at Maaten Bagush. unit, having undergone many changes in the conception of its work and developments in all Difficulties Caused by Mis-information aspects. Rescue efforts did not always run smoothly, and on many occasions difficulties were created PHASE in. FROM EL ALAMEIN TO TUNIS by aircraft being sent out on searches for missing LANDING GEOUND "X" near Abu Sueir became machines which finally proved to be anything the home of the Air/Sea Rescue Flight from July but missing. March and April, 1942, were parti­ until the end of November, 1942. The number cularly fruitful in these "will o' the wisp" searches of sea rescues was limited owing to the small with a sequence of sorties that need never have amount of air activity over the sea by aircraft been made, until it seemed that an aircraft had based in Egypt, but there was a great increase only to be reported missing for it automatically in the number of land searches. A total of 44 to turn up safe — but after the rescue aircraft aircrew were picked up or assisted after forced- had carried out its search. In addition to such landing in the desert, and seventeen rescued from wrong information there were cases of vague in­ the sea in the three and a half months preceding formation, which was of little or no help for the the opening of our offensive at El Alamein. In search. This is one example of information from addition to these operations 56 personnel of the a Regional Control, on which it was impossible 13th Hellenic Squadron were evacuated from to'despatch a rescue aircraft:— "Aircraft posi­ Gianaclis to landing ground "Y" in four of the tion somewhere on an arc made with its centre Flight's Wellingtons. at I».G. 104 and radius an unexpired distance be­ ed earlv fore E.T.A." On another occasion a Wellington The strength in aircraf twag fjpEfl% was reported missing "about 60 miles from Cre­ "in this period tfl^i^oBePfJlptfe. M Amphi­ bians and one ived. At first light next morning two craft proved veryj s therefore took off to search areas to the enemy coast line or forward ut by the Commanding Officer; after daylight, when a Wellington would have been six hours they both returned having seen nothing vulnerable to attack. One Wellington and the Maryland also made; unsuccessful searches in other areas in the after­ A Mysterious Disappearance noon. On the next day no fewer than nine air­ The navigational standard and ability of the craft, including four lent by 203 Squadron, car­ Flight's aircrews to look after themselves were ried out extensive searches in different areas now excellent, and the complete disappearance without success, although the A.S.R. Walrus dis­ of a Wellington while on a search is still an un­ covered the lost 205 Group Wellington (for which solved mystery. The circumstances were these. "F" had been looking), whose crew had walked At 10.05 hours on 3rd August, 1942, Air/Sea safely into base. Rescue Wellington "F" took off to carry out a The search was continued on the 6th but was square search in position 30° 51' N. 29° 52' E. again negative, and in view of the vast regioi for a 205 Group Wellington which was believed which had been covered it was decided that no to have forced-landed. At 13.00 hours Welling­ more could be done. No trace of Wellingtrf ton "F", which had ten hours endurance, sent a "F" has ever been found, but the Flight substij W.T. message saying "Nil. Continuing". From quently received, information, via the Intenvij that time nothing further was heard from it. tional Red Cross, that the crew had all beeB A "request news" signal was sent out but no killed. It is possible that after crossing the ««•«*.

r •» ~*~

77n.y photograph gives an idea of the difficulty experienced in trying to locate so small an object as a dinghy.

Qattara Depression the aircraft turned north the two days following but without success, and behind the enemy lines and was shot down. when the full area of the triangle had been co­ vered the rescue aircraft had covered an area Outstanding Operations of 12,100 square miles in 34 flying hours. It would be wearisome to give accounts of Another long operation which had happier re­ searches, many of which resemble each other so sults began on 15th October with a request from closely. There are, however, in this period, as 203 Squadron that a search be instituted for a in the two preceding ones, several outstanding Baltimore believed to have forced-landed due to operations worth recording. On the 5th, 6th and engine trouble either in the sea or on the coast 7th October, for instance, the Flight flew the between Port Said, El Arish and a point 31" most extensive search in its history, looking for 20' N, 33° 45' E. Two Wellingtons took off at a Blenheim which had not returned from a train­ 15.18 hours to search previously worked out sec­ ing flight. The track over which this aircraft tions of the tall triangle made by the above bear­ had been briefed to fly made a large triangle ings, and on its first leg of the section east extending from Port Said to 34° 00' N, 34° 00' E. from Port Said aircraft "T" located the Balti­ (level with and west of Beirut), then to Haifa more, badly smashed and burnt, on an isolated and back to Port Said. This area was divided part of the shore in soft ground on which it "was and various parts allotted to three sea rescue impossible to land a heavy aircraft. One of the Wellingtons and the Maryland. No sighting was survivors was seen some distance away walking made although the Wellingtons remained out westwards along the shore in search of help, until darkness. Further flights were made on while a little group of three huddled near the machine, ori'e- of Tvhom stood up and waved to fully located the dinghy but was unable to land the rescue aircraft; of the two recumbent figures in the rough sea. one was seriously injured and the other dead. A plan was then drawn up whereby a Balti­ The second rescue Wellington "W" now arrived more of 203 Squadron was to locate the dinghy from the other direction, and after dropping a and drop a specially prepared rescue kit con­ first-aid kit and a message to say what action taining pyrotechnics, with instructions to fire was being taken, remained circling the position them one hour before dawn on the following while aircraft "T", which had already dropped day, when two sea rescue aircraft would be over supplies, flew off to the nearest camp to organise the position ready to guide a high-speed launch a lorry and land rescue party. After some time to the dinghy. Unfortunately, the Baltimore fail­ "T" re-appeared, guiding a Jeep by firing verey ed to find the dinghy and the plan had to be cartridges and, when they neared the walking postponed. survivor, it dropped a message tin so that he was located and picked up. Before it could reach Another day elapsed before the rescue attempts the damaged aircraft, however, and while still could be resumed, but at 14.00 hours on the 7th some distance from it, the Jeep became bogged. Wellington "W" took off with the special kit so A Magister aircraft of 203 Squadron, containing that the plan outlined above could be put into the squadron's medical officer, now arrived over action. The Axis forces were now in full retreat, the position and landed. An Oxford from the with a rear guard cut off and surrounded at same squadron also arrived and landed a short Mersa Matruh. The Wellington therefore flew while later. Wellington "W" then departed, leav­ just off the coast to Ras-el-Kanayis, then set ing "T" to circle the position until darkness, course for the dinghy's assumed position, which when it also returned to base. was reached as dusk was falling. A square Arrangments were made in the evening for one search was begun, and when on the third leg a of the Flight's aircraft to contact a high-speed verey light was observed some distance away. . launch in position 31°08' N, 32°56' E at first light The aircraft was directed towards it, and the and guide it ashore, while a rescue Wellington dinghy found in position 32°49' N, 26° 13' E, al­ should drop extra supplies and materials for an though it could only just be seen in the gathering improvised runway, because the Oxford also had darkness. Flame floats were dropped to illu­ become bogged. minate the position followed by the special kit On the following day, the 16th, four sorties which fell 30 to 50 yards from the dinghy. It were made by the sea rescue aircraft, further was subsequently learnt, however, that the weight supplies were dropped, and the Baltimore sur­ of the kit broke it open on impact with the water vivors successfully taken off in the high-speed and the airmen were able to salvage only a few launch. The land party, however, was still stuck of the contents, the pyrotechnics not being among with the Jeep, and the Oxford was still bogged, them. It was now dark, and "W" returned to with the improvised runway laid. The 203 Gianaclis. Squadron party were unable to get the Oxford In the hope that the plan would now work off until the 27th, during which period of eight successfully arrangements were made for a high- days sea rescue aircraft continued to keep them speed launch to be close to the position at dawn, provisioned with supplies. and aircraft "T" accordingly took off in darkness to arrive, over the dinghy one hour before light. A Missing Beauf ighter No answering pyrotechnics answered the flame On 2nd November a missing Beaufighter was floats dropped over the dinghy's D.R. position, reported to have come down in the sea north and and after a period of local circling the aircraft a little to the west of Sollum bay. The distance made a square search. It is not surprising, how­ from Alexandria was 249 nautical miles and as ever, that this was unsuccessful, considering the there were insufficient hours of daylight remain­ time and conditions, and after dawn the Welling­ ing the Maryland was sent to Edcu ready to take ton was unable to return to the original position, off at first light the next day. At 08.45 hours having orders to leave the area by 07.00 hours. a message was received from the Maryland, "Am The search was resumed the following day, the., over dinghy containing two live aircrew, position 3 32° 33' N, 26° 00' E. Can stay two hours. Sea fit 9th, Wellington "Z" making a before dawn take-' for amphibian." Then followed, for the dinghy's off. This time the dinghy was located in" position occupants, a chapter of accidents. A Beaufighter 32° 35' N, 26° 19' E, and circled by the aircraft was sent by No. 201 Group to relieve the Mary­ until 09.54 hours, when some Bisleys arrived and land, but owing to its restricted endurance the took over. It was unfortunate that the M.T.Bs Maryland had to leave the area before the Beau- seen in the area could not be guided to the fighter arrived. This meant that the Beaufighter dinghy, as they had orders to return to port failed to locate the dinghy and mark it for the immediately after daylight. Sunderland which had also been sent, and both The dinghy's latest position was passed to the would-be rescuers had to return to base after, Naval authorities at Mersa Matruh, which was negative operations. now in our hands, and in consequence the Beau-, On the next day, the 4th, the Maryland went fighter dinghy survivors were safely picked up^ unserviceable; the Sunderland, however, success­ by launch on the morning of 10th November." High-speed launches whose

****»*£" mmh BiBR.A.F. High Speed Launches must be Thus ended succe fo r foH by the Air/Sea Rescue *JliVPQ> without their help many searches would have been in vain. After nearly two years A Spitfire's Mistake of working together, sharing- the same trials and' A fortunate rescue was effected on 10th De­ tribulations, in fair weather and foul, a special: cember, one of many in a very busy period, and technique and perfect understanding of each was due to the result of a most unusual action other's difficulties has developed. Methods? of in which a Spitfire from Malta had attacked a communication have improved greatly, and gone formation of three Marauders returning from an for ever are the early days described in Phase operation near Tripoli. One of the Marauders One. On a recent dccasion, for example,' a high- was severely damaged but came back most of speed launch was guided by a rescue Wellington, the way on one engine until obliged, through dropping a series of flame floats, up to the crew lack of petrol, to come down in the sea off of a Beaufighter 60 miles from the coast two Benghazi. The call for help was received in late hours after dark on a moonless night, and the afternoon at Berka, where a detachment of the crew brought ashore safely. The sea was so Flight was operating, and within a few minutes rough that the launch had to steer a series of Wellington "W" was airborne. The Marauder courses across instead of into the swell, until survivors were located swimming, in a position finally, by excellent navigation, they were able: 32°14' N, 19°41' E; the daylight was fading and to see the light from the torch the survivors had owing to oil patches on the water round the received in the kit dropped to them. swimmers care had to be taken in dropping the flame floats which would illuminate the two The Flight Moves from Abu Sueir dinghies also dropped by the Wellington. A launch on its way to the position was fortunately The quick and extensive advance of the sighted by the aircraft, who established contact Vlllth Army in Gyrenaica during November was with the Aldis lamp, and the three Marauder responsible for a change in the methods of survivors were safely picked up. On his return operation of the Air/Sea Rescue Flight. The to Malta the Spitfire pilot reported that he had base remained at L.G. "X", Abu Sueir, until the mistakenly shot up a Boston! end of the month, when the whole Flight moved to Burg-el-Arab, but prior to that date detach­ Another unusual and most important rescue ments were sent to operate from more advanced^ was effected on 24th December when the Christ­ landing grounds at Gianaclis, Sidi Barrarii, mas fare intended for No. 32 A. S. P. at Gambut and Benghazi. Two Wellingtons formed; Gianaclis was found to have been sent to Gambut, the strength of these detachments, complete with and a sea rescue Wellington was called upon to ground crews for maintenance purposes, and they; remedy' the mistake. were usually away for ten days until released by a new aircraft and crew. One Warlrus also went Present-day Methods of Sea Rescue forward with the Advanced Fighter Wing to as­ It has been found by experience that every sist any pilots forced down into the sea during individual attempt at rescue presents its own operations. This advanced detachment proved difficulties, so that no definite plans can be laid very useful, rescuing no fewer than ten airmen down for procedure. Immediately the survivors (one a German) in six weeks. of the wreckage have been located it is necessary to mark the spot continually with smoke floats, Further Developments for, if sight is lost, the search has to begin all over again. This is especially important in the The Flight was now responsible for a long case of a dinghy which is extremely difficult to coast-line with an ever-increasing land and sea see on the water. A signal is also sent to base area; detachments therefore became a permanent giving the position and requesting that an institution, and a new Blenheim Flight with six amphibian or a high-speed launch be sent out aircraft was formed in January, 1943, to assist according to the state of the sea, the distance, in these new commitments. The two places of the weather and other governing factors. The permanent detachment were Gambut and Berka. aircraft then circles the position continuously In February the Blenheims were used on anti­ until help arrives, or guides the rescue craft to submarine patrols, although sea rescue work had the spot if necessary. first call. The Flight had always, even in its early days, desired to be employed on this work, for, as The rescue equipment per aircraft consists of already stated, it relieved ,the monotony of wait­ two special dinghies, so designed that they in­ ing between calls for rescue and provided first- flate slowly as they drop and land on the water class training for aircrews. In February the de­ fully inflated; two rescue kits or a complete tachments were increased by one Walrus and one Lindholme rescue gear, all containing ample sup­ Wellington at Misurata and one Blenheim at Mal­ plies for the comfort of the survivors untjl pick­ laha. ed up, including a spare dinghy, water," food, At the end of March, 1943, the Air/Sea Rescue blankets, a verey pistol, and other necessities. Flight moved from Burg-el-Arab to its present This account deals only with the operations of base at Benghazi in two separate parties, road the Air/Sea Rescue Flight, but the A supply bag being packed

Final Figures transportation of urgently required skilled tech­ The total number of personnel rescued or as­ nical personnel and equipment in connection with sisted during the period covered by this review the opening of Benghazi and Tripoli harbours of operations of the Air/Sea Rescue Flight- after their capture, and on searches for both July, 1941, to June, 1943—amounts to 234, of enemy and friendly surface craft. The area of which twelve were enemy airmen. Ninety-two activity now extends from the Turkish coast to personnel were rescued in the desert and 142 in Tunis, covering many miles in depth north and the sea. Fifteen landings were made in doubtful south. country, the biggest rescue numerically being an In conclusion it cannot be over emphasised occasion when seventeen passengers of a strand­ that without the full co-operation of all aircrews ed Wellington were picked up by a Flight aircraft in adopting the correct procedure when about to which took two days to complete the operation. force-land, and especially in practising dinghy In 1943, in addition to the anti-submarine pat­ rols already mentioned, many sorties have been made on communication flying, including the s Air Forces in the Middle East 1940-1943

THE GERMAN AIR FORCE at the beginning of the sian, Western and Mediterranean fronts, it was war was greatly superior in strength to the Allied possible to base planning operations on calcula­ air forces opposing it. It was backed by an air­ tions as to how many aircraft could be spared craft industry with an output two or three times from other theatres of war. In the Mediterra­ as great as the combined output of England and nean, we were still for a time in a position of France. It was flown and serviced by picked numerical inferiority. In fact, it was not until personnel, who were conscious of the fact that well on in 1942 that we can claim to have achiev­ they were in a privileged branch of the armed ed first equality and then superiority in numbers forces, proud of the might and striking power of and in equipment. the Luftwaffe and raised by easy successes in recent campaigns to the highest point of confi­ Allied Strength Increased dence and enthusiasm. The strength of the Allied air forces has doubled For the first two years of the war the G.A.F. and probably doubled again since June, 1940. benefitted largely by its overwhelming superiority New types of aircraft have come into production in numbers. In one campaign after another it and, in particular, a fleet of heavy four-engined gave spectacular and effective air support to land bombers has come into being. In fact, bomber forces practically without opposition. This was development has necessitated the re-classification the story in Poland, in Norway, in France, in the of bomber categories, so that aircraft which two Balkans and in Crete. It was under these condi­ years ago were officially classified as heavy tions th&t the JU.87 obtained its greatest succes­ bombers now count as medium bombers. There ses. During this period, the only check sustained has been no comparable development in the by the G.A.F. was in its efforts against the meantime in the G.A.F. The first line strength R.A.F. in the Battle of Britain. of the G.A.F. today is little, if any, greater than it was in June, 1940, and reserves of operational The numerical superiority of the G.A.F. in the aircraft are believed, to be considerably less. first two years of the war was such that in plans There has been no development of heavy bombers for various possible contingencies in the Middle in the G.A.F. comparable with the great British East area, the main factor to be considered with and American four-aengined bombers. The total regard to G.A.F. forces that might be employed bomb load of the G.A.F. bomber force to-day is was not a question of how many aircraft could probably little more than it was two years ago, be spared, but a question of how many could be whereas the total bomb load of the Allied air operated in any given area on the airfields and forces has increased tremendously. supply facilities available. It was always felt fThe German Air Force and aircraft industry that the G.A.F. was in a position to provide suf­ appear to have been organised on the assumption ficient air forces in any area for projected ope­ that the war would be short and that victory rations, and numbers of aircraft were not a li­ would be achieved before the Allied nations had miting factor. tijme to develop their own aircraft industries. The In the meantime, however, British production standardisation of a few basic types of aircraft, vras increasing; the R.A.F. was expanding, and such as the ME.109, ME.110, JU.88 and HE.lll after a time American aircraft also came into the undoubtedly facilitated large-scale production. picture. In this development three outstanding On the other hand, this standardisation of indus­ points may be noted. In the Abyssirtian cam­ try was to some extent a barrier to the introduc­ paign air superiority was finally and effectively tion of new types of aircraft. During the first achieved following the arrival of Hurricanes ; two years of the war, when the G.A.F. might in North Africa American fighters first showed have been able to afford a temporary reduction their worth in the Syrian campaign, and from in output in order to introduce new types of air­ that time American aircraft became increasingly craft, these did not appear to be necessary. Since important in Middle East operations. In Malta the opening of the Russian campaign, however, the turning point of the terrific air blitz of the losses have equalled, and have frequently exceed­ spring of 1942 was marked by the arrival of ed, new production, and the Germans have not Spitfire fighters. been able to let up on production, even had they The position really changed from the date of wished to do so. , the Russian campaign. From that time onwards, They have, TuJwever, been able to introduce with the G.A.F. largely committed on the Rus­ uccessive improvements, including more power­ ful engines giving better performance, higher servicing personnel; irrespg ! %i A^aBclbf rated altitudes, heavier armament and improved maintenance facilities, so that they, in turnTra­ armour, so that, on the whole, the German aircraft pidly became unserviceable and added their quota employed in the Mediterranean theatre have been to the losses already sustained. little inferior in performance and, on occasion have even had advantages over, the aircraft op­ By the time the Allies had occupied Cyrenaica, posed to them. /JThe arrival of Spitfires in the the I.A.F. in North Africa, was reduced to such Mediterranean has been followed by the arrival a hopeless state of disorganisation that the losses of a few of Germany's latest fighter, the FW.190."] suffered were such as to cripple its effort for many months to come. Similar disaster had A Change in Bomber Policy overtaken the land forces, and the way to Tripoli appeared open before us. Fortunately for the Realisation towards the end of 1940 that they Italians, it was at this moment that the G.A.F. had failed to achieve a decisive result, and that appeared in the Mediterranean, and before long they were possibly faced by a long war, led to a our effort had be to drawn away from Tripolita­ change in German bomber policy, which involved nia in order to send help to Greece. { the intensification of attacks on our shipping. The move of units of the G.A.F. to the Mediterra­ A Serious Threat Removed nean area towards the end of 1940 was After the capture of Greece and Crete it was also • connected in the first place with this new expected that a substantial part of the air forces policy. Aircraft moved to the area included units involved in that campaign would remain in the that had specialised in attacks on shipping, and Mediterranean. Our own air forces had been se­ the famous shipping attack ace, Major Har­ riously weakened by the Greek campaign, and linghausen, came to the Mediterranean in charge were, moreover, called upon to face outbreaks of operations against shipping. For these opera­ in Iraq and Syria. The prospective threat looked tions, the G.A.F. required bases in Sicily from grave indeed. It was soon found, however, that which to operate against Allied shipping and Na­ the greater proportion of the G.A.F. had been val units, which were still passing through the moved to the Russian front, leaving in the Medi­ Mediterranean, and against Malta. Bases were terranean area a force of some 400-500 aircraft. also required in Cyrenaica from which to operate Partly because their attention was absorbed else­ •against Egyptian ports, the Sues Canal and the where, and partly because of lack of time, the northern end of the Red Sea. It is possible that Germans were not able to provide effective air the Germans also envisaged operations from bases assistance in the Iraq and Syrian campaigns. in Italian East Africa against our shipping in the An attempt was indeed made to send German Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, but, if so, these fighters and bombers to Iraq, but it was impos­ plans never materialised. sible to provide supplies and maintenance for \A t the time when the G.A.F. arrived in the them, and by the time they arrived the campaign Mediteranean, however, towards the end of 1940, was almost over. Some of these aircraft operated General Wavell had succeeded in rolling back the from Syria, and German aircraft and specialists Italian Army out of Egypt and was rapidly were undoubtedly in Syria when the Syrian cam­ pushing the remnants out of Cyrenaica. In the paign began but, probably realising the hopeless­ process, the Italian air forces had crumpled up, ness of the position owing to the impossibility of and the Germans found themselves obliged to take providing supplies, and probably also in an endea­ over part of the I.A.F. commitment in North vour to embitter Anglo-French relations by lead­ Africa. They remained until the final evacuation ing us into a war with each other, the Germans of North Africa: / withdrew all their aircraft in the early stages of the campaign, leaving us and the Vichy French Italian Weaknesses in Cyrenaica to fight it out alone. In June, 1940, the Italian Air Force in the Me­ The Battle for Supplies diterranean had a numerical superiority of some After the successful termination of the Syrian ten to one over the R.A.F. The colossus, how­ campaign and the brief operations in Persia ever, had feet of clay; it rested upon a deficient which followed, interest again centred on the Li­ maintenance system, backed by an inadequate byan front. Here the Axis forces had advanced aircraft industry. New production was insuffi­ in the spring of 1941, until by the end of April cient to make good operational wastage, espe­ our land forces were back at the Egyptian fron­ cially by the time the Italian Air Force was tier, though a garrison still held Tobruk. From fighting in North Africa, in Italian East Africa, this date until November there was little change in Greece, in Sicily and in the Aegean. The sup­ in the general position, although we made an ply of replacements and spare parts for mainte­ attempt to relieve Tobruk, which failed, and in nance in North Africa was not properly organised, September the enemy made a reconnaissance in and the maintenance system itself was too small strength, which also failed to achieve any decisi­ and not sufficiently elastic. The result was that ve result and was heavily attacked by the R.A.F. in their retreat large numbers of aircraft had to be left behind on airfields through minor defi­ Possibly the main interest at this period, how­ ciencies. To make good the losses, whole squad­ ever, was JjK^^MfrkMFl^ftF; T rons of new aircraft were flown over without tfoAfri­ AIR FORCE - ARRIVAL I* JIEIMTERRAXEAX AREA FRBRUARY, 1041"

ca it was essential for the enemy to build up ade­ Fall in Axis Serviceability quate supplies. These had to be brought across r- By the autumn of 1941 it became evident that by sea and the R.A.F. concentrated to an increas­ the position was changing. The Germans were ing extent, and with ever growing success, on the heavily committed in Russia, and the G.A.F. in shipping, supply lines and ports involved. The that area suffered heavy losses. Our own forces effect of these operations and their Naval in the Mediterranean area were steadily built up counterpart was to cause such a reduction in the during the summer, so that by November, 1941, supplies received that, by the autumn of 1941, when the "Crusader" operation started, we were the enemy was still not in a position to under­ approaching something like air equality. In take a full-scale drive against Egypt. fact, in the battle area we probably had nume­ In the meantime, our own supplies were arriv­ rical superiority, for by this time the R.A.F. had ing steadily. Had the enemy attacked our supply learned mobility and concentration. R.A.F. routes with the same persistence as we attacked maintenance also had vastly improved, with the his, the results might have been different. As result that our serviceability jvas considerably it was, the Axis diverted a considerable part of higher than that of the enemy J their bomber force to convoy escort. This had This last feature deserves stress. Prior to the the effect of reducing the scale of bomber effort, Russian campaign, German squadrons normally and does not even appear to have had the merit had with them a 25 % reserve of aircraft imme­ of saving their convoys from our attacks. diately available as replacements, and further The employment of the G.A.P. bomber force replacements could be obtained at short notice in this period was, indeed, open to criticism. from the large stocks of aircraft in stored re­ There appears to have been a lack of policy serve in Germany. The heavy losses incurred with regard to the choice of strategic objectives, in 1941 must have bitten deeply into G.A.F. re­ with the result that attacks were disseminated serves. Gradually the majority of G.A.F. units against various targets instead of being con­ lost their immediate reserve and replacements centrated on the few most vulnerable points of had to be obtained from air parks and central our supply organisation. The failure is all the stores. Under these conditions, there was a ge­ more notable as the enemy had all the advantage neral fall in serviceability. Even at the best, of airfields and interior lines. Malta was vir­ average serviceability seldom exceeded 60-70 %, tually isolated. The Germans had airfields in and has frequently fallen much below that figure Sicily, Cyrenaica and Crete, from which they in the past year. could cover the whole of the operational area, From the start of the "Crusader" operation, while we ourselves, denied all aerodromes in Cy­ renaica, the Allied air forces achieved air superiority, of the have held this superiority, with rare excep­ since that time in all the Libyan battles/j G.A.F. Reorganization in the Mediterranean ,^_- ISUS, In the autumn of 1941 there were indications and dispensing with T %%M •MHR.A.F. of a major change in the status and strength of heavily attacked his advancing forces and was the G.A.F. in the Mediterranean. Ever since the successful in slowing up his advance, enabling capture of Crete, the Mediterranean command us to make preparations for the stabilisation had been organised as a Pliegerkorps. In No­ of our line in the Gazala area. By February vember, 1941, however, Luftflotte 2, which had we were back at Gazala. been operating on the Russian front opposite Moscow was transferred from Russia to the The Neutralisation of Malta Mediterranean area, where it took over Flieger­ At this point it was obvious, both to Rommel korps X, and, in addition, started another Flie­ and to ourselves, that any further advance by gerkorps, Fliegerkorps II. This change portend­ the Axis forces, or even holding the ground they ed a major development of G.A.F. activity in had recovered, would depend upon their ability the Mediterranean in the coming spring (1942). to receive supplies from Europe. The passage The arrival of a second. Fliegerkorps suggested of convoys across the Mediterranean, with rein­ that the strength of the G.A.F. in the Mediter­ forcements and supplies, was constantly menac­ ranean was to be approximately doubled, and as ed by our air and naval forces, particularly those G.A.F. strength in the previous months had been operating from Malta. The next phase of the 400-500, it was anticipated that a force of 800­ campaign was, therefore, a race for supplies be­ 1,000 would be operating in the Mediterranean tween the Germans and ourselves. area before long. In order to ensure the passage of supplies to Looking back, it now appears clear that Hitler, ^North Africa, it was essential that Malta should at the time of making the transfer, thought that be neutralised as a striking base. In fact, it the capture of Moscow was assured and plan­ must have appeared clear that so long as Malta ned to make an enormous pincer movement in remained in our hands, the Axis would not have 1942 against the Caucasus, the northern prong sufficient control over the Central Mediterranean going through southern Russia and the southern to enable them to undertake really large scale prong through Egypt and the Near East. This operations in Africa. The reduction of Malta ambitious project, however, was frustrated, by would open a clear passage across the Central the unexpected strength of Russian resistance Mediterranean to Tripoli and Benghazi, across during the winter. The Russian counter-attacks which the Germans could bring up their forces brought the German Army within an ace of and supplies to any desired extent. But Malta disaster and made it necessary to switch back was known to be strongly defended and direct to the Russian Front a proportion of the air assault would involve a major operation and forces that had been withdrawn. heavy casualties. The resistance of the Island could, however, be weakened by effective air On the Mediterranean front the intention to blockade while at the same time its use as an expand the command to a Luftflotte was adher­ air and naval base would be neutralised by heavy ed to and Marshal Kesselring, A.O.C. Luftflotte air attack. The plan appears to have been the­ 2, established his headquarters in Rome, while refore to carry out a heavy scale of air attack Fliegerkorps II (A.O.C. General Loerzer), esta­ on Malta with the object of destroying air and blished its headquarters in Sicily. The scale of Naval facilities and using up the Island's stocks reinforcement was not, however, as great as had of ammunition and petrol, while at the same been anticipated. Instead of building up to a time preventing the arrival of any further sup­ strength in excess of 1,000 aircraft, the G.A.F. plies to the Island, thus preparing the way for in the Mediterranean in the next few months did its final assault and capture. In the meantime not exceed 750 aircraft. advantage was to be taken of the neutralisation The reinforcements went, practically without of the Island to pass a series of convoys through exception, to Sicily and were employed to build to Tripoli and Benghazi and build up Rommel's up a rising scale of attack against Malta. To supplies in Africa. an ever-increasing degree, the battle of the Me­ In part of this plan the Germans were suc­ diterranean was developing into a battle for sup­ cessful. The offensive striking power of the plies. In Cyrenaica, the success of our "Cru­ Island was reduced and for a time practically sader" operation had relieved Tobruk and forced disappeared and supplies to Africa, particularly the enemy for a time out of Benghazi. Our ad­ on the Tripoli route which was out of range of vance, however, had overrun its supply lines and our African-based bombers, were successfully airfields, and we were unable to build up the brought over. But the enemy did not succeed necessary organisation quickly enough. in destroying the Island's defences, nor in put­ Rommel, who had skilfully kept together the ting the Island permanently out of use. On 10th majority of his armour during his retreat, pro­ May newly-arrived Spitfires came into action and fited by our weakness in the forward area to 42 enemy aircraft were destroyed or probably make a dramatic "come-back". His advance destroyed and a further 13 damaged. These started on 21st January, and a week later he re­ losses came as the culmination of a very heavy entered Benghazi. He pushed on rapidly with series of losses which the G.A.F. had suffered mobile forces through the Jebel Akdar, leaving in its unsuccessful attempt to reduce the Malta

•91 defences, Losses from frghtevr action and A/A With the enemy tenuously held at El Alamein, from 25th February to 9th May amounted to within striking distance of the Delta, the battle 420 aircraft destroyed or probably destroyed, and of supplies entered a more acute phase than 340 damaged. With its need for conservation of ever. Rommel's supply line across the Mediter­ effort, the G.A.F. was unable to afford to throw ranean was shorter than ours via the Atlantic away any further aircraft on this venture and and the Cape. His next move depended upon the attack on Malta was called off. Meanwhile, being able to build up his forces and supplies however, Rommel had received the supplies in the forward area to sufficient strength to be which enabled him to make a new bid for Africa. able to launch his attack on the Delta before we could build up an overwhelming force against The 1942 Offensive him. It was a race against time and our air On 26th May, 1942, the enemy began an of­ strategy therefore required intensified air at­ "fensive against our positions in Cyrenaica. The tacks on his supply lines, though this was ren­ move of his land forces was preceded by a few dered all the more difficult by the distance days of increasingly heavy air attacks against which now separated our airfields in Egypt from our communications and airfields in the Western the main sea lanes. Desert, finishing with heavy bombing of our landing grounds in the Gambut area on the night The Blockade of Malta of 26th/27th May. During the battle of the The position of Malta was in consequence more next four weeks, which culminated in the cap­ important than ever, and it was to be expected ture of Tobruk on 20th June, G.A.F. fighters, that attempts would again be made to neutra­ dive-bombers and ground attack aircraft gave lise the Island's striking power. In July the close support to the land operations in progress. scale of attack on Malta, which had been consi­ The scale of activity, although fairly considerable, derably reduced since the beginning of Rommel's was not, however, maintained at a pitch of high­ offensive at the end of May, once more increas­ est intensity and it appeared that the Germans ed, the attacks being particularly directed against were limiting their scale of air effort and con­ sequent losses. Only at Bir Hakim and in the the airfields. The fighter defences of the Island final assault on Tobruk did the enemy air for­ were by this time, however, highly effective, and ces operate at really maximum intensity. By our Spitfires caused heavy losses to attacking this time, however, the advance of the German bombers. The Germans changed their tactics and land forces had driven us out of the airfields in provided increased fighter cover, but without the Gambut area, and Tobruk was out of range success, and before long they were obliged to of our fighter aircraft, so that the G.A.F. at­ discontinue daylight bombing attacks against the tacks took place virtually without opposition. Island and operate their bombers mainly by night, daylight operations being limited to fighter and The enemy's air superiority over Tobruk was, fighter-bomber sweeps. however, an isolated phase. From the begin­ ning of the attack the R.A.F. was active and the Meanwhile, attempts to ship supplies through Germans can in no way claim that their advan­ to the Island provoked immediate and most in­ ce was made under cover of air superiority. In tensive reaction from the G.A.F. and very little fact, the next phase of the advance, which took shipping was able to get through this air block­ them practically to the confines of the Delta, ade. The Island's stocks of fuel, food and am­ was made in the very teeth of Allied air supe­ munition were seriously reduced and operations riority. It is true that close support forces of had to be curtailed. In June, an attempted con­ G.A.F. fighters and dive-bombers followed up voy through the Eastern Mediterranean met with the rapid advance of the army in a series of disaster. In August, however, a strongly escort­ leap-frogs, but the number of aircraft available ed convoy was passed through the Western Me­ rapidly diminished, replacements did not arrive diterranean and, although heavy losses of both to make good losses, supplies were short, so that Naval and merchant vessels occurred en route, the scale of G.A.F. effort was small and had five supply ships, including one tanker, battled little if any effect on the battle in progress. through to Malta and provided a stock of sup­ G.A.F. fighters were unable to prevent the inten­ plies which enabled the Island's defences to be sive attacks of our light bombers, fighter-bom­ maintained, until further improvement became bers and fighters, which maintained a shuttle possible. service of day and night attack against Rom­ It is estimated that practically the entire ef­ mel's advancing land forces, and materially con­ fective bomber forces of both the I.A.F. and tributed towards slowing up and taking the G.A.F. in the Mediterranean were concentrated sting out of his final assault at El Alamein. in Sicily and Sardinia for attacks on this convoy. Nevertheless, Rommel's campaign proved, if They sustained heavy losses in the attacks and proof be necessary, that air superiority of the it is a tribute to their respect for the fighter defending forces will not alone prevent an ad­ defences of the Island that no attack was made vance. (It had previously been demonstrated in on our shipping once it had entered the harbour the "Battleaxe" operation that local air supe­ at Malta. riority of the attacking force will not necessa­ rily ensure an advance).—/ During the next two months G.A.F. operations over Malta were on a much smaller scale. Day­ AXIS AIR FORCE RAKQE - JUKE TO

/CAP CAF \FIGHTER. CAF CAF CAF'RANCE

light operations consisted mainly of high alti­ T Axis Tactics in the Summer of 1942 tude sweeps by M.E.109 fighters and occasional *- In Egypt, the stabilisation at the Alamein po­ fighter-bomber raids. Bomber operations were, sition in July was followed by a period of rela­ for the most part, limited to small-scale night tive quiet. The G.A.F. had suffered heavy wast­ attacks and in many cases even these were not age in the advance and was endeavouring to pressed home, as bombers jettisoned their bombs build up its forces again, but the supply of re­ into the sea and turned for home on being placement aircraft must have been very limited challenged by our fighters. With the weight of as for some weeks there was little apparent in­ air attack removed and with more supplies avai­ crease in the German scale of attack. Through­ lable, Malta again became an offensive base and out this period, generally speaking, heavy losses .MaZta-based aircraft operated with great success were avoided by the enemy, and, in particular, against important Axis convoys en route to JU.87 dive-bombers were sparingly used and Africa. The losses sustained finally goaded the were always prepared to jettison their bombs G.A.F. Command into another attempt to break and make for home if challenged by our fighters. down the offensive power of the Island's air In place of the JU.87, the Germans used fighter- bomber ME. 109s to an increasing extent. Si­ forces, and in October a number of bombers and milarly, in place of HE.126 army co-operation fighters were transferred from the Eastern Me­ aircraft, ME.109S were used for short-range re­ diterranean to Sicily and offensive operations connaissance^ and army co-operation over the were again resumed against Malta. At the same battle areaj About this time, the ME.109G time, important supply convoys were being de­ fighter came into operation, but in spite of spatched to Africa, and it was probably hoped earlier reports did not prove to be a great ad­ to safeguard these by neutralising our air forces vance on the ME.109F. in Malta. The attempt was a dismal failure; G.A.F. operations by day were limited to heavy casualties were inflicted upon the attack­ fighter sweeps over the forward area and occa­ ing bombers and fighters by Malta's defences. sional small fighter-bomber and dive-bomber Relatively -few of the attacking forces got raids. ME.109 reconnaissance aircraft were able through to the airfields, which were the primary to operate over Alexandria and ME.109 fighter- objectives, and Malta's torpedo and bomber^forces bombers carried out a few attacks on airfields were not prevented from operating; in fac't^they along the Aleocandria-Fayoum road. Night ope­ had an exceptionally successful week and; a|nu»m­ rations were carried out by bombers from Greece ber of most important ships were sunk.. and Crete and consisted mainly in attacks on landing grounds and communications in the for­ During October a last-minute attempt was made ward area with occasional attacks on airfields by the Germans to rush supplies across the Me­ in the Delta, and on the harbours of Alexandria diterraean and forward to the battle area. Air and Sues, but the scale of attack was not large, forces were transferred to Sicily in an unsuc­ averaging only ten to fifteen sorties per night. cessful attempt to ground Malta's air striking forces, while important convoys were sent over. In view of the vital importance of the battle Transport aircraft in ever-increasing numbers of supplies, it is amazing that the Germans did were employed to bring troops and supplies not employ their bomber forces to a greater ex­ across from Greece via Crete to Cyrenaica. In tent against our shipping and ports, particularly reply, the Allied air forces intensified their at­ against Suez. The failure to do so can only be tacks on shipping and on transport aircraft at ascribed on the one hand to inaccurate appre­ their bases. ciation and on the other hand to the employment of a large part of the bomber forces on escort to As the date of the battle drew nearer the Allied convoys in a vain endeavour to afford protection air forces carried out a series of heavy attacks to Axis supply shipping. against enemy-occupied airfields. In the initial stages of the battle extremely heavy attacks The September Offensive Fails were made by our ground-straffing and fighter- bomber forces on occupied forward airfields. At the end of August, Rommel made a final These raids were highly sucessful, causing heavy effort to capture Egypt. He had brought up casualties to aircraft on the ground. We already such forces as were available to him in Africa had considerable numerical air superiority and and had serviced his tanks and rested his air from the start of the attack we achieved and forces. He had not, however, been able to build held practically undisputed air superiority over up the supplies necessary for a prolonged cam­ the battle area. In fact, in the early days of the paign. It must have been obvious to him that the Allied forces were being built up and that battle Allied fighters maintained standing patrols before long we could expect to have superiority. for hours on end over enemy fighter landing He would never again be relatively as strong grounds in the forward area. Allied bombers and ­ as he was at that moment, and if he were to ground-straffers were thus free to attack enemy attack, it must be rfow or never. In view of the land forces to the maximum degree. The wheel limited supplies he had available, however, such had turned full circle. Allied air forces in the El an attack must be in the nature of a gambler's Alamein battle achieved the same degree of air throw, its success depending upon a rapid break­ superiority as the G.A.F. had enjoyed in the through and immediate exploitation of success. early battles of the war. Rommel, a born gambler, took the throw, and Reaction to Our Landings in North Africa lost. The credit for failure of the attack goes to In the meantime, bombers and fighters were Allied land and air forces on the spot. But on transferred back from Sicily to the Eastern Me­ a broader view, the ultimate reason behind the diterranean. Before they came into operation, failure was Rommel's inability to build up his however, a new threat appeared; large Allied supplies and replacements sufficiently quickly convoys sailed into the Western Mediterranean owing to the strategic bombing by the Allied air and Allied forces were landed in French North forces. Africa and began to advance towards Tunisia. The German reaction was prompt and energetic. The Battle for Supplies Continues The greater part of the bomber forces, together After the failure of this attack, there was with some fighters, were withdrawn from the again a period of relative calm in the forward Eastern Mediterranean and transferred to Sicily. area. But behind the scenes the battle of sup­ A force of fighters and dive-bombers was estab­ plies went on. Allied air attacks on enemy ship­ lished in Northern Tunisia. German and Italian ping and ports continued on an ever-increasing torpedo-bombers were sent to airfields in Sou­ scale, while the Axis on their side redoubled their thern Sardinia from where they operated against efforts to bring in further supplies by sea and Allied convoys in the Western Mediterranean. air. All the time, Allied supplies and reinforce­ From this time onwards, it is clear that the ments were pouring into Egypt. Convoy after main theatre of the war in the Mediterranean convoy arrived safely and unloaded troops, equip­ was considered by the enemy to be the Central ment and supplies. It is again amazing that the G.A.F. did not attempt to interfere to a greater Mediterranean, and in North Africa Rommel's extent with our shipping and ports. A few small forces were left with only the reduced forces of attacks were made, but little or no damage was Fliegerfuhrer Africa and a very small bomber done and no real interference was caused. Kes­ support from Crete. In the retreat through Egypt selring still appears to have considered it more and Cyrenaica the part played by the Axis air important to provide escort to his own shipping forces in the battle was practically nil. The than to attack ours and he had an insufficient I.A.F.jnade an early get-away; the G.A.F. moved force available to do both at successive jumps but lost the majority of ift on the way. In the halt at Agheila By the middl at Buerat} short breathing spaces were El Alamein we Ind a temporary improvement was ef­ AXIS AIR FORCE RANGE JULY TO OCTOBER. 1942

fected in serviceability, but no new units were Towards the end of 1941 it was clear that the sent to the area and only limited numbers of re­ I.A.F. could not continue with this happy-go­ placement aircraft were forthcoming so that ser­ lucky policy and expect the aircraft industry to viceability slumped as soon as operations were make good the 'resultant heavy losses. Produc­ renewed. For all practical purposes the enemy tion was never large and ?ould not be expected air forces were out of action from the second day to maintain the original strength under the strain of our attack at El Alamein until the Axis forces of protracted offensive operations, particularly were back at the Mareth Line in Southern Tu- when further embarrassed by an inefficient main­ tenance organisation. The capture of Cyrenaica made it possible for Consequently a process of regeneration was es­ us to run convoys under air protection along the sential and was made possible by a closer col­ Cyrenaican coast and thence across to Malta laboration with the G.A.F. In November, 1941, from where they were met by Beaufighters and the appointment as C.A.S. of General Fougier, Spitfires and brought into port under fighter of reputed pro-German sentiment, probably mark­ cover. In this way the long blockade of the Is­ ed the beginning of this policy and the acceptan­ land was finally broken by a series of convoys ce by Mussolini of the unpleasant fact that hen­ which were passed through after the middle of ceforth his Air Force would be subordinated to November. It is an indication of the inability the G.A.F. as a weaker partner. of the G.A.F. to meet all its commitments that The Italian bomber force had proved itself these convoys were allowed to arrive and unload practically useless in East Africa, in the first practically without molestation. Libyan Campaign, in Greece and against Malta; it was, therefore, largely relegated to recon­ The Italian Air Force naissance and shipping patrol duties in areas Little has been said on the subject of the Ital­ where opposition was unlikely to be met. The ian Air Force, since for all operational purposes torpedo-bomber force had been the only branch it was subordinated to the German Air Force by to show consistent enterprise and determination the end of 1941 and has remained so ever since. in the past, and its strength was increased by 1941 had seen the Greek fiasco (saved only by converting a number of bomber squadrons to German intervention), the disintegration of the torpedo-bombing units. Meanwhile, a major East African Empire, and the first retreat in part of the fighter force was still equipped with LAbya resulting in a loss of some 1,200 first-line obsolete aircraft, and an effort was made to re­ aircraft with a proportionate lowering of moc equip as many units as possible with the newer AXIS AIR FORCE RAWGE — FEBRUARY, 1943

/CAF GAF\FIGHTER. GERMAN CAP CAFOftR RANGE BOMBER RANGE

MC.202 and RE.2001 aircraft then coming into gle-engined day-fighters available for the defen­ service. The transport service has proved its ce of Italy remained totally inadequate, while worth in the past, and its strength was built up there was a complete absence of suitable night- by transferring some of the older type bombers fighters. to transport units. In all, the prospects of the I.A.F. were not Subsequently, activities of the I.A.F. were al­ happy.. Its only offensive arm, the torpedo-bom­ most entirely confined to defensive duties in the ber force, was concentrated in Sicily and Sardinia rear areas, and although the role has been in­ for attacks on Allied shipping, but was severely glorious it has enabled the I.A.F. to build up its limited in employment by its inability to stand strength, while G.A.F. aircraft were released the inevitable heavy losses in action, owing to the for more offensive operations. The exceptions lack of depth behind the first line. The bomber to this defensive policy were the torpedo-bomber and bomber-reconnaissance force was equipped operations against our east-bound convoys in with obsolete aircraft and could be employed only June and August, 1942, but these attacks were in undefended areas owing to the vulnerability infrequent and ample time was available to make of its aircraft to modern fighters. The fighter good the heavy losses incurred. force, although relatively large, was for the grea­ ter part equipped with obsolete aircraft, and the Improvement in Morale more modern fighters, numbering only some 350 A corresponding improvement in morale took aircraft, had to protect Sardinia, Sicily and a place up to the beginning of October, 1942, but large part of Italy from the increasing Allied air after that the Allied offensive in North Africa— offensive. Subsequent events proved the impos­ culminating in the loss of the most important sibility of this task. Italian overseas possessions—combined with the Allied landings in French North Africa and the Withdrawal From Cyrenaica heavy R.A.F. raids on Northern Italy, gave the The final phase in Libya opened in December, I.A.F. a number of new problems to face. Chief 1942, with the withdrawal of the Axis forces of these was the question of home defence, which from Agheila to the strongly-fortified Buerat appears to have been almost entirely overlooked position, with the G.A.F. disposed east and south­ previously. An effort was made to improve the east of Tripoli. While this represented a subs­ fighter defences in the south by concentrating tantial advance for the Allied forces it seriously the bulk of the most modern fighters in Sicily, stretched the supply lines of the Vlllth Army Sardinia and Southern Italy. This was made and Western Desert Air Forces, and thus made easier by the withdrawal from North Africa of possible a temporary reinforcement of Axis po­ all but a small force of fighters, after the fall sitions. In their new positions the G.A.F. were of Tripoli, but the available force of modern sin­ far better off than before, and their supply and maintenance problems were greatly simplified. importance of the long-range bomber Furthermore, they were operating from goodj Strength was fairly well maintained, but opera­ well-established airfields, and the static position tions were poorly organised and results almost in Tunisia enabled the Germans to consolidate the negligible. The technical ability and morale of existing facilities which tended to give them aircrews shot down during these operations show­ immediate tactical superiority in view of the im­ ed a marked decline and suggested general dete­ measurably greater problems of supply and main­ rioration of technical methods and a lowering tenance facing the Allies. of aircrew training standards. At the same Tripoli was occupied by the VHIth Army on time Allied raids on bomber bases in Sardinia 23rd January after a week's heavy fighting, dur­ and Sicily increased operational difficulties and ing which the G.A.F. single-engined fighter force reduced serviceability. was heavily engaged and serviceability suffered accordingly, sinking at times to a very low level, Furthermore, Axis strategy necessitated the but recuperating rapidly during any lull in the disposal of long-range bomber aircraft in Italy, fighting. Strength was maintained fairly consis­ Sicily, Sardinia, Greece and the Aegeans, and tently by a policy of basing fighter-bombers and increased the difficulties of assembling a power­ fighters • well in the rear and moving them for­ ful striking force at any one point. Successful ward for operations from advanced landing Allied attacks on Axis shipping necessitated grounds. But the Italians failed to follow the transferring a large proportion of the bomber example of the G.A.F., with the result that los­ force to convoy escort duties, and it is estimated ses on the ground were heavy and large numbers that as much as one third of the total bomber effort was diverted to this end during the first of aircraft were left behind when the Tripoli air­ four months of 1943. Towards the end of the fields were evacuated. Only a small force, con­ Tunisian campaign this shipping protection be­ sisting of the newer type Italian fighters, was came more and more ineffectual and fighters withdrawn to Tunisia; the remaining aircraft had to be taken from their o.ther tasks to pro­ were flown back to Italy to avoid the necessity vide some measure of cover for convoys and of maintaining a large number of obsolescent ports. This, in turn; prevented sufficient protec­ aircraft of little fighting value. tive patrols being flown for the ground attack ^In the south the Axis forces were now stabi­ and reconnaissance units remaining in Tunisia. lised behind the Mareth line, but in the central sector, after a period of comparative inactivity, This attempted compromise was a feature of the G.A.F. moved considerable forces down from the whole campaign and reflects the inadequacy the north to support the Axis attempt to widen of the G.A.F. forces available. No attempt was the Gafsa-Sfax bottle-neck which threatened to made to build up the vitally necessary fighter divide the armies of Rommel and Von Arnim. forces, and indeed none was possible during a This counter-attack was at first supported by period of increasing G.A.F. commitments on the almost continuous fighter sorties, but the scale Western and Russian fronts. There is no doubt of effort fell off as the Allies advanced to the that the long period of heavy operations and west and fewer fighter bases became available, continuous wastage in North Africa, combined while increased pressure against the Mareth line with the need for considerable reinforcement of forced the G.A.F. to divert part of its forces to the Western Front fighter defences, were im­ portant elements in restricting the reinforcement meet this VHIth Army threat. of the relatively weak G.A.F. fighter forces on On 19th March the Vlllth Army attack on the the Russian Front. Mareth line was launched and all available air­ craft had to be temporarily diverted from ope­ The remaining G.A.F. in North Africa was rations against the 1st Army, even dive bombers finally concentrated on the few airfields round and ME. 110s being pressed into service. Main­ Tunis where the aircraft were very vulnerable tc tenance appears to have been of a high order Allied air attacks and were often prevented from and a heavy scale of effort was kept up for se­ taking off and operating in their own defence veral weeks, but the Mareth line collapsed at the by the Allied fighter patrols. The supply posi­ end of March, and after a temporary hold up at tion became steadily more acute and eventually JU.88 and ME.110 aircraft were assigned tc the Akarit position the G.A.F. withdrew to air­ transport duties to make good part of the heavj fields in the Tunis area. Operations were now losses inflicted by Allied fighters on the Axis entirely defensive in character and, for the first transport aircraft fleet. Maintenance became time since El Alamein, Allied air supremacy was increasingly difficult, and as the Tunisian battle complete. neared its climax the G.A.F. strength and acti­ African Finale vity declined progressively, until in the final stages the G.A.F. was ineffective, and during the The most noticeable characteristic during the last few days almost completely eliminated. whole period was the decline in strength and Part I —1941-1942 who insisted on an efficient system being pro­ EAELY IN SEPTEMBEE, 1941, the first seven vided to conform with the provisions laid down Flying Control Officers were posted to the Middle in the International Convention of Aerial Navi­ East Command by the Directorate of Aircraft gation. As many people will remember, the Safety for the purpose of inaugurating a Flying Croydon Control System was quite a household Control Organisation to work on the same lines word, and there is no doubt that the Civil Air as that provided in the United Kingdom for Traffic Control provided by Air Ministry was a Bomber and Coastal Commands. great comfort not only to the operating Air Lines, In order, however, to understand the develop­ but also to the Insurance Companies who cover­ ment of the Flying Control Organisation in the ed the lines, and, inter alia, to the fare-paying Middle East it is necessary to consider for a passengers. moment the history of the same organisation in * * * the United Kingdom. The Royal Air Force during this period, how­ After the last war the only Flying Control ever, was rather left out of it. The Civil System Organisation, worth calling such, was the Civil of Communicational Control Areas could be used Air Traffic Control branch of the Department in emergency by service aircraft if they carried of Civil Aviation. This branch was established wireless, but, in general, service aircraft did not to meet 41m daafiaM af E carry out long cross-country flights at night except on manoeuvres in the summer months partment in the Air Ministry when reasonable weather could be expected. ary interests. In 1937, however, it was decided to introduce, From then onwards Regional Control in the mainly for the benefit of Bomber Command, a United Kingdom continued to develop and expand system of Regional Controls based at certain as an organisation to give aircraft assistance in bomber stations in England and Scotland, whose distress, and to safeguard the routine behaviour functions were to land aircraft in bad weather. of all aircraft at all times, whether on the ground The equipment available included H.F. D/F, or in the air. One of the main problems to face Beam Approach, and full night-flying facilities. was the provision of suitable officers to man the A weather reporting system was also available. Regional Control centres, and to form Control Aircraft in distress could call up any one of these Staffs at all the operational stations and at Controls, and by requesting "Control" be fixed, certain O.T.Us. The total number available in homed, or diverted according to the distress cir­ March, 1941, was 138, whereas requirements cumstances. amounted to 2,000. A school was opened at These Regional Controls were staffed with Oxford, where direct entry A. and S.D. officers trained officers, some of whom had been in the undertook a six weeks course, followed by a Civil Air Traffic Control system, so that full period of practical training on a busy operational knowledge of the working of the Civil system airfield. The output of the school was approx­ was known in the event of a civil aircraft re­ imately 40 personnel per course. Fighter and quiring the R.A.F's Regional Control. Coastal Commands ran their own courses in ad­ When the war started the Civil Air Traffic dition, to assist the school in providing officers Control and the R.A.F. Regional Control were for their own requirements. merged into one. All equipment and signals Throughout the summer and autumn of 1941 facilities belonging to the former were taken over the Regional Control System was expanded in so for the use of Bomber and Coastal Commands, far as personnel and equipment permitted. The who urgently needed every available piece of number of Regional Control Centres increased to radio and visual aid equipme"nt. 40 in number, and were renamed Type I Flying Control Stations. The total number of additional The experiences of the first winter of the war stations at which flying control was introduced showed up the magnitude of the problem of navi­ increased to 80 by the end of the year. These gation over long distances, particularly at night. were known as Type II Flying Control Stations, The capabilities of tired crews had never been the main difference between the two types being correctly assessed in peace time, with the result that the former maintains a continuous watch that errors in navigation and inability of crews and is able to assist any type of aircraft, while to find their bases in bad weather led to numbers the latter gives assistance primarily to aircraft of fatal accidents. The problem was intensified belonging to the individual station, but can also by the need for identification from the Air De­ be used for diversions. fence point of view. These problems were complementary and it was therefore decided to form a special branch in the Air Ministry responsible for Regional The problems to be faced by the small staff of experts who had been posted to put Flying Con­ Control and recognition and identification diffi­ trol on the map in the Middle East were quite culties. This branch, which was started in different from those experienced in the United February, 1940, under the Director of Home Kingdom. In the first place, it must be realized Operations, began to expand the Regional Con­ that the whole of the eastern and southern border trols by opening new centres and providing Re­ of England and Scotland now houses so many gional Control Officers for certain Bomber and airfields, satellites and "Q" sites that one might Coastal Groups, whose function was to advise the almost call the whole area one vast landing ground. A.O.C. on control matters and administer the The excellent communications existing between Control at airfields in the Group. the bomber Groups, and between these Groups

^4 % ^C and their landing grounds, made the whole pro­ blem of control far easier to solve than out here In January, 1941, the full weight of the enemy's where the large area, different operational fronts, bomber strength was felt against us. At this scarcity of equipment and bad communications time Air Staff was very concerned that our combine to make planning of aircraft safety- ser­ bomber effort was unduly restricted by weather, vices a formidable task. and that the weight of our offensive bore little comparison with that of the enemy. The C.A.S. The officers posted for this purpose were pick­ decided that Regional Control must be expanded, ed from Bomber Command, since it was primarily and made universal for both bombers and fighters for assisting bomber aircraft that the A.O.C.-in- to assist them to operate in conditions at least C, M.E., had requested the postings. as bad as those which seemed not to deter the On arrival in the Command the- officers were enemy. In order that problems should be solved split into two mobile units; one unit was establish­ as speedily as possible, it was decided that it ed at a medium bomber Group then based in the should be the responsibility of a separate de­ Canal Zone, and the other with (Rear) A.H.Q., W.D., then located at Maaten Bagush, the front ing our bombers to land in between periods of line at this period of the campaign being through enemy action. Sollum. The primary functon of these units was The other Mobile Flying Control Unit visited to enable the officers concerned to gain expe­ squadrons in the desert advising on better local rience and appreciate the flying conditions exist­ airfield control. A# particular feature of its job ing in the desert and Delta areas. Although was the carrying out of trials for a modified these units were called Type I Stations, shortage Z.Z. controlled approach procedure for landing of equipment and personnel prevented them from aircraft in sandstorm conditions, using a Mobile performing in a similar way to a Type I Sta­ T.R.9 R/T Station for the purpose. The actual tion in the United Kingdom. trials were quite successful and during the first The Mobile Flying Control Unit located at half of 1942 over ten squadrons were trained in R.A.F. Station, Kabrit, concentrated on the de­ this procedure. velopment of better local airfield control faci­ lities. This station had more in common with a Type I Bomber Regional Control than any other One of the main difficulties experienced by the other station in the Middle East. The job "of the unit in connection with these Z.Zs was the com­ unit was straightforward and consisted of im­ plete lack of interest shown by some squadrons proving R.T. control of medium bombers, intro­ in the value of R/T. One Blenheim squadron, ducing electrical flare - path equipment, and for example, was quite enthusiastic about the forming a liaison with the local sector control. idea of having a blind approach aid for landing This liaison was found particularly useful during in sandstorms, but pointed out ruefully that its periods of enemy activity in the zone in assist­ squadron R/T was hopeless. The visiting Flying

an Airfield Controller edure. Two Sergeant Airfield Controllers investigating a T.R.9.D. R/T set for local control at airfields.

Control Officer asked the Commanding Officer But although a certain amount was done in of the squadron if he could look at an aircraft's introducing better flying discipline and R/T T.R.9 installation. On examination it was found control among squadrons, this operational thea­ that the set was still in a wooden crate com­ tre still lacked an organisation which could look pletely cowered with sand and no battery or after pilots if they got into trouble over the crystal available. The Flying Control Officer Mediterranean or over the desert and bring then asked if he could meet the squadron's them back safely to their bases. At this time Signals Officer. It was explained that there was (April, 1942) the medium bomber L.Gs were no Squadron Signals Officer but that Sgt. Smith in the El Daba area under the control of a Wing which had by now moved up from the Canal was considered to be the man who knew more Zone. More advanced L.Gs were being built and about wireless sets than anyone else in the it was expected to form another bomber wing squadron. When Sgt. Smith appeared on the in this area. It became imperative therefore to scene and a new battery and crystal had been find more Flying Control Officers to superintend provided, the sand removed and an R/T ground the safety of aircraft on these airfields and to to air test carried out, more cheerful results introduce the policy which by now had been ensued. The Commanding Officer of the squa­ brought into force by H.Q., R.A.F., M.E. for the dron became keen and all pilots were instructed guidance of formations in developing their own to be in their dispersed aircraft and to listen in Flying Controls. A school for training Flying on the modified Z.Z. procedures so that they Control Officers had been established at R.A.F. could understand what it was all about. Airfield Controllers under training being instructed in Bomber marshalling procedure. Station, Kabrit, and twenty-seven A. and S.D. It was decided by the A.O.C.-in-C, therefore, officers (ex U.K.) were given a fortnight's course that a programme of development, satisfactory before being sent to L.Gs in the El Daba area to all formations, should be worked out. This for practical experience still under instruction. programme included better airfield control to­ gether with tighter flying discipline throughout the Command. It was not intended, however, to At one of the A.O.C.-in-C's conferences early neglect the area flying control aspect where, • in May, 1942, the whole question of flying con­ communications permitting, it could be provided, trol services in the Western Desert, Delta and because even the best airfield control is incom­ Canal Zone areas was discussed. It was appa­ plete without a regional distress organisation. rent that communication difficulties, particu­ larly in the Western Desert, made a network of It was decided to introduce a link between the Regional Flying Control stations impracticable M.B. Wing in the El Daba area and the fighter at this stage. Different formations stated dif­ defence wing Sector Operations Room, by sup­ ferent requirements. A.H.Q., Western Desert, plying a staff of watchkeeping Flying Control demanded airfield control only and were not in­ liaison officers in the latter, their job being to terested in the requirements of bomber forma­ co-ordinate all available information of friendly tions in the back areas. The Naval Co-operation bomber aircraft getting into trouble and if such Group maintained that a first rate "fixer" ser­ aircraft eventually ditched, then the local A.S.R. vice was all that was required by them. The Flight detachment would be contacted and rescue West African Reinforcing Route was primarily action initiated. concerned with Staging Post airfield control, At first there was some doubt by the Sector and since their aircraft rarely deviated from the Controllers as to the value of the newcomers, given track of the route, it was not necessary but when it was explained that they were there to concentrate so much on an area distress to look after the safety of aircraft at times when control. the sector controllers themselves were far too busy with scrambles, shipping protection patrols, gency laj etc., their use was recognised. many ome'rs—'oT TRe—same™ HWTuWP faff c< Within the first fortnight of this step being munications proved to be the greatest handicap taken three Wellingtons returning from opera­ and it is known that many more might have tions in the Benghazi area were materially as­ been saved if quick communication with our most sisted, using a control system which had never forward fighter L.Gs had been available together been introduced before. Sidi Barrani, which was with a trained Airfield Control staff. one of the most advanced L.Gs available for bomber use at this time, was equipped and staff­ ed as an advanced diversionary base for returning Such was the Flying Control situation which bombers. A part-time staff on duty at night prevailed up to the time when the Allies fell time only for manning the flare-path was laid back on El Alamein. With this withdrawal on; many nights went by at first without their considerable disruption of the Flying Control or­ being required, then one night a returning ganisation followed. A course for twenty new Wellington reported engine trouble with his officers which was to have been held at L.Gs starboard motor, and losing height rapidly in in the El Daba area was cancelled and most of a position approximately south of Gambut. Co­ the Control Officers, who, if they had been train­ ordination of his H.F. D/F bearing from Mersa ed, would have been exceedingly useful at this Matruh with the R.D.F. plot obtained on him by time, were returned temporarily to various R.A.F. the most advanced A.M.E.S. enabled "Courses Transit Camps. to Steer" to be passed to the aircraft, so that he The remainder of the more experienced Flying was able to make Sidi Barrani, where an emer­ Control personnel returned to the bomber stations

A distress call from an aircraft being plot ^gional Flying Control Officer!

103 A powerful signalling lamp used for controlling aircraft taxying and taking off. Navigation plays an important part in the syllabus for Airfield Controllers

105 A : R/T CONTROL.

0 1 : No.t ALOIS LAMP OPERATOR 0.2 : No.Z ALOIS LAMP OPERATOR P .- PYROTECHNIC OPERATOR S.1ANDS.2: BLACK SMOKE GENERATORS - Landing Groorul (ISO XAROS APART)

in the Canal Zone and Levant areas. But in Part II of this article will deal with this spite of this momentary setback in the develop­ problem, together with the development of the ment of this branch of the Aircraft Safety or­ ganisation, the teething troubles were over. All Regional Flying Controls now functioning along formations by now were realizing the importance the Mediterranean coast between the Levant and of building up and strengthening the organisa­ Tunisia, for the purpose of giving aircraft flying tion, especially in view of the necessity of pre­ through the Eastern Mediterranean the maximum serving every available aircraft and crew in the possible assistance when in trouble. Command at this critical period. (To be continued.)

106 Two eastbound convoys have passed safely through the Sicilian Channel." —Official report dated 29th May, 1943.

^^ WHO has studied the war in the The struggle for mastery in the Mediterranean Middl'e^'lla^st, this bald statement — to be follow­ in those three years makes one of the most im­ ed thrMe,e ^yeeks later by another official report portant and absorbing studies in the strategy of that: $First westbound through convoy has pas­ the present war. For R.A.F. personnel it holds sed safely through the Mediterranean" — is a a particular interest, for the story of the battle most significant one. of supply routes is also the story of the develop­ Eof three years, ever since Italy entered the ment of Air Power as a substitute for Sea Power war. in June, 1940, the Mediterranean had been in the Mediterranean. This area became for virtually closed to our convoys between the Unit­ three years a testing ground for new theories ed Kingdom and Egypt. The bulk of reinforce­ and experiments in warfare. In retrospect, those ments in men and material had been forced to years are seen to be a mixture of triumph and make'the long passage round the Cape. Thus, disappointment, valuable for the lessons learned for £hr,e# years we had been as severely handi­ and at times almost futile for the waste of effort cajjjpecl.as a golfer with one arm in our fight expended for the meagre results obtained. against an enemy whose supply lines could be The story of the sea war falls conveniently in­ measured in tens of miles while ours were mea­ to three periods of roughly a year. The first sured in thousands of miles. Since the war in year, up to the end of May, 1941, saw the change -the Mediterranean area was so largely a war of over from sea to air dominance; the second year supplies, this handicap might have been fatal. saw the supply war at its height, during which, Now, however, in the summer of 1943 the through often by hit-or-miss methods and by bitter ex­ channel was open again. perience, we learned how to tackle the enemy's CEPHALONI IONIAN

00 o

5101 hANtlSHO FUKA DISTA NC ES CAPE BON TO LEBANON COAST . . 1,500 MILES CAPE KR1OS TO DERNA . . 18O • OULFo/SIRTE TO STRAJTSo/OTRANTO 700 • NAPLES TO TUNIS . . . 350 • CAPE BON TO TRJPOLI . MALTA TO ALEXANDRIA. MALTA TO TRJPOLI MALT A TO BENGHAZI . ED1TERRANEAN P TRJPOLI TO BENGHAZI. . . •M ALEXANDRIA TO TOBRUK. . . shipping; the third year, from the middle of 1942 thought, air powerBeg onwards, saw the benefits of those first two years from November, 1940, onwards. In that month reaped and the control of the Mediterranean pas­ Fleet Air Arm Swordfish, operating from car­ sing completely into our hands. riers, bearded the main Italian fleet in Taranto This article does not pretend to be in any way harbour. This, as will be seen, was the cloud technical; it is merely a record of events in the no bigger than a man's hand. Mediterranean area as they occurred. It may In June, 1940, however, that day was a long perhaps be said that only one side of the Middle way ahead. Naval power still ruled the Medi­ East campaigns is given and that ultimately the terranean and the R.A.F. in the Middle East play­ fighting man on the ground beats the enemy, ed second fiddle, with a mere handful of squa­ . even if naval and air forces strangle that enemy's drons. In those days a raid by five bombers supplies. There is no denying this, and the arti­ was what a raid by five hundred is now. cle must be read with the knowledge in mind that, while the sea war was being decided, the The Position Changes for the Worse land war was being fought also, the effort made - Any feeling of confidence that we may have by all the services fitting into the final picture had regarding a snap victory in the Mediterra­ of the Axis defeat in Africa. nean area was shaken when Italy's opportunist action was followed up by the catastrophic col­ AIR POWER OUSTS SEA POWER lapse of French resistance and all the handicaps (June, 1940, to May, 1941) brought in the wake of that collapse. Imme­ diately the whole responsibility for safeguarding TO UNDERSTAND HOW the change from sea the Middle East fell on our shoulders. To make dominance to air dominance came about, it is matters worse, instead of having France as an first helpful to glance at the map of the area ally we had as neighbours Vichy-sympathising involved. What is called the Eastern Mediter­ authorities whose attitude was, to say the least ranean — the area dealt with in this article — of it, unhelpful. We could expect no co-operation is roughly rectangular in shape and measures from Tunisia in the west, Syria in the east or some 1,500 miles from east to west, from the French Somaliland in the south. Lebanon coast to Cape Bon. At its narrowest, • Realizing, then, that we would have to play between Derna in Cyrenaica and Cape Krios in a lone hand, our plans were made accordingly. Crete, it is barely 180 miles across. At its wid­ It was certain that Italy would at once try to est, where the Gulf of Sirte and the Ionian Sea get a stranglehold on Egypt and the Sues canal combine to form a bulge in its shores, it is near­ area by blocking the Mediterranean and the Red ly 700 miles across. The islands — Malta and Sea, and thus prevent supplies reaching the Bri­ Sicily in the west, Crete in the centre, and Rho­ tish forces in the Middle East. We, therefore, des and Cyprus in the east — are of obvious stra­ struck quickly. In the Western Desert a few tegical importance. hours after the declaration of war bombing at­ Every part of these relatively narrow waters tacks were begun on the Italian supply ports. can be covered by aircraft based on the Mediter­ The Italians were taken by surprise — and such ranean shores or islands. All shipping lanes can, names as Tobruk, Derna and Benghazi, hitherto therefore, be watched from the air and none can unknown to the general public, began to figure be said to be completely immune from air attack. in newspaper headlines. From Aden and the It is clear that whichever side controlled the Me­ Sudan 'attacks began on Italian bases in Eritrea diterranean airfields was well on the way to and Abyssinia. controlling the waters. Without French help, however, we were not It is doubtful, however, whether this fact was strong enough to prevent the Italians in August widely realised at the beginning of the war. The from occupying British Somaliland, with its stra­ Mediterranean had for long been more or less the tegically placed port of Berbera, or from cros­ private property of the Navy; to Naval men sing the Egyptian-Cyrenaican frontier in Sep­ Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria, Cyprus were what tember and advancing as far as Sidi Barrani. Bond Street and the Strand are to Londoners. Nevertheless, the R.A.F. continued the supply Before Italy plucked up the modicum of courage war with as heavy attacks as possible on Tobruk that was necessary to come into the open, it and on lines of communication between Sollum looked to most people as though the Mediterra­ and Sidi Barrani, making the Italian administra­ nean could safely be left to the British and tive position, never very secure, more difficult French Mediterranean fleets. Italy's action and than ever. France's collapse immediately swept away the The one bright spot in our relations at this time natural territorial domination enjoyed by the with our former French allies was the fact that Allies. It was soon obvious that before we could the Governor of Chad, the territory lying across regain that domination, the Mediterranean area the Takoradi-Cairo air ferry route, joined the was going to be the scene of much stiff fighting. Free French movement, and by September the How decisively air power was to affect the whole of French Equatorial Africa was safe from trend of that fighting, few people then guessed. Vichy influence. Dakar still had to be watched, Nevertheless, whatever may have been the opi­ but the most immediate threat was removed. In nion of the "leave it to the Navy" school of the ReJfrSeaf.rea, too, the Aden R.A.F. squadrons

109 and the Navy had the situation well under con­ there of the Italian fleet, powerful and intact, trol and at least four out of the estimated total was an ever-present threat to any British move­ of eight Italian submarines operating in the ment. Constant watch was kept by the R.A.F. neighbourhood were sunk or disabled. on Italy's warships and on the night of ll/12th Up to mid-October the Middle East situation November an attack was planned on Taranto, appeared fairly hopeful. There had been no se­ the chief base. rious naval engagement in the Mediterranean. Sixteen Swordfish of H.M.S. "Illustrious" and The Italian fleet remained dispersed in its bases five of H.MJS. "Eagle" were briefed to operate and the Italian air force, in spite of a ten-to-one in two waves of twelve and nine aircraft res­ superiority in numbers over the R.A.F., accom­ pectively, separated by an hour's interval. Ele­ plished little. If the Italians had shown more ven aircraft carried torpedoes, six in the first enterprise by air and sea they could have made wave and five in the second, and the remainder Malta untenable in 1940; fortunately, they left carried bombs. Two aircraft had the task of the island alone — an oversight that was to have illuminating the target with parachute flares. repercussions that few Italians could have for- The operation was well executed. Torpedo seen at the time. That word "Malta" was to hits were scored on one Littorio class and two sound more and more unpleasant in Axis ears Cavour class battleships, and two cruisers and as the months went by and as, through Malta's other vessels in the harbour were hit by bombs. efforts, over a thousand aircraft were shot down The attack resulted in a further dispersal of and over a million tons of shipping sunk or the Italian fleet — which did not venture out damaged. in any strength until the Cape Matapan engage­ ment in the following March. Italy Invades Greece This action was followed on 26th November The Mediterranean war area expanded when by fifteen Swordfish from "Illustrious" bombing Italy invaded Greece on 28th October, 1940. The the submarine base at Portolago, Leros Island, R.A.F's commitments then spread to the Adria­ and by eight from "Eagle" bombing Tripoli har­ tic and the Aegean Seas and the phase began bour. At Portolago two aircraft attacked what that was to end with the evacuation of Crete in was believed to be a warship, while others start­ May, 1941. In this phase the first signs of the ed fires in the dockyard area. At Tripoli fires substitution of air for sea power became manifest. were started on the quays and three probable The only possible answer to Italy's move was hits were obtained on a ship alongside the Spanish to switch squadrons to Greece from the Western Quay. Desert and Egypt, although they could be ill- As already indicated, these actions were the spared. By the end of the year four squadrons first sign in the Mediterranean area of the vul­ were operating and Egypt-based Wellingtons nerability of naval surface craft to attack from were using Greek airfields as advanced landing the air. The sinking of the cruiser "Southamp­ grounds for attacks on Italian bases. ton" two months later was the beginning of the The immediate task of the R.A.F., as far as end of the theory that surface forces could ope­ the Greek campaign was concerned, was to hold rate safely at sea within reach of hostile shore- up the flow of Italian supplies and reinforce­ based aircraft. ments proceeding to the front via Albania. To do this attacks were directed against shipping Wavell's First Campaign in transit wherever it could be found and against In spite of the possibility of added commit­ the principal Albanian ports of Valona and Duraz­ ments in Greece, preparations went on for push­ zo. The bombers did their best, but compared ing the Italians back to Cyrenaica. Attacks with modern standards the weight of attack was continued on the Italian supply lines, but again pathetically small. The normal raiding party compared with the hundreds of bombers operat­ consisted of about six Wellingtons and three ing in 1943 the scale of attack was insignificant. Blenheims — and these could hardly be expected On 27/28th October, for instance, we find three to have a profound influence on the enemy's Blenheims bombing Benghazi and on the 31st supply position. a solitary Bombay dropping a stick on BardAa. With the intention of interrupting supplies at Looking back, these operations, whatever may the loading points, sixteen Wellingtons, en route have been thought at the time, seem more like from the United Kingdom to the Middle East, nuisance raids than anything else. were retained at Malta. From there they each On 9th December General Wavell's push start­ carried out four sorties against ports in South­ ed, with the R.A.F. strengthened by squadrons ern Italy—but again the scale was not suffi­ moved up from elsewhere in the Middle East. cient to cause the Italians much anxiety. By the end of 1940 the British were well over The high-light of the period, however, and the the frontier and were approaching Bardia, Mus­ first real sign of the coming air dominance in solini's "bastion of Fascism". In Greece the the Mediterranean, was the Fleet Air Arm at­ Greek army was proving more than a match tack on the Italian naval base at Taranto. Until for the Italians, although in the air the R.A.F. it became clear that the Mediterranean was some­ was outclassed as far as actual aircraft were thing more than a naval cockpit, the presence concerned and was finding attacks on the ene­ my's rear increasingly arduous owing to diffi­ Greek culties in giving the bombers fighter protection. ing, our squadrons were much below stFength" The real battle of the Mediterranean had not through casualties and lack of spares. Yet air­ yet begun, although it had been realized that the craft had to be found to protect incoming convoys building up of our own supplies and the damag­ and the disembarkation ports in Greece. ing of the enemy's was going to be of paramount What was more serious, however, was the entry importance. As already mentioned, our supply of the German land forces into the Mediterranean situation was hampered by the necessity of using arena. The convoy bringing Rommel to Africa the long route round the Cape to avoid running reached Tripoli in February; on 24th March the the gauntlet in the Mediterranean; as regards Germans occupied Agheila; the British were forc­ the enemy's supplies, although attacks were made ed to fall back to the folium line, leaving a gar­ with the aircraft at hand, torpedo-bombers were rison isolated in Tobruk; and the airfields, so scarce and A.S.V. and other anti-shipping devi­ valuable for sea operations, returned to the ces were not yet available. In the Mediterra­ enemy. nean, therefore, the R.A.F. and F.A.A. were ra­ ther in the position of a man trying to take on The Battle of Cape Matapan an opponent and having one hand tied behind As the Germans were making their initial ad­ his back. It was fortunate that the Mediterra­ vance in Africa, attention was attracted to the nean opponent was not a more determined one sea war by an engagement between British and instead of being one who, indeed, through his Italian naval units. own stupidity seemed at times to have tied both Until March there had been no major clash his own hands behind his back. between the rival fleets. In case such an action The only cause for regret was that, with materialized, however, we had to keep on the spot French help instead of Vichy hostility, we might a Battle Squadron of three Queen Elizabeth class well have driven the Italians out of Africa by battleships and two cruiser squadrons as well as the end of 1940. the necessary lesser vessels. This force was not sufficient to watch the whole Mediterranean area, The Germans Take a Hand as well as protect convoys running to Alexandria from the west and from Egypt to the Greek The first three months of 1941 were to bring ports. The Navy had, however, played its full mixed fortunes to the Mediterranean sea war. part in harassing enemy convoys—so much so, The most significant event occurred in January, in fact, that towards the end of March the Itali­ when German aircraft, operating from Sicily, sank ans decided to carry out a manoeuvre. Its main the British cruiser "Southampton" and badly da­ objects were to distract the attention of the Me­ maged a destroyer and one of the aircraft car­ diterranean fleet from the Naples-Tripoli supply riers that had taken part in the Tar ant o show. route while further convoys made the passage This misfortune did not seem of major impor­ and, secondly, to tempt our warships to pursue tance at the time — but what had actually hap­ Italian naval units into a position where they pened was that events of the previous spring off could be attacked by dive-bombers from Sicily or Norway had begun to repeat themselves in the Southern Italy. Mediterranean and a few shore-based aircraft had shown themselves capable of damaging a In the first aim they suceeded, and passed a strong naval force. The Cape Matapan affair in number of supply ships through to North Africa. the following March was the outcome of an at­ In their second aim they failed, and off Cape Ma­ tempt by the enemy to inflict a more serious de­ tapan, in the extreme south of Greece, on 26th feat on the Mediterranean Fleet by enticing it March Italian naval units, at a time when they within reach of shore-based aircraft But this were not covered by air protection, were caught comes later in the story. by British warships and suffered heavy losses. This action" did not, however, materially affect In Cyrenaica in January General Wavell's swift the status quo in the Mediterranean, although it advance gave us, temporarily, airfields on the was hailed at the time as a smashing victory that southern shores of the Mediterranean in the Ben­ would once more turn the Mediterranean into a ghazi region, from which we could operate more lake as British as Windermere. The trouble was easily against the enemy's supply routes and that we had no time to exploit the temporary ad­ ports, and link up with aircraft from Malta. vantage given to us by this naval success and Agheila was captured on 8th February, but our by our short tenure of the Cyrenaican landing swift sweep forward rebounded on us by present­ grounds, to intensify our attacks on enemy ship­ ing acute supply problems. Shortage of fuel was ping lanes. The Army and the R.A.F. had their the most urgent problem and for a time no bomb­ hands full both in the Desert and in Greece and ers could operate. The position was further com­ Crete—and the enemy continued to transport to plicated for both the Army ajid the R.A.F. by the Africa, and subsequently supply, a formidable fact that reinforcements were being diverted to mechanized force. Greece, where the B.E.F. landed early in March. The Loss of Greece and Crete In this campaign, where the battle of Valona in February had forced the R.A.F. policy to change The end of naval power in the Mediterranean from strategic bombing to close support for the in sight. When the Germans attacked

111 Greece on 6th April, both the R.A.F. and the all important in the campaigns fought between B.E.F. were hopelessly outnumbered. On the the Delta area and Tunisia, where the vast dis­ night of the 17/18th the evacuation from Greece tances and sparse land communications necessit­ began and continued until 2nd May. On 18th ate supply by sea for the advance eastward or April the Wellingtons which had been operating westward of any large land forces. It had been in Greece returned to Egypt and the Blenheims quickly realized that if we could not have free fell back to Crete to provide protection for the passage through the Mediterranean ourselves, we sea evacuation from Greece. must at least stop the enemy from enjoying this On 3rd May attacks on Crete began when Suda benefit. It was essential to prevent the enemy Bay was dive-bombed. On the 9th the last of from exploiting the advantage that short sea the Blenheims flew to Egypt to avoid destruction, routes gave him into an overwhelming one that leaving only a handful of fighters to carry on the might well have caused us to lose the Middle struggle. The next day saw the beginning of the East. full-scale enemy bombing attacks on Crete, which From the early days of the war with Italy continued until the invasion commenced on the every effort had been made, with the totally in­ 20th. As the invasion went on and as the final adequate aircraft at our disposal, to damage the evacuation took place between 29th May and 1st enemy's supply position, both by attacks on his June, the Navy and the R.A.F. fought hard under shipping in transit and on his ports and bases. what soon became impossible conditions. Until That we achieved as much as we did was due en­ the end fighters from Egypt gave such cover as tirely to the courage and tenacity of the air they could to' the ships as they evacuated per­ crews. In the year between June, 1941, and June, sonnel, and transport aircraft added considerably 1942, the same handicaps of insufficient aircraft, to the numbers saved. Long-range fighters, how­ faulty torpedoes and unsuitable bombs had to be ever, which would have given better protection overcome. Yet at the end of the period, after to ships, were not available^ much trial and error, a balanced day and night The events of April and May were, at least reconnaissance and striking force had been built temporarily, disastrous to the British position in up that, working in close co-operation with the the Mediterranean. Our material losses alone Navy, decided the sea war. in Greece and Crete were heavy—200 aircraft and Blocking the Back-Door six cruisers in addition to many thousand per­ Before turning to the first supply race in the sonnel, naval, military and air force. As regards summer and autumn of 1941, it is necessary to the strategical position, the enemy gained im­ glance at the precautionary measures that had mense advantages by now possessing airfields in to be taken within and without the Mediterranean Sardinia, Sicily, Southern Italy, along the Cyren­ area for safeguarding the Middle East. aican coast as far as the frontier, and in Greece and Crete. It looked as though he had a strangle­ In the south, the virtual end of the Abyssinian hold on the British as far as the Mediterranean campaign came in the middle of May, when the area was concerned. We had no bases for our Duke of Aosta, the Italian commander, surrend­ naval or air forces except Egypt, the Levant, ered aTAmfto Alagi. The campaign dragged on Cyprus—and Malta. But those words "and Malta" until November when Gondar fell, but these ope­ were to have wider and wider significance as rations did not affect the situation at large. The time went on. important thing was that control of the ports in Eritrea and Somaliland removed a direct threat Any question of naval dominance in the Medi­ to Aden and to our supply lines from South Af­ terranean, after the bombing and straffing that rica — although the Yichy-controlled island of our ships had undergone during the evacuation, Madagascar constituted another threat that had could now be shelved. In future, surface units to be cleared up in 1942. had little chance of operating successfully with­ out air cover, and although, as will be seen, the In the eastern section of the Mediterranean Navy continued to take its full share in weaken­ events also took a turn for the better and at ing the enemy's supply position, the majority of least partially offset our misfortunes in Greece shipping attacks had to be left to the submarines. and Crete. In the first place, between 2nd May and 2nd June, the Iraqi rebellion was quashed THE BATTLE FOB SUPPLIES and the danger of Axis infiltration scotched. Se­ (June, 1941, to June, 1942) condly, between 8th June and 12th July, the more important Syrian campaign was successfully FROM JUNE, 1941, onwards it may be said that completed, and any chance of a stab in the back aircraft controlled the Mediterranean. The main from that quarter averted. concern was now the battle for supplies. That With Iraq and Syria safe, the only other ne­ battle had, of course, begun as soon as Italy en­ cessary move was the occupation of Persia, which tered the war, but in this year it reached its was effected in four days in August. British zenith and the fact that we won it had a pro­ and Russian forces co-operated and by their ac­ found influence on the war in the Middle East. tion secured our lines of communication through If the Mediterranean had become in 1941 un­ Iraq and the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean, # safe for warships, it was even less safe for mer­ our oil resources at the head of the Persian Gulf, chant ships. Yet freedom of sea movement was and the Russian oil organization in the Caucasus. / The fact that Anglo-Russian forces operated In Kingdom to Egypt after May, 1941, and Malta was Persia was, of course, brought about by the Ger­ in a position of splendid isolation. man attack on Russia in June. For the whole period, too, the R.A.F. operat­ Thus, between May and August, the back-door ing from both Egypt and Malta was sadly handi­ to the Middle East, that might have been used capped by being expected to make bricks in the by the Axis to advantage, had been blocked. We way of results without straw in the way of suit­ still could not afford to relax our vigilance on able and up-to-date aircraft. It was expected to Cyprus, since the nearest enemy air and naval cover the entire Mediterranean area, both offen­ bases were only 300 miles away; static fighter sively and defensively, with a handful of squa­ defence and sea reconnaissance were constantly drons. Malta, apart from a number of Welling- maintained to foil any possible Axis attempt to tons, some fitted with A.S.V. equipment, sent out capture the island. from the United Kingdom, was represented by nothing but Blenheims, Marylands and two F.A.A. The Race for Supplies squadrons flying Albacores and Swordfish. From Meanwhile, in the main quarter of the Mediter­ Egypt the only aircraft available were a Blen­ ranean war area the race to build up supplies heim squadron, a Sunderland squadron with in­ went on in anticipation of a resumption of the adequate A.S.V., a mixed Maryland reconnais­ struggle, which came when the "Crusader" cam­ sance and Beaufort torpedo-bomber squadron, a paign opened in November. The general situa­ Beaufighter squadron and a few old Ansons and tion, although on the surface unfavourable to us, Dorniers flown on limited reconnaissance by had its bright as well as its-dark side. Greek and Jugo-Slav squadrons respectively. The main reason why the position was not This was hardly a formidable array of aircraft worse—indeed, critical—was that the Germans, — and included no night-striking force. Between having overrun the Balkans and Crete, did not them, however, they produced amazing results. continue their impetus southward, with results Aircraft flying on the Crete-Libyan patrols pro­ that are, of course, unpredictable but which might tected our shipping coming up to the forward have proved fatal to our whole position in Africa. bases or, when the attempts were made, to the 'instead, they turned the full weight of their at­ beleagured garrison in Tobruk; systematic tack northward and invaded Russia in June, leav­ searches from both Egypt and Malta watched for ing comparatively small, but well-trained, forces Axis convoys; and striking forces, as the figures to give a tough fibre to the far more numerous given below prove, took heavy toll of the enemy's Italians facing us in the Desert. What would ships. have been the outcome if Hitler's "intuition" had pointed south instead of north is—like what might Attacks on Axis Shipping have been the situation in the Mediterranean if For running supplies over to Africa, the1 enemy we could have counted on the French army, navy had the advantage of alternate routes, either west and air force in June, 1940—one of the most in­ or east of Malta. From Naples, the main embark­ teresting "ifs of history" in the Middle East. ation port, vessels were normally routed:— In any case, this relief was granted to us and (a) South-west to Palermo, thence in a more we were able to build up in readiness for the westerly direction making landfall in Tu­ winter offensive. Here, again, the bright side nisia in the Cape Bon area, before turn­ showed itself. Following the visit of the Har­ ing south down the coast to Tripoli and riman and other special American Missions, a possibly on to Benghazi. flow of American material began that affected (b) South through the Straits of Messina the whole supply situation in the Middle East. and then north-east towards the island More and more squadrons became equipped with of Corfu off Greece, before continuing American aircraft, from Tomahawks, that were along the Greek coast and south to either in time for the Syrian campaign, onwards. In Benghazi or Derna. the Deser titself, although an attempt to relieve Tobruk in June failed, the enemy could not reduce From the other normally-used ports of embark­ it and the garrison was kept supplied and rein­ ation Taranto or Brindisi — vessels proceeded forced by a number of brilliantly-executed Naval as (b) above. A subsidiary route, usually confin­ movements. ed to smaller craft, which now began to be em­ ployed in ever-increasing numbers, ran through On the darker side of the picture, the Eastern the Corinth Canal and thence south to Crete and Mediterranean was virtually ringed by enemy south again to Derna or one of the other minor airfields and by bases from which enemy surface Cyrenaican ports. Small vessels were also used and submarine craft could operate almost at will. to ship material off-loaded at Benghazi along the Possession of both Crete and Sicily gave the Cyrenaican coast. The enemy rang the changes Axis the added advantage that they could>—and on these routes according to the strength of our often did—switch strong air forces from one to attacks or whether these attacks were coming the other to deal with our shipping movements mainly from Egypt or from Malta. on whichever side of the Mediterranean they happened to be. Bo tight was the Axis grip on The Navy and the R.A.F. watched these routes, the western approaches to the Mediterranean that although their efforts were not closely co-ordi­ no convoy passed through from the United operation Group in September. Between the loss portant target for the added reason that it was of Crete at the end of May and the opening of the main base for air convoys plying between "Crusader" in November, bombers and torpedo- Crete and Cyrenaica. bombers of the R.A.F. and F.A.A. had the follow­ Malta's contribution in the summer and autumn ing record:— of 1941 consisted of 548 sorties against Italian (a) Merchant vessels sunk 34 and Sicilian ports and bases, and, on the African (b) Merchant vessels probably sunk ... 22 side, 544 sorties against Tripoli, Benghazi and (c) Merchant vessels damaged 106 the smaller intervening harbours on the Gulf of (d) Merchant vessels (results unknown) 60 Sirte. These attacks were continued on as heavy (e) Naval vessels sunk 3 a scale as possible during the actual "Crusader" (f) Naval vessels probably sunk 3 campaign. (g) Naval vessels damaged 7 Changes in the "Crusader" Period (h) Naval vessels (results unknown) ... 41 All Naval claims were made by submarines, For six months, then, the Navy and R.A.F. had except on one occasion in November when sur­ worked away in this period of so-called inacti­ face units, acting on information supplied by re­ vity in the Desert, stepping-up their efforts dur­ connaissance aircraft, accounted for seven mer­ ing the special intensive preparatory period of chant vessels and two destroyers sunk out of a about six weeks, designed to do the maximum convoy of nine merchantmen escorted by two last-minute damage to the enemy. cruisers and six destroyers; on this occasion one As a result, when our attack was launched on of our submarines also sank one destroyer and 18th November, the Vinth Army's task was made damaged another. The Navy's total bag con­ easier, for it was faced by an enemy with few sisted of:,— reserve supplies. Since a campaign, however (a) Merchant vessels sunk 65 bravely the personnel may fight, cannot be sus­ (b) Merchant vessels probably sunk ... 7 tained without the sinews of war, the enemy (c) Merchant vessels damaged 17 was back at Agheila* in January, 1942 — with (d) Naval vessels sunk 17 practically no ammunition, petrol or food. That (e) Naval vessels probably sunk 2 our own supply position in the forward area was (f) Naval vessels damaged 6 by then precarious was no fault of the R.A.F. and F.A.A., which — often with out-moded air­ Thus it may be seen that in the period of a craft — had in the summer and autumn kept little under six months leading up to "Crusader" open our supply lines while harassing the enemy's. the enemy definitely lost nearly a hundred mer­ chant vessels, representing a total of over 370,­ During the Vlllth Army's advance up to the 000 tons. Add to this the losses of material pro­ middle of January, the whole situation in the bably sustained in other attacks not claimed as Mediterranean brightened — although for only "kills", and in the R.A.F's battering of ports and a short time. There were two main contributory bases, and it will be realized that the enemy's causes of this improvement. In the first place, supply position was not as healthy as he would the influence of No. 201 Group, which had been like it to have been. It was reckoned that near­ re-formed for Naval Co-operation work in Sep­ ly half the enemy's sea traffic from Europe to tember, began to make itself felt. The second Africa failed to arrive. favourable factor was a territorial one the fact that the Cyrenaican airfields round the Jebel Attacks on Ports and Bases Akdar bulge once more fell into our hands, mak­ If half the enemy's shipping failed to arrive ing sea reconnaissance and the attacking of owing to the toll taken by the R.A.F. and the enemy shipping easier and, by improved facilities Navy, a great deal of material failed even to for fighter protection, ensuring that convoys start on its way to Africa or was destroyed soon could be run to Malta with a reasonable chance after it arrived. In dealing with the bombing of survival. of ports and bases, however, it is always impos­ As already mentioned, No. 201 Group had a sible to assess the extent of damage caused to millstone in the shape of inadequate aircraft hung supplies; one can merely keep in mind the fact round its neck. The forces at its disposal were that this bombing not only caused damage to individually unsuitable either in type, range or stores of fuel, ammunition and other supplies, but training, and collectively entirely insufficient in also destroyed harbour and railway facilities and numbers to protect our own shipping or to locate interfered with the work and morale of those and attack the enemy's. In particular, there was who were employed in the docks and in the as yet no A.S.V. long-range reconnaissance squa­ vicinity. dron, no trained night-striking force and few Between June and November Egypt-based air­ long-range fighters with experience in fleet pro­ craft flew 143 sorties against supply bases in tection duties. Greece and Crete and, on the disembarkation side Improvements were, however, being made. By of the Mediterranean, 1,014 sorties against Ben­ the end of December a Mobile Unit had been ghazi, as well as regular attacks on Derna and formed by No. 201 Group which could operate a Bardia, used for the smaller craft crossing from maximum reconnaissance and striking force Greece and Crete. Derna airfield was an im­ from the most advanced landing grounds that the current military situation allowed; all dis­ A severe handicap to us at this time was the embarked F.A.A. units in Egypt had been placed fact that only a few ships had R.D.F.; much under No. 201 Group, adding weight to the strik­ trouble was experienced with R/T; and, in addi­ ing force; certain bomber squadrons from No. tion, the Western Desert fighters had no I.F.F. 205. Group were also available to. be diverted In consequence, no vectored interceptions were from desert targets to shipping targets if re­ possible and fighters patrolled overhead, maintain­ quired; and certain fighter squadrons could be ing air superiority directlly above the convoy. drawn from A.H.Q., Western Desert, to cover In order to improve communications and fighter coastal shipping bringing material up to Tobruk direction from ships, the Beaufighter squadron and, later, to Benghazi for the short time we carried out frequent exercises with shipping in held it. Alexandria. The single-engined squadrons, how­ ever, could not be spared from the Desert, so Anti-Shipping and Convoy Operations were unable to get this valuable practice. The importance of holding Mediterranean air During the "Crusader" offensive, although oc­ bases was driven home in January, 1942, when cupation of the Cyrenaican landing grounds eased No. 201 Group's forces were temporarily dispos­ the position of No. 201 Group, our shipping bring­ ed in the Benghazi area. This,month saw suc­ ing material forward continued to face the threat .cessful offensive and defensive operations under­ of enemy submarines. Moreover, as the enemy's taken. The offensive operations — particular­ air position grew more difficult in mid-December, ly a combined Cyrenaican-Malta attack between so he increased his submarine activity along the 23rd and 24th January on a convoy bound for Cyrenaican coastline. In this month it was estim­ Tripoli, in which a probable troopship of 13,000 ated that some 70 Italian and 20 German subma­ tons was claimed as sunk — showed clearly how rines were operating in Eastern Mediterranean waters; No. 201 Group's aircraft claimed three of much more could have? been done by a specialis­ them and their successes were small. During the ed day and night striking force and the need lull that followed " Crusader" special anti-sub­ that No. 201 Group had for night A.S.V. recon­ marine measures were taken by No. 201 Group, naissance aircraft as highly trained as the day which will be referred to later. reconnaissance squadron. In any case, the at­ tacks made by forces that were either only part­ The Position After "Crusader" ly trained or on temporary loan, undoubtedly came as an unpleasant surprise to the Italians. Before proceeding with the story of the war in As for the main defensive operations, the three the Mediterranean—which was about to enter its Malta convoy movements between the middle of most critical, yet most interesting stage—it may December and the end of January, although not be helpful to review the position as it was after particularly noteworthy in themselves, once more the failure of the "Crusader" offensive. drove home the lesson that, given adequate air By the middle of February the land forces, protection, shipping had a fair chance of making counter-attacked by the enemy on 21st January, harbour. Subsequent convoy attemps to Malta, were back at the Gazala line, and here they stop­ after we had been pushed back to Gazala in Feb­ ped until the enemy resumed the offensive on 26th ruary, 1942, were to show equally clearly the ha­ May. Fortunately, although our supply position zards to be expected if that air protection could had been partly instrumental in causing our with­ not be given. drawal at the end of January, the enemy's own supply position was such that he was in no fit More Fighters on Shipping Protection state to exploit his initial success. He had seized his opportunity, but his. impetus could carry him no The VTIIth Army's brief occupation of the Cy­ further than Gazala. The reasons for his shaky renaican bulge gave us a limited opportunity in supply position were that it had been systematical­ January to use Benghazi harbour, but the few ly weakened before "Crusader" began; sub­ weeks were too short to influence the critical sup­ sequently, attacks on his shipping by the R.A.F. ply position to any appreciable extent. Merchant and Navy had never let up; and he had lost a vast vessels were scarce, and the protection of those amount of material—including, it was estimated, that could be run to Benghazi and Malta threw a nearly a thousand aircraft definitely destroyed or great strain on the air force and Naval units con­ abandoned—during the British sweep forward. cerned. Another supply race was about to begin. The During the time that we were rushing supplies geographical positions of the antagonists were up to Tobruk and, temporarily, to Benghazi, al­ much the same as they had been before "Crusad­ most all the Western Desert fighter squadrons, as er." The chief difference was that we could now well as No. 201 Group's Beaufighter squadron, use Tobruk as a forward supply port—and this were turned over to shipping protection. Every was of considerable advantage, so long as the evening, towards dusk, as enemy dive-bombers sal­ R.A.F. could continue to give it a fighter umbrella lied out with strong fighter cover, more and more and deal with marauding submarines. The enemy, R.A.F. fighters were airborne. If our squadrons for his part, could use Benghazi again as his for­ could be drawn or fought off, the dive-bombers ward base. would come in; if our fighters could not be per­ As regards the harassing of the enemy's supply suaded, no bombing attack followed. routes, we had once more lost the west Cyrenaican

115 landing grounds. Our reconnaissance and ship- rines, torpedo-bombers, dive-bombers and mine­ striking forces were back in bases in the Tobruk layers. area. Malta was strengthened by the convoys that To combat the submarine menace, which was a had brought in fuel, ammunition and other essen­ serious one in the spring of 1942, special atten­ tials, but the enemy, knowing this, had already tion was paid to anti-submarine searches. Dur­ begun the first round of his full-scale air offen­ ing the first three months of the year the average sive against the island. daily number of A/S patrols was five or six; in In essential, then, our problems from the end of April and May it rose to ten or eleven. To make January to mid-May were (a) to prevent enemy this possible, No. 459 Squadron R.A.A.F. (Hud­ supplies from reaching Benghazi, and (b) to safe­ sons) was added to No. 201 Group in February ; guard our own supplies on their way up from between 24th March and 7th April No. 13 Hellen­ Alexandria to Tobruk. Malta's troubles were in­ ic Squadron, on whose old Ansons the bulk of the cidental to the main theme. A/S patrolling had fallen, was withdrawn for re-equipment with Blenheims; and in April No. Failure to Sink Axis Shipping 47 Air Echelon (Wellesleys) joined in the hunt. In tackling these two problems in the spring of Close co-operation between Air and Naval staffs 1942, the R.A.F. was more successful in defending also effected considerable- improvement in com­ our own supply lines than in attacking the enemy's. bined procedure for A/S aircraft and Naval sur­ face vessels. During the three months from mid-February the U-boats were sighted and attacked almost daily increased distance from the targets brought about along the 370 odd miles of coast between Alex­ by the withdrawal to Guzala served to emphasise andria and Tobruk, the most fruitful area for at­ the lessons learned in January. The ever-recurring tack being normally fairly close inshore between need for a long-range night reconnaissance and Daba and Tobruk. From ((February to the middle torpedo striking force had been strongly urged as of May the R.A.F. claimed five submarines sunk, early as September, 1941. It was only late in the three probably sunk, ten damaged and twenty- spring of 1942, however, that an A.S.V. Welling­ three other attacks of which the results were ton squadron came out from the United Kingdojm unknown. In the same period the Navy added to No. 201 Group and a beginning made to convert five sunk, one probably sunk and two more da­ No. 205 Group's No. 38 Squadron Wellingtons to maged. Some idea of the value of the submarine night torpedo-dropping. This squadron, which had searches and strikes is shown by the fact that begun torpedo operations in February, was with­ between mid-February and mid-May only three drawn in April for a period of special training successful U-boat attacks were made on our Tob­ and experiment, which lasted until the middle ruk shipping. of May. The enemy's other weapons—bombers and tor- The decisive effect on the campaign that these pedo-droppers—were concentrated in large num­ night-flying forces exercised later in the year, bers in bases in Crete, the Dodecanese and Cyre­ even when operating from Delta bases, shows only naica. To meet their threat the maximum fight­ too clearly the part they might have played at this er protection available was given to the convoys. stage in preventing the enemy's May offensive. From the middle of February to the opening of That, again, is one of the Middle East "might the enemy's May offensive a total of 2,630 fight­ have beens." As it was, the Egypt-hased. Albacores er sorties were flown on shipping protection, the were often out of range; Malta was under continu-. fortnightly figures rising steadily from 200 odd ous air attack; and it was out of the question to to near the 700 mark. withdraw even for a week.No. 39 Squadron's few The S.E. fighter situation had improved suf­ day-striking Beauforts for the training and the ficiently to allow the alllocation of some squadrons rest which the pilots, who had gained skill by a from the Desert to defence of the coast route and process of the survival of the fittest, so badly for special training in convoy escort. A second needed. Consequently, convoy after convoy steam­ Beaufighter squadron became available for Naval ed south from Italy, virtually unmolested, except co-operation work by the end of February and when within range of the magnificent, but over­ in May a third squadron was added. Naval liai­ worked, F.A.A. Albacores and iSwordfish based in son officers were also attached to fighter wings, Malta. For a time two Fortresses were available, but attempts to improve fighter direction by exer­ and their lack of coastal training was overcome cises with Naval vessels suffered continuously by attaching a Fleet Air Arm observer to each from the necessity of diverting the Beaufighters crew. On the whole, however, these two aircraft to road-straffing in Cyrenaica. achieved little in the way of concrete results. To deal with the mine menace, the Navy and R.A.F. worked together, and in the Sues Canal Safeguarding Supplies to Tobruk area the speciafl G.R.U. Wellington flight—the At the same time that the Navy and R.A.F. "flying magnets"—carried on the vital and dan­ were doing their utmost to damage the enemy's gerous work it had begun in 1941. supply position, they were making an equal effort to safeguard our own supplies coming up t sault on Malta Tobruk. The ^ « e these convoy attacking and convoy pro- available weai operations went on in the Mediterranean

116 between mid-February and mid-May* I^dlta en- ' more aircraft through to Egypt in March, April dured its darkest hour. The debt owed to Malta's and May than during the three quieter preceding defenders during this period is uncalculable, for months. After 10th May Malta enjoyed compa­ our position in the Mediterranean would have be­ rative immunity from heavy attack until the come immeasurably worse if the island had been equally abortive Axis offensives opened up in the overborne. As it was, Malta's effective bomber following July and October. striking power ceased almost entirely after the first week in March. Nothing, however, could Efforts to Relieve Malta subdue Malta's defence—not even when over 400 During this spring offensive only one attempt enemy sorties were put up against the island in could be made to provision Malta. A movement a single day. The timely arrival of Spitfires in February had met with disaster and none of from March onwards—particularly the arrival the three merchant vessels that left Alexandria and immediate employment of over 50 on 9th reached its destination. No further convoy was and 10th May—added to the unconquerable spirit sent until 20th-23rd March. of the pilots, turned the scale in our favour. This time the land forces were brought into The enemy had begun to put the screw on the picture to stage a feint attack with four Malta early in the year, sending over some 2,000 strong armoured columns against enemy positions sorties in a month. Now, however, in the three and landing grounds with the object of diverting months from the middle of February, approxi­ the enemy's attention from the convoy by leading mately 10,560 sorties were flown. Over half these him to think that a full-scale offensive was im­ sorties—5,715—were flown in the month of April minent. The R.A.F. provided widespread recon­ during the climax of the assault. In one week in naissance, strategic bombing of airfields in Crete that month 1,638 enemy sorties were made and and Greece, as effective fighter cover as possible on the peak day—the 7th—400 sorties. and, in addition, reconnaissance, fighter and bom­ In Malta's period of extreme crisis at the end ber support for the land operation. During the of April, the island was perilously near the limit passage one merchant vessel was sunk and three of its endurance. Fighter losses were extremely escorting destroyers were badly damaged. All serious; during the month 23 Spitfires and 18 ships except one, however, made harbour on the Hurricanes were destroyed and 57 Spitfires and 23rd. From the 24th to the 26th the enemy made 30 Hurricanes damaged. A.A. gunners were res­ repeated efforts to destroy the convoy as it un­ tricted to fifteen rounds per gun per day. Run­ loaded. The merchant vessels escaped until the ways were cratered and repaired—and prompt­ 26th, when all three were set on fire, two of them ly cratered again. The little equipment that re­ sinking. mained was in constant danger of being destroy­ This was the last Malta convoy movement until ed. " There was always a chance that the R.D.F. mid-June when an attempt was made to reduce and wireless stations might be written off, making enemy interference by running convoys concur­ it impossible to operate fighters with any effi­ rently from Alexandria and the United Kingdom. ciency. To avoid almost certain damage or des­ In addition to the spring convoy movement, a truction, delivery aircraft intended for the Middle raid was made on 15th March on the Italian East had to be passed on, with relief crews, the island of Rhodes, in the Dodecanese, with the same night that they arrived, and even then there object of relieving the pressure on Malta by was no guarantee that they would not be damaged drawing part of the enemy's air strength away by intruders. from Sicily to Crete, for fear of similar attacks. Fortunately, the enemy could not keep up a For the bombardment the Navy despatched hundred per cent pressure all the time—his crews two cruisers and six destroyers. The R.A.F. needed rest and his aircraft servicing—and his air gave them protection during daylight with Beau- activity fell off noticeably after the end of April, fighters operating from Edcu, east of Alexandria, apart from a brief resumption of attack in May and Nicosia, in Cyprus; F.A.A. Albacores illumi­ when vain attempts were made to destroy the nated the target; and the R.A.F. carried out diver­ Spitfire reinforcements as soon as they flew in sionary bombing with Wellingtons and Blenheims from the carriers. of Cretan airfields immediately before and dur­ There is no doubt, however, that, partly at ing the Naval bombardment. Everything went least, the enemy succeeded in his object, for he according to plan, although the Albacores had was able to build up enough material in the difficulty in spotting the fall of the shells owing Desert to risk a drive for Egypt on 26th May. to low cloud. It cannot be said, however, that Malta, during the three previous months, could the operation achieved its real object — indeed, make no more than 22 sorties against shipping air attacks on Malta grew in intensity. in transit and could claim only five ships damag­ ed, although three merchantmen were sunk dur­ Ports and Bases Still Attacked ing an attack on Palermo harbour on 2nd/3rd While the campaign against the enemy's ship­ March. ping went on, there was no letting-up on that Although Malta's aircraft, however, were un­ other aspect of the Mediterranean war — the R.A.F's" attacks on ports andjsases, alll with the able to do more damage than this, the island lv was still very much on the map and even pasged^. . ""*" 'P position.

117 As was only to be expected, by far the greater signmenTT Wiew days later, was in connection part of the effort had to be put up by aircraft with the big Malta convoy movement. Subse­ based in Egypt. Against ports and bases in Cy­ quently, their main task was the pounding of the renaica, Greece and Crete they flew 762 medium enemy's supply bases, continuing the work that and light bomber sorties. Of these the great had for so long been carried on almost unaided majority — 695 sorties, including 67 on mine- by those old faithfuls of the Middle East, the laying — were directed against Benghazi, which Wellingtons. the enemy used in preference to Tripoli, since it was nearer to the forward area. Lessons of the June Malta Convoy Malta could muster only 59 sorties against The Malta convoy attempt in June was timed ports and bases — and of these 57 wer,e flown to take place between the 14th and 18th, when before 8th March, by which time the equivalent the enemy had his hands* full in the Desert. The of "rain stopped play" had occurred. Before plan was to pass convoys simultaneously from operations became impossible, Wellingtons made the east and west, hoping that a least one part 41 bombing and mine-laying sorties against Tri­ would have a good chance of getting through. poli and sixteen — on the night of 2nd/3rd March Every effort was made to safeguard the convoys, — against Palermo. and a Combined Operations Room was set up In this mission against Palermo 26 tons of at No. 201 Group's H.Q., where the C.-in-C, Me­ bombs were dropped mainly on a large convoy diterranean, and the A.O.C.-in-C. could co-or­ that was assembling there. It was outstandingly dinate operations from Egypt and Malta. In the successful and helped to compensate for the many event, two out of the four merchant vessels from disappointments. Subsequent photographic re­ the Gibraltar side made harbour;, none of the connaissance revealed two 6,000 ton ships and seven from the east arrived, because, threatened one of 2,000 tons sunk in the harbour, the su­ by a powerful Italian naval force, the convoy perstructure and outlines being visible above the had to be turned back to Alexandria. water. A 9,000 ton vessel, set on fire by a This enemy force — two battleships, four crui­ direct hit, was seen to be unloading on to another sers and eight destroyers — was attacked from ship. the night of the 14/15th by successive strikes of Wellingtons and Beauforts, and by Liberators and The Enemy Resumes the Attack Beauforts in a synchronised high-level bombing The stage was now set for the enemy offensive. and low-level torpedo attack. A number of In spite of the great efforts made to damage the bomb and torpedo hits were claimed, and on the Axis supply position, when the attack came on 17th a Malta reconnaissance aircraft spotted the 26th May, the enemy was able to sweep forward whole force back in Taranto, less one cruiser to within 60 miles of Alexandria by the begin­ which was seen to sink by one of our submarines. ning of July. By then, however, he had outrun Although this convoy movement ended in disap­ his strength and there was not sufficient punch pointment, the experiences gained were not wast­ left in him to carry him into the Delta. ed. From subsequent discussions of the opera­ The enemy's advance gave him, theoretically, a tion important improvements were later made greater advantage in the Mediterranean than he in the procedure for the control of fighters from had ever possessed before. He could use To­ ships and in the co-ordination of Fleet R.D.F. in bruk, after its capture on 21st June, as a for­ fighter control and gun control. Use of "rodster" ward supply base; he could route his ships well in the shadowing aircraft to home the low-level east of Malta's aircraft range, through the Co­ A.S.V. Beauforts to the vicinity of the target rinth Canal and via Crete to Tobruk, the last was effectively proved; in the synchronised strike lap short enough to be covered in one night and by the Beauforts and Liberators, the "rooster" two brief daylight periods, during the latter of in the Maryland that led the Beauforts was pick­ ,which fighter protection could be given; he could ed up at 50 miles range and the aircraft homed also bring material up by road, rail and small to within three miles. Another point made was coas,t-crawling craft; he denied us the use of the the inadequacy of 500 lb. bombs when used — landing grounds between Tobruk and Daba as as they were by the Liberators — against capital reconnaissance and forward striking bases; and ships; it was considered that with 2,000 lb. gave, by his speedy advance, the added disad­ bombs a severe defeat might well have been in­ vantage to our ship-striking forces that they flicted on the Italian fleet. As it was, the never knew when they might have to fold their damage caused by the aircraft and bombs avail­ tents and move to bases even further back. able proved once more that a naval force, with­ Nevertheless, although we seemed to be up out strong fighter protection, is at the mercy of against it, June had its brighter side in the sea bombers and torpedo-bombers if the attacks are battle. This month saw the lean period about pressed home with determination. to end and the first concrete results brought by This occasion in June was the last time that the months of specialisation and training. An­ the Italian fleet put to sea in any strength. other event in June was the advent of the Ame­ rican heavy bombers into the Mediterranean Sinkings during the Lean Months area. After theif^^ebu^ asainst the Ploesti oil- On paper, the record of definite sinkings of fields on the 111 "kips during the months from "Crusader" to the end of June, 1942, does not seem impres­ The striking power of the R.A.F. was by now sive. The disadvantages, however, under which greatly enhanced by the development of A.S.V. the R.A.F. and F.A.A. suffered during the lean technique — in its infancy a year ago — for months must be borne in mind. As the result finding the quarry and, for attacking the quar­ of air attacks the following claims were made: ry after it was found, the development of long- (a) Merchant vessels sunk 5 range night torpedo-bombing. No. 38 Squadron's (b) Merchant vessels probably sunk ... 10 Wellingtons, after their period of training and (c) Merchant vessels damaged 69 experiment in the early summer, had got well (d) Merchant vessels (results unknown) 116 into their stride by July. Thanks to the night (e) Naval vessels sunk 5 searching and striking force, at last paying (f) Naval vessels probably sunk 8 dividends for the long period of trial and error, (g) Naval vessels damaged 34 enemy convoys were safe neither by night nor (h) Naval vessels (results unknown) ... 90 by day. In the same period units of the Royal Navy — Some idea of the amazing improvement in normally submarines — had this record:— technique is shown by the fact that between (a) Merchant vessels sunk 61 the opening of the enemy's May offensive and (b) Merchant vessels probably sunk ... 14 the end of June, aircraft based in Egypt and (c) Merchant vessels damaged 13 Malta accounted for only one ship definitely sunk; (d) Naval vessels sunk 29 in July and August they sent sixteen Axis ships (e) Naval vessels probably sunk 5 to the bottom and probably sank another fifteen. The Navy added 23 sunk. Thus, at a time when (f) Naval vessels damaged 13 the enemy was gathering his strength for a final The improvement in the number of sinkings in attempt to reach the Delta — that abortive of­ the next period was to be, by comparison, almost fensive that began on the last night in August startling. At the end of June, the month that and failed after five days — supplies that might had looked so black, the tide was about to turn. have made his offensive harder to check did not reach him. THE TIDE TURNS Malta's aircraft, which in May and June had (July, 1942, to June, 1943) flown twice as many sorties as those based in THE MONTHS OF July and August, although Egypt and had attacked four times as many still critical as regards the land situation, were ships, had to take second place in July, as enemy the turning point in the sea war in the Mediter­ shipping normally passed outside their range. ranean. Once the lines had stabilized at El Ala­ However, they still struck when they could — mein in July, the supply war began in earnest. and waited until the enemy ships were once It was absolutely vital to smash the enemy's more driven within their reach as the VHIth supplies before he could gather strength to re­ Army advanced in the autumn. sume his offensive and while we were preparing Attacks on Coastal Ctaft our counter-offensive. Already in July there were signs that the One of the most notable features of the July- enemy was not happy about his supply position August period was the smashing of the enemy's and was living largely on the material captured attempt to run supplies up the coast from To­ from us during his forward drive. Nevertheless, bruk, to Mersa Matruh, the nearest possible point to the front line, in "F"-boats, the tank-landing a supreme effort was called for from the R.A.F. craft that can also carry motor vehicles, general and the Navy's submarines to prevent further cargo or troops. food, equipment, ammunition and fuel — parti­ cularly fuel — from coming up to the enemy's Between 20th July and 17th August 29 of these forward position. That supreme effort was made. craft were destroyed and many others probably Although they had the advantage of being able destroyed or damaged. The best results — se­ to use the shortest sea routes in the Mediterra­ venteen sunk — were obtained by A.S.V. Hud­ nean and were now mainly of small size, enemy sons, which reconnoitred the coast before dawn ships were stalked as patiently and relentlessly and, having found their prey, attacked from the as any deer in the Highlands. dark side during the first few minutes of half light, using 100 lb. bombs. Daylight attacks Improvement in Sinking Figures were made by Beaufighters, using cannon and No. 201 Group in July had its base at Ismailia, machine-guns, and by Bisleys using 250 lb. with advanced headquarters still at Alexandria. bombs, and other night attacks were made by For reconnaissance and strikes it could call on Swordfish and Albacores armed with bombs. Wellingtons, Beauforts, Hudsons, Sunderlands, The successes scored against coastal craft at Beaulighters and the F.A.A. Swordfish and Al­ this time forced the enemy in the middle of bacores, as well as bomber squadrons of No. 205 August to rely largely on road and rail transport Group and Western Desert fighter squadrons, as for carrying supplies up from Tobruk to the for­ ward area — and Beaufighters saw to it that this needed. A.H.Q., Egypt, still controlled the spe­ traffic, too, was given little peace. cial Wellington G.R.U. Flight, mine-spotting in 1 Another noteworthy achievement in July was the Suez area, and certain coastal-fighter and the night-fighter squadrons. torpedo Albacores, using a landing ground 150 lessons learned were later borne out in the high miles behind the enemy lines, against a convoy degree of anti-submarine protection given to our bound for Tobruk. This stratagem was neces­ sea-borne supplies during the subsequent ad­ sary in order to bring the Albacores within ef­ vance to Tunisia — and in the ever-increasing fective range, and to make it possible a ground punishment meted out to the U-boats. party and fuel for replenishing the aircraft's tanks were taken forward in Bombays flying Attacks on Harbours Continued south of the battle area below the Qattara De­ Apart from the shipping strikes, the R.A.F. pression. The Albacores made their surprise still gave the enemy no chance to carry on his attack, but disappointingly could not claim a harbour activities uninterrupted — and now the definite sinking. After the operation the whole American bombers really began to make their party was withdrawn safely — still undiscovered weight felt. Benghazi passed out of medium by the enemy. bomber range at the end of June, but the U.S.A.F. heavies could reach it, and did so to the extent Anti-Submarine Activity of some 200 sorties. At the same time that we were gaining the Tobruk was attacked allmost non-stop from the upper hand in the Mediterranean over the ene­ time of its capture in June to its recapture by us my's supply-carriers, both large and small, an­ in early November. In that period it experienc­ other menace was being vigorously tackled by ed no fewer than 3,526 effective bomber sorties the Navy and R.A.F. — the U-boat menace. and felt the weight of 4,250 tons of bombs. In The enemy's advance had brought about a addition to Tobruk and Benghazi, the smaller change in his submarine strategy. Before July ports of Sollum and Mersa Matruh were also vis­ U-boat effort was concentrated mainly against ited, and the heavy bombers went further afield our Western Desert supply routes; when El Ala­ to Suda Bay, Heraklion and Navarino. Of the 63 mein was reached enemy submarines began to vessels hit by bombing in the enemy's ports be­ make a nuisance of themselves in the Levant area. tween the end of June and the beginning of No­ They normally operated singly, confined most of vember, 40 were hit in Tobruk, eleven in Benghazi their attacks to the hours of darkness and seldom and another eleven in Mersa Matruh. attacked convoys that had an air escort. Sinkings of our shipping were, however, comparatively The curious thing was that, while we were giv­ light in the Mediterranean area — although sink­ ing the enemy's shipping and supply bases ali we ings were extremely serious, between May and had, we received comparatively little in exchange. November, off the East African coast, where Instead of turning heavy attacks, which he could enemy submarines were operating in packs of four well have done, on to our ports and bases—par­ )r five. ticularly Suez—the enemy preferred to employ his aircraft in protecting, or trying to protect, his From the enemy's advance in May up to the own convoys. Yet there was always a chance end of October, aircraft made 66 attacks on sub­ that the enemy might alter his policy and the marines, sinking two, probably sinking six and squadrons guarding our lines of communication damaging seventeen. Aircraft co-operated in in the Canal area, the Gulf of Aden, and the Per­ other attacks made by Naval units, which claim­ sian Gulf could never relax their vigilance. The ed eight destroyed and three damaged. work of these squadrons was often dull and mono­ The policy of No. 201 Group in anti-submarine tonous, but nevertheless had a vital place in the warfare had always to be governed by the num­ Mediterranean war. ber of aircraft it had available. The best use, however, was made of the resources at hand. Final Offensive on Malta Much economy in reconnaissance effort, for ins­ tance, was effected by instituting standard patrols The period from July onwards also saw the carried out by all operational aircraft flying be­ clouds lift from Malta. Since May, when the tween coastal landing grounds; aircraft were enemy called off his mammoth air offensive, the routed along the shipping lanes and crews kept island's aircraft had kept up their attacks on an eye open for any signs of submarines. Axis convoys; petrol had been too short to permit a land bombing programme, apart from a series It was never possible to provide close A/S of some 80/90 sorties flown at the end of May escort for all convoys by day and night. When and the beginning of June against Messina, Taran­ the areas in which submarines were active could, to, Naples, Augusta and Cagliari. From mid-June however, be accurately forecast by Naval intelli­ to mid-November all available fuel was needed to gence, those areas were immediately concentrat­ keep fighters, reconnaissance and ship-striking ed on. Any submarine contacted was continuous­ aircraft flying. ly hunted for some 48 hours by aircraft co-ope­ Malta's fighter pilots, now that Spitfires were rating with Naval surface forces. available in increasing numbers, never relaxed the The development of this combined procedure grip they obtained in May. When the enemy, by No. 201 Group and No. 235 Wing working in goaded by the continual attacks on his shipping, close harmony with the staff of the C.-in-C, took advantage of the lull at El Alamein in July Mediterranean, was the most important factor Ih to stage another air offensive, Malta's fighters this sphere of the Mediterranean activity. The smashed it in ten days. In those ten days Spit­ fires and Beaufighters accounted for 95 enemy officers were Sak to haveTbeen standingTo see The aircraft destroyed. After that the island enjoy­ ships come in. ed something it had not enjoyed for many long months—a quiet period of several days and nights The Naval Co-operation Wings Move Up without an alert. , As the VHIth Army pursued the Axis forces Before the final assault came in October, a westward in November, it was closely followed by convoy movement to Malta was attempted from the offensive and defensive Naval Co-operation the west, which had proved the lesser evil in June. Wings. Their task was to maintain a continuity Nine out of the fourteen merchant vessels that of operations against the receding enemy shipping passed Gibraltar on the night of 9/10th August routes, to protect our own sea-borne supplies and failed to arrive, but the 47,000 tons of food-stuffs, to assist the Navy in clearing the successive ports fuel and ammunition brought in by the remaining for the reception of our cargo vessels. British ships made the island's position temporarily and American bombers added to the enemy's sup­ easier. ply 'chaos by bombing ports and bases all along In October, the enemy, not expecting the Vlllth his line of retreat. Army's attack to materialise before December or When Tobruk was denied to the enemy after its January, once more" thought that the time was fall on 13th November, the continued otfensives 'ripe to put paid to Malta so that his convoys carried out by No. 247 Wine's aircraft forced the would not be molested on the western side. Malta's Benghazi and TripoZi-bound convoys westwards fighters thought otherwise. When the offensive into range of Malta. With the fall of Benghazi opened on the morning of the 11th with a few on the 19th, the enemy gave up trying to run the bombers attacking Hal Far, Spitfires met them. shorter Mediterranean gauntlet and endeavoured By the evening of the 19th, the enemy had lost to supply Tripoli by sending ships from the west 118 aircraft destroyed, 50 probably destroyed and along the Tunisian coast. From 21st November 137 damaged. For every British pilot lost the onwards Tripoli became the principal target of enemy had sacrificed fifteen members of air­ the R.A.F. and U.S.A.F. bombers. Mine-laying crews. in the enemy's ports and anchorages was extens­ There is no doubt that, in staging this final at­ ively carried out by No. 201 Group squadrons aft­ tack, the enemy once more underestimated Malta's er they had been deprived of shipping targets. ability to keep its Spitfires in the air and also To augment Malta's striking power, as the war overestimated the staying-power of his own pilots moved westward, units from No. 201 Group were and crews. German airmen captured in October transferred there. A Beaufighter squadron, a admitted that there was a general reluctance torpedo-Beaufort squadron and a F.A.A. squadron among the G.A.F. for flights anywhere near of torpedo-Albacores went over early in Novem­ Malta. This is easily understood. ber. These were followed before the end of the The enemy derived no benefit from this offens­ year by a Baltimore squadron, an A.S.V. Wel­ ive. There were more shipping strikes in the lington squadron and two squadrons of Welling­ ten days up to 20th October than in the previous ton torpedo-bombers. ten days, and on the only night when bombers did Meanwhile, with equal continuity of operations, not carry out shipping attacks, no enemy ship had anti-submarine and long-range fighter escorts been found within range of the island. were maintained from special mobile wings as our Next month Malta, for so long a thorn in the shipping routes extended to the west. By enemy's flesh, was to take up an offensive that January, 1943, a chain of Naval Co-operation increased in volume until in 1943 the island be­ units covered the seaways from Syria to Sirte. came the jumping-off place for the invasion of Similarly, in accordance with the procedure e­ Sicily. volved* from continued exercises in co-operation with the Navy during 1942, a chain of short-range The October Offensive Opens fighter sectors under A.H.Q., Egypt, with Naval Once the vmt h Army's offensive was under liaison officers, moved into position and provided way on 23rd October, there was no, doubt as to protection against the threat to our shipping which side had won the supply race. In the sum­ from aircraft based on the northern shores of the mer the enemy had been living largely on the Mediterranean. provender he had been able to grab from us dur­ The late autumn of 1942 also saw the develop­ ing his drive to El Alamein. Now in October, ment in Egypt of a new type of aircraft, the Ma­ through the efforts of the Royal Navy and the rauder, as a day torpedo-bomber. The squadron R.A.F., he was short of most essential items— flying them soon proved itself successful in trial and he was to be kept short as he fell back to operations in the Aegean Sea, before moving west Tripolitania. with most of the other ship-striking forces. Fuel was his most pressing problem. His tan­ kers had been the R.A.F's prize targets. None The Final Relief of Malta was allowed to reach Tobruk for six weeks before After the August convoy from the west, Malta our offensive opened, and the strikes culminated had to wait three months before the next move­ in a series of daring attacks on 26th October that ment could be made. As soon as the ground si­ annihilated a tanker and the rest or a convoy tuation permitted the risk to be taken, a sailing under the cliffs of Tobruk, on which high German was planned and four heavily-escorted merchant vessels left Port Said on the evening of 16th No­ The Position at the End of the Year vember. The enemy by then had his hands full in By the end of 1942, in the war in the Mediter­ the Desert and no damage was done to the convoy. ranean the Axis had been completely outfought The 28,000 tons of supplies brought in were multi­ and a sufficiently formidable force had been built plied when ten more ships arrived in December. up to ensure that we remained on top. The few Convoys now made the passage almost without aircraft at the disposal of No. 201 Group when it incident and ships, as soon as they were unload­ became the Naval Co-operation Group in the ed, returned safely to Egypt for re-loading. Pos­ autumn of 1941 had grown in fifteen months into session of the Cyrenaican landing grounds once a highly-trained specialist force — largely based more enabled maximum air cover to be given and in Malta — comprising:— Malta was strong enough to counter any threat 1 Baltimore Reconnaissance Squadron. from aircraft based in Sicily or Southern Italy. 2 Beaufort Torpedo-Bomber Squadrons. By the end of December, Malta's aircraft had 1 Marauder Torpedo-Bomber Squadron. the fuel and ammunition with which to pay off 1 Wellington Night Reconnaissance Squadron. old scores against the enemy. The island's "dark 2 Wellington Night Torpedo-Bomber Squadrons. days" were over and the formidable air force be­ 2 A.S.V. Albacore Torpedo-Bomber Squadrons. ing built up there was ready to turn from defence 1 A.S.V. Sunderland Squadron. to offence. Already, on the night of 7/8th No­ 1 A.S.V. Hudson Squadron. vember, Wellingtons specially sent over from 1 A.S.V. Walrus Squadron. Egypt had begun operations in support of the 2 Bisley Squadrons. North-west African campaign by the first of a 1 Wellington. Minesweeping Flight. long series of attacks on targets in Tunisia, Si­ 1 Wellesley Flight. cily and Sardinia. Spitfires and Beaufighters, 3 Beaufighter Fleet Protection Squadrons. too, in shooting down in November and Decem­ ber over 70 of the transport aircraft on which The significance of the growth of this balanced the enemy largely relied to rush men and material reconnaissance, shipping-strike, anti-submarine over to Africa, were beginning the orgy of des­ and fighter protection force is borne out by the truction of airborne traffic that was to reach a fact that, as soon as the VIIIth Army's offensive climax in the following April. began, the enemy was denied safe passage for his supply ships, the immense sea-borne tonnage vital Bombing from Three Sides to our land and air forces in their advance was un­ loaded at successive ports at a speed exceeding all Towards the end of 1942 we had the advantage expectations, and convoys reached Malta almost of being able to harass the enemy's supply lines unscathed. All this was achieved in the from three sides—from Cyrenaica, from Malta face of still powerful enemy air forces in the and from North-west Africa. This advantage, Dodecanese, Crete, Sicily and Southern Italy, the in addition to making the running of Axis con­ ever-present menace of U-boats and the immense voys more precarious than ever, gave us fresh potential threat of the Italian Battle Fleet. bases from which to bomb departure and arrival From the beginning of July up to the end of ports. ll942, the R.A.F's record of sinkings added up to As a rule, aircraft from the North-west Afri­ a substantial figure:— can side operated by day throughout December (a) Merchant vessels sunk 27 against the Tunisian ports, while MaZta-based (b) Merchant vessels probably sunk ... 29 bombers carried out night attacks. Tunis was the (c) Merchant vessels damaged 108 most heavily attacked point, daylight raids by (d) Merchant vessels (results unknown) 96 American Fortresses and Liberators beginning (e) Naval vessels sunk 4 on 6th December. Day attacks on Bizerta were (f) Naval vessels probably sunk 4 frequent and towards the end of December Sous­ (g) Naval vessels damaged 28 se and h'fax were also bombed from the three sides. ' (h) Naval vessels (results unknown) ... 53 Naval submarine and surface forces between On 27th December the port of Sousse had the distinction of being bombed in the morning by them g'ained the following successes :— Algerian-based Fortresses; in the afternoon by (a) Merchant vessels sunk 65 Liberators from Egypt and Albacores from Mal­ (b) Merchant vessels probably sunk ... 4 ta; and during the night again by Egypt-based (c) Merchant vessels damaged 8 Liberators. (d) Naval vessels sunk 10 (e) Naval vessels damaged 6 Nevertheless, in spite of our attacks on his bases and shipping lanes, the enemy was able, Changes in the New Year with the material flown across by a fleet of In January, 1943, there was little doubt of the some 300 transport aircraft added to that brought final outcome of the war in Africa. Once the in the ships that eluded our vigilance, to keep enemy had been driven from his Buerat dine on his forces more or less adequately supplied. 15th January he hardly paused in his retreat for There was to be no question of bundling the over a month. Tripoli fell on the 23rd, the last enemy out of Africa until the full pressure from Germans were across the Tunisian border by 6th east and west could be brought to bear in 1943. February and by 21st February the main Mareth defences were reached. Afte/ tfre Mareth Line strain was thrown on the" vl had been "outflanked late in March, the end was it down the west coast of Italy. in sight, although there was to be much stiff In addition to being used as a dumping-ground fighting before the final collapse of the Axis for­ for Africa, Sicily—even before the Axis debacle ces on 14th May. in May—had to be stocked against the possibility The first three months of 1943 saw a number of invasion. In this connection the ports of Ca­ of developments in the Mediterranean, including tania, Augusta and Syracuse on the east coast changes in the operational command of the Allied were employed. Two 10,000 ton tankers, for in­ air forces. As far as the sea war was concerned, stance, were known to be operating, one between the chief changes were (a) the establishment of Naples and Catania and the other between Taran­ the Mediterranean Air Command 'as a combined to and Augusta. R.A.F. and U.S.A.F. operational H.Q. to co-ordin­ ate all air effort in the Mediterranean area, and Shipping Strikes Continued (b) the expansion of A.H.Q., Egypt, to A.H.Q., In the first half of 1943, bombers, torpedo- Air Defences, Eastern Mediterranean, responsible bombers and fighters from the three sides carried for protecting the coastline and convoys from Tri­ on the good work against shipping. politania to the Levant. Beyond Tripolitania the There were one or two changes in the aircraft work of A.H.Q., A.D.E.M., was taken up by the employed and other developments. At the be­ North-west African Coastal Air Force, whose ginning of the year, Malta's R.N.A. Squadrons responsibility stretched as far as French Morocco. ceased to use their Swordfish—for so long one With most of its aircraft transferred to Malta, of the most familiar sights in the Mediterranean No. 201 Group, which had for so long borne the —and relied entirely on Albacores for strikes. heat and burden of the day in the Mediterranean, Special armed night searches were laid on in the Sicilian Narrows by Malta Albacores, Wel­ went into semi-retirement. In January and Feb­ lingtons and Beauforts, some carrying torpedoes, ruary the Group was responsible for no fighter other bombs. Towards the end of January Mal­ •or day bomber operations; only two sorties on ta's Mosquitoes began to be employed in cannon night attacks—one by a Baltimore and one by a and machine-gun attacks on shipping, and Beau- Marauder; and only fifteen day torpedo strikes— fighters and Spitfires joined in whenever they had exclusively by Marauders. a chance. Mosquitoes also contributed indirectly Apart from protective work, No. 201 Group's towards the success of shipping strikes by intrud­ activity was now confined largely to the Aegean er raids on Sicilian airfields designed to tie down Sea area. The Axis garrisons in Crete and the enemy night-fighter activity. Greek islands were kept supplied by material The majority of attacks by MaZta-based Wel­ brought over in caiques, schooners and small mer­ lingtons, Beauforts and Albacores continued to chant vessels ranging in size from 100 to 800 be made at night, while from the North-west Af­ tons. Wellingtons, Baltimores, Beaufighters and, rican side Mitchells, Marauders, Fortresses and until they were withdrawn at the end of February, Liberators—usually escorted by Lightnings—con­ Marauders bombed and straffed these craft. Be­ centrated mainly on day bombing strikes. As a tween January and June they made approximate­ rule, aircraft from North-west Africa watched the ly 300 sorties and sank or probably sank over 30 route across the Sicilian Narrows to Tunisia; Mal­ assorted vessels and damaged some 30 others. ta's aircraft attended to the eastern end of the channel and the coasts of east Sicily and the toe Enemy Shipping Routes Restricted of Italy. In 1943 the enemy woke up to the unpleasing With the greater number of bombers at their fact that only a fraction of the Mediterranean was disposal, tactics were often used by the N.A.A.F. open to his shipping. Even that fraction was as that could not be used by Malta. These consist­ fraught with danger as the Brighton road on a ed of formations of fifteen-twenty strongly escort­ peacetime Bank Holiday. ed aircraft pattern bombing from 5/10,000 feet with 500 lb. bombs. Considerable success was Already at the beginning of January any route claimed for these tactics, both in attacks on ship­ east of Malta had been given up as a bad job ping in transit and in harbour. and the fall of Tripoli on 23rd January made little A feature of the period from April onwards was difference to the enemy's supply situation, since the anti-shipping activity of Kittyhawk and War- its value as an off-loading port ceased at the hawk fighter-bombers of the Western Desert Air end of 1942. Now, in the new year, even the di­ Force around Cape Bon and in the Gulf of Tunis. rect route from Naples to Tunis or Bizerta was Their best day was 30th April when they sank made too hot by our strikes from Malta or North­ a destroyer, a 1,500 ton merchant vessel, an es­ west Africa. The bulk of Axis material was cort vessel, a Siebel ferry and an "F"-boat, as first brought over to Sicily by sea or rail, and wettl as damaging other craft. from Palermo or Trapani ships—mainly small craft,,of which the enemy still had a large fleet- Altogether in the first half of 1943 aircraft of were run under cover of darkness to the Gulf of the Middle East and Malta Commands (including Tunis. the Ninth U.S.A.F.) accounted for :— Messina, the terminus of the train-ferry, was (a) Merchant vessels sunk 14 naturally humming with activity and a great (b) Merchant vessels probably sunk ... 47 (c) Merchant vessels damaged ...... 79 • the defe"nees*cPMpa restricted space as a small (d) Merchant vessels (results unknown) 71 island can be reduced to impotence. (e) Naval vessels sunk 8 (f) Naval vessels probably sunk 7 Guarding Our Own Supply Lines (g) Naval vessels damaged 9 For our part, the VHIth Army's supply line (h) Naval vessels (results unknown) ... 17 was never in any danger of being cut all the way from Egypt to Tunisia. Having learned from the In this period far more successes were claimed past, the deliberate policy was to fight the cam­ by aircraft operating from the North-west Afric­ paign at our own speed and to consolidate our sup­ an side. Since figures from this side have not plies before taking the next fence. In the six previously been included, they are now given as months up to the end of June aircraft from Egypt from the opening of the campaign on 8th Novem­ and Cyrenaica flew 3,844 sorties on area and ber, 1942, until the end of June, 1943. During close cover searches for submarines and 12,329 these months the R.A.F. and U.S.A.F. claimed 136 fighter sorties on shipping protection. In the same ships of alll types sunk, 90 probably sunk and period Malta's aircraft contributed 283 sorties on 150 damaged. Many of these were, of course, anti-submarine reconnaissance and 1,434 sorties small craft. Of the merchant shipping attacked, by fighters on shipping protection. Malta's res­ the estimated gross tonnage was 128,400 sunk, ponsibility increased in June as calls were made 159,800 probably sunk and 299,600 damaged. for extra cover to protect the convoys bringing In the first six months of the year surface and invasion material to the island for use against submarine craft of the Royal Navy had the fol­ Sicily. lowing record :— Our life-line was also protected by the G.R.U. (a) Merchant vessels sunk 74 Wellingtons, which followed close behind the (b) Merchant vessels probably sunk ... 8 Vmth Army. In collaboration with Naval mine­ (c) Merchant vessels damaged 12 sweepers, they cleared the waters of the harbours (d) Naval vessels sunk 6 often within a matter of hours of their being (e) Naval vessels damaged 5 evacuated by the enemy. Attacks on Railways and Supply Ports The Position at the End of June, 1943 With the enemy on the defensive, British and Over three years had now passed since Italy American bombers backed up the shipping strikes took the plunge — that plunge which caused a in preventing him from consolidating his supplies. splash large enough to engulf the Italian African As already indicated, he had been forced to trans­ empire. What else had happened in those years? port a great deal of material by rail and train- The Axis grand strategy — a vast movement ferry to Sicily in order to cut down the sea pas­ sweeping through Russia and the Middle East sage to a minimum. To hamper this supply flow, and so joining up with Japan advancing trium­ Malta sent its Mosquitoes, Beaufighters and Spit­ phantly from the east — had vanished as all other fires on "train-busting" missions, a job which all Nazi dreams will vanish. Instead of the hoped- types—especially the Mosquitoes—found to their for triumph, the Axis fortress faced the prospect liking. Between the beginning of January and of invasion, which was to be realized when British the end of June, Malta's aircraft put over 160 lo­ and American troops landed in Sicily in July. comotives in Italy and Sicily out of action and in Exactly how far the fight in the Mediterranean their straffing and bombing attacks undoubtedly helped to turn the tables will, of course, never be destroyed a vast amount of war material being carried by rail. In addition, they damaged many known. All that can be said is that, without the station buildings, goods yards and warehouses. effort put up by the Royal Navy and the Allied air forces in the sea war, the task of the land Against the supply ports in Italy, Sicily and forces would have been an impossible one. The North Africa the volume of attack by R.A.F. and work of each service is complementary to the U.S.A.F. mounted steadily. Naples (still the prin­ work of the others. cipal embarkation base), Messina (the junction From the sea war itself the irrefutable fact has of the Sicilian train-ferry), Palermo, Cagliari in emerged that, at least in a confined area such as Sardinia (which was also being stocked against the Eastern Mediterranean, the side with the best possible invasion) and, before the Axis collapse and strongest air force, working in harmony with in Africa, Tunis, Bizerta, Pousse, Sfax and Ferry- a reduced naval force, decides the issue. ville—these were the most visited targets. The No better proof of the truth of this—nor better dropping of mines, too, lessened the chances of proof of which side finally ruled the Mediterra­ supplies reaching their destination. Every attack nean waves — can be given than this extract knocked another nail into the Axis coffin. from the official Italian newspaper, "Giornale d'l­ The capture of the islands of Pantelleria and talia". Excusing the non-appearance of the Ita­ Lampedusa on 11th and 13th June respectively, lian fleet to defend Italian territory, it says: "This after being subjected to almost non-stop bombard­ war has shown that the navy cannot move about ment from the air as well as shelling from the freely to engage the enemy navy without the sea, showed another aspect of the uses to which support of adequate air cover. The enemy fleet air power can be put. Without air protection— is operating under the coyer of massed air forces." which Malta possessed Where was "Mare Nostrum" now? THE FIEST EMPLOYMENT of the South African strengthened by the advent of German troops and Air Force during the present war was in the armour, with the consequent withdrawal of our land forces—which had been depleted on behalf Abyssinian campaign, and when these operations of Greece—back to the Egyptian frontier. were drawing to a successful conclusion in April, The first S.A.A.F. bomber squadron to operate 1941, it was decided to implement the decision, in the Middle East was No, 24, flying Marylands. taken earlier in the year, to employ South Afri­ They participated with R.A.F. squadrons in the can squadrons in the Western Desert. defence of Crete between 23rd and 26th May, and No. 1 Fighter Squadron was the first S.A.A.F. a fair amount of damage was inflicted between squadron to arrive in Egypt in April, 1941, and those dates on enemy aircraft at Maleme; one was at once employed on the defence of Alexan­ Maryland was lost in these operations and three dria. Further squadrons followed quickly and damaged. The squadron was then engaged, due from that time onwards the story of the S.A.A.F. to our lack of long range fighters, oh shipping is closely interw&ven with that of the R.A.F. cover to vessels carrying out the evacuation. The arrival of these air force reinforcements nexj really active employment of the S.A. waV'opportune. * ^^!®ffS?2 \ :S^|SWd"whe^theVheT^ p wai" enlistelitd dd dur­ losses in Greece; tfe %tt#pl| in, Cf ^/^fS & ii& m J-feattleaxe" operation which opened in nent; the Italian f^r^e ttCy^t :^ ¥'t \I W-1% T the Western Desert on 15th June, 5efoTe~TTie offensive opened Bostons of re-establishing land communication "with Vo­ were successfully used on Tac/R for the first bruk and the re-occupation of Halfaya, Sollum time. and Capuzzo. The offensive lasted three days Special stress was laid on the fact that "Cru­ and finally failed owing to the enemy's superiPi­ sader", was primarily a land battle and that the strength in tanks. Nos. 1 and 2 S.A.A.F. Squa­ main role of the Allied Air Forces was to be one drons flying Hurricanes, and No. 24 Squadron of Army co-operation. Fundamentally their with Marylands, made their debut during this task, in which the S.A.A.F. played a vital part, period in intensive Western Desert operations was that of winning and maintaining air supe­ against a numerically superior enemy air force. riority in order that our troops should operate In spite of the odds against us, however, the unhampered by air attack. R.A.F., assisted by the S.A.A.F., were able, first, to provide the umbrella requested by our land The fortunes of our land forces fluctuated con­ forces, and later to hinder the advance of the siderably between 18th November and 8th De­ enemy's armour and M.T. while our troops with­ cember, until, after three weeks of most persistent drew to their former positions. Inevitably, ca­ and aggressive fighting on the part of our troops, sualties were heavy, and No. 1 S.A.A.F. Squa­ the enemy began to withdraw to Gazala. This dron lost nine Hurricanes and seven pilots in was the first stage of this retreat which finally four days. halted, in the middle of January, 1942, at Agheila. In addition to inflicting considerable damage The Long Lull to the enemy on the ground during November and A long lull in the Western Desert followed our December, the S.A.A.F. shot down 60 enemy air­ abortive offensive. It was broken on 14th Sep­ craft in combat, bringing the total tally for 1941 tember by an armoured reconnaissance in up to 102 enemy aircraft destroyed. In the same strength by the enemy with the object of testing period sorties totalled 5,972. our defences. The column advanced as far as These results were not achieved without loss. Rabia, south of Sidi Barrani, but was caught During November and December S.A.A.F. Units while refuelling in the vicinity of Alam Dignaish suffered numerous casualties to aircraft, involv­ by Marylands of Nos. 12 and 24 S,A.A.F. Squa­ ing 106 aircrew personnel killed, missing or pri­ drons who dropped 20 tons of bombs from 6,000 soners of war. The most severe losses sustained feet, scoring direct hits and starting many fires by individual squadrons in single operations oc­ among the vehicles. The same squadrons re­ curred on 20th November when No. 21 Squadron turned to the attack three times later in the day, had four out of nine Marylands shot down and a thus foreshadowing the famous shuttle service of fifth badly damaged by ME. 109s during an at­ 1942, and by the accuracy of their bombing in­ tack on enemy tank concentrations at El Adem, flicted such damage that the enemy column aban­ and on 10th December when five out of six Bos­ doned further progress and withdrew to the fron­ tons of No. 12 Squadron were shot down by twelve tier positions on the next day. The last attack to sixteen ME.109s, after bombing retreating was made by a formation of 24 Marylands escort­ enemy transport. Although the cost in the latter ed by Hurricanes, who encountered some twelve operation was heavy, it marked a definite step ME.109s and several G.50s over the objective. forward in the employment of light bombers, as In the ensuing combat the Hurricanes destroyed it was realised that we could no longer afford to one ME.109, one G.50 and probably destroyed a employ them in daylight without fighter protec­ second ME.109. One Maryland and three Hur­ tion — a decision which had far-reaching results ricanes were lost. and paid handsome dividends. The lull then continued until the opening of Commenting on the work of the S.A.A.F. dur­ our "Crusader" offensive in November. During ing "Crusader," Air Chief Marshal Tedder wrote: this quiet period opportunity was taken to accli­ "Special recognition is due to the S.A.A.F. Squa­ matise the S.A.A.F. to desert conditions and to drons whose attacks have undoubtedly been a build up the strength of the force. The final vital element in reducing the enemy's air strength. closure of the Abyssinian campaign in November Photographs have proved the cool-headed preci­ released a large number of experienced personnel sion of their bombing, even more than confirmed for transfer to the Middle East. examination of the effects on the ground. Their achievements have been remarkable." The "Crusader" Offensive The "Crusader" offensive, designed primarily After "Crusader" to destroy the Axis armoured forces in Cyrenai­ The "Crusader" offensive virtually finished ca, opened on 18th November, 1941. The S.A. with the enemy's withdrawal to Agheila. On 21st A.F. strength in the desert at this time consist­ January, however, Axis forces began a three-day ed of Nos. 1, 2 and 4 Fighter Squadrons with reconnaissance in strength to test our forward Hurricanes and Tomahawks, No. 3 Wing control­ elements. These they found to be , extremely ling Nos. 12, 21 and 24 Bomber Squadrons with weak due, among other^ factors, to supply diffi­ Marylands and Bostons, a Flight of J£imv 16 going. Seizing with No. 40 Army Co-operation S le enemy turned his No. 60 Photographic Survey Squadri Ive, greatly assisted

126 by captured dumps of material, and the next five weeks saw the British and Imperial Forces fall­ and contacts ^ ing back to defensive positions at G^azq^a, ,j%hich,. : .^ monthij.,16%( sorties' were prepared in de^Q: *$Mj &&.$. #$L f | f\ f S%ujadrf nl; i|ight enemy great part in slowing §p, fti^ e^r| l | twO^proba^b^ destroyed and five ^ and Nos. 1 and 4 s!E.l.Pv]-s|uadr^ns ,dldi.tJief ;vXlofes. of;thlr|!een in combats against odds' _^ fair share of the woiMn- #*ound«straffing 'and and four enemy aircraft to one S.A.A.F. on many aerial combat. No. 2 S.A.A.F. Squadron was em­ occasions- The loss in S.A.A.F. personnel was, ployed on protective shipping patrols over sup­ however, light; three pilots were killed, three ply convoys to Tobruk% The S.A.A.F. light bom­ missing- and two wounded. ber squadrons, however, had been withdrawn from operations at the end of 1941 for training, No. 1 Squadron was withdrawn from the reorganisation on a three Flight basis and for Western Desert on 11th April for a rest and aircraft overhaul due to excessive oil consump­ change of employment in the Delta area, their tion on the Boston; they were not, therefore, main occupation being shipping patrols, assisted available during this period. by No. 5 Squadron, equipped with Tomahawks. The latter squadron had arrived in the Middle Stalemate in the Desert East during February and commenced covering protection on 2nd March. Their first success From the end of February until 26th May there was registered on the 5th, with the destruction was another lull in the land fighting, while both of one JU.88. They followed this up on the 11th armies built up their strength for a resumption by destroying one JU.88, and damaging three of the offensive. others and a Heinkel, out of an enemy force of Between January and early May Bostons under five aircraft which attempted to attack our ship­ No. 3 S.A.A.F. Wing flew only 219 sorties, mainly ping. owing to the lack of suitable light bomber targets Other S.A.A.F. reinforcements to arrive during and unfavourable weather conditions. Intensive this quiet quarter were Nos. 7 and 15 Squadrons. training for both day and night bombing, however, No. 7 Squadron was employed first in dropping continued, for it became increasingly clear that "sticky" bombs and later, equipped with Hurri­ suitable targets for light bombers in daylight in cane IIDs, became a tank-buster squadron. the forward area could be found only during a No. 15 Squadron, with Bisleys and Blenheims, fluid battle when concentrated targets were pre­ was employed on General Reconnaissance. A sented. The scale of effort by the Bostons in­ detachment also operated from Kufra Oasis creased during March, their attention being given to the Martuba landing grounds with the object No. 40, now a complete S.A.A.F. Squadron, con­ of putting the enemy air forces on the defensive tinued their Tac/R work for 30 Corps, providing and weakening their increasing attacks on our valuable information for our land forces, espe­ lines of communication. On 21st March two Bos­ cially the 7th Armoured Division. Owing to in­ tons from No. 12 Squadron were shot down re­ creasing enemy fighter activity with the object turning from a raid on Barce. On the next day of denying us this information — in April the No. 24 Squadron lost three Bostons over Martu­ squadron lost five aircraft — experimental chan­ ba, although two of the creNvs escaped safely. ges in tactics were made, and it was finally de­ These attacks were abandoned after 28th March, cided that every Tac/R aircraft should be escort­ as owing to the increase in enemy A.A. fire it was ed by a second aircraft constantly weaving. On decided that daylight raids were no longer profi­ 28th April a Hurricane escorted in this way by table. However, by that time the enemy's air of­ a Tomahawk was attacked by four M.E.109s in fensive had, temporarily, been much slowed down. the Tengeder area. The Tomahawk was shot down, but the Hurricane escaped and returned Dust storms and a shortage of suitable targets safely to base with valuable information. restricted operations in April, but in May objec­ No. 60 S.A.A.F. Survey Squadron continued to tives included Benghazi, Martuba and Derna, the map territory behind the enemy's lines. attack on the last being the first night opera­ tion by Bostons, It is not necessary to give The Offensive Resumed details of the night employment by Bostoms in The Axis offensive, which we had anticipated this account, because their operations were fully and for which we were fully prepared, began on covered in an article on page 100 of No. 2 of the the evening of 26th May with a small thrust by R.A.F. Middle East Review. Italian units south-east from Segnali. This was The S.A.A.F. fighter squadrons were more ac­ watched and reported by Tac/R aircraft of No. 40 tive during this period, their sorties for March S.A.A.F. Squadron. totalling 708, mainly on offensive sweeps and During the night the enemey's 15th and 21st interception patrols. On 15th March four Toma­ Armoured Divisions passed round Bir Hakim, hawks of No. 2 Squadron encountered a,mixed and moved northwards in two columns towards force of JU.87s and ME.109s o

127 Pantelleria wider attack by the S.A.A.F.

123 The retreating enemy being bombed by the S.A.A.F. on the Daba road in November,''1942. hawks, No. 4 Squadron with Tomahawks (chang­ intensive periflG^UdlPfeffort the desert war had ing to Kittyhawks in mid-June) and No. 5 Squa­ yet produced. In addition to escort duties, these dron with Tomahawks were at Gambut. No. 3 three squadrons took their place in fighter South African Wing, controlling Nos. 12 and 24 sweeps and patrols, and contacts were frequent. S.A.A.F. Squadrons with Bostons, and Nos. 223 In the first four days of June, for example, and 14 R.A.F. Baltimore and Blenheim Squadrons, their bag of destroyed enemy aircraft was fif­ was at Baheira. No. 1 Squadron was still em­ teen JU.87s, four ME.109s, and one CR.42, for ployed on the defence of Alexandria and on ship­ the loss of ten aircraft, seven of the pilots escap­ ping protection in the Alexandria and Port Said ing safely. No. 5 (Squadron made its debut in areas, with Flights at Edcu and El Gamil. No. 40 the desert during June, and of the total of 35 Squadron was based at Sidi Azeiz with its ad­ enemy aircraft destroyed by the three S.A.A.F. vanced landing ground at El Adem. No. 60 Squa­ fighter squadrons during the month, No. 5 Squa­ dron was at L.G. 121, Nos. 7 and 15 Squadrons, dron accounted for 21—an auspicious start. In temporarily non-operational, were in the rear addition, they probably destroyed seven and da­ area. The small detachment of No. 15 continued maged a further eleven enemy aircraft. to operate from Kufra. When the fighter wings moved back from The history of the fortunes and misfortunes of Gambut they were given a brief rest. (It will the land battle has previously been described in be recalled how the fighter squadrons operated the "Review". The primary task of our air forces until the enemy was on the threshold of Gambut, was to win and maintain air superiority, which in order to provide air cover for our troops in they did in no small measure. During June and the El Adem "box" and over our forces retiring the subsequent retreat to El Alamein the efforts from Gazala). The rest was of short duration, made by No. 3 S.A.A.F. Wing were remarka­ however, for the unexpected collapse of Tobruk ble, and the number of light bomber sorties far on 20th June necessitated the provision of surpassed any total that had ever been carried cover to our land forces as they crossed the out in the desert before. Bombing in perfect for­ Egyptian frontier. mation day after day, and sometimes on a clock­ No. 40 Squadron, based well forward, had con­ work time-table, the Boston attacks became known tinued its daily tactical reconnaissances for 30 as the Boston Shuttle Service. One hundred and Corps until the last minute, and often provided twenty-six raids were made, at an average of information on suitable targets for the light and three per day, to disperse and delay enemy land fighter-bombers. The squadron narrowly escap­ forces, and the damage inflicted was immense. ed being put in the bag when Tobruk fell, and Of the record total of 950 bomber sorties made was forced to cease operations for eight days in June, over 85% were carried out by Bostons of while the squadron re-sorted itself. Nos. 12 and 24 S.A.A.F. Squadrons. They drop­ ped nearly 600 tons of bombs. The bulk of the The Critical Period light bomber sorties were made in daylight, al­ If air activity had been intense throughout ways with fighter escort; there were, however, June, it reached a crescendo during the first few 162 sorties at night. During the retreat the Wing days of July when the Axis forces launched what moved back in three steps; Baheira to Maaten they anticipated would be the final attack on Bagush, then to Daba, and finally to L.G. 99 near Egypt. the Delta. Squadrons operated until the last minute, the signal to move often being when the Both fighter and bomber sortie figures soared, bomb bursts from our aircraft could be seen on but the brunt of the close army support given to the horizon, showing that the enemy was approx­ the Vlllth Army continued to be borne by the imately only twelve miles distant. light bombers, the squadrons still consisting of Nos. 15 R.A.F., 223 R.A.F. and 12 and 24 S.A. The success attending the first employment of A.F. under the control of No. 3 S.A.A.F. Wing. Kittyhawks as bombers, in May, led to a number Both the South African squadrons completed their of the S.A.A.F. Kittyhawks being similarly equip­ 1,000th sortie since 26th May during the month, ped. They operated with conspicuous success No.. 24 Squadron reaching this figure on 17th from their first engagement, often acting as part July (in a period of 55 days) and No. 12 Squa­ of the striking force as well as escort to the dron ten days later. Bostons. The latter reached their peak figure in The Boston Shuttle Service continued at full sorties on 26th June, when the two squadrons throttle. On 1st July Bostons made nine escort­ made 120 sorties. The only casualties suffered ed daylight raids and completed 83 sorties in in daylight in the whole of June were two air­ spite of bad weather. The next day the weather craft shot down by A.A. — a great tribute to the still hampered operations, but a further 91 sor­ fighter escorts. ties were made in seven raids. One of the features of the campaign from the On 3rd July—probably the most critical day in air point of view was, in fact, the flying disci­ the whole of the fighting of the Battle for Egypt pline, aggressiveness and all round efficiency of —the Allied Air Forces' sortie figures reached the fighter escort work of Nos. 2, 4 and 5 S.A.A.F. th 151 bomber and 524 fighter sor­ Squadrons. Thanks to their protect^ bomber sorties were carried out bomber casualties ^I under No. 3 Wing, Nos. 12 and 24 Squadrons' contribution to these figures amount­ ing to 132 sorties, while the S.A.A.F. fighter jrmation squadrons made a total of 219 sorties. - g our It was on 3rd July, also, that No. 1 Squadron, troops. The Squadron Diary records the event: which had just returned to the Western Desert, "We caught up with 20+ Stukas and 20+ fight­ held its famous Stuka party and shot down four­ ers and a lovely dogfight took place; we fought teen out of fifteen JU.87s and one ME.109P with­ all the way home". Two JU.87s, one ME.109F out loss to themselves. This feat was made and one ME.109E were destroyed, 2 ME.109Fs possible only by the magnificent top cover pro­ were probably destroyed and another was damag­ vided by No. 274 (R.A.F.) Squadron, which con­ ed. The squadron's only loss was one Kittyhawk. tinuously engaged large formations of ME. 109s Meanwhile, until 14th July, when the battle and prevented all but a few fighters interfering for the Ruweisat Ridge put the Boston Shuttle with the destruction of the Junkers. A remar­ Service into operation once more, a comparati­ kable tribute was paid to No. 1 Squadron's ground vely quiet period set in. On the 19th and 20th, crews in the fact that 16,000 rounds of ammu­ and again on the 24th, the Bostons co-operated with fighters and fighter-bombers, and carried nition were expended without a single stoppage. out synchronised attacks on enemy aircraft dis­ The A.O.C., W.D., sent the following personal persed on the Daba and Fuka landing grounds. message to the iSquadron Commander:—"Magni­ The raids were very successful and, in spite of ficent. Congratulations to you, the Squadron intense enemy opposition from both the air and and the Wing on the grand Stuka party. Your the ground, only one Boston was lost through success has greatly heartened the Army. We are A.A. all delighted at your warrior squadron restarting so well." Final Attack on El Alamein Line The following day, 4th July, the Boston figu­ August was a quiet month, compared with res again topped the 100 mark, and the A.O.C., June and July, although S.A.A.F. sorties totalled W.D., congratulated No. 3 Wing as follows:— 1,496. No. 15 Squadron, equipped with Bisleys, "The sortie strength and aircraft serviceability started operating from Mariut on shipping and of Nos. 12 and 24 Squadrons in particular have offensive coastal patrols. On the 14th, three Bis­ made a record that in the circumstances will leys attacked and damaged a three-masted probably never be beaten. The Vlllth Army, the schooner off Sidi Barrani from sea level, and next Press and the B.B.C. have all wondered at your day other Bisleys sank three barges near Sidi work, but, in due course, the best testimony will Barrani and Mersa Matruh. On the 25th, the come from the enemy". landing grounds at these two places were attack­ During the month No. 15 Squadron carried out ed by six Bisleys from 50 feet. Two large aircraft its first operation in the Western Desert, helping were destroyed on the ground, while four others the light bomber squadrons with a raid on ene­ were damaged, and a petrol dump was set alight my M.T. concentrations. No. 7 Squadron com­ and a number of vehicles destroyed. Again, on menced operations as an anti-tank squadron ar­ the 28th, Bisleys were employed on low level med with "sticky" bombs. These did not prove straffing attacks, their target being a train near successful and the squadron was later re-equip­ Matruh. One of the three Bisleys was lost, but ped with Hurricane IIDs for cannon attacks on the train was derailed. No. 40 Squadron did not A.F.Vs. operate during August, but No. 60 Squadron con­ On 13th July, No. 1 Squadron again encounter­ tinued with its photography behind the enemy ed a strong1 force of enemy bombers heavily es­ lines. corted. For the loss of one Hurricane, five CR. On 31st August, the Axis forces launched the 42s were destroyed and two CR.42s and one ME. heaviest and last attack in their efforts to occupy 109F probably destroyed. On the 23rd of the the Delta. By 5th September the attack had month twenty Stukas, heavily escorted and about failed, and the enemy, having suffered heavy tank to attack our troops, were attacked by the same losses, was forced to withdraw to his original po­ squadron and a further five JU.87s and one ME. sitions. In throwing back this attack, the allied 109F were shot down, while the sixth Stuka was air activity was intense. The S.A.A.F. contri­ damaged, for the loss of three Hurricanes, the buted notably to this and once again light bomber pilots of two being safe. sortie records were broken. The four squadrons Nos. 2, 4 and 5 Squadrons nearly doubled the under the control of No.3 Wing — Nos. 12, 24, previous month's sortie figures. Altogether the 55 R.A.F. and 223 R.A.F.—were joined by B.25s S.A.A.F. fighters carried out a total of 2,344 (Mitchells) of the U.S.A.F. A shuttle service sorties during July. With the addition of those was brought into operation and the light bomber made by the bomber squadrons, including No. 60 operations between 31st August and 4th Septem­ Photographic Squadron, 3,064 sorties were made, ber became known as the "Boston Tea Party". and 40 enemy aircraft were confirmed destroyed On 2nd September 167 sorties were flown, and by the S.A.A.F. in aerial combat. the next day, on eleven raids, no fewer than 202 sorties were completed. The following table of On the 11th, No,, ,2, Squadron operated for the ; first time with Kittyhawks. ' orf' this day, too, if tiiiJTMirnftmiJfrMiii'— while providing cover to:,. Bostons* they were or­ '<*­

S.A.A.F. Baltimores bombing dispersed M.T. Another S.A.A.F. at

133 In September the S.A.A.F. carried out a total of 1,488 sorties and destroyed seven enemy aircraft Date Raids Sof tlfcf l M 2& $5 confirmed. One notable engagement took place S.A.A.F. R.A.F. on 6th September, when eleven Tomahawks from No. 5 Squadron encountered twelve plus Me.l09Fs Aug. 31 3 54 33 18 3 escorting fifteen JU.87s near Burg-el-Arab. Three Sept. 1 8 119 65 48 6 JU.87s were destroyed, two JU.87s probably des­ 2 10 167 102 54 ' 11 troyed and one JU.87 and one ME.109F damaged 3 11 202 92 92 18 for the loss of three Tomahawks missing. As a 4 4 72 42 18 12 result of this engagement, the A.O.C., W.D., sent 36 614 334 230 50 the following signal to No. 5 Squadron:— "I per­ sonally consider your Squadron record during these hard months the most proudly gallant in From the night of 30th/31st August to 5th the whole fighter force. To-day was typical of September almost the entire Allied bomber force, the way your pilots went into the Stukas. The except the heavy bombers, was employed in bom­ losses of the Squadon have been and are a heavy bing the enemy's columns in the battle area. Ap­ penalty, but you have made the enemy pay. proximately 6,600 bombs, with a total weight of Well done". > 1,736,000 lbs., were dropped at the rate of one bomb every 71 seconds during the period of five On 23rd October, the same squadron destroyed days and nights, estimated at an average concen­ two ME.109Gs and probably destroyed another tration of 25,000 lbs. per square mile of battle for the loss of one Tomahawk. area per hour. Of these figures the S.A.A.F. light In October the S.A.A.F. made 3,013 sorties, but bombers dropped 300,160 lbs. (134 tons) at an most of them were flown after the 24th, during average rate of one bomb every 48 • seconds our advance. Twenty enemy aircraft were des­ throughout their attacks. troyed, the majority being fighters (fourteen ME. No. 233 Wing, with Nos. 2, 4 and 51 S.A.A.F. 109E, F and Gs, four MC.202s and two JU.87s). Squadrons and No. 239 Wing, escorted the light The cost to the S.A.A.F. was 32 personnel mis­ bombers, completing 815 sorties during the five sing and fourteen killed. . days. Although enemy air activity was on a con­ siderable scale and combats with enemy fighters Preparations for the Allied Offensive before, during and after reaching the targets In preparation for the Allied offensive, sche­ were frequent, not one bomber was lost through duled to start on 23rd October, the Allied Air fighter action. A.A. was fierce and four Balti­ Forces were reorganised. A new R.A.F. light mores, one Boston and one Mitchell were lost, bomber wing, No. 232, was formed with two and at least twelve others were seriously da­ R.A.F. Baltimore and three U.S.A.F. Mitchell maged. squadrons under its control. No. 3 S.A. Wing Our heavy losses during the first two days ne­ retained the control of both the Boston squa­ cessiated new tactics being adopted, and it was drons, Nos. 12 and 24, with the addition of No. laid down that light bombers would go into the 21 S.A.A.F. Baltimore Squadron. An additional target above 6,000 feet in order to escape light fighter group, No. 212, was also formed, making A.A. and below 9,000 feet to minimise the effect two mobile fighter groups in the Middle East. of heavy A.A. The raids were usually carried out* In addition to this, one P.40 squadron was at­ by eighteen bombers at a time in order to conserve tached to No. 239 Wing, while two others form­ fighter escorts, and an echelon take-off was ed a wing on their own. The squadrons under adopted to allow bombers to become airborne in No. 3 S.A.A.F. Wing were rested from opera­ formation without dust interfering with the tions whenever possible, but continued training, pilots' vision. This formation has since been and in consequence when the battle opened were adopted by No. 3 Wing and, added to their per­ prepared for sustained and intensive activity. fect formation in the face of intense A.A., has resulted in the light bombers becoming known as The South African Air Force in the Western the "eighteen imperturbables". The constant Desert now consisted of:— bombing the enemy received each time he formed No. 1 (Squadron Hurricane IICs up to attack soon had an effect, and by lunch­ Nos. 2 and 4 Squadrons... Kittyhawks time on 3rd September his forces were beginning No. 5 Squadron Tomahawks to withdraw. No. 7 Squadron Hurricane IIDs Nos. 12 and 24 Squadrons Bostons By 5th September, the Axis forces, exhausted, No. 3 were back in their original positions and from Wing No. 21 Squadron Baltimores then until the night of 23rd-24th October, a pe­ No. 15 Squadron ... Bisleys riod of reorganisation and intensive preparation No. 40 Squadron ... Hurricanes I for our own attack commenced. Nevertheless, air and II A/B activity was kept on a fairly intensive scale_in ... Baltimores order to (a) maintain air superioifEV fbj ^ lighter Wing (controlling the enemy watching oUr movemei$, Jinlk($) h 74 R.A.F. and No. 335 per his own preparations. oris). The Offensive < Opens * sharply as the enemy rapidly retreated51'out of At 21.4ft $ouis ;on :23rd October :;the 'heaviest range. Between 1st and 5th November the Bos­ artillery b|rrage,eyer laid in Africa preceded the tons and Baltimores under No. 3 Wing made 339 attack by tiur fartd forces, on a six mile front in sorties, 129 of them on the 3rd, and the S.A.A.F. the northern sector at 22.05 hours. Four Bos­ fighter squadrons made 556, the peak in their tons of Nos. 12 and 24 S.A.A.P. Squadrons, which case also being on the 3rd with 168 sorties. had been training for the task since September, No. 40 Squadron was the first S.A.A.F. squa­ flew low over the enemy lines laying smoke dron to re-enter Cyrenaica on 12th November, screens as cover for our advancing infantry and and by the 26th the fighter squadrons were ope­ the clearance of mines. rating from Msus. Although air resistance had On the following day, out of a total of 174 been broken in the early part of the month a light bomber sorties, Nos. 12, 21 and 24 Squa­ number of combats did occur. On 11th Novem­ drons made 131, giving ^ose support to infantry ber No. 2 Squadron destroyed eight JU.87s and advancing in the southern sector. probably destrpyed four, while later in the day At this stage during the early developments No. 4 Squadron, on a sweep with No. 2, destroy­ of the battle, the enemy was seriously short of ed one ME.109G, one ME.109E and one JU.52. oil, and reports were received on 26th October These operations cost No. 2 Squadron four Kit­ that an urgently required Axis tanker was ap­ tyhawks, but the pilots of two were saved. A total proaching Tobruk. A combined R.A.P. and S.A. of 30 enemy aircraft was destroyed by the S.A. A.F. attack was immediately laid on with ins­ A.F. fighters during the month. tructions to sink the tanker at all costs. The The light bombers' last contact with the enemy attack was led by five Bisleys from No. 15 for a while was on the 9th when they twice Squadron, and the tanker was eventually sunk bombed the retreating forces between Halfaya in the face of fierce opposition. Three of the Pass and Sollum. The bad state of the going five Bisleys were lost as well as a number of forced our land forces to keep to the one and R.A.F. aircraft. It was on this day, too—26th Octo- only road, and in consequence the forward mo­ ber—that the enemy counter-attack was broken vement of air force ground personnel was res­ up largely by the intensive air activity which tricted. When it became evident that the light took place. One hundred and twenty-two light bombers could not be used in the first stages of bomber sorties, of which the S.A.A.F. contributed the chase into Libya, the three S.A.A.F. squa­ 90, were made against the enemy, while the S. drons settled down to training in formation and A.A.F. fighter squadrons destroyed two, probably night flying, and practice bombing. destroyed three and damaged four enemy fighters During the first week of November the R.A.F. for the loss of one Tomahawk. No. 7 Squadron, squadrons controlled by No. 7 S.A. Wing made operating with No. 6 R.A.F. Hurricane IID Squa­ some 500 sorties. On 23rd November the Wing dron, successfully attacked a concentration of took over the control of the Tobruk area, and enemy tanks and armoured vehicles, for the loss was concerned mainly with shipping escort duties. of only one Hurricane IID which was forced Operations during December, 1942 down by A.A. damage north-east of Lake Magh­ ra; the pilot was saved. On the 27th an attack A certain amount of re-organisation of the by the enemy to stem our advance in the north S.A.A.F. in the desert took place during Decem­ failed. Again this was largely attributable to ber. No. 7 Wing was re-constituted and became the efforts of the light bombers, of which No. an entirely South African Wing with Nos. 2, 4 3 Wing contributed 144 of the 177 effective sor­ and 5 Squadrons, which had been withdrawn ties made. On the 28th the Axis again assem­ from operations on the 8th, under its control. bled their forces for counter-attack and the third The VHIth Army had broken the El Agheila time they were broken up by over 100 light bom­ positions and was at Buerat by the end of the ber sorties, of which the S.A.A.F. contributed year. No. 40 Squadron moved forward with the 50%. From 29th October to 1st November there land forces, maintaining sorties on Tac/R were few targets for light bombers as the enemy throughout, undeterred by the fourteen moves it realised that concentrating his vehicles was ask­ made in eight weeks. The other S.A.A.F. squa­ ing for too much trouble, but the fighter-bombers drons which operated during December were Nos. 1, 15 and 60. Moving to Jedabya on 8th Decem­ came into their own and carried out over 400 ber and to Merduma on the 19th, No. 1 Squadron sorties. By 2nd November the enemy was be­ was the second S.A.A.F. squadron to cross into ginning to retreat and the Shuttle Service, which Tripolitania, only 24 hours behind No. 40. The had proved so effective in slowing down the ene­ Bostons operated on two days only, the 15th and my's advances in June and July, again came into 16th, when they were moved forward specially operation and considerably quickened his retreat. to bomb enemy concentrations on the road and Between 19th and 31st October, Nos. 1, 2, 4 in the wadis to the west of Marble Arch, and and 5 S.A.A.F. Squadrons made 1,377 sorties,, transport and gun positions in the Nofilia area. while No. 3 Wing, ;although.not operating at full : After that, although the squadrons remained in blast until; the first day of the 'battle, ma'de,778 Readiness, no suitable targets were located. The sorties during the same period on close g dumber of movements made by S.A.A.F. squa­ The S.A.A.F. effort coritiAuedia*iJrelsJ drons in the wake of the VIHth Army between 5th November, after which date it fell awa November, 1942, and January, 1943, are of in rat defen­ terest. They were:— f Tripoli No. 3 Wing 4 advances (23rd January^ tilgF»»LW J?S.r«« out 849 Nos. 2, 4 and 5 Squadrons... 10 sorties, dropped 395,870 %8.m>Qfy(Mm and des­ No. 1 Squadron 12 troyed four and probably destroyecRive enemy No. 7 Squadron 4 „ aircraft. No. 40 Squadron 14 The Move to Mareth No. 60 Squadron 9 Until the third week of February bad weather From Buerat to Tripoli was largely responsible for preventing air ope­ While the Vlllth Army was probing the Bue­ rations on an intensive scale. Nevertheless, No. rat positions prior to breaking through to Tri­ 40 Squadron, which operated from Castel Benito poli the majority of the S.A.A.F. squadrons were six days after the fall of Tripoli, continued with moving forward or awaiting the next phase of its Tac/R work in order to keep the ground for­ operations. ces informed of the enemy's movements. There was little fighter activity during Ja­ During this period, too, the Western Desert nuary, but No. 1 Squadron, operating with No. Air Force moved up to the Medenine, Nefatia, 244 .Spitfire Wing, destroyed three and probably Ben Gardane, Bu Grara area. From this area a destroyed four enemy aircraft in the month. day and night offensive was carried out on enemy landing grounds behind Mareth. In ad­ Further improvements in equipment occurred dition to the medium and heavy bomber attacks during this period. No. 40 Squadron changed its by the R.A.F. and U.S.A.F., the light bombers Hurricanes for Spitfires; No. 60 Squadron chang­ from No. 3 Wing carried out 105 sorties during ed its Baltimores for Mosquitoes; and No. 5 the moonlight hours of the nights 23rd/24th to Squadron changed its Tomahawks for Kitty- 25/26th February. ' These attacks were confined hawks, thus allowing No. 7 S.A. Wing to operate to an area bounded by the Mareth-Zarsis road, completely as a fighter-bomber wing. the coast, and Wadi Zizzonr These night attacks No. 7 Squadron moved to Bersis for protective were usually followed by day bombing and straf­ fighter patrols and No. 15 Squadron continued fing by the fighters. with its shipping patrols from Mariut, Gambut The first "three squadron" operation carried and Cyprus. out by No. 7 S.A. Wing was an attack on the Moving up to Sirte and establishing an advanc­ Mareth airfields from Zuara on 22nd February. ed operational landing ground at Gzina, the whole The Wing then moved forward to Nefatia Main of No. 3 S.A.A.F. Wing began a period of in­ L.G. and by the 26th was engaged in intensive tensive day, as well as night, operations against operations. the enemy's landing grounds and lines of com­ munication behind Buerat. These attacks, al­ From Mareth to Cape Bon though no longer spectacular, had a definitely From 11th March, when the Vlllth Army's harmful effect on the enemy and he was forced attack on the Mareth Line commenced, until 14th to use up a considerable amount of flying hours May when the fighting ceased in Africa, air ac­ on protective fighter patrols. This was very no­ tivity was on an almost continuously intense ticeable on 13th January, when a formation of scale. South African light bombers alone car­ eighteen Baltimores from No. 21 Squadron, es­ ried out a total of 1,604 sorties, 158 of them at corted by U.S.A.F. P.40s, was attacked by fif­ night. All raids were made by formations of teen plus ME.109s while bombing the Bir Dufan eighteen aircraft, heavily escorted by fighters, and Misurata roads. The ME.iO9s carried out including Kittyhawks from No. 7 Wing. They a frontal attack from out of the sun, their vi­ were mainly directed against dispersed M.T. and gorous and determined attacks succeeding in dug-in positions. A total of 82 raids was car­ splitting our formation before the P.40s could ried out in daylight and in the 1,446 forties flown intervene and a general dog fight took place. only seven aircraft were rendered Cat. III. Night The Baltimores destroyed one and probably des­ operations were directed against similar targets troyed another ME.109 as well as damaging two and in the 158 sorties flown four aircraft were more. Altogether seven ME.109s were definitely rendered Cat. III. Superficial casualties to air­ shot down, but our casualties were ten P.40s and four Baltimores; however, only one Baltimore craft have not been included in the figures, but crew was lost. at times the A.A. was so intense that more than 75% of the aircraft returned holed. The following day, while the eighteen Bostons During March and April 5,615 sorties were from Nos. 12 and 24 Squadrons were attacking flown by S.A.A.F. fighters. The Luftwaffe, and the same area, ME.109S attempted to use the sometimes the Regia Aeronautica, showed consi­ same tactics, but the element of surprise was derably more aggressiveness than they had done lacking and Kittyhawks from No. 239 Wing sha FW.190S down 4 ME.109s for the loss of one Kittyhaw! rn Tunisia Operations by No. 3 Wing's light bombers co: Mareth tinued on a fairly intensive .scaler until Trip iron shot was in our hands. From the day the VIII lestFoyed two FW.190s

136 —the first of this type to fall victims to desert lth May the light bombers fighters. ew remaining Army On 26th March, one of the epic Western Desert Air Force's attacks took place to relieve the New On the Zealanders outflanking the Mareth Line at El -resis­ tance in Africa, Ba ua­ Hamma. Between 15.30 and 16.00 hours the dron participated in the f: enemy positions were bombed by Bostons and nants of the 90th Light Division? Baltimores from No. 3 S.A. Wing and Mitchells, were dropped at 15.27 hours. At 15. ir while following them closely came Hurricane IIDs Support Control signalled:—"Ground reports from No. 6 Squadron and Kittybombers from Nos. bombing very successful — very good crop of 239 Wing, 57 and 59 Pursuit Groups and 7 S.A. white flags springing up." Shortly afterwards Wing. Spitfires from No. 244 Wing maintained a further signal from the A.S.C. read: "There is a constant cover patrol overhead. The program­ NO (Repeat) NO bombline in Africa". me arranged for No. 7 S.A. Wing to make the final attack on the gun area itself. Attacking from 1/2,000 feet, Nos. 2, 4 and 5 Squadrons bombed and straffed the target just north of Thus ended the African campaign. It did not, Toujane and in the El Hamma-Gabes area. Their however, end the employment of the South Afri­ score from ground-straffing alone was 25 M.T. can Air Forces with the Desert Air Force. flamers, eleven M.T. destroyed, 21 damaged, one They were well experienced in aerial warfare Bren-carrier, a small tank and two semi-tracked and moved, and will continue to move, with the vehicles damaged, a large tank and two A.A. po­ Royal Air Force and the U.S.A.F. steadily north­ sitions shot up; an 88 mm. gun silenced, three ward against the Axis forces in Europe. Already large tents set on fire and a large number of the names Pantelleria, Lampedusa, Malta, Sicily' enemy personnel killed — for the loss of one pilot and Italy can be inscribed in their history. From wounded and two missing. The enemy A.A. fire five squadrons operating at the beginning of this was intense; twelve of our aircraft were holed and account, the strength, at the end of June, 1943, rendered Cat. II. has grown to two Wings and sixteen Squadrons. On 19th April No. 7 Wing again came into pro­ Np mention has so far been made of Nos. 3 and minence. Encountering a large force of enemy 41 S.A.A.F. Squadrons, which began operating on air transports over Cape Bon, they destroyed fighter and shipping patrols towards the end of fourteen JTJ.52s, one S.81 and two fighters, and this period, as their role until the Sicilian inva­ probably destroyed four other transport aircraft sion was of a defensive rather than an offensive for the loss of one Kittyhawk. Three days later nature. the same Wing, with the help of No. 1 S.A. This brief report should not end without tri­ Squadron, destroyed 23 ME.323s and one R.2001 bute being paid to the magnificent work of the without loss to themselves. ground and maintenance personnel, and the vital The IS.A. squadrons operated at full pressure and even less spectacular work of the two until the Axis forces were finally expelled from Bomber Group Maintenance Companies, whose Africa. A brief lull on the ground allowed light efforts made possible the 35,000 operational bombers to switch from Army targets on 8th May sorties flown by the S.A.A.F. with the Desert and attack the airfield and harbour at Pantelleria Air Force since 1941, and whose degree of tech­ in order to prevent the enemy staging a Dunkirk. nical skill in keeping the aircraft always sup­ These raids were carried out constantly until the plied and in fighting condition greatly contribut­ 11th, and photographs revealed that damage was ed to the destruction of over 400 enemy aircraft exceptionally heavy. in combat. "The Western Desert is the tactician's parad and the quartermaster's hell' — Captured German General.

A. WAR CANNOT be won without the things provides the necessities in the first place and, to win it with. The object of the Middle East subsequently, salvages them and puts them right Maintenance Organization is to ensure that the if they go wrong. R.A.F. in the Middle East has the thing's neces­ This article shows, first, the modern main­ sary for its part in winning the war. The ne­ tenance organization and, second, how it has cessary things range from, order to meet the increasing pro­ selves to the small* ei 13 i Et.ftht by the changing course of the keeps those aircraft ddle East. From extremely modest

138 beginnings it has be^o^le g ^as| Vganization spreading over the Middle East to Tunisia and quantities of material held at each depot and, closely linked with the Par East, to form one if necessary, re-allocates holdings between them combined effort extending from North Africa to so that equipment is held in the correct geo­ China. graphical area. The provision of explosives and Whatever disappointments and difficulties ammunition is similarly attended to by a Pro­ there may have been in the past—and there vision Office located at the largest explosives were plenty—no one can deny that the recently- depot. completed campaign in North Africa has been a triumph of organisation. The Air Stores and Air Ammunition Parks From the base depots the equipment on its The Basic Organization way to the squadrons passes out to one of the At first sight the organization that exists for Air Stores Parks. Each of these is capable of delivering the goods to the R.A.F. looks extreme­ serving some six squadrons and four ancillary ly complicated. In reality, however, it is simple units. To do this it holds an average of one and leaves few loopholes for error. It is ex­ month's requirements for the units it serves. tremely flexible and can be adapted at need to Each Air Stores Park consists of a headquarters suit either mobile or static warfare. For the section, an M.T. section and an equipment section. purposes of this article, the organization as it Each A.S.P. is fully mobile and able to move was at the beginning of the October, 1942, of­ at short notice with the squadrons it is serving. fensive has been taken, for although there were From the A.S.P. can be detached a small highly naturally certain changes as the advance con­ mobile party which carries approximately seven tinued, this was the basic organization. days' requirement of consumable stores for units The fountain-head of the whole organization operating in the forward areas. These mobile is in the Delta area. Here contact is maintained sections maintain their stocks by an M.T. service with London, Washington, North Africa and from their parent unit further back. Only re­ other centres of the Allied war effort and also curring items are held, and these include such with the corresponding Army and Navy depart­ things as glycol, sparking plugs, signal batteries, ments on all matters of common-users supplies. sulphuric acid, distilled water, and barrack and From the base stretch out the sections and units clothing items. that are responsible for everything that comes Bombs, ammunition and fuel similarly pass to under the heading of supply, salvage or repair. the Air Ammunition Parks, which hold one month's requirements for the squadrons they The Supply Services serve—an average of 2,000 tons of explosives The Supply Services are the multiple stores of and fuel. Each A.A.P. comprises a headquarters the R.A.F. The following paragraphs show how section, an M.T. and workshop section and four the item demanded—from fuel, bombs and am­ dump sections. Each dump section is capable of munition downwards to the smallest split pin— operating two or three dumps of explosives and reaches the unit. fuel. These dumps are conveniently placed so Material arriving from the United Kingdom, that squadrons can draw on them. The A.A.Ps, the United States or India is unloaded under the too, are fully mobile since they must be able to supervision of one of the Embarkation Units. follow up the squadrons as they move. These units are located at the Middle East ports Alongside the AA.Ps are the Supply and to advise and assist the controlling authority at Transport Columns. Each consists of a head­ the docks. They see that priorities of unloading quarters section and four transport sections. are followed and that R.A.F. equipment is Their normal function is to transport petrol, checked and despatched to the correct main­ bombs and ammunition to the dumps or to pass tenance unit. these items to the squadrons when on the move. The material is taken to the maintenance units In advance or retreat they are used to stock by rail or by vehicles of the Mechanical Trans­ forward airfields or to clear dumps and land­ port Company. New vehicles arriving at the ing grounds no longer required. Urgent require­ ports are also employed to carry equipment to the ments are sent from base to forward areas by maintenance units before they pass on to the air transport. M.T. Base Pool. The squadrons themselves hold seven days' There are four main Equipment Holding Units stocks of consumable stores. These supplies are and three main Explosives Depots in the Delta maintained by demanding on the A.S.P. to which area and other subsidiary units inside and out­ each squadron is allotted. side the area. The chief Maintenance Units each Rear A.H.Q. maintenance staff is responsible hold a complete range of spare parts for the for passing on direct to H.Q., Middle East, de­ R.A.F. and are so dispersed that if any one of mands from Advanced A.H.Q. for aircraft re­ them were written off by enemy action, only placements, aircraft and engine spares, ammuni­ a small percentage of the total holdings would tion, fuel and oxygen. This staff also controls, be lost. The provision of equipment to stock administratively and technically, the rear sup­ these depots is the responsibility of the Master ply and repair units. On the supply side it is Provision Office, controlled directly by H.Q., in close co-operation with Rear Army H.Q. and arranges the amount and distribute quickly be made fly­ nition and fuel coming forward by rail, road or able arT dTsmantTeU UilU' taken on specialist ve­ sea for the R.A.F. hicles to the R.S.Us. The more remote commands—Iraq, the Sudan, The advanced sections of the R.S.Us are con­ Aden and East Africa—each have their own trolled from a headquarters situated near the self-contained supply organization, which is a forward airfields. Crash Inspectors are ready miniature of that existing in the main theatre to be taken by air or M.T. to crash sites to of operations. examine and categorize the aircraft; with them normally go an armourer and electrician for re­ The Technical Services moving guns, instruments and wireless equip­ The function of the Technical Services is to ment to prevent pilfering. supply the R.A.F. with the necessary aircraft The salvage units have a most responsible and and M.T. and subsequently, when need arises, often arduous task. They have to travel hun­ to salvage and repair them. The organisation dreds of miles into the blue in order to bring back which keeps the squadrons operational is consti­ the disabled aircraft. Fighters can be picked tuted as follows. up complete with wings, saving valuable time, The flow of new aircraft starts from one of and bombers can be towed away. The aircraft- the Erecting Centres—the chief being at Tako­ carriers are huge 60-feet vehicles. Good organ­ radi in West Africa, Port Sudan on the Red Sea ization and discipline with salvage convoys is and—although, of course, only since the invasion essential since, when narrow roads are reached, of North Africa—Casablanca. As the aircraft multiple-englned aircraft are apt to be unpopular arrive in crates or as deck cargo from the United with other road-users—and with the police. Kingdom or the United States, they are erected The rear R.S.Us are fully mobile and confine at the centres and made serviceable for flying themselves to work that can be finished within on the first stage of their journey—to one of seven days. They also receive new aircraft the Aircraft Storage Units. from the Aircraft Storage Units, inspect them At the A.S.Us the aircraft are serviced after and pass them on to the squadrons, and in ad­ their long flights from the Erecting Centres. dition salvage aircraft that crash or force-land Here they are fitted with the operational equip­ in their own areas. ment which transforms them from merely flying Aircraft that cannot be dealt with by the to fighting machines. Guns are harmonised, R.S.Us are removed by the Base Salvage Section's bomb sights fitted, and wireless and other special Shuttle Service to the main depots for repair. items are installed and tested. Minor modifica­ The majority of these depots are in the Delta tions are also carried out at the A.S.Us ; area, but others are dispersed in the Sudan, modifications beyond their capacity wait until Kenya, Eritrea, Levant, Iraq and Persia. Even the aircraft reaches one of the main Delta area those depots in the Delta area are widely dispers­ depots. Aircraft ready for operations are then ed as a precautionary measure. In order to make passed to the Aircraft Reinforcement Pool en the best use of the facilities in the Cairo district, route to the squadrons. garages and other suitable buildings were press­ The responsibility of getting the aircraft from ed into service. One major depot is located in the Erecting Centres to the squadrons via the the same caves that house one of the main A.S.Us and the Aircraft Reinforcement Pool Equipment Holding Units, and may be considered belongs to No. 216 Air Transport and Ferry absolutely bomb-proof. Group. This group maintains the Aircraft De­ livery Unit, a pool of 450 pilots, and supervises The repair depots include Aircraft Repair and the staging posts along the various routes and Engine Repair Secticns, a Signals Repair Section also the Ferry Control Units, whose task is to and a General Engineering Section, which com­ control the aircraft over the reinforcing routes. prises armament, parachute, electrical, propellor, All matters of maintenance and salvage of air­ carpentry and instrument repair branches and craft along the routes come under No. 216 Group. an M.T. repair shop. Aircraft earmarked for the Operational Training Units are delivered in the same way as aircraft The M.T. Organization going to the squadrons. A subsidiary organization of the Technical Services provides and maintains the M.T. in the Repair and Salvage Organization Middle East. All R.A.F. vehicles arriye by sea When accidents occur, the repair and salvage direct from the United Kingdom, the United organization steps in. Crashed aircraft in the States or South Africa, or are assembled at Army forward areas are salvaged by advanced sections Vehicle Assembly Units. of the Repair and Salvage Units. These sections From the docks they proceed to the M.T. Base were originally formed from personnel of the Pool, where they are inspected and serviced be­ base R.S.Us and they are situated as near the fore being delivered to the units to which they front line as possible. Since their essential work are allotted. On their way to the Pool the new is salvage, they undertake only light repairs on vehicles are used to carry equipment to the main­ site to patch up the aircraft sufficiently to enable tenance units. The Pool can receive, inspect and them to fly back to the base R.S.Us or repair issue an average of 2,000 vehicles monthly. k IED An organization similar to that for aircraft age of armour, m7rmth<®^ti

141 (c) The visit of the American supply mis­ The Delta maintenance depots were increased sions from which followed a flow of in number and were so dispersed that even if American material that changed the one were completely destroyed by enemy action, supply situation in the Middle East. only a fraction of the total holdings would be lost. (d) Considerable re-organization of the whole This dispersal was vitally necessary after the air maintenance system, including the form­ attacks on the Abu Sueir depot in August, 1941. ation of the office of Chief Maintenance To offset the shortage of service personnel, and Supply Officer to take over the con­ more civilian help was enlisted in the repair of trol of the organization that had former­ aircraft and M.T., under the supervision of R.A.F. ly been exercised by the C.E.S.O. and the technicians. The most important of these civilian C.R.S.O., under the A.O.A., Middle East. alliances was the British Airways Repair Unit, The urgency of the Middle East's need was employing several thousand personnel. recognised just in time. In spite of such pro­ Although results of the visits of the American blems as shipping shortage and the necessity missions soon began to be felt, there were, as of helping Russia, plans were made for stepping already indicated, inevitable teething troubles. up the whole scale of supply to Egypt. This was At first American equipment was not suitable made possible largely through American help. for Middle East conditions and had to be adapted Visit of the American Missions extensively to make it suitable. A steady stream of American aircraft was, however, coming in. The discussions with the American missions Tomahawks had been in time for the Syrian had far-reaching results. The essential one was campaign in June and July, and there were by that direct contact with the United States led to November enough to equip six squadrons. Bostons a better understanding of the Middle East's were ready for operations on 17th November, the supply problems and to the general policy of eve of " Crusader," and Kittyhawks were to equipping and maintaining the air force there make their first operational sorties at the end of more and more from America. December. Altogether the strength of serviceable As time went on, British aircraft were joined or aircraft had been nursed up from approximately superseded in increasing numbers by American 200 in May to 970 by the "Crusader" target date. aicraft — Tomahawks, Kittyhawks, Bostons, Baltimores, Liberators and the rest. " Crusader " and Beyond More detailed outcomes were the provision of air links between Egypt and the United Kingdom; The "Crusader" campaign—especially when our better co-ordination of service and civilian air lines stretched up to Agheila—naturally threw reinforcement organizations; the establishment a great strain on the maintenance organization, of civilian and service erection and repair centres particularly on the salvage and repair sections, to deal with American types; and the appoint­ which had to make a maximum effort to keep ing of British and American liaison officers to up aircraft strength. A figure of over 800 ensure the smoothest possible running between serviceable aircraft was, however, maintained Washington, Cairo and London. throughout the offensive in spite of the calls made by the actual campaign and in spite of the fact All these benefits did not, however, grow up that help had to be sent to the Far East. Be­ like mushrooms overnight. At first there were tween December, 1941, when Japan entered the irritating snags and disappointments. Until a war, and the end of April, 1942, over 600§ aircraft reasonably satisfactory situation could be reach­ passed from the Middle East to India and the ed, the maintenance branch had to do the best it Far East. Malta, too, in the spring of 1942, had could with the material at its disposal to fulfil to be supplied with aircraft at the expense of all its obligations—and that material was not Egypt. Nevertheless, British as well as American excessive. aircraft were arriving all the time and the United Putting the House in Order States were now actively in the war. The period of comparative quiet in the summer The pause between the end of "Crusader" in of 1941, with the enemy inactive at the frontier January, 1942, and the opening of the Battle for and the Abyssinian campaign progressing favour- Egypt in May was invaluable for re-equipping ably, was used to put the maintenance house squadrons and training or resting personnel. in order as far as possible before the zero day Great efforts were made to give the pilots the for "Crusader" in November. There was much material to fight with in the coming campaign to be done—and done quickly. There was still and over 800 aircraft were ready to face the a shortage of almost every item, from the air­ enemy when he attacked in May. craft itself to flying clothes to keep the pilot The effort put up by the R.A.F. in the next warm. Every effort was made to remedy this few months is now history. As far as mainten­ state of affairs, and particular attention was paid ance concerned, it need merely to the salvage and repair side of the 05 ization did not crack under More R.S.tJs were formed |ties engendered by the with- sert and a Base Salvage since it is constituted to transport crashed aircraft Fficiently either in advance or from the battle area back to in retreat. A remarkable fact is that from the

142 A supply convoy receiving orders before moving off.

middle of June, at the most critical period, air­ It is a notable fact that this figure was not only craft serviceability figures maintained an upward maintained, but increased to over 1,400—a peak trend. This occurred in spite of continued di­ figure of 1,415 operational aircraft serviceable in versions to India and the Far East, in spite of the Command being reached in January, 1943. over 600 aircraft lost or damaged before the During the first two months of the campaign an enemy was* checked in early July and in spite average of 90 fighters a week were sent from of the record number of sorties that had to be all sources into the desert—a record figure of flown by the R.A.F. in helping to ensure that the 167 being reached during the first week in check was a permanent one. November. A steady supply of from 350 to 380 The summer campaign, had once more driven aircraft a month came from the repair units, home the lesson that efficient salvage and repair which by October had reached such a pitch of organizations are absolutely essential in modern production that they were able to turn out in warfare. The Base Salvage Depot had been so that month 450 airframes and nearly 850 engines —remarkable figures compared with the 100 air­ developed that, in spite of the speed of the frames and 150 engines of November, 1941, less enemy's advance, all repairable aircraft except than a year before. about half a dozen were retrieved and we lost only 3,000 tons of aviation spfrit, much of which The immediate effect of this output from re­ was destroyed, and 1,000 tons of explosives, some pair was to make squadrons less reliant on the of which was later recovered. flow of new aircraft. The majority of new air­ craft arriving over the reinforcement routes was, The October Offensive in fact, available for arming new squadrons and There was no doubt, once the October offensive re-arming existing squadrons with more up-to­ had opened, that we had won the supply race. date types, thus improving the quality as well The enemy had not expected us to be in a po­ as the strength of the air force. sition to attack before December or January. In spite of the long lines of supply, transport But while the R.A.F. and the Navy were attend­ difficulties were overcome with the help of the ing to the enemy's supply position, our own had Army organization, particularly in movements by been built up. When the time came for the rail and sea. Through the efforts of the R.A.F. Vlllth Army to advance, ground and air forces Supply and Transport Columns, which carried were at last equipped to withstand a long-sustain­ forward fuel and explosives from the railheads 1 ed campaign-^ajjd* the enemy was not. ;I>I v to newly-captured landing grounds, constant As regards the aircraft, prior,to^he offensive and fighter-bomber pressure was main­ some 1,000 vtferje serviceable in ^he scjuadrdns. lemy. At the fall of Tripoli in January, the M.T. companies en delivering to Air Stores Parks and squadrons, on—and defeated—the Italians~mTne first desert nearly 1,500 miles from base, equipment for campaign. which neither rail nor sea transport was avail­ What is thought of the maintenance organiza­ able. Particularly urgent material was flown up tion by the air force that fought the recently- by the transport squadrons, which also achieved finished campaign is shown in the following some memorable "lifts" of complete fighter wings message from the A.O.C., Western Desert, Air to harass the enemy from positions where R.A.F. Vice Marshal H. Broadhurst, D.S.O., D.F.C., fighter operations were least expected. A.F.C. :— "Now that the campaign in North The Air Stores Parks and Repair and Salvaga Africa is successfully concluded, I would like to Units themselves were highly mobile. The for­ express the appreciation of the Western Desert ward A.S.P., entirely carried on wheels, could Air Force for the magnificent support we have strike camp and be on the way within two hours, received from the Delta maintenance and supply could pitch camp and be ready for issues within organization. This campaign has provided an in­ half an hour, and could also issue spares and credible administrative problem, but in spite of consumable stores on the roadside. The special­ the fact that our lines of communication event­ ly-constructed vehicles of the Base Salvage ually extended up to a distance of 1,700 miles, Depot collected damaged aircraft from points we have never lacked anything and any urgent 800 miles away over the desert, often doing demands have always been met with a courtesy round trips of 1,600 to 1,800 miles. and willingness which has been most encourag­ ing to our efforts against the enemy. This A Triumph of Maintenance campaign will go down to history as a triumph This article has given some idea of the achieve­ of administration, and I will be most pleased if ments of R.A.F. organization in a campaign that you will convey to the departments concerned has been a triumph of administration. It is a the very real gratitude of the Western Desert far cry from the days when a few men, a few Air Force."

'Queen Marys" en route from the desert- zvith salvaged aircraft.

WED THE SELECTION OP EXTRACTS from the Opera­ "Flying Control—New Style" marks a new tions Record Book& in this number of the R.A.F. phase in the varied operations by the R.A.F. Ar­ Middle East Review covers a wide field in events moured Car Companies, and may foreshadow a and geography. The first, 33 Squadron's ex­ greater development later. Item number four, periences in Crete in May, 1941, is a reminder of the surrender of a fortified island to a forced- the way air supremacy and initiative has been landed, non-combatant aircraft, is unique in the taken from the Axis air forces. The enemy's history of capitulation, and it is worth noting ability to learn from his successes in no way that the original mission of the aircraft was to equals our ability to learn from our reverses, and rescue a German pilot from a watery grave. there can be no doubt that the disasters of 1940 The visit of Lord Trenchard, Marshal of the and 1941 laid the foundation stones for the suc­ Royal Air Force, to 178 Squadron is briefly des­ cesses of 1943. cribed in item number five. The photographs It is a far cry from Crete to Seychelles, where, were attached as an Appendix to the squadron's on the edge of the Middle East Command, air­ Form 540, and complete an interesting record. craft maintain anti-submarine patrols on the vital supply routes which cross the Indian Ocean. No. 1. Two Years Ago. The account of the domestic and business life of (From 33 Squadron. May, 1941.) 209 Squadron detachment at this out of the way Malerae, Crete, 1.5.41. At this time the Squadron spot is a good example of how valuable Form 540 was stationed at Maleme, its strength consisting can become in keeping squadron history. of four Hurricanes, eight pilots and an ample

145 number of ground crews under a Flight Sergeant, 09.00 hrs. A few hours after the bombing a large with no spares of any description and only two number of ME. 109s straffed the aerodrome for boxes of tools. half an hour. Since our strength was somewhat depleted as Three Hurricanes took off to intercept, Sgt. the result of the evacuation from Greece, the Ripsher and Sgt. Reynish getting off before Squadron joined forces with the remnants of 80 the straffing had developed. In the third ma­ Squadron, who were also stationed at Maleme, chine S/Ldr. Howell took off as the aerodrome and with their four Hurricanes and three pilots was being straffed. He passed 20 yards to the we became known as "The Hurricane Unit, Crete." rear of one enemy aircraft, and across the path No. 80 Squadron had no ground crews what­ of another, but keeping very low until he reach­ ever, all maintenance for the "Unit" being done ed the hills, he was able to climb safely. A few by 33 Squadron's crews. minutes later he shot down one ME. 109 con­ N.B. This narrative only concerns the experien­ firmed. ces of 33 Squadron's personnel and not those of Meanwhile, Sgt. Reynish was in combat with the whole Hurricane Unit. three enemy aircraft, one of which was seen to dive steeply into the hills after the Hurricane From the beginning of May a normal routine nad made an astern attack. Sgt. Reynish was was maintained, consisting of protective patrols then attacked by nine more ME. 109s and all over ships evacuating from Greece until about disappeared behind the hills. At the same time May 4th, followed by standing patrols over Suda Sgt. Ripsher sighted six enemy aircraft out to Bay and a number of "scrambles" during the sea and attacked. One enemy aircraft was seen following week. Two of these "scrambles" were to dive steeply towards the sea. Sgt. Ripsher successful in intercepting the enemy. was also attacked and his aircraft damaged, and 3.5.41. In the first of these F/O Woods and Sgt. was killed whilst making his approach to the Genders encountered about 24 JU.88s, F/O aerodrome. Sgt. Reynish was shot down and Woods shooting down one confirmed and damag­ baled out over the sea, and succeeded in swim­ ing a second, while Sgt. Genders damaged four. ming a distance of two miles back to safety. In 4.5.41. In the second engagement F/O Woods the first raid one Hurricane was burnt out on and F/O Noel-Johnson encountered twelve more the ground, while in the evening raid a second JU.88s, each pilot damaging at least two enemy was also destroyed, besides aircraft of other aircraft. units on the aerodrome. 5.5.41. F/O Noel-Johnson intercepted a single S/Ldr. Howell returned after an absence of JU.88 on reconnaissance, but was unable to get three and a half hours, having landed at Betimo within effective range. to refuel and re-arm. 6.5.41. By this date our serviceability of air­ Maleme. 14.5.41. One ME. 109 exploded in mid­ craft had been reduced to six, owing to one air­ air above the aerodrome after being hit by an craft landing with its undercarriage up and an­ ack-ack shell. other suffering from internal engine trouble. Use 15.5.41. Two Hurricanes arrived from Egypt. was made of these to keep the other aircraft serviceable. 16.5.41. A number of JU.87s and 88s, escorted by ME.109s, attacked Suda Bay and were in­ 12.5.41. On the evening of May 12th S/Ldr. tercepted by S/Ldr. Howell, who shot down one Howell arrived from Egypt and took charge of ME. 109 confirmed and one JU. 87 "probably.' the Hurricane Unit. Six other pilots of the Two further ME. 109s were shot down by others, Squadron accompanied the Squadron Leader to the enemy aircraft crashing on Maleme beach relieve those pilots who had been in Crete since and their pilots being taken prisoner. the evacuation of Greece. Six of the latter and and approximately 30 airmen left Crete the same Sgt. Reynish arrived back at the camp. evening by Sunderland for Egypt. 17.5.41. A small force of enemy aircraft bomb­ The spotter system was introduced so that air­ ed Suda Bay and the aerodrome, causing a small men could carry on working although enemy petrol dump on the latter to burn up, but doing no other damage. We were unable to operate aircraft could be seen overhead. in spite of the efforts of the ground crews, who 13.5.41. 11.00 hrs. During flying practice one carried out extensive repairs keenly, efficiently Hurricane (V7800) overshot the aerodrome and and quickly, considering the lack of tools and crashed. spares. The keenness and high morale of the 13.5.41. 21.00 hrs. Three enemy aircraft drop­ airmen was largely due to the excellent work of ped bombs in the close vicinity of the aerodrome F/Sgt. Salmon who, in difficult circumstances, and Maleme village and machine-gunned the organised various games which definitely helped aerodrome surroundings, but no damage was to keep up their spirits. done. 18.5.41. The aerodrome was dive-bombed and 14.5.41. 06.00 hrs. One enemy aircraft dropped straffed at intervals throughout the day, the most six bombs on west ,side of aerodrome, .damaging serious raid taking place at 14.30 hours, during Blenheims of 30 Squadron which were already g^^ftqUfr BQqrti ^jxt it ,on a Hur­ unserviceable. rice

146 men in a slit trench and a third burying two dolier of 50 rounds hanging from the branch of Greek civilians. The three airmen were quickly a tree nearby. Though there was some consi­ dug out and were still alive but suffering from derable danger of his being killed, he got out shock. A.C. De Comeau, who was in a trench of the trench, made his way to the tree, grabbed near that in which the Greeks were buried, left the bandolier and returned safely to the trench, his own place of safety, and proceeded to ex­ having drawn a good deal of fire from the enemy: tricate the two Greeks while bombing and straf­ Having used up this supply the party, now num­ fing was still in progress. bering only four, had to make a dash for our In the evening F/Sgt. Salmon and W/O Clarke, main body of defenders. After several hazard­ with about 20 airmen, left Crete by Sunderland ous adventures, all four eventually succeeded in for Egypt. reaching our lines safely. 19.5.41. Attempts were made to build more pens With constant protection from ME. 109s, ME. for our aircraft, but repeated straffing raids 110s and ME. 112s and with co-operation of made this impossible. It is believed that (ME.112s JU. 87s bombing our gun posts, the parachutists were used besides ME.109s for these raids. were not long in capturing our Squadron Head­ Sgt. Bennett flew back our one remaining quarters and those of the New Zealanders. In Hurricane to Egypt. spite of the incessant bombing and straffing of our ack-ack posts, the latter took a heavy toll of 20.5.41. On the morning of the 20th began .the gliders and troop carriers before being silenced long-awaited airborne invasion of Crete, heavy or captured. bombing and straffing by large formations of enemy aircraft heralding the arrival of hun­ Several attempts were made to encircle the dreds of parachute troops as they dropped from hill, to which all airmen who were not captured JU. 52s flying at only a few hundred feet above or wounded had made their way to re-inforce the ground, some of them towing gliders which the New Zealanders, but all attacks were suc­ were released over the dry river bed which ran cessfully beaten back, some at the bayonet point. along one side of the aerodrome. After being taken prisoner by parachutists a 04.15 hours. However, every man was on duty party of our airmen, together with some of 30 at 04.15 hours standing by in pre-arranged de­ Squadron, was made to march up the hill to­ fensive positions, so that the aerodrome person­ wards our lines. Our forces opened fire against nel were by no means taken by surprise. the enemy, killing some of the "hostages" and After the first few aerial attacks that morn­ wounding L.A.C. Hutchinson. Four of the R.A.F. ing, all personnel were ordered to take up de­ personnel were later able to escape. fensive positions with the New Zealanders who On several occasions the similarity of the had several gun posts in the vicinity of the camp. R.A.F. Home pattern blue uniform to that of the parachutists resulted in many casualties to 07.30 hours. At 07.30 hours while personnel were our men through the action of our own troops. attempting to have some breakfast, an extreme­ ly heavy bombing attack was made on the de­ 20.5.41. 17.00 hours. At approximately 17.00 fensive positions of the hill adjoining the aero­ hours JU.52s made attempts to land on Maleme drome, whilst the first loads of parachutists land­ aerodrome but were driven off by three guns of ed on the camp. The gliders (each containing the New Zealand Artillery. about 20 men) and towed in "trains" of four, 18.30 hours. By this time our position on the hill were mostly wrecked or burnt on landing. Many was becoming very bad, and after various enga­ landed very near our machine-gun posts, their gements in which we used a few odd "I" tanks, numbers enabling them to overcome our posts which were put out of action by German anti­ almost immediately and use the guns against our tank guns, the position had to be evacuated. A own troops. new position was taken up about a mile further One party of parachutists of about 30 in num­ back on another hill. ber landed all around a trench in which eight 23.00 hours. At 23.00 hours it was decided to of our airmen were sheltering, so cutting them evacuate the casualties from the new position. off from the main body of defenders, but these After this was finished, most of our airmen eight men managed to maintain a regular and walked seven miles further to the rear to join accurate fire which killed at least thirteen of the New Zealand Company's H.Q. established in the enemy. Meanwhile, however, out of the eight a wood. of our men, three were killed and one wounded during the action. One of the killed was A.C. 21.5.41. The day was spent helping the New 'Eaton who volunteered to make a dash for his Zealanders as best as possible. The latter had tent to replenish their dwindling supply of am­ with them eight parachutists as prisoners. munition, but on reaching the tent he was ap­ Straffing and bombing continued at regular parently spotted, as the tent was riddled with intervals during the successful landings on the machine-gun bullets from which he could not aerodrome. JU. 8,7s released hundreds of small have escaped. No more was seen of him. metal/, ol^cts^wliiih whined during their fall, r Ammunition supplies were nowfextremely-lo w '" " ' ' jp take cover while the enemy but fortunately 943205 A.C. Jones noticed! a;ban­ At nightfall the Squadron was nearly prisoners of war. The fates of the 55 men and rounded again, but Maories managed to clear the two latter pilots mentioned remain unknown. the road to Canea, leaving the Squadron in a P.S. When reading this report allowance must safer position. be made for small inaccuracies, as under the cir­ Between Maleme and Canea. 22.5.41. Little cumstances of the fighting it was not possible to enemy activity took place during the morning. keep an official and accurate record of events. Some straffing was carried out by ME. 110s, but Such events as are here recorded are written enemy snipers proved almost as worrying as the down from information received from a number enemy aircraft. of sources—mostly from the diaries and memories 15.00 hours. The Squadron was ordered to take of those who participated in the events described. up new positions on the top of another hill and prepare for another attack. No. 2. "Seychelles Detachment." 17.30 hours. Attack started, but was repulsed (From 209 Squadron. May, 1943.) at the bayonet point by the Maories. JU.88s The even tenor of life at the R.A.F. Station and ME.110s bombed and straffed a village at at Seychelles received a serious shaking up as the rear of our positions. a result of our determination to improve condi­ 23.5.41. 05.00 hours. The Squadron retired with tions generally down there. The Engineer's of­ a number of New Zealanders across country to ficers were politely but firmly requested to H.Q. New Zealand Forces, where they met F.A.A. move from their very comfortable bedrooms and personnel and more members of the Squadron. spacious private balconies in the one main build­ All proceeded eastwards along the road to Canea, ing and the Major—Engineer Officer in Charge— being straffed every fifteen minutes for some was also asked to relinquish his claim to the ten miles. On reaching Canea the H.Q., R.A.F. large banda next to the main building. We then evacuated the party to Traivoros, some fifteen converted the large wardrobes, which were left miles east of Suda. in the vacated bedrooms, into commodious filing cabinets, the Victorian washstands into desks Traivoros. 24.5.41. Party stayed in hiding all and the pot de chambre cabinets into handy fil­ day, while waves of JU.87s, DO.17s and HE. ing cupboards and typewriter stands. One room Ills bombed Canea, the attack lasting for six was rapidly converted into the Ops. Room and hours. A naval 12" gun mounted at Suda Bay the other into " Cyphers," and the two large ad­ shelled the aerodrome at Maleme throughout the joining balconies knocked into one and made day. into a first class signalling platform, with a clear, 25.5.41. Party still in hiding. At least three uninterrupted view of the whole harbour as far JU.88s shot down. as Praslin Island, several miles away. 25.5.41. Party left Traivoros packed very tight­ The banda next to this building, which the ly in lorries and travelling throughout the night Major had used as a sort of sail loft, was clear­ over a 7,000 ft. mountain range to the south coast ed of rats, lizards and dirt; palm leaf mats were of Crete, they reached a spot about five miles laid on the floor and more Victorian furniture east of Spahkia. All transports were then sys­ was obtained from various sources; the sail loft tematically wrecked. was thus rapidly transformed into a delightful mid-Victorian open air parlour, complete except 27.5.41. Everyone lay in hiding in caves or wadis for plush curtains, anti-macassas and "love- throughout the day. seats." 28.5.41. Army lorries and ambulances arrived with wounded and troops, who were straffed all There was, of course, a bar fitted up in one day. corner of the ante-room. Finally, the long room on the ground floor of the main building, which At night orders were given to move west­ runs the length of the two upper rooms combin­ wards. Most of the able-bodied men carried ed, was turned into a spacious and cool dining stretcher cases for three miles, having to cover room, with white-washed walls, red poplin very rough ground, being bombed at intervals. curtains—purchased in the local town—and im­ Spahkia. 28.5.41. 03.00 hours. Spahkia was posing looking Indian prints on the wall—also reached where three destroyers were lying to purchased in the town. take off survivors. The results of our labours have proved more 03.30 hours. All three destroyers, loaded to ca­ than satisfactory. There is little to mention of pacity, sailed for Egypt. Flying Duties as all flights were either transit Alexandria. 29.5.41. Six JU.88s attacked the between Seychelles, Diego Suarez and return to ships without success, all reaching Alexandria Seychelles or test flights. No enemy activity safely at 17.30 hours. was encountered on any of these trips nor any The Squadron lost about 55 men as well as hazards met with—except for unfortunate Cata­ S/Ldr. Howell, P/O Butcher, P/O Dunscombe lina 'L.' and .Sgts. Reynish, Loverid Currents are bad at Tambeau Bay and storms With the exception of P/O '.was approaching to land when she Reynish, all those pilots ar by a down current, bounced heavily in the sea, and ripped a large hole in the galley compartment. The pilot manoeuvred her extremely. off the sea again, not realizing how badly damag­ ed she was until the air gunner seeing land and No. 3. Flying Control—New Style. sea panoramed through the galley compartment (From No. 2 Armoured Car Company. April, 1943.) deck, tapped him on the shoulder and acquainted him with that fact. The pilot, after studying Tunisia. 6th April. A half section of No. 2 the situation from all angles, decided that the Armoured Car Company advanced with N.Z. only thing to do would be to land as close in­ Headquarters through the gap made by the 50th shore as possible and make a dash for the beach. Division under shell fire from the enemy who This he did, causing further damage to the were in defensive positions. Catalina, perhaps, but undoubtedly saving the 7th April. Reached south of Sidi Mehedb where lives of the crew and passengers through his aircraft of No. 7 S.A.A.F. Wing and 57 Pursuit clear thinking and calm handling of the aircraft. Group, U.S.A.F., were controlled and directed on All who were in that aircraft then are away the enemy M.T. moving along the Maknassy- again on detachment in Tulear and the pilot is Mezzouna road. Great success was achieved by now Captain of aircraft 'N.' directing the bombing and straffing, the aircraft There is little else to relate in viewing the being controlled by R/T from Armoured Cars in month's activities. Tunis and Bizerta fell, the visual range of the targets. This is the first African Campaign ended and the great victory time that Allied aircraft have been direct­ was duly celebrated. In the midst of our labours ed on to enemy targets by R/T contact from on a combined operations building with the Navy Armoured Cars, the controller actually being in we were suddenly recalled to Mombasa on more visual range of the target. In the late after­ urgent duties. There are 'IT-boats down south noon our position was heavily shelled by 88 mm. and we are off to Tulear and Durban to per­ guns attacking the 8th Armoured Brigade. suade Jerry how unhealthy that area is for 'U'­ 8th April. Aircraft of No. 7 S.A.A.F. Wing boat operations. and 244 Wing contacted with success. Our farewell to Government House at Sey­ 9th April. Two Armoured Cars left main party chelles was a little touching. Poor Mrs. Logan! and returned to Advanced Air Headquarters. One She was having such a lot of trouble with her Armoured Car and one tender remained with N.Z. household, we had not been able to provide her Divisional H.Q. and maintained contact with with any of the cheese she longed for so much, fighter-bomber aircraft. Advanced to Telil where the Governor's whisky had dwindled down to a there was slight shelling. Six enemy tanks were mysteriously infinitesimal amount and the cho­ knocked out by 8th Armoured Brigade. colate which we had all been contributing to both 10th April. Continued with N.Z. Division H.Q. of them out of our ration would cease upon our and advanced along main road to the main Sfax departure. They both looked very forlorn as they road which was cut at La Hencha. stood waving from Government House steps as we- left. 12th April. Entered Sousse with N.Z. Division and continued on road to Enfidaville stopping Leaving Seychelles at 06.15 hours, we were at Sidi Bou Alt where slight shelling was en­ waterborne at Mombasa at 14.30 hours, after fly­ countered. ing through one successive rain storm after an­ other; and immediately our feet were placed on 14th April. The two Armoured Cars which terra firma we discovered that there were had proceeded to Air Headquarters rejoined cuckoos in our nest. Nearly the whole of our party. Squadron were away on detachment, either in 16th April. Advanced to five miles north of Durban or Tulear, and the officers not on attach­ Sidi Bou Ali. ment sick in hospital or away on leave. The 20th April. Moved to four miles south of cuckoos in the nest were a Squadron which had Tacrouna and contacted No. 6 Squadron on R/T, recently arrived from the United Kingdom. the armoured cars directing them on to the Apart from Squadron movements there have targets. Very hilly country and bad visibility. been no structural alterations at Kipevu since we Tanks of the 15th Panzer Division reported as went down to Seychelles. Food conditions, after being north of Tacrouna. a temporary improvement, are now worse than 26th April. Proceeded to re-join Company at ever. Rats still chase each other in hundreds over our rafters, and joyfully take their fill of Hergla. our shaving soap and tunic buttons; mosquitoes No. 4. The R.A.F. Captures Lampedusa. have become more belligerent than ever and (From R.A.F. Station, Hal Far. June, 1943.) malaria has been carrying numerous bodies off to hospital cots and patient nursing sisters; our The Air/Sea Rescue Swordfish "P" was des­ Mess remains the same except that heat has patched at 11.00 hours, 12th June, on a search jigsawed our Mural with enormous cracks all for a dinghy containing a shot-down German over the landscape, and we have a new radio­ pilot. The pilot was later picked up by a High grairioplione. Speed Launch, but the Swordfish failed to re­

149 turn to base after its maximum endurance of No. 5. A Distinguished Visit. seven and a quarter hours. An A.S.R. Beaufort (From 178 Squadron. June, 1943.) and Wellington carried out a search for it but Lord Trenchard, Marshal of the Royal Air sighted nothing, the visibility being poor. It Force, accompanied by the Deputy A.O.Grin-C, was later learnt that the Swordfish had failed to R.A.F., M.E., Air Marshal Sir F.J. Linnell, K.C.B., locate base owing to the bad weather, and, hav­ General Brereton, Commanding Ninth U.S.A.A.F., ing compass trouble and being almost out of Brig.-General U.G. Ent, Commanding 9th Bomb­ fuel, had landed on Lampedusa aerodrome which er Command, U.S.A.A.F., visited the Squadron. was still in the hands of the Italians. The Is­ Lord Trenchard presented 40404 W/Cdr. J.J. land was in the process of being heavily bombed McKay, D.F.C., with the American Distinguished by the N.A.A.F. and the pilot was offered the Flying Cross. After the presentation Lord Tren­ surrender of the Island in between raids. The chard gave a talk to all Squadron personnel, and Swordfish refuelled, took off, and landed near had many informal chats with both aircrew and Sousse to announce the surrender of Lampedusa, ground staff members of the Squadron.

Photographs of Lord Trenchard's vhi

150 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

is due to the Officers Commanding

THE SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE

AIR STAFF INTELLIGENCE H.Q., R.A.F., M.E.

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For their kind permission and co-operation in the production of material for this number of

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151 THE UEXT ISSUE

HISTORY Conquest of Sicily - Invasion of Italy Activity in the Aegean -, Attack on Ploesti

THE R.A.F. REGIMENT

MEDICAL RECEIVING STATIONS IN THE WESTERN DESERT

AIR TRANSPORT

FJLYING CONTROL., PART II

EVACUATION OF WOUNDED BY AIR

FROU THE 54©'i

ETC.

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