(B) Methods/Sources Py' (2)(G) Foreign Relations CI

41$ TX 4, 41 15;(4. V 1,1 .1 444, 11-.144,t 4 "..Y;w4 <IP 4, )bt45 6 . .; • ./..01b4 CLEAR lIKT2 CnICEXO SEtiRLT 4adaci, ZINag,BEFORE INITIATING*Cke A TION BASED ON THIS MEMORANUDir 8TRA1EGIC SERVICES UNIT, ma DEPARIMIT Washington, D.C. 30 September 1946 COUNTRY: Japan, Northern Europe. SUBJECT: Japanese Wartime Intelligence Activitie orthern Europe, DATE OF INFORMATION: 1940-1946, with earlier bac • EVALUATION: B-2, sept_as Viere noted; • REFKiENCES: ( :-:ea.,, Major General Makoto -- Biographical Sketch : SU, 25 September 1946, DB 41226. (b) .• OUCUI, Major General Birose, and BIROSE, Colonel Eiichi -- Biographical Sketches or: SSU, 25 September 1946, DB i1229. (o) INOUE, Yoichi; ITO, Colonel Kiyokazu; KIGOSHI. Major Taeukazu; SO; Kichinosuk44 and SATO, Major iateuya -- Biographical Sketches of: SSU, 27 Sept. 1946, DB #1246. (d) 0there..-aa:.indidifria7 The following survey is based on information obtained from N. : linterrogation of subjects of References (a), 01) and (c) at Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, by ) a representative of SSU. caamumas under interrogation fraa 6 May to 20 Jay 1946, the others from 3 June to 20 July. • , (_ ntents I. Introduction. II. Development and Objectives of the Offices of Military Attache at Stockholm and Helsinki. III. Intelligence Aids and Methods. 1, Finances N, • 2. Communications 3. Methods 'Used in the Gathering of Intelli- gence and the Maintenance of Security. IV. Contacts and Sources 1. Polish 2. Finnish and Baltic • S. German 4, Hungarian 5. Smedish 6. Relations with Other Japanese Missions in Europe V. Summary of Intelligence Obtained I. INTRODUCTION Statements made under interrogation by.subjects of References (a), (b) and (c) -- particularly ONODERA, Japanese Military Attache at Stockholm from 1941 to 1945, and ONOUCIU, who held the sans post at Helsinki from 1940 to 1944 -- have revealed the DB #1225 - 1 - SECRET ...CONTROL .1 1.1 EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b) (2)(A) Privacy (2)(B) Methods/Sources py (2)(G) Foreign Relations CI c_ Declassified and Approved for Release NAZI WAR CRIMES D by the Central Intelligence Agency ISCLOSURE ACT Dat: 5- ) tit? Vrif? 46: •7\:•1, Ced copy /- • RECREir -CONTROL following important and hitherto little icncan facts about Japanese intelligence activities in Europe before and during World War II. First, the Japanese Army General Staff ho.s for nany years collaborated closely with the General Staffs of the Polish, Finnish, Estonian, and Latvian Armies in subversive end intelligence activities against Russia. After the outbreak of war in the Pacific, the r astern Allies were also included as one of their targets. This collaboration included the exchange by official agreont3nt of General Staff officers ; for training and instruction, the exchange of orypto-o.naly-tic and other intelligence material, joint financing end planning of subversive operations in peace as well as in war, and joint training and direction of espionage end sabotage agents. Second, in Europe the Japanese Nilitary Attachas functioned as leading fig- urea in all such activities. Both in peace and in war they were responsible not only for normal diplomatic duties and the generally recognized intelligence work of military representatives in foreign countries, but also for every ldnd of subversive activity including direct contact with espionage end sabotage agents, maintenance of clandestine comantioationa, radio interception and illegal commercial operation. In Sweden, Finland, Poland and the Baltic states, they were the only Japanese to do this work, and there ,is little if any evidence to show that the Envy or the Foreign Office played more than a secondary role insofar as intelligence was concerned. • Third, ONODERA and ONOUCHI themselves had been trained for years as specialists in Russian intelligence. When the former was first sent to Sweden it was in that ca- pacity only. However, as the war developed his office gradually beams the most important Japanese espionage peat in Europe with directives covering all fronts and with aloes to 2,000,000 Yen bold at his disposal for intelligence operations. Efts organliation, through rhich be obtained outetandingly successful results, was based on the collaboration already mentioned. RYBIKONSIa, former head of the German Seotion• in Department II of the Polish General Staff, worked in his office .Z. .or almost three and a half years. NAASING, former chief of Department II of the Estonian General Staff end, officially a refugee in Stockholm, was his chief agent throughout the war. When the Finnish crygto-anedytic section under HALLAM it fled to Sweden they relied on 0110D2tA for funds and placed the results of their work at his disposal. In addition to these he also had a source within the Swedish General Staff in the person of Major PETERSEN and he made extensive txxchanges of intelligence material with Earl Heinz KRAMER, who is generally acknowledged to have been one of the Abwehr , a most ancoess- i!ratoro. ii —••••••• — . a_ - 2 - SECRET .CONTROL Xl. DE1TEL0-1 ... IT An. 011,n3CTIVE:I OP TNL! 0:771(.2 C7 HILIW,RY ATTAM AT STOCKHOLM AND RELSIM1 A. STOCLIOLII 1. Appointment and Authority ONODERA was appointed to the post of Military Attache at Stockholm in November 1940 and aosumed it officially on 5 February 1941, succeeding Coltnel NISHIMURA Toshio, an expert on Russia and Finland. He vao told that the Ruscian and German Sections in Department II of the Imperial General Staff wanted him stationed in Europe as one of their foremost Russian specialiets. Nis job wan to be an observer and to study the war from what was considered a second line position, in contrast with the first line of quasi-operational posts in the belligerent countries. Such an assignment seemed the more fitting in that the study of strategy was another of his specialties. OtTODEF.A. stresses that his office in Stockholm VAS never planned as an active intellim,ence center and became so only as a result of the progress of the war. Hewn° always handicapped by the fact that ho had left Japan entirely unprepared for such a development and there- fore never obtained the staff or equipment appropriate to an operational inbellirence post. Though accredited only to the Swedish Government, hares considered responsible also for Norway and Denmark. Ho frequently went to Norway, where he had vied connections in German military ciroles. Denmark was kept closed by the Germans because of unsettled conditions, and he succeeded in going there only on his way to Berlin and for one meeting with the representatives of Ast Oslo. MODEM was not connected administratively with any °tiler military mission in Europe. Be claims to hr,re been campletely independent even ritliWthe Japanese Legation at Stockholm, and citas as evidence the facts that his funds were separate (he had no contact with MUMMA, the Legation paymaster) and that he had a personal code for direct oammunication with Tokyo. 2. Directives The directives which ONODERA received from Tokyo changed, as did the nature of his work, with the progress of the war. In general they were of two types, basin and special. Be never felt bound by them and frequently acted on personal initiative when he thought he could best ierve his countrys interests in that way. a. Basic Directives i. General intelligence on Russia-military, technical,politioal and, economic. This was proper to the Stockholm post and fitted in with his awn previous training. General intelligence on Germany. This was also a regular target for the Stockholm post. It was altered somewhat as Japan and Germany became more closely allied, but continued nevertheless throughout the war. iii. General intelligence on Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and, after August 1944, Finland and the Baltio countries. iv. Study of the general strategic development of the war. v, Study of new tactical methods developed by both aided. Japanese military publications an this subject, some of which had been prepared by ONODERA himself, were considered to be out-dated. General intelligence on the western Allies (after 8 December 1941). -3- SECRET CONTROL ' • kl ":1•4 ,c1-• ri 4K-ht-sc;'. .11 1:; kC; ,• 0 : • co py CECRW .CCUTROL b. Special nirect:.ves Fepruary 1941. To c) loot all material on Gorman propara_ tic= for the invasion of Britain, rith particular emphasis on the cperational date. OHODERK sayc that Tokyo evidently wished to coordinate plans in the Pasifio with German action in Europe. He reported on the basis of information obtained from German and Estonian sources that not Britain but Russia was about to be invaded. Tokyo GHQ had been receiving contrary reports from °SHEA in Berlin and at first rofueed to believe ONODERA. When hio rife arrived in May 1941, dhe warned him that Head- quarters , officials were very displeased with him and that he could expect to be recalled. September 1944. To make arrangements to take over the espionage organizations of the Axis powers. (For an account of 0170DERAs attempts to do tibia soe "Japanese Wartime Collaboration with the German Intelligence Service" -- SSG, 4 October 1946, BB #1239.) May 1945. To collect all information on the redeployment of the Allied tomes in the European theater to the Far East. Iv. February 1944. To purchase ball bearings in Sweden, regardless of the laus forbidding their exportation. This was an espeoially urgent directive. ONODERA made three unsuccessful attempts to carry kb -out. The first was through the Bulgarian Minister NICOLAIEFF andercialAttaohéSERAFIEG7 the Coszs, who had agreed to make the purchgE77175FEETTEa7RFFEEFTUFTRe shipment to Germany where the ball bearings were to be forwarded to Japan by submarine or blockade runner. However, Bulgaria surrendered before it was possible to carry this out. The second attempt was through VOECZKOENDY and othero of the Hungarian Legation. This also failed because Hungary was invaded. The third was through a Swedieh contact, ERIC ERICSSOt who claimed to have made the necessary arrangements with FINKS, the representative of the S.D.

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