41$ TX 4, 41 15; (4. V 1,1 .1 444, 11-.144,t 4 "..Y;w4 . .; • ./..01b4 CLEAR lIKT2 CnICEXO SEtiRLT 4adaci, ZINag,BEFORE INITIATING*Cke A TION BASED ON THIS MEMORANUDir 8TRA1EGIC SERVICES UNIT, ma DEPARIMIT Washington, D.C. 30 September 1946 COUNTRY: Japan, Northern Europe. SUBJECT: Japanese Wartime Intelligence Activitie orthern Europe, DATE OF INFORMATION: 1940-1946, with earlier bac • EVALUATION: B-2, sept_as Viere noted; • REFKiENCES: ( :-:ea.,, Major General Makoto -- Biographical Sketch : SU, 25 September 1946, DB 41226. (b) .• OUCUI, Major General Birose, and BIROSE, Colonel Eiichi -- Biographical Sketches or: SSU, 25 September 1946, DB i1229. (o) INOUE, Yoichi; ITO, Colonel Kiyokazu; KIGOSHI. Major Taeukazu; SO; Kichinosuk44 and SATO, Major iateuya -- Biographical Sketches of: SSU, 27 Sept. 1946, DB #1246. (d) 0there..-aa:.indidifria7 The following survey is based on information obtained from N. : linterrogation of subjects of References (a), 01) and (c) at Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, by ) a representative of SSU. caamumas under interrogation fraa 6 May to 20 Jay 1946, the others from 3 June to 20 July. • , (_ ntents I. Introduction. . II. Development and Objectives of the Offices of Military Attache at Stockholm and Helsinki. III. Intelligence Aids and Methods. 1, Finances N, • 2. Communications 3. Methods 'Used in the Gathering of Intelli- gence and the Maintenance of Security. IV. Contacts and Sources 1. Polish 2. Finnish and Baltic • S. German 4, Hungarian 5. Smedish 6. Relations with Other Japanese Missions in Europe V. Summary of Intelligence Obtained I. INTRODUCTION Statements made under interrogation by.subjects of References (a), (b) and (c) -- particularly ONODERA, Japanese Military Attache at Stockholm from 1941 to 1945, and ONOUCIU, who held the sans post at Helsinki from 1940 to 1944 -- have revealed the DB #1225 - 1 - SECRET ...CONTROL .1 1.1 EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b) (2)(A) Privacy (2)(B) Methods/Sources py (2)(G) Foreign Relations CI c_ Declassified and Approved for Release NAZI WAR CRIMES D by the Central Intelligence Agency ISCLOSURE ACT Dat: 5- ) tit? Vrif? 46: •7\:•1, Ced copy /- • RECREir -CONTROL following important and hitherto little icncan facts about Japanese intelligence activities in Europe before and during World War II. First, the Japanese Army General Staff ho.s for nany years collaborated close- ly with the General Staffs of the Polish, Finnish, Estonian, and Latvian Armies in subversive end intelligence activities against Russia. After the outbreak of war in the Pacific, the r astern Allies were also included as one of their targets. This collaboration included the exchange by official agreont3nt of General Staff officers ; for training and instruction, the exchange of orypto-o.naly-tic and other intelligence material, joint financing end planning of subversive operations in peace as well as in war, and joint training and direction of espionage end sabotage agents. Second, in Europe the Japanese Nilitary Attachas functioned as leading fig- urea in all such activities. Both in peace and in war they were responsible not only for normal diplomatic duties and the generally recognized intelligence work of military representatives in foreign countries, but also for every ldnd of subversive activity including direct contact with espionage end sabotage agents, maintenance of clandestine comantioationa, radio interception and illegal commercial operation. In Sweden, Finland, Poland and the Baltic states, they were the only Japanese to do this work, and there ,is little if any evidence to show that the Envy or the Foreign Office played more than a secondary role insofar as intelligence was concerned. • Third, ONODERA and ONOUCHI themselves had been trained for years as specialists in Russian intelligence. When the former was first sent to Sweden it was in that ca- pacity only. However, as the war developed his office gradually beams the most im- portant Japanese espionage peat in Europe with directives covering all fronts and with aloes to 2,000,000 Yen bold at his disposal for intelligence operations. Efts organliation, through rhich be obtained outetandingly successful results, was based on the collaboration already mentioned. RYBIKONSIa, former head of the German Seotion• in Department II of the Polish General Staff, worked in his office .Z. .or almost three and a half years. NAASING, former chief of Department II of the Estonian General Staff end, officially a refugee in Stockholm, was his chief agent throughout the war. When the Finnish crygto-anedytic section under HALLAM it fled to Sweden they relied on 0110D2tA for funds and placed the results of their work at his disposal. In addition to these he also had a source within the Swedish General Staff in the person of Major PETERSEN and he made extensive txxchanges of intelligence material with Earl Heinz KRAMER, who is generally acknowledged to have been one of the Abwehr , a most ancoess- i!ratoro. ii —••••••• — . a_ - 2 - SECRET .CONTROL Xl. DE1TEL0-1 ... IT An. 011,n3CTIVE:I OP TNL! 0:771(.2 C7 HILIW,RY ATTAM AT STOCKHOLM AND RELSIM1 A. STOCLIOLII 1. Appointment and Authority ONODERA was appointed to the post of Military Attache at Stockholm in November 1940 and aosumed it officially on 5 February 1941, succeeding Coltnel NISHIMURA Toshio, an expert on Russia and Finland. He vao told that the Ruscian and German Sections in Department II of the Imperial General Staff wanted him stationed in Europe as one of their foremost Russian specialiets. Nis job wan to be an observer and to study the war from what was considered a second line position, in contrast with the first line of quasi-operational posts in the belligerent countries. Such an assignment seemed the more fitting in that the study of strategy was another of his specialties. OtTODEF.A. stresses that his office in Stockholm VAS never planned as an active intellim,ence center and became so only as a result of the progress of the war. Hewn° always handicapped by the fact that ho had left Japan entirely unprepared for such a development and there- fore never obtained the staff or equipment appropriate to an operational inbellirence post. Though accredited only to the Swedish Government, hares considered responsible also for Norway and Denmark. Ho frequently went to Norway, where he had vied connections in German military ciroles. Denmark was kept closed by the Germans because of unsettled conditions, and he succeeded in going there only on his way to Berlin and for one meeting with the representatives of Ast Oslo. MODEM was not connected administratively with any °tiler military mission in Europe. Be claims to hr,re been campletely independent even ritliWthe Japanese Legation at Stockholm, and citas as evidence the facts that his funds were separate (he had no contact with MUMMA, the Legation paymaster) and that he had a personal code for direct oammunication with Tokyo. 2. Directives The directives which ONODERA received from Tokyo changed, as did the nature of his work, with the progress of the war. In general they were of two types, basin and special. Be never felt bound by them and frequently acted on personal initiative when he thought he could best ierve his country s interests in that way. a. Basic Directives i. General intelligence on Russia-military, technical,politioal and, economic. This was proper to the Stockholm post and fitted in with his awn previous training. General intelligence on Germany. This was also a regular target for the Stockholm post. It was altered somewhat as Japan and Germany became more closely allied, but continued nevertheless throughout the war. iii. General intelligence on Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and, after August 1944, Finland and the Baltio countries. iv. Study of the general strategic development of the war. v, Study of new tactical methods developed by both aided. Japanese military publications an this subject, some of which had been prepared by ONODERA himself, were considered to be out-dated. General intelligence on the western Allies (after 8 December 1941). -3- SECRET CONTROL • kl ":1•4 ,c1-• ri 4K-ht-sc;'. .11 1:; kC; ,• 0 : • co py CECRW .CCUTROL b. Special nirect:.ves Fe pruary 1941. To c) loot all material on Gorman propara_ tic= for the invasion of Britain, rith particular emphasis on the cperational date. OHODERK sayc that Tokyo evidently wished to coordinate plans in the Pasifio with German action in Europe. He reported on the basis of information obtained from German and Estonian sources that not Britain but Russia was about to be invaded. Tokyo GHQ had been receiving contrary reports from °SHEA in Berlin and at first rofueed to believe ONODERA. When hio rife arrived in May 1941, dhe warned him that Head- quarters , officials were very displeased with him and that he could expect to be recalled. September 1944. To make arrangements to take over the espionage organizations of the Axis powers. (For an account of 0170DERA s attempts to do tibia soe "Japanese Wartime Collaboration with the German Intelligence Service" -- SSG, 4 October 1946, BB #1239.) May 1945. To collect all information on the redeployment of the Allied tomes in the European theater to the Far East. Iv. February 1944. To purchase ball bearings in Sweden, regardless of the laus forbidding their exportation. This was an espeoially urgent directive. ONODERA made three unsuccessful attempts to carry kb -out. The first was through the Bulgarian Minister NICOLAIEFF andercialAttaohéSERAFIEG7 the Coszs, who had agreed to make the purchgE77175FEETTEa7RFFEEFTUFTRe shipment to Germany where the ball bearings were to be forwarded to Japan by submarine or blockade runner. However, Bulgaria surrendered be- fore it was possible to carry this out. The second attempt was through VOECZKOENDY and othero of the Hungarian Legation. This also failed because Hungary was invaded. The third was through a Swedieh contact, ERIC ERICSSOt who claimed to have made the necessary arrangements with FINKS, the representative of the S.D. in Sweden. At one time they planned to vend the ball bearings by air over the northern route, but this scheme also fell through. ERICSSON received about 7000 . kroner for preliminary expenses. OBODERA had been authorized to spend the total of the War Ministry funds in his possession for this purpose. 3. Development of Intelligence Activitiee in Stockholm _ Before the outbreak of the Russo-German war the Japanese mission in Stockholm was regarded as relatively unimportant in the over-all organization for Europe. Even after June 1941 it continued to be neglected by Japanese military circles, who were under strong German influence. At the beginning of 1942 it began to be interesting as an observer s post and it was somewhat rtrangthened by the arrival from Berlin and Paris of newspaper men who began to report on the western Allies to their news ser- vices. A representative each of Mitsui and Mitsubishi was added to tho Military Attachb s office at that time - another Mitsui man a few months later - and in the middle of 1942 a Navel . Attaché s office was created. At the end of the some year, the staff of the Le Gatiou being nearly doubled with the arrival of a now minister (MOTO), a stronger impulse war given to intelli- gence work. Late in 1943 some members of the diplomatic mission co Rome came to ! Stockholm. By mid-1944 the effective distribution of Japanese diplomatic staffs in i _.„1 SECRET _CONTROL 941 , • • oontinental Europe had changed considerably: the Berdai mission had begun to feel that its days rcre nunbored, the French misnion was completely dicsolved, and the •Japanese diplomatic situation in Spain and Portugal had become most uncertain. As a result, Stockholm became a vital point for Japanese intelligence and people were transferred there from each of the places mentioned. At this timo there was again a noted increase in presswork. Finally in 1946 a group of twenty naval officers headed by Admiral ABE arrived from Denmark. (They rore : I nterned by the Sweden, however, and were never able to do any intelligence work.) Notwithstanding these develoaments, ONODERA emphasizes that throughout the war, to the best of his knowledge, his own office was the only Japanese organization in Sweden which was engaged in secret intelligence operations. 4. Office ana Pereonnel The Military AttachA t s office was situated at Linnegatan 26. ONODERA and his family lived in the same apartment building. Other members of the office had their awn houses or flats in Stockholm and its satirise. During the summer months of June, July and August a house was rented near Stockholm at Djursholm, Stockholm Meg i-4. 15. Its eaners were Miss VSOM=OMMPERWIT, sister of the chief of the Swedish General lisifet.6d Staff intelligence Department, and Mks. BERGENDABL, a relative of Minister :of Foreign Affairs. All the office force were frequently invited to this summer place and it was occasionally used for business purposes. When MODER arrived in 1941 his only helper was yowl, a refugee business man. Mrs. OUODERA was obliged to assist with office work until April 1942. when ECM and INOUYE (of Mitsni and Mitsubishi respectively), were assigned to the office. Neither of these men was trained for intellirence work. In October of the same year they were joined by SATO Fichineenke (Mitsui), who came from Berlin not because of his qualifications but to recover from a serious case of ulcers. It was not until early in 1444 when Major SATO Tates:Iva cane from the dis- banded Italian mission that an officer was assigned to ONODERA as Assistant Military Attaché. SATOvas an aircraft engineer with little experience or interest in intelli- gence work. In December 1944 Colonel ITO and Major XIGOSUI were transferred to Stoekholm. Again neither was connected with the General Staff or had had any training in intelligence. The Stockholm office was never provided with the proper stenographic help for work on Japanese reports. OITODERA made repeated requests for a Japanese female secre- tary to be sent from Tokyo, but the outbreak of the Russo-German war made this im- possible. As a result all secretarial work had to be done by his assistants. For a list of personnel of the Office of the Military Attaché at Stookholm, with brief description of each, see APPENDIX A. (The staff of the beat of the Lega- tion is given in APPENDIX D.) 5. Japanese Newspapermen in Stockholm OUODERA states emphatically that no Japanese journalist was ever employed in his office and that he never used one for intelligence work. (Rd explains a prevalent impression to the contrary by the fact that the newspapermen, many of wham liasl.friendeeraong his assistants, were always using his office as their meeting place and that at least once a week Mrs. ONODERA gave Japanese dinner parties to which they were all invited.) He has never hoard of any official arrangement, secret or other- wise, by whichJapanese military missions were connected with newspapermen for intelli- gence. The majority of the journalists, he says, were sent to Stockholm after December 1941 to observe developments in the United States and Great Britain and report on them to the head office of their agencies in Tokyo. They tried to keep in contact with foreign journalists and they made it their buciness to obtain all foreign newspapers and publications which came to Sweden, including thoee wrbioh reached the country illegally in spite of British and American censorship lave. There was much traffic in these and high prices were paid for them. According to OHODERA, the chief source from which they came was the crews of planes arriving fram England. - 5 - SECRET ,CONTROL OPY SSCRT.,COUTRGI. The Japanese journalist° communicated directly with their Tokyo agencies through Swedish cawercial tolezraph cenmanios. They wen able to do so at a reasonable rate because there existed nuival exchange oontracts between Swedish and Japanese news services. In the caao of Dcmoi, ONODERA made an : agreement whereby he could use thdoe facilities and thue avoid delay in reporting non-confidontial in- formation. Until the end of 1942 the Counsellor of the Japanese Legation (KODA JOtaro) was officially in oharge of the journalists. When tho new minister (OKAMOTO) arrived he took them over himself. In the winter of l)44 preen conferences were instituted at the Legation. They were attended by the Minister, the Counsellor and the service attaches or their representatives. The purpose of the meetings was to review the progress of the war and to obtain from the journalists any information of value. They were a failure because none of the journalists ever contributed anything. ONODERA says that he made several uninocossful efforts to use the journalists. Be offered to allow them to send confidential news to Tokyo by using his secret code, but they never availed themselves of it. In 1944 when he was looking for new sources on the western Allies, he oarefu4y oonsideredWach ono of them as a potential inter- mediary with foreign journalists for intelligence purposes. He decided not to use any of them, however, because without exception they lacked the personal initiative and discretion essential to suoliwork, If, for example, they hoard that one of the Legation officials had an interasting toonnection, they almost always broke in to ob- tain a story. On one occasion Majer SATO had a premising contact with RIEDEL. the German Assistaxt Air Attache, whioh was spoiled by KOGO, who was after something sensational. Again, Counsellor KODA had an opportunity to obtain interesting material from the renegade Soviet diplomat DMITIIEVSKY but lost it because of the interference of KOGO and URISHINO. Not until 1946 did ONODERAmeet a journalist who suited his purposes. For an a000unt of this man and his relationship with OUODERA, see SSU memorandum "ENO- MOTO Memotaro," 7 October 1946, DB #1247. Brief notes on the Japanese news services and their representatives in Stockholm will be found in APPENDIX C. B. HELSINKI 1. Appointment and Authority The post whioh Maj. Can. (then Colonel) Hiroae ONOUCHI took over on his arrival. in Helsinki on 29 September 1940 had formerly come under the authority of. the Stob holm Legation and had usually been occupied by an Assistant Military Attache. .It was Changed into a full time position when the outbreak of war against Poland and the 000upation of the Baltic States by the USSR left Finland as the only border state of the Soviet Union in northern Europe. -• - — 74moucni s predecessor, Col, NISHIMURA, continued to serve as Military Attache at Stockholm until relieved by MOM:RA.1n February 1941. 2. Directives ONOUCHI says that he received no special directives from Tokyo Headquarters because he had only one code, the additive of whioh Was ooneidered Weak. Orders were therefore sent more frequently to offices like those in Berlin, Rcme and Stockholm, which had numerous codea end were felt to isomer, secure. His general direotives. were as follows 1. General intelligence on the USSR. Thieves his chief objective. Priority was to be given to order of battle, tactics, forest and street fighting, the use of tanks and new weapons. -6.. SECRET CONTROL ria ,n ".1 LlYz;) SECRET COUTBOL /// GenaraVintelligence covering Finland. Military developments, war potential, political condition. iii. General intelligence covering Germany. This was to be concen- trated on German military activity in Finland and the Baltio area, with priorities similar to those listed under °in. iv. Anglo-American order of battle. (Diroctives concerned with the western Allies were received after December 1941.) T. Anglo-American shipping. vi. Collaboration on crypto-analymis with the Finnish General Staff. This was a highly secret order reeeived from the Cen- tral Speoial Intelligence Bureau of the Imperial General Staff, end ooincided with the arrival of Lt. Col. MOSE Eiichi. The Minister himself was not advised of the nature of H1ROSE s. mission, and all subsequent details were handled only by BIROSE. (See below, III 2. - Communications) 3. Office and Personnel In 1960 the Military Attach l e office and residence were both located at Parkgarten. Later, in 1942 an office was established at 28 Barecan in a louse rented from Col. MERIT. In 1944 the residence at Parkgarten was bombed and OBOCCBM moved to Grankura, where the bulk of the office work (including receipt of ineasages) was carried on, although a small °Moe continued to be maintained in Helsinki. Despite the importance and quantity of the intelligence available at Hel- sinki, ONOCCRI s staff was extremely small. Only one officer was assigned to him permanently as an assistant. He oocasicnaliy received visits fran student officers, but they wore on special miss4ons and oquld not be considered as members of his staff. His civilian assistants were Also inadequate in number. For a list of personnel of the Office of the Military Attach at Helsinki, see APPEPIRX B. 7 - SECRET CONTROL It , .4.:1 i o , 4 „,.. -, ,, v,N1,•■:f ,,,, 1 ..,:Ps 44. , N I ) -;*; ; 0 or .. ,4-‘; k t:1 v, ( 4. It; ,..i. III ".1..-.:1 otso L'S617: . • • 4-■ . • SECRET CONTROL III. INTELLIGENCE AIDS AND METHODS 1. Financee (For supplementary detail see SSU memorandum Wartime Finances of the Japanese Military Attachbs at ftockholm and Heleina," 4 October 1946, DB +12320 A. STOCKHOLM • The funds assigned to the Military Attacha t s Office cane directly from Tokyo and were entirely independent of the Legation. ONODERA dealt with the diplo- matic finance officers only after the Japanese surrender, when he was instructed to hand over the balance of his reoources to them. Hie budget was divided into three categories; office administration, intelligence, and the purchase of war ma- terials. The administrative and intelligence funds came free the General Staffs the purchasing account was supplied by the War Ministry and maintained in ONODERA t e name by representatives of the Berlin offices of OKURA, MITSUI, MITSUBISHI and SEOUL Tsvsno. These companies were camniesioned by the Japanese Government to buy war materials (ball bearings, piano vire, etc.) in Sweden, but they could not obtain foreign currency in sufficient quantities from the Reichsbank, which released it only to certain high-ranking diplomats. A portion of this account was assigned to Air Force purchases and was administered by Major SO. .e ; Until August 1941 payments were 1.10.C4 in dollars by the soischama Specie Bank in Tokyo through New York to the ,Mill...e.ry Attach4 t e account in the Eneilda Dankan in Stookhohn. The dollars were then changed into kroner by ORODERA. From August 1941 to the end of 1942 all fund.: ware transferred byway of the Y.S.B. Ber- lin branch. Thereafter, until the end of the war, money from the General Staff came directly from the Y.S.B. in Tokyo to the Skandinaviska Bardeen in Stockholm and that from the War Ministry directly to the Enskilda Banken. The acoounte in both banks were in OUODERA t e name. ONODERA gives the following account of total yearly expenditures from • General Staff funds (evaluate. B-3): Administration Intelligence 1941 Kr. 120,000 Kr. 30,000 1942 Kr. 120,000 Kr. 40,000 1943 Kr. 120,000 Kr. 40,000 1944 Kr. 120,000 Kr. 360,000 1946 (till Nev.) Kr. 75,000 Kr. 40,000 The largest item of administrative expense was telegrams, with supplies next and general administration (including certain payroll disbursements) last. (In 1942-1944 their annual average was Kr. 75,000, Kr. 25,000 and Kr. 20,000 respec- tively.) The intelligence fund was used to make direct payment to seoret sources, for the transmission of money to agents abroad, for presents to officials and other contacts And for entertainnent; small sums also went to INOUE for the payment of publications obtained from clandestine sources. During the early years of the war MODENA himself was paymaster; after December 1944 the job was turned over to KICOSKI. Among the civilians IIOMMA, SATO end INOUE continued to reoeive their salaries from Mitsubishi and Mitsui, as did the press representatives from their respeotive newspaper or aervioes. All civilians received additional compensation from ONODERA for overtime. um , a clerk originally assigned to Stookholm, continued on the payroll even though he moved first to Hel- sinki and later to HIGUCRI:a office in Berlin. OKODERA put about 10,000 Kroner of the administrative fund at ONOUCHI s disposal each month for the purchase of daily necessities not available in Helsinki. Be also received map for similar purchases from his colleagues throughout the belligerent end occupied countries. - 8 - SECRUT CONTROL rrt f74 ;MT t$,-15 : • ■ Mr45 :ZIAW F. ;; tn B. HELSINKI All funds sent by the Japanese General Staff to the Office of the Military Attache in Fi nland were tran pferred through the Yokohama Specie Bank s Berlin branch. As the war progressed and the disappearance of foreign trade made the acquisition of foreign currenoios increasingly difrisult, tho Y.S.B. found it almost tnpossible to carry out the necessary converslon into Finnish or Swedish currency. Resul ing delays in the arrival of funds frequently made it hard for °NOUGHT to cover his office expenses, particularly payments for communication services. In 1944 an agreement was finally reached for the transfers to be effected through a bunk in Switzerland (name not remembered). There were two office budgota, one for administration and ths other for intelligence . The latter served a function .3imilar to that of OUODERA in being expended for infor- mation obtained from secret sources, gifts, entertainment, the salary of one Finnish private secretary, etc. ONOUCHI pays that his average yearly expenditures for ouch items outside of exceptional cases was 380,000 Finnish Marks or 38,000 Yen. The ad- ministrative budget averaged 1,476,000 Narka or 147,600 Yen annually: 24,000 Yen for o2Zice expenses, 3600 for salaries and 120,000 for oommunications. HIROSE, who took over the functions of paymaster in 1944, gives the sane figures for the administrative account but estimates intelligence expenses at 20,000 Yen yearly. In making these he paid money tc ONOUCHI on demand in exchange for a receipt, without always knowing to whom payment was made. (Evaluation of figures in above paragraph, 8-3.) 2. Communications (For supplementary detail see SSU memoraum "Wartime Communication Facilities of the Japanese Military Attaches at Stockholm and Helsinki, 4 October 1946, GB #1234.) A. STOCKHOLM In reporting to Tokyo Headquarters and in communicating with the other Japanese missions in Europe, ONODERA used ordinary mail, diplomatic couriers, radio and secret 0. Befwe the outbreak of the Russo-German war on 22 June 1941, liaison with Tokyo was made by official Japanese couriers about once a month; they travelled by train, air or both. Thereafter and until August 1945 there was no regular courier service to and from Japan, and the few documents which were sent back and forth were carried either by diplomatic parties who had received visas to cross Russia or by blockade runners and U-boats. Courier service within Europe was carried out by officers frcm the staffs of the various Japanese diplamaticruissions. OVODEBA says that the Stockholm office sent couriers only to Helsinki and Berlin. It was rarely necessary for him to dispatch may of his personnel because everyone in the belligerent or occupied countries wanted to make trips to Stookholm to by food and other articles which were rationed br unobtainable elsewhere. When he did send a pouch by someone in his own office it was carried by an officer accompanied by one of the civilians. ONODERA frequently took the pouch to Ber- lin himself. . • • 1•■•-• -!:", -Re pays that the only Japanese military radio station which existed in Europe during - the War was-at Budapest, and that hardly ever functioned. All his radio reports were sent to Tokyo through Swedish cammercial cables. Before June 1941 current material was sent to the office of the Military Attache in Hose= and forwarded through a Russian • company because of a Russo-Japanese radio contract allaving relatively cheap rates. Later it was forwarded through Berlin, where a similar arrongemeat existed with the Germans. litigant dispatches vete sent directly from Stockholm. Press material also went directly because of a mutual exchange agreement _ cween the Swedish and Japanese news services. - 9 - SECRET CONTROL 4.;-4 ,01.1-e4•14 yr/ .44,41 td.; ‘.3 Qt 4/ 2.4 CO SECRET CONTROL • ONODERA claims to have no knowledge of the existence of (/f sets in the offices of any of htc colloa;ues in the other neutral countries of Europo. Ho himself had not .bocn equipped with any by Tokyo; ho atimits having oame into possession of two which, however, hr says ho never us: . 0., ic doolures that his connection with clandeatine 10 work was largely indirect, through the Pinnish 1.3., the Pole RiTMCWSKI or the Estonian LAASING. B. ME13II.011 Until June 1941 a regular cu-srior orvz6 to lielsinId eaohment4 from Tokyo via Moecow. After the ontbreak of the war beiT:oot: Russia and Gerr.any thto vsrvice was broken off and couriers were used only for tripe to StIckholm and Dorlin. lnce there were no pro- :essional diplaiutic ceurters the trips were Aade by office personnel; URA was the one most frequently seat. wore coearia:tally dispatched, art by the Stockholm office, via blockade runner or submarine, b..tt more those which contained documente cf any value. . After June 1941 telegrams were the only way of transmitting reports to Tokyo. They were of two kinds, urgent and routine. Urgent nessave were sent directly fran the Helsinki General Post Office, which used its own discretion in routing via Berlin or Sweden, depending on atmoepheric conditions. This wai the more direct method but it was very expensive, one word costing 50 Finnish Marko (5 Yen). • • Routine . mossages were dispatched through the Helsinki Post Office to the Military Attkohe in Berlin. At the beginning of the text the destination of each message was indicated; "0" stood for the Berlin Military Attache, 5A" for Tokyo only and "GA" for both Tokyo end Berlin. (These indicators were changed from time to time.) This method was cheaper because of the wireless telegraph rate agreements with Germany, but it had the disadvantage of taking a long time. Both radio and telephone were used to communicate with other Japanese missions in Europe. • 5. Methods Used in the Gathering of Intelligence and the Maintenance of Security Beth ORODERA and oilman laid a substantial part of the foundation of their highly 4uooeisful intelligence work at Stockholm and Helsinki in their previous assignments to thi post of Military Attache at Riga, Latvia -- OUODERA in 1936-1938 and GNOCCHI in 1939-1940. Both were adept at exploiting the contacts made by themselves at that time and by their predecessors earlier. OITOUCHI was not explicit in the aurae of his brief preliminary interrogation on the subject of his techniques as such; the following sum- mary mos given by OUODERA. He used two principal methods of obtaining intelligence. The first and most suc- cessful was espionage, his own specialty. The second was newspaper and publication analysis which he left in the hands of his assistants, assigning to each the eUbjeote for ehioh his technical experience best fitted him. • • Ile_prefers to work alone. BO never oonfided fully in any of his assistants with to-intelligenoe work. .When he called on them it was for isolated Jobs of a technioal nature and he never allowed them to have complete knowledge of his methods. Re refere to himself as a dictator and Gaye that he likes to be the only one giving orders and to know.: that all those who are working with him are completely dependent on him. a. Positive Intelligence ONODERA believes in working with organizations rather than with individuals. An individual cannot provide information unless related to some sort of organization, - 10 - SECRET CONTROL SECRET COI1TROL and a yell-established organization is the only source from which a Military Attache can hope to ret a constant flaw of reliable information. Ha says that as a first step he always established contaot with the loading intollirence officers, both native and foreign, in the country to which he was accredited. He then studied and appraised their possibilities and formulated a plan by which he could best obtain what they had to offer. He believes that the relationship in such a case must be initially beeed on oollaboration and friendship rather than on money. The more gradually the relationship is built up the better. His own best sources during the war were men Idiom he had known for many years. His second step was, whenever possible, to find a way of en- suring the loyalty of the man he considered valuable by binding them to him through gratitude for services rendered to their families or for prcteotion in difficult times. He streeses that he never ceased to plan for the future in this connection, and oites as an example his attempts to find young Hungarian ecientista whose education he could finance, thus placing them under obligation to Japan. (See SSE memorandum "Possible Diversion of Funds of the Japanese Military Attache at Stockholm to the Training of Hungarian Finnish Students...." - 30 September 1948, DB "233.) He says that he got some of his best results by working with the General Staffs. of small countries. They were usually better informed than anyone else with respeot to their powerful neighbors; they had many possibilities for obtaining intelligence but did not possess the necessary finances. He found that if he was tactful he could supply them yith money and gradually create a situation whereby they were morally o- bliged to give him information because their debt had became so large. To illustrate his theory he gives the following examples taken from his ex- perienoes during the mar. In each case he combined friendship, collaboration or money in varying degrees to suit the situation.. i. Estonia: Ile formed friendships werkinr with Estonian General taff-Efficers while Military Attache in Riga fram 1936 to 1938. At that time he did a great deal to finance their common opera- tions. Later when many of the sane officers were in financial difficulties in Germany he supported their families from Stockholm. Consequently he received information free them throughout the war even when they were working for other services. He says that as the German situation became worse, almost all the bestSetonians made known their wish to come and work with him in Stockholm. ii. Finland: During the first part of the war his collaboration with the ?inns was based on friendship and exchange of information. Later after their defeat he made them a considerable payment, not only for what they could offer at the time, but in the hope that it would bind them to him fOr.the enthral. iii. Poland: This very fruitful relationship had been prepared in WON? years by other Japanese officers. ODODERA l s awn verh:rme entirely dependent on the friendship and protection which he gave to one man, RIDIKOWSKY. iv. Germany: Friendship and the necessary collaboration between two allies fighting a war together were the basic element : of his relationship in this case. v. Hun,ary: The limited material obtained from tha Hungarians was given in o ficial exchanges with the Military Attach. vi. Sweden In this case official exchanges were taoilitated to some WERT by personal friandebips. For further detail of OHODERA s relstimehip with the above zervices see below, part IV (Contacts and Sour04e). - 11 - SECRET CONTROL SECRET CONTROL b. Counter-Intelligence and Security The Japanese mission in Stockholm had no joint security system. The Lega- tion was deplorably lax in this respect and did not institute a night watch until the autumn of 1944. =HERA eolved his aern problem separately; he recalls no case of penetration of his offioe. It vise a general rule among the Japanese never to use a foreign pouch, even that of an ally, for sending olassified material. Out of necessity =HERA once used the Polish pouch in an attempt to send money to the Japanese Military Attaché in Moscow, a venture which failed because the money was intercepted by the British at Gibraltar and returned to Stockholm. Be also sent an official letter to the Japa- nese Military Attaché in Berlin through FAGFER and the Abwehr pouch, but it never reached its destination despite his repeated protests and WAGFER I s promises. His contact with the Finns was the best method for ensuring the protection of his codes. The Japanese crypt-analytical station in Budapest also contributed: HAYASHI, the Dilitary Attaché, once warned the Stockholm Legation that en a of its ciphers had been broken by the British. layover, subsequent tests initiated by Minister OKAMOTO tended to oontradiot his statement. OMODERA l s chief source of counter-espionage information was DAASIFG, to wham he went to cheek all new sources and agents. DAASING had agents in WAGHER s organi- sation, in the Russian press office and in the British passport control office. Through them it was possible to find out about and forestall any action which was being planned against the Japanese. =HERA does not know the identity of any of these men. MAASIMG s contacts in the Swedish police served to warn OMODERA of danger frau that quarter. A check an DAASIN( himself was provided by OHODERA s close personal relationship rith many of his former colleagues on the Estonian General Staff. HIGUGHI, who worked in liaison at Berlin with the German counter-espionage agency, was a farmer pupil of OITODSRA s and kept him informed of German activity and in- tentions, as did the Vanohnrian diplamatio representatives in Berlin. c. Penetration Agents OITODERA used the Finnish and Baltic organisations for penetration work a- gainst his principal target, Russia. This was simply the continuation of work already begun during his stay in Riga. It was not necessary for him to be connected with any of the details. As the war developed and he received directives to initiate intelligence operations against the western Allies, he began extensive preparations for this work. However, he says that he only succeeded in launching one mission - against Britain - and that this one was of dubious reliability. He claims never to have used consciously any double agents. The closest he came to doing so was in the case of BFURGARDE, agent of the mission just referred to. ODODERA realized that he must be working for the.Britiah but never openly dis- closed the suspicion. Be says further that he was well mare that many of the Scanda, navian -and Baltic agents with wham he worked were also employed by the Allies, but inmost -aisles he trusted then and felt that the best way of conserving their loyalty was to make no attempt to turn such activity to his cm use. He was, of course, always oareful to check them whenever an important matter wee under consideration. d. Deception Material =HERA says that it was very diffioult for him to use deception material be- cause he never received any information fran Tokyo regarding Japanese strategy in the war. Ha studied the possibilities of using as charnels for this purpose the journalists rhos° agencies had exchange agreements with Swedish papers (for instance, Yomiuri with the Afton-Bladdet, Fichi Field with the Svenskadagerblat, and Donsi with T. T.). However, lack of properly coordinated material made this impossible. - 12 - SCCRET CONTROL Tea. SECRET COUTROL MUSE. Occasionally passed tendentious information through his agents to the Rus- sian Legation, but ONODERA was not directly oonnected with thie aspect of HAASIUG s activity. He was himself the recipient of deception material several times during the war from both the Allies and the Germans. In 1941, the latter, in an attempt to hurry Japan s entry into the war, put on a deliberate campaign to convince Ambassa- dor COMA in Berlin that they wore going to invade Great Britain. WHIM was taken to - visit the invading bases and shown troops in training and large quantities of landing craft. ORODERA, on visiting the headquarters of Commanding General FAME- man mf the German occupation forces in Norway, was told the same story by a Col. VORONITSEY. From the British, whose talent he admires in this rospeot, OHODERA believes that he received the following false information: i. Separate peace rumors. These came to him through the most varied sources, including HALLSIRG (Who had obtained it form sanaL, an Estonian refugee in Stockholm) and DUITRIEVSKY, the renegade Soviet diplomat. ii. False dates for the Normandy landings. These reports were in the form of an attempt to persuade the Japanese and the Germans that the Allies would be afraid to risk the operation. As soon as the large-scale bombink attack began, however, it became oYident that they were untrue. Ili. Russisin entry into the war against Japan. This material was more cleverly placed than any other. It came to CHIMERA through VAGY of the Hungarian Legation; he had received it from a Hungarian Jewish refugee banker in Stockholm. It was given out just before the 1943 Attachd s meeting in Rome, where it was discussed and re- ported to Tokyo. =HERA heard later that it had caused a.great deal of trouble in the General Staff. iv. The redeployment of the Amerioan 8th Bomber Commend to the Far East through Russia, and the visit of an American Air /fission to Russian air bases in Eastern Siberia. Both items came through KRAMER of the Abwahr,.but OUODERA. believes the original instigator to have been British: These reports also were taken seriously in Japan because they were written in great detail. OHODERA always suspected the air mission report on account of a reference to Suisoewka, near Vladivostok, where he knew there was no airfield. - 13 - SEC121:"? C017TROL ;04 mot : • PT t's1 [1.3 fj ge Li SECRET "dITTROL MI, " \ CONTACTS ADD SOURCES 1. Polieh A.. BACKGROUND Collaboration between the Polish and Japanese General Staffs dates back to the Rue:so-Japanese war and has always been based on a common hatred of Ruscia. It began in Europe early in the century betneen General Baron AKASH/, Military Attache in Stockholm, and General PILSUDSKI. A further tie was provided by officers who had been prisoners of war in Japan and who had been so kindly treated by the Japa- nese that they formed o club, macre of which entertained Japaaece officers later coming to Poland as diplomatic representative°. OHODERA says there were many oases in rbioh such Japanese lived at the homes of club momborn during their stay in Poland. (Re adds that it was formerly a Japanese tradition to reat prisoners well and that he was profoundly shocked to hoar what had happened during World War II). Active collaboration between the two oountries on a milit(4y basis began immediately after the last war, when PILSUDSKI use president of Poland. ONODERA does not know the details of what took place at that tine. He says that Major General YAMAKAKI Masataka and Lt. General FUJITSUKA are well informed in this regard. Until 1939 the center of Japanese intelligence astivity againct Russia waa always in the Warsaw Military Attache s office. AA arrangement existed whereby Japanese officers were periodically sent to Poland to study Russian codes with the Polish General Staff crypto-anslytical elation. OUODERA. citea the following Japa- nese officers who were trained according to this agreement: General HYAKITTAXE Seikiohi and General OKUBO Shunjiro in the late 1920 s; Col. SAKAI (deceased) and Col. KUDO in the early 1930 s; Co.. SAKURAI Nobuta an Col. ?MI Eiichi in 1935-1936. The Japanese system of press and document analysis practiced so extensively dUring the war and its successful use for intelligence purposes were also learned from the Poles. Col. KONALESKI, later Polish Military Attache in Lisbon, wiS an authority on this system and had visited Japan for the purpose of teaching it; two or three other Polish officials had similarly instructed members of the Enantung Army intelligence Service in Harbin. In exchange for each instruction the japaneee undertook to supply the Pelee:with Soviet code intercepts and other intelligence material obtained in the Far East. As a result of this background of cooperation. when Poland was occupied by the Germane and the Russians in 1939, and the Polish General Staff forced to take refuge in London, Col. GANO (head of the Polish T. S:) proposed to Col. UEDA (Japa- nese Military Attache in Mersey ) that the Japaneie take over the Polish intelligence organizations against Russia and Germany. This offer was officially refuced by Tokyo Headquarters because of the alliance with Germany. However, individual Japa- nese and Polish offieers in EUropo continued to work together under cover, and Poles who had stayed behind on the continent were given Japanese or Manchurian passports and enployed in the EMbassies and Consulates. . - Wishing to take every advantage of the possibilities of this collaboration, Cel.-GA00100940 arranged with Col. nu to send a ?olish intelligence mission to the Far East for work on intellience against the-Tra, in Japan or at Knantung . Army Headquarters. Mon most manbera of this missiLl returned to Europe in 1942 with the Polish Military Attache to Tekyo, Col. REVETOR, :.ro (one a lieutenant named SKORA) sought aid obtained permission to remain in the Far East and continue their work gains . Russia in secret, still in collaboration nith the Japanese. The request was forwarded to Polish Headquarters in London through ONODERA s office. Within a short time General SIKORSKI, despite the fact that a otate of war existed between Poland and Japan, ansuered that permission was given in accordance with the long tradition of collaboration between the two countries. Lieutenant SKORA, who ONODERA thinks .is connected with crypto-analysia, was last heard of in VArchuria. SECRET C.ONTROL COPY SECRET CONTROL B. ONODERA OVODERA s own successful and extensive oollaboration with the Poles was centered around the ox-Poliah General Staff intelligence officer RYBIKOffSkI, who worked with him in his office for throe and a half years. When ONODERA arrived in Stockholm, ho found collaboration beteeon the Japanese and the poles already established and functioning. In 1940 Col. RISHNURA, ONODERA l c predecessor, had agreed with Col. GAM that RYBIKOVSKI (formerly head of the Gorman section and one or GAUO I s beet assistants) should be given a Uhachurian passport and a cover job in a Japanese Military AttachWa office. At first he had been assigned to Col. =mare °Mee in Riga. Later when this was closed as a result of the Ruacian invasion of the Baltic countries, he moved to Stookholm. When ho arrived in Sweden there were two other Poles, GIREVITCH and KOMAR, working there. They controlled an espionage group in Copenhagen and the original plan had been for all three to re- main and work against Germany and Russia. However, GIREVITCM was compromilled when ane of his agents was arrested by the Swedes in Goteburg and he was obliged to cease his activities, eventually going to England in 1941. RIBIKOWSKI remained as the only P.I.S. representative . In order to secure additional cover be obtained from Finland, where he had contacts in the Finnish polies, a false Russian pass- port in the name of PIOTRE MOM He had previously been using the aliasIIICHAI. LOWEY. aff0DERA worked with him on the most intimate terms until the spring of 1944 and refers to him as his "Ohief of Staff." Although MINOT:SKI was employed in hie office, he allowed him absolute independence in his intelligence activities and deliberately remained ignorant of the details of many of his operations. His two mein targets were always Russia and Germany. Be never gave ONODERA any information, about the western Allies and °BC/HERA says that he never asked for any. • Working in OHODERA s pay end at his Stockholm office, RYBLKOWSKI received reports from his extensive network of agents situated throughout northeastern Eur- ope and in the USSR and forwarded then via Japanese diplomatic couriers to Polish Headquarters in London. Japanese offices which played a part in this system were located in Germany, the Baltio countries, Finland and Poland. Early in the mar Berlin VW the most active eacohange center; there, another Polish I. S. officer naMed JAKVBIC 0 KUNCEMCZ had been given a Japanese passport and worked in the Eabassyedth Attaches MIURA and ISHIDA. In Koenigsberg the office of the Japanese Consul, SUGMARA, was used, and in Riga and later in Helsinki that of ONOUCHI. A network of Polish agents who reported to RTBIKOWSKI existed in the cities of Bialystok (Poland) and Minsk and Enolenek (Russia), the first having long been a center of Polish intelligence activity against the USSR. Another was under the protection of the Manchurian Gonsulate General in Warsaw, which remained open after the Japanese Eabasay had closed down and until early in 1942. SUGIHARA s office in Koenigsberg was the headquarters of agents who were in contact with mem- bers of the Polish resistance movement at Kaunaa, Lithuania. RIBIKORSKI had two sources in Finland; ZARA, a newcpaperman working in the Polish Legation at Helsinki, who received information from agents in Russia, %Mnd -ROETMOVW of the Finnish I. S. (see below). There were two Polish agents at Rarva, Estonia, two at Riga, Latvia, and a group-in the Ural and Caucasus regions of eastern and southern Russia. RYBIKOWSEI was unable to establish communications with this group fram Stockholm and therefore a description of the organization with a list of the agents names was sent to Tokyo. OHODERL (ides not know how this information was used by the Japanese, but he thinks that liaison with the group must have been made by the Japanece Military Attache in Persia or Turkey and that Gen. ISOUURA (M.A. at Ankara) was probably the one to have responsibility for such liaison at the time. - In August 1941 when General SIKORSKI t a London government sent an official mission to goscaw for the first time, a Polish I. S. officer accom p anied than. Be - 15 - SECRET CONTROL SECRET ,CORTROL was able to send information back to London whence it vont to =CERA in StooLho:An through the Palish dipInmatic pouch. This source produced excellent information . Until 1942 when it was compromised thrOuc,h Russian breakinr of Polish codes. For a ,surmary of the information receiNcd by OUODERA from RYRIKOWSKI sue below, V., Summary of Intelligence Obtained.. C. 0110UCITT OVOUCUI s connections with the Polish I. S. were always indirect. He con- firms the facts that a working agreement had long existed between the General Staffs of the two cOuntries and that Polish officers worked with Japanese military in several European capitals, including Bucharest and Ankara as well ae Berlin and Stockholm. At Bucharest a group of several Poles in the Japanese Military Attacha s office gathered information on 4nternal oonditions in the USSR: food supplies, industries, conmunications, etc. They collaborated with Lt. Col. FUJITSU/CA until the spring of 1942 and then with Col. =twin until the Russian occupation; ONOUCHI heard that soma of them were arrested by the Germane and says that Col. EMU= Fukashi (liaison officer in Berlin with Abt II and III of the Abwehr) knows the de- tails of the case. amanita first contact with the Poles occurred when howls stationed in Harbin, on duty with the local Special Service (Tokumu Kikan) unit of the Raantung Army. Instruction in document analysis as mentioned above and also in orypto- analysis was given there under the direction of Consul KUYATEOWSKI (Japanese spelling), assisted by one or trio Polish officers who had been sent from ITCWOUI and who worked under cover as civilian members of the consulate staff. One of these was a document analysis specialist whose name mom remembers as resembling "RIPUTSKI." He adds that Vas was almost surely a cover name, and it is quite possible that it may have been Col. KOWALESEI. Another name remembered in this connection is PAVLOKICZ. The group worked under General YAMAMOTO and Col. SUZUKI and trained Japanese officers specially sent fmm Tokyo, among then ISRIZEKI Sakaa and NOMURA Saburo. In Latvia OUOUCRI came into contact with RYBIKOWSKI in connection with work which was being organized jointly by the Finnish, Polish and Japanese intelli- gence services. He had met him formerly in Sweden at HISRIMURA t s office. He believes his real mane to have been LIBITSII, though he is not certain of this and ;Jaya that in all his own dealing with him the name molar aas used. At that time RYBIKOWSKI had only Danish and Polish papers and was in need of a passport from a country not occupied by the Germans. ONOUCRI arranged for him to obtain a Man- churian passport through ERARA, Counsellor of the Manchurian Legation in Berlin, the perticulare of which were as follows; name, PIOTRE MANCH; raoe, Russian; home address, Hailer. RYBIKOWSKI came to Riga shortly before the Russian invasion of the Baltic States to make contact with a Polish group working for SUGDIARA, Japanese Consul in Kaunas, Lithuania, and to build up a network of Polish agents in Latvia. He suc- ceeded in setting up an organisation whose members were located on the Baltic coast La Rige,anc1en the Russian frontier. It was headed by a former painter whose name OROUCRI believes was KUMEWIEGZ and whose headquarters were near the frontier. His chief agent in Riga was a Polish woman who worked as a laundress. After RYBIKOWSKI returned to Sweden OROUCRI forwarded reports from these people and from SUG1RARA to Stockholm. He complains that they were all written in Polish and that he was in no way rewarded for his trouble. In August 1941 ONOUCHI says that the liaison became difficult because a Russian agent WAS assigned to watch his house. In Riga ONOUCRI also knew the ?olish M. A. Col. BRZESKRIHSKI, but the latter was depressed about his country s defeat and did little intelligence work before the Russian invasion made it necessary for him to move to Stockholm. - 16 - SECRET CONTROL A e7.1.1 .‘ k rq R11 .44.,:a - -% • PY SECRET, CONTROL At the beginning of ONOUCHI s stay in Finland, RYBIKONSFI came to Hel- sinki and cooperated with mammal - assistant to PAASOMEH, chief of the Finnish I. S., and a speoialist in espionage . in establishing lines to Estonia and • Latvia. mum obtained the results of their work through the office of SALO- KORPI, one of the leaders of the Finnish cryptoanalysis group. He does not know the details of this activity. He says that it was still going on in 1943 when 0NODERA, acting on RYBIKONSKI s behalf, asked ONOUCEII to have POEYHOMEN send a liaison man to Stockholm. Later on he found out that POSYHOMEN had done so. In Helsinki he knew of the following members of RYBIKONSII s organiza- tion: =A (see above); a Pole about SO years old described as a slippery character who had fled with the American Minister s party; and an excellent con- teat in the passport section of the Finnish police. OHOUCUI was in direct contact with ZABA, who was introduced to him by HYBIKONSII in October 1940. He obtained frem him same information on Finnish politics and internal affairs. ZABA went to Stockholm shortly after the outbreak of the Russo-German war in June 1941. ONOUCHI a other Polish contacts in Helsinki included a ranges named BERSON, who had been introduced to him by NISHIMURA, and the Polish Military Attache, Col. LOS. He made repeated attempts to exchange information with the latter but soon found that he was doing no intelligence work. (ICS later moved to Stockholm where he worked for the Polish I.5. against Germany.) He also wanted to meet the Polish Minister, said by NISHIMURA to be exceptionally well informed about Russia, but this man left for Sweden before he could do so. BERSON, who had lived in Mos- cow, merely gave GNOCCHI some superficial information on Russia. - 17 - SEO.R177 CONTROL AlliitrAffilantiV1 f.41g." ,Irsk , SECRET C7.01TRCL 2. Finnish and Baltic a. Finnish A. BACKGROUND There had been extensive contacts and exchanges between the Finnish and Japanese intellieence services before OMOUCHI arrived in Helsinki or ONODERA in Stockholm. Their collaboration, as in the case of the Polish-Japanese relationship, had originated in the days of the Russo-Japanese War and had always focused on work against the USSR; it had been given an historical foundation in theories of racial kinship. Because of the relative inactivity of the Finnish I. S. before 1934, how- ever, it had remained largely superficial until in that year Col. TERADA was ap?ointed the first Japanese Military Attaohe to Helsinki. He and his successor Col. KATO laid the groundwork for the more intimate collaboration Which began with the arrival of Col. NISHIMURA in 1938. Relationship between the two services mas on a strictly military basis and was kept secret; according to OUOUCUI, name of the Finnish political leaders or even President WITTY knew about it. Work was carried out on an exchange baeis. The Finns gave the Japanese instruction in crypto-analysis and access to all types of intelli- gence on the USSR. and the Japanese gave money (through payments made to the Finnish Military Attachè in Tokyo) and a certain amount of Soviet intelligence and interoept material obtained in Asia. In 1939 and 1940, as a result of the Soviet threat to the high secrecy of activities being carried on in Finland, the center of espionage end sabotage collabora- tion between the Finns and the Japanese moved to NISHIUURA s office in Stockholm. At the end of the Russo-Finnish war in March 1940 it returned to Heleivki. At this time, the Poles too collaborating, RYBIKONSK1 went to Riga (see above). • During the same period, as a result of negotiations initiated by NISHMKGRA, the Kwantung Army requested of the Finnish General Staff that two Finnish officers be sent to the Far East to teach methods of winter warfare. The Finns agreed and sent Col. KAMA, an outstanding specialist on the subject who had commanded the 4th Division on the Mannerheim Line during the war, and an assistant, Major RHINE, an artillery officer. They traveled through the United States and arrived in Japan in november 1940. in Manchuria they worked w:th Col. KOTA= Etsuo (chief of the Inantung Army s Intelligence Section) end Col. KATO Yoshihide. They were prevented fram returning by the outbreak of war between the USSR and Germany, and remained in Japan as military attaches. According to OVOUCHI, they were still (at the time of his interrogation) in Tokyo, where he had last seen than on the street in July 1945. In studying the Russo-Finnish war and in conversations with the Finnish Nor Minister, NISHIMURA discovered that perhaps the most important cause of the Finnish -idonemees against the Soviet araios had been the crypto-analytical service under Col. HALLAMAA. It had succeeded in breaking the codes used in Soviet combat comnunications so rapidly that it could communicate Soviet orders to Finnish unit commanders before they reached their destination in the Soviet lines. NISHIMURA determined to acquire this valuable weapon for the Japanese services. He consulted with HALLAIIAA and worked out an arrangement whereby a specially designated Japanese officer would be assigned to the Finnish orypto-analytioal section for the purpose of learning their methods. The Japanese paid for this privilege with money of which the Finns were sorely in need as a result of the war, and with Russian cipher material -- five digit -_ ob- tained in the Far East and forwarded by Tokyo. The appointment to NISHIMURA s office in 1940 of Col. HDRICCHI and a naval officer whose name OrODERA cannot recall was the immediate result of this agreement. HORIUCHI, who had had no previous training in such matters, proved unequal to the task and was replaced in 1941 by Col. HIROSE Eichi, a trained specialist who re- mained until the closing of ONOUCII , s office in 1944. - 18 - SECRETAATTROL ittf0061 -;44:47-,01oolty ??, SECRET CONTROL B. ottani NISHIMURA's assistant, NINOMIYA, introduced .ONOUCHI to Finnish General Staff circles. His work with the General Staff began at once and continued without in- terruption throughout his period of duty (Sept. 1940 - Sept. 1944). He made the following trips and inspections in connection with it: • 1. February 1941. Inspection of the Suomusalmi battle fields for the study of winter warfare. 2. September 1941. Inspection of the front in the Kannas sector. 3. November 1941. Inspection of the front in Karelia. HIROSE replaced onoucia on this trip. 4. April 1942. Inspection of the central Karelian front. " • . • 5. April (1) 1942. Visit to plane factory at Tanmerbors. • June 1942- Visit to Finnish General Staff Headquarters at Sikleli. Inspection of the underground installations of the General Headquarters. T. November 1943. Inspection of fortifications, tour of nor- thern Finland as far as Rokniemi. 8. February 1944. Accompaniment of Japanese military,. air and naval mission headed by Col. KOTANI to inspect German Air Force winter installa- tions in northern Finland. 9. July 1944.. - Accompaniment of Japanese Doctor KOMORI of the Berlin EMbisay to inspect an army hospital in central Finland. 10. July 1944. Visit to Finnish General Headquarters at Hikkeli. 11. Juby 1944. Visit to Flange. In February 1944 a Finnish-Japanese intelligence conference was held in Helsinki. The Japanese were represented by C10UCHI, HIROSE, and col. ISHIMA, a technical intelligence specialist sent from the Berlin EMbasay. The following Finns attended: Col. PAASOBBM, chief of Department II; Col. MEMO, chief of the positive intelligence section; Col. KOEKKONEN, his assistant; Major RANTANEN, air specialist of the estimates section; and Capt. SALOKORPI of the espionage section. They discussed Russian military developments, industry, and war production capacity. ISHIZUKA brought with him German technical reports from Berlin. The conference concluded that the defeat of Germany was inevitable. Department II of the Finnish General Staff was boated in Helsinki at the time of ONOUCIII s arrival. When the General Staff moved to Mikkeli in June 1941, the operational section of Department II went with it but the offices with which GNOCCHI was in contact left representatives in Helsinki. His account of the over-all organization is as follows:, Department II: Chief, Gen. DILAUDER; kaistant, Col. ENKEL. - 19 - SECRET,CON2R0i t:4441f.WV r 1904.441,4411 .A.414,44:44;014414*, f,e..-‘ 771 }t 1 Va" A q rk`t: 1;11 britta SECRET_,- C011 21/01: Positive Intelligenoo Section; Chief, Co].. POEYHOUEIT. Estimates Section: Chiof, Col. KOEKKOTTEU. Crypto-Analysis and Monitoring Section: Chief, Col. HAILAMAA; Asaistant, Capt. PALE. Espionage and Sabotage Section: Chiefs, Lt. Col. SANTAVUORI and Capt. SALOKORPI; Assistant, Lt. RVUELA. Counter Intelligence Soction: Chief, Col..WAIDEU; Assistant, RAUTSUO. Liaison Section: Chief, Col. ROSEUBREUER; Assistant, Col. SLOEOR In July 1941 NEL/ODER vas suoceeded by Col. PAASONIMT (wham ONOUCHI did not meet until 1944), a confidant of LTATTITERHEDA and President RYITI, whose fanily lived in the latter s offioial residenoe. PAASOUEMI was half Hungarian, married to a Hungarian, and a graduate of Saint Cyr. He did not get on well with POEYHONER and in 1942 replaced him with Col. SOWITTO, who had been Finnish Military Attache at 110800W in 1939. SOUERTO in turn was suoceeded by Col. ROBISON= in June 1944. POETHONEW was OHOUCHI s closest contact in the Finnish General Staff. He was a specialist in training and dispatching espionage and sabotage agents against Russia. He spoke the language well, had studied the subject for many years and IMO much looked up to in Finnish military circles. mown describes him as a daring, positive worker with great ability for gathering intelligence and only one weak point - in evaluation - which is said to have caused his downfall with PAASONEV. They exchanged information and worked together in planning operations. POEYHONEU s headquarters were divided between Helsinki and Mikhail. GNOCCHI never visited the latter place but was in regular contact with the Welsinki office. For a time this was under the direction of Lt. Col. SANTAVVCRI; ONOUCITI s contacts, • however, were either with POWHOUEU himself or with Capt. SALOKORPI and his assis- tant, Lt. RUTTELA (who worked on Soviet radio activities). SALOKORPI was a specialist in espionage and in oharge of the fabrication of false papers. When POETRONEll was transferred, SALOKORPI handled all of ONOUCHI s contacts with Department II. (For a description of the material received by ONOUCIII from POEYTIONET and his section, see below, V., Sumnary of Intelligence Obtained.) Apart frcm the Finnish General Staff, ONOUCHI had a personal source of in- telligence and several official contacts among the Finns at Helsinki. The intelli- gence source was a lawyer named SFITHEHAN (Japanese spelling), who had been employed for several years at the Japanese Legation until he was dismissed by Minister SAKAYA. He supplied ONOUCHI with reports on internal conditions in Finland end received from him a monthly salary of 3000 Finnish Marks (300 Yen), increased in 1943 to 5000 Marks. The other contacts were with the following Finnish officials, who GNOCCHI olaimayere in no way conneoted with intelligence wad from wham he caws he never obtained-information: RAIOCARAIHEIT - Section Chief in the Foreign Office who was in charge of liaison with Japanese diplomats. NISSOUEU - An employee of the Foreign Office from whom CROUCH received official invitations, visas, ration coupons, etc. Dr. RAHSTEAD (probable spelling; Japanese version is RAMUSUTEDDO) - A former Finnish minister to Japan, and language professor in the Finnish university. Ile was president of the Japanese-Finnish Society, honorary president of which was the Japanese minister. While ONOUCHI was in Helsinki this society held one staff meeting a year; other meetings were cnncelled because of the war. He knows nothing of its membership, no list of which had been published since 1939. - 20 - SECRET,,,COITTROL Itto$44., mcii..4Agt,a000,34•444042PO41101tAltiArtieV go4:10 440 •ftlr , ;,,Wi444AWAv4,4, :."1 ,c1": .2 ououon obtainod nem° information about Finnish political developments and internal condition° from the Japanese minister, whose courco vas an ex-member of the Foreign Office namod LAUTIARI, then on the staff of the Finnish newspaper Kaupalahlti (Japanoce cpelling). This information van particularly interesting in February 1944 during the period Which preceded the peace neeotiations, and again i.e August of the acme yoar with regard tn the peace terns. C HIROSE A valuable General Staff contact and working arranment with which onoucui was not directly associated was maintained for three yoars by his subordinate, Assistant Military Attach 1!IR0S1: Eiichi, who until tho beginning of 1944 had no other duties in the Military Attach/Os office thar to write reports on crypto- analysio for Tokyo Headquarters. HIROSE was aont to Finland specifically to cooperate with the Crypto-analysis Section of Department II, a mission considered as highly secret and personal. Not even the Japanese Minister to Finland was aware that he was anything more than a routine Aas t U.A. For administrative purposes he was attached to the Japanese War Ministry, but his directives were communicated to him personally from the Central Special Intelligence Section. Except fcr matters of Office routine he was ectirely independent of ONOUCHI. Immediately after his arrival in Finland in the spring of 1941 HIROSE was taken to Grankura, a naval monitoring and orypto-analysis station located about 40 kilometers west of Helsinki. It was commanded by Capt. POKARIffEH with a staff of about 100. This station concentrated on interception and deciphering of Soviet messages originating in the Baltic area, particularly those from the main Soviet naval base. At the beginning of July HIROSE was taken to General Staff Headquarters at Mikkeli and introduced to Col. HALLAUAA, who took him to the Army crypto-analysis center at Savonlinna. There he mot the Finnish officers who were to direct and assist him in his study of Soviet codes: Lt. (later Capt.) PALE, next to HALLAMAA the best Finnish crypto-analyst, who worked on the codes of all nations but who was handicapped by a lack of knowledge of Russian; Capt. PARKO, another orypto-analyst; BOGOJABLENSK1, a White Russian refugee who had taken Finnish nationality. WHOSE is not sure who coamanded the Savonlinna center but says that it came directly under the authority of HALLAM in Mikkeli; it too had a staff of about 100. - In December 1941 the Grankura and Savonlinna stations were amalgamated and their personnel and equipment transferred to Soldavala on the shore of Lake Ladoga. Capt. PARK° was int in command of the new center and PALE became chief of the cryptc- analysis services. HIROSE says that the total staff was about 500 men, including 200 signal operators. This 1 , mber included several Russian refugees whose knowledge of the language was of considerable assistance to the Finns. Except for periods of report-writing at the M.A. s s office in Helsinki, HIROSE spent all his time at Soldavala until early in 1944 when he was told by the Finns that, as a result of an order by UANNERHEIU which applied to all foreigners, he was no longer authorized to go there. He thinks that the real reason for breaking • Off Obeperation may have been that the Japanese were not supplying enough material to the Finns. The development of the ear at that stage may also have been a contri- buting factor, since contacts between the Finns and the Soviets for the purpose of arranging a separate peace had already begun, (For camments on the results of HIROSE s collaboration in crypto-analysis, see below, V., Summary of Intelligence Obtained.) Ihile on duty in Finland IIIROSE made a number of trips to other European countries. He went to Stockholm three or four times a year to buy living necessi- ties not available in Helsinki, and about once a year traveled to Berlin with occasional aide trips to places with whioh he was unfamiliar: 1941 - Berlin for health reasons. • 1942, February - Berlin; Budapest for a conference with erypte- analyst SAKURAI. • 1942, September - the Stalingrad front with a delegation of Japanemo military engineers. Ho says that he vas on leave at this time and wont along out of curiosity. 1943, October • narlin, Budapest (where ho 3A11). Sophia PIM Bucharest. 1944 : Aurn%t BArlin tn uhserve ...onclitienn in Gorel,ay eter the - 21 . "sal 1010540,k.”,KAN.:Wia,Kk-ei? 4,1,,,_ re.) ror.". 1.771 97 1 Pinl" C.; Ilzm 14 P• ".1 SEC:LEL,-.11AACI, • opening of the second front. In July 1043 an assistant wee unexpectedly assigned to him fr-m Budapestt HAGATA Kozaernon, civilian graduate of the Foreign Office Language Sc.lool who had been working under SAKURAI. HAGATA was trained in the Russian language but did not speak it. HIROSE cays that he who not ahls to be of much assistance in oryoto- snalytioal work because of inexperience due to a long period of inactivity in Budapest. D. OITODERA As Military Attache in Riga (1956-1938) OHODERA had been in touch with the Finnish I. S. and had come to know both PAASOITET and HAILAMAA. Inasmuch aft all the countries in the Baltic area were associated in obtaining information about their powerful eastern neighbor, the F.I.S. had.boen mare of ONODERA s already existing relationship with the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian General Staffs (see below). During the early part of his stay in Stockholm he had no direct rola - nship with the Finnish service -- that being within the province of ONOUCHI .-- bua PAASONEN and BALLAMAA made it apparent thet they did not want to lose their personal contact with him and he oontinued to keep in touch with than through Capt. WILLIMN, the Fin- nish Naval Attache/ at Stockholm. Besides receiving general reports on the situation at the Russo-Finnish front from ONOUCHI, who sent them regularly and who also visited Sweden about fifteen ttmea during the war, Off0DERA kept abreast of the Finns by working with WILLMAN and with Col. STEWEN, the Military Attache. STEWEN was one of his most productive sOurcee . during the first part of the war; he was a personal friend of the Crean Prince and had excellent contacts with Swedish officers in the General Staff. Among these was Major PITHRSEN of the Espionage Section; OMODERA believes that he had STEWEN worked closely together until near the end of the war when the- , quarrelled and STEM began !peaking against him. STETTER disliked the Ger- mans and avoided the Military attach VON DTNMANN, but he was always friendly to the Japanese. Be was unpopular with many ef his compatriots /MUMMA distrusted Mm and warned OUODERA against him. ONODERA got intelligence from him (see below, V., Summary of Intelligence Obtained) by exchange end by purnhase. He says that he was astonished when the offioial representative of Finland asked to be paid for this information. He says that STEREO received 1000 Ironer for a report on three or four occasions. OUODERA also gave him .Russian material and general estimates on the progress of the war. STEMEN .wrote his reports in Swedish, the only foreign language which be spoke fluently. Although the information which Inman supplied was less extensive, ONODERA regarded him as more intelligent and honorable than STove.M. rie chief source was the Finnish General Staff; ho probably also had good personal sourcre in Sweden. Al- though he was in touch with Lritish ana Lw.oriozo cf:iciolr ho =Ter c=7, orornA nry information concerning the western Allies. To ONODERA s knowledge he did not work with CELLARIDS (see balm) or any other German I. S. representative. ONODERA was also in toxic/iv:1th Capt. IMORMGREN, WILD AN s predecessor as Naval Attaaha; they exchanged same information. ONODERA believes that HORMGREU had, in one of the three Baltic countries, a source of information on Soviet naval activity which In August 1944 ONODERA heard from his Finnish friends of the irvainent peace between their country and the USSR. He immediately made contact with PAASONEN and =LAMA through WILLItAIT and undertook to do what he oould to protect and help the Finnish services. About tot time a group of more than a thousand Finnish intelligence operators -- including a special service parachute battalion of 400 men -- secretly came over the frontier into Sweden, bringing with them their radio equipment and their archives. This undertaking wee given the active support of the Swedish Army, which assigned ilhjor PETERSEN to carry out the details. The Finnish group continued its former eotivities, setaing up a crypto-analytical sec- tion near Stockholm and operating throe or four monitoring stations in northern Sweden. It was in direct communication with the Finniah resintance movement. -- Z2 — 3ECRTP:T/OffIROL , BEST OECHET C.CIEP.OL (MODEM says that in spite of what was done for there ?inniah exiles by the Smedea, they ware deeperately in need of money and were not even able to apply for holp to their traditional friends, the limericanc. Accordingly, his efforts in their behalf took the form of financing them to the extent of about 250,000 - 300,000 Kroner -- his entire funds including War tanistry money, which he later had to replace. He had pried more and had roceived an additional 150,000 Kroner frcm Tokyo for this special purpose when the mar snded befre ho could deliver it to them. He sayo that, although the information which he received at the time was in no way oammensurate with the amount expended, he considered it an excellent investment for the future from the Japanese point of view. OHODERA received intelligence frail the Finns in two ways, through per- sona). contacts and ia written reports. HALLVIAA and PAASOITEH both visited him eepasately on two occasions. They brought him no partiqular item of information but come to discuss the progress of the war in general, the situation of the Finnish refugee group in Sweden and the development of their mutual collabora- tion. Ihen they were both abaent from Stockholm, PALE was their representative and carried out their instructions; Re was UALLAUAA a most outatanding arypte- nr.n.lyet.end at the seine time the guardian and arohivist of the files and equipment which the refugee group had brought with thea. cnl..177..107.1.= vane crme reports from Finland three or four times. Be had been Finnish Uilitary Attachb in Moscow and was, with SALM:EMI, in charge of HALLAHAA a agents behind the Russian lines. AALUUS, a Latvian 1-4410 v_IEL=1-4:4.. o77to-maleyst (considered seoond only to PALE) who had worked in Berlin before joining the HALLAHAA group, was also in touch with OITODERA and MAASIEIG (see below). • Over a period of about ten months written reports were delivered to CEIODERA weekly, usually on Uondays, WWI S:MIT or by Hrs. UABEUHRT, an employee of the Finnish Legation. The information oontained in these reports (see below, V, Summary of Intelligence Obtained) reached Stockholm in three different ways: a. By radio. The Finnish Legation had a 71/T set which was in touch with Finland. (OTIODKRA believes that this was operated with the knowledge and tacit oonsent of the Swedes). In this case the re?orts were usually written up by/ULM:UT, PALE, or Komaral in Stockholm. b. By the Finnish diplomatic oourier. o. By clandestine frontier orossers. This method was used mostly in 1945. (MODEM believes that they were seoretly assisted by the Swedes (probably Hajor PETERSEB), but he knows no further details. 0110DHEA also had a Finnish source which was in no nay oonneoted with his relationship to the General Staff: a former pone, officer named zunEurn who -hid-collaborated with the German 0ELLARIDS during the first part of the war and who came to Stockholm as a refugee late in 1944. MODER employed him as a general informant for oounter-espionage purposes. mum= eupplied American publications, acted as intermediary between °HOUMA and prospective agents and, since he was working simultaneously for HOER and SALEINGES of the German I. S., gave the latest information on German activities. OHODERA paid him a total of about 10,000 Kroner for his work. • b. Ileltio A. MODER Of all OHODERA s sources at Stockholm ) the best came from Estonia and the other two Baltic republics. Els contacts with them had been founded on his collaboration with intelligence officers of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian - 23 - SEGRET OONTROL 1,1:441q:4;itli;TIF4041 ,e nt ,,k CVA40-4 J aw4.01N MOCPAIliertAft34, SECREls.OTKOL sor. General s: sift in 1936-1930 rhen ho vas Mili .nkrz , Attache in Riga. During those years he had formed personal friendships with several of the officers and worked very closely with them in obtaining intelligence on the USSR. Aeting in the name of the Japanese General Staff, ho had succeeded in raking an epee- went with Col. MAASEIG, Chief of Department U qf the Este:mime General Staff, to sot up a joint Jaeanese-Estonian organisaon through which Estonian agents recruited by the E.I.S. were briefed by the .%7amuse Military Attache, returned to the E.I.S. for further trz-...ningr and then scrt into Russia. Resulting in- telligence vas to be shared by both countries. In 1938, as pert of this system, 0/10DEM supplied the E.I.S. with 16,000 Marks fas? the purchase of a speed boat to be uued on Lake PEIPUS for taking operatives to and from Russia. Re says that one of the agents of the joint organization was an Estonian officer on the Soviet General Staff who provided excellent information until the end of 1939, first from Moscow and later frau Ihabarevsk. Another was dispatehed to Manchuria and was supposed eventually to report to Japan; however, he failed in his mission. Two of 0110DERA s closest collaborators in this undertaking were Major. TI:I5TIAll my . (1,1. RAABBY11. The former, in charge of the Estonian oervice t s two training centers for agents, ran an espionage net inside kussia, i4lamoialeas of which were Eatenians located in the following places: Leningrad (a small group the ohief of Which was a dootor); Moscow; the Volga region (among the Estonian oolonies); end eastern Siberia. The le.i:Zev, ulo .7=e/etied MAASIUG as head of the E.I.S., else. had sources in Russia. 0110DERA wan recalled before he an able, himself, to witness the full results obtained from this orvenization. Havaver, he says that it was so suc- easeful that whereas his predecessor, Col. T. OUCH, had sent forty cabled re- ports to Tokyo and 0110DERA two hundred, his successor Col. T. TAKATSUEI sent three hundred in a shorter tine than either of them. ONODERA was highly com- plimented on this feet when he returned to Tokyo. A similar joint arrangement was made by OUODERAvith Col. KIKRUS, chief of Department II of the Latvian General Staff, who had an espionage training sehool located at DunabrUck (Daugavpils) and a small organization which operated in Ostrow, Pskov, and the neighboring frontier region. His assistant was Lt. gel. PETERSON, succeeded by Lt. Col. ZERMINS. After the Russians occupied Latvia in 1940 they discovered this organization end ZERICLIS emitted suicide. PETER- SON flpd to Germany, where, he fought through the war as an officer in the German army not oonnected pith the Abwehr or the S.D. MMUS took refuge in Stockholm. BIRZINS, Latvian Master of the Interior and Chief of the "Latvian Volun- teer Corps", also worked with ONODERA, who says that he is unusually intelligent and well informed on Russian matters. After the invaskon he went first to Fin- land and-than to Stockholm. There he came into oontact with 0110DERA s predeoessor, Col. NISHIMURA, who intreducied him to YAMAMOTO of the Berlin Embassy as a men who could be valuable to the Abwehr in work against Russia. However, the Germans were against BIRZYNS because his volunteer corps had opposed the German inspired Latvian National Socialist movement, and he was finally arrested by the S.S. In spite of effortstsadeto secure his release, he disappeared. 0110DERA says in this connection that the intermediary meal frequently used by the Japanese in Berlin for obtaining Gael favors from the S.S. was Frau Von ROSENSTEIN, wife of a Latvian General who had ken captured by the Russians. During the war the Estonian and Latvian General Staffs were disbanded and the officers whoa OITODERA had known became scattered, either living as refugees in Sweden or working for the Finns and the Germans. However, he managed to keep in touch with them for collaboration whenever they were in a position to be use- ful to him. If their families were in financial difficulties he helped them with funds and other necessities which could be obtained more easily in Sweden than elsewhere. By this means he strengthened the friendships which he had already formed and obtained some of his most interesting information fram quarters which other Japanese observers in Europe were unable to touch. SECRET ,0071ROL • - • SECRET/00UTROL 0110DER10,1 closest and boat collaborator who Col. MAASIUG. A former officer in the Czarist armies who had graduated from the MILE1CMilitary Aca- demy and fought in World War I as a captain. MAASING was chief of the Estonian I.S. during the period of ONODERA s service in Riga. Shortly before the Soviet invasion he moved to Stockholm whore, as Estonian Military Attache, he continued to direct Estonian espionage against tho USSR. In 1941 he joined the Germans, working with CELLARIUS in "Gruppe E" and with other Abwehr sections on the Eastern front. Throughout this period he always reported to ONODERA through ONOUCHI and the Japanese diplomatic pouch. In April 1942, at ONODERA s suggestion, he broke contact with the Germans and Finns and returned to Stock- holm ostensibly as a civilian but actually to become OHODERA s chief independent collaborator (in contrast with RYDIKOWSKI, who worked as an employee within the Japanese Military Attache organization). ONODERA, who had helped MAASING s family while he was absent in Finland and Germany, gave him a monthly salary of between 1,000 and 1,500 Kroner and also occasional presents. From Stockholm he continued to direct his espionage organization against the Soviet Union, using agents located in Estonia, Latvia, Leningrad and Moscow. They were mostly Estonians from all walks of life and included Communist Party members. inong them were same of his former colleagues of the H:4;.1.: hi been captured and taken to Russia, like Col. TOMBERG of the Estonian Air Force, than the Soviets put to work teaching in a military academy. OPODERA implies that TCMDERG gave excellent information. Go^orn1 P AJDPA, former Estonian Chief of Staff, and General CMS, Chief of Operations, were in similar situations. MAASING told MODERA that =et of tile senior Estonian officers had been given such assignments by the Soviets. He cammunicated with this organization by means of agents among the crews of Soviet ships. A/though he was anti-German, MAASING had a number of sources within Germany. He was a friend of Admiral CAHARIS, who held him in high regard. ONODERA says that in 1944, shortly before CAHARIS fell into disgrace, he wrote "AASING a letter in which he described the position of Germany as being des- perate and proposed that steps be taken immediately to create an organization for the future. MAASING s chief source in Germany was the Estonian Col. JACOB- SW, who was able to furnish good information because of his special position in the Abwehr. General SAIDRA of the S.S. was also an informant. Another was Col. GROSS/VW, an Estonian who had attended the Ecole de Guerre in Paris and was active during the war in Upsala and in Germany. MAASING had excellent connections among officers of the Swedish army because, in the pre-war days when he was chief of the LIZ., the Swedish General Staff had sent some of their officers to study under him. Col. maim- DAMP= recently appointed Chief of the Swedish I.S. and former Military Attache in le4in, and Col. KAEMPF, also of the S.I.S., were among his former pupils. General JUNG was a friend of MAASING, who was also very close to Major PETERSEN.: ONODERA believes that in addition he had valuable contacts within thn:Swedieh crypto-analytical section, probably among Finns who had transferred from HALLANAA s service. He was in olose touch with the Swedish State Police, which he had been inetrumental in organizing before the war. This organization functions under the Ministry of the interior and is responsible for civil counter eipionage. HAASING s contact was with PALTIGREHT (9), one of its directors. Among the Finns, ILLASING s best friend was General !TLANDER. HAULAMAA was hostile to !LELA= because the latter had "deserted" the alliance of Baltic nations in 1942 at a crucial moment. Later this fact was forgotten and at the end of 1945 they were working together again. MAASI IG also had a number of sources among the western Allies. The best was GARNIM, the Fromch (Gaullist) Assistant Military Attache. Since GARNIER was inexperienced and did not have sufficient funds to pay MAASING for intelli- gencf, reeived, he supplied information on hie own country. ONODERA describes him a3 stupid and says that he was well aware of HAASI.NG s connection with the JapansJo, even trylng to use him to obtain ONOCERA s help in getting from KRAEMER the names of Frenoh agents in German employ. ONODERA of Course refused. MAASING s other al. ed contacts were the American Consul, CARLSON (ONODERA distinguishes - 25 - S7CRET COHTROL SXRET,C0jT1OL between Consul CARLSOr and an Lmorican intel"igenco oporativo of the same name) and the Englinhmen VCKHDBING (?) a CHEMIIRE. (For a description of the material which OrODERA received from MAASIrC., see below, V, Summary of Intell- igence Obtained.) 4 Another oloae friend of ONODERA from the Riga days was Col. JACOBSE•, J described as a very clever man who was interested above all in politics and diplomatic intrigue. Aftsr the Soviet invarlon ho fled to Germany. Being n friend of CANARIS, he was taken into the Abwchr and used for special missions in the Baltic countries and occupied mist. He was in touch with HAASING, but independently of that fact he sent ONODERA occasional reports on the political situation in Germany. When CANARIS was disgraced, JACOBSEN was left jobless in Berlin and ONODERA helped him and his family with money and supplies from Stockholm. He had excellent contacts in Sweden. OrODERA believes that he was reel- ponsible for the original contact between CANARIS and Col. AIZSREREGTZ; , the head 1 of the Swedish I.E. He was also a close friend of JURLIN-DANNFEID,rwho for- warded his letters to MODEM through the Swedish diplanatio.pouch. At the end of the max he was interned in FLENSBURG. Be had gone there in an attempt to reauh 7770 7:7 Ct!..1.1 )":".A. sone assets. Ho had formerly been wealthy man, but his property in Estonia had been oonfiscaEed and hie beic4,ini;s in Berlin destroyed by bombing. O1IODERA , 1 renaining contacts among the Esta:kiaha Col. SAJIMM, H j, misTr411 and Alexei de BELLEGARDE. NAASHIG s successor as head of the Estonian I.S., SAARSEN is described by OrODICZA as his most intimate Estonian friend. Be worked for the Germans through put the war, though not always at their bidding, and kept in touch with MODEM. He had excellent contacts with the Poles. KRISTIAN (see also below, B.) wham MDT= ham known for ten years, was largely responsible through his ability to handle espionage agents for the suc- cess of the joint Ja2enese-Estonian penetration of the USSR which was organized before the war. After serving as EstonianHilitary Attache in Finland in 1940- 1941 and later working for the Abwahr, he came to Stockholm in 1944 and offered to work for ONODERA. The latter gave him a year s living expenses out of grati- tude for his former services but says that KRISTIAN had changed markedly over the years and was no longer trustworthy; therefore, the offer was refused. ONODERA states emphatically that he did not receive any intelligence from KRISTIAN at this time or at any other time during the war. BFILFGARDE was an exception among OHODERA s Estonian sources because he was not connected with the General Staff, and ONODERA had not known him before the Var. They first met in August 1042 at HOPEI/A. 1 a Stockholm office to which BELLEGARDE came from Germany with a card of introduotion from JACOnSEN, whom ONODERA had previously naked for sources on England and America. .BELLEGARDE e elitinued to work in and out of Germany for the Abeehr, meanwhile visiting Sweden from time to time and reporting to ONODERA on German activities. Early in 1944 he moved his household from Berlin to Stockholm. Planning to go to England, he proposed to ONODERA that he act there as an agent for the Japanese. OHODERA says that in spite of the fact that he was distrustful of BELLEGARDE he agreed to the ?repose because he had no direct contact in Great Britain and the risk from . his standpoint was not groat. BELLEGARDE left in September 1944 and from then until the end of the tax reportod regularly, even arranging to have the New York Times overseas edition sent to ONODERA once a week. (See below, , V, Summary TrIntelligence Obtained.) B. ONOUCUI While moms was stationed in Riga (1939-1940) he carried on the es- pionage operations initiated jointly by his predecessors, OrODERA and TAKATSUKT, with Col. NAASIIIC, head of Department II of the Estonian General Staff. His cbief collaborator was Major KRISTIAN, who ran a training center near Tallinn and directed all recruiting, training, and dispatching of agents. Just before the Soviet invasion KRISTIAN went to Helsinki as Estonian Military At- tache and began to work with the CELLARIUS Abwehr organization. In August 1940, because of Russian threats, he moved to Stockholm and then to Berlin where he spent six morths working in Abt II and II/ of the Abvehr. After June 1941 he returned to Finland to run an espion:LFe and sabotvge training center for Es- - 2Z r • BEST SECRET ,CONTROL toniesss about 30 kilaaetcre from Helsinki, (Ina resumed his contacts with OROOCKI and CELLARXUS, At Riga 070UM received istolliganco obtained fram the activity of E.I.S. agents in Russia. In hio reports to Tokyo thieves rpferred to ea "KO" ("A") typs intelligence. In return he gave exchange ma- terial supplied by Tokyo and collaborated in the tc.-iefing of agents. Ho also paid the equivalent of 500 You monthly to tho Estonian General Staff through KRISTIAN -- at first in pounds sterling and later in dollars. Shortly before, his departure for Holsirld in September 1940 he supplied the last in- stallment of funds for the purchase of a motcr boat bought in separate parts by the Japanese Vilitary Attaché s office in Berlin and chipped to Estonia by courier. This was the boat used for the transfer sf agents across Lake Peipus. =Jam later heard that it was employed throughout the Soviet occupation and later when the 4ermana entered the country in July 1941. At Helainki OROUCHI loot direct contact with the Estonian Generrl Staff, whose officers were scattered through Germany and the Scandanavian countries. However, he kept in touch with KRISTIAR and bought from him reports on the USSR for 5000 Finnish Mulls apiece. mum had another Utopian contact in Admiral PITTKA, who sold him reports on politioal conditions in Estonia under the Soviet occupation. In the case of the Latvian General Staff ObOOCai agkin julievitei: at Riga the situation which had been built up by OHODERA and 7AXATSDEI. Ho worked wl.th Col. FIFEMS, who later fled to Stockholm, and with L. Col, zErcaus, who committed suioide in July 1941. They cooperated on an espionage system similar to that conducted by the Japanese and the Estonian I.S. The in.i ormation which OR000LE1 received as a result was referred to in reports to Tokyo as "OTSU" ("B") type. On the whole, it was inferior in quality and quantity to what was obtained from the Estonians. In exchange for it =UCH gave advire in the training of agents, Soviet in- telligence sent fran Tokyo and the msr.thly equivalent of 800 Yen, which went to the General Staff through KIKEUS. SECRET,,CbRTROL PY sEcmT ;!.o71(1z(1. 3. Genuan (For further details son "Japanese Wartime Col1a7Joration with the German Intelligence Service," SSU, 4 October 196. DO #1239.) A. ONODELA ONODERA says that ho had never lthed the Germane and dieagreed with their conduct of the nor from its very beginning. His con contacts with them and what he heard later from his Finnish and Estonian friends only tended to confine his earlier estimate. In spite of the fact that Japan and Germany were allies, he never sucoeeded in working with German intelligence organiza- tions as he did with the Finns and the Estoniens. His boat German sources were all the outgrowth of personal friendships. He explains this by saying that the Abwehr representatives in the Scandinavian countries, with the ex- ception of imam, were primarily interested in counter-espionage, whereas his own nein objective was positive intelligence. German suspicion of the activities of REMY:0MT in his office and hie can experiences with WAGNER and L72.LLZarlm 7 171 elr.o c-• ee: ennsioereble mutual distrust. There follow brief descriptions of his relationships with various German persowelitiee; for the results of his work with them see below, V, Summeey of Intelligence Obtained. a. Admiral CANAR1S. ONODERA first net the chief of the Abnehr while, as Military Attache at Riga, he was on a trip in Eetonia with os7mtk. He re- members the date as that of the execution ofiMarshal TUKLIACHEVSKI, Kremlin- purged Red Army leader (12 June 1937). During the war they saw each other briefly whenever they were in Berlin at the same time, discussing the overall leer situation and the needs of their respective intelligence services. OHODERA says that they got along yell with each other and beceue close friends.. A further bond between them was created by the fact that CARARIS was also friend of /UASING, JACOBSEN and MANDE/2. At ONODERA s requeet CANARIS sent him OKW reports in their original form without the usual censordhio by the Attaché Department. OHODERA passed these on to the office of Gan. KOMATSU, the Military Attache at Berlin. KOMATSU considered this contact with CANARIS to be most valuable because the Japanese in Berlin otherwise received only material which had lost its value through security processing before it reached them. Such a situation had existed 'eke, since KCPIATSII s arrival in Berlin early in 1943, when previous direct colla- boration between Ambassador °slim and the Abrehr was broken off by the Ger- mans. b. Karl Heinz KENKIER. Although socially he knew KRAMER - one of the Abwehr s most successful operators - as early as 1943, ONODENA did not _begin to work with hie until August 1944 when they were brought together by vnTIatiftnaLtas, .610 German Air Attaché who had been reoalled fram Stookholm to Berlin. Fltae that time on they collaborated closely and OMODERA considers KRAEMER to have been one of his most valuable sources. They met once a reek either in the German Embassy or in the office of ONODERA, and from time to time in the .apartment of one of the latter s assistants. WERZLAU, a Russian specialist, who had joined KRAEMER in 1944, was often present. ONODERA al- ways went alone. He says that he revealed some of his ern sources but usually in an indirect manner so as somewhat to camouflage them. However, RRABPER revealed none of his except official German Air Force publications. C. Dr. (Col.) Hans WAGNER. Chief in Stockholm of Abwehr K.O. Schweden. He first made contact with ONODERA on CANARIS s orders at the beginning of 1941. From that time on they net occasionally when WAGNER had received material train Berlin with instructions to pass it on to OROBERA. They did not get along. ONODERA knows that WAGNER made several attempts to penetrate his office and even tried to bribe the maid servants in his home. "However, he does not be- lieve that his efforts were successful. - 28 1 SECRET,,C011ROL LPV.;72 PUP P `- !1 r t r4 . Ri 1 0) .I: 4 ;4 r y OL p6:SAN SECRET qwn.m. IVOSIPG, who know WAGHER s organization, had a low opinion of his abilities, as did most of the other Germans in Stockholm. This was one of the reasons why ONODERA made direct contact with Ast Oslo instead of going through %%VIM as ho should have done, To keep up appearanoes OrODERA sometimes officially asked WAGNER for counter-espionage or security informa- tion as, for instance, in the case of BELLSGARDE. However, the answers were never satisfactory. MAGNER always promised a great deal but never produced anything of interest. OrODERA claims to know almost nothing about UTEIUMK, WAGrER, s assistant, wham he merely saw once or twice when UTZVARK came to deliver mescages at his office. After the July 20th (1E144) plot against Hitler. =CERA was told in Oslo by SALZINGER of Abwehr III F that UTERNARK had supersededWAGNER in K.O. Schweden because ha had geed connections in the S.D. d. Colonel VON HEIIIRIANN, Air Attache at the G,,rman Legation. Born in the Haiti° region, he was a Russian specialist who spcke the language fluently. GNODERkbegan to exchange intelligence with him in the summer of 1942. Be gave Soviet military material and received from VON HEIM= information on the American and British air forces and on Soviet war industries, all of which eame from official German Air Force publications. Generally speaking, the informa- tion woa VON HEINEMANN had many friends among the Swedes. ONODERA believes that ka .rrehanged information with General JUIVGDAHL, Chief of Staff of the Swedish Air Force. He was recalled to Berlin in October ii4; a:ad akortly to- fore his departure he initiated the exchanges between OrCDERA and KRAMER, who had been working with him. OHODERA never eetablished anything more than a social relation with his successor, Colonel GOLCHER. e. Major VON ROSENBLATT, German Assistant Air Attache. He had fre- quent contact with OGODERA. They did not make official exchanges of informa- tion but VON ROSENBLATT, an aircraft engineer, kept ONODERA supplied with material on the latest German teohnical developments. He was born in Finland and spoke Russian fluently. f. Colonel VON UTIPANN, Glittery Attache. Hewes OPODERA t e closest official contact anong the Germans. They did not exchange material but met about once a month to disouas intelligence matters and the over-all problems of the war, each giving his opinion of future developments. VON UTHGANN s job was devoted almost entirely to exploiting contacts in Swedish military circles and he therefore did not have much information of interest to ONODERA. g. CELLARIUS. For the first three years of the war there waa no direct contact between ONODERA and CELLARIUS. During early and sucoessfUl operation with "Gruppe E" of the Abwehr, CELLARIUS forbade the officers working with him to have any contact with OUODERA because of the latter i employment of RYBIKOWSKI. Nevertheless, ONODERA was kept informed of his Activities by MAASING through MISS. who frequently travelled from Estonia to Finland and gave °COCCHI reports which were in turn forwarded to Stook- helm by courier. In 1944 ONODERA found out through SAARSEN that CELLARIUS was O ing to organize counter-espionage activities against the Pole, in Finland. In October 1944 HORN, CELIARIUS s assistant, made contact with ONODERA on his chiera behalf. He proposed that GRODERA act as an inter- mediary for messages between CELLARM and certain members of the Finnish I.S., including HALLAHa. However, the plan fell through and (=HERA states that he received no information fram CELLARIUS at any time, nor did he ever have any more direct connection with him than has been stated. h. Other Contacts. Throughout the war (=CERA made regular trips to Norway at the invitation of the German Cammander-ln-Chief, General VON FALKENHORST. In 1942 he went an an official tour of the northern zone in the company of other Axis Attaches from Stockholm, among them Colonel GARBEA (Rumanian) and Colonel ROERO (Italian). In 1943 he was personally invited to visit the German military installations and was guided by Colonel VON ROSBERG of FALKERRORST s staff. In the came year ho established contact with the local Abwehr -29 - SECRET CCITTROL Stelle through Colonel NOMST, also of FALKETMORST s staff. The chief of the Ast was Captain VON BONI% who was assisted and later succeeded by Major VON GALLED. Through than OHODERA arranged to receive reports on Allied military activity in Great Britain -- troop movemente, and air force and naval activities. The reports were transmitted to him through the office of 707 11T7rAlir three or four times a month. They were received by OHODERA s assistant Col. ITO from one of the German Assistant Mdlitary Attaches, VOU 1:007IG1EGG of VON WATZD^RF. Same of than originated in Berlin, but they were operational and much better than anything received by KOMTSII s office. They ceased after 20 July 1944. B. =cut As Japanese Military Attache at Helsinki mamma had feu German switacte. He was officially in touch with the German Hilitary Attache, Col. MITE AIH, and the Naval Attache, Capt. VON BOHM (he says that the latter spoke good Russian and was the more interesting of the too), but they were more occupied with details of the alliance between Germany and Finland than with intelligenoe work. To OHOUCII s astonishment, they were oompletely ignorant of what was going on when the Finns first put out feelers for a separate peace with the Soviets. In general, the Finns sew to it that no contact took place betwebn thair German and Japanese collaborators: for instance, POETHOIRUI took great pains to keep mown away fram the Finnish-German espionage training camps located near liovaniami. OUOMI had some slight (and unproductive) dealings with CELLAR IUS, whose work was Imown to him indirectly through RRISTIAN. On the whole, he had a low opinion of it. 4. Hungarian (For further details see "Jaeanese Wartime Collaboration with the Hungarian Intelligence Service," SSU, 4 October 1946, DB #1241.) A. ONODERA To OHODERA s knauledge, there has never been any official collaboration between the Japanese and Hungarian General Staffs on a basis similar to that which has been deseribed in the cases of Poland, Finland and Estonia. Limited cooperation did exist in Budapest between a group of Tinncarian civilian and military code experts on the one hand, and on the other Col. HAYASHI, the Japanese Military Attache, and Col. SAEDRAI, who directed a small crypto- analysis section. In Stockholm Japanese collaboration with the Hungarians was limited to offioial ozsliarzes between OPODERA s office and that of the Hungarian Military Attache, Col. KOBOR. KOBOR himself was accredited to both Swetien awl Fin- land and during the war resided in Helsinki beoause he was able to obtain mcre valuable material there. Consequently, OHODERA rarely saw him, though MEM knew him well. He worked -alt ., ,Lc, %:Lt% t!1: nwri.eh Ganeral Staff through FAASOBES, whose wife was Hungarian. OUODERA says that his work was poor and that he was lazy and a drunkard. - __From February 1942 to January 1944, ONODERA dealt with a resident mem- ber of KOBOR s staff, Col. VAGY. VAGY s experience in Department II of the Hungarian General Staff before his arrival in Stockholm had been confined to Rumanian affairs. MODENA was able to help him with background information on the USSR, his primary target, and says that he was well qualified for his work; he became one of the most successful intelligence officers in Stockholm. They met once a week to exohange information and became close personal friends. (See below, V, Summary of intelligence Obtained.) In January 1944. VAGY was reelaced by Col. VOECZKOENDY, who had pre- viously been with the Russian Section of the Hungarian I.S., and with Abt II of the Abwehr in the southern sector of the eastern front. OHODERA describes him as much more interested in the internal political intrigues of the Hun- garian diplomatic mission than in gathering intelligence. His sources, if he had any, were probably among journalists. ONODERA am him frequently but their contact was social and they never made any exchanges or studies together. He occasionally gave GNODERA miscell- aneous information on 7)o1itical conditions in Great Britain and on the morale - 30 - SECRET ,CONTROL 1 of Allied coldiers in North Africa, and AO described how 113 had formerly 000perated with FREYTAG VOIT LoRaawnaf in tralninc and 1r7;cnizing a group of Polish agents and parachutists who opemted behind the Soviet lines in the UkraiRe. He also sold OUODERA United Statec and British newspapers and magazines which ha obtained allegedly fran British pilote through the Countess =RUIN. His relaticns with KOBOR, in contrast with those of VAGT,were excellent, Ile saw the Germans frequently and was in touch with :SHAMES. MODERA says that although he was qualified to be a good source on the USSR, he was too closely bound to the Germans to be trusted, He returned to Hungary in the autumn of 1944 because the Swedish govern- ment refused to recognize the recently installed Hungarian Nazi regime which he supported. (For further mention of him zee SSU memorandum BD 41253, 30 September 1946, "Possible Div. on or Funds.. .to the Training of Hungarian and Finnish students...") '• B. OHOUCHI At Riga (1939-1940) ODOUCTII had worked for a short while with the Hun- garian Nilitary Attache befare the latter was transferred to Macon. (Then ee t, th i7: nr,r rmt- IrrIld to the Hungarian Army and in 1942 was taken erisoner by the Soviets.) In Uelsinki OOUCtI knew Col. KODOR, though at first contacts with him were difficult to make because i(JiiAZIkOcit rP:oegary. Active collaboration between them OD intelligence matters began in September 1943, however, when KODOR became ODOUCHI s best source for information abotr: the wes- tern Allies. Because of his excellent oonnoction with Col. PAASONEN, he ob- tained very complete materiat on this subject from the Finnish Attache Section. (See below, V, Summary of Intelligence Obtained.) OUOUCHI describes the abore-mentioned Japanese-Hungarian collaboration in Budapest as "close" and suys that in addition to assigning Hungarianc to the crypto-analysis offioe headed by Col. SAKU1AI, the 7ungarian General Staff gave official permission for a Japanese military radio station to be net up in the office of the Japanese Hilitary Attache. - 31 SECRET.>CCETROL ti 0 n . i . • - A ,..,,,,..7 . 6. di W fi ....:::,...! . - Ood....::,$ f-1:,:i 3. :edish (For further details ace "Japanese V1rtJ Coatacts with the Swedish Intell i -gence Service," SSU, 4 Oztober 1946, DB 44243.) OPODERA claims to have loft meny good friends in Sweden -- more than did any other member of the Japanese diplomatic mission. He says that thia fact ie due to his having always made a point of keeping business and social matters etriotly separated, a courtesy much appreciated by the Swedes during the var. .He had known some of than in Japan previously: for instance, the GADELIUS family, whose firm had traded between the trio countries for several qenorations and whose children have Japanese names. The MARTIN EAMON family were a similar case. He had a long standing acquaintanceship with such Swedich diplanata formerly aocredited to Japan as BAGGE, who had been Minister for many years and who knew OMODERA s family; and RIPA and SCNIDOO, who had both been Counsellors. His best friend wae Professor BOCK, the icthyologist, who had studied in Japan for many years. He also knew General TWERNELL, General EEREHSVARD, Admiral STROELIBOCM, Count DOUGLAS, and Count BOUDE, and was active in the Japan-Sweden Club, whose president was Admiral DESCHAMPS and whose vice president the engineer 7ALY=3. Altzh 1.1 0! cen:. ?0 drcw..sTd current events with these people, he claims never to have asked any of them for intelligence information, and he says that they were all correepondingly grateful to him. ONODERA s and his wife s popularity was evidenced by the feet that their Swedish friends gave a large tea party in their honor shortly before the repatriatiou; there wan 1.e 17nr.Ly fcz Minister OKAMOTO or for any other member of the mission. Obtaining intelligence from official Swedish sources was very difficult and OPODERA says that the greater part of what he succeeded in getting came to him in- directly through other sources like MAAS= or EZMEMER. Be describes the Swedish .people as being most reserved in their offices and most likely to talk, if at all, when they are drinking at a party. He cites as an example the case of General NORDENSCHILD, Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish Air Force, who in 1945 at a fare- yell cocktail party in honor of Col. GARBEA, the Rumanian Military Attachb, gave ONODERA a detailed account of American and British Air Force concentrations in England and forecast the date of the impending bomber offensive against Germany with considerable accuracy. ONODERA fet:s that this information turned out to be very useful. ONODERA was never able to get complete information about the Swedish I.S. He was in touch with each of three chiefs of the General Staff, Dept. II, who suc- ceeded each other during the war: Col. AIDERIREUTZ, Cameander LABDQUIST, and Col. JUHLIN-DANEFELD. He says that the intelligence command changed because the Swedee warted to keep up with the progress of the war as it developed in favor of the Allies. AIDERIREUTZ had been known as a friend of Admiral CAEARIS. LANDITUIST was not discreet about his contacts with the Germans; OPODERA once met him tra- veling on the plane to Berlin in the company of WALMER. .NMELITT-DARNFELD ) he describes as having been pro-German/shale he was Military Attache in Derlin . at the beginning 11.-•■•• ...-..of-thmTaT, but as having later espoused the Allied oause with great vigor. ONO- DERA was also acquainted with Col. BOERNSTR JGRNA and Col. KAMP of the Military Intelligence Seotion, with Major PETERSgE of the Espionage Service, and with BOUM , of Counter-espionage. He exohanged intelligence only with ALDEREREUMand PETER-. SEM (see below, Vd, Summary of Intelligence Obtained). 6. Relations with Other Japanese Missions in Europe. (See also "Japanese Wartime Military Missions in Europe," SSU, 4 October 1946, DE #1245-) The various Japanese military missions in Europe communicated frequently. Their repr-eentatives gathered once a year at an official Attache meeting which was pre- sided over by the senior officer present. At these meetings each Attache gave a brief account of his activities durilig the year past and of the war s development - 32 - elii7e12 in 47 , ! o eas sE.;- A/ 13 . t Fn A,. g cr, nt. fr. 1 )1: ! ?cot. OA busir. of these Ceservntioes t. jciot reeort zco otiouc tore doomed ::occeerry woe drmin ue and forwarded to Tok,. .o. has a pea: opirS.on of the rosultz rchlevud s-5, the meetinm,s, which occurred as f0110ws: 1041 Herlill eresidiu!: iTficer. Gen. 194Z 11 1945 Nome 11 Con. 1.70TIMI3B. 1944 ihula?c5t Gen. WA:Tn. In addities it vas cuntmory 1. 07 differoot poste to .supply each other with in- formal:ion for 130 in oxchanGes with foroigr sources. Eithez a report was prepared at the request of a specific 2ost, or copier of reports to the General Staff were forwarded eimeltanconely with the original. OBODEPA had agreements for such ex- changes wi".:.h the following: a. Berlin. After Tokyo, Berlin was OHODERA ,, most important source of .exchange 71:617ial,- KOMATSU (the Military Attaché) was occupied more with diplomatic( affairs than with intelligence, but OFODERA was in touch with the heed° of different sections in his office from each of wham he received information on reqUast, 1. From Col. OTANI Etsuo who, he says, was the most active member of the UilitarY Attaohh s office, he received general information on 12;.= ...75rf:. Its vnlitywns elwnye examllent. KOTARI being one of the for emost Japanese specialist in such mattera. ii. From C01% MISMI Hizashi he received troop movement reports obtained fron the German General Staff and from German Air Pores Headquarters, with which 1/sIlI was liaison officer. iii. From Col. IT IZUKA he obtained information concerning Soviet mar production and technical developments. ISHIEUKAras liaison offi- cer with the Economic Section and the Armament Department of the Ger- man General Staff. He had spent two years in Russia and knew Soviet technical methods well. iv. From Col. UTGUMII Fukashi he received reports concerning the Abwehr (Abt II and III) and the Gestapo and Kripo. With Ass t Military At- taché TA:DP.0TO, 111GOMII was in charge of liquidating the Japanese political sabotace plan against the USSR which had been handed over to the Germans in June 1941. Their work ras kept highly secret. MIMI- cni had once served under OUODERA as an arobivist in the Russian S ecti on of the Japanese General Staff. v. Col. SAIOJRAT Mobuta, liaison officer with the German orypto-analytioal Services, came once to Stookholm to take material which OFODERA had Obteined from HALLAM. 1n elm/lenge for the information he received from the above sources, - - OFODERA suPelied military intelligence on the Russians and the wee- -- teru Allies as well as reports of German troop movements an both fronts. The latter were especially appreciated by the Japanese in porlin becauge they were difficult to obtain in Germany. b. Helsinhi. OFODRRA s exchanges with mouani were made several times a r7B30.1:11 courier, ()FOUGHT supplied same Soviet material not obtained by OHODERA from his other soleces. In return OFODERA gave general in- formation about Soviet and Scandanavian matters. o. Madrid. At the Attaché meeting held in Rome (1943) ODODERA had agreed vith Col. SAKURAI Keizo, the Military Attaché in Spain, for a regular seri.es of exchanges between Stockholm and Madrid. SAKURAI sent reports on the arued forces of the western Allies in Europe and North Africa. He obtained tham from official Spaniah sources and from what OBODERA heard to re liunarier and Italian agents. =GERA sent back information de- rived from the Swedish General Staff and from BELLECARDE. - 33 - SECRET CONTROL sT Av At A .• - a: . • : , cloaF11,(:c. : : r. '..• /41.0 , 5 ico;;.; • c: t :. ' 1 r ilS11.;.■ • .1 TU. 1 1,i • .1 o? ' • •1.-,r.l.ss that 10 ai t» - . rmrsop.ol fr(NrIontly . 1.1 ;fo 01! 1,10±. .1' hCI c..arrUI:f■O :dunc:3 21.1 whoi y1 fa Inn ill e. - lie hoe, sal.° IiiII Goneril Aechl Ankc.:..L., mit naver . that .1thouh TriXEIC: ,.1 had L3i ;ourcle, 1r w.,..1:111 re el.;ed as hoen obtai-,:ed frcrtI ci or.cct3L1 ancl inferior to .sha:-. TICIMA wax frart Be:: ore the autbroo:c of the Russo - Gorman einlv-r.rna of flzrviet Trir.:h the Mlitary Attach in ...losuou rrero aftcr 1941 wora l.aU *.•••-;71 Buchg rest or Sophia. Those with C .:a Budapest pcgrr. -.-rere tee:Irina awl enrnsd only with oommunications and orypto-analysis. V•-•—• • tot..trovo A ir esg eiahlnot,iti4 SECRET ammo , F • • ,, V. 3U1!7ARYCIPIIITELLIGE17CEOBTAI3IED For an account of the intelligence exchanged among the Ja2anese themselves see above, IV. 6., Relations with Other Japanese Missions in Europe, The following sumnary is concerned largely with Positive Intelligence. Through their collaboration with the intelligence services or with various officials and nationals of certain countries who were also mmong their targets, the Japanese inevitably gained considerable knowledge of a Counter-Intelligence nature concerning those countries. Th3 general struoture of what they knew end told in the interrogation has been covered in the foregoing account by countries of their contacts and sources, however, and only.cupplementary in- stances are cited below. It is reasonably ceitain that OHODERs. and MUM received from Finnish, Swedish and perhaps Polish sources a good deal more intelligence on the western Allies than that admitted to in their interrogations and given here. 1. General Summary by Sources Nationality Name of Page Subsource and/or Target of Source TOTIFFr Ref. Nationality Nature of Intelligenoe Supplied Country a. Polish (A. ONODERA) RYBIKOOSRI 16 Extensive network Various and detailed, USSR A of Poles inel. JA inal. GB, troop movements, Germany KWIC 0 KUNCERICZ bases, etrategy and in Berlin, others tactics, economic intell. at Bialystok, Minsk, Smolensk. War saw, Kaunas, Koenigsberg. Riga, Helsinki, Emma BREESK. 16 GAHO (Polish I.S. Declaration of war; troop WIUSKI Chief) in London movrnents. RYBTROWSKI in Allied military activity USA. 6 England in India and Burma. Gr. Brit. (B, OUOUCUT) ZABA 17 Politics and internal Finland affairs. BERSON 17 Previous contacts General information, des. USSR in /lesooy cribed as superficial. b. Finnish (A. OUODERA) STEM 22 Finnish Gen. Staff. Soviet military strength. USSR HULABAA, Finn. Red Army Eastern Front OB. USSR (Probably Swedish) Internal political situation Gr.Brit. - " TETERSEN (Swed.)R.A.F. tactical methods. (Allegedly a source Allied troops in Iceland. Western boated in Iceland) Allies Dept. II, Finnish German Army Eastern Germany General Staff Front OB. 1 - 35 7 SECRET ,CONTROL BEST • Nationality Hams bf Page Suboouroe and/or Of Source Touroe E7 Warianty Nature of Intelligence Eaplicci CPSIA, b. Finnish WILLMAN 22 Finnish refugee Soviet fleet extivitiea and USSR (cont.) group in Stock- troop movements in the Baltic holm; personal area; codes. ISOUrCOO German troop movements. Germany Reactance movement aotivitisa. Fialand Military and diplomatic codes. Sr. Brit., France, Vatioan, Portugal, Turkey, Rumania, Yugoslavia. HORMGREN 22 .Souroe located in Soviet naval activity. USSR one of Baltic States IUMENIUS 23 NORM SAL2INGER. Publications (magazines). USA German Sr. Brit. • "Latest info on German activities." Germany • CE vetting services. (general) PAASOMEN, 23 Generally, the Soviet cods material (both as USSR BALL wideepread con- codes and as subject matter). KAM, tacts of the Finnish PALE refuges group Security servicaso protection (general) (inol. orypto of ONODERA s codes. section) of Stookholm Reports on piogress of war. USSR PALE 23 Finn. crypto .Info that Swedish orypto sect. Sweden soot., had broken ONODERA s general code. SALOICORPI 23 PALE arohivea Soviet oodes. USSR of Finnish orypto section (B. ONOUCHI) POEYHONEN 20 German forces in/Finnish Gen. Staff reports on USSR (in his Finland Dept. II, development of var. absence, Finnish Gen. Staff SALOKORPI • Allied ocnvoye in Murmansk Allies or RUWELA) Arohangelsk. USSR Dept. II, Finn, Technical: planes, tanks, Gan. Staff rocket guns. Military training methods. War production capacity.. Interrogation of P.o:a. s 38 SECRET _CONTROL - • Ft.,;.i 1,161 444 a I LA/ tri Tif SECRET.; CONTROL Nationality Name of Page Subsource and/or Target of Source Souroe Nature of Intelligenoe Supplied Country b. Finnish CI Sect. Of Dept, Cl reports annual "pereen- Allies (dont.) II ality primer." II Estimatea Sect. Reports. II SALOKORPI 20 Espionage " II Us. of propaganda 6 deception USSR material in °Combat by Red Army. • PALE 20 Crypto N o Codes of all nations. USA, Or. Brit,, USSR. Turkey, other SLOEOR 20 Finnish Gen. Finnish Angy war capacity. Finland StatfAttaohe Fragmentary German ditto. Germany Seotien LAUTEARI 21 A Finnish newt- Internal conditions and politi- Finland paper dal developments. 0111E13LAN 20 Not given Internal conditions. Finland o.Estonian (A. °NOMA) MAASING 24ff. WAGNER (German); CE: vetting of all ONODERA s (general) Soviet press now sources and agents. office. Stockholm:- British passport control office, do.: Swed1th police Estonian: ------47."--nts in Sato- Probably various. USSR nia, Latvia, Len- ingrad Moscow Offioers on Soy. General Staff: TOXBERG, UDENS JACOBSEN (Abwehr) "Good information." including Germany, plani for invasion of USSR. prob. USSR o GROSSMAN (in Swe- Unknown. en A Germany) ■••••••• - Finnish: MELARIME Probably CS. (general) Indio . unknown Technical and scientific. USSR GAMMA: l li ft n CANARIS Unknown, Prot. USSR CELLAR.= (oh- Germany(1), wehr "Gruppe E") USSR SAIDRA (SS) SS Divisions. Germany Abwohr OS reports. - 37 . sscRE7r-ctinum aECRET, boORot Rationality Rome of peqp_Snbsouroe and/Or Target ef S•vros I7 Rationality Saturn of Intelligenes Supplied •Country o. Estenian MAASIU0 Andialk: Army Unknown; probably various. (general) (Cont.) (Cont.) irriiars MELO. DABEFELD, XAEMPF, now4 PEVMMIN. erYptd seotion, stmte.polioe (PAIS S:ME); _ . PETERSEE (1) Military activity Irak • Or. Brit. • Police Advance:notice of Swedish CB. Sweden measures. Ind/v. unknown Arnham attack plans. U8A. Gr. Brit. ryanche GaNTER Troop movements, OD France; USA, dr. Brit. • Polit. Audi. developments FranCe Amex-inane Unknown, if any. CARMON • N giggg •S4Soirces in Troop movement., polltioal, war USSR 11260.111 potential. Unknown Publications. USA, Gr. Brit. NAMING UnktIOWA Atom bomb. USA? (?) V./weapon°. Germany Tank produotion. USSR BELLE- ES Abwehr; Swedieh Probably various. esp. GARDE Russian agenta ; Germany Seadiab, Army; Set.. Ea= refuge. Allied attack and occupation Baetern group) CARLSON plans, Allies (Amaricen coneul)Allied army for Far East. • moms (British Import Contr. Troop movements and OB. USA, Off.); reel- . ) _ Gr. Brit. donna in Arrival of convoys in England.) England Second front. ) Internal and political. France Internal conditions. Germany JACOBSEN 25 Absehri CARARTS Political Germany (Via JUR.; .LIN-DANN.... FED) - 3a - SECRET_ -CONTROL reti f3 Zo htinI' r ,„43y 'd BESTAVA ...••••• Nationality Name of Ems Subsourso and/Or TurS of Sour , NUFFIr Ra- Vationality .Nature of Intelligence Supplied Mtn o. Sstonian XRISTIAN 26 CELLARIUS (08Toly) (Indireot rwsulto only, thru us6a, (cont.) the Pinot; none frum KRISTIAN Germany/ htneolf.) SUBSEA 26 Gorman (Abeet!..); Unknown. prob. USSR. Poll Germany (B. GROUCH!) PITTRA 2? POLIROTIEN (fu), Political. USSR/ oom- Retold taote in Estonia 41. Latvian (A. OSODERA) =NUB, 24 Latvian network Probably various. USSR PETERSON.in Ostrov. Pskov • LIRSITIS neighboring frontier area DIRZITTS 2,4, Unknown Unknown IT2SR (B. anoucua) XIXKUS. 27 Latvtaa-Gon. Probably various. USER =RUINS Staff German CANARIS 28 Abwihr Off-reports; interrogation of USSR (via Soviet P.O.W. s; Soviet mill.. (to MOD- WAGNER) tory publicatione. EM only) Western troop movements in India. Allies Military studies in chemical Genoa), std biological vaulare. Conversational attract!, dis- USSR. cussion of needs of German ifeetern Jac. intelligence! services. Allies, Germany KILIEHER -28 Abseils. Teohtical reports an aircraft USA, production; airborne ground Or. Brit. faros troop movements. Ger. Air Force Fleet movements. Gr. Brit. Unknown U.S. attacks on Okinawa USA Philippine.. in advanoo. Unknown U.S. Air Faroe delegation USA, to USSR. USSR Swedish Metal produotiaa. tSgt Unknown Publications. USA, Sr. Brit. Voknown Tanks and artillery. Gr. Brit. PGIASTER Unknown Atcm bcab. (T) -89 SECRET---CONTROL •py ■11.2 40 . some CONTROL Nationality lame of Ne. Subsouros and/or or Source 800s Sationalttc Sature Of intelligence Supplied I. German SRAl27311 28 , Wawa Tank production. (cont.) (?) VON urelemt 29 YOU DOM/E. MI Unitary sotivtty in Cr. Brit. Western GALL (German) Allies Swedish Military /lout discussion with ORODERA (Moral) Circles of intelligence matters. Air forts information. VOTE RBI- 29 Offieial demon mat, MI1A1M. Air Poree puhl. dr. Brit. War incinstries. USSR tow .20a 30 derzum Latent demo teoh, develop. OntaavY SINBLAST Berlin banes of Sections of U.S. War USA R(= Production Board. Ass- i t Air Attache, Ettoalhoha) 10113100193341 German General information on the Allies YOB TM% 30 progrese atilt, war. fD0922 f. langerinn (A. OVOLIERA) reef 30 Probebly Swedish, Peoific offensive plans, in USA perhaps LANDQ073? advance, • tEnbloan data on Allied forces Western in No. Africa a western front. lilies EDingarien den. BBlitnry forces, tech. develop., US22 Staff war produotion4 Indirectly from Oars. western front OS Mwmacy Bads Olow. Staff - • (Stbseuroes in gen- eral included deed. P.O., Oulu Staff la : prob. Crypto Seot.t man Olen), OARNIES (Preach) VOW 30 Allegedly British Beespepers end magazine.. USA., WENDY pilots through Or. Brit. Goatees 02291fIlt. a Ouch rained in nem Unknown Ifieoollenecus Or. Brit. Unknowa Sorele of soldiers in So. We stern Africa. Allies - 40 - w.f.! CONTROL Nationality Name of Av , . Subsouro0 and/or rTart of Source RV; Nationality Nature of Intelligence Supplied ountry f. Hungar-- ian (B. =max) (Contd,) aOSOR $O ff. fiie016A.nn at U. S. ehipping and vet produ0- USA Washingtons PM-tion; 1942 industrial outlook. SONEN, Finnish Attache Section PAASONEN Finn- No. Africa OS, late 1943. USA, ish Attache Sect. ar. Brit. Iliac. reports on Germ. Army. Germany Soviet activ. in Balkans. USSR SoVist Amy Air ctrength. Finn. Gen. Staff Tech. reports an ordnanoe. • Swedish (mum only) PETER- 32 Sired. Gen. Staff Western front OB. Western SEM Allied • Troop movement reviews.. All belligerents Soviet troop movements on USSR Finnish . Baltio front. - • (7) Germ, eastern front Oa. Germany " (7) Technical studies: e.g., en Germany rocket bombs. awed. Secret Samples of German sabotage Germany Police apparatus (Possible sub- sources of same of the above: attaches diplomats of mall countriea) ainni- JACOBSEN See JACOBSEN. ;:. :4411MELD (Eetonian) SIDER.... 32 Seed. Gen. Staff. Troop movements; Baltic USSR ACREUT5 Dept. II Fleet OB. - Brew— 32 Seed. Air Force Air force concentrations, USA. SCHUB bomber offeneive (inadvert. Gr. Brit.. • tantly given). MeDSON 52 Tunscin Import- Discussion of trade and (general) Export Co.(Swed.) production trends. Legation bulletins. USA, China SECRET,CONTROL .t,i77.!IMIVIS:renIVRI95,1974931211:19Enrorimmennrrirer...... es. •..1nRET C6TROL Nations/11 Name of Subsource and/or Target TrrarrOW Te11747,— 40 1. Nationality Nature of Intelligens , Supplied Country • • Swedish UAW . Skandinavidka Swedish Quarterly Roviaw und (general) (cont.) STROM, Bank (Sod.) other eoonanio publ. Director worldwide production firares. Asnietance in drawing u (general) economic reports. ESSEH, Degaposten. Articles on internal condiiona Manager Swad. pro-Nati Gr. Brit. nowspaper VICXLURD Personal ex- Discussion of trip t.> tritsin. Gr. Brit. perience in Great Britain VIVRE Swedish firm of Priee quotations and market Seed. GADELIUS conditions. general Frau Swedish prone Translations. IARSBER- GER (employee in OHODERA,s office) 2.Detai/ed Summery by Target Countries Itens affecting the United States and Great Britain jointly, ea well es a few concerning other of the Allies than those two or the USSR. will be found listed under b., Western Allies. !Target Date Obt. Sounee Subsource and/or .13ouny Description of Intelligence Obtained (When Known) ionalityty rationality a. with the at tialognat USA Reports dealing bomb. After Oct. ISRAEVOI (Germ.) (7) 1944 or HAASTNG (Eutontan) USA Plan for the general U.S. offensive Time of FAGY (Hung.) probably Seed.. in the Pacific (subsequent develop- attack on perhaps ments proved this information to Bougainville have been accurate). (page 32) Plan for the U.S..attaok on the Aleu- 1 month tians, and other information about in ad - U.S. forces in Alaska. Vane. Report of the forthcaming U.S. attacks "Sufficient KRAEMER (German). tIrdaunm an the-Philippines and Okinawa. 4 in advance Described as not detailed enough. to be inter- esting" Reports of U.S. Air Force delegation Between visit to Soviet airfields in Siberia. Aug. 1944 (ONODERA says he never received Way 1946 — further onnfirmation.) Written in Reports on V.S. plane production, in Monthly Link s= great detail and oontAieing production during German figures on various plane types. 1945 - 42 - SECRET CCUTROL Target Data (lbt. Bourn° and/or Subsource and/or Country Description of Intelligenoo Obtained Inhon Known) Ilationali Nationality USA Report, seeminr,ly derived in part trait Early KOBGR (Rung.) OREUDAR (spell- publicationn, on navel and merchant 1944 ing?), Finnish marine ahippinc in the U.S. U.A. Washington General report of war production in U.S. A Industrial outlook in U.S. in 1942. 1942 a PAASOIMI Finn. Attache Section Names of the different sections of the RIEDEL (Germ. nerlin War Production Board. Ass t A.A.) U.S. diplomatic oodo (oee concluding 1943 PALE (Finn) Finnish Crypto section 3., below). (broken Section 1941) U.S. magaidnes (publioations). late 1944- num= Unknown July 1945 (Finn) b. Western Alliee A report of plane for the Allied at- HAASING (Est.) Swedish tack on Arnheim (ale). This doubtless refers to Arnhan, where paratroops of the F-irst Allied Airborne Army landed 15 Sept. 1944. No ocement as to how far in achmnee or bon accurate. Report of a second Allied attack on. After D-Day BELLEGARDE Unknown the southern side of Cherbourg Penin- (6 Juno (Estonian) Buie, dcheduled rde Aug. 1944. (This 1944) re-Jo:twee considered important-by the Germans, who had been expecting the second attack from the north in the vicinity of Hanfloure and Le Havre.) Allied plan for attack in the Dec. 1944 BELLEGARDE Unknown direction of Osnabruok in March 1945. (Estonian (The Germano had expected such an in England) attack in July.) . Detailed account of U.S. and British 1943 11ORDENSCILILD (Swedish Air air force conoentrations in England, (C-in-C of Force sources) with e. oonsidernbly accurate forecast Swedish Air of the impending bomber offensive Force) ._, agoinet_Germany. (=DELA says this --info:motion-turned out to be very useful.) Very detailed reports on aircraft Uonthly, PatA=72( Probably official production in U.S. Great Britain. Aue. 1944-, (German) German Air Force Sometimes contained important items lley 1.946 . publications about new methods or changes in the location of factories, Western front CB, detailed studies 2 or 5 oo- PETIPSW! . Swedish General by the Swedish den. Staff. (OnODERA =slots (Swedish) Staff mentions one he gave to KRAMER as betwoen having been dated 22 Feb. 1945.) mid-1943 April 1945 - 43 - BECREt-:CCOTROL Date Cbt. Source And/or S.-boom:us and/or cunt Delroiption of (!hne Nioouftr 'Nationality •b. Western Allies (cont.) Reports An Allied oampoys in Mbrmensk POEYBONEN Finnish General and Archangslsk. . (Finn) Staffo partly . frau Gennan for- get stationed in Finland. Esoellent reports on movonent of Al- Regularly Unknown Unknown lind. air bases In Europo with details during of OD, plans types, eta. 1944 Reports on the passage of Allied German planet through (sic) Gibraltar. liParti on snaps Of command in the Regularly 0 Unknown militkry forces of the westnno Allies. in 1944 early 1946 Detailed report on organisation in sitar 1945 muntanE Ebgland of an arny for the Par East. (Eitonian in England) Detni/s of mobilisation and troop Before CADMUS Abwehr movements in India. Uar. 2944 (German) via VAOPER Alliedimilitary nativity in Great or 4 VOTI UTTI- VOU BONIN & Britain. troop movnnanta, air form times YOU ALL monthlyand naval Activities. Some of those (German) (German) briginahmi in Berlin butter, opora- rron 190- tiovel and much bettor than anything RO July meived by the Jap. /LA. office there. 1944 Arrival of convoys in Britain. Vid -1944 BELLEGARDE Unknown (Swtonian) Answers to quoations about the Becloud Front. • Fragmentary reparts on Allied troops Aocoriing to in Iceland. SI1VIE,J. source in Iceland Teohnioll material on new U.S. and Aug. 1944- Probably Offioiil British pinaelppee. Hay 1946 Gene. Air Foto,. publications , 00 it 17,5, and.Britith Air Farces in iv oáaM Wis. Those of Europe were detailed, oenteinimg croup um- bers, plans types Ornament and base location. Dnacription and movements of U.S. and (=DMA thinks, Dritiah airborne divisions. • Judging frpn the style, that this may have cone frail a Eritiih military aurae) General U.S. and British troop move- Official Gorman ments on all fronts. A.F. reports (The name tl(Pel of info was also furnished by =SITIO, PETER- psn, BELLEGARDE) - 44 - ,...... ,b .,„ • a ' '13 , f 4 t w. 6," g.^II iscno7--ctinntot Target Onto Obt. Source and/or Subsouros and/or Country Description of Intelligence Obtained Mien Knoem), lktionality b, Western Allies (cont.) Swodillh den. Staff reviews of troop Mid-1943- FEMUR Swedish General movnnents of all belligeronts on all April 1945 (Swedish) 3taff fronts. Mao. data on Allied forces on the Feb. 1942- VAGY (num5.) Unknown eastern front and in Va. Africa. Aug. 1943 Morale of Allied soldiers in 1944 VOSOZEOENDY No. Afrioa. (flung.) OB of U.S. nnd British forces in Late 1943 RUBOR (ame.) PAASONF/1 A Finn. North Atria . Attache Section general info on progress of Weokly XORDIGSNO A (Office of Germ. from Oat. VON TTAISD(RFF M.A., Stookhoka) 1944 (German) Reports describing Allied plane char- 1945 Unknown (In English, ovi- acteristics. dently not writ- tan by a tech- nician) U.S. and British Air Force info. Mid-1942- VON arm- Official German s:Xt. 1944 MANIT (Germ.) A.F. pUbl. Finnish Dept. XX CI Seotion reports MEDIC= As indicated (Finn) Finnish Dept. II Estimates Section " and reports. SALOWORFI U.S. and British nmarspapers end 1944 V OECZEOLIITIL Countess CZFIMIU, marAminee. (Hung?) allegedly frau Brit. pilots Dittos The Booncmist, The Financial KU ViluS (Finn), Unknown Wows. Tbe--71:570M-TIales )117Wifork nAAnna (Sot.), Ms, Life. ast,WARg etc. SRAM/ (Germ.), , Bang. M.A., ot al. Translations from the Swedish press. Frau IARSBUR- Swedish nem/s- GER (Swedish) evers of OHODERA s onion Articles for Panel on internal con- ESSER, pro- (Preeunably ditions in U.S. and Groat Britain. Vast Swede sources of the paper Deg:: posten) . ?blitical and military developuents GAMIER Oeullist Gen. in Frame.. (French) Staff, prob. other French sources - 46 SECP2T-CONTROL SECRET • 90211140L Tart Date Oat. Source and/Or Subsouros and/Or WIEEFY Description of Intelligenoe Obtained Then Known) Vationali4 Rationality b. lastarn Allies (oont.) Apr. Internal 1946political oonditioms in prilEaknn (Personal ob- France. (Setonian, •ervation in. in England) Maroh 1946) Chinese Legption (Stockholm) bulletin. ?SISSON (Bred.) p. Great Britain 2 marts containing =tone" material STENEN (Finn) Prob. Swedish, on W.A.?. taotioal methods, deaoribed perhaps PETER- : as melt valuable. ((00DERA Woe ecm- SEW plimentedby Tokyo 1112 for getting them.) Reports at British tanks and artillery. Feb. 1945 Probably (Written in ARMEE (Germ.) German) Plans tar Britimh Army of Occupation Vid..1948 BOCUMARD5 - Unknown in Germany. (Estonian, in England) British Cwt. code of 1934, complete. Mar. 1948 WiLLNAH (Finn) Finn, rerageo orypto group A. report on the political situation STEM; (Flan) Probably Swedish within Great Britain. Rico. info on ditto. 1944 - TOECZKOMY Unknown (Hung.) Dissuasion (with CGTOD2Ws assistant VICKLUMD Personal obser- MOUS) of a trip to Britain. (Bred.) vation Significant materiel Soviet mobilisation plan. Spring 1941 NAMING (Eat.) Unknown Plans and descriptive details of the a • "Stalin Lino." ports on Soviet Gen. Staff conver- Late 1941 or RYBIKawSKI sations of Out. 19411 disou gaion be- early 1942 (Poliah) -tmanONAL117, vibe nsmitAxl to defend Mos- ciow at all costa, and IrDIOSIOLNICO, who • Advocated retreating beyond the Volga. itroWeant of Soviet reeerves called back !rem the Volg• line to (Wend Goma (winter 1941-1942). . Soviet plans (Spring 1942) for strata- 1942 RYDIKOWSKI gio retreat to Don-Stalingrad-Volga- (Polish) Ruben /ins. Reports concerning removal of Soviet war industryto the Ural region. I. The Soviet operational plan for the central front. SECRTT COUTROL .,--- SMUT-CONTROL 777-- Date Ott. rsolaroe =Or Subsource end/or ;.M Descriktion of Intelligenos Ohtainad W.715;102) natio-x-I LE" Nationality d. USSR (cont.) Soviet Can, Staff esthete of German 194 RYBIRMISK/ Unknown operation in 194Z Omni feared (Polish) German attack against the left wing of the Moscow front). Impending Soviet declaration of war After Car- BRZESOMMII GANO (London against Japan. men surren- (Polish) Polish I.B. der Chief) Yovement of 10 Soviet divisions to the Far Beate= front. Situation reports of the eastern front Weekly for WILUMN Fionish and of Soviet troop movements. These 10 months (Finn) refugee were mostomplete. containing detailed prior to group identification of units and positions, Japanese but OBODERA empleins .that they always surrender cane too late t6 be of use. Regular reports .on Soviet troop move-- S or 4 Unknown mints in Finland, Latvia, Estonia, times a White Russia. Leningrad and (to a leo- month r;:T ser extent) Moscow. They were vary . (exact detailed. &ant unit ideatifioationo period and pinpoint positions. unknown) Finnish Oen.. Staff reports on dovolop- every POSYNOMMT Finnish Gen. ment of the war against USSR; troop 10 days (Firm) Staff; Germ nevenents, air and ground force OB; (exact forces in ordnance, supplies end replacements; period Finland naval activities in the Baltic. unknown) Soviet Baltic Fleet OB; a complete re- April ALDE1BREUT2 Seed. Dept. II port which ONODFAA passed on to the 1941 (STrediffil) Japanese W.A. at Moscow. Reports on Soviet fleet and troop Prior to WILLMAN (Finn) Finn. Gen. Staff; movements in the Baltic area. Mar. 1946 personal sources in Sweden Onsplete OD of Soviet eastern front smun (Finn) HALLAMAA-of Finn. armies (1 report). crypt° group . . .._. Reports_op Soviet miiitar? foroes. Monthly. VAOY (Hung.) Hungarian 06n. — bechnieil-developments and ear pro- Feb. 1942- Staff duotion. Oat. 194$ Technical reports on new develoments POEM= Finnish Can. in construction of Soviet plane., tank!! (Finn) Staff and rocket guns. Estimates of Soviet strategic re-OrVerni. . Frequently RYBIKONSKI Unknown after 1942 (Polish) Detailed description of nay Soviet 1943 WILMA!! Finm.den. Staff aircraft carrier. (Finn.) or personal sources in Sweden 47 - SCCRET CONTROL swim"COOL Date Obt. Source an or Subsourco and/or 7T.Iggir Description of Intelligence Obtained (When Rnosn Nationality d. USSR (cont.) Szteneive Soviet code material (see Throughout Various Finnish Crypto below). the ear Finns Section Viso. Reports on Troop Uovemonts, OD eto Soviet troop movements in Latvia, Lith- Feb. -Jnne RYBIRCFSRI Unknown uania and Sart Poland. 1941 (Polish) Ditto, northeastern 6 central fronts. After 1942 Reviews of Soviet military strength. Oont.bly STEREO Finnish Gen. (exact per- (Finn) Staff iod unknown) Soviet naval notivity. 1101P.13El1 SUbsouroe in one (Finn) of Baltic states Operational reports on eastern front. Unknown German S.S. Soviet troop movenents oaths Finnigh WALLAilAd Unknown front. (Finn) Ditto, northern sector of eastern Aug. 1941 :ALDERIRBUTZ Seed. Dept. II .front. (Swedish) lkmement of Soviet armies and divisions Between PETERSEN% Deed. Gen. on Finnish and Ratio fronts. laid-1943 (Swedish) Staff? Apr. 1946 Reports on Strength of Soviet army 1COBOR Finn. Gen. Staff; and air force. (flang.) PAABOREW a At- tachè Section General info on progress of the cur. Weekly ROEFICSEGO (Office of Germ. fran VOU WATZMORF Stookhola) Oct. 1944 (German) Soviet military training methods. PGMBONER Finn. Gen. Staff (Finn.) . Misc. Report. on Technical SUbjects, Produotion Capacity, Far Potential eto. Figures of reilros4 transportation of Feb.-June RIBIRCOSRT Uniatown —....SeSistmer materials and troops in 1941 (Polish) eastern Poland. Soviet saientifio and teohnidal develop. MAASINO German and (Bet.) Finnish Soviet war industry production figures. Milne:Jen Figures and estimates of Soviet lair POEYRODUT Finnish Gem. produotion capaoity. (Finn) Staff . Reports an Soviet ordnance develop. ROBOR flung.) Finn. technicians 48.. sscgET--dourem NUE COPY SECRET-'6NTROL Tar et Date Obt. Source ant/or Subsouros andat Country Description of lntelligenoe Obtained (When Known) lationali ir 'Nationality d. USSR (cont.) . Soviet tank production. Mar. 1946 KRAEMER (Germ.) Unknown or MAASINO • (Est.) Soviet war industries. Itid-1842- VON HEINEMANN Offioial German Oct. 1944 (German) air foree publications Codes, CS Material, P.O.W. Intern) ations Four Soviet military °odes: (1) Five- Nov. 1944 WILL/IAN Finnish refugee symbol operational code cemplete with (Finn) crypt° group method for use, (2) Five-symbol NOD .code complete with methods (3) Pour- symbol tank combat ocmmuniostion code, inomplete--about 20-26% broken; (4) FourJiymbol air force oommuniostions oods, ditto. • One four-symbol Soviet military code, Jan. or • incomplete -- about 25% broken. Feb. 1946 . • Four Soviet °ode•, (1) EKVD . five- Probably PALE archives digit, °caplets analysis (sans as SALOK0aPI of Finnish above?), (2) NOD five-digit, moon- (Finn) refugee orypto put. analyst's (3). and (4) military group combat oadmuntoation code. possibly for tank units (sene as latt two above?) (See also . concluding section 3., below.) Soviet arny MAO of deception material Deo. 1940 SALOKORPI Finnish Dept. II and propaganda in oodbat. (Finn) Espionage Scotian Finnish Dept. II CI Section reports POSTMEN Finnish Dept. II and yearly 'personality primer.' (Finn) CI Section Reports on interrogation of Soviet Finn. Gem. Staff Ditto dealing with eastern Siboria. Bet ova CANARIS (Germ.) Abwehr Mar. 1944 viaTMGM72 .-;:--Pisblitiaticcat_ Politioal, Miscellaneous Soviet military publications recently Before CAliAISIS (Gera. Abwohr oaptured on the eastern front. Mar. 1944 via WAGNER Translations from:the Swedish press. Frau LARSBER- Swedish GER (Swed.) of newspapers ONODERA's off. Soviet political developments in Fin- lUNSING (Est.) Unlasown land, Latvia, Estonia, White Russia, Lentngrad and Moscow. - 49 - ,- SECREt CONTROL SECRET,.CONTROL Target Date Obt. Souroe und/or Subsouroe and/or cuntry Dosoriptiou vmtellifence Obtained NetionaIity 4. USSR (cont.) Political conditions in Estonia under Regularly PITTRA (Ent.) POEYHONEU (Finn) Soviet cooupation. from Got. in late 1040; 2940 PITTRA s con- tacts in Estonia . Report on Soviet activity in Balkans. KOBOR (Hung.) FUSON= (Finn) Attache Section (General?) reports on the WRifor IRISTIA• CELLARIVS (Germ.) which ORODERA paid 000 Yen api4oe. (set.) SALOKORPI (Finn) Finnish Dept. II Estimates Section POEYHOREN or Finnish Dept. II reports. SALOKORPI Estimates Section (Finns) General info on the USSR super- Pall 1940 BERSON Previous contacts ficial. (Polish) in Uoscow Finland Internal oonditions and political LAUTRARI, UnIciown developmentevespeolaly with regard Finnish too newspaperman a. Impending peace negotiations; Feb. 1944 (via Jap. Minister at b. Peace terms. Aug. 1944 Helsinki) Reports on Finnish army and war SLOSOR Finn. Oen. Staff capacity. (Finn) Attache Section Uilitary end political devylopments SALOKORPI PALE archives, in Finland. (Finn) Finn. refugee orypto group Info concerning activities of the 10 months WILIPAR Finnish refugee Finnish resistance movement. prior to (Finn) group Japanese surrender Internal conditions regular reports. SHIHrtAll Unknown (Finn) Politics and internal affairs. Oct. 1940- ZABA (Polish; June-1941 one of RYBI)OTSII s network) r. Germany -;pien ree:Tinvesion of the USSR in MAAS= JACOBSEE (Est. Juno 1941. (Set.) in Abwihr) Establishment of German air bases Between RYBIKCWSKI Unknowa in Poland. Feb. June 1941 Concentration of German forces in East Prussia and near Warsaw. (Thraudh the above two items. MODER was able to confirm other inforeatir,“ mhioh revealed the German plan to attack the US586) - 50 - ZRET,CORTIOL r 11 g‘4 b.;;V;41.-, .tb A SECRET.CONTROL 12212t.t Date Obt, Source and/or Subsource andfor Z.6 -4-tiY. Deocription of Intelligence Obtained Then Known Neticnality f. Garners, General strategic plans of the German trAASnia SA1DRA (German nigh Command for the spring of 1943. (se.) SAO Very detailed reports on western 1945 vsar (nung.) Obtained indir- front OB. ectly fran Seed. Gem. Staff; prepared by mnio-passrsm, Soviet Gen. Staff estimates of German Between 12BINOW5KI Unknown operations in 1942, Ally 1941 6 Dec. 1942 Ce in great detail; including unit "Serb in Aborehr identifiontion and positions. 1941-1942" Disc. material on the German engy, inol. PAASCRDM! 6 Finn. a report on the limits Of the German re- Attache Section treat f.r: the eastern front and an sati- net. of German capacity to hold the Baltic states. Reports on German technical develop- Between mots Swedish General mantas e.g.. V-1 and rocket Oct. 1944 (Seed.) Staff I bombs. Theme /were ocmplete studies Apr. 1946 with photographs. German military studies of chemical Before CANARIS Abwehr and biological warfaremethods. These Car.-1944 (German) were in great detail =d yers con- via EIMER sidered interesting by Tokyo. German Army OS. After 1942 RYSIXONSKI Unknown (Polish) Pormatien and oanposition of nee 3.8. MASTRO SAIDRA (German divisions. (Est.) s.s.) GB reports of German units on eastern ST um (nun) Owed. Gen. Staff front, received regularly, Dept. TI Ditto (armies and divisions). !lid-1943- PETERSEST Swedish General. Apr. 1946 (Seed.) Staff? - Frequent reports With estimates.of After 1942 RYBIBORSXI Utdamown 1 ._Gemmenvmx industry production. (Polidh) Technical develegkonts in Germany. Unineown Dorman . • Latest Osman technical developnonte. YOU ROSEN.- Official German BLATT (Germ.) =woos? Samples of German sabotage.apporatue. Between Puma Swedish Secret mid-1945 (seed.) Polioe and April 1946 Military and catamroial transpOrtn- 1944 Unknown Unknown tion on the Danube. Periodic reports (general in scope?) Aug. 1942 - BELUGA= Absehr Sept. 1944 (Eat.) PITMSPIT Swedish Genera General Staff reviews of troop =eve- Between mantel of all belligerents on all mid-1943 4 (Sued.) Staff fronts. Apr. 1945 - 61 - 0 ‘ P7,77.P1 .. !:7 r 4i k '.;■ 740 li, 1 :,,..., 7 . W •::, 7. 0 .1 Z , e t,-, ;.,;7:-.A 01 V , • Ci, 04:;Yi k" 4, ` 4 NI, 01 kir•Alle ■ 44.1 7.:f :; IECRET---tONTROL T6111%, Date Obt. Source acd/or Subsource an 7Country Desoriptian of Intelllgenco Obtained Then Known) Nationality Nationality f. Gennany (cont.) Reeorts on the political situation in Oooesion- JACOBSED CANARIS Germany. al until (Est . ) Abwehr liar. 1944 Answere to ODODERA s questions about Sumner BELLEGAR5E Unknown internal conditions in Germany. 1944 (liet.) Fragmentary German material."Finn. Gen. Staff S(FaCil Attache Section S• Sweden Advsnoe notice of pending Swedish CE HAWN Swedish Polios measures. (liet.) and other Into that Swedish orypto service had Zany PALS of Finn. Unknown broken ISKIDERA m general code. 1946 crypt° croup 3. Foreign Code Haterial Obtained by the Japanese throu5h Collaboration with the Finnish Crypto-Analysis Group (For background see page 21, above.) (In his work with the Finns. HIROSE was associated with that branch of the Crypto-Analysis Coati= which concentrated on Soviet codes. Be was aware, however, of the work of ether branches and Imam that they were successful in breaking codes of the United States. Turkey end other nations. On instructions from Tokyo he had frequently requested results obtained frac the study of U.S. material they were refused until the autumn of 1943, when heves given a diplomatic strip-type cipher which he describes as consisting of 15 horizontal linee of 30 letters each and designated, he believes, as "A;L:ple says that the Finns were able to break this American code because of enciphering mi @made at the Eabeasy in Vichy during 1941. The some code was later found to be in use by the American missions at Born and Chungking, the last messages which VIROSE saw having been dated December 1942. Be adds that the Finns were sanetbnes helped in their attempts to break new Amerioan ciphers by the fact that a new system would be used for consunioations between European stations Stifle the, old system was still being employed to send the same message between London and Washington. ODODERA denies that he ever had a U.S. coder he says that he repeatedly requested such material from the Finns but received the answer that the Japanese already had the best available in Takye. As indicated above, he did receive one (=plate British code and considerable Soviet materials -and 11mM:rah 1945 he obtained from the Finnish refugee orypto-analysis croup (through the Finnish Naval Attache, Capt. WILLMAN) the followings ■••••-• Turkish military attache code, complete with method, whose name QUODERA renembers as "Gankel," and three or four incomplete Turkish codes (names unremembered). De was officially complimented by Tokyo • 1141 for obtaining .the complete ins. b. Two Trenoh (Viohy) diplomatic codes, incomplete. o. Two Rumanian diplomatic (t) codes, incomplete. d. One Vatican cede, incomplete. e. One Yugoslav code, inoomplete. f. One Portuguese code, incomplete. The Finnish Crypto-Analysis Section s Russian branch (with which MOSE collaborated) was successful in breaking Soviet infantry, tank and air force combat communications ciphers. It failed to brook the Davy "Rod" five-digit code because call signs and keys were changed daily from the very beginning of the war -- a system later adopted by the Rod Army. - 52 - -- - SECREEr • SECRET CONTROL The NRVD four-digit codes presented no diffioulties. They varied acoortling to the regional divisions of the USSR with epecial types for Moscow, LeningrA, eastern Siberia and the /MD frontier guard poste. Individual codes differed through changes in the additive tables. The best results obtained with these ore from material inter- cepted by the Japanese between Kamchatka and Vladivostok. DISOSE describe, the development of Finnish orypto-analvxis during the war as follows at the beginning of the invasion of Inmate by the Gen-ans in June 1941, various weak points in the Soviet Army codes were exposed by t1.1. German surprise attack. The Finns easily deciphered these oodes and when they . red the war in July they had already aocumulated considerable information on the disposition and strength of the Soviet armed forces which faced them. The vital five-digit code used by the Soviets in the eummer of 1941 was easily deciphered because of its irystenatio arrangement of digits and the use of • set additive table. At the end of 1941 the front was temporarily stabilized and the Soviets tried to oorreot the weaknesses in their cryptographic system. During the intervening period prior to the distribution -of a now cipher, they tried to strengthen the existing syetem by using a double additive on each =seize. They began at that time a routine of revising their codes at intervals of from two to six months. They also controlled the use of additive tables, dividing them into three categories -- one-time pads, rotating and general -- thus making it diffioult to deoipher messages unless a large number were aecumulated. They used a two- to four-digit code of increasing complexity, often changing both the key and the cipher. In 1942, in spite of these difficulties, the Finnish orypto-analyste managed to keep up with the changes in the Soviet codes. The major portion of the messages which they deciphered were related to the German sector of the front rather than to their own, sinoe operations on the latter had almost ceased whereas the former continued to be very active. The following conditions are described by HIROSE as being responsible for the Finnish nearness a. Interoeption of material from the German front. b. Simultaneous use by the Soviets of old and new ciphers during a period when ciphers were being changed. o. Itistakes of enciphering (fixed habits and nom-adherence to regulations). d. Special characteristics of long messages. e. Special characteristics of short messages. During the spring of 1945 the volume of Soviet traffic greatly deoreased, end there was an over-all intensification of precautionary measures as a result of which it became impossible to decipher operational messages. The only success encountered was with four- digit codes. In 1944 difficulties increased. The Soviets employed even strictm security measures, instituted a large number of communication regulations and greatly restricted the use of NA so that the Finns found it no longer possible to break Soviet ciphers by intercepting operational traffio. APPEVDP4. LI. iL PE:NMI-FL, OFHCE 0? VIE ::iLITARY ATTACHE AT ;:vracria.1 ITO, Col. Klyokezu, Ass t Military Attache) KIGOS7,1, flaj. Yasukaau, " SATO, Maj.. Tatsuya, ) See Reference (c) YoidAi, civilian SATO, Nichiioauke, ITIGUCIII, Lt. Col. Fukaahi, Ass , t Military AttacW. Though carried on the diplomatic list as accredited to Sweden and Finland. NIGUCHI was resident in Berlin where he worked under Oen YAMAMOTO (Ass , t M.A,) on special liaison with the Abwehr (alt II and III) and the SA, ONODERA says that he was officially assigned to positions in Stockholm and 7. 1 41sinki because he would thus obtain diplomatic facilities for his novan:n-,... rked with a liaison group concerned with CHANDRA BE. (See above, IV. 8, .:Wei e-s with Other Japanese Missions in Europe.) HOLM, Jiro Mitsui representative, shipping expert. He had formerly been stationed in London and had travelled to the United States, Spain, Italy, France and Germany. In Stockholm he worked on shipping publications and coding. He acted as intermediary between ONODERA and Frau MARKIVER, an employee, of the Finnish Legation, and meetings pith the Finns ?wow. HALAMAA and PALE were held in his flat. He was also in touch with and FINKE in connection with the proposed ball bearing purchases, URA, Saburo A painter who had lived in Europe for many years and had been recruited for service in the office of the Military Attache at Helsinki at the beginning of the war. Be . OaM8 to Stockholm after the Finnish surrender in the fall of 1944. He was used most frequently as a oourier and general messenger. The Finns all know him and he therefore sometimes acted as intermediary with them, particularly with SALOKORPI of the F.I.S. Espionage Section. OHODERA says that he was too fond of women and drink to be trusted with serious intelligence work. TOGO , Shinichi Japanese businessman married to an Estonian and formerly resident in Helsinki. He had lost all his possessions through the war and came to Stockholm as a refugee. OITODERA found him already employed in the office when he arrived. YOGO1 helped with all the office work but it was never possible to trust him because he suffered from a nervous disorder. In May 1942 he left for Berlin to work in the Manohurian Legation. SASAKI A clerk from the Japanese Wax Ministry 41110 was originally assigned to the office of the Military Attache in Stockholm. However, he never worked for ONODERA because he had already been transferred to Helsinki by NISHIMURA late in 1910. He subse- quently went to Berlin where he worked with HIGUCHI. (See also APPENDIX B.) KjESSLER, Karin (Mrs.) Stenographer Who was a member of OPODERA s staff throughout his stay in Stockholm. She was in charge of all natters requiring the use of the Swedish language such as protocol, social invitations, etc. 0110DERA says that she never participated in any intelligence activities. LARSBEHMR, Mrs. EMployed during 1943 to translate Swedish . publications into English f assistants who were preparing economic and technical studies. SEGRET„COHtkL RUIUMSKI lRYDICKI, 1!ICHAILMSKI, Fiotre BMW ,Tx-ceief of the Gernan Soosion of the Polich I.S. who eennxmea both a liussian and Manchurian passport. He was carried on the office renter ea c secretary entil expelled from Svedon because or Gorman pressure in to spring of 1944. (For further details see aho y°, IV. 1., Polish Contents and Sources.) T • Aalowing individualc have all been reported at verioea times as having been con,ected with OMODERA s offico, but he denies over havisu emplo-ed or had moro than casual sonteet with any of theft: GUESIH, Boris (probably the same as KUKSIII) • HAMSGARD, lils JERHGTROM, Earl Heart LEIBRIAR LE1BERG:3R, Eric SEIANDIE, Maud STAL4AF E, Sixten APPENDIX II: LIST OF PERSONITEL OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE AT HELSINKI HIROSE, Lt. Col. Eiichi, Ass t Military Attache 1 At tLe beginning of his tour of duty in Helsinki HIROSE spent nearly all his time collaboration with the Finnish crypto-analysis group. Later on this was broken 1 off and he took over the work of adniniatrative officer and paymacter for OHOUCHI.D 1 (For a description of his work see above, ry 2. a, Finnish Contacts and Sources; for a biographical sketch of subject, Reference (b).) HIOUCHI, Lt. Col. Fukasbi, Ass t Military Attache, nicucui was never resident in Finland. He cams to Helsinki in December 1940 to ob- 0 tain information on the use of propaganda and deception material in combat by the Russian Army, collaborating in this work with SALOKORPI of the F.I.S. Espionage See- tion, and again in 1941 and at the end of 1943. KIKKMUA Akira. Civilian assistant in charge of office administration and coding. He was transferred to Bulgaria when a Military Attache s office was o p ened there in July 1944. He was chronically ill and unable to contribute much to office activities. SA2AXI. Clerk, worked on adminietrative matters and drafted final reports for Tokyo. rie always remained on duty at the office when mown was away travelling. He had for- merly been assigned to Col. HISHRIURA in Stockholm, but when the latter returned to Japan he was transferred to He had previously been there on temporary duty to substitute for KIKKAWA.• HAKATA Chozemnon. wee. --Clerk,--aseisted HIROSE in matters connected with crypto-analysia and prepared the reports on that subjeot for Tokyo. He also worked as a code clerk. He had pre- viously been in the crypte-analysie office in Budapest and was suddenly transferred to Helsinki without being requested by OHOUCHI. He knew the Russian language but could not speak it well. 55 - SEMET_CONTROL n •-• milv air!: sEcuT-cog5OL •VA Iiaeura. Suerabary. t former iiainto ,: wheal OJOLC • II euscliees to unflUed 1`,.)r wort. in a military attaoh4 I e office. Me had fer:erly boon in Steekhsla wita visinuak. The .olle. ging offic(.. cs...ao to Helsinki or. apecial missions: MOJO, Lt. Cul. !.n the Aadical Corps. he nal sent Croi Tokyo in ?.arch 19a to inverata t;le, use or bacteriologioal vexfare by the Ruesiana during the wintar camplie ,1 o/ 7.939-1940. Hit arrival was delayed because the Russiana at first refUaed to ,;ive him a transit visa. His findings revealed come euiCance of the use of carbon poison Lacillus (I) on a small ccalo. He wont to Berlin cad remained there for the rest of tae KOTANI, Col. Etsuo. Came to Finland in February 1944 ao head of a mission of Japanese Army, Navy nnd 1,11- peroonnel to inspect Gorman air force winter installationa OCHIAI, let Lt, Engineer. Came from Berlin in July 1941 to ctrdy oonditions on the Eastern Front, He returned to Berlin. APPENDIX C1 JAPAMESE JOTIMAIISTS I STOCLCIOLIT ------1. Donoi SAITO Ilasani, SAZAKI Rinichi. Domei was the only service which vas actually connooted with =DEW-Os office. As stated above, he uaod it for communicating non-confidential mattors to Tokyo. Those consisted of busimese, technical and military analyses prepared by his assistants; material from illegally obtained publications was uometimes included. INOUE was closely associated with the Bassi man in this arrangement. SAITO had previously worked in China, Berlin and Lisbon. He frequently came to the Military Attach4 I s office to dismiss the war or arrange for the aending of dispatchea, but VAS never in any sense a member of the utaff, OMODERA says that he received more information than he Gave. BAZARI arrived from Italy at the beginming of 1944, he was SAITO t s aesistant and played a subordinate role. 2. Tamiuri URESUITIO, RITARTIRA Hiroshi, MARI Shin. URESHIMO represented thie aervice rhen OTIODIVA arrived in Stockholm. Hs was hard working and intelligent and oceasionally produced interesting itmas whioh he passed on to the Minister or the Couneeller. RITAMTRIA, in spite of hi o reputation as a savant, OMODERA considers totally unsuited to intelligence work. Me describse him as an intellectual cretin. Shortly after his arrival he offered his servicao to OHODERA and wanted to work as an agent in the gathering of military intelligence, out UMODERA re- fused. In the spring of 1945 RITRIURA received no funds from Japan and was reduced to such o precarious state that OHODERAtmes obliged to lend him small suma for living expenses. L MARI Shin vas assiatant to EITAMMIZA. He alto barraged money from MODER in 1945. 3. 21.sahi WATANABE Shinichiro, EINA, • WATANABE had only social contacts with OMODITA, He at into a.:• oublc with the Legation for p ending ac information fram bin (fun sources matorir-7 tcken frcm a copy of nne maga:Iinc rhich he hcd aucceedod in gettirg stone,. than his colleagues. He woo succeeded by EIRIA, OFODERA hardly kra: . EC) • " lachi KOGO Eiichi, dcoeribod as a lit!.,y drvukard; KATO Minna; MUTT° Hamotaro -- See SSU memorandum of that title; 7 October 194G, DI) il1247. APPENDIX D: THE JAPANESE DIPLWATIC MISSION IN STOCITOLM• The Japanese colony in Stockholm van made up entirely of Location officials cad a few journalists; there were no other Jaoanose residents. The groat Japanese trnding firms of Okura, Mitsui and Mitsubishi vero represented by Svodao and their Japanese agents only came to Stockholm on occasional vieits. ONODERA knows of no organized intelligence activit:-. 77ithin the Lecation. He says that there wore only throe men qualified for such work - TSUCHIYA Jun, KODA Jotaro, URIU Mateo - and they were prevented tram engaging in it by Minister OKANCTO, rho was strongly opposed to it on principle insofar aa accredited diplomats were con- cerned. ONODERA, who bitterly dislikes the minister, says that he always obstructed intelligence work vhanever ho could. The chief activity of Legation employees was press and publication analysic. /CODA and TSUCHIYA had contacts with certain Swedes and with DRIMIEVSKY, a renegade Soviet diplomat frau whom they obtained same use- All information on Russia. As previously mentioned, MODENA made an unsuccessful attempt to obtain intelligence through press conferences and discussions in propa- ganda meetings. The naval Attaoh6, Captain MISHIMA Ion, UV, was a radio specialist and had little interest in obtaining intelligence by any but the normal straight forward methods. His assistants worked on press analysis and he had some contacts among Swedish r::spapers, including Gunnar MUELLER. OHODERA never heard that he tried to got information from secret sources or was connected in any ray with espionage. He does not have a high opinion of DISHIVA s abilities and at one time arranged with Captain 110J1KA, the naval attaché in Berlin, to have him replaced by Captain OJI. However. the development of the war prevented this transfer. Minister: OKADOTO Suemasa. Arrived in Stockholm in November 1942. Formerly stationed in the U.S.A. and in England. At the outbreak of war in the Pacific he was Consul General in Singapore, He wee interned in India and after his release by exchange came straight to Stookhola. He is a specialist in matters concerning the United States and Britain and considered by the Japanese to have been secretly in fava of the Allies. GNODERA is emphatic in stating that he did everything in his power to hinder the euocessful carrying out of secret intelli- gence activities by the members of his staff. Counsellor, KODA Jotaro. In Stockholm from Feb. 1941 till Jan. 1945, vhen he was transferred to Zurich, Switzerland. He worked with DDITRIEVSKY and was in touch with Japanese and foreign journalists. German specialist. ONODERA says that he is well qualified for intelligenoe work. First Secretary: YAMAGUCHI Ivan. Arrived in February 1942 from Vienna where he , had been Consul General. At the time of the outbreak of war he was Consul at Bombay and was interned An India. Subsequently he served in Belgium and Germany. He was the administrative officer and heed of the financial aeotion of the Legation. First Secretary: TSUCHIYA Jun. Specialist in matters concerning the United States; speaks good English. He had good contacts with members of the Swedish Foreign Office, among them GAVE of the press section, GIENANT, and HEPP. - 67 . S3CRET CONTROL • 4. : : :1 : • s: 1— r o.- : :.ct • At Teat:CAT. ea )1cn !AC 3 -11ICZ pPo 11V.to .r.c r.(MITZA ilc D r.!7•71;•:7:7, •l t■ o72 Ead u.r.1 ;job Dritish Amor:can Ata !t•TO Arrived ..1"7 131 of 1C ..,-1 vith TO. lird ly scr:7c:i 1 1 t )e Unated .1tates cd•:/.cbc.a. Worked on Stat.:s Ye.ctr4oshi, Arriv r d I Cc cAer 1174:2, fersIsrl ...;jr. Lc.ntIon, Economic Datocer 1942 :Cron Germany. Etccrt in Ger.. st:st mette...o. At-tac4S: -2eiti. Arrived iti t!.c tr.c.nor of l9, forasrly- ir. France. Radio t,:c.iaio.j.an, Ile vas an old .2072 and 1.-umv little about the latest radio c1.7:velopmeP.ts.lb iao charTc only of the rece? ...ion of the t:aily nses broa, :casto ircit Arri •.-..2c1 thz sur.,:v2r fror, Lisboa. icli.th TC. and 21ITIO. Code cle r. Ccrk HAT:Ift•IA. Code cler!;... Y.:111:4113;iI. In Stocaolm s-.c.nce 1940. ?forked under l AIIATJCIII Itito in the aiministrativo and financial section. Clerk: MAi.:117.11RA. Faso in administrative and financial section. 01 fico of the Naval Attach Thc.va; LZISItIT.t, Capta.in Ion ( GC? %above ), tovil littr.exl: INABA, C.apt., iJF. Came from Italy in . Dicburoinf.: Officer, carried out Ii.iem w r,th the lalitary Attach:0 cffize. Clerk, Y.4.1 ,1111).1.. Ctuse to Storkhol-r. fc.z1 Berlin. Stenogapher. - IJAMTL Eohichi, Enr;inser; arrived in Aoril 1942 as ititsu- b--...0:11 rept c.sentative. Eat been in the United !..tatoo. Civilian employee: SEZAKI Ennio. Office clerk. Formorly in Paris, vhf,re he had studied paintint before the war. Distributie PLEASE CLEAR /TIM OFFICE OF ORIGIN Tib:FORF, , C 121 PAC , T °kyr, ACTION RAG21)-677.-Effriff. 0- ID-MOS (1) Orr (3) Stt.te (1) CI( t 1) RV; 87•fc.1.11,1,,,,ci:!!TADL
(B) Methods/Sources Py' (2)(G) Foreign Relations CI
