Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (2012), 11–32.

IS FORMAL? BOLZANO, KANT AND THE KANTIAN LOGICIANS1

Sandra LAPOINTE McMaster University

Summary In the wake of Kant, logicians seemed to have adhered to the idea that what is distinctive of logic is its “formality”. In the paper, I discuss the distinction Kant draws between formality and generality of logic and argue that he ultimately confl ates the two notions. I argue further that Kant’s views on the formality of logic rest on a series of non trivial assump- tions concerning the nature of cognition. I document the way in which these assumptions were received in his successors. In the second part of the paper I focus on Bolzano’s criticism of the Kantian position and his redefi nition of the notion of form. I argue that while what contemporary, post-Tarskian generally understand as the formality of logic ought to be traced back to Bolzano there are also important diff erences between the two positions.

As we understand the term today, Kant was not a logician and his inter- est in traditional logic was comparatively superfi cial. Of course, Kant did not entirely avoid logical issues and even innovated—one might consider the criticism of traditional syllogistics in Th e False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures (1762), or the classifi cation of judgements he put for- ward in the section of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) entitled ‘Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgements’. But his treatment of logical questions per se is often seen as relatively inconsequential.2 By

1. I would like to thank Nick Stang and Clinton Tolley for their comments on previous versions of this paper. 2. See for instance (Kneale and Kneale 1962, 354ff .). Th is is not entirely surprising given what seems to have been Kant’s position regarding the possibility of progress in logic: Kant had claimed that logic was „closed“ (geschlossen) and „complete“ (vollendet) (Bviii), which suggests that he did not think that major improvement could be achieved, let alone a reform undertaken. contrast, Kant’s dealings with questions concerning the subject matter of logic, its scope and its place within a theory of rationality should be seen as pioneering. It is true that in the Critique Kant discussed logic only to distinguish it from “transcendental” logic (in the Introduction to the eponymous section), that is, what Kant conceived as the investigation of the conditions of possibility of our of objects. But this discus- sion—a discussion that is developed in the fi rst few pages of the Introduc- tion to the Logic (1800)—turns out to be substantial. What’s more, it was considerably infl uential. In the years that followed the publication of the (second edition of the) Critique, many authors sought to work Kant’s ideas into their presentations of logic. Th e result is an interesting collection of logical Systeme, Anfangsgründe, Grundrisse, etc. whose authors all have in common a more or less explicit commitment to Kantian doctrines. Th ey include Ludwig Heinrich von Jakob (1759–1827), (1770-1842), Johann Christoff Hoff bauer (1766–1827), Johann Gottfried Karl Christian Kiesewetter (1766–1819) and Gottlob Wilhelm Gerlach (1786–1864). Th e notion of a Kantian school of logic is not entirely new. Most notably perhaps, in his System of Logic and History of Logical Doctrines, (1868, §29), Friedrich Ueberweg introduced the label to pick out a group of authors that includes those mentioned above as well as others: Johann Gebhard Maass (1766–1823), Ernst Christian Gottlieb Reinhold (1793–1855), Carl Friedrich Bachmann (1785–1855), (1773– 1843), Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841) and Wilhelm Drobisch (1802–1896), for instance. Ueberweg thought relatively little of the Kan- tian logicians and his comments are accordingly terse: Th e logical works that proceed from the Kantian school, or which essentially share its tendency, refrain from entering upon the deeper problems, and do not make up for this want by perfect accuracy, suffi ciency and clearness in the problems to which they have limited themselves. (Ueberweg 1868, §29) In addition to being uncharitable, Ueberweg’s discussion is problematic in other respects. For one, the list he provides includes at least one phi- losopher who clearly did not share Kant’s ideas, openly criticized him, and indeed should be seen as a detractor of Kant’s theories: Maass (Cf. Maass 1793).3 More importantly, Ueberweg does not tell us what makes a logic “Kantian”. Of course, the historical and theoretical connections

3. See (Allison 1973, 42).

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