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national interest; Presidency of the Council of the EU; small states; KEY WORDS: size, other factors also limited its ability to fulfil its national interests. In addition to a weak to a weak size, other factors also limited its ability to fulfil its national interests. In addition lack of soft ability for coalition building and lobbying, the two main factors of constraint were the knowledge among Slovenian officials and weak coordination among policy agents. advocating national interests can also be facilitated by a smaller range of priorities and a greater greater a and priorities of range smaller a by facilitated be also can interests national advocating revealed that, besides the country’s key actors. We level of coincidence with the interests of other predictions that a member state can push through its national interests more easily during its through its national interests more easily during its predictions that a member state can push presidency because it possesses certain powers that enable it to set the agenda, which is the most Especially trueeffective way of realising national interests. state presidencies, in the case of small questionnaire administered to key Slovenian actors in the presidency, the analysis confirmed some analysis confirmed the some actors in the presidency, questionnaire administered to key Slovenian certainof the theoretical expectations and revealed disparities. Our analysis confirms theoretical The main goal of the article is to establish how a small country, Slovenia, promoted its national promoted its national Slovenia, The main goal of the article is to establish how a small country, the Council of the EU, how this experience fits into interests when it held the Presidency of the theory states. Based on a of small states and what lessons can be drawn for other small Abstract Marjan Svetličič and Kira Cerjak Interests: The Case of Slovenia The Interests: Small Countries’ EU Council Presidency Presidency EU Council Small Countries’ National of their and the Realisation ISSN 1848-5782 1848-5782 ISSN UDC 061.1EU:323(497.4) DOI 10.1515/cirr-2015-0015 CIRR XXI (74) 2015, 5-39 XXI (74) 2015, CIRR View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk at papers similar and citation metadata, View . concept. The with empirical findings empirical with 1 zero sum game (Nye 1991 2004). Large states also began (Nye 1991 2004). soft power process which Keohane and Nye (1989) regard as oneas regard (1989) Nye and Keohane which process agenda-setting Presidency took place before the Lisbon Treaty and the changes it brought to the configuration of the Council. Presidency took place before the Lisbon Treaty and the changes it brought to the configuration of the Council. The term “the Council of the EU” is not completely accurate, although we decided to use it since the Slovenian since the it use to decided we although completely accurate, is not EU” the Council of “the term The 1 and necessary experience that set it apart from the old member states, that set it apart from the old and necessary experience Slovenia was aware that the presidency would not be an easy task. Slovenia was constantly reaffirming its EU commitment,first with its rapid the by joining subsequently 2007, and January in zone euro the to entry the last challenge area later that same year. Representing Schengen Already during the accession negotiations, Slovenia showed a high level high a showed Slovenia negotiations, accession the during Already led to its that successfully of engagement joining the EU in May 2004. of the national interests of small EU member states during the Presidency the states during small EU member of the national interests of (EU Council) of the Council of the European Union The article combines the theoretical framework concerning the realisation realisation the concerning framework theoretical the combines article The small size, they use other forms of structural power (Strange 1995) such assuch 1995) (Strange power structural of forms other use they size, small the modern international community.of the key sources of power in the states have obviously limited internal and external resources to help them limited internal and external states have obviously 2003). To overcome their(foreign policy) interests (e.g. Hey pursue their own formed small states led these states, because of a lack of hard sources of led these states, because of formed small states on power, to rely more Smallpower. hard absence of to the due not but soft power on to rely to the collapse of the bipolar world order, international relations were mainly the bipolar world order, international to the collapse of of realist theory with the explained in terms emergence of a multitude of newlyand world order collapse of the bipolar The enforcement of national interests has been a key issue of the modern been a key issue interests has of national The enforcement Cold War. Prior the end of the especially following community, international Introduction when Slovenia was still part of Yugoslavia (see Svetličič 1989; Kirn 2012) Special directives on how to adjust to Europe and checking whether its whether checking and Europe adjust to to how Special directives on already in 1990 introduced were legislation was in line with EU directives served as recognition of that nation’s statehood and successful of that nation’s statehood served as recognition into Europe was one of the Becoming integrated into the EU. integration it gained its independence. Slovenia even before main political goals of This prestigious assignment, which Slovenia assumed in January 2008, Slovenia assumed in January which assignment, This prestigious based on an analysis of the Slovenian EU Council Presidency of 2008. based on an analysis of the Slovenian

Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(74) 66 - 2015 - 2012 6 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(74) 66 - 2015 - 2012 7 capacity as compared to the normal EU capacity as compared to the normal agenda-shaping It sheds new light on the role of the presidency of small states when small states presidency of the of role the on light sheds new It 2 More on the role of the trio in: Udovič and Svetličič, 2014. the trio in: Udovič and More on the role of 2 new theoretical insights. The analysis method new theoretical is based on a quantitative the involved in Slovenian actors the among (survey) conducted to extent the aspects: main two from analysed were data The presidency. its national interests with those of other trio and other EU member states; Slovenian Presidency provides some the whether determine and (3) to whether Slovenia was more successful in realising its national interests as Slovenia was whether the chair with balanced Slovenia how examine to (2) presidency; its during membership, With this focus in mind, the primary goals of this article are (1) to establish With this focus in mind, the primary extent to which these idealistic were met, but also to what expectations like to use the presidency as an extent and how countries nevertheless interests. opportunity to enforce their national focus of its research. In an attempt to be realistic, it establishes In through focus of its research. (via the eyes of the presidency’s actors among them) not only the survey guiding and influencing it (see Niemann and Mak 2011) that stipulate the stipulate that 2011) Mak and Niemann (see it influencing and guiding community and promote broker be an honest should presiding country the interests national makes article This national ones. than rather interests the new, trio form. Most authors dealing with the EU have not put the put have not EU the with dealing authors Most form. trio new, the They have predominantly based issue of national interest in the forefront. their approach on the legal basis including the norms of the presidency, trio. in presidency is conducted seat and the in the are members small new The originality of this article lies The originality of in its is methodological approach. This namely the first empirical evaluation based on a survey among actors of the firstpresiding newcomer member state that formed part of the first agenda” (Kajnč 2009: 89). agenda” (Kajnč Presidency also had to help justify the “trio team presidency system in presidency system in team “trio justify the help to also had Presidency carrying by only not policies, in EU and consistency coherence of terms the trio’s priorities high on the but also by keeping out the programme presidency, Slovenia had to show that small new EU members could also could members EU new small that show to Slovenia had presidency, be good chairs. Thirdly, being part of the first presiding trio, Slovenia’s had to prove that after the closure of the 2004 and 2007 enlargement enlargement 2007 2004 and the of closure the after that prove to had to only to belong not were suitable new member states the processes of a rotating the new system it. Secondly, with but also to lead the club, The challenge was threefold because, firstly, the Slovenian Presidency - interpretation can only be subjective since they represent the sum can only be subjective since they represent interpretation of individual interests that reflect their preferences and derive from their values, making it impossible to measure them objectively. kinds of Objective and subjective national interests are two different interests (Miletić 1978). dently of subjects that are only able to recognise this objectivity. recognise able to only are that subjects dently of Morgenthau (1951; 1995) claims national interests are defined by power. National interests cannot be objectively defined (Aron 1975). Their National interests are objectively determined and exist indepen and objectively determined are interests National 3. 2. 1. public interests. Consequently, because theorists are far from united, therepublic interests. Consequently, because definitions, including the following:is a plurality of (sometimes opposing) topic in the social sciences. It is difficult to objectively define because of the of because define objectively to difficult is It sciences. social the in topic the complexity and changeability of theinvolvement of subjective interests, issue over time and the difficulties of distinguishing subjective interests from The definition of national interests remains a complex and under-researched and complex a remains interests national of definition The A.1. National Interests A. Literature Review Literature A. with the results of the empirical research. The last the empirical The last with the results of out the main research. part sets in general. small presidencies country for lessons learned conclusions with The article is divided into five parts.in light EU Council Presidency discussing the for framework theoretical The first two sections the present along the methodology The next section presents of national interests. the interplay of the interests of other EU actors. of the interests the interplay the realisation of national interests during the EU Council Presidency can Presidency EU Council the during interests of national the realisation Slovenia’s explain of the realisation the extent to which behaviour and than ability rather Slovenia’s proactive of result was the interests national which the theoretical premises about small small about premises concerning behaviour states’ the theoretical which

Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(74) 66 - 2015 - 2012 8 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(74) 66 - 2015 - 2012 9 Firstly, because the Firstly, because 3 and “it may encourage an and “it may encourage 4 Secondly, the concept does not provide a clear Secondly, the concept

governments/elites (McLean 1996). (McLean governments/elites There is a dialectic is a dialectic of subjective unity There views objective and whereby one has to be aware that national interests are usually defined by of the population. interest is rooted in values and that different states do in fact pursue different ends. Kratochwill (1982) suggests defining suggests (1982) Kratochwill ends. different pursue fact in do states different that and values in rooted is interest two. national interest as analogous to public interest although his contribution is in fact differentiating between the 4. Rosenau (1980: 284–286) claims that “the national interest is ‘essentially erroneous’”. He recalled that the national well-being the promote to established policies other also but foreign only not encompassing broader, is approach Our 4 3 environment through: (1) the power they possess to define and enforce ability translate them 1995) their to (Morgenthau and (2) interests those among actors and are not given. external their to relation in themselves define states help interests National national interests as a sum of individual preferences. The constructivist The individual preferences. of sum as a interests national school (Wendt 1992) created in the interactions argues that interests are 1998). According to liberalism, states could no longer rely on simple power rely on liberalism,longer states could no to 1998). According and should (according to the idealist politics world in an interdependent approach) act ethically arena. A subjectivist in the international sees in time and space (see also Waltz 1979). According to a realist view, EU 1979). to in time and space (see also Waltz According decision-making attributes greater power to larger states (e.g. Pedersen interest is a key explanatory tool in the analysis and understanding of analysis in the and understanding tool is a key explanatory interest policy. foreign Realists believe contemporary Morgenthau that like are objectively national interests are constant, given and do not vary interests, ranging from those claiming that it is something objectively given it is something those claiming that from ranging interests, subjectively Realists constructed. to those claiming that it is something claim that the national recently, more traditionally, and constructivists In general, we can distinguish four schools of thought regarding national schools of thought In general, we can distinguish four guide to the formulation of foreign policy guide to the formulation 42–43; 1970: Frankel 6; 1951: (Morgenthau nationalism” narrow of attitude Clinton 1994: 21–22). it is uncertain with regard to the relationship between particular interests particular between relationship the to regard with is uncertain it interest. and the national elite convictions, the mass media, and policy inertia”. Many are therefore Many policy inertia”. mass media, and the elite convictions, of national interest in general. against the concept term “national interest” is ambiguous—it is difficult to define it clearly and Roskin (1994: 36) posits that “national interest may be difficult to define and system, public global the ideology, effects of warping to the due Instead, “it must adhere to the Council’s rules of the to Instead, “it must adhere 5 considerable extent, to put the Community interest above the national interest”. After analysing eight Council presidents, Kirchner (1992: 114) concluded that “most appeared prepared, to a 5 Their behaviour as chair is curbed by formal decision rules for the adoption the rules for decision by formal is curbed as chair behaviour Their of proposals and informal norms of neutrality, impartiality, effectiveness 244). 2011: Thomson 2006; (Elgström consensus-building and 2004) (Tallberg procedure, which demand neutrality” (Kietz 2008: 10). When at the helm, interests. national their pursuing limitations on states have certain member fulfilment of its functions, and in particular the brokerage role, promote to its position as Chair in negotiations use Presidency does not that the special national interests. In theory, the pursuit of national interests during the presidency can presidency the during interests national of the pursuit theory, In successful the for is almost a precondition since “it question into come A.2.1. The role of the presidency and the realisation of national interests focus on the theoretical dilemma concerning the (un)privileged role of (un)privileged role the dilemma concerning theoretical the on focus national interests. the presidency in pursuing a state’s national interests as chairs. To establish national interests as chairs. To role of size in determining the pursue way they the and negotiations in states’ behaviour member national interests during the EU Council Presidency, it is first necessary to Presidency. However, size plays role because it determines an important realise their and pursue ability to their and states’ presidencies member from either formal or informal power sources (Wallace 1985), informal power sources (Wallace giving them formal or either from size, this of Regardless outcomes. negotiation over a certain leverage leverage increases significantly during the time they hold the EU Council The preconditions for successfully The preconditions interests are realising a country’s national undeniably its influence andpower. EU member states can derive these Role of Small States of Role especially at a time of chairing the EU Council. especially at a time A.2. National Interests, the EU Council Presidency and the their national interests (Svetličič 2002). This is reflected in the behavioural but membership regular only during not of EU membership, dynamics national interests differ on the basis of a country’s size, which makes size makes which size, country’s a basis of the on differ interests national an important factor; namely, it raises the question of differences in ability pursue states large small and means and ways the in consequently, and, into viable national policy guidelines (Plano and Olton 1988). Inevitably, Inevitably, 1988). Olton and (Plano guidelines policy national viable into

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 10 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(74) 66 - 2015 - 2012 11 namely, the presidency presidency namely, the 6 setting, agenda-structuring, and agenda-exclusion (Tallberg 2003a, an of preferences national the 2003b, by defined usually is influence This 2006). areas. or proposals policy certain The neglect or forward presidency can either push individual presiding country (Tallberg 2003a). Besides adding policies to the agenda, the presidency has the power of agenda-shaping which includes agenda- 6 dossier and the way of introducing (or even omitting) certain policy issues (or even omitting) certain dossier and the way of introducing from institutional negotiation. the presidency to influence the pace of negotiations despite the agenda the despite negotiations of pace the influence to presidency the skills, negotiation good and mediation agenda-setting, Through inherits. it the presidency can regulate the intensity of discussion on a particular (Warntjen 2007). These prerogatives include additional power resources prerogatives include additional power 2007). (Warntjen These of and asymmetrical control information such as asymmetrical access to enable They 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2006). (Tallberg processes negotiating the process (Tallberg 2003a, 2003b; Warntjen 2007); legislative work Council’s the steering of prerogatives certain enjoys Some go even further by arguing that the presidency undisputedly presidency undisputedly that the by arguing Some go even further agenda-shaping the through decision-making and negotiations influences “amplifier” of their own interests or as “silencer” of these interests (Bengtsson interests these of “silencer” as or interests own their of “amplifier” common European interests. et al. 2004) by giving priority to the regard the presidency as “responsibility without power” (Dewost 1984: 2), privilegeda in states member puts Presidency EU the that claim others while anas presidency the use to whether choose to them enabling position, The perception of the EU Presidency varies with the author’s position. Some position. author’s the with Presidency varies EU The perception of the interests by carrying coordinative, out agenda-setting (standing the out leadership and representative. instrument), mediating, following as roles: the most administrative important and When holding the presidency, member states can materialise presidency, member states When holding the national initiatives. To be successful, they must be able to present such interests as interests such present able to be must successful, they be initiatives. To other of support the which gives them EU interests, also being common members. least to some extent (Tallberg 2004; Schout and Vanhoonacker policies or own their by launching national imprint some make to try They 2006). compromise their own national preferences to ensure deals are agreed agreed are deals ensure to preferences national own their compromise all that expected be may nevertheless It 1999). Bomberg and (Peterson at presidencies their during interests their national pursue to states want Because they are judged for their “productivity”, presidencies sometimes sometimes presidencies “productivity”, their for judged are they Because ). executive summary by the Lisbon 8 and not so much on the presidency’s presidency’s so much on the and not 7 However, after its introduction there were several criticisms that “the institutionalisation of the trio-Presidency with one with trio-Presidency the of institutionalisation “the that criticisms several were there introduction its after However, large state being part of each set can be seen as ensuring that large states’ interests are defended at all times” (also through the work of small states in the presidency chair; authors’ comment) (Klemenčič 2007, the involvement of the European Parliament, the decision rule in the Council and the polarisation of actors’ positions actors’ polarisation of Council and the in the rule decision Parliament, the the European of involvement the on a legislative proposal. According to Thomson (2008: 612) the decision-making process is determined by factors outside of presidents’ control: presidents’ of outside factors by determined is process decision-making the 612) (2008: Thomson to According than their own. The trio was established presiding states to pursue common (Community) interests rather to “force” 7 8 in consensus-building (Szabó 2011). Thomson (2009) suggest that the rotating presidency is less relevant in the relevant presidency is less rotating the that (2009)Thomson suggest enlarged EU as it was in the EU-15. Other researchers role EU play an important enlarged the in would even presidency rotating confirm that the “the six-month rotating presidency was acceptable with an EU of 12 or even 15, but is simply impractical and in an EU of 27 members”. Arregui influence more towards the EU’s internal level. Not surprisingly,Mazzucelli (2008: 10), for example, calculated that the role of the presidency would be reduced by 10% [in the post Lisbon years]. Brandy (2007: 1) states that Policy, now chairing the Council in certain formations. These changes in certain formations. Policy, now chairing the Council presidency, the role of the rotating greatly affected and restructured its and security arena and shifting foreign the in diminishing its role reduced by the establishment of the President of the European Council European the of President the establishmentof by the reduced Affairs and Security Foreign for the Union and the High Representative of Promotion of national interests during the Presidency gained a new the during national interests of Promotion of the presidency trio dimension with the introduction Treaty. With the treaty, the official roles of the presidency were further Bunse 2009). Despite these constraints, the Council presidency gives incumbent presidency Council the constraints, Despite these member states a resource outcomes with in line with which their preferences (e.g. Tallberg they 2004, 2006: 29–39; can influence decision the short six-month tenure and the inherited agenda. tenure and the inherited agenda. the short six-month process, but it has little influence over the duration that Council the discretion of policy Therefore, outcomes. or the content of decision-making to shape the agenda is presidents have indeed limited, to mostly also due engagement engagement legislative in the of timing the the influence can negotiation country presiding the that processes. stresses Thomson (2008: 611–612) confirmed that the country’s influence is greater during the negotiationon its time outcomes at the helm. However, factors on external dependant this influence is mostly Empirical Empirical studies (Schalk et al. 2007; Thomson 2008; Warntjen 2008) also

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how presiding states pursue national interests, but interests, national states pursue presiding whether On the other hand, the sociological approach claims that the On the other hand, the sociological 9 in 1998. For more details on similar cases of assertive presidencies, see Elgström (2003). An example of a one-sided and assertive presidency was dealing with the situation in Iraq when Great Britain held it 9 to old members, at least in the period soon after their accession. It has been after period soon to old members, at least in the on influence marked a had not have states member new that suggested such informal processes, state representatives need strong relationships strong such informal processes, state representatives need take time to form. states. Such relationships with representatives of other a disadvantage compared states may be at new member Consequently, process through which policy demands are transformed into decision policy demands are transformed which process through outcomes is defined by informal bargaining. Toparticipate effectively in by following in more detail the formal norms of presidency conduct. In the formal norms of presidency conduct. detail by following in more challenge of size, new member states face the their small addition to adapting to and integrating into the EU’s system of decision-making. The to use the role of chair to pursue their own interests (Bengtsson et al. 2004). to use the role of chair to pursue Conversely, small own national preferences states compromise their behaviour which gains its momentum from the far better use of power use of far better the from behaviour which gains its momentum member large is that reason The afford. small states can than resources states have interests in basically and are generally expected all policy areas Obviously, size determines Presidency behaviour. For large states, large For behaviour. Presidency Obviously, size determines partial for pretexts of effectiveness are often “productivity” and the norm common European interests instead of involving its own in the negotiationthe in own its involving of instead interests European common and Wallace 2006).(Dewost 1984; Wallace 1985; Hayes-Renshaw to pursue its own national interests has been confirmedpractice. several times in and endeavours to realise thepresidency’s behaviour harbours compromise negotiation process using additional power resources, which is typical ofis which resources, using additional power negotiation process uses these resources behaviour. That the presidency large state presidency According to the rationalist approach, the presidency influences the large member states varies significantly. large member states A.2.2.Country as a factor size in presidency behaviour by pursuing their own national interests or do they endeavour to realise to realise or do they endeavour interests their own national by pursuing mainly of small Here the behaviour European ones? the common and country country tends to influence the EU agenda. Hence, themain question is realistically not to their advantage resources use both power to do it. Do they they try In spite of such different views, we can conclude that each presiding presiding that each conclude can views, we different of such In spite

10 This perception not only honest broker. Due to limited human resources, small states are far more dependent than large ones on the assistance more of the small states are far Due to limited human resources, General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) and European Commission (EC). The an ally against EC represents small states the and for own, their on states usually prepare large that documentation GSC helps them draw up a much the influence of large states and an advocate for the common EU interests.

that small states are in turn more successful when holding the presidency. 10 (communitarian) interests. Therefore, several analyses (Beach 2004; Quaglia and Moxon-Browne 2006; Schout and Vanhoonacker 2006) have confirmed play the role of a compromise-oriented a of role the play tothem allows but presidency, the run to legitimacy necessary the them gives commonincorporate some of their national interests within the framework of Paradoxically, in this case smallness increases the influence and prestige that because it enables small states tostem from the institute of the presidency member states tend to show greater tolerance and understanding whenmember states tend to show greater few national interests.small states want to pursue those Therefore, they are not considered a threat. Others perceive them as weak,Therefore, they are not considered which gives them the opportunity to use this non-competitive relationship other remain in the background, Because they usually advantage. to their and, through specialisation (Baillie 1999) dedicate their otherwise limitedand, through specialisation (Baillie administrative resources to prepare well in these areas (Klemenčič 2007). of power. Smaller states are forced to prioritise between sectors withoutsectors between prioritise to forced are states Smaller power. of damaging their interests, usually remaining proactive and inflexible in their only focus on one priority (or a few)most important sector(s). They generally and large states can be seen in the former’s different choice of negotiationand large states can be seen in the tactics and use of conflict-avoiding negotiation behaviour as a source The fact that they depend a great deal on the assistance of EU institutions EU of assistance the on deal great a depend they that fact The interests may not a more modest number of national and can pursue between small of their presidencies. The only difference affect the quality an additional source of competence. an additional source the logic of appropriateness, “which increases their credibility in reaching credibility in reaching “which increases their appropriateness, of logic the Council negotiations” States in the Member the a compromise among (Kajnč 2008a: 2–3) and which for them, unlike for larger states, represents Because Because small states have less specific national interests, this helps them follow to afford can They effectiveness. with behaviour normative juggle less power than the old members, but it does not imply that their power is is power their that imply not it does but members, old the than less power 188, 199). (see Thomson 2011: marginal decision outcomes (Goetz 2005: 254), which may indicate that they have they that indicate may which 254), 2005: (Goetz outcomes decision

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 14 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(74) 66 - 2015 - 2012 15 . A core working . A core Slovenia began its Slovenia began 12 Being the first newcomer and one of the smallest 11

13 Apart from Luxembourg, which shared the presidency with the , Slovenia was the smallest country to have to smallest country Slovenia was the Netherlands, which shared the presidency with the Luxembourg, Apart from “The trio system was agreed at the meeting of Permanent Representatives to the EU in March 2006 and approved EU in March the Representatives to Permanent of meeting at the trio system was agreed “The group for the presidency was established in order to coordinate the preparations also at the political the preparations also at the level, deciding to coordinate the presidency was established in order for group have not did usually countries Other consequences. financial having decisions all and priorities its and programme the such a high-level political coordination body. presided over the Council of the European Union. 901-04/2004-2 Slovenia no. 2005 Republic of dated 6 January the of Government the of Decision by the General Affairs and External Relations Council programme in and June three-year 2006, strategic replacing programme the for previous the one-year Union Presidencies” operational by (Kajnč an 2008b: 18-month 5–6). programme The of first three trio successive presidencycomposed of , and Slovenia. took place from January 2007 until June 2008 and was

12 13 11 administration by adapting domains the several structure of charge in in person three one having ways, (2) fields, namely working by: merging (1) resources, Slovenia optimised the working processes and tried to lessen to and tried processes working the Slovenia optimised resources, its public of organisational/administrative barriers the of effects the Given the modest size of its public administration, Slovenia also had to in the capital. Due to limited human structure adjust the organisational it concentrated the most capable Slovenian officials in a small, yet very Ž. 2009, pers. comm., 3 June). flexible and agile nucleus (Mejač, Slovenia chose to have a so-called Brussels-based presidency, making its of core Brussels the in (PermRep) Representation Permanent the organisational decision because good presidency activities. This was a January 2005. presidency preparations already in 2005, presidency preparations ahead of the almost two years established and May) 28 comm., pers. 2009, A. (Bratkovič, practice normal as as early preparations presidency the for structure organisational the first presiding trio. presidency, to have ever held the countries Slovenia in January 2008 started its presidency as the last country of the B. The Slovenian EU Council Presidency of 2008 Presidency The Slovenian EU Council B. 2008 to establish if Slovenia conformed with the normative behaviour of behaviour 2008 normative with the establish to conformed if Slovenia small of the realisation how that affected presidencies and member state interests. its national The following sections analyse the Slovenian EU Council Presidency of Presidency EU Council Slovenian the analyse sections following The From Such staff limitations were limitations were Such staff 14 EU membership represented a vital EU membership represented 16 and foreign policy towards the EU ever the policy towards and foreign 15 . A year later, the Strategy for Integration into the EU was prepared and adopted by the into Integration for Strategy . A year later, the After the accession in 2004, Slovenia has not reframed its foreign policy strategy, nor has it declaratively established For more information, see Cerjak (2010). For more information, (Potočnik Strategy Development so-called the was Europe approaching about Slovenia in prepared strategy first The between Slovenian national interests and the EU is the Strategy on the Western Balkans adopted in 2010 (Udovič 2011; (Udovič 2010 in adopted Balkans Western the on Strategy the is EU the and interests national Slovenian between Zupančič and Udovič 2011), arguing that Slovenia should serve as a countries (see also Udovič and Turnšek 2011). bridge between the EU and Western Balkan the Slovenian government (Mrak et al. 1998). a platform for the formation of the Slovenia–EU relationship (Šabič and Lange 2014). An attempt to establish a new the relationship with the EU was unsuccessful. The only link policy strategy (2010) elaborate foreign that would further et al. 1995) while the next one, on international economic relations (Bobek et al. 1996), relations (Bobek et was already entitled international economic on one, et al. 1995)next while the Full Membership Associated to

16 14 15 of Slovenia of the EU Council. It stipulated the productive cooperation of productive cooperation It stipulated the of Slovenia of the EU Council. membership, all the political parties were also united in supporting the in supporting also united parties were political membership, all the all political among agreement presidency. The the undertake decision to Presidency successful the support 17 May 2007 to parties was signed on singled out the presidency as one of a number of strategic tasks (Official 60/2004). No. As in the case of EU Journal of the Republic of Slovenia and presidency priorities were later also presented and debated. The and presidency priorities were Activities of the Republic of Slovenia of the Orientation Declaration on the the period January 2007 to July 2008 within the institution of the EU for pupil” (Klemenčič 2007: 12). And the presidency also represented a national a represented also presidency the And 12). 2007: (Klemenčič pupil” by the the presidency was supported decision to undertake The interest. programme the 2004, where 17 November on Assembly already National national interest that was also reflected in Slovenia’s proactive endeavours proactive Slovenia’s in reflected also was that interest national it the reputation of a “star that brought during the accession negotiations Slovenian development strategy Slovenian development Policy Strategy formulated since the 1990s, including the Slovenian Foreign in 1999 (Bojinović & Požgan 2014). Accession to the EU and to NATO had been the two primary goals of the of goals primary two the been had NATO to and EU the to Accession B.1. National Interest during EU Council the Slovenian Presidency 2008 Slovenia pursued mostly issues that were part of the inherited agenda and agenda inherited the of part were mostly issues that Slovenia pursued the Western Balkans. one priority of national interest, limited itself to only (GSC) and the European Commission (EC). which during presidency, the of programme six-month the in reflected also handle the tasks at hand. Nevertheless, Slovenia still needed external external still needed Slovenia Nevertheless, hand. at tasks the handle was understaffed. it where policies EU of areas certain cover to assistance This assistance mostly came from the General Secretariat of the Council and and (3) entrusting the staff with preliminary experience of the field to

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 16 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(74) 66 - 2015 - 2012 17 17 http://www.eu2008.si/en/ The_Council_Presidency/ . [accessed 27 March 2014]. Even though Slovenia only had this priority that was Even though Slovenia only had 18 promoting dialogue between cultures, beliefs and traditions in the beliefs and traditions in the between cultures, dialogue promoting Intercultural Dialogue. context of the European Year of the successful launch of the new Lisbon Strategy cycle; of the new Lisbon Strategy the successful launch climate/energy issues; making a step forward in addressing and Balkans; Western the on perspective European the strengthening the future of the Union and timely entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty; Lisbon the of force into entry timely and Union the of future the The Western Balkans was the only true Slovenian priority that did not overlap with the German or the Portuguese More on the priorities of the Slovenian Presidency is available at: signing of the Stabilisation with , solid mediation in handling Kosovo’s independence the and Accession Agreement signing of and its recognition and wise protection of national interests (the retention of the ecological fishing zone) during the accession negotiations with . More in Cerjak (2010). Priorities_Programmes/indexd41d.html programme (Grabnar 2007: 6). Due to Slovenia’s proactive role, it reached important the Western Balkans integrating into Europe, namely the vizum liberalisation for all the the countries of the region, milestones in the process of 4. 5. 3. 1. 2.

18 17 Even though “some observers had expressed (implicit) Even though “some observers had doubts prior to EU the handle to able be would country tiny this 2008whether January looking across all policy dossiers for linkages and using these to provide a to these using linkages and dossiers for across all policy looking (Lenarčič 2007). genuine response to globalisation” Slovenian priority”. the overall goal of the presidency closely related to its national interest, initiatives, was not to come up with endless but to “seek to add value by According to Kajnč (2009: 89), “While the first three priorities largely form was dialogue intercultural and promoting agenda part of the inherited true was a Balkans Western the on focus the symbolic effort, a of more the following five priorities for the term of its presidency: the following five EU Member State”. Based on the 18-month programme of the presiding trio, Slovenia chose Due to such proactive engagement, Klemenčič (2007) also that predicted Slovenia would use the Presidency as an opportunity “to profile itself committed and efficient competent, a as internationally and EU the within decided on them. on decided all parties in formulating the presidency priorities before the government government the before priorities presidency the formulating in all parties , “just not screw it up”. (Economist 2006:51) Economist 20 (Šabič 2009: 3), one has to bear in mind that “newcomers 19 , for example, remarked that Slovenia really had just one priority for its term: to run it smoothly, or Economist A more detailed presentation of the Slovenian Presidency priorities and their general contribution to the positive the to contribution general their and priorities Slovenian Presidency the of detailed presentation more A development of the entire EU can be found in the Slovenian six-month programme, available at: http://www.eu2008. at: available programme, six-month Slovenian the in found be can EU entire the of development si/includes/Downloads/misc/program/Programme_en.pdf [accessed 22 December 2014]. according to one official interviewed by the

The 20 19 with the presidency priorities, declared national interests from national from presidency priorities, declared national interests with the strategic documents and development strategies or the trio presidency Therefore, such broad conception of national interests was also included interests national of conception broad such Therefore, tool (see section methodological in our survey, which was the primary presidency only results of the compare the want to C). We did not interest that as such includes everything that enhances the well-being declared by a government, something of Slovenian nationals. It is not political between different groups. party, ministry or elite, but can vary In this sense, the article looks at national interests as the general public general the as interests national at looks article the this sense, In can thus be interpreted as contributing also to the general strengthening general the also to as contributing can thus be interpreted EU the of consolidation internal the values, and integration European of and regional cooperation. The six-month programme and the priorities of the Slovenian Presidency implicit national interests national interests that can be understood as part implicit can be understood national interests national interests that Slovenia as well as the of objectives strategy development broader the of the population. EU that lead to the well-being of (Slovenian Development and Foreign Policy Strategy, the Programme Policy Strategy, (Slovenian Development and Foreign undeclared, also as the but Presidency), Slovenian EU the of and Priorities interests in the context of the Slovenian EU Council Presidency should be EU Council Presidency should of the Slovenian interests in the context that goals policy foreign as only not sense: broader much a in considered documents strategic aforementioned in the explicitly mentioned were country represented for Slovenia a far more important, overarching important, more Slovenia a far for represented country national of realisation the Therefore, national interest. and pertinent With the Western Balkans as the only substantive priority, the solid solid the substantive priority, only Balkans as the Western the With a presiding as performance presidency and good realisation of the that it would also do anything to at least retain if not further enhance its enhance further if not at least retain to also do anything that it would reputation. European historically view their inaugural presidency as a chance to prove their prove to chance as a presidency inaugural their view historically was (2007) Klemenčič Therefore, 15). 2006: (Lewis credentials” ‘European’ but presidency, the during safe it play Slovenia would that predict to right Presidency”

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 18 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(74) 66 - 2015 - 2012 19 - 21 ises about the realisation of small the the realisation states’ national interests during ises about this usual small did it deviate from or EU Council presidency of the state behaviour? with the interests of other, especially larger, EU member states? How states? member EU especially larger, other, of the interests with trio countries and EU of the other did it navigate among the interests its national help Slovenia formulate countries Did other institutions? ability to do so? interests or did they impede their Did Slovenia’s behaviour as the chair reflect the theoretical prem more easily than during the time of normal membership (and if so, normal of time the during easily than more Did or did it just recognise to what extent)? it do so independently pursue them as such? the communitarian interests and interests presiding state balance its own How did Slovenia as the Was Slovenia able to realise its own interests during its presidency its during interests its own realise able to Was Slovenia The first results of this survey in view of the realisation of national interests were published in the Slovenian language by language Slovenian the in published were interests national of realisation the of view in survey this of results first The Svetličič and Cerjak (2012). 3. 2. 1.

2008. It was sent directly via the distribution list of the Presidency Human 2008. Presidency It was sent directly via the distribution list of the 21 Our anonymous electronic survey consisting of 40 questions was of survey consisting electronic Our anonymous conducted by Kajnč and Svetličič between 9 July and 4 September The survey was structured around the following three research questions: The survey was structured around The empirical part of this article is based on the analysis part of this article is based empirical of a survey The Presidency. actors involved in the Slovenian conducted among C. Methodology and Research Questions Research Methodology and C. more often than not opposing. more often national interests during their work for the presidency. This gave some gave some This presidency. for the work their during interests national many institutions different that results, namely, tangible and interesting views had different times also and those views interests on national were programme. The respondents were asked about their own views of the views of own their about asked were respondents The programme. authors mostly authors 23 . Separately, the survey was distributed to diplomats diplomats to distributed was survey the . Separately, 22 See section A.2.1. Respondents were civil servants presiding over working groups, as well as their proxies and experts who cooperated on the dossiers as national delegates.

23 22 facilitated the materialisation of Slovenia’s (24.6%) national interests and it made it harder. only a small share (7.5%) stated that reflected in the experiences of Slovenian the respondents. As shown in presidency the claimed that respondents of the Table 1, almost a quarter through agenda-setting during the presidency are split, decision- influencing of chances the increases presidency the that agree The same ambivalence making, thus helping their realisation. was Although theoretical opinions on possibilities of realising national interests national realising possibilities on of opinions theoretical Although D. Results of the Slovenian Presidency Survey Results of the Slovenian Presidency D. the views of actors directly involved in the activity that is being evaluated is being activity that the involved in directly actors of views the diplomats. of foreign policy as well as an over-representation 667 addressees. We received 407 replies (61%), of which 235 (35%) were 235 which 407 replies (61%), of received We 667 addressees. least one at left respondents cases (26%) the 172 while in fully completed it represents sense that is biased in the survey The question unanswered. to other diplomaticto other of the Republic representations and consular of to distributed was survey the total, In (44 people). (RS) abroad Slovenia dossiers (454 people) (454 dossiers Permanent the at substantive issues on working public servants other and and to the EU (PermRep), of Slovenia of the Republic Representation Resources Resources Sub-Group, which included those responsible for substantive

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 20 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(74) 66 - 2015 - 2012 21 % 7.5 33.3 24.6 21.1 13.6 100.0 N 17 76 56 48 31 228 but on the other the on but 25 24 A very obvious national interest was national interest very obvious A 26 in the EU during the Time of the Presidency? of the the Time EU during in the Of the trio presidency programme priorities, Slovenia only had one area of true national interest, namely, the future only had one area of true national interest, priorities, Slovenia Of the trio presidency programme If not stated otherwise, the tables represent the findings of our survey. the tables represent If not stated otherwise, poor preparations. It could also reflect perspective of the Western Balkans (Cerjak 2010). If we consider that multicultural dialogue was more of a symbolic gesture than a real priority, the rest of the priority list was clearly part of the inherited agenda (Kajnč 2009).

Slovenia defended/enforced its interests with more difficulty during the during difficulty more with interests its defended/enforced Slovenia presidency. Total The presidency had no interests. enforcing Slovenian influence on the difficulty of defending/ presidency. of the we had to give priority to interests Because of the presidency, EU. There were no specific Slovenian interests in my working area. interests in my working no specific Slovenian There were more easily its interests during the defended/enforced Slovenia Table 1. How Do You Rate the Difficulty of Advocating Slovenian Interests Interests Slovenian Advocating of Difficulty the Rate You Do How 1. Table 26 24 25 realise such national interest Slovenia mostly did not have to give up its up give to have did not mostly Slovenia interest national realise such 33.3% of the believe that which leads us to EU one, the of position in favour respondents without specific national interests in their working area most of the respondents, who claimed that Slovenia had given priority to EU to priority given had Slovenia claimed that who respondents, the of namely to consequence, that, in order interests. This has an important to administer the presidency well, to enhance the reputation of Slovenia to enhance to administer the presidency well, star European truly presidency) “as a the to (also thanks perceived be to by 21.1% This was corroborated observation). referee pupil” (anonymous Slovenia instead focused on a limited number of areas jointly established of number Slovenia instead focused on a limited programme. presidency trio by the setting capabilities. Being without specific national interests ina vast range of EU issues, not have strong interests in a vast range of policies, of range vast a in interests strong have not hand it could be interpreted as an impediment to Slovenia’s agenda- interests in their working area, which could question the premise about interests in their working area, which the facilitated materialisation On one hand, this result of national interests. might partially confirm the theoretical expectation that small states do At the same time, another 33.3% claimed that Slovenia had no specific 5 (%) 16.9 17.7 17.2 17.3 I disagree 61.9 58.9 67.9 54.7 55.2 I partially agree (%) 28 21.4 23.4 14.8 39.8 agree (%) I completely N 214 221 210 209 209 Actors of a particular group of states. The interests of Slovenia matched those those matched Slovenia of interests The of the EC. those Slovenia matched of interests The of the trio partner states. those matched Slovenia of interests The of the GCS. The interests of Slovenia matched those those matched Slovenia of interests The member states. of the majority of other those matched Slovenia of interests The Table 2. Level of Accordance of Slovenian Interests with Those of Other of Other with Those of Slovenian Interests Level of Accordance Table 2. one can also understand the lack of national interests in a vast range of vast range a in interests national lack of the understand also can one Looking again at the alternative interpretation of the results in Table 1, of the alternative interpretation again at the Looking (approximately 15% on average), it can be inferred that the alignment of of interests was most likely one reason that facilitated the realisation Slovenia’s national interests during its presidency. or (2) by the end, most of the programme had already by Germany been and finalised Portugal. Further, considering the low level of support actors other of those varied from Slovenia’s interests that claim the for countries (21.4%), which could mean that: (1) Slovenia as the last country last the as Slovenia (1) that: mean could which (21.4%), countries of that trio instead focused on its own six-month presidency programme; of the least damaging position in light of a non-existent goal in a particular a in goal non-existent a of light in position damaging least the of there Conversely, referee). by an anonymous policy area (as suggested trio with other of interests accordance the of share was a slightly lower on the help of the GSC and EC which is usual in the case of small member small of case the in usual is which EC and GSC the of help the on states’ presidencies (Cerjak 2010) also an expression and, consequently, Slovenia’s interests matched the most with those of other member states member other of with those most Slovenia’s interests matched the (40%) as well as the GSC and the EC (38% altogether). The latter can be substantially relied Slovenia residency first-ever its in since explained easily

drawn from Table 2, which shows a high level of accordance of Slovenian Slovenian of accordance of level high a shows which 2, Table from drawn EU actors. with those of other interests likely also followed the European agenda. The same conclusion can be be can conclusion same The agenda. European the also followed likely

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 22 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(74) 66 - 2015 - 2012 23 No (%) 91.3 97.9 22.4 37.5 41.9 68.2 76.4 84.0 86.4 Yes 8.2 2.1 (%) 77.6 62.5 58.1 31.8 23.6 16.2 13.6 N 147 145 152 152 148 148 148 144 147

Formation in the Council Working Parties? Formation in the The agenda was mostly influenced by the EP. The agenda was mostly influenced by the EC. The agenda was mostly influenced by the The agenda was determined by the trio. the agenda. The agenda was mostly influenced by the GCS. The agenda was mostly influenced by the possibility shaping which included the of a role have I did not The agenda was determined by external events. The agenda was determined by external I determined the agenda as a combination of priorities arising the I determined of the presidency and Slovenian national from the programme priorities. I determined the agenda according to my own judgement. I determined the agenda according to my I determined the agenda according to the programme of the I determined the agenda according to presidency. Table 3. Do You Agree with the Following Statements about Agenda about Statements Following the with Agree You Do Table 3. in its agenda-formation capacity. Namely, almost 63% of respondents and independent Slovenia appeared quite sovereign Table 3 shows that of clearly defined positions could translate into Slovenia’s weak agenda- realising national mechanisms for main the of capacity—one setting interests. broad national interests. Therefore, the finding that one-third of officials had no specific interests in their issue areas could be alarming. The lack Intuitively, it would be expected that, when holding the presidency, presidency, the holding when that, be expected would it Intuitively, Slovenia would also have defined positions on issues not directly linked to the presidency’s related to they were indirectly interests since its national fields as a potential impediment toSlovenia’s agenda-setting capacity. This subsequently enabled the realisation This subsequently enabled the realisation 27 Examples of such dossiers were negotiations for the Return Directive, the legislative liberalisation the Return package for of the for Examples of such dossiers were negotiations electricity and gas internal market, confirmation of the mandate to open negotiations on a new agreement between agreement new a on negotiations open to mandate the of confirmation market, internal gas and electricity 2010). the EU and , and the proposal for the Directive on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (Cerjak

27 other problems that made it less proactive in fully realising its national made it less proactive problems that other interests, and forced it to play the role of an honest broker. (Bratkovič, A. 2009, pers. comm., 28 May). (Bratkovič, A. 2009, pers. comm., some Slovenia encountered lack of national interests, In addition to the of another, far greater national interest that was vital for Slovenia, far greater of another, missteps any without well and project presidency the out carry to namely, gain the trust of other member states, enabling it to close certain dossiers certain close to it enabling states, member other of trust the gain failed to be adopted during time and had a long for open had been that several previous presidencies. theoretical postulate that small member states are more effective when small member states are more postulate that theoretical of national interests helped Slovenia holding the presidency. The absence presidency programme priorities that were more of its national interests. presidency programme priorities also The lack of national interests can as being in line with the be regarded This in turn means that Slovenia’s agenda-setting prerogative as the chair chair the as prerogative agenda-setting Slovenia’s that means turn in This its own inability put among its own to was relatively limited, due also to was quite strongly influenced by the presidency programme,Slovenia put more emphasis priorities and much less on European on in which European. to be perceived as a good Slovenian national interests in order followed the EU agenda. Therefore, it can be inferred that the absence it can be inferred agenda. Therefore, followed the EU alignment with EU interests only of issues and range of interests in a vast gave the illusion of independent agenda-formation. In reality, this duty national interest (see p. 13). This high figure largely its own interests, 1 that Slovenia, lacking conclusions of Table is not surprising given the the 77.6% of respondents who claimed they determined the agenda in the claimed they determined who of respondents 77.6% the among contained which presidency programme, the with accordance five priorities only one that can be narrowly defined as direct Slovenia the agenda and that its agenda-setting ability was not affected by its consideration also take into However, one should interests. lack of national whereas 58% of respondents said was agenda-setting the of respondents 58% whereas a combination priorities. This Slovenian national priorities and programme of presidency in forming role quite an autonomous Slovenia played that would mean claimed that they set the agenda according to their own judgement, judgement, own to their according the agenda they set that claimed

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 24 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(74) 66 - 2015 - 2012 25 8.3 45.8 31.3 22.9 20.8 22.9 18.8 60.4 33.3 to EU Priority interests (N = 48) 36.8 28.9 28.9 27.6 19.7 21.1 13.2 46.1 40.8 (N = 76) interests no specific no specific There were There No 51.6 29.0 25.8 16.1 19.4 12.9 16.1 48.4 48.4 (N = 31) change 35.3 17.6 29.4 11.8 35.3 47.1 29.4 29.4 35.3 Harder (N = 17) Difficulty of pursuing national interests Difficulty (2) hierarchy within institutions that stifled 28 25.0 19.6 26.8 16.1 10.7 39.3 42.9 25.0 33.9 Easier (N = 56) and (3) insufficient knowledge in related fields which would 29 Issues of the Slovenian Presidency (in %) (in Presidency Slovenian of the Issues This, together with poor vertical cooperation within the department (42.9%), was also recognised as a major problem (42.9%), was also recognised department within the vertical cooperation with poor This, together A human resources deficit has been a permanent feature of Slovenia’s foreign policy development (Roter 2009). On by those who claimed that national interests were easier to defend during the presidency. the other hand, the presidency has been an important element in the socialisation of foreign policy elites (Bunič and Šabič 2013).

institutions’ functioning Insufficient knowledge in the field of operation Internal political problems Unfamiliarity with the EU of linkages Insufficient information on the substance of relevant issues stifled initiative Insufficient knowledge in related fields and awareness Insufficient interdepartmental Insufficient interdepartmental cooperation Hierarchy within institutions Poor vertical cooperation Poor vertical cooperation within department Human resources deficit Problem area Problem area Source: Based on our survey and elaborated by Kajnč and Svetličič (2009) Source: Based on our survey and elaborated by Table 4. Difficulty of Pursuing National Interests and the Main Problematic Problematic Main the and Interests National Pursuing of Difficulty 4. Table

29 28 the lack of knowledge in the field of operation (35.3%), it can be concluded that concluded be can it (35.3%), operation of field the in knowledge of lack the it was, in fact, the lack of knowledge altogether that was the biggest obstacle. (1) human resources deficit (47.1%), initiative (35.3%) aboutresponses with last the linking When 35.3%). (also linkages have enabled A comparative analysis of answers about problematic presidency issues and theA comparative analysis of answers about difficulty of advocating national interests (Table 4) revealed several obstacles to the performance of Slovenia’s Presidency in realising its national interests:

81.9 15.5 22.0 26.8 28.3 73.2 seldom (%) Seldom or very 18.1 84.5 77.9 73.2 71.7 26.8 often (%) Often or very 32 N 224 226 224 221 226 227 evidently remained relevant issues evidently remained 30

31 EC Officials GSC Officials organisations Actors? Public servants/diplomats of RS Interest groups, non-governmental Kajnč and Svetličič (2009) showed that informal contacts were intensive but not satisfactory since 58% of respondents of 58% since satisfactory not but intensive were contacts informal that showed (2009) Svetličič and Kajnč See section B. case the in that, convinced were respondents of 80% as many as that showed (2010) Kajnč and Svetličič of study The were convinced that networking skills and informal contacts should be improved in the future. of the next presidency, an improvement in the cooperation among ministries within the Slovenian public administration ministries within the among cooperation in the improvement an presidency, next the of as well as between institutions is of the utmost importance. Officials and parliamentarians of the EP Representatives of other member states

Table 5. How Regular Were Your Informal Contacts with the Following the with Contacts Informal Your Were Regular Table 5. How 32 30 31

intensive within its own public administration. in their definition and realisation. most the not were they but contacts, informal frequent had generally researchOur showed that Slovenia informal contacts among public servants. In terms of the better realisation realisation better the of terms servants. In public contacts among informal would have informal communication improved interests, national of cooperation coherent interests and bolster more helped identify national Inflexible decision-making and staffing problems in particular affected making and continuity of staff) making and continuity Slovenia’s realisation of the presidency and affected the entire throughout national interests. phase of its presidency. Nevertheless, in Slovenia’s case the usual case the in Slovenia’s presidency. Nevertheless, its phase of decision- flexible (e.g. administration public state’s small a of advantages pursuing its national interests. By adjusting the organisational structure to structure organisational the adjusting By interests. national its pursuing administrations, states’ public small disadvantagesof common avoid the preparation the issues already in some of these tried to deal with Slovenia These were the main problems that prevented Slovenia from successfully successfully from Slovenia prevented that problems main the were These

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 26 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(74) 66 - 2015 - 2012 27 Therefore, the more intensive contacts more the Therefore, 33 The study from Naurin and Lindahl (2008) on coalition-building in the Council indicated that Slovenia was ranked among the last three member states as regards the coalition potential index.

33 of Council negotiations, rather than a sign of Slovenian proactiveness. This proactiveness. Slovenian a sign of than rather Council negotiations, of member states were more with the other would also explain why contacts or the EC. frequent than with either the GSC regarding many policy areas, it is more probable that the frequent informal frequent the that probable is more it policy areas, many regarding member states states were the result of other member contacts with other point focal was the Presidency the holding by which lobbying Slovenia, of other European actors to a great extent (Tables 1 and 2). Moreover, European actors of other interests national own Slovenia’s lack of also detected survey our since with other member states could indicate a more outward pro-European has been it especiallysince Slovenian Presidency, the of orientation established coincided with those that Slovenian interests and priorities Lindahl (2008), Slovenia had poor coalition-building capacity and little appeal as a coalition partner. these contacts for information-gathering and better coalition-building. information-gathering and better these contacts for is hardly possible to Naurin and since, according The latter interpretation understood in two ways: either as a display as Slovenia’s or proactiveness in using Presidency nature of the Slovenian of the European-oriented Slovenia been properly pursuing its national interests. Slovenia been properly be member states may informal contacts with other The frequency of realisation of national interests. One would anticipate that the contacts the that would anticipate One interests. national of realisation had intense most the would have been civil servants Slovenian among contacts contacts with officials of other member states(84.5%) and not with their glance, first at small very perhaps While (77.9%). administration public own still of us with a valid provides the difference of the degree estimation Table 5 demonstrates that Slovenian civil servants had the most frequent frequent most the had servants civil Slovenian that demonstrates 5 Table 3.85 3.26 3.48 2.90 2.89 (N = 55) for Slovenia Irrelevant dossiers Irrelevant dossiers 3.50 3.17 4.33 3.33 4.17 (N = 11) for Slovenia for Slovenia Evaluation of those who worked on: of those who worked Evaluation Relevant dossiers Relevant dossiers Public Administration (Average Score on a Scale from 1 to 5) 1 to 5) from on a Scale Score (Average Administration Public Slovenia to the EU (PermRep) network Diplomatic and consular Government Office for European Affairs Government Office (GOEA) of the Republic of Permanent Representation Ministry of origin Other Ministries Actors Source: Kajnč and Svetličič (2009) Table 6. Comparison of the Evaluation of Cooperation with the Slovenian Slovenian the with of Cooperation Evaluation of the 6. Comparison Table background expertise to realise national interests in the Slovenian public expertise to realise national interests in the background administration. the PermRep suggests that those who possessed more knowledge were knowledge possessed more who those that suggests PermRep the portfolios. This may be understood less on the priority keen to cooperate necessary the lack of a critical eye regarding manifestation of as the country’s own public administration as well as impaired internal institutional own public administration country’s from respondents among results deviation of the Further, cooperation. diplomatic and consular network) indicate that these areas were granted were areas these that indicate network) consular diplomatic and ministries other of scores generally lower The less time and attention. of fewer informal contacts with the can be explained by the problem star pupil, European perspective for advocating stability, and growth the lower scores given to cooperation the Western Balkans). Conversely, on non-priority portfolios (with the exception of the PermRep and the all of its resources on being as successful as possible in those areas where areas those as successful as possible in being on its resources all of itself as a positioning (e.g. interests explicit national more had some it There was a significantly higher level of engagement and better evaluation better and engagement of level higher significantly a was There of cooperation of the Slovenian public administration when their officials (Table 6). This means that Slovenia focused on relevant dossiers worked

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 28 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(74) 66 - 2015 - 2012 29 (July – Specifically, 34 membership. It confirms It membership. (July – December 2009), normal (January – June 2012)). The surveys were conducted (January – June 2011) and Based on the initial research about the Slovenian EU Council Presidency, a series of similar surveys was conducted also similar surveys was conducted series of a Presidency, Council Slovenian EU the about initial research the Based on conclusions on a single case study, the preliminary results of the comparative more this article somehow conclusions of this article, making the the results and conclusions of actually reinforce study of five countries’ presidencies universal. in the same way in order to provide the possibility of cross-country comparison on different aspects of the EU Council Presidency. Our preliminary evaluation of the cross-country comparison has not were also no surprising that there interests. It was even more realised their national the manner in which the countries showed substantial differences in survey by the aspects covered the many of States regarding old and new Member substantial differences between based its article this though even So article). this tables of the in as showed same less the or more aspects are (the in four other Member States when they took over the Presidency ( the over they took States when Member in four other 2010), December

34 in influencing the assumptions small mechanisms in line with theoretical concerning member negotiation process state behaviour during the presidency. and used the presidency’s Slovenia’s agenda-setting appeared very sovereign and independent. This means the country was aware of the value of agenda-shaping The abovementioned factors also affected Slovenia’s capacity. agenda-setting According to the self-evaluation of its public administration, why the Slovenian public administration felt that the realisation of national realisation of the that felt public administration Slovenian the why presidency. interests was facilitated during the have specific national interests in a vast array of areas and, second, its presenting European actors, of other interests largely coincided with those explains mostly This goals. its fulfilling to opposition any hardly with Slovenia the theoretical postulate that the presidency can make an imprint on presidency the that postulate theoretical the Two main factors explain this. First, Slovenia did not processes. negotiation The key finding of our analysis is that it was easier to pursue national interests national pursue to easier was it that is analysis our of finding key The during programme) presidency the in included modestly very (although time of the presidency as opposed to the national interests and provides ideas for future research. national interests in its trio form and thus provides some relevant conclusions. and thus provides some in its trio form about assumptions theoretical certain questions and corroborates both it of realisation the and Council EU the of presidencies small state of role the that we should have evaluated more countries and compared the results evaluated more countries and that we should have the analysis of the survey with realisation of of objective criteria for the presidency member new a of analysis first the still is it Yet interests. national By presenting a single case study based on the self-evaluation of actors For universal lessons. offer cannot research our in the presidency, involved E. Conclusion E. This means that Slovenia that means This 35 See footnote 30.

35 interdepartmentally disunited, bad and, at times, even non-existent. Here, non-existent. even times, at and, bad disunited, interdepartmentally Slovenia probably missed an opportunity since more public administration its own within communication better and processes efficient working problem during the Slovenian Presidency. Therefore, many respondents Therefore, Slovenian Presidency. the during problem thought these issues led to a definition of national interests that was the most effective way. The underdeveloped informal contacts were the most effective way. The underdeveloped cooperation horizontal and vertical of problems in reflected also therefore pertinent most the as emerged fact in which hierarchy, stifling a as well as partially hindered the realisation of its national interests. For example, For its national interests. realisation of the partially hindered within its own public administration in communicate Slovenia did not Slovenia did not take full advantage of that difficulties structural some encountered it since administration states’ some other benefits of small its public administration, but it also intensified work on relevant dossiers, cooperation (Table 6). which was reflected in higher quality in putting more national interests in the programme. Specialisation wasin putting more national interests its priority areas. Slovenia not only adjustedsought to make better progress in structure to mitigate the constraints ofits entire presidency organisational in the presidency and deny some pessimistic expectations that a smallin the presidency and deny some administrativeLimited so. do to unable be would country member new were also thought to be limiting factorscapacities and lack of experience This modest list of Slovenia’s priorities is a logical consequence ofpriorities This modest list of Slovenia’s the presidency, namely to perform wellperhaps the major objective of in certain priority areas than in others, which is clearly consistent with is clearly consistent which in others, areas than priority in certain presidency behaviour. theorised small state was not too proactive in trying to materialise them, but was firm enough to achieve visible progress. This seems to have made it more influential programme. Such pro-European orientation and honest-broker behaviour behaviour honest-broker and orientation pro-European Such programme. actors and resulted in the adoption gain the trust of other helped Slovenia open. been long had dossiers that several of Western Balkans, were part of the inherited agenda. The time to put to time agenda. The inherited of the part Balkans, were Western presidency the setting was when agenda the on interests national more interests, Slovenia actually set the agenda mostly according to the to according mostly agenda the set actually Slovenia interests, Slovenian analysis the The of programme. presidency and its own trio the except for all priorities, that demonstrated programme Presidency Conversely, the same results revealed that, due to the lack of its own its own of lack the to due that, revealed same results the Conversely,

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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 30 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(74) 66 - 2015 - 2012 31 objective data on the realisation of priority interests of presiding countries of interests priority realisation of the objective data on the during taken decisions evaluation of behaviour, voting instance, (for presidencies, etc.) applying more robust methodological tools. diverse array of countries in terms of size and presidency experiences, more in terms of size and presidency experiences, diverse array of countries with compared be survey(s) should the subjective results of the issues, and In order to be able to generalise the results regarding the presidencies’ presidencies’ the regarding results the generalise be able to to order In should include a more research future interests, national realisation of From Slovenia’s point of view, this represents the successful fulfilment of a highly important national interest. national interests since these capabilities poor. national interests since these capabilities were assessed as rather the EU Council gave Slovenia greater Nevertheless, the Presidency of modest expectations. the visibility exceeded international and the results (in both priority and non-priority areas), which would also have been easier been have also would which areas), non-priority and priority both (in skills informal Improved networking and enhancing defend in practice. to materialisation of the for chances also have enhanced could contacts It could have improved its vertical and horizontal cooperation that might that cooperation its vertical and horizontal could have improved It have directly led to more coherent and clearly defined national interests would have had to raise the level of knowledge and skills within its public its public skills within and knowledge level of raise the have had to would if its public administration it could have gained more Further, administration. administration. small a of advantages the from benefit to how known had critically. Namely, there were internal factors that prevented Slovenia from prevented that factors internal were there critically. Namely, Slovenia its national interests, of pursuit the improve optimally. To acting interests. It acted in accordance with the logic of appropriateness (see in accordance with the logic interests. It acted presidencies. state small principle of guiding 1998), the Olson and March more far be viewed should interests national its realisation of Nevertheless, In conclusion, Slovenia played according to many observers the role of role the observers to many according Slovenia played In conclusion, a good presidency (Klemenčič 2007; Lenarčič 2007; Ster 2008). In most its own pursuing than rather agreements reaching focused on cases, it interests that would have been easier to defend. to defend. easier been would have that interests (up- (up- and downstream) would have resulted in clearly defined national http:// , 12(3): , , 1(3–4): . London: London: . . 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Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 38 Vol.XVIII,XXI No.(74) 66 - 2015 - 2012 39 is professor emeritus at the Faculty of Social of Faculty the at emeritus is professor is a graduate of the Faculty of Social Sciences,is a graduate of the Faculty the institute of the Presidency of the Council of EU and the EEAS. the institute of the Presidency Studies, University of Leiden. Her main research focuses on theon focuses research main Her Leiden. of University Studies, institutions, with a special focus ondevelopment and role of EU Kira Cerjak UnionEuropean of postgraduate a and Ljubljana, of University to many international organisations. He has authored more authored has He organisations. international many to than 300 articles and books. Studies association (TEPSA) board. He is also a member of (TEPSA) board. He is Studies association many editorial boards of scientific journals and a consultant the EIBA, as well as a International member Scientific of Cooperation, FP7 Trans Advisory European Group policy for Faculty of Economics, and GEA College in Ljubljana. He was the vice chair of COST project ‘The Emergence of Southern Multinationals’ vice president of and the President and of International Business (EIBA). He is also teaching at the at teaching is also Business (EIBA). He International of Skopje and Rijeka, Sarajevo, Trieste, Trento, Universities of Negotiations and International management. He was management. International and Negotiations Republic of of the of Science Ambassador the nominated Academy European the Fellow of is the in 2007 and Slovenia Sciences, University of Ljubljana (was also its Dean) currently currently Dean) also its (was Ljubljana of University Sciences, teaching; International Economics, International Business, Marjan Marjan Svetličič