PRESCRIBED FIRE OPERATIONS GUIDE (PFOG)
SEQUOIA AND KINGS CANYON NATIONAL PARKS
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. FMO Memo 3
II. Introduction 4
III. SEKI Prescribed Burn Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 5 Required For All Burns
IV. Human Factors and the Prescribed Fire Operations Guide 6
V. List of Issues & Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGs) A. Issue #1 – Leader’s Intent 7 B. Issue #2 – Pre-Season Training 8 C. Issue #3 – Burn Unit Layout 8 D. Issue #4 – Medical Planning 9 E. Issue #5 – Smoke and Traffic Control Planning 10 F. Issue #6 – Snags and Hazardous Trees 11 G. Issue #7 – Burning Under or Around Power and Phone Lines 12 H. Issue #8 – Archeological Clearance 13 I. Issue #9 – Trainer/Trainee Model 14 J. Issue #10 – Spring Grass Burning 14 K. Issue #11 – Sudden Burn Windows Opening and Closing 16 L. Issue #12 – High Energy Slopes 17 M. Issue #13 – Aerial Ignition 18 N. Issue #14 – Trees of Special Interest 20 O. Issue #15 – Pile Burning 21 P. Issue #16 – After Action Reviews (AARs) 24
VI. Conclusion 25 A. PFOG Task Group Members 25 B. Glossary 26 C. References 28
2 June 6, 2013
MEMORANDUM OF COMMANDER’S INTENT
To: All Red Carded Staff
CC: Chief Ranger, SEKI
From: Fire Management Officer, SEKI
Subject: Implementation of the Prescribed Fire Operations Guide, SEKI
The fire management program is committed to building and maintaining a High Reliability Organization. One of the hallmarks of an HRO is a pre-occupation with failure and an organizational structure attuned to listening for “weak signals.” These “Lessons Learned” lead the development of best practices that improve our safety and enhance our operational performance.
SEKI FMO has updated the 2007 Prescribed Fire Operations Guide (PFOG) guide to reflect additional learning that has occurred over the past several years. It is my intention that all levels of the fire organization use this guide to direct prescribed fire planning and operations. The PFOG contains over 10 years of organizational and individual learning. Let’s use to PFOG to enhance our performance and change our behaviors. "A lesson is learned when we change our behavior".
The PFOG is an excellent resource to assist in preventing errors of the past from continuing into the future. Unless so stated in the guide, the PFOG is not policy and does not abrogate our individual responsibility and accountability. While the PFOG should inform decision making, it is not to serve as a substitute for good judgment and sound operational decisions.
All burn bosses operating in the park, whether or not they are employees of SEKI, are expected to be familiar with the document. Similarly, all SEKI fire personnel filling overhead and leadership positions should also be familiar with document.
Sincerely,
David M. Allen
3 II. INTRODUCTION
A. History Since its inception in the 1960s, prescribed burning at Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks (SEKI) has historically been highly productive. Numerous lessons learned from both successes and unintended outcomes have provided unique opportunities for current and future fire managers to gain knowledge.
The fire management program at Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks is committed to building and maintaining a High Reliability Organization. One of the hallmarks of an HRO is a pre-occupation with failure and an organizational structure attuned to listening for “weak signals.” From weak signals, lessons learned are developed which lead to the formulation of best practices that improve our safety and our operational efficiency.
In fall 2006, the parks experienced some minor unintended outcomes on prescribed burn operations. In response, Fire Management Officer David Bartlett commissioned a task group to analyze past lessons learned in the parks’ prescribed fire program and compile a guide of best practices for prescribed fire planning and implementation. Of equal importance was to capture these lessons before they would be lost to history.
B. Purpose This Guide was developed for Burn Bosses, Firing Bosses, Holding Bosses and Fire Managers with the goal of creating a more standardized, efficient, and safe operation/organization, while still allowing for flexibility in the execution of prescribed burns. It was not intended to create new policy or another checklist of items that a Burn Boss must do.
Section III has standard operating procedures (SOPs) required on all SEKI prescribed burns. Included in Section V are several recommended standard operating guidelines (SOGs) which Burn Bosses may implement as best practices.
This is not a comprehensive guide. Each prescribed burn offers an opportunity to learn. Significant lessons captured in the After Action Review (AAR) process should be discussed at the Annual Prescribed Fire Operations Review. It is recommended that this document be reviewed at that time. At a minimum, lessons learned should be added to this document on a biennial basis.
C. FUELS MANAGEMENT EXPECTATION All SEKI Fire Management employees who are qualified for burn overhead positions (e.g. – Burn Boss, Firing Boss, or Holding Boss at the appropriate qualification), should be able to fill that position similar to any other fire management assignment. This includes proper readiness in case of “sudden burn windows” or unplanned substitution for an individual in a primary overhead position who is unable to attend the burn. Burn Bosses should try and identify their overhead team as early as possible and provide ample time for unit recons. It is the responsibility of overhead qualified employees to be as familiar as possible with all the potential burn units.
4 III. SEKI PRESCRIBED BURN STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP’S) REQUIRED FOR ALL BURNS
A. Required operational overhead positions on all Type 1 and 2 burns. 1. Prescribed Burn Boss 2. Firing Boss 3. Holding Boss(es)
B. The Prescribed Burn Boss will work for the Duty Officer.
C. The Prescribed Fire Manager position will be filled at the discretion of the Park Fire Management Officer and Duty Officer in coordination with the Burn Boss.
D. The Prescribed Fire Manager will work for the Duty Officer.
E. The Prescribed Fire Manager and the Duty Officer can be the same individual at the discretion of the Park Fire Management Officer and Duty Officer in coordination with the Burn Boss.
F. If the position is staffed, the Prescribed Fire Manager will be the primary smoke call participant. In the event the Prescribed Fire Manager position is determined to not be needed, the Duty Officer or designee will be the primary smoke call participant.
G. There will be only one Firing Boss on each prescribed burn. The Firing Boss will work directly for the Burn Boss. When there is only one Firing Team, the Firing Boss may directly supervise that team without using a Firing Team Leader. CAUTION: WHEN USING AERIAL IGNITION, ANY FIRING TEAM LEADER IN THE HELICOPTER MUST BE QUALIFIED AS A FIRING BOSS PER THE INTERAGENCY AERIAL IGNITION GUIDE. (SEE ISSUE #13 BELOW.) CAUTION: THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF FIRING TEAM MEMBERS RECEIVING TWO SETS OF POTENTIALLY CONFLICTING INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE FIRING BOSS, FIRING TEAM LEADER, OR THE APPROPRIATE HOLDING BOSS.
H. While not a required SOP, the use of Firing Team Leaders is highly recommended when there is more than one Firing Team. All aerial Firing Team Leaders will work for the Firing Boss.
I. There will only be one overhead (Burn Boss, Firing Boss, or Holding Boss) trainee per burn.
J. The Fire Information Officer (FIO) will work for the Burn Boss. The Burn Boss is responsible for working with the Fire Education Specialist to ensure the FIO
5 position is staffed. This includes having a back-up plan in case the primary FIO is unavailable.
K. Input from the FIO will be incorporated into the planning process at the earliest possible time. The Burn Boss will work with the FIO to ensure the relevant requirements of the burn plan, such as notifications, are met.
L. A copy of the burn plan should be on scene during prescribed burn operations. NOTE: THE 2008 INTERAGENCY PRESCRIBED FIRE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES GUIDE (PAGE 13) REQUIRES PORTIONS OF THE PLAN BE TAKEN IN THE FIELD FOR COMPLETING THE BRIEFING AND SAFE PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION.
M. It is the responsibility of the Burn Boss to coordinate with the appropriate Duty Officer to ensure there are adequate long term patrols after the ignition phase.
N. The Burn Boss will be responsible for declaring a burn officially out unless another arrangement is made. CAUTION: ON TIMBER UNITS, BURN BOSSES MUST BE 100% SURE THAT A BURN IS ACTUALLY OUT BEFORE OFFICIALLY DECLARING IT SO. IT IS RECOMMENDED WAITING UNTIL AFTER THE FIRST AUTUMN RAIN BEFORE DOING SO.
IV. HUMAN FACTORS AND THE PRESCRIBED FIRE OPERATIONS GUIDE
Human beings are as complex and dynamic as the weather. Our actions are not always logical or predictable. The ways in which we process information and interact with our world can have as profound an impact on a prescribed burn as the weather conditions. These are known as ‘human factors’. They include barriers to situation awareness (stress, fatigue, distraction, etc), hazardous attitudes, and how we make decisions, to name a few. They exist on every fire assignment. And like the weather, they require consideration, continuous monitoring and adaptation as changes occur.
In the early 1990s, pioneers such as Jim Cook, Karl Weick, and Judith Orasanu began investigating the impact of human factors on fire operations. Since then, studies have attempted to clearly define and categorize these factors. As we understand more about them, we can better recognize and handle their presence in a reliable, consistent manner. For instance, most firefighters are now taught about the dangers of being ‘mission driven’, that is, getting so focused on completing the task at hand that corners are cut and safety is compromised. Working with a small burn window, a Burn Boss might be tempted to start lighting a unit before all hazard snags have been dealt with or hoselays completed. By anticipating this temptation, we can establish formal checks to help maintain focus on the bigger picture. Other factors include ‘selective perception’, a tendency to subconsciously ignore any information running counter to our expectations. For example, a Holding Boss might dismiss an inexperienced holder’s concern about
6 overextended resources without assessing the situation in person. Awareness of this tendency can remind everyone to support a good flow of communication both up and down the chain of command throughout the operation.
A Burn Boss should not feel isolated when making decisions. There is a lot of prescribed fire experience at SEKI and sometimes other Burn Bosses, overhead, or crewmembers will be your best teachers. In addition, the Prescribed Fire Operations Guide was created to capture prescribed fire successes and unintended outcomes so that they may inform our future endeavors and modify our behavior.
The following issues and case examples have been identified in past years as having significance. These reflect the diversity of situations facing Burn Bosses. When reviewing these lessons learned, note how often human factors have played a primary role.
V. LIST OF ISSUES & STANDARD OPERATING GUIDELINES
A. Issue #1 – Leader’s Intent
1. Issues a. Unclear or lack of leader’s intent has contributed either to unwanted fire behavior/effects or control problems.
2. Case Examples a. Valley View Burn – 2006. Little to no clear intent was communicated to ground burners from the Firing Boss throughout the day. This resulted in unwanted fire effects in the test burn and then later along the Panorama Point Road. b. Cabin Meadow Burn – 2006. Failure of the Burn Boss to clearly communicate intent resulted in ground burners turning the southwest corner and getting ahead of the aerial ignition. The consequence was unwanted fire intensities and mortality in mixed conifer, as well as grounding of the helicopter due to smoke. c. Sherman Creek Burn (fall segments) – 2001. Vague leader’s intent from the Burn Boss was not clarified by the Firing Boss. This lack of interpretation resulted in fire intensities that produced spot fires and unwanted tree mortality. NOTE: MAPS OF SOME OF THE CASE EXAMPLES CAN BE FOUND AT: J:\seki\park_programs\share_docs\fire\plans\burn_plans\PFOG\MAPS
3. SOGs a. Leader’s intent must be communicated at all levels of the operation. CAUTION: NEVER ASSUME COMMUNICATION CAN BE IMPLIED. BURN OVERHEAD MUST BE CAREFUL TO NEVER ASSUME THAT SUBORDINATES UNDERSTAND ANYTHING THAT IS UNSPOKEN. REFER TO THE “COMMUNICATION RESPONSIBILITIES” IN THE INCIDENT RESPONSE POCKET GUIDE. b. The Burn Boss must clearly communicate their leader’s intent during the briefing. This may include specifics on the firing sequence or areas of holding concern.
7 CAUTION: SUBORDINATES MAY FEEL MICRO-MANAGED WHEN GIVEN SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE BURN BOSS. HOWEVER, BURN BOSSES MUST REALIZE THAT THEY ARE ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE ENTIRE OPERATION. c. Briefings must not be rushed regardless of target pressures, environmental discomfort (i.e. – extreme cold, heat, etc.). CAUTION: BRIEFINGS THAT DRAG ON TOO LONG WILL LOSE THE ATTENTION OF THE PARTICIPANTS. d. Whenever possible, face to face communication of leader’s intent is preferred. e. Utilize planning meetings with key overhead personnel prior to operational briefings to clarify procedures and operational sequences. f. When burning in high visitor use and/or high public visibility areas, Firing Bosses must give clear intent to igniters to minimize scorch, char, or mortality to old growth trees. It is especially crucial that burners avoid intentionally igniting cat faces on monarch giant sequoias. Critical areas of the parks where burners must be given well defined leader’s intent are along all roadways and within the giant sequoia groves of Giant Forest and Grant Grove.
B. Issue #2 – Pre-Season Training
1. Issues a. Most returning firefighters are rusty from having a winter off. b. Newly hired seasonal firefighters are frequently very inexperienced.
2. SOGs a. Incorporate an annual pre-season prescribed fire operations overview with permanent employees. Review the “Fuels Management Expectation” with all permanent fire employees annually (see page 4). This will normally be done at the Spring Operations meeting. b. Conduct a pre-season Firing Methods Refresher module for all SEKI fire employees annually. (A copy of the SEKI Firing Methods Refresher outline can be found at J:\seki\park_programs\share_docs\fire\plans\burn_plans\PFOG.) c. Review and document the specific prescribed fire and drip torch Job Hazard Analyses at the module level to every employee prior to their first prescribed burn of the season. All JHAs must be signed by all participants. (This is a Module Leader responsibility.)
C. Issue #3 – Burn Unit Layout
1. Issues a. Error chains leading to escapes and other unwanted consequences can begin in the burn planning phase. b. Midslope lines, both over and underslung, have led to significant control problems and past escapes.
8 2. Case Examples a. Upper Redwood Burn – 2006. Vegetation torched along an overslung road resulting in over 30 spot fires in one afternoon. b. Tar Gap Burn – 2002. A narrow underslung trail used as a timber burn boundary proved to be indefensible. While not converted, the resulting roll out eventually backed all the way to the East Fork of the Kaweah River and more than doubled the size of the original unit. Additional resources were required to complete this burn. c. Lookout Burn – 1998 (map unavailable). Excessive heat build up in chaparral below a midslope overslung road resulted in a declared escape above the road. d. Amphitheater Burn – 1997 (map unavailable). Torching of shrubs below a midslope overslung road ignited flashy grass fuels above the road resulting in an escape.
2a. Success Stories a. Hart Burn – 2009 / Davenport Burn – 2008. On both burns vegetation was cut back on overslung roads and night time blacklining operations occurred. This implemented SOGs ‘3e’ and ‘3f’ below. b. Cedar Bluff Burn – 2008. Burn was laid out and moved up in priority to take advantage of a recent fire above the unit which acted as a natural boundary requiring no holders.
3. SOGs a. Burn Bosses should always consider firefighter safety and length of their exposure when laying out burn units (or dividing them up for smoke management purposes). b. Use favorable terrain for boundaries by avoiding midslope lines where possible. c. Take advantage of roads versus trails when possible if midslope boundaries are unavoidable. d. Consider fuel types when laying out burn units (e.g. – midslope grass units can be more forgiving than shrub or timber). e. Cut back brush along overslung roads in timber and chaparral to reduce fire intensities and spotting potential. f. Work with the Air District to identify night time windows for blacklining overslung lines. g. Burn units should be laid out sequentially (usually high to low and/or east to west) and build off previous burns as anchor points.
D. Issue #4 – Medical Planning
1. Issues a. Mitigations required from the 2008 Dutch Creek Incident have created new protocols for Burn Bosses to be familiar with.
9 2a. Success Stories a. Redwood Mountain Burn – 2011. Due to remote access and delayed response times, a Park Medic was pre-positioned on the unit during the ignition phase. b. Circle Meadow Burn – 2012. Early season pack out drills/training, medical gear prepositioning, and applying the incident within an incident concept, resulted in a rapid and smooth medivac after an individual broke their ankle while protecting the Pillars of Hercules trees. For more information on this incident, refer to: http://wildfirelessons.net/documents/Circle_Meadow_Lessons_Learned_Review.pdf
3. SOGs a. All ICS-206 Medical Plans must be Dutch Creek compliant. (For a copy of the current medical plan template refer to J:\seki\park_programs\share_docs\fire\plans\burn_plans\PFOG.) b. Availability and location of Park Medics should be checked daily by the Burn Boss through Fire Dispatch. c. All EMTs should be identified at each briefing. d. Copies of the ICS-206 should be given to each line EMT at the initial briefing. e. Copies of the ICS-206 given to the EMTs should include a map of the burn. f. Critical medical gear (back boards, trauma gear, AED, etc) should be pre- positioned on burns at strategic locations. g. When terrain and/or lack of road access will complicate medical responses, Park Medics should be ordered up and assigned to the burns. CAUTION: DUE TO WORKLOADS, PARK MEDICS ARE FREQUENTLY ONLY AVAILABLE FOR ASSIGNMENT ON THEIR WEEKENDS.
E. Issue #5 – Smoke and Traffic Control Planning
1. Issues a. Smoke has repeatedly impacted park roads during burn operations. The worst impacts have occurred during blacklining on units below the road. b. While nighttime smoke from burns above the road has not been as much of a problem, the potential still exists for road impacts under those circumstances.
2. Case Examples a. Swale East 3 – 2012. Nighttime smoke combined with fog necessitated firefighters having to return to duty to provide traffic control along Highway 180. b. Falls Burn – 2009. Traffic control along Highway 180 was not activated in a timely manner resulting in several visitors having to drive through thick smoke. c. Silver Burn – 2006. Impacts were experienced to a narrow section of the Mineral King Road during blacklining operations. d. Quail Flat Burn – 2004. Impacts were experienced along the Generals Highway during blacklining operations. There was a delay in implementing traffic control. e. Sherman Creek #3 and 4 Burns – 2002. Heavy smoke was experienced across the Generals Highway before traffic control was implemented.
10 3. SOGs a. Prescribed fire warning sign caches should be inspected and inventoried by the appropriate designee at the start of each fire season. b. Warning signs must meet Department of Transportation standards. c. “Smoke Ahead” signs should be phased out and replaced with “Reduced Visibility” signs due to their repeated theft. d. On all burns above or below a road, a traffic control plan should be in place and attached to the Incident Action Plan. e. Traffic control plans should adopt and implement the ‘Four Phases of Traffic Control’. (For a copy refer to J:\seki\park_programs\share_docs\fire\plans\burn_plans\PFOG.) f. When feasible on burns below a road, the vegetation should be brushed back ten feet or more to reduce the spotting potential. g. On burns below a road, Fire Management should work with the Air District to try and get permission to blackline the road at night. h. On all burns above a road, a night shift should be available to monitor smoke and roadway safety. i. During each briefing, resources should be pre-identified as a traffic control group with an appropriate chief-of-party. j. Traffic control groups will normally work for the appropriate Holding Boss. k. The traffic control group should be positioned on burns as to be available for immediate activation (strive for within three minutes) of the traffic plan. l. The traffic control group should use a separate line-of-sight radio frequency as to not interfere with burn operations. m. Once the traffic control plan is implemented, the traffic control group should be dedicated to traffic control and only traffic control. n. Traffic control groups should make use of a pilot car. o. Pilot cars should have signs identifying themselves as such (e.g. – “Pilot Car – Follow Me”) to reduce the incidents of visitors passing them. p. Pilot cars should have light bars when possible. q. Burn Bosses must notify dispatchers when traffic control has been implemented. r. Traffic control must be coordinated with the appropriate Sub-district Ranger and/or law enforcement personnel.
F. Issue #6 – Snags and Hazardous Trees
1. Issues a. Snags are one the biggest safety hazards faced by firefighters on prescribed burns and are present throughout SEKI. b. There is a high volume of snags in the tussock moth kill zone in the Grant Grove area. c. A shortage of qualified Class C Fallers frequently leads to last minute snagging the day of the burn. d. The presence of large amounts of snags magnifies holding concerns.
11 2. Case Examples a. Buena Vista Burn – 2004. Last minute snagging during the actual burn along the Generals Highway put a falling team in a potentially compromised situation. b. Grant West Burn – 2004. Firefighter sustained fatal injuries after being struck by the top of a burning snag.
2a. Success Stories a. Bobcat Burn – 2010. Intensive snagging along the perimeter resulted in there being minimal problems along the Crescent Meadow Road and an underslung trail. b. Hart Burn – 2009. Numerous snags on the bottom flank were lined instead of fallen. There was a greater than 90% success rate in keeping fire out of them.
3. SOGs and References a. Burn Bosses must strike a balance between falling snags and incurring the associated resource damage versus lining snags and risking potential problems. b. For snags affecting firefighter or public safety, the first option considered should be falling. c. For snags affecting control the first option considered should be lining. d. Snags with tight bark can generally be lined and may not have to be fallen. e. There are numerous references available to firefighters pertaining to safety around hazardous trees. Some of the more common ones are listed below. f. The SEKI Job Hazard Analysis for “Fire-Hazard Trees” can be found at J:\seki\park_programs\share_docs\fire\plans\burn_plans\PFOG. g. A US Forest Service “Hazard Tree Awareness” document can be found at J:\seki\park_programs\share_docs\fire\plans\burn_plans\PFOG. h. “Hazard Tree Safety” is located in the Incident Response Pocket Guide, “Specific Hazards” section. i. Information from the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) Hazard Tree Subcommittee is located at http://www.nwcg.gov/branches/pre/rmc/htsc/index.html j. When burning along roadways, firing should generally employ a backing fire technique to minimize mortality and the creation of hazard trees within the last 100 feet.
G. Issue #7 – Burning Under or Around Power and Phone Lines
1. Issues a. Burning under or around power and phone lines has resulted in damage to these utility systems. This has been primarily an issue in the Grant Grove area.
2. Case Examples a. Azalea Burn – 2009. Heat from a burning log damaged a phone line and knocked out phone service to Wilsonia. A tort claim was subsequently filed against the park by Verizon (tort claim was ultimately thrown out).
12 b. Valley View Burn – 2006. A live tree fell on top of a power line and knocked out power to the Hume Lake Camps. c. Sunset D Burn – 2002. A live tree fell on top of a power line and knocked out power to part of Grant Grove.
2a. Success Stories – There have been numerous burns completed in the Grant Grove area without damaging power/phone lines.
3. SOGs a. Power/phone line corridors should be used as segment breaks or burn unit boundaries when possible, so burning will only occur on one side at a time. b. Power/phone line corridors should be brushed back as wide as appropriate to minimize heat. Use 30 feet on each side as a guide. c. When possible, hoselays should be installed underneath power/phone line corridors. CAUTION: FIRE PERSONNEL NEED TO TAKE CARE WHEN SPRAYING WATER AROUND POWER LINES. d. All power poles must be lined.
H. Issue #8 – Archeological Clearance
1. Issues a. Fire management currently does not have funding to hire a dedicated archeologist to clear prescribed burns. b. Communication has been poor at times between fire management and cultural resource personnel. c. Poor communication has led to last minute prep around sites, negative impacts to sites, and last minute burn boundary adjustments.
2. Case Examples a. Huckleberry Burn – 2011. Poor communication between the Burn Boss, Burn Boss trainee and the Fire Archeologist resulted in a six acre polygon being unnecessarily excluded from the unit the day before ignition. b. Swale East 1 Burn – 2011. The original Burn Boss did not ensure required mitigation work on archeological sites was completed prior to ignition. This resulted in a substitute Burn Boss having to locate and prep two sites during the actual ignition phase. c. Roads End Burn – 2005. Burn was a late add-on and was not able to be surveyed the previous year. This resulted in significant boundary changes two days before ignition.
2a. Success Stories a. Whitaker and Circle Meadow Burns – 2012. The Pacific West Regional and Whiskeytown Fire Archeologists were brought to SEKI to survey both burns in a timely manner which allowed their completion the same year.
13 b. The vast majority of archeological sites within burn units have been successfully protected. Prescribed burning has also occasionally uncovered archeological sites/materials.
3. SOGs a. Units should be cleared the prior year before ignition. b. Future Fire Archeologists should be red carded if possible to become familiar with the capabilities of what fire crews can safely protect. c. Burn Bosses should follow the newly developed (2011) ‘Cultural Resource Compliance Process for Rx Burns’. (For a copy refer to J:\seki\park_programs\share_docs\fire\plans\burn_plans\PFOG.)
I. Issue #9 – Trainer/Trainee Model
1. Issues a. Lack of direction from trainers to trainees has led to unwanted fire behavior/fire effects. b. Trainers frequently spend more time away from rather than with the actual trainee. c. Trainers can be overtaxed when they have more than one trainee.
2. Case Examples a. Lion Fire – 2011. This was a wildland fire managed for resource objectives. A Firing Boss trainee with minimal supervision unnecessarily created a large gap of timber from a stand replacement backfire during a holding operation around the Quinn Cabin. b. Nature Trail Burn – 2011. The FEMO trainer inadvertently ended up with two trainees simultaneously on the same assignment.
3. SOGs a. Trainees and their trainers should be identified as early as possible to facilitate advanced unit scouting. b. Trainers must be actively engaged in their trainee’s performance. Trainers should actively shadow, provide direction as needed, and mentor their trainees. c. Burn Bosses and Module Leaders should ensure there is only one trainee per trainer for any position.
J. Issue #10 – Spring Grass Burning
1. Issues a. The spring grass prescribed burns are usually the first burns executed each year. All personnel regardless of experience are out of practice. Many newly hired SEKI fire seasonals are generally inexperienced. b. Many fire employees have minimal experience in the grass fuel type. c. Frequently inexperienced personnel are put on firing teams on grass burns to gain experience.
14 d. The spring grass burns frequently have different Burn Bosses, Firing Bosses, and Holding Bosses due to small segment sizes and opportunities to provide refresher and trainee assignments. e. The burns provide opportunities to refresh normal burn overhead and give people a chance to work operationally with each other after the winter. f. Burning in the low elevation front country can expose firefighters to heat stress and related injuries. g. One of the primary benefits of the grass burns is to serve as training exercises to all fire management personnel. h. Part of the training component of the grass burns is heat acclimatization and physical conditioning which can create the feeling of a rushed atmosphere (similar to wildfires) to inexperienced firefighters. i. Burning off wetlines requires an enhanced level of communication and coordination versus burning off handlines. This is compounded with inexperienced personnel. j. Working in the grass fuel type is a common denominator for fatality fires due to flashy fuels. k. Grass fires are particularly susceptible to wind shifts. l. Many of the grass burn unit boundaries are surrounded by fences. m. Most of the grass at Ash Mountain is exotic and grass seed can easily be transported by firefighters from their nomex or boots to other parts of the parks.
2. Case Examples a. Helibase segment – 2006. During the test burn prior to laying down an adequate wetline, poor communication between the Holding Boss and a distracted engine operator resulted in a complete loss of water pressure to the holders. This caused the test burn to run outside the unit before being contained. b. Research segment – 2004. A sudden wind shift in grass near the southeast corner caused one overhead to run through the flames and another to run uphill to safety. The situation was compounded by the presence of a fenced in corner. The fence has subsequently been removed.
3. SOGs a. Incorporate an annual pre-season prescribed fire operations overview with permanent employees. This will normally be done at the Spring Operations meeting. b. Fire personnel should not participate on the annual grass burns without having attended an annual Firing Review Module. CAUTION: THIS MAY NOT ALWAYS BE REALISTIC. FIRING REVIEW MODULE MUST BE SCHEDULED EARLY ENOUGH IN THE SEASON TO NOT IMPACT BURN WINDOWS. THIS REQUIREMENT MAY HAVE TO BE WAIVED AS TO NOT COMPROMISE THE ABILITY TO CONDUCT EARLY SEASON TIMBER BURNS IN DRIER YEARS (E.G. – QUAIL FLAT – 2004, SHEEP CREEK – 2008, HELIPORT AND VALLEY FLOOR – 2013).
15 c. Assign one individual (e.g. – the District FMO, Fuels Specialist or Assistant, etc) to coordinate overall burn unit prep, overhead and trainee assignments, and logistics. d. Maintain an ongoing inventory of segment by segment supply needs to facilitate logistical ordering. e. “Weed eat” all burn unit boundaries a minimum six feet. f. Constructing all firelines to mineral soil in the grass fuel type minimizes control problems versus burning off only wetlines. g. On critical pieces of line place hose laterals every 100 feet. h. Use only nozzles which have fog capability (e.g. – KK nozzles). i. When fences are present, minimize holders getting ahead of the hoselay and the leading active fire edge. j. Firefighters should clean their boots, nomex, equipment, and vehicles prior to going to other areas of the parks after working in the grass. A Best Management Practices document for weed prevention during fire activities can be found at J:\seki\park_programs\share_docs\fire\plans\burn_plans\PFOG.
K. Issue #11 – Sudden Burn Windows Opening and Closing
1. Issues a. Sudden burn windows provided by the Air District can lead to rushed planning. NOTE: THIS IS NOT AN UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE ON MANY BURNS AT SEKI AND IS NORMALLY MITIGATED. b. Sudden closing of burn windows due to weather, air concerns, politics, etc, has led to accelerated firing and at times to undesired fire effects. c. Sudden burn windows can stress and/or overtax logistical support.
2. Case Examples a. Crescent Meadow Burn – 2009. A sudden burn window resulted in tension between the Burn Boss and Cache Manager. b. Silver Burn – 2006. The Holding Boss felt he did not have adequate time to recon the burn unit prior to ignition. c. Highbridge East Burn – 2005. Aerial stripping in the brush in the eastern portion of the unit resulted in unwanted mortality in high elevation conifers. This was due to trying to finish the burn prior to the window closing sooner than expected.
2a. Success Stories a. Nature Trail Burn – 2011 / Quarry West Burn – 2009. Park was able to respond to sudden burn windows opening and successfully complete these projects.
3. SOGs a. Refer to the above “Fuels Management Expectation” (see page 4). b. Sudden burn windows must be recognized as a reality given the local air quality and limited opportunities for burning. Burn Bosses should stay ahead of the planning curve throughout the season to be prepared to take advantage of opportunities as they arise.
16 c. To facilitate planning, Burn Bosses should submit logistics plans for each burn to the Cache Manager by June 1 annually. When possible the Cache Manager should be given a minimum one week notice about a particular burn. d. Burn unit planning should try to incorporate cut off contingency lines where barriers, topography, or operations permit. e. Burn Bosses need to avoid being overly mission focused by completing a unit at the expense of undesired fire effects. CAUTION: BURN BOSSES MUST WEIGH THE CONSEQUENCES OF NOT COMPLETING A UNIT (AND POSSIBLY HAVING AN UNSECURED PERIMETER) VERSUS BURNING AN AREA EITHER TOO HOT OR TOO COLD.
L. Issue #12 – High Energy Slopes
1. Issues a. Burning on high energy slopes (defined primarily as south and west facing aspects greater than 20% in the mixed conifer/chaparral zones) has led to control problems or unwanted fire effects in the form of excessive tree mortality. b. Burning on high energy slopes is especially compounded during restoration burns and/or dry years. c. The potential for undesired fire intensities is magnified on these slopes when using aerial ignition. d. Burners have significantly contributed to negative fire effects on high energy slopes due to poor ignition techniques and/or lack of attention or supervision. e. The presence of burning snags, other hazards, or barriers on previous strips may result in burners having to take their next strip wider than normal due to safety concerns.
2. Case Examples a. Crescent Meadow Burn – 2009 (west aspect of a multi-aspect unit). When burning in August, mortality in giant sequoia saplings and mature mixed conifer was higher than expected despite the effort of the Firing Boss to limit intensities. b. Zumwalt Burn – 2008 (flat aspect). While not on a high energy slope, heavy fuel loading resulted in significant overstory mortality despite the efforts of the Firing Boss to keep strips narrow. c. Silver Burn – 2006 (south aspect). Despite burning after receiving autumn rain, high fire intensity and tree mortality was experienced during aerial and ground ignition. d. Highbridge East Burn – 2005 (south aspect). Despite burning in early November, high fire intensity and tree mortality were experienced during aerial ignition. e. Grant G Burn – 2004 (west aspect). A test burn conducted in the second half of June during a dry year produced unwanted fire intensities. This contributed to control problems and the burning of a minor power line. f. Wye Burn – 1995 (south aspect) (map unavailable). Head fire was ignited in a manzanita field off Highway 180. This resulted in the mortality of several large, old growth sugar pines located immediately above the brush. Being visible from
17 the road, the mortality caused a significant negative reaction both among the public and NPS employees.
3. SOGs a. Where smaller unit size and terrain permits, consider using ground rather than aerial as the preferred ignition method. b. Experiment with alternative ignition patterns such as chevrons and spot lighting, versus straight strip lighting. Ignition intensity must be regulated by the Firing Boss. c. Burn high energy slopes as early in the year as possible to reduce fire intensities. CAUTION: BURNING EARLY IN THE YEAR ON HIGH ENERGY SLOPES WILL INCREASE THE NEED FOR LONGER THAN NORMAL PATROLS. CAUTION: BURNING CHAPARRAL EARLY IN THE YEAR COULD HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON SEED BANKS DUE TO HIGHER SOIL MOISTURES. CAUTION: MOST HISTORICAL AND/OR ECOLOGICAL BURN WINDOWS DID NOT OCCUR PRIOR TO MAY OR JUNE. d. Burn high energy slopes late in the year or after receiving precipitation. CAUTION: WAITING TO BURN LATE IN THE YEAR RISKS NOT BEING ABLE TO DO THE BURN AT ALL DUE TO RAIN, SNOW, AND/OR LACK OF RESOURCES. e. Jack pot larger fuel concentrations during the shoulder seasons. CAUTION: BURNING IN THE SHOULDER SEASON RISKS BURNING WHEN FUELS ARE WET. THIS CAN LEAD TO POOR FUEL CONSUMPTION AND EXCESSIVE SMOKE PRODUCTION. f. Fire Management should work with the Air District to try and get permission to blackline at night to reduce control problems on high energy slopes.
M. Issue #13 – Aerial Ignition
1. Issues a. There have been miscommunications between aerial and ground ignition teams which have led to undesired fire effects. b. Unfamiliarity with judging distances from the air combined with a lack of patience after doing a test strip has led to unwanted fire intensities. There is a lag time between dropping ignition devices and the subsequent fire behavior. c. Not all predetermined aerial ignition plans have been followed which have led to confusion among the ground forces. d. Not knowing the location of or getting fire too close to the unit boundaries has the potential to cause either spot fires or slopovers.
2. Case Examples a. Hart Burn – 2009. Ping pong balls were dropped outside the burn unit due to poor visibility from the canopy and smoke.
18 b. Silver Burn – 2006. Aerial ignition got ahead of the ground ignition on the west flank. The ground firing team rapidly fired the line to even out the burn. This resulted in unwanted fire effects in a stand replacement patch of mixed conifer. c. Cabin Meadow Burn – 2006. Ground burners got out of the firing sequence by turning the southwest corner and getting ahead of the aerial ignition. The consequence was unwanted fire intensities in mixed conifer and the production of too much smoke which shut down the aerial ignition. d. Castle Burn – 1995 (map unavailable). Inadequate aerial scouting led to fire being ignited outside the planned unit boundary. This resulted in a long term smoke episode negatively impacting Three Rivers. e. Suwanee Burn – 1992 (map unavailable). Helicopter drift during ignition put fire in several unwanted places resulting in a wildfire conversion.
3. SOGs a. The Firing Boss will generally stay on the ground during aerial ignition operations. NOTE: THIS SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH THE FIRING BOSS QUALIFIED AERIAL FIRING TEAM LEADER WHO MUST BE IN THE HELICOPTER DURING AERIAL IGNITION OPERATIONS. (See page 5, III.G above and 3c below.) b. Pertinent overhead (Burn Boss, Firing Boss, etc.) should turn off their radio scan and only monitor the air-to-ground frequency when aerial ignition is taking place. CAUTION: THE BURN BOSS COULD MISS ESSENTIAL OR EMERGENCY RADIO TRAFFIC DURING THIS TIME. THIS CAN BE MITIGATED IF THE BURN BOSS NOTIFIES ALL RESOURCES ON THE BURN WHERE THEY CAN BE CONTACTED IN THE EVENT OF EMERGENCY TRAFFIC. c. The minimum staffing on a helicopter will be three people. This includes the pilot, a plastic sphere dispenser operator (PLDO), and an Aerial Firing Team Leader. NOTE: THE AERIAL FIRING TEAM LEADER IN THE HELICOPTER MUST BE QUALIFIED AS A FIRING BOSS PER THE INTERAGENCY AERIAL IGNITION GUIDE. d. The Aerial Firing Team Leader needs to understand the ignition sequence and must communicate it to the pilot and PLDO. e. The Aerial Firing Team Leader must maintain communication with ground forces (Burn Boss, Firing Boss, Holding Boss, etc.) and know their location. Feedback from ground forces should be obtained prior to continuing with each additional strip. f. The Aerial Firing Team Leader must be experienced enough to be able to judge distance from the air (i.e. – exactly what a 100 foot strip looks like). g. The Aerial Firing Team Leader must be patient after doing a test strip. Fire behavior must be observed and objective attainment must be confirmed by the burn overhead prior to additional ignition. h. Avoid changing pre-determined aerial ignition plans without the concurrence of all pertinent burn overhead.
19 i. Aerial firing personnel should do a reconnaissance to make sure all on board know the burn unit boundaries. If necessary, have ground personnel mark boundaries with signal fires, flagging, panels, or use signal mirrors. j. Do dry runs while in communication with ground personnel prior to all active igniting. k. Firing Bosses should consider compartmentalizing the unit into labeled blocks and creating special maps for this purpose. Reviewing these maps with the Aerial Firing Team Leader has resulted in fewer problems. l. If possible, burn maps should be downloaded into the helicopter GPS prior to ignition to assist with unit orientation.
N. Issue #14 – Trees of Special Interest
1. Issues a. Giant sequoia trees and logs, which have been given names and are therefore considered to be trees of special interest (e.g. – General Sherman, General Grant, etc), require special protection during prescribed burn and wildland fire operations. b. Because giant sequoias are recognized as a fire adapted/dependent species, excluding fire from trees of special interest while burning adjacent sequoias has created confusion among firefighters. c. Guidance for protecting trees of special interest has not been properly disseminated to park fire crews, which has resulted in confusion as to what level of preparation is required. d. Not all trees of special interest are signed and can be difficult to locate. e. Occasional lack of close supervision by Fire Managers and/or Module Leaders has resulted in lesser experienced firefighters making decisions on the level of preparation. f. Protecting trees of special interest has resulted in firefighters taking higher and/or unnecessary operational risks.
2. Case Examples a. Circle Meadow Burn – 2012. An employee broke his ankle avoiding a falling snag while protecting the Pillars of Hercules. b. Hart Burn – 2009. Confusion stemming from the Hart Tree sign being moved to the nearby Roosevelt Tree, led to the creation of a Park Superintendent’s task group to determine the level of preparation needed to protect both trees. This resulted in employees spending numerous work hours conducting a site visit and writing a report. c. Giant Fire – 2003. This was a wildland fire managed for resource objectives where firefighters failed to exclude fire from the Washington Tree. The resulting tree damage caused significant negative political fallout. d. Grant West 1 Burn – 1990 (map unavailable). Lack of preparation and patrol resulted in the Montana Tree falling over.
20 2a. Success Stories – On the vast majority of burns where trees of special interest have been present, they have been successfully protected.
3. SOGs a. All Module Leaders should be familiar with the Trees of Special Interest section of chapter 5 of the Fire Management Plan and review it with their firefighters as necessary. (Refer to J:\seki\park_programs\share_docs\fire\plans\burn_plans\PFOG for a copy.) b. Prior to initiating prep, site visits must be conducted by the parks’ Fuels Management Specialist and Fire Ecologist with the appropriate Module Leader responsible for prep oversight (see FMP). c. Proper supervision must be present during the actual prep (see FMP). d. Firefighters should avoid disturbing soil immediately adjacent to any giant sequoia. e. Dead and down fuels should be swamped above or to the sides of the trees and not downhill. f. Firefighters should use minimum impact tactics and weigh excessive resource damage (saw cuts, etc) versus the benefit of fire exclusion. g. Firefighters must balance safety and risk management versus benefit during operations.
O. Issue #15 – Pile Burning
1. Issues a. Pile burning has been traditionally treated as a low complexity operation when in fact numerous escaped prescribed burns have been attributed to pile burning nationwide regardless of agency. b. Pile burning has been historically perceived as a routine off-season operation which has contributed to a certain degree of complacency among fire personnel. c. There have been numerous instances of pile creep and one pile burn escape in SEKI since 2002. Pile creep is not unusual and has been routinely experienced similar to slopovers/spot fires on broadcast burns. If uncontained, pile creep can potentially lead to an escape. d. Most pile burn units are located in the wildland/urban interface in close proximity to structures. e. In the absence of post-ignition moisture, piles have a long heat residence time similar to early season broadcast burns. This requires long term patrols and careful monitoring of changes in long term weather patterns and drying trends. f. Pile burn complexity can be compounded by the lack of SEKI fire personnel staffing during winter months and the uncertain availability of contract crews. g. Pile burn complexity can be compounded by difficult project site access during winter months. h. The timing of pile burning is critical, usually entailing an early spring cut off date which shortens the window for completion. The best windows for pile burning routinely occur during the winter holidays when personnel are on leave. i. Pile burning requires labor intensive chunking to reduce the risk of creep/escape.
21 j. Accessing and chunking piles in snow loads greater than one foot is difficult. This typically leads to a ring of unburned fuel around the pile after the snow melts. k. Past pile burn prescriptions have not been adequate. There have been few existing examples of a good pile burn prescription to use as an example. NOTE: THE SEKI PILE BURN PLAN AND PRESCRIPTION WERE MODIFIED IN 2008. l. There are unique safety problems associated with pile burning such as winter driving, hypothermia, PPE (including cold weather gear), disposing of old fuel, etc. m. There is not a clear procedure for qualifying and using personnel in the Burn Boss Type 3 (RXB3) position for pile burning at SEKI. (Refer to RM-18, chapter 7 or the Interagency Prescribed Fire Planning and Implementation Procedures Guide for additional RXB3 information. For the RXB3 taskbook refer to http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/taskbook-agency/blm-fs-fws-bia/rxb3.pdf). n. Pile burning is the most expensive per acre prescribed burning done at SEKI due to the use of contract crews and the shoulder season funding of subject-to- furlough employees. o. Pile burning in Cedar Grove and on high energy slopes such as below Silver City and Wuksachi present unique challenges. p. Untreated piles can have an aesthetic impact on interface areas to visitors, residents, and employees.
2. Case Examples (specific pile burn maps are unavailable, refer to the maps in the original mechanical plans) a. Atwell piles – 2011. A lapse in patrol combined with predicted rainfall not materializing, resulted in significant creep requiring long term patrol and low level containment actions on approximately five acres. b. Cedar Grove piles – 2007. Piles were ignited in the spring after 0.75 inches rain. The following day in between patrols, fire escaped from a pile ignited the previous day. This resulted in the destruction of an NPS outhouse and a concessionaire trailer. c. Cedar Grove piles– 2005. A test burn was conducted under dry conditions in the spring. Firefighters immediately had to go into suppression mode and contain around 10 piles which had all burned together. d. Wilsonia piles – 2003. Approximately 300 piles were ignited in the fall after a snowfall. These piles were not chunked. After the snow melted firefighters had to contain several areas of creep right adjacent to structures. Firefighters also needed to go back and reconstruct and re-ignite most of the original piles. e. Silver City piles – 2003. Piles which were buried under snow in the winter were discovered in the spring. Piles were in close proximity to Silver City and needed to be burned per the Superintendent and to meet targets. Although the project was successful, firefighters spent several days just prior to the opening of the Mineral King Road containing around three acres of creep.
22 2a. Success Stories a. Faculty Flat Thinning – 2012 / Lodgepole South Thinning – 2010. Thinned material was bucked up into firewood lengths and moved to nearby campgrounds. This resulted in the debris being disposed of without having to build piles. b. Sheep Creek piles – 2008. These piles, located in Cedar Grove, were burned within a newly created broadcast burn unit based on the lessons learned from the 2007 Cedar Grove piles escape (see 2b above).
3. SOGs a. In areas of the parks with difficult winter access (e.g. – Cedar Grove and Silver City), consider alternative methods of debris disposal such as lop and scatter, broadcast burn, etc. b. Ensure mechanical plan specifications are followed for pile construction. This includes teepee shaped piles to facilitate easier chunking, papering piles to ensure dryness, not placing piles directly adjacent to snags and jackpots, factoring in slope and radiant/convective heat transfer potential, etc. Handout the ‘Proper Pile Construction Specifications’ flyer to all crews prior to building piles. (Refer to J:\seki\park_programs\share_docs\fire\plans\burn_plans\PFOG for a copy.) c. To meet NPS policy, a fully qualified Burn Boss must be on site for all pile burns regardless of complexity. CAUTION: THIS COULD STRETCH QUALIFIED BURN BOSSES THIN DURING WINTER MONTHS WHEN EMPLOYEES ARE ON FURLOUGH. d. Initiate Burn Boss Type 3 (RXB3) taskbooks to permanent fire employees who meet the prerequisites and have the desire for the responsibility. CAUTION: PILES BURNS ARE FREQUENTLY NEAR STRUCTURES AND ARE NOT ALWAYS LOW COMPLEXITY. USING AN RXB3 RISKS PUTTING AN INEXPERIENCED BURN BOSS IN WHAT COULD SLOWLY EVOLVE TO A MORE COMPLEX SITUATION. e. The Burn Boss can designate a chief of party and depart the scene only after ignition has been completed each day of the burn and personnel are well into a chunking mode. f. It is the responsibility of the Burn Boss to ensure there are adequate patrols and that long term weather forecasts are being monitored. CAUTION: PATROLS MAY BE NECESSARY EVEN AFTER A RAIN EVENT. g. Burn unit boundaries in the pile burn plan should incorporate the entire mechanical project boundary. h. Using the mechanical project boundary, Burn Bosses should consider broadcast burning a pile burn unit when feasible. i. Pile creep should be expected within a mechanical unit boundary. j. The Burn Boss will determine the level of control action necessary on all creep based on values at risk, personnel on site, weather forecasts, fuel conditions, etc. k. It may be necessary to line individual piles or the entire project boundary at the discretion of the Burn Boss. NOTE: THE NEED FOR THIS MAY BE A
23 TRIGGER TO CONSIDER BURNING THE UNIT AS A BROADCAST BURN. l. Structures located within a pile burn unit boundary present a special case where pile creep is unacceptable. m. All piles will be chunked. Pitchforks or McLeods are effective tools for chunking. Properly chunked piles significantly reduce the chance of creep/escape. n. Unchunked rings of leftover fuel should be re-piled and re-ignited. o. The number of piles ignited must be commensurate with the number of personnel on site. Assign a geographical area of responsibility to each person/pair. Use 10 piles per person per shift as general guide. p. Avoid burning piles with too much snow on the ground to avoid labor intensive digging and chunking. q. Disposal of old fuel is best accomplished on either the pile at the auxiliary helispot or the Grant Grove dump. r. PPE should be commensurate with the environmental conditions. s. Review the winter driving JHA with all personnel prior to ignition if road conditions warrant.
P. Issue #16 – After Action Reviews (AARs)
1. Issues a. Module Leader dissatisfaction with the overall AAR process led to bringing in an outside facilitator to conduct AAR training in April, 2010. b. The avenue for Module Leaders to provide input to overhead AARs needs to be constantly monitored for improvement. c. Crewmembers can be reluctant or uncomfortable participating in AARs when fire program overhead are present.
2. Case Examples a. Cabin Meadow Burn – 2006. Despite multiple AARs being conducted, some Module Leaders felt their input was not solicited during the overhead AAR.
3. SOGs a. At the discretion of the Burn Boss there will be either one AAR for everyone or different levels of AARs depending on the complexity of the operation. b. AARs should be conducted at the end of each shift. CAUTION: AFTER ACTION REVIEWS CAN GET STALE IF DONE DAILY WHEN NO SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OCCUR. c. Incorporate the ‘DRIP’ process (debriefing, roll-up, information sharing, preplanning) into AARs. The DRIP process resulted from the 2010 AAR training. SEKI AAR Protocols are located at J:\seki\park_programs\share_docs\fire\plans\burn_plans\PFOG d. All relevant AAR information, suggestions, etc, must be rolled up to the Burn Boss.
24 e. Firing and Holding Bosses should debrief and solicit input from their resources through the chain of command prior to an overhead AAR. f. AARs conducted at the individual module level may result in more information being rolled up to the overhead. Module Leaders have an equal responsibility to provide input up the chain of command. g. There will be an Annual Prescribed Fire Operations Review conducted at the end of each season. Primary attendees will be Burn Bosses and Program Managers. On occasion, additional personnel who served in prescribed burn overhead positions may be requested to attend.
VI. Conclusion
It is important to note that since the introduction of modern prescribed burning over four decades ago, the majority of burns at SEKI have been successful. Examples include the successful restoration and maintenance of fire in the giant sequoia groves of Giant Forest and the development of reduced fuel buffers protecting the communities of Silver City and Wilsonia.
As a high reliability organization, when a prescribed burn results in a significant unintended outcome such as an escape, SEKI fire management should consider the development of a site visit or staff ride package to formally capture the lessons learned. A formal staff ride package for the 1997 Amphitheater Burn escape was developed by the park in 2006 and implemented in 2007. Staff ride information can be found at http://www.fireleadership.gov/toolbox/staffride/index.html.
In summary, this list of issues and standard operating guidelines is by no means comprehensive. It is reasonable to expect that new issues will arise and should be discussed at the Annual Prescribed Burn Operations Review. As these new issues are recognized and as standard operating guidelines evolve; this guide should continue to evolve and serve SEKI for years to come.
A. Current PFOG Committee Members Ben Jacobs (chair), SEKI Fuels Management Specialist Will Basye, SEKI Assistant Fuels Management Specialist John Goss, Sequoia District Fire Management Officer Carrie Vernon, Helicopter Superintendent
Original PFOG Task Group Members (2007) Ben Jacobs (chair), SEKI Fuels Management Specialist Brit Rosso, Kings Canyon District Fire Management Officer Greg Ver, Engine 72 Captain John Ziegler, Helicopter Superintendent
25 B. Glossary
Duty Officer: The District Duty Officer has the responsibility to assess all reports of wildland fire within the district and determine, initiate, and oversee the appropriate response. The District Duty Officer is responsible for assuring that all actions provide for wildland firefighter and public safety and address values to be protected, commensurate with the Park’s Fire Management Plan. (Source: SEKI Fire Management Officer Memo dated May 4, 2012.)
Fire Effects Monitor (FEMO): The FEMO is responsible for collecting the onsite weather, fire behavior, and fire effects information needed to assess whether the fire is achieving established resource management objectives. (Source: Interagency Prescribed Fire Reference Guide, page 15; see Guide for additional information.)
Firing Boss: The Firing Boss reports to the Prescribed Fire Burn Boss and is responsible for supervising and directing ground and/or aerial ignition operations according to established standards in the Prescribed Fire Plan. (Source: Interagency Prescribed Fire Reference Guide, page 14; see Guide for additional information.) (See S-234 Ignition Operations – 2009 Instructor Guide, page 1.12 for a list of duties and responsibilities.)
Firing Methods: The means by which a prescribed fire is ignited, i.e. – hand and/or aerial ignition.
Firing Sequence: The order in which Firing Teams will begin and/or complete their firing assignments; this includes aerial ignition.
Firing Team: Given number of burners plus a Firing Team Leader. Firing Team specific responsibilities include: Evaluating fuels to be lit. Picking safe access routes before lighting and always having an escape route. Maintaining communication with adjacent burners and team leader. Lighting fire in a way that meets specific burn objectives. Not lighting underneath or upwind from other burners. Maintaining awareness of drip torch mix fuel levels. Drinking plenty of fluids and rotating out individual burners prior to them becoming fatigued.
Firing Team Leader: The Firing Team Leader (FTL) is a position that may be used when there is more than one firing team. The FTL works for the Firing Boss and supervises and manages a Firing Team to accomplish ignition objectives. All FTLs must be a qualified FFT1, possess a radio, and have previous firing experience. The FTL must coordinate with the Firing Boss, additional Firing Teams, and the appropriate Holding Boss.
Firing Team Stagger: How burners of a Firing Team will be placed so they do not lay fire underneath or upwind from one another or lay fire in a way that may increase the
26 possibility of spotting. Stagger is further defined as either 1-2-3 or 3-2-1 with the number 1 burner closest to the line. (See S-234 Ignition Operations – 2009 Instructors Guide, page 3.12 for additional information.)
Firing Techniques/Firing Patterns: Lighting techniques used to create head, backing, and/or flanking fire spreads to accomplish specific firing objectives, i.e. – strip lighting, spot lighting, ring firing, flank lighting, chevron lighting, etc.
Holding Boss: Individual responsible for supervising the holding operations along a portion of the prescribed fire perimeter. Fireline qualifications may range from a Single Resource Boss to a Division Supervisor.
Prescribed Fire Burn Boss Type 3: Burn Boss who is only allowed to implement low complexity prescribed fires where the possibility of spread or spotting outside the project area is negligible to non-existent; multiple fuel models are not involved and aerial operations are not involved. An example of a Type 3 burn is piles surrounded by snow or in wet conditions. (Source: Interagency Prescribed Fire Reference Guide, page 10; see Guide for additional information.)
Prescribed Fire Manager: Responsible for implementing and coordinating assigned prescribed fire activities. May be assigned during periods when multiple simultaneous prescribed fires are being conducted; when multiple prescribed fires will be conducted within a short time frame; or where there is complex interagency involvement. (Source: Interagency Prescribed Fire Reference Guide, page 14; see Guide for additional information.)
Trigger Points: A geographic, temporal, or environmental point which triggers a specific action(s) to mitigate a circumstance, either foreseen or unforeseen.
27 C. References
Wildland Fire Qualification System Guide, 310-1
Interagency Prescribed Fire Planning and Implementation Procedures Reference Guide (July 2008 version)
NWCG Prescribed Fire Complexity Rating System Guide
RM-18, Chapter 7, Fuels Management – version from November 2011
NWCG RXB3 Position Taskbook
Lessons Learned Center – Ignition/Firing Techniques Information Collection Team Report
Lessons Learned Center – Escape Prescribed Fire Reviews and Near Miss Information Collection Team Report (2008)
Lessons Learned Center – 2012 Escaped Prescribed Fire Review Summary
Lessons Learned Center – Circle Meadow Lessons Learned Review
SEKI Fire Management Safety Committee Meeting Minutes – 11/14/06
S-234 Ignition Operations – 2009 Instructors Guide
2004 Grant Grove Prescribed Fire Review
Interagency Aerial Ignition Guide
Incident Response Pocket Guide, January 2010 version
Federal Fire and Aviation Safety Team (FFAST), Hazard Tree JHA Template
Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks, Job Hazards
National Interagency Fire JHA Database
Cedar Grove Pile Incident Report, version 3.0-draft
Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks, Fire and Fuels Management Plan
28