Domesticating and Muslim Immigrants: Political and Church Responses to Constructing a Central in

By Dia Anagnostou, Ruby Gropas and Dimitris Antoniou

Forthcoming in the volume The Orthodox Church of in the 21st Century: Religion, State and Society in an Era of Transitions, Elizabeth Prodromou, V. Macrides and Victor Roudometof (eds.), University of Notre Dame Press, 2008.

Abstract

Occasioned by immigration influx, Muslim religious presence in the country and its needs and claims have fuelled into a process of negotiating the terms of interaction between church and state, between religious and secular spheres. This chapter focuses on the mobilization and political controversy surrounding the establishment of a central mosque in Athens over the past couple of years, in which the Orthodox (OCG) has actively engaged. It explores the influence that established relations between Orthodoxy and the Greek state weigh upon initiatives to construct an Athens mosque, but also the fundamental ramifications of accommodating the religious needs and demands of Muslim immigrants. Notwithstanding the salience of transnational religious ties shaping migrants organization and identity, the analysis departs from the assumption that how host states respond to Islam, and the institutional structures through which they seek to accommodate migrants’ demands, play a decisive role. On the basis of ethnographic field research and material from the press, the empirical sections of this chapter explore the responses of the OCG regarding the so far suspended plan to construct an Athens central mosque. By reviewing parliamentary proceedings, they also examine the political debates that took place in the Greek parliament, and unravel the church- state dynamics that underpin these debates.

Introduction

The influx of large numbers of immigrants in Europe over the past couple of

decades has brought national societies up against the challenge to accept and

accommodate Islam. European governments are called to recognize its presence and

to establish the institutional structures to enable its adherents to practice their religion

and organize collectively. Defining the parameters of brings anew to

the fore the uneasy intersection between religious and secular politics (Katzenstein

2006, 31). More importantly, it comes up against entrenched traditions and structures

1 defining dominant national religions and church-state relations. The active

involvement of the Orthodox Church of Greece (OCG) in the political debates

regarding Muslim religious presence in the country is characteristic not of Greek

exceptionalism, but of a broader European pattern: it is part of an ongoing process of

negotiating the terms of interaction between church and state, between religious and

secular spheres. This chapter focuses on the mobilization and political controversy

surrounding the establishment of a central mosque in Athens over the past couple of

years. It explores the influence that established relations between Orthodoxy and the

Greek state weigh upon the latter, but also the fundamental ramifications of

accommodating the religious needs and demands of Muslim immigrants.

In the past two decades, the immigrant population of Greece has risen to an

estimated 10-12% of the country’s population (www.statistics.gr; Triandafyllidou

2006). Of these, at least 100,000 are estimated to be Muslims and come from various

countries from across the Greater and Southeast Asia such as ,

Palestine, , Syria (Gropas and Triandafyllidou 2007a).1 Most of them are

concentrated in the Athens area. Immigration has transformed and diversified the composition of Greece’s demography at an exponential rate. Similarly to most other

Southern European countries that have also experienced immigration pressures over

the same period, Greek society perceived itself as largely mono-cultural and mono-

religious. Furthermore, according to recent Eurobarometer surveys across the EU27,

although immigration and integration of foreigners do not appear to be an issue of

major concern for , nonetheless, they are among the Europeans who hold the

most negative view towards immigration (EBS273 2007, 45, 72).

The migration dynamics have presented a vast range of challenges for Greek

institutions to manage the migrant influx by gradually beginning to develop policies

2 of socio-economic inclusion and cultural pluralism. Among the normative and policy shifts that have been taking place in Greece, one of the issues that merits closer examination are the religious needs and claims of Greece’s Muslim immigrant population in a country that is overwhelmingly Christian Orthodox. The first part of this chapter places the immigration situation in Greece in the context of the current literature on immigration and religion. This is relevant for understanding the politics and political debates that have surrounded the imminent, yet still unrealized, construction of a central mosque in Athens.

To be sure, the recent immigration influx did not occasion the first encounter of contemporary Greek politics with Islam. Instead, such an encounter has already had a long history in relation to the autochthonous Muslim population inhabiting the northeast part of Greece, a vestige of the country’s Ottoman past. In reference to it,

Islam is officially recognized as a ‘known religion.’ An extensive structure of and religious foundations enable this historical minority of Thrace, the subject of another chapter of this volume, to practice and express its religious identity.

While the question of immigrant integration has been approached in relation to principles of citizenship acquisition (Brubaker 1992), the issue of Muslim religious diversity in Europe is more closely linked to the relationship between church and state

(Kastoryano 2004, 1235). In the Greek context, this chapter explores how the ‘new’

Islam is represented and recognized in relation to bequeathed structures and principles governing the historically symbiotic interaction between the OCG and the state. Such structures and principles have undoubtedly constrained the organization of Muslim religious diversity, as well as the ways in which Greek state institutions have so far attempted to accommodate the latter. The second part of this chapter briefly depicts

3 the inherited institutional and legal framework defining the relationship between the

Greek state and the Orthodox Church of Greece.

On the basis of ethnographic field research and material from the press, the

empirical sections of this chapter explore the responses of the OCG regarding the so

far suspended plan to construct an Athens central mosque. By reviewing

parliamentary proceedings, they also examine the political debates that took place in

the Greek parliament, and unravel the church-state dynamics that underpin these

debates. The analysis juxtaposes and compares government initiatives to

accommodate ‘new’ immigrants with established ‘old’ Muslim religious structures in

the northeast region of Thrace. The Greek state’s regulation of both ‘old’ and ‘new’

Islam appears to be similarly characterized by an overwhelming tendency to centrally

manage and tightly control the practice and organization of Islamic religious faith as a

way of containing the political assertion of Muslim immigrant communities.

The controversy over the creation of a central Athens mosque presented in this

paper crystallizes ongoing public debates and reflects the political and social changes

that have taken place over the past fifteen years as Greece has been transformed into an immigrant multicultural society. It encapsulates the institutional dynamics of conflict and accommodation between church and state, but also the shifting manner through which Greek political and ecclesiastical authorities view and seek to manage the rights of ‘new’ religious minorities. The political and social context has been significantly changing from the first 2000 law until the promulgation of the latest

2006 law for the construction of a central mosque in Athens. While reflecting and being shaped by the dominance of the , the debates around the

Athens mosque no less reveal that the role of the latter is being reconfigured. In this context, it is also pertinent to consider whether Greece’s modernization process has

4 also been associated with an underlying secularization trend, thereby influencing the

propensity of Greek political elites and Greek society to be more open towards

religious pluralism. Thus, it is argued, in spite of certain nationalist or phobic

reactions, the first steps towards further domesticating Islam have been made.

Religion and migrants in Greece

Greece’s immigrant population is estimated at about 1.15 million people and includes

co-ethnic returnees such as Pontic Greeks and ethnic Greek , (IMEPO 2004,

4). Estimates range between 10% of the total resident population and 12% of the

labour force (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2007b). The largest immigrant population

group is Albanian, followed by Bulgarians, Georgians, Romanians, Russians,

Cypriots, Poles, Pakistanis, Ukrainians and Indians. According to the 2001 census

data, the religious denominations of this population can be grouped as follows: 29.5%

Muslim, 22.4% Christian Orthodox, 13.2% Christian Catholic, 27.7% Christian

(other) and 1.8% are declared as atheist (www.statistics.gr). A significant percentage

of the overall immigrant population are migrants from Romania and the former Soviet

Union who are overwhelmingly Christian Orthodox.

A 2004 study on discrimination faced by immigrants in Greece offers some

interesting insights to this statistical data. When migrants of Christian Orthodox faith

were asked if they faced any problems in practising their religion they reply that they

face none (Marvakis et al. 2004, 26). Moving on to other nationalities and other

religious affiliations, however, the situation becomes rather different. For instance,

there is a wide variety in religious affiliation among Albanian immigrants. About one third of them identify themselves as Christian Orthodox (research has suggested a rather general tendency among Albanians to Christianisation/’Hellenization’ to

5 facilitate integration in Greek society), one third as Muslim and a smaller percentage as atheist. However, about 40% of the Albanian respondents noted that they feel they cannot express their religious faith because they fear discrimination. Similarly, 32% of the Arab respondents replied that they faced problems in exercising their religion in

Greece (Marvakis et al. 2004, 37). This survey data suggests that Muslim immigrants are likely to experience some discrimination, or some sort of problem in practicing their religion, at varying degrees.

The most obvious problem is arguably the fact that there exists no official religious venue for Muslims in Athens, where non-EU immigrants are estimated at over 130,000, or 17% of the city’s population (IMEPO 2004, 6). As there are no provisions for practising Islam in Athens, where most Muslim immigrants are concentrated, several makeshift mosques have sprang informally and are used as prayer halls by Muslims from Pakistan, , Egypt and other countries

(Antoniou 2003, 166; Tsitselikis 2004, 284-5). Most of these places are illegal due to

the fact that they have not applied for a ‘house of prayer permit’ from the Ministry of

National Education and Religious Affairs.

Research has shown that religion is important for new immigrants in different

ways: either to provide a social space for expressing ethnic difference or as a means

of achieving incorporation in the host country (see Levitt 2003; and Yang and Ebaugh

2001 for extensive bibliography). A growing body of literature over the past couple of

years show that a central factor influencing the role that religion plays for immigrants

in the host country is its relative importance in and migrant ties with their country of

origin (Yang and Ebaugh 2001). This point may be of particular interest in the case of

Greece. In effect, as noted above, over 56% of the immigrant population of Greece comes from . Given that a large percentage of Albania’s population is

6 Muslim, it would be reasonable to expect that this portion of the majority immigrant

group in Greece would be the most active group in mobilising in favour of the

construction of the mosque in Athens in order to provide for their religious needs.

This has not been the case. On the contrary, the Muslim Albanian population has been

among the least vocal in these claims. Immigrants from various Arab countries

(Egypt, Syria, Palestine) and particularly the Pakistani community (that totals 1.4% of

the total immigrant population) have clearly taken the lead. Drawing from Yang and

Ebaugh’s research, this could in part be explained by the marginal role that religion

holds in Albania, in contrast to its strong influence in most Arabic countries and

Pakistan, respectively.

Initiatives to establish a European Islam in immigrant countries are no doubt

influenced by transnational contacts and practices of migrants (Levitt 2003). The

politics of transnational diaspora that grows out of these in the host countries is strongly and variably influenced by the different ethnic and social background of migrant communities (Katzenstein 2006, 13). Notwithstanding the salience of transnational religious ties, though, the analysis of this chapter departs from the assumption that how host states respond to Islam, and the institutional structures through which they seek to accommodate migrants’ demands, play a decisive role.

They set the parameters that encourage, or conversely discourage, the organization and formation of collective migrant identities. For example, in the case of Germany, it has been argued that the prevalence of radical Islam is closely linked to the monopolistic politics of corporatist representation that the German state imposes on its non-Christian immigrant communities (Tibi 2006). In other countries as well, the nature of institutional representation has been crucial because it can potentially nurture and cement particular kinds of collective identity (Kastoryano 2004, 1249).

7

The institutional and legal framework of religious affairs in Greece

The constitutional recognition of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ (Article 3) as

the prevailing sets the overarching legal frame defining relations between church and state. Freedom of worship and generally religious freedom is specifically protected for all ‘known religions’, as defined by Article 13 of the Greek

Constitution. ‘Known religions’ according to the Council of State Decisions 721/1969 and 1444/1991, refers to religions whose worship is not against the public order or

morals and where there is no exercise of proselytism. Religions recognized as

‘known’ have the right to perform their rites of worship freely and under the

protection of the law, while their ministers shall be subject to the same supervision by

the State and to the same obligations toward it as those of the prevailing religion.

The recognition of the Orthodox faith as the prevailing religion in Greece,

does not per se compromise religious pluralism. It does not make the Orthodox faith

the official religion of the state, nor does it in principle violate any of the rights

protected by the European Convention of Human Rights. It can be equated to a formal

declaration that the vast majority of the population of the Greek state are affiliated to

the OCG. This privileged positioning, however, reflects the fundamentally symbiotic and thoroughly interweaving relationship between church and state in Greece. Such position has been at the centre of ongoing controversy and growing unease not only with regards to the way Orthodoxy is defined as being tantamount to Greek national identity, but also with regards to the rights and freedoms of other religious minorities.

This particular relationship constitutes a vestige from the past and reflects historical processes whereby the Greek state made the Orthodox Church an integral

8 part of the country’s national development. During the fight for independence from

the and the subsequent phases of nation-state building, the

professedly formative role of the Orthodox Church in preserving and

national identity against assimilation, have led to a tightly-knit relation between the

two (Veremis and Koliopoulos 2002, 141-151; 162-163). Religion (Eastern Orthodox

Christianity) followed by language, were the two principle defining criteria of Greek

national identity during the struggle for independence. The ‘heteroglossoi’ (those speaking a non-Greek language) were not that much of a problem in becoming assimilated in the Greek nation and incorporated in the Greek state; the main insecurity was felt by the ‘heterothreskei’ (those adhering to a different religion from

Orthodox ). Though Jews, Muslim Turks and Albanians were not discriminated against and were allowed to freely exercise their religion, they were clearly differentiated because it was considered that they had not fought for the country’s freedom (Veremis and Koliopoulos 2002, 252). Therefore, in a sense, non-

Christian minorities were entitled to fewer rights. This bias or prejudice continues to be a more or less subtle, underlying theme today in the provisions that are set up and the institutional approach towards the way ‘other’ religions can be practiced in

Greece.

The Orthodox Church of Greece is a legal entity incorporated under public law. For all other religious communities to be established, however, these have to be recognized as private law entities and they have to abide by laws that are relevant to associations as included in the Civil Code (see Konidaris 2003, 224). Moreover, regarding the establishment of non-Orthodox religious venues, Law 1361/1938 and its amendment 1672/1939, stipulate that this is subject to a permit issued by the Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs. This government permit is issued

9 following an opinion provided by the OCG. It also requires an application lodged by

fifty families from the wider neighbourhood and living at a distance from a temple of

the same denomination that makes it difficult for them to observe their religious

duties (Psychogiopoulou 2007, 7). This restrictive framework and the way it has been

managed by Greek authorities has been criticized by the European Court of Human

Rights for allowing unwarranted interference by administrative and ecclesiastical

authorities with religious freedom, and caused reactions among religious minority

groups (see Psychogiopoulou 2007, 7-10; Ktistakis 2003, 276-7). While Council of

State case law in Greece circumscribes ministerial discretion and reduces the role of

the Greek Orthodox bishop to that of consultation, the administration and the

executive retain the discretion to review the necessity for establishing a place of worship (Stavros 1995).

The restrictive for non-Orthodox faiths framework described above does not apply to the autochthonous Muslim community of Thrace. Managing the religious affairs of the latter is exclusively defined by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty and its bilateral (Greek-Turkish) section on the protection of minorities. Despite the preservation of Islamic law as a local system of religious autonomy throughout this century, however, relations between the Muslims of Thrace and the Greek state have over the past fifteen years been strained. Among the main causes of friction has been the fact that Greek state authorities consider it their exclusive competence to appoint the , and oppose the demand for the community to select its own religious leaders (Tsitselikis 1999).

In recent years, religious politics regarding the privileged position of the OCG has been influenced by two factors. The first has to do with the processes of

modernization and what may simplistically be referred to as ‘Europeanization.’ Both

10 have to a certain extent, been connected with a trend of ‘secularization’2 among

segments of Greek society, or at least of increasingly vocal strands of political discourse. If compared to certain other EU Member States, Greece would still most probably qualify on the more religious side of the axis. Nevertheless, a comparison of

Greece today, with four or five decades ago would suggest a more secular country.

There is a decrease in church-attendance, there is less tolerance towards official statements from the church on civil and political matters, and, there is in principle a consensus on the need to further disentangle the church from the state.

At the same time, opposite trends may also be discerned. For example, as noted above, religion continues to maintain a strong presence in everyday life and this remains uncontested by the majority. The survival of religion in Greece can be seen to underscore in a more visible manner a broader European reality in spite of the alienation of society from organized churches (Berger 1999, 10). A clear manifestation of this in the Greek case is the widespread reactions to the government decision in 2000 to remove a reference to religious affiliation on police identity cards.

This was not only opposed by 46% of Greek public opinion but also led three million

Greeks to sign a petition against this decision that was mobilised by the OCG.3

Eurobarometer surveys also show Greeks to think that religion rightly holds an important place in society to a much greater degree comparison to other Europeans.4

Religion, however, is not important only for the majority, native population. It

is equally important for much of Greece’s new residents, its immigrant population.

Indeed, it may be the case that demands advanced by Muslim migrants actually fuel

into renewed assertion and salience of religious affinities on the part of Greek

Orthodox majority. This leads to the second factor that has to do with migration-

related diversity, which is propelling transformations in the field of religious politics

11 regarding the rights and freedoms of non-Orthodox communities, as well as the role of the state in managing the latter. The need to construct a mosque to cater to the religious needs of the Muslim immigrant community in Athens has been long argued by diplomatic representations of Arabic states and in more recent years, by representatives of immigrant organizations. In the next section, we provide a sequence of events and an overview of the positions put forward by the different actors during the debate on whether and where to construct the mosque in Athens.

Contemporary politics of mosque construction

The first mosque in the contemporary history of Athens was established in the early

1990s, surprisingly enough on the roof of Divani Caravel, a luxury hotel in the city centre. It was to serve the devotional needs of Muslim businessmen from the Middle

East, mainly from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. Most of them had moved to the Greek capital during the Gulf War. As the management of the hotel changed in the mid-1990s and most of these Muslims moved to other European countries, the structure was removed. Since that time, the history of Islam in Athens shows many examples of Muslim immigrant communities moving from the initial stage of praying in private houses, towards the more advanced stage of renting accommodation on a temporary basis (basements, storehouses, garages, small shops) in downgraded areas of the capital for use as prayer halls (mescit). These places are either divided along lines of ethnicity or organized according to locality (Dunn, 2004) and usually operate illegally.

Most of the immigrants using these places of worship had settled in Athens in the 1990s at a time when Greek economy begun to prosper and the prospect of greater

European future was brighter than ever. It was a time of great optimism marked by the

12 beginning of a new Greco-Turkish rapprochement, and the vision of Athens 2004

Olympic games that would prove the world of Greece’s democratic stability, cultural

achievements and infrastructural advancement. It was natural that in this context,

successive Greek governments would be more keen on responding to allegations

regarding religious freedom in the country made by various NGOs, the U. S.

Government5, the EU and the international press. One of the most common

accusations was crystallized in the following cliché phrase: ‘Athens is the only

European capital without an official mosque.’6 As a result, a new image of a modern,

European, ‘multi-cultural’ Athens had to be projected. Part of this endeavor was an

initiative taken by the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs to organize the

establishment of a mosque in the capital city. As George Papandreou, former Minister

of Foreign Affairs, put it, the mosque was supposed to be built ‘in the spirit of the

multi-cultural democratic Europe of which Greece is a part’ (Smith, 2003). It seems

that for Papandreou and many other Greek officials being European at end of the

1990s was also about being multi-cultural and somewhat more Islamic.

Nevertheless, a heated debate commenced with controversial opinions being

expressed by national representatives and political parties, when the bill reached

parliament. The bill stipulated that both the mosque and the cultural centre were to be

constructed in Peania in an area about 20km east of the centre of Athens, comprising

35,000 square metres. This would have been a place of worship, study and

information (Parliamentary Proceedings, 30 June 2000). At that time the opposition expressed, virtually in unison, serious objections to the project. But the objections were not so much directed at the issue itself, but at the way the government was handling it.

13 Disagreeing with the government’s intention to establish the mosque in the town of Peania, in the suburbs of Athens, the main opposition party ‘

(ND)’ argued that there had been no prior study on the suitability of the area and the needs of the Muslims living in Athens. It also disagreed with the fact that the government had tried to incorporate the draft law on the mosque and the Islamic cultural centre into legislation involving the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens. When the Minister of Culture was challenged in Parliament, he said a mosque was necessary because half the athletes competing in the Olympic Games were expected to be

Muslims. After this statement, George Kalos, the ND MP in charge of religious affairs, told reporters ‘… the governmental reasoning is absurd. The Olympic village is to be built 15 km north of the capital and the planned mosque would be too far from the village for the athletes to use it’ (Reuters, 1 June 2000). New Democracy was right to point out the political manoeuvres of the government. The establishment of a central mosque was not necessary for the Olympic Games of 2004, since a religious centre would be constructed within the Olympic village anyway. However, one could easily speculate that government officials believed that by presenting the establishment of a central mosque as a necessity for the Olympic Games, they would silence potential voices of opposition.

During the afore-mentioned session in Parliament, the Greek Communist Party

(KKE) MP, Liana Kanelli, mentioned that the Arab League had been asking for a place of worship in the Greek capital since 1971 and that KKE had always regarded the establishment of the Athenian central mosque as a necessity (Parliamentary

Proceedings, 15 June 2000). Kanelli underlined that the establishment of a central mosque in the Greek capital is not a new issue. It is well-documented for instance that in February 1979 the late Prime Minister Konstantine Karamanlis discussed with

14 King Fahd the possibility of establishing a central mosque in Athens during an official

visit to Saudi Arabia (Monitor, 2003). Almost fifteen years later, Prime Minister

Konstantine Mitsotakis also explored the possibilities of establishing a mosque in the

capital city, and instructed the then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Virginia

Tsouderou, to handle the issue. As she stated in an interview (Tsatsi and Spyropoulou,

2000), the very existence of the law 1672/1939 did not allow her to move ahead with

her plans to establish an official place of worship for the capitals’ Muslims. She had failed to convince a bishop from the greater Metropolitan area to accept the construction of a mosque within his territory. From that time onwards three successive ministers of Foreign Affairs7 have also attempted to provide a solution to

the Athens Mosque issue with little success.

The records of parliamentary proceedings reveal that MPs representing the

Greek Communist Party and the Coalition of the Left and Progress (SYNASPISMOS) not only regarded the construction of a central mosque as necessary, but also suggested the central area of Gazi as a possible location for its establishment

(Parliamentary Proceedings, 15 June 2000). For many years, the area has attracted

Muslim migrants from and more recently Muslim immigrants from the Middle East and South Asia due to the cheap housing available. The suggestion of this area as an ideal place for the establishment of a central mosque undoubtedly reveals some knowledge on behalf of the Greek MPs of the Muslim geographies of the capital.

Allocating urban space for the needs of the capital’s Muslims is an act of

‘spatial management’, in which different segments of Greek society have been unevenly engaged. Some easily claim the status of ‘spatial manager’ by engaging in discussions on who is to enter the national space, where to settle and to practise

15 religion while others are constructed as ‘spatially managed’ – these are the people

‘who are talked about in the media and in political debates’ (Dunn 2003, 162). In our case the Greek MPs acted as ‘spatial managers’ by suggesting a specific area for the

devotional needs of the capital’s Muslim population. The role of the latter was limited

to one of relative passivity. They expressed their objection to the option of Peania, but

did not take any initiative to propose an alternative location. As we argue below, the

role of ‘spatial managers’ was by no means restricted to MPs. Members of the clergy

and citizens of very diverse backgrounds were ready to discuss not only the location

of the mosque, but also if Muslims should be allowed a space in Athens or even in

Greece.

In spite of these objections, on the 30 June 2000, the ruling socialist

government approved the building of the first large-scale mosque and Islamic cultural

centre for the needs of the capital’s Muslims, with article seven of the law on ‘Issues

of preparation of the Olympic games 2004 and other arrangements’ (Government

Gazette, 30 June 2000). This mosque, however, was never built. Six years later, in

2006 it was announced that a mosque was to be built in the centre of Athens, and not

in Peania as originally planned. Exploring this debate might prove very useful in our

attempt to identify and examine the church’s politics regarding the imaginary mosque

and the new Muslim presence hitherto described.

The Orthodox Church of Greece and the production of uncertainty

In seeking to explain why this central mosque was not built in the Greek capital, a

reading of the printed press suggests that many referred to an actor that was not

specifically mentioned in the parliamentary debates: the Orthodox Church of Greece.

This institution is usually viewed as an actor expressing positions of defensive

16 nationalism and frequently opposing initiatives targeting the modernization or secularization of Greek society. Discerning the church’s position regarding this issue is not an easy task. The press was quick to point out the multiple positions being expressed within the church and at different levels of hierarchy (Eleftherotypia, 20

April 2006). The official one was usually maintained by Archbishop Christodoulos, while the unofficial ones were expressed by several bishops and local priests

(Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2007b). Both sides expressed highly diverse views that changed year by year.

Amongst the first to react to the government’s intention to establish a Mosque in Peania was the local bishop, Agathonikos of Mesogia and Lavreotiki. From the very beginning of this debate Agathonikos declared his strong disagreement with the idea of constructing a central mosque within his territory, and continuously warned the local citizens of the oncoming ‘danger’. In his annual report of the Metropolis for

1999, he referred to the issue of the Athenian central mosque and the Islamic cultural centre in the following words:

“…I owe to you, my beloved flock, to include in my annual report an issue of

great importance and interest. I would like to inform you of an issue which

will result in numerous problems and realignments. I am referring to the

Athenian central mosque and Islamic cultural centre, which is to be built on a

top of a hill in Peania. Our holy Metropolis in cooperation with the local

authorities and the local population will strongly react to [this] effort to

adulterate the religious, cultural, social and traditional structure and life of the

citizens of Mesogia8… I call on the citizens of Mesogia to struggle in order to

prevent the establishment of foreign, dangerous and heretical elements in our

region...” (Mantas, 2000).

17 Ethnographic research has shown that this passage actually encapsulates some of the

arguments put forward by locals against the project. The local bishop informs his

flock that the Islamic complex will be constructed ‘on top of a hill’. Thus it will make

a very distinct visual claim over public space.

Concerns over the visibility of mosques in public space are by no means

confined to the people of Peania. On the contrary, they are well documented in the

literature on anti-mosque politics and in reality constitute one of the most usual

arguments against the establishment of places of worship. John Eade, for instance, in

his work on the ‘Islamization of Space in London’ refers to white activists of Ealing

who described Islam and its symbols as ‘an alien invasion of local space’ (Eade 1996,

231). Islam is regarded as ‘foreign’ and ‘dangerous’, a religion which should be

monitored by the state, as its practise might have catastrophic results both for the

country and the small society of Peania. Mosques are conceived as a ‘heretical

element’ and by extension Islam as a heresy, ‘a doctrinal imposture of Christianity’ as

Said put it (Said 2003, 59-60).

Naturally, these local reactions attracted the attention of the local, national and

international media as well as of several NGOs that maintain regular contact with the

European Commissioner on human rights, Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles.9 When Mr. Gil-

Robles visited Athens he raised the issue of religious freedom in Greece in a meeting

with Archbishop Christodoulos. This meeting was indeed revealing since the

Orthodox Church declared not to oppose the construction of a mosque in Peania and

Christodoulos attempted to explain local reactions in the following manner:

We, being Greeks, have been subjected to the [rule of the] Turks for 400

years. And this occupation (katochi) by the Turks was paid for with sacrifices

in blood. We had hundreds of victims who were sacrificed for the freedom of

18 this land. Our religion had played the primary role of protecting our language,

history, religion and identity, since at that time it had no political power. In the

mind of the Greeks, everything Islamic is Turkish… Thus there is this hatred

which, I would say, we do not cultivate. We are trying to silence it and this is

also known to the government. For this reason, [the government] has chosen a

place outside the city of Athens [i.e. Peania], so as [the Muslims] are not right

in the middle… we are afraid that such a mosque right in the centre of Athens

with a minaret… and a muezzin who will be heard five times a day performing

the prayer, will provoke a reaction from the Greek people, the extent of which

we cannot know (pou den kseroume pou bori na ftasi).10

In his speech, the Archbishop depicts the Greek population as a homogenous body which reacts in the same way for the same reasons. He attributes opposition to the establishment of a central mosque to a collective memory of ‘Turkish occupation’ that lasted for ‘400 years’ and caused a permanent trauma that has passed from one generation to another. It conjures up an immediate identification of ‘everything

Islamic’ with ‘everything Turkish’. In order to avoid widespread public reactions, the

Archbishop suggests hiding the mosque from the public eye. Even though he is not against it, he prefers an almost invisible mosque lost in suburbia.

Departing from preceding views expressing outright opposition or ambivalent acceptance, two years later the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church voted in favor of the establishment of a Mosque in Peania. This decision was an important one which, however, did not put an end to the clergy’s reactions to the project. Quite the contrary it had already become obvious that many church officials belonged to the project’s strong opponents and closely associated Muslim and Islam in general with past

Ottoman oppression and problematic Greco-Turkish relations. Thus, they used words

19 and phrases like ‘Cyprus,’ ‘Turkish rule,’ ‘Turkish oppression,’ ‘Aegean Dispute,’

‘Constantinople,’ ‘Hagia Sophia,’ objecting against the construction of a mosque

(while many had argued in favor of it some years ago). An interesting case is that of

Anthimos of who argued that there should be a quid pro quo from

Turkey who has to return Hagia Sophia to the Orthodox of the world (Eleftherotypia,

26 July 2004). In this context, Hagia Sophia emerges as a symbol of mosque

opposition, imbued with symbolic value, which calls on the proponents of the mosque

issue to approach it through a prism of Greco-Turkish reciprocity. The rationale

behind its usage could be crystallized in the following question: If the Turks do not

respect Greek symbols, why should Greeks allow the existence of a Turkish symbol

(i.e. mosque) in their capital city?

Recasting the politics of religion and religious freedom: statist or pluralist?

The vacillation between impetuous opposition to and uneasy reception of the project

to construct a central mosque in Athens expressed among the religious and political

leadership in 2000, had significantly dissipated when a new bill was discussed in and

passed by Parliament in 2006. Unlike the debate that took place in the presentation of

the first bill, the parliamentary debate in 2006 was characterized by thorough cross-

party consensus on the need to proceed with the construction of the mosque. On the

whole, and in stark contrast to the earlier initiative, all parties welcomed the

government’s initiative to introduce this bill. Besides the parties of the left

(Communist Party KKE, Coalition of the Left and Progress SYN), the two main

political parties, the centre-right ND government and the centre-left opposition of

PASOK, almost competed for which party is the most sincere and committed

supporter of multiculturalism. The ND government representative who introduced the

20 bill appealed to respect for religious differences as a value to be upheld, condemned xenophobia. It conceded that immigration in Greece is not only a de facto reality but also a largely desirable and economically expedient phenomenon. As Mr. Vasiliou stated on behalf of the government, “let’s not fool ourselves – we are a multinational, if I may say so, society” (Parliamentary proceedings, 7 November 2006, 880).

At the same time, disagreement between the opposition parties and the government moved to the issue of what kind of institutional frame should be put in place to define the functioning of the Athens mosque. Controversy centered on whether and the extent to which the state should exclusively control and manage the mosque, as opposed to involving the participation of Muslim communities. The controversial articles 5 and 6 of the bill stipulated that the mosque is to be managed by a seven-member Management Board presided over by the General Director of the

Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs (MNERA). Comprising officials from the same ministry, along with two members from officially “recognized and representative” associations of Muslims in the greater Athens area, this Board shall appoint the imam of the mosque and exercise administrative and financial control.

PASOK deputies criticized the bill for being blind to pluralism in so far as it homogenized and therefore overlooked significant internal differences (dogmatic, national, sectarian, etc.) among the Muslims living in Athens. They accused the government for failing to consult with representatives from the various Muslim associations of Athens, and for reserving full discretion to itself to decide which ones among the latter it considers representative and thus worthy to be invited to participate in the Management Board. Evangelos Venizelos on behalf of PASOK even claimed that the controversial articles 5 and 6 of the bill violate the spirit of

21 Article 13 of the Greek Constitution, and the European Convention for Human Rights

(ECHR). Particularly problematic from Mr. Venizelos’ view was the status of the

planned mosque as an organ of the Greek state, managed by a predominantly

Christian board of state administrators, and with an imam appointed by the MNERA.

Nonetheless, Mr. Venizelos was careful to differentiate the possibility of centrally

appointing the imam in the latter case from the state’s appointment of the of

Thrace. The latter, as he implied, is rightly a prerogative of the state because the status

of the Thrace mufti is defined by the special conditions of the Lausanne Treaty. In

contrast, “We have here [in the Athens mosque] an imam who has an exclusively

religious role and not judicial, administrative and other state-related competences.

This imam has nothing to do with the mufti of Rhodope or Ksanthi” (Parliamentary

Proceedings 7 November 2006, p. 886).

The opposition’s criticisms were evidently informed by the conflict of the

Greek state with the ‘old’ historical community of Muslims in Thrace and some relevant European Court of Human Rights judgments (see Psychogiopoulou 2007).

Case law of the latter has found problematic and “unnecessary for a democratic society” the traditional statist approach of Greek governments to prohibit individuals other than the state-appointed muftis to act as religious leaders of Thrace’s Muslims.

While carefully delimiting such contentious issues with the ‘old’ Islam as distinct and separate, the parliamentary debate over the ‘new’ Islam was underlined by competing conceptions of state-controlled religious leadership and organizational structures versus pluralist ways of accommodating the rights of Muslim migrants. Furthermore, in the representatives’ disagreement over whether the state should appoint the

Management Board of the planned mosque, a main undercurrent was a broader and

22 more fundamental contestation of the intimate relations between the OCG on the one

hand, with the Greek State on the other.

In sharply criticizing the restrictive legislation regarding the establishment of

non-Orthodox places of worship, as well as the state interventionism characterizing

the bill of the Athens mosque, deputies of leftist parties (KKE, SYN) attributed the

latter to the persisting interdependence between religion and state in Greece. Their

view as such pointed to a powerful underlying influence arguably exercised by the

OCG, as a result of its tight intermeshing with the state. It furthermore implicitly

referred to the structural-institutional predisposition of Greek state authorities to

centrally manage and administratively control religious communities instead of

allowing for self-management (Parliamentary Proceedings 7 November 2006, 883-

885). Leftist deputies saw that state interventionism in the planned mosque reproduced the tight interdependence of the Greek State with the OCG, and sharply criticized both, demanding a definitive separation of the state from religious affairs.

As if the government was indirectly charged with succumbing to pressures from the

OCG, some of ND deputies were quick to point out that Archbishop Christodoulos had agreed with the plan to construct an Athens mosque and praised the OCG for its purported progressiveness in giving its official approval for it (Parliamentary

Proceedings 7 November 2006, 891-893).

In setting the record straight, the Minister of National Education and Religious

Affairs Ms. Yannakou defended the government’s state-led approach on pragmatic grounds. She affirmed its determination to provide for ‘objective management’ and secure the necessary preconditions for the use of the mosque by Muslims living in the greater Athens area (Parliamentary Proceedings 7 November 2006, 895-896). Ms.

Yannakou clarified that the planned mosque is to be a property of the Greek state. She

23 dispelled the charge that the government failed to consult representatives of the

Muslim communities and claimed that it has actually opened an ongoing dialogue

with them. Significantly, in assuring that the OCG does not aspire to meddle with the

new mosque issue, Ms. Yannakou pointed to the fact that for this reason the

government had revised the provision that applications for constructing non-Orthodox places of worship required the local Bishop’s consent. In sum, the center-right government’s position exemplified a pragmatic approach to the need for a Muslim place of worship in light of longstanding and ongoing disagreements and reservations on the part of local society and segments of the OCG. The ND government prides itself to have moderated such reactions, which had obstructed earlier initiatives to construct a mosque, with a realistic plan.

Conclusion

In several EU countries, Islam increasingly represents a unifying identity among

Muslim immigrants for organizing and asserting their interests collectively, in spite of differentiated and fragmented religious denominations, national identities and social backgrounds (Kastoryano 2004, 1251-2). The variable ways in which European

governments are responding to the religious claims and needs of Muslim migrants is

closely linked to different approaches of organizing religious diversity, its relationship to the state, and to different conceptions of separation between church and state prevailing in each country (Kastoryano 2004, 1242). In France and Germany, for example, granting to Islam official recognition through creation of representative institutions of Muslims has come up against the neutrality of the state regarding religion, as well as the clear demarcation between religious and secular spheres. In

France state initiatives to create representative Islamic institutions have come in

24 conflict with the fundamental principle of laicite. In Germany on the other hand, public recognition of Muslim organizations has been less problematic due to earlier involvement of religious and church institutions in providing assistance and facilitating assimilation of immigrants (Kastoryano 2004, 1245-8). While in other

European countries it is the neutrality of the state that poses problems in government attempts to grant public recognition of and presence to Islam, in Greece it is the inherent partiality of the state regarding religion that is the source of contradictions.

Nonetheless, the presentation and discussion of the political debate and the position of the OCG around the plan to construct an Athens mosque suggest notable evolution and change. It is evidenced as much in the position of the political and religious actors, both within and between Church and State, as in the underlying dynamics shaping the traditionally intricate intermeshing between the two. Such a change has been part of a process that did not start with the issue of the Athens mosque. Instead, it has been underway since the country’s democratization in 1974, slowly dismantling, rather than reproducing, the historically entrenched symbiosis between religion and politics. Intellectual and political discourse in Greece has mainly focused its criticisms on the constitutionally guaranteed position of the OCG and demanded its legal separation from the state as a means of preempting its interference with political matters. Emboldened declarations and initiatives to separate the church from state, however, have often concluded with pragmatic compromises, in fear of alienating potential supporters and voters (Stavrakakis 2003, 154). As it is rightly noted, legal separation would not necessarily prevent the church’s politicization, because its relations with the state are complex and multifaceted, rooted in longstanding institutional structures, social relations, and vital political interests

(Stavrakakis 2003, 161-2).

25 In bringing political and ecclesiastical authorities up against the challenge of

multiculturalism, the issue of constructing a central mosque in Athens attests to a

notable reconfiguration of Church-State relations already observed by other scholars.

Downplaying its initial opposition to the mosque project, by 2006 the Church’s leadership shifted to a position of acceptance, even if on ambivalent and conditional grounds. Whether a response to diminished political influence or to a perceived need

to engage other religious and secular actors in civil society, such a shift attests to the

fact that Orthodox leaders have been actively renegotiating and redefining the role of

the church in Greek society (Prodromou 2004b, 69).

While pressures emanating from the OCG have no doubt stalled progress on

earlier initiatives to create an Athens mosque, there is little evidence that the Greek

government in the latest law succumbed to such pressures. Only two deputies of the governing party, well-known for their strongly conservative and nationalist views,

were prepared to defend or praise the position of the OCG. As evidenced in other

issues, like for example the identity cards, Greek governments appear ready to break

with the accommodationist pattern defining church-state relations after 1974 and

increasingly adopt vis-a-vis the church a strategy of competitive engagement

(Prodromou 2004a, 473). Far from a clash between modernity and tradition, such

dynamics of conflict and accommodation are intrinsic to negotiating the realities of

multicultural pluralism of Greece’s recently constituted immigrant society

(Prodromou 2004a, 472).

The decision reached with the latest law to establish a central Athens mosque and a Council responsible for managing it will grant a degree of representation to

Muslims. However, this will be under the aegis and control of Greek authorities and the central state. This statist approach of the government is no doubt based on a

26 familiar model of managing religious affairs in Greece: state authorities have

inherited a tendency for and aptitude in it through longstanding interference in and

historical symbiosis with the religious sphere. In light of the various reactions to the

mosque project, it also represents a pragmatic response to the challenge of

multiculturalism and the need to accommodate migration-related diversity

(Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2007b).

At the same time, notable is the extent in which this state-led approach was

questioned by representatives across the political spectrum. A number of Members of

Parliament advocated the need to promote more pluralistic structures of Islamic religious practice and organization, premised on the participation of migrant associations and communities. This could, of course, be more inclusive and possibly sustainable, however, it presupposes the existence and mobilization of well-organized and active Muslim religious and civil society associations. In any case, the controversial process that has defined government initiatives over the past couple of years to establish a central mosque in Athens is only the beginning of a longer term challenge to domesticate Islam in Greece. It is a challenge to achieve a transition from

‘Islam in Greece’ to an ‘Islam of Greece’, defined not only by the presence of

Muslims in the country, but by affinity with Islam that will express itself and grow within the framework of Greek national institutions.

Nationalist reactions that perceive the institutionalization of the Muslim presence in Athens as potentially threatening were limited to certain actors and contained in the official public discourse of both the state and church officials.

Undoubtedly, the country’s democratic consolidation and domestic political change is an important factor that explains this evolution. Over the past ten to fifteen years, the

European human rights norms, particularly as these are interpreted and elaborated by

27 the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, have also proved catalytic in

this respect. Advocating pluralism and criticizing a statist approach to managing religious differences in Greece are framed through references to Greece’s democratic and European nature, as well as to the democratic rights and freedoms of migrant

newcomers. To be sure, though, such views are strictly advanced in relation to the

‘new’ Islam of immigrant communities, while they steer clear of any references to the

‘old’ Islam pertaining to the Muslim population of Thrace. The religious rights and

freedoms of the latter have been managed through the prism of inter-state relations

and Greek-Turkish antagonism.

Accommodating religious pluralism does not disrupt or affect the existing

social order in a secularized system (Machacek 2003, 152). The latter does not mean

that religion does not continue to be important to the individual; it does, however

mean that a secularized system entails the structural and functional differentiation of

religion from other institutions. It also involves the emergence of religion as a distinct

institutional sector where religious consensus is not needed for the proper functioning

of other institutional settings (Machacek 2003, 153). It would also be relevant to add

here that religious consensus would also not be needed for the proper functioning of

other religious institutions/ religions. Such a secularized system does not exist in

Greece. However, a process of acknowledging the diversity that characterizes

contemporary Greek society has been underway. The affirmation of religious

pluralism, even if confined at the level of official rhetoric, is a reality that comes hand

in hand with Greece’s current understanding of democratic governance, respect and

tolerance for difference, human rights and freedoms.

28

Endnotes

1 Other studies put the estimate as high as 200,000 Muslims or even higher (see Tsitselikis 2004, 271; Marechal 2002 cited in Frank J. Buijs and Jan Rath 2002, 7). 2 Secularisation is defined here as distinguishing and detaching the religious and public spheres, i.e. the institutions and state policies from a particular religious affiliation. It does not suggest that religion has become irrelevant or insignificant (see also Berger 1999) 3 See “Greek Orthodox Church and Identity Cards” at http://www.religioustolerance.org/chr_orthi.htm 4 When asked whether they consider that the place religion holds in today’s society is too important, 66% of Greeks disagreed, ranking amongst the highest in the EU where the average lies at around 48% (EB66, 2006: 40). 5 See for instance The ‘International Religious Freedom Reports’ on Greece issued by the U.S Department of State for the last six years. 6 See Arslan, A. Y‘Atina’daki cami tartışması semboller savaşına dönüştü’ (The debate over the Mosque in Athens was turned into a war of symbols), Zaman, 11 March 2003. 7 Theodore Pangalos and George Papandreou of PASOK, and Petros Molyviatis of New Democracy. 8The area Mesogia is located northeast of Athens behind Mt. Hymettus and consists of several small towns, including Paiania. 9 Report by Mr Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights on his Visit to the Hellenic Republic 2-5 June 2002, Strasbourg, 17 July 2002. 10 Thoma Tsatsi, “Sti machi tou minaret kai I Dora”, Eleftherotypia, 29 March 2006.

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B. Parliamentary Proceedings from the : Parliamentary Proceedings, 15 June 2000 Parliamentary Proceedings, 30 June 2000. Parliamentary Proceedings, 7 November 2006

C. Greek official state websites: Greek Constitution, First Part- General Provisions, Relations between Church and State, Article 3. http://www.parliament.gr/politeuma/syntagmaDetails.asp?ArthroID=3 Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs http://www.ypepth.gr

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