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South African Police Service Data on Crowd Incidents: a Preliminary Analysis

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South African Police Service Data on Crowd Incidents: a Preliminary Analysis SOCIAL CHANGE RESEARCH UNIT, UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE DATA ON CROWD INCIDENTS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS PETER ALEXANDER, CARIN RUNCIMAN AND BOITUMELO MARUPING © 2015 SOUTH AFRICAN RESEARCH CHAIR IN SOCIAL CHANGE, SOCIAL CHANGE RESEARCH UNIT, UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG. South African Research Chair in Social Change _________________________________________________ SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE (SAPS) DATA ON CROWD INCIDENTS A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS Peter Alexander, Carin Runciman and Boitumelo Maruping Social Change Research Unit, University of Johannesburg 1 2 Contents Executive summary .................................................................................................... 5 Authors ....................................................................................................................... 6 Acknowledgments ...................................................................................................... 7 Abbreviations ............................................................................................................. 8 Figures and tables ...................................................................................................... 9 List of appendices .................................................................................................... 10 1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 11 1.1 Source of data ................................................................................................ 11 1.2 Columns ......................................................................................................... 12 1.3 Purpose of report ............................................................................................ 12 1.4 Definitions: complexity and confusion ............................................................. 13 1.5 IRIS and Public Order Policing ....................................................................... 15 1.6 IRIS classifications .......................................................................................... 16 2. Peaceful and unrest incidents .......................................................................... 19 2.1 Distinctions: official ......................................................................................... 19 2.2 Distinctions: practice ....................................................................................... 20 2.3 Numbers ......................................................................................................... 22 3. Distribution of incidents by province ................................................................ 25 3.1 Overview ......................................................................................................... 25 3.2 Incidents related to population ........................................................................ 28 4. Motives ............................................................................................................ 32 4.1 Understanding and defining motives assigned by the SAPS .......................... 32 4.2 Analysing incident motives ............................................................................. 34 4.2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 34 4.2.2 Analysis of incident motives by province .................................................. 37 4.2.3 ‘No motive registered’ .............................................................................. 39 4.2.4 ‘Dissatisfied with service delivery’ ............................................................ 40 4.3 Aggregated motive option analysis ................................................................. 43 4.3.1 Sampling unclear motive options ............................................................. 45 4.4 Summary of key results from aggregated motive analysis .............................. 46 4.4.1 Aggregated analysis by peaceful and unrest incidents ............................ 46 4.4.2 Aggregated motive option analysis by province ....................................... 48 4.5 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 48 5. Residentials ..................................................................................................... 50 3 6. Environmentals ................................................................................................ 52 7. Conclusions ..................................................................................................... 54 7.1 Complexity and caution in interpreting IRIS data ............................................ 54 7.1.1 Peaceful and unrest incidents .................................................................. 54 7.1.2 Provincial distribution ............................................................................... 54 7.2 Motives ........................................................................................................... 54 7.3 Recommendations and future research .......................................................... 55 8. Addendum: Misinformation from generals and minister ....................................... 56 8.1 Relevant findings from our research ............................................................... 56 8.2 Abuse of IRIS statistics ................................................................................... 57 8.2.1. SAPS generals ........................................................................................ 57 8.2.2 The President ........................................................................................... 58 8.2.3 Minister of Police ...................................................................................... 58 8.3 Implications ..................................................................................................... 59 References ............................................................................................................... 60 Appendices .............................................................................................................. 63 4 Executive summary • Between 1997 and 2013 the South African Police Service’s (SAPS) Incident Registration Information System (IRIS) recorded 156,230 ‘crowd incidents’; 90.0% of these were classified as ‘crowd (peaceful)’ and 10.0% as ‘crowd (unrest). • IRIS documentation of these incidents, which will soon be made public, is analysed in this report. We decode key categories used in IRIS. • Crowd incidents are not protests. Indeed, a high proportion of incidents relate to recreational, cultural or religious events. • The number of registered incidents plummeted after 2006 largely due to the re- organisation of public order policing, and this underlines the reality that IRIS statistics chronicle police activity rather than public events per se. • The definition of ‘peaceful’ and ‘unrest’ is primarily determined by the character of police intervention, and ‘unrest’ should not be equated with ‘violent'. • The number of crowd incidents spiked in 1998, 2005/2006 and 2012/2013. There were more unrest incidents in 2012 (1,811) than any other year, and the highest number of peaceful incidents (11,010) was in 2013. • Geographically, for the 17-year period, the proportion of crowd incidents recorded as unrest varies between 6.3% in KwaZulu-Natal and 16.5% in Western Cape. The number of crowd incidents per capita was substantially higher in North West than in any other province. • IRIS has 78 different options for assigning ‘motive’ to an incident. Aggregating these into 10 groups reveals that, overall, ‘motives’ that are labour-related are the most numerous (24% of the total). With unrest incidents, community-related motives are the most common (27% of the total). • Recognising the importance of IRIS for public accountability, we recommend that, SAPS incorporate clear definitions of its categories and options, addressing the concern to record protests that exists within public, political and policing spheres. • We recommend three kinds of additional research. First, further inquiry as to how incidents are defined, recorded and categorised. Secondly, further analysis of notes that accompany entries for each incident, including distinguishing which are protests. Thirdly, analysis relating police-recorded protests to media-reported protests, and quantitative analysis linking protests with social and demographic variables (e.g. unemployment). 5 Authors Peter Alexander is a professor of sociology at the University of Johannesburg, where he holds the South African Research Chair in Social Change. Carin Runciman is a post-doctoral research fellow attached to the South African Research Chair in Social Change at the University of Johannesburg. Boitumelo Maruping is an MA student in sociology and a senior research assistant with the South African Research Chair in Social Change at the University of Johannesburg. 6 Acknowledgments This report has been produced under the auspices of the South African Research Chair in Social Change, which is funded by the Department of Science and Technology, administered by the National Research Foundation, and hosted by the University of Johannesburg (UJ). Additional funding has been provided by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. We are obliged to all these institutions, without which our research would not be possible. We are obliged to the
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