LGBTQ+ ASYLUM LAW in ISRAEL How Does the State of Israel Deal with the Question of LGBTQ+ Asylum Seekers to Present Itself As a Safe Haven?

THE SEARCH FOR A SAFE HAVEN: LGBTQ+ ASYLUM LAW IN ISRAEL How does the state of Israel deal with the question of LGBTQ+ asylum seekers to present itself as a safe haven?

Word count: 17.789

Rosanne Van de Vijver

Student number: 01712399 Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Omar Jabary Salamanca

Academic Dissertation A dissertation submitted to Ghent University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Conflict and Development Studies Academic year: 2019-2020

Deze pagina is niet beschikbaar omdat ze persoonsgegevens bevat. Universiteitsbibliotheek Gent, 2021.

This page is not available because it contains personal information. Ghent University, Library, 2021.

iii

Abstract

Deze verhandeling onderzoekt de aanpak van Israël omtrent LGBTQ+ asielaanvragen. Israël presenteert zichzelf als een veilige haven voor de LGBTQ+ gemeenschap. Verwezenlijkt Israël deze claim binnen het kader van asielwetgeving? Dit onderzoek is gebaseerd op een literatuurstudie van het internationale en nationale wettelijk kader rond vluchtelingen en asiel. Meer specifiek wordt de asielaanvraag op basis van vrees voor vervolging door seksuele oriëntatie onderzocht. Daarnaast wordt de literatuur rond de presentatie van Israël bestudeerd: de concepten homonationalisme en pinkwashing worden onder de loep genomen, alsook de situatie van LGBTQ+ binnen Israël. Er wordt kritisch vergeleken of de wetgeving en presentatie van Israël naar de buitenwereld toe correspondeert met de acties ten aanzien van LGBTQ+ asielzoekers. Dit gebeurt aan de hand van cijfers omtrent het herkenningspercentage en via specifieke cases en getuigenissen. Er wordt gefocust op de grootste groepering asielzoekers in Israël, asielzoekers van Afrikaanse herkomst. Daarenboven wordt de situatie van LGBTQ+ Palestijnen geanalyseerd. Deze verhandeling concludeert dat de presentatie van Israël als veilige haven niet correspondeert met de acties van Israël ten aanzien van LGBTQ+ asielzoekers. Aan de hand van pinkwashing profileert Israël zich als een open en tolerant land. Zo tracht Israël erkenning en sympathie op te wekken bij Westerse landen. Deze praktijk poogt daarnaast aan de aandacht van de bezetting van de Palestijnse Gebieden te onttrekken. De oppervlakkige profilering van Israël slaat aan via bijvoorbeeld toerisme gefocust op LGBTQ+. Dit onderzoek besluit echter dat openheid en tolerantie tegenover LGBTQ+ misleidend is: deze openheid en tolerantie focust zich enkel op joodse Israëlische LGBTQ+ leden door de geïnstitutionaliseerde discriminatie in Israël. Bijgevolg kan dit niet open en tolerant genoemd worden.

Acknowledgement

I am pleased to acknowledge several people who helped me finish this long term journey that is my dissertation. First and foremost, I would like to thank my promotor, prof. dr. Omar Jabary Salamanca. Next, I would like to pay my gratitude to the people from Hotline for Refugees and Migrants and HIAS for helping me with several sources. Furthermore, I would like to thank my parents for giving me the opportunity to study. Additionally, I would like to thank my team of moral support and endless enthusiasm, Leonie Mertens and Daya Buyle. Lastly, I would like to express my gratitude to Floris Van de Vijver for all the time and effort he put into reading and correcting this dissertation, as well as encouraging me unconditionally.

Table of Contents

Abstract iv Acknowledgement v 1. Introduction 1 1.1. Research Method 2 1.2. Terminology 3 2. Asylum claim Based on Sexual Orientation 4 2.1. International Refugee Law 4 2.1.2. Non-Refoulement 5 2.2. Asylum Claim based on Sexual Orientation and its Obstacles 6 2.2.2. Argument of Criminalisation 9 2.2.3. Argument of Credibility 9 2.3. Conclusion 11 3. Asylum policy in Israel 12 3.1. Foundation of Israel’s Immigration law and Asylum Policy 12 3.2. Refugee Status Determination Process 15 3.3. Non-Removal Policy and Group Protection 17 3.4. Recognition Rate 18 3.5. Summarily Rejection 19 3.6. Palestinians 20 3.7. Conclusion 22 4. Homonationalism and Pinkwashing 23 4.1. Homonationalism 23 4.2. The Practice of 'Pinkwashing’ by Israel 25 4.3. Conclusion 27 5. LGBTQ+ in Israel 29 5.1. Start of LGBTQ+ Visibility 29 5.2. Start of the Legal Recognition 30 5.2.1 Children 30 5.2.2. Marriage 31 5.2.3. Social and Political Recognition 31 5.3. Conclusion 32 6. LGBTQ+ Asylum Seekers in Israel 33 6.1. African LGBTQ+ Asylum Applications 33 6.2. Ambiguity of the Refugee Status Determination Process for LGBTQ+ 34 6.3. LGBTQ+ Palestinians in Israel 37 6.4. After the Rejection 38 6.5. Conclusion 39 7. Conclusion 40

Reference List 41 Appendix 46

vii

1. Introduction

In light of pride month in June of 2020, ‘Hotline for Refugees and Migrants – Israel’ wrote a post on Facebook regarding LGBTQ+ asylum seekers (Hotline for Refugees and Migrants – Israel, 2020). The text includes several short testimonials of LGBTQ+ members seeking asylum in Israel, including:

“Paul (pseudonym) is an asylum seeker from Ghana, persecuted in his home country for being gay. Here in Israel he has become involved with the LGBTQ+ community, even volunteering for the Aguda LGBT Task Force, but his asylum claim was rejected, leaving him without status and exposed to the threat of deportation.” (Hotline for Refugees and Migrants – Israel, 2020)

“Jenny and Masha (pseudonyms) are a couple seeking asylum from Russia and Ukraine, who came to Israel after being persecuted in Russia for their political activities as women's and LGBTQ+ rights activists. They have yet to receive answers on their asylum claims.” (Hotline for Refugees and Migrants – Israel, 2020)

The search for a safe place and space to express one’s sexual identity leads some LGBTQ+ asylum seekers to Israel. Israel promotes itself as an advanced and liberal state to gain support from Western countries. Among other subjects, Israel advertises the freedom that LGBTQ+ members enjoy to support its credibility. The freedom portrayed by Israel casts a shadow over the occupation of Palestine done by Israel. Additionally, Israel claims to be the only country in its region that is a safe haven for the LGBTQ+ community. A favourite topic in regards to this promotion is the city of Tel Aviv, one of the most popular destinations for gay tourism during the past decade. This strategy is called ‘pinkwashing’.

This academic dissertation explores the question of LGBTQ+ asylum seekers and the allegations of ‘pinkwashing’ in Israel. How does the state of Israel deal with LGBTQ+ asylum application to present itself as a safe haven? Paul, Jenny and Masha have applied for asylum in Israel based on their sexual identity.

This thesis will first research the Israeli legal frame for asylum in Israel. Currently a total of round 30.000 asylum seekers reside in Israel. 92% of asylum seekers in Israel originate from Eritrea (73%) and Sudan (19%) (Hotline for Refugees and Migrants – Israel, 2020). Among these 30.000 asylum seekers, several asylum seekers are looking for a safe haven to express their sexual orientation and gender identity. Has Israel granted asylum based on sexual orientation in the past? How does Israel approach these kinds of asylum cases? To answer these questions, I research the legal claim for

asylum based on sexual orientation, both internationally as in Israel. I analyse Israel’s asylum law and look into judicial precedents. To better comprehend the context of these asylum claims, I explore the notion of homonationalism and pinkwashing. Next to this theoretical framework, I look into the evolution of LGBTQ+ acceptance in Israel. Fleeing to Israel can be explained by several push- and pull factors. Though there are plenty of push factors for LGBTQ+ members, this thesis will mainly focus on the pull factors for migration to Israel as an LGBTQ+ member. The focus is thus on the response of Israel to those searching for that safe haven Israel has been claiming to provide.

1.1. RESEARCH METHOD

This academic dissertation is based on a literature review. The legal framework for asylum claims based on sexual orientation and the context of homonationalism and pinkwashing in Israel is reviewed and researched. The literature study on asylum claims contains a critical comparison of theoretical framework of the asylum system and its implementation. The implementation is analysed based on relevant reports on recognition rates, as well as testimonials of asylum seekers for illustration. A large body of information exists on the different aspects that will be connected throughout this research.

To understand the legal framework of asylum, this research finds its basis in the Rufugee Convention of 1951, its Protocol of 1967 and Israeli ntional Laws. This dissertation is partly based on research data of the Refugee Rights Clinic in Tel Aviv by Michael Kagan and Anat Ben-Dor between 2003 and 2007. With assistance of the Hotline for Refugees and Migrants – Israel and HIAS, I was able to gather the most accurate data available on asylum in Israel at the submission of the dissertation.

This research is build on the body of literature surrounding ‘pinkwashing’ and ‘homonationalism’ that has been created over the passed decade. Scholars such as Jasbir Puar, Sarah Schulman and Jason Ritchie have delved into these topics extensively.

By critically analysing the collected data and literature, this academic dissertation provides a description of the legal framework of asylum claims nationally and internationally in light of pinkwashing and homonationalism in Israel. This research contains qualitative data to reflect experiences of LGBTQ+ asylum seekers in the context of Israel.

This research experienced challenges regarding accurate and reliable data on asylum applications in Israel. Several academic sources mention the ambiguity of state documents on the immigration and

asylum system. The Immigration Authority has been accused of being unwilling to publicise data on asylum applications. Following the sources used in this dissertation, this research only uses data that has been published in more than one statistic of state documents and data that has been publicized by international organizations, such as UNHCR.

1.2. TERMINOLOGY

In this dissertation the term LGBTQ+ is used for people identifying as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or other non-heteronormative expressions of sexual orientation or gender identity. It is worth noting that asylum seekers who fall under this category and thus flee their country of origin because of their sexual orientation or gender identity do not per se identify themselves with the term LGBTQ+. LGBTQ+ is an overarching term coming from Western ideas. This dissertation aims to be inclusive and thus will use ‘one’ as a personal pronoun, referring to he/him, she/her and they/them. If ‘one’ does not fit the sentence, this research paper will use ‘he/she/they’ or ‘him/her/them’.

The terms sexual orientation and gender identity are used in the definition of the Yogayakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. This document from 2007 contains non-binding principles composed by a group of human rights experts. The Yogayakarta Principles are also used in the Guidelines on International Protection of the UNHCR. Sexual orientation “is understood to refer to each person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender or the same gender or more than one gender”. Gender identity refers to “each person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense of the body (which may involve, if freely chosen, modification of bodily appearance or function by medical, surgical or other means) and other expressions of gender, including dress, speech and mannerisms” (International Commissions of Jurists, 2007). Though there are other suitable definitions for sexual orientation and gender identity, this research will analyse international law wherein these terms are defined as such.

2. Asylum claim Based on Sexual Orientation

The United Nations has 193 member states. Beside these UN-members, some countries have an observatory function in the UN and others have not been recognized by UN-members. Of these 193 countries, 72 countries criminalize same-sex relations between consenting adults. In at least seven countries this can lead to the death penalty. Only nine countries have included LGBTQ+ rights into their constitution (Mendos, L. R., 2019). Since the 26th of May 2020, same-sex marriage is legal in 28 countries (Cabrera, C. G., 2020).

This chapter researches the legal framework of an asylum application based on sexual orientation. Receiving international protection based on fear of persecution because of one’s sexual orientation finds its roots in the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. To comprehend asylum in Israel, this chapter first explores the international refugee law and how an asylum claim based on sexual orientation fits into this. Next, this chapter explores the obstacles of an asylum application based on sexual orientation.

2.1. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW

When looking at legal claims for asylum, the first source to consult is the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. This document was originally written with people in mind who were persecuted because of their political opposition, as well as for the protection against the extermination of Jews and Kulaks in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (Spijkerboer, T., 2013). 26 states participated in the conference from the 2nd to 25th of July 1951, among them Israel. As written in the Convention, Israel is one of 26 “who all submitted satisfactory credentials or other communications of appointment authorizing them to participate” (UNHCR, 2010). Next to Israel, several Jewish organizations were present as observers, such as Agudas Israel World Organization and the World Jewish Congress. Israel ratified the Convention as one of the first proponents in 1954. In 1967 a new Protocol was added. The new protocol was ratified by Israel as well. This Protocol extended the protection to all future victims of persecution, opening up the possibility to apply for asylum based on fear of differing forms of persecution.

The Convention and the added Protocol define a refugee eligible for asylum according to the following main criteria:

“[...] shall apply to any person who: [...] owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR, 2010, p.14).

Living with a well-founded fear of persecution for being a member of a particular social group, such as being LGBTQ+, is thus a reasonable ground to apply for asylum. The general opinion in international law and judicial precedents is that homophobic violence falls under the violence which can flee from under the 1951 Convention. It is important to note that the UNHCR guidelines specify that the grounds of persecution need to be examined from the point of view of the persecutor. This means that even if a person does not identify as LGBTQ+ but is perceived as such, this is a valid ground for asylum application (UNHCR, 2012).

2.1.2. Non-Refoulement

If an LGBTQ+ member flees from their home country based on a well-founded fear of persecution, he/she/they cannot be sent back to the home country where they would be in danger. This is written down in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention as the principle of non-refoulement. Non-refoulement is a part of customary international law, which the Israel High Court of Justice recognizes. It is also recognized by the Israeli High Court of Justice as a part of the right to life enshrined in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (Kagan, M. & Ben-Dor, A., 2008).

Though Article 33 of the Refugee Convention prohibits countries to send people back to countries where they face danger, it makes an exception in Article 33/2 when the individual claiming asylum poses a threat to the hosting country (UNHCR, 2012). This exception is used by the state of Israel as one of the arguments to deny Palestinian asylum seekers refuge. Though the exception of Article 33/2 is often used to deny asylum in Israel, Israel is part of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In this Convention, Article 3 prohibits the deportation of people who are in danger of torture, thus prohibiting refoulement to these countries (UN Office of the High Commissioner, 1984). This could apply for example to LGBTQ+ Palestinians who face a serious threat of being tortured by the Palestinian Authorities or by their Palestinian family.

Additionally, the Refugee Convention of 1951 explicitly states in Article 3 that “the Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin” (UNHCR, (2010, p17). This non-discrimination article could again refer for example to LGBTQ+ Palestinians seeking refuge in Israel based on their sexual orientation.

A person can be excluded from the status of refugee if he or she “has committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity”, as well as “serious non-political crime”. Additionally, Article 1F. of the Convention states that no country is allowed to add other reasons for exclusion. Article 42 of the Convention explicitly states that no country can expand the exclusion clause and thus that the exclusion clauses are exhaustive (UNHCR, 2010).

2.2. ASYLUM CLAIM BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND ITS OBSTACLES

Since the foundation of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951, several changes have been made to replace the temporal and geographical limitations of the original document. One of the changes was the inclusion of the risk of persecution based on the membership of a particular social group. This adjustment was carried out because of women pleading for equality in the Refugee Convention. The specificity of women fleeing violence, for example, sexual violence, based on gender was a prelude for the inclusion of sexual orientation. In 1981 the Dutch Council of State was the first to recognize sexual orientation as a social group that could be persecuted within the refugee law (Spijkerboer, T., 2013). Currently, sexual orientation falls under the belonging to a particular social group, as motive for persecution in the definition of a refugee. Other social groups recognised are race, religion nationality and political opinion.

A consensus has been set in place on what is meant by belonging to a particular social group. UNHCR and major common law jurisdictions agree that sexual orientation falls under this category. Some criteria have to be met, but this kind of asylum claim also has to be handled with nuance. Membership of a specific social group does not necessarily mean that the person should actively associate with others belonging to that group. The membership does not have to be formal. UNHCR has streamlined the definition of ‘social group’ based on past judicial decisions and the other four categories - race, religion, political opinion or nationality – in the definition of a refugee:

“A particular social group is a group of persons who share a common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. The

characteristic will often be one which is innate, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights” (UNHCR, 2002, p.3).

UNHCR adds to this definition that there is no requirement that the social group has to be ‘cohesive’. The example is given of women that form a particular social group because of the common characteristic of sex, “whether or not they associate with one another based on that shared characteristic” (UNHCR, 2002, p.4). Based on national studies in 26 European countries and Israel conducted in 2011, Sabine Jansen and Thomas Spijkerboer publicised a report on the difference of approach in LGBTQ+ asylum cases. This research exposed several obstacles, such as the argument of discretion, the argument of criminalisation and the argument of credibility.

2.2.1. Argument of Discretion

The discretion reasoning encompasses the argument that people of a certain group, for example based on their sexual orientation, living in a hostile environment can live out their identity discreetly without any major risks. With this reasoning, LGBTQ+ members could live according to their identity without major risks by only expressing their sexual identity in the private spheres of the home, tolerant areas or specific safe spaces. The discretion argument is thus turned around: it is presented as the right to privacy, containing the right to sexual autonomy. However, this right to privacy has a flipside. Because of this, members of the LGBTQ+ community are denied international protection and asylum. It is argued that they would not attract attention in their home country if they would not come out in their home country. They are expected to protect themselves in their hostile country by not living out their identity in public, perhaps for their entire life. Besides this, LGBTQ+ members who are not discrete about their sexual orientation in their hostile country of origin are accused of not having a well-founded fear of persecution. It is then suggested the asylum seeker moves to a different area within the hostile country of origin.

Additionally, asylum seekers who have only just begun to openly live out their LGBTQ+ identity in a third country can be rejected on account of several other reasons. They can be accused of lying about their sexual orientation, pretending to be LGBTQ+ to receive international protection. As mentioned previously in this chapter, if the asylum seeker has not come out of the closet in the home country of origin, they supposedly do not face any threat because of their sexual orientation. Furthermore, the question is posed whether the LGBTQ+ member was ‘voluntarily’ discreet or in the closet in the

home country based on characteristic tendencies or because of pressure by the hostile society to be discreet. (220)

Within the discretion reasoning, the argument of visibility of a specific social group is used. Some courts argue that a specific social group is recognizable through common characteristics of the members of that group, even though UNHCR argues that it is not mandatory to be cohesive (2002). This leads to the denial of asylum for LGBTQ+ members, who cannot be recognized as members of this social group. This argument states that if the person was able to conceal its membership of a certain social group in their home country in the past, it can conceal it again upon return. The social visibility argument can be more harmful towards certain LGBTQ+ subgroups such as lesbians or bisexuals since they have a lower visibility rate than for example gay men. The UNHCR Guidelines on Refugee Protection explain this:

“Stigma attached to issues surrounding sexual orientation and/or gender identity also contributes to incidents going unreported. Information can be especially scarce for certain groups, in particular bisexual, lesbian, transgender and intersex people. It is critical to avoid automatically drawing conclusions based on information about one group or another; however, it may serve as an indication of the applicant’s situation in certain circumstances” (UNHCR, 2012, p.17).

Many discussions have taken place on the discretion reasoning. New Zealand, Australia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland and Norway have abolished the discretion reasoning within their laws because of its ambiguity1. For example, in New Zealand the Refugee Status Appeals Authority stated:

“By requiring the refugee applicant to abandon a core right the refugee decision maker is requiring of the refugee claimant the same submissive and compliant behaviour, the same denial of a fundamental human right, which the agent of persecution in the country of origin seeks to achieve by persecutory conduct” (Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, 2004, p.48).

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) agrees:

“There is no duty to be discreet or to take certain steps to avoid persecution, such as living a life of isolation, or refraining from having intimate relationships” (UNHCR, 2008, p.13).

2.2.2. Argument of Criminalisation

Furthermore, the argument of criminalisation forms a second obstacle to the asylum application of LGBTQ+ members. The Refugee Convention of 1951 reasons that if a certain sexual orientation is being criminalised in the country of origin, this can be ground to apply for asylum. There are still more than 70 countries that criminalise same-sex acts between two consenting adults. Several of these countries do not mention lesbian sex or transgender identity in their law, but they do criminalise them in practice. It occurs frequently that an LGBTQ+ member is being criminalised in the country of origin and yet does not get granted asylum (Jansen, S. & Spijkerboer, T. 2011). The reasoning entails that the asylum seeker needs to provide proof of this criminalisation or enforcement. If the LGBTQ+ member is not able to provide evidence, he/she/they is not recognized as refugee based on criminalisation of sexual orientation. The LGBTQ+ member thus has to proof enforcement of the authority in their country of origin. This is problematic for several reasons. The mere law that a same-sex sexual act criminalises should suffice as a valid fear of persecution. Next to this, it is hard to proof one is being persecuted because of their sexual orientation: the authority in question can cover their reasons. An individual is defenceless against the official authority of the country of origin. It is important to note that one can also be persecuted by non-state entities with power in the country of origin. The Guidance Note of the UNHCR discredits the need to proof persecution and enforcement in criminalising countries:

“The very existence of such laws, irrespective of whether they are enforced, may have far- reaching effects on LGBT persons’ enjoyment of fundamental human rights” (UNHCR, 2008, p.10)

2.2.3. Argument of Credibility

Lastly, the credibility argument is used against LGBTQ+ asylum applicants. I briefly touched upon this within the discretion reasoning, but it is used separately as well. The main (and often only) evidence of an LGBTQ+ asylum case is the statement of the asylum seeker. The assessor has to decide whether or not the statement of the asylum seeker is credible. The evaluation is delicate, because of the lack of actual facts.

The UNCHR Guidelines on Refugee Protection N. 9 of 2012 specify:

“The applicant’s own testimony is the primary and often the only source of evidence, especially where persecution is at the hands of family members or the community. Where

there is a lack of country of origin information, the decision maker will have to rely on the applicant’s statements alone. Normally, an interview should suffice to bring the applicant’s story to light. Applicants should never be expected or asked to bring in documentary or photographic evidence of intimate acts. It would also be inappropriate to expect a couple to be physically demonstrative at an interview as a way to establish their sexual orientation” (UNHCR, 2012, p.17).

It is expected that LGBTQ+ members behave and conform to stereotypes of their social group, their sexual orientation. This is based upon stereotypical characteristics derived from Western ideas what a specific sexual orientation looks like. For instance, a lesbian is often expected to behave more masculine or ‘butch’ and a gay man is often expected to behave more feminine or ‘flamboyant’ because of stereotypical images. Certain specific symbols, icons, and idols of the LGBTQ+ community are well known in Western countries because they originate from these Western countries. The rainbow flag is an example of a well-known symbol for the LGBTQ+ community, but might not mean anything specific in the country of origin where sexual orientation is criminalised. This argument is thus nonsensical. If the LGBTQ+ asylum seeker has lived in a country where it is criminalised, the asylum seeker might not have bought books on LGBTQ+ history, hung out a rainbow flag and acted according to Western stereotypes. Furthermore, previous heterosexual relationships, children, marriage and others do not indicate of a person is LGBTQ+ or not. The discovery of one’s sexual orientation can happen later in life. Additionally, several countries in the research of Sabine Jansen and Thomas Spijkerboer use medical examination, witness statements, specific questioning methods and timing of filing the request to assess one’s credibility (2011).

It is often reasoned that asylum seekers pretend to be LGBTQ+ during their asylum application to receive refugee status. This way, it reasoned that being part of a sexual minority is being exploited in asylum applications. The credibility assessment only focuses on a stereotypical embodiment of a sexual minority. The LGBTQ+ asylum seeker is expected to have gone through fixed steps of denial, shame, self-discovery and so forth as would a stereotypical LGBTQ+ member go through. Plenty of LGBTQ+ members have not experienced these fixed steps, since the discovery of one’s identity is personal. It is of great importance to recognize that a sexual minority group is not a homogeneous mass (Spijkerboer, T., 2013) (Biekša, L., 2011).

2.3. CONCLUSION

In the research of Thomas Spijkerboer and Sabine Jansen (2011) we discover that there is still a lot of ambiguity within the assessment process of an LGBTQ+ asylum application. The most common obstacles have been discussed in this chapter. For more detailed information, I recommend the full report of Jansen and Spijkerboer (2011). Though there are plenty of hurdles, the UNHCR Guidance Note of 2008 and the UNHCR Guideline of 2012 provide clear instructions and advice.

3. Asylum policy in Israel

The third chapter ‘Asylum Law in Israel’ analyses the laws that make up the foundation of Israel’s immigration and asylum policy. Since Israel has no domestic asylum law, it bases its policy on four domestic laws, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and its Protocol of 1967. Next to the basis of the legal framework, this chapter analyses recent developments of refugees and migrants in Israel.

3.1. FOUNDATION OF ISRAEL’S IMMIGRATION LAW AND ASYLUM POLICY

Since Israel declared its independence on the 14th of May 1948, it has put itself at the forefront as provider of a place for refuge for survivors of the Holocaust. This forms the base for Israel’s immigration policy: it focuses on Jewish refugees and migrants. The foundation of Israel’s immigration policy constitutes on four basic laws: the ‘Law of Return’ (1950), the ‘Law of Entry’ (1952), the ‘Nationality Law’ (1952) and the ‘Prevention of Infiltration Law’ (1954). In absence of a specific law that regulates refugee status, Israel bases its refugee and asylum policy on these four laws, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and its Protocol of 1967 (Avigal, N. & Zuker, G., 2020).

The ‘Law of Return’ states that every person with at least one Jewish grandparent is allowed to come to Israel. This law does not mention non-Jewish people. The Law of Return is the basis of Israel’s immigration law. This law states “every Jew has the right to come to this country as an oleh” (No. 5710-1950, The Law of Return, 1950). With this law, Israel aims to protect its Jewish majority. Israel defines itself in this manner as an aaliyah state, a state of Jewish return. The Law of Return thus gives the right to immigrate for Jewish people, though not to gain immediate citizenship. In 1970 the Israeli Supreme Court decided that the Law of Return includes a broad spectrum of Jews and their relatives. Because of this wide definition, many people who are not actually Jewish immigrated to Israel in the 1990s, mostly originating from the Soviet Union. Because of family links, they were seen as Jewish. This large number offered a counterbalance to a Palestinian minority, who are denied the right of return by Israel. The Law of Return thus results in the prohibition of return of non-Jews to Israel, such as Palestinians. Every non-Jewish person falls under the Law of Entry (Kritzman-Amir, T., 2009).

The ‘Law of Entry’ regulates the entry of non-nationals and people who are not oleh (1952). More specifically, this law regulates how to acquire a visa for Israel and entails criteria for deportation for

non-nationals. Most non-Jewish people who enter Israel can only make use of a temporary worker visa and cannot make use of the Israeli welfare system.

The Nationality Law’ (1953) regulates the ‘return’ of Jewish people to Israel, who want to acquire the Israeli nationality based on return, residence, birth and naturalization. A Jewish person can thus go to Israel, apply for an oleh certificate and in this way make the aaliyah, the return to Israel. This falls under the Law of Return (1950). When this person has acquired an oleh certificate, they can apply for the Israeli nationality (Yaron, H. et al., 2013). Jews making the aaliyah and applying for citizenship receive immediate inclusion and are able to enjoy the welfare system to the fullest. Non-Jewish people can receive limited rights, though they can lose this immediately based on the smallest change or inconsistency, regulated by the Law of Entry. (Kritzman-Amir, T., 2009)

The fourth law that makes up the foundation of the Israeli immigration system is the ‘Prevention of Infiltration Law’ (1954). This law defines armed and non-armed ‘infiltrators’ originating from hostile countries. This law enables the state to deport these subjects without trial or conviction. It is mainly meant to keep Palestinians and their allies out of Israel and it would prevent terrorism.

From 2008 the Israeli government under Prime Minister Ehud Olmert tried to add a third amendment to the Prevention of Infiltration Law of 1954. The third amendment stated that asylum seekers could be held under administrative detention. Administrative detention meant that they could be detained without a trial or indictment. This attempt was continued under the government of Netanyahu. In July 2012 this law was passed. Eritreans could be detained up to three years without a trial. Other asylum seekers from enemy states such as Sudan could be detained indefinitely. When the expansion of prisons was completed in June 2012 the government started to put the third amendment into practice. Several human rights NGOs opposed the third amendment. Eventually, the third amendment to the Prevention of Infiltration Law of 2012 was cancelled. The High Court of Justice ruled that indefinite detainment is not proportionate to liberty and safety. The High Court of Justice thus ordered to release all detainees within 90 days. The government did not accept this ruling. It tried to pass a law that sidestepped the High Court of Justice. Petitioners went to the High Court to accuse the State. Immigration authority started releasing detainees, but not all of them. Out of 1.750 detainees, approximately 800 detainees were released before the 10th of December 2014. On this date, the state passed a fourth amendment to the Prevention of Infiltration Law.

The fourth amendment entailed that Israel is allowed to detain asylum seekers that had not been released yet by the 10th of December 2014. Next to this, it stated that asylum seekers entering Israel after this date have to be detained. This fourth amendment is a violation of the High Court’s ruling to

release all detainees within 90 days. In practice, this meant new asylum seekers could be detained without a trial up to one year in Saharonim prison near the border of Egypt. After this detention period, they are transferred to a semi-open detention camp for an indefinite period. The indefinite period ends when they ‘agree’ to be deported back to their country of origin. Asylum seekers that already resided in Israel with a conditional release visa can be detained in the new semi-open detention prison Holot across from Saharonim prison. This semi-open detention prison supposedly allows asylum-seekers to leave during the day. The reality is that asylum seekers have to register three times a day so leaving is not easy.

As with the third amendment, the fourth amendment was fought by NGOs and dismissed by the High Court of Justice. The Court imposed a 90-day period wherein the state had to adjust this law according to Israel’s Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. If the state would not modify the law within this period of time, it would have to shut down Holot immediately and release all detainees. The state changed the period of detention to three months in Holot without trial for asylum seekers coming into Israel after the amendment was passed. After these three months, they are transferred to Saharonim for twenty months. Most of the asylum seekers affected by this amendment are asylum seekers that have been in Israel for five years and had to go to Holot to renew their conditional release permit.

The Prevention of Infiltration Law of 1954 and its adjustment throughout time discourage asylum seekers from crossing the border of Israel. The ambiguity of the asylum system, the long detention periods, the uncertainty of one’s future all might motivate asylum seekers to go elsewhere or leave ‘voluntarily’ back to their country of origin. The pressure to ‘voluntary’ leave has proven effective: since 2013, over 9000 asylum seekers have left Israel to go to Europe, North America or Rwanda or Uganda. Rwanda and Uganda made a deal to receive aid from Israel in exchange for hosting Israel’s ‘infiltrators’ (Sabar, G. & Tsurkov, E., 2015). In 2017 Israel introduced the Deposit Law. This law forced asylum seekers to put 20% of their salary into a deposit. They could only reclaim their money if they decide to leave Israel (Avigal, N. & Zuker, G., 2020). In April of 2020, the High Court of Justice ruled that the Deposit Law of Israel is illegal. The HCJ ordered the state to return the money retrieved from asylum seekers within 30 days. This amount of money is the total of 1/5th of the salary of approximately 36.000 asylum seekers. (Yaron, L., 2020)

These four laws make up Israel’s immigration and citizenship policy. This policy is derived from the principle of state sovereignty. A state can decide whom to include and exclude when it comes to immigration law. A state can decide this based on self-interest. To the contrary, asylum law or

refugee law is determined by international legal obligations. The Refugee Convention is intended for states to commit to the protection of refugees, who are different from immigrants. When a state is part of the Refugee Convention, such as Israel, it is morally obliged to include refugees, provide them with protection and grant them social and economic rights. As previously mentioned in chapter 3, Israel was an active participant in the drafting of the Refugee Convention. This moral commitment made toward refugees in 1951 and the idea that Israel can identify with victims of persecution, may lead one to think Israel’s asylum system is of a high standard. Even though Israel has signed the Refugee Convention in 1951 and ratified it in 1954, it was never included in domestic law. This means the Refugee Convention is not legally binding in Israel. As a result, an individual is not able to go to a domestic court with claims based on the Convention. (Kritzman-Amir, T., 2009)

3.2. REFUGEE STATUS DETERMINATION PROCESS

To determine if someone is eligible for protection according to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, one has to go through the Refugee Status Determination Process (RSDP).

From the 1950s up until 2001, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) handled asylum requests in Israel (Cue, E., 2002). The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) handled requests of Palestinians up until 2001. After 2001, an intra-ministerial committee took over part of the asylum application process, which decreased the impact and involvement of the UNHCR in interviews and recommendations. UNHCR and the Ministry of Interior shared responsibility. This system was used from 2001 until 2009. On July 1st 2009 the Ministry of Interior took full responsibility of the asylum application process.

On the 1st of July 2009, a Refugee Status Determination Unit was installed to make recommendations to the Ministry of Interior on each asylum case. Every person entering Israel legally or illegally can apply for asylum within one year of entry, according to Israel’s policy (Government Israel, 2020). For an individual request, an asylum seeker has to fill out an application form. In the past, an asylum seeker could only file an application in person at the RSD office in Salame Street, Tel Aviv. Long lines prevented many asylum seekers from applying. Currently, an asylum seeker can apply in the RSD office in Tel Aviv (for Ukrainians and Georgians), or Bnei Brak or via an online form. Since the form is extensive and complicated, most asylum seekers seek out help from NGOs, attorneys or aid organizations. (Avigal, N. & Zuker, G., 2020)

The RSD Unit decides whether to reject the request or transfer it to the Advisory Committee for Refugees. After recommendations, the Minister of Interior makes the final decision. Israel’s Population and Immigration Authority (PIA) issued the Procedure for Handling Political Asylum Seekers in Israel (PHPAS) on February 1st, 2011. In this procedure report, the PIA states that the processes follow the authority of the Ministry of Interior and the Law of Entry (1952), except with regard to deportation. This means that the deportation authority is in charge of ‘removing’ people from Israel and the Ministry is not. Supposedly, the Ministry of Interior cannot expel applicants before a final decision has been made on their application. It is important to note that the RSD Unit falls under the authority of Directorate of Enforcement and Foreigners, which is responsible for detainment and deportation of foreigners. Other units of the Immigration Authority, such as applications for legal recognition because of marriage, do not. (Avigal, N. & Zuker, G., 2020)

The Ministry of Interior has employed RSD officials who are specialised in asylum applications. According to Israel’s PIA the RSD officials are professionally trained by international experts (Library of Congress, 2016). However, Israel’s RSD officials allegedly use questionable interviewing tactics. The RSDP officials of the Ministry of Interior have been accused of working in reversed logic. By practising verbal abuse, they attempt to detect people who are not refugees, so they can deport them. Asylum applicants are rejected based on the smallest inconsistency without a double-check (Sabar, G. & Tsurkov, E. (2015). Long hours of interviewing, small details and translation issues are used against the application in their credibility assessment. For example, a gay asylum seeker from Morocco got his application rejection because Morocco is deemed to be safe for LGBTQ+. The RSDP officials based the information on the fact that they had found a pro-LGBTQ+ website from Morocco and the fact that Elton John, who is openly gay, had once performed in Morocco. (Berman, Y., 2012)

3.3. NON-REMOVAL POLICY AND GROUP PROTECTION

Israel also had a non-removal policy applying to certain countries. The non-removal policy entails that a person from a certain country can apply for asylum, but even if he does not, he can’t be removed. This is a temporary measure applicable to different countries depending on current affairs. The non-removal policy is also known as group protection.

Group protection or non-removal policy seems like a reasonable measure but is an ambiguous and temporary measure. Some countries such as Ivory Coast and Liberia have received the label ‘countries in crisis’, resulting in formal temporary protection for these nationals. However, most countries are not recognized as ‘countries in crisis’, such as Eritrea and Myanmar. Up until 2012 Sudanese and Eritrean nationals were placed under group protection and could not file an individual request. Because they had been interviewed upon entry and received a document stating they received some sort of protection, they were under the assumption they filed an asylum claim (Avigal, N. & Zuker, G., 2020). They were excluded from asylum procedures in Israel because of the temporary group protection, so they risked being deported. The regulation about group protection changed in 2013: refugees under group protection were able to apply for an individual request. This change in policy was never clearly communicated though. Refugees were notified by NGOs, aid organizations, attorneys and word-of-mouth. Group protection for Eritrean and Sudanese nationals ended at the end of 2015. More Eritreans and Sudanese nationals filed an individual asylum request, but many of them were summarily rejected because of a ‘delay in filing’, stated in article 1(C) of the RSD Regulation.

There are no clear guidelines on when temporary protection measures can or will be terminated, which adds to the incertitude of group protection. The group protection system allows the country to handle large groups of asylum seekers instead of having to look at each individual separately. The only element that matters is the nationality of an asylum seeker within this system. Fear of persecution, personality and motives are made redundant. Viewing refugees as a mass of outsiders by just looking at their nationality, takes away the option to apply for refugee status based on a personal fear of persecution. It takes away the option to claim asylum based on sexual orientation for example. Besides falling under group protection, they are also often labelled as ‘work infiltrators’. Refugees cannot refute the accusation of being a ‘work infiltrator’, because they are not given an RSD process. (Kritzman-Amir, T., 2009)

3.4. RECOGNITION RATE

Exact figures for the recognition rate are scarce. Since Israel’s declaration of independence in 1948 until 2015, approximately 200 people received refugee status in Israel based on the Refugee Convention (1951).

Since 2006, over 13.000 refugees, asylum seekers and other migrants have passed the Sinai border from Egypt to Israel. The catalyst for this wave was the killing of 27 Sudanese refugees during a sit-in in the Mustafa Mahmoud Park in Cairo on the 29th of December 2005. Sudanese refugees were protesting the suspension of the RSDP by the UNHCR in Egypt (IRIN News, 2006). After this incident, approximately 1000 Sudanese refugees fled Egypt. The majority of the 13.000 refugees crossed the Sinai border since 2007 (Human Rights Watch, 2008). When the first wave of African asylum seekers crossed the border of Israel in 2006, they were detained without a trial for almost a year. The detained asylum seekers mostly originated from Sudan and thus supposedly formed a threat to the Israeli state, coming from an enemy state. Israel wished to return these asylum seekers across the border of Egypt, but this was never realized since a deal with Egypt did not happen. A detention facility Saharonim was set up near the border of Egypt due to the increasing number of asylum- seekers crossing this border. Detention periods for asylum-seekers decreased from a year in 2006 to several weeks in 2008 because of lack of space and legal efforts of Israeli NGOs. As inconsistent detention periods are for asylum seekers, as is the type of status they receive once their case is assessed and approved. Before 2013, Eritreans and Sudanese nationals were not allowed to file a request, because of the Prevention of Infiltration Law. Since 2013 Eritreans and Sudanese nationals are allowed to file an individual request, but the recognition rate has not increased. The Ministry of Interior only examined 45 out of 3.165 Sudanese cases and rejected all of them up until 2015. In 2017 the recognition rate for Sudanese and Eritrean nationals was a scarce 1%. In a report on Eritrean and Sudanese nationals in Israel from 2017, UNHCR states that “lack of formal recognition of refugee status of persons defined as ‘infiltrators’ is linked to short coming in the asylum procedure” (UNHCR, 2017).

From 2009, when asylum applications were taken over by the Ministry of Interior, until 2017, 52 refugees were recognised out of 10.836 decisions made according to the State Comptroller’s Office. Based on this data, the recognition rate from 2009 to 2017 comes down to 0,48%. (Berman, Y., 2018)

A report published by HIAS in April of 2020 stated that the recognition rate currently is 0,06% in Israel. This percentage is based on the total of asylum requests between 2011 and 2019. This data was gathered by the Refugee Rights Clinic at Tel Aviv University, Amnesty International-Israel and

HIAS.2 HIAS states that several sources they’ve received from the Ministry of Interior contain inconsistencies, such as different final numbers coming from the same statistic. Only numbers reoccurring in several documents are thus being used. The Immigration Authority has given little information to enhance completeness of statistics of this report. (Avigal, N. & Zuker, G., 2020)

If compared to recognition rates of other countries, it is clear Israel’s recognition rate is very low. For example, in 2011 Greece had to account for its recognition rate of 1% to the European Court of Human Rights. Hotline for Refugees and Migrants composed statistics of UNHCR Yearbook of 2016 (UNHCR, 2018) of OECD countries to visualise the comparison, since Israel belongs to OECD (See Annex I for statistics of Berman, Y., 2018, p 10-12).

This data shows that Israel’s recognition rate is noticeably lower than most countries in this list. The percentage of recognition rate in Japan, Hungary and Poland come close to Israel’s recognition rate. To illustrate further, Canada had the highest percentage of recognized refugees with 62,17%, but there were no figures on people granted complementary protection. Belgium had a recognition rate of refugees of 40,55% when published. Of all applicants for complementary protection in Belgium, 10,73% were approved.

3.5. SUMMARILY REJECTION

Up until April of 2020, a total of 73.889 asylum applications have been filed to the RSD Unit of Israel. 42% of the asylum requests are summarily rejected by the RSD Unit. UNHCR advises that summary rejections are only advisory when the asylum claim is clearly unfounded and fraudulent (UNHCR, 2019). Courts in Israel have also stated that summarily rejections are dangerous since it can endanger the life of an asylum seeker because of deportation. (Avigal, N. & Zuker, G., 2020)

The RSD Unit has three different grounds for rejection. The first reason to reject an asylum application is based on the timeline of application. As mentioned before, one can apply for asylum within one year of entry into Israel. This ruling is stated in article 1(C) of the RSD Regulation. A ‘delay in filing’ can endanger the credibility of ones claims or can indicate false claim to prolong ones stay.3

2 The Refugee Rights Clinic at Tel Aviv University, Amnesty International-Israel and HIAS filed information requests at the Ministery of Interior over several years. 3 More information on limiting the time for LGBTQ+ asylum application to one year: Neilson and Morris, The Gay Bar: The effects of the one-year filing dead-line on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and HIV-positive foreign nationals seeking asylum or withholding of removal, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV 233 (2005).

Article 1(C) of the RSD Regulation was applied to Eritrean and Sudanese asylum seekers, as mentioned previously in this chapter. The majority had been in Israel for longer than one year. This first article can be applied before the first identification interview.

Secondly, the RSD Unit can reject an asylum application summarily based on the lack of credibility of one’s identity. Article 3(A)1 states that the applicant has to have ‘reasonable proof’. The identity is determined in a first identification interview. This interview precedes a short basic interview to determine asylum reasoning. The need for proof is troubling for a couple of reasons. A person fleeing their country of origin because of (fear of) persecution might leave identity documents behind. A person fleeing their country can lose identity document during their journey. An illiterate person can have problems with explaining one’s origin. Asylum seekers originating border regions can have a different mother tongue than that of the country of origin.

If one passes the identification process, the asylum applicant has to undergo a short interview where the basic claim for asylum is examined. The asylum applicant has to prove that his or her asylum claim is based on the Refugee Convention of 1951, signed and ratified by Israel (UNHCR, 2010). Article 4(A) of the RSD Regulation allows rejecting an application if the grounds of the asylum claim do not align with the Refugee Convention. Besides these three incentives for rejection, an asylum claim can also be prematurely rejected because of lack of cooperation, departure or the opening of a different process (Avigal, N. & Zuker, G., 2020).

3.6. PALESTINIANS

Israel’s migration and asylum system is aimed at attracting Jewish people and restricting non-Jewish people, as described previously in this chapter. One of the four law’s forming the foundation of Israel’s migration and asylum system is the Prevention of Infiltration Law. This law, as explained earlier, discourages asylum seekers to come to Israel. It aims to exclude non-Jewish asylum seekers. It aims to exclude asylum seekers originating from enemy states. Enemy countries include Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Sudan. Next to these countries, Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank are seen as enemies of Israel. People who are not Jewish and fled Israel during the 1948 War are not eligible for citizenship. Though Israel committed to international law, it never put into practice the obligations towards stateless persons. Israel signed the 1961 Convention on Reduction of Statelessness on the 30th of August, 1961. However, it did not ratify the document (UNHCR, 1961).

Israel’s own Nationality Law outweighed the international commitments towards stateless persons. (Kritzman-Amir, T., 2009)

The main reason why these nationals would seek refuge in Israel is proximity. These refugees are often people nearby and see no other quick option. They fled their country and went to Israel as a ‘state enemy’, which should already indicate their well-founded fear in their home country. Israel does not process their asylum requests though. This is written down in Article 6 of the Israel asylum regulations.

The Refugee Convention of 1951 and its Protocols follow the principle of equality and the principle of non-refoulement, so in theory Palestinians fall under this ruling. But specific ruling for Palestinian asylum-seekers, though not all, are noted in article 1D of the Refugee Convention based on the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Refugees and the Near East (UNRWA). Palestinian refugees from Arab- Israeli wars fall under this separate mandate.

Article 1D of the Refugee Convention:

“This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.” (UNHCR, 2010, Article 1D, p.16)

Two reasons are at the foundation of this separation: the first reason being that there is no overlap possible between the UNHCR and UNRWA mandates. The second reason being that it ensures continuity for the protection of Palestine refugees. The continuity of protection insures that when a Palestinian refugee under the UNRWA mandate leaves the UNRWA operated areas, he/she will automatically fall under the Refugee Convention of 1951. UNHCR does state that such a refugee can be returned to the UNRWA area if it does not face a serious threat there. However, article 1D is not applicable to all Palestinian refugees. It only affects individuals who fall under the mandate of UNRWA. These are people who reside in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. The current definition, which has changed since 1951, is:

“[Palestine refugee] shall mean any person whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.” (UNHCR, 2010)

After the 1967 Six Day War, UNRWA also took on Palestinians who were displaced at that moment in time. This means that article 1D is only applicable to people and there family that were displaced in 1948 and in the 1967 war. These Palestinians cannot apply for asylum since they don’t fall under the

Refugee Convention of 1951. In April 2008, less than 30% of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip received support from UNRWA (Kagan, M. & Ben-Dor, A., 2008). Michael Kagan and Anat Ben-Dor illustrate the different interpretations of Article 1D regarding Palestinians. (See Annex II)

3.7. CONCLUSION

Chapter three reviewed the asylum policy and immigration law of Israel. Israel has no domestic asylum law so it bases its asylum policy on the domestic immigration laws, the UN Convention for Refugees of 1951 and its Protocol of 1967. Israel uses a different approach towards Palestinians. This overview is necessary to examine asylum claims based on fear of persecution because of sexual orientation or gender identity.

4. Homonationalism and Pinkwashing

When researching asylum applications based on sexual orientation and gender identity, the context of the asylum application has to be analysed. Within the context of Israel, the presence of ‘homonationalism’ and subsequently the notion of ‘pinkwashing’ are at the forefront. This chapter will carefully explain the lens through which sexual orientation and gender identity are viewed in Israel. First, I will research the notion of ‘homonationalism’, whereafter I research ‘pinkwashing’ to theorize and contextualize Israel’s relation to LGBTQ+. Scholars such as Jasbir Puar, Sarah Schulman and Jason Ritchie have delivered extensive works on these topics.

4.1. HOMONATIONALISM

Jasbir Puar was the first to introduce the term ‘homonationalism’ in 2007 in her book ‘Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times’. As professor and graduate’s director of the women’s and gender studies at Rutger University in the US she specializes in critical ethnic studies and queer theory among others. ‘Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times’ was largely considered the leading queer analysis after 9/11 and the War on Terror. Homonationalism is often described as a phenomenon of white supremacy or fascism that uses LGBTQ+ for its own ends, but this seems to be oversimplified. Homonationalism rather rejects the idea that the nationstate is always heteronormative and that the queer subject is always an outlaw within the nationstate. Homonationalism is depicted by Puar as an assemblage of political, economic and social forces that forms an organizing principle of global politics that shows “how ‘acceptance’ and ‘tolerance’ for gay and lesbian subjects have become a barometer by which the right to and capacity for sovereignity [of a nationstate] is evaluated” (Puar, J., 2013). Puar uses the example of the United States politics after 9/11: members of the LGBTQ+ are promised citizenship in exchange for participation in the nationstate, such as participating in homeland defense and the military service. In this way the U.S. as a western nationstate seems modern and progressive because it seems capable of including all marginalized people. This assumption cannot be true though, because the cultural and legal citizenship of one group always seems to be at the expense of others, specifically racialized others (Puar, J., 2007). Jasbir Puar further explains this in her article ‘Rethinking Homonationalism’ of 2013:

“Homonationalism, thus, is not simply a synonym for gay racism, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries; it is not

another identity politics, not another way of distinguishing good queers from bad queers, not an accusation, and not a position. It is rather a facet of modernity and a historical shift marked by the entrance of (some) homosexual bodies as worthy of protection by nation- states [...] Part of the increased recourse to domestication and privatization of neoliberal economies and within queer communities, homonationalism is fundamentally a deep critique of lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses and how those rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to citizenship – cultural and legal – at the expense of the delimitation and expulsion of other populations.” (Puar, 2013, p.337)

In her 2017 postscript of the book ‘Terrorist Assemblages: homonationalism in queer times’, Puar writes about what homonationalism means under the Trump administration. She states:

“Rather, it is about use of such rights within modes of global governmentality as a marker of civilized status, and as a frame for understanding why and how “homophobia” and its liberal counterpart, tolerance, are used to laud populations with certain attributes at some moments and then vilify other (racialized) populations for these same attributes.” (Puar, 2017, p.224)

Homonationalism thus entails a form of inclusion as well as exclusion. By including LGBTQ+, a marginalized group, into mainstream society it grants citizenship to LGBTQ+, but at the same time excludes others. By adopting and conforming to the hegemonic ideology of the nationstate, LGBTQ+ members legitimize the actions of the nationstate. At the same time this creates exclusion of other parts of the LGBTQ+ community, such as LGBTQ+ of colour. By granting citizenship, the nation expands its boundaries and portrays itself as tolerant, liberal and progressive. Concurrently the nationstate creates an opposite ‘Other’ that is portrayed as intolerant, illiberal and conservative, which is then used to legitimize violent policies towards this ‘Other’. Homonationalism was first used in the context of the United States, but it is also applicable to Israel. Sarah Schulman researched homonationalism in the context of Israel with her book Israel/Palestine and the Queer International (2012). Schulman is an American activist, writer and historian, as well as a Distinguised Professor of the Humanities at College of Staten Island and a Fellow at the New York Institute of Humanities. Schulman explains:

“While homonationalism is a product of white culture and emerges unconsciously whenever gay people (and their admirers) assimilate into racist power structures, it is not deliberate government policy. However, nowhere has homonationalism been more consciously

harnessed by governments than in Israel, where the manoeuvring of gay rights to supporting racist agendas evolved strategically from marketing impulses.” (Schulman, 2012, p.135)

Within the context of the U.S. and its War on Terror as well as the context of Israel/Palestine, Tavia Nyong’o, an American cultural critic, historian and professor at Yale University, states in his foreword of the 10th anniversary edition of Puar’s book that there is a need to replace the image of a tolerant West which scapegoats and surveils brown bodies next to the image of an intolerant Islamic world who is against queers and women’s rights. (Puar, J., 2017)

4.2. THE PRACTICE OF ‘PINKWASHING’ BY ISRAEL

If we contextualize homonationalism in Israel/Palestine, we subsequently come to the practice of ‘pinkwashing’. The term ‘pinkwashing’ was first introduced in 1985 by Breast Cancer Action to unveil companies who claimed to support victims of breast cancer whilst actually profiting from the illness. The word ‘pinkwashing’ is in line with the act of ‘greenwashing’, where companies profile themselves as eco-friendly to make a bigger profit. In relation to Israel/Palestine, the term pinkwashing was first used by Ali Abunimah, the editor of Electronic Intifada. In 2010 he stated: “We won’t put up with Israel Whitewashing, Greenwashing or Pinkwashing.” Pinkwashing is a direct product of the Brand Israel Campaign. This campaign was introduced by the Israeli Foreign Ministry in 2006. Pinkwashing is often perceived as a tool to avert the attention from Israel as an imperial aggressor. East West Communications gathered a global perception score based on how a country is described in major media. Israel has always been ranked at the bottom out of 200 analyzed nations, which it set out to improve. The Brand Israel Campaign aims at global cities in the western world, such as New York, Toronto and Londen and sponsors several cultural and social events, such as film festivals. A big part of this campaign was thus to promote Israel as gay friendly, as Stand With US, a self-declared Zionist organisation, said in The Jerusalem Post. The effects of the Brand Israel Campaign in terms of ‘pinkwashing’ and ‘gay friendliness’ are visible through the World Pride 2006 that was hosted in Jerusalem, as well as ‘Out in Israel’ that was organised in San Francisco. As Sarah Schulman described it accurately in ‘Israel/Palestine and the Queer International’ Brand Israel is “a well-funded and highly orchestrated marketing campaign to sell Israel to tourists and cultural consumers”. It is a means of the Israeli government to promote itself as a “modern, liberal society with open values while whitewashing its human rights violations and dual citizenship systems” (Schulman, S., 2012, p.23-24). In this way, Palestinians are unwillingly rebranded as well, and this as ‘gay unfriendly’. (Puar, J., 2011)

There are two aspects to ‘pinkwashing’, the first one being that Israel uses LGBTQ+ rights to promote itself to the outside world, namely to western countries to try to create allies such as the United States. This is the idea behind the Brand Israel Campaign, but the promotion of gay rights does not necessarily mean it really does support gay rights to the fullest. Second, by using LGBTQ+ rights and putting these to the forefront Israel tries to delegitimize Palestinians, meaning that Palestinian society is portrayed as anti-LGBTQ+. Moreover, Palestinians are framed as the opposite of Israel, supposedly being barbaric, homophobic, uncivilised, suicide-bombing fanatics (Puar, J., 2010). Hence ‘pinkwashing’ is a potent method to overshadow the occupation of Palestinians, as well as to validate physical and structural violence against Palestinians.

Within the discourse of pinkwashing, LGBTQ+ rights are used for political objectives. The narrative of love and tolerance is transformed into a political narrative in the context of Israel. This is clearly illustrated within the aftermath of a hate crime in Tel Aviv on August 1, 2009. Two teenagers were shot dead and several others were injured by a gunman in the Tel Aviv Gay Center. (Haaretz, 2009) A lot of high officials condemned this hate crime along with other incidents against sexual minorities, hijacking the attention to promote their own agenda. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited the crime scene and made a vow to fight homophobia, stating that Israel is “a country of tolerance” and murder is “anti-Israeli”. Former minister of culture and sports Tsipi Livni proclaimed that the hate crime “does not reflect Israeli society”. Shimon Peres, Israel’s president at the time, declared that “Israel will never accept such violence and will not rest until the murderer is brought to justice (Hochberg, G.Z., 2010, p.493)”. The backing of the most powerful people of Israel meant a feeling of a united and inclusive Israel fighting for the LGBTQ+ rights and against hate and bigotry. Next to this uniting national feeling, Ha’Aguda, Israel’s LGBT Task Force, rejected the request of former Israeli Palestinian Knesset member Issam Makhol to speak at the memorial ceremony. Ha’Aguda defended its decision:

“We didn’t want [him] to make any connection between our memorial ceremony and the occupation. Our event was dedicated to the memory of two young people whose death was brought about due to sexual preferences, and this has nothing to do with [things like] the occupation.” (Hochberg, G.Z., 2010, p.495)

The hate crime of 2009 happened at the Tel Aviv Gay Center, which is sponsored by the municipality, again (illustrating) the sexual politics of Israel. The center is promoted as a safe haven for LGBTQ+, but is financed by heteronormative Israeli Jews, which influences the inclusiveness and overall atmosphere of the center. By financing Tel Aviv’s LGBTQ+ community, “the Israeli government was

investing in something other than equality”, as Sarah Schulman wrote (2012, p.23-24). Another example of the politization of LGBTQ+ inclusion is the change of route of the Jerusalem Pride. After the deadly shooting in 2009, the Jerusalem pride parade was relocated from the city center to the Rose Garden next to the Knesset as a political statement. In 2012 it took on its previous route, but it changed again in 2013 passing the Knesset. (Hartal, G.,2016) Besides the Jerusalem pride parade, the Tel Aviv pride parade of the past several years have been financed by the municipality. During the municipal parades in Israel’s ‘gay capital’, rainbow flags with a Star of David are distributed and carried through the city. The successes of the Brand Israel campaign and the homonational efforts of Israel are visible through the presence of LGBTQ+ sections in all of the most central political parties, such as Likud. Another marker for success is the 2012 hacking of the Tel Aviv Gay Center’s website by the Al-Qaeda hacktivists; it shows the importance of the LGBTQ+ presence. (Hartal, G., & Sasson- Levy, O., 2017)

The division between sexual discrimination and other forms of discrimination, such as social and ethnic discrimination, comes across as artificial, creating some sort of national amnesia, in the words of Gil Z. Hochberg (2010, p. 496). There is no denying that there is a relationship between the oppression of sexual minorities and the oppression of other social minorities, illustrated in the sexual politics and pinkwashing practices of Israel. But the diasporic production of pinkwashing has evolved into a much too simplistic analogy of being against the Israeli oppression and violence towards Palestinians while also being against Palestinian sexual oppression. These two types of oppression are put side to side, as if these can be seen on the same level of gravity. Puar compares this to the idea of liberal thinkers that colonial oppression is equivocal to sexual oppression. (Puar, J., 2011) This misleading alignment can be illustrated with the following example: in 2008 Teachers Against Occupation wrote and signed a letter to the United States condemning the Gaza invasion of January 2008. In that same year, people who signed the letter were asked to sign another letter condemning homophobia and oppression against women in Palestine, the Middle East and North Africa. Worth noticing is the fact that these regions are targeted based on Islam being framed as homophobic and misogynistic, though not all of these regions are defined by the Islamic religion. (Puar, J., 2010)

4.3. CONCLUSION

By defining the notion of homonationalism and the practice of pinkwashing and contextualizing these terms in relation to Israel/Palestine, I have created a theoretical framework to build upon in the next chapters. LGBTQ+ rights and other human rights, specifically Palestinian rights, cannot be separated.

Israeli law professor and activist Aeyael Gross argued that all claims to any sort of right that do not take Palestinian occupation in consideration, are homonationalist. (Gross, A., 2015) Even though we zoomed out to look at large theoretical frameworks, it is important to note that this tells us very little about the everyday lives of queer people in Israel, and even less about the actual experiences of queer Palestinians. (Ritchie, J., 2015) For a more information on homonationalism and pinkwashing, I recommend Jason Ritchie’s ‘Pinkwashing, Homonationalism, and Israel-Palestine: the conceits of Queer Theory and the Politics of the Ordinary’.

In chapter five I research what it means to be LGBTQ+ in Israel and how exactly pinkwashing was put into practice throughout Israeli history.

5. LGBTQ+ in Israel

Israel is very proud of its achievements concerning LGBTQ+ rights since it has gone through several changes in law and society in a relative short period of time. In this chapter I discuss the improvements Israel has made for the LGBTQ+ community.

5.1. START OF LGBTQ+ VISIBILITY

When the Jewish state of Israel was established in 1948, the legal and social status of LGBTQ+ members was non-existent. Universally homosexuality was seen as socially deviant. Since Palestine inherited the legal code of the British mandate, the State of Israel inherited the Buggery Act of 1933 that criminalised homosexuality. It was legally prohibited to have same-sex relations and to perform same-sex acts, even in private between two consenting adults. In the 1950’s Israel’s Attorney General stated that if this happened between two adults in private, the law would not be enforced. Though it was never legally enforced, the possible risk of persecution and social consequences caused humiliation and carefulness among LGBTQ+ members. (Kama, A., 2011) Officially the law only applied to homosexual men and male-to-male intercourse, as it did not mention lesbians, sexual relations between women or any other kind of non-heterosexual relations. (Frankfort-Nachmias, C., & Shadmi, E., 2004)

Outside of the legal context, the first official public outing of the LGBTQ+ community was the creation of the National Association of LGBT rights in Israel, HaAguda (‘association’) in Tel Aviv in 1975. This small group of gay men started organizing social gatherings for the LGBTQ+ community. What first aimed to bring LGBTQ+ members together and create a safe space, later also developed a political objective called Otzma (‘power’). In 1978 the first lesbian-feminist organization of Israel was founded in Beer Sheva called ALEF. (Hartal, G., & Sasson-Levy, O., 2017) The organization hosted parties and lectures. (A Wider Bridge, 2019) When the Aguda tried to organize an international LGBT conference in 1979, it was not able to find a space due to kosher regulations. Out of protest, the members gathered together at the City Hall Square in Tel Aviv to protest. For the first time, LGBTQ+ members openly fought for equality and recognition. (Kama, A., 2011)

5.2. START OF THE LEGAL RECOGNITION

During the 1970’s several attempts were made in the Knesset to abolish the anti-sodomy law without any result. Orthodox Parties pressured the Israeli parliament to reject the proposal. Nevertheless, on the 22 of March 1988 the Knesset officially repealed the anti-sodomy law that prohibited consensual same-sex acts. When the Knesset decided to amend the anti-sodomy law, the religious and conservative sectors of Israel still did not agree. From their point of view, same-sex relations were unnatural and posed a threat to the ‘natural’ and pristine Sabra, the so-called Jewish native of Israel. (Kama, A., 2011) The law encouraged reproduction of Jews, preventing the extinction of the Jewish- Israeli people. (Stelder, M., 2018) The Penal Code of 1988 legally recognizes consensual same-sex relations (though still male-centred). The new law was put into effect in a discrete manner to not stir up public debate and insult the religious and conservatives. During that same year, the Haifa court ruled that a same-sex couple could get the same rights regarding splitting mutual belongings after a split as a heterosexual couple. (Frankfort-Nachmias, C., & Shadmi, E., 2004)

Several gains were made by and for the LGBTQ+ community during the 1990’s, especially after a shift in the political landscape in 1992. Known as ‘Israel’s gay decade’, several legal and social steps were taken. (Puar, J., 2011) In 1992 Otzma, the political wing of HaAguda successfully lobbied for an addition to the Law of Equal Rights at the Workplace. From then on, it is prohibited to discriminate on the basis of ones sexual orientation in any aspect of ones employment. In 1993 discrimination based on sexual orientation in the Israel Defence Force was prohibited. It is important to note though that since 1996 the IDF does not mention this in the military codebook. In 1996 the first LGBT wing of a political party was founded, Ge’ut as part of the Meretz party. Ge’ut actively lobbied several LGBT candidates in the Knesset, the Tel Aviv city council and the Jerusalem city council. (Kama, A., 2011) During this decade plenty of new LGBT movements and organisations emerged, such as the Jerusalem Open House in 1997. (Jerusalem Open House, w.d.) Additionally, during ‘Israel’s gay decade’ the first Israeli pride event was held in Tel Aviv in 1998. It is important to note that not more than a year later, pride events organized by HaAguda were already partially sponsored by the municipality. (Hartal, G., & Sasson-Levy, O.,2017)

5.2.1 Children

After the 1990’s, the LGBTQ+ community’s fight for human rights evolved into a fight for equal family and marriage rights. Israel’s social ideal is focused on marriage and family, which is why the normative family model became an important objective. In the year 2000 the Israeli Supreme Court

acknowledged the right of Ruth and Nicole Brener-Kadish to be registered as mothers for each other’s children as a lesbian couple. Though the State contested the decision of the Court, it was reaffirmed in 2005. The Court accepted a broader interpretation of the 1981 Adoption of Children Law and thus ruled that it accepted the lesbian couple’s right to mutually adopt each other’s children. (Dotan, Y., 2015) Tal and Avital Yaros-Hakak were the first same-sex couple to actually adopt each other’s children in 2006. (Kama, A., 2011) In 2008 the Court ruled that same-sex couples were also allowed to adopt non-biological children. This meant that from 2008 on gay men were also allowed to adopt non-biological children. (Dotan, Y., 2015)

5.2.2. Marriage

As for marriage, it is not allowed for same-sex couples to marry in Israel because there is no civil marriage. The religious orthodox establishment controls marriage and divorce. (Hartal, G., & Sasson- Levy, O., 2018) In 2006 five same-sex couples were wedded in Toronto, where after they came back to Israel to get registered as married. The Ministry of Interior allowed their registration, which set a precedent for multiple other same-sex couples. The prohibition to legally wed as a same-sex couple in Israel complicates the inheritance laws. In 2004 the Nazareth Regional Court ruled that same-sex couples have the same right to full inheritance as heterosexual couples that have a domestic partnership. That same year, the Tel Aviv Family Court validated an official domestic partnership between two men, acknowledging the broader meaning of ‘family’. (Kama, A., 2011) As form of protest, a symbolic public marriage is organized during the Tel Aviv pride parade every year. (Hartal, G., & Sasson-Levy, O., 2018)

5.2.3. Social and Political Recognition In 2008 the municipality of Tel Aviv founded the Gay Centre, meaning it is sponsored and controlled by municipal leadership and not by LGBTQ+ organizations or social movements. The control of the physical space and decision making of the Centre in the Garden Meir is a clear example of the politicization of the LGBTQ+ community.

Even though the LGBTQ+ community gained legal recognition and visibility relatively quickly since 1988, hate crimes against the community did not end. In 2005 a man was stabbed during the Jerusalem Pride Parade. In 2009 two people were killed and 14 injured at the Bar-Noar (‘Youth Bar’) during a youth meeting of HaAguda in Tel Aviv. (Hartal, G., & Sasson-Levy, O., 2017) These incidents

have been an opportunity for Israeli politicians to show support and profile themselves as pro- LGBTQ+, modern and tolerant. By condemning these hate crimes, these representatives of the Jewish State aimed to raise sympathy and support (Gross, A., 2010) The tactics of pinkwashing thus misuse tragic events like these. The Brand Israel Campaign launched in 2006 by the Israeli Foreign Ministry adds to this practice. In 2010 a new campaign came to live, called ‘Tel Aviv Gay Vibe’. This online tourism campaign specifically aimed to attract European LGBTQ+ tourists to Tel Aviv. (A Wider Bridge, 2019) During the summer of 2012 about 25 000 gay tourists descended to the city, spending about 50 million dollar. This meant an increase of 20% from the previous summer, proving the effectiveness of this strategy in the context of pinkwashing. (Hartal, G., & Sasson-Levy, O., 2017)

Inside the Knesset, several parties have created an LGBT wing to gain support. Mainly leftist parties have a political lobby in the Knesset, such as Meretz and Shinui. (Dotan, Y., 2015) Between 2013 and 2019 the Israeli government did not include ultra-orthodox parties, which made legislation for LGBT rights, as well as sexual and gender equality less complicated. During previous governments these objectives were mostly achieved through court appeal. (Hartal, G., & Sasson-Levy, O., 2017)

5.3. CONCLUSION

This chapter aims to explain a concise summary of LGBTQ+ history in the Israeli State. Michael Oren, former Israeli ambassador to the US, stated in his speech at the Equality Forum in Philadelphia of 2012 that Israel has been fighting for gay rights even before the 1967. (Pinkwatching Israel, 2012) Aeyal Gross pointed out that not in the 1960s nor in the 1970s Israel fought for LGBTQ+ rights. (Gross, A., 2012) This chapter reveals that only during the 1980s and the 1990s the LGBTQ+ community gained visibility and equality through effective and recurrent activism. When only a small number of politicians stood by LGBTQ+ activists during these decades, now large sums of the Israeli capital are used to promote LGBTQ+ tourism in Tel Aviv, sponsor Pride Parades and subsidize LGBTQ+ spaces. The legal, judicial and societal gains of the LGBTQ+ in Israel are used as a showpiece for the outside world. Though Israeli politicians have appropriated LGBTQ+ rights, LGBTQ+ members are still legally discriminated against, for example with to prohibition to marry. Additionally, the discrepancy between the modern, tolerant pro-LGBTQ+ Israel and the Jewish traditional Israel makes for several interesting judicial precedents and cases. (Frankfort-Nachmias, C., & Shadmi, E., 2004)

6. LGBTQ+ asylum seekers in Israel

Chapter five about the LGBTQ+ community in Israel revealed the position LGBTQ+ members have in Israel as a Jewish citizen. LGBTQ+ citizens of Israel enjoy a broad spectrum of rights, though not as extensive as in some countries. The promotion of Israel as a safe haven for LGBTQ+ through pinkwashing is based on the rights LGBTQ+ citizens in Israel enjoy. This image paints a picture of the possible rights an LGBTQ+ refugee could enjoy when fleeing to Israel. This is reinforced by the practice of pinkwashing of Israel. This chapter researches whether LGBTQ+ asylum seekers are recognized in Israel as refugee. To depict a comprehensive view of LGBTQ+ asylum seekers in Israel, this chapter looks into the experience of Africans first. Nationals from Eritrea and Sudan form the biggest group of asylum seekers in Israel. Secondly, LGBTQ+ Palestinians are examined. Examining LGBTQ+ members originating from African countries, mostly Eritrea and Sudan, and Palestinian LGBTQ+ members, does not mean to exclude LGBTQ+ members from a different nationality.

6.1. AFRICAN LGBTQ+ ASYLUM APPLICATIONS

As mentioned in this dissertation, the majority of asylum seekers in Israel are Eritrean and Sudanese nationals. In Eritrea, homosexuality is punished with a prison sentence ranging from three to ten years. In Sudan, homosexuality is criminalised and is punishable with a prison sentence up to seven years. The abolishment of the death penalty and flogging in Sudan only happened in 2020. (Damshenas, S., 2020) Next to legal criminalisation in both countries, social harassment and violence occur against LGBTQ+ members.

Growing xenophobia of African asylum seekers creates hostility towards LGBTQ+ members originating from these countries. This xenophobia is fed by Israeli state propaganda and policy, creating a Jewish state against ‘others’. The ‘others’, African asylum seekers for example, face deportation. (Millo, Y., 2013) Israel has a recent history with deportation to third countries on the African continent. In 2013 Israel announced it had a deal with an unnamed African country to host asylum seekers in return for assistance in defence and agriculture. In 2014 the Israeli government once again announced a deal with two African countries that did not wanted to be named. During that same period, Israel was sending Eritrean and Sudanese nationals ‘voluntarily’ to Rwanda and Uganda on a regular basis. In January 2018 Israel changed its tactics. Prime Minister Netanyahu wrote a post on Facebook: “The government approved a plan today that will give every infiltrator two options: a flight ticket out, or jail.” The flight ticket out refers to a one-way airline ticket to

Uganda or Rwanda, together with $3.500 cash and no legal status or recognition in the receiving countries. Jail refers to indefinite detention. (Gidron, Y., 2018) Through media attention and protests, this plan of deportation received a lot of backlash nationally and internationally. One of the criticisms was the deportation of LGBTQ+ asylum seekers to countries where they might be persecuted by government and/or society. The Immigration and Border Authority rejected the request to add LGBTQ+ asylum seekers to the group that cannot be deported, such as women and children. In January of 2018, HIAS and Aguda – LGBT Task Force requested the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice to protect LGBTQ+ asylum seekers from deportation. They both rejected the request as well. The Ministry of Justice claimed that the existing system of a pre-deportation hearing, meaning a first short interview, “provides a suitable solution under the circumstances to the fears that have been raised”.

Yonatan Berman wrote a report about an asylum case of an African LGBTQ+ asylum seeker in 2016. Attorney Sara Shaul, who represented the Ministry of Interior on the panel, stated that “sexual orientation isn’t protected by the convention, and this is an unjustified expansion of the convention”, referring to the UN Refugee Convention. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees recommended that Israel recognize this African asylum seeker based on his sexual orientation and fear of persecution. Israel did not follow recommendations. (Yaron, L., 2018)

Only in recent years, the Ministry of Interior started recognizing the fear of persecution of LGBTQ+ members as a valid asylum claim. The Ministry of Interior even issued a legal opinion recognizing the persecution Eritreans could face because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Up until July of 2018, only two asylum seekers were recognized as refugees in Israel due to persecution for their LGBTQ+ status. In December of 2019 only four asylum seekers were recognized as refugees based on fear of persecution because of their LGBTQ+ identity. It is worth comparing the number of recognized LGBTQ+ refugees in Israel to the number of recognized Sudanese and Eritreans in Israel. In December 2019 these four recognized LGBTQ+ refugees are equal to a third of all recognized Eritreans and Sudanese refugees. (Avigal, N. & Marshall, S., 2019)

6.2. AMBIGUITY OF THE REFUGEE STATUS DETERMINATION PROCESS FOR LGBTQ+

Yiftach Millo of HIAS published a report in 2013 on the protection gaps facing sexual minority refugees and asylum seekers in Israel, among other areas. For his qualitative research, Millo interviewed a member of the Israeli RSD Unit. The RSD officer explained the methodology of

assessment of an asylum claim based on sexual orientation or gender identity. The RSD Unit looks for visible signs of one’s sexual orientation, according to the RSD officer. This method is problematic, since most LGBTQ+ refugees have hidden their sexual orientation or gender identity in their country of origin. The officer specifies that this requirement ranges from having a circle of LGBTQ+ friends to having same-sex relationships. The RSD Unit officer uses the argument of credibility defined by Spijkerboer (2013). This is a problematic method, since most LGBTQ+ refugees have always hidden their sexual orientation, in the country of origin. (Millo, Y., 2013)

Eyal Migdalovich wrote an article on July 9, 2018 on the experience of a female asylum seeker origination from Ghana. During her asylum application she was represented by Adv. Yadin Elam. The interview and conclusion illustrate the subjective working of the RSD Unit. The Ghanaian woman claimed she was persecuted in her country because she had a relationship with another woman. The RSD Unit recognized that the woman had had a relationship with a woman, as she had claimed. The RSD Unit did not however recognise that the Ghanaian asylum seeker was a lesbian, as she had claimed.

The RSD Unit determined this based on strange perceptions of sexual orientation and gender identity. The first reason the application was considered unfounded, was the fact that the asylum seeker mentioned she had a relationship with a man when she was younger that was also physical. Secondly, the Ghanaian woman did not spell out in words that she was physically or romantically attracted to women. Next to these two arguments, the conclusion stated that only after her break with the man, the asylum seeker started having relationships with women. The asylum seeker mentioned she had relationships with women because she wanted security. Next to these arguments, the RSD Unit was guilty of using the argument of credibilty. The Ghanaian asylum seeker did not seem ‘lesbian enough’, because she “displayed a lack of knowledge of terminology of the LGBT community”. The RSD Unit asked the woman how she came to the conclusion that she was a lesbian. The woman replied that she did not understand the question. The RSD Unit asked the woman when she first felt interested in women. The woman replied that she did not remember. The legal opinion on the asylum case stated that “it is expected of a person living a homosexual lifestyle to be familiar with and know certain terms if this”. This sentence in itself is problematic. It assumes that LGBTQ+ members have a certain homogeneous lifestyle. It assumes that the Ghanaian asylum seeker was able to live out her sexual identity through this ‘homosexual lifestyle’. It assumes that every LGBTQ+ member has knowledge of terms that are only openly used in specific areas of the world. This kind of credibility assessment is based on Western concepts

portrayed in the media and trough other channels about how an LGBTQ+ member consciously goes through several steps of self-discovery, exploration, education and community. The legal opinion argued that “a ‘surprising’ discovery (without any early signs) of sexual orientation at a late age, after maintaining real relationships with men, is improbable to the point of impossibility” (Berman, Y., 2018, p.24-25). In the Guideline of the UNHCR this reasoning is invalidated: “In some cases, before LGBTI individuals come to understand their own identity fully, they may feel “different” as children. When relevant, probing this experience of “difference” can be helpful to establishing the applicant’s identity. The core attractions that form the basis for adult sexual orientation may emerge between middle childhood and early adolescence, while some may not experience same-sex attraction until later in life. Likewise, persons may not be aware of their full gender identity until adolescence, early adulthood or later in life, as gender codes in many societies may be less prescriptive or strict during childhood than in (early) adulthood.” (UNHCR, 2012, p.16)

The legal opinion on this asylum case concluded:

“The applicant failed to establish her identity as a lesbian or as a woman attracted to women, and her claims of being a lesbian cannot be accepted. At most, it is possible she had sex with a woman, [...] and also maintained some form of a ‘relationship’ with her, but her claim for a clear and real lesbian identity cannot be accepted.” (Berman, Y., 2018, p.24-25)

The conclusion of the RSD Unit illustrates the absurdity and ambiguity of the asylum application process in Israel for LGBTQ+ members.

The Refugee Rights Legal Clinic represented another Ghanaian who applied for asylum based on their sexual orientation. During this interview, the RSD Unit showed a picture of men dressed in women’s clothing marching in the streets of Ghana. Based on this picture, the RSD Unit stated “homosexuals proudly and gloriously march in the streets of Ghana”. The attorney of the Ghanaian asylum applicants researched the photo and discovered the men were students carrying out a prank. (Berman, Y., 2012, p.40)

The grounds for rejection are based on assumptions about LGBTQ+, not on nuanced research. The RSD Officers of Israel claim to have followed an international training for asylum interviews with specific focus on LGBTQ+ and gender. Israel wants to profile itself as a tolerant and progressive state through pinkwashing. This does not reflect in their actions during asylum interviews. This example

shows that Israel’s LGBTQ+-friendliness is superficial. As Yonatan Berman wrote “it is hard to believe that the document cited above was issued by a state authority” (2018, p.25).

6.3. LGBTQ+ PALESTINIANS IN ISRAEL

Palestinians have the most disadvantaged position in Israel. If a Palestinian wants to apply for asylum in Israel based on fear of persecution because of their sexual orientation of gender identity, there are not many options. The choice to flee to Israel is often based on proximity. Israel is nearby and has profiled itself as LGBTQ+ friendly. LGBTQ+ Palestinians who are persecuted of have fear of persecution could apply for asylum base on the Refugee Convention of 1951. Israel has not yet granted any LGBTQ+ Palestinian refugee status based on fear of persecution though.

Palestinians face more hurdles applying for asylum than any other LGBTQ+ asylum seeker in Israel. Palestinian residents are not allowed in Israel. This ‘closure’ policy has been in place since 1993. Palestinians are seen as enemy nationals and therefore could form a threat to Israel. When a LGBTQ+ Palestinian does manage to go to Israeli claimed ground, he/she/they has to live in hiding. If the Israel police finds out a Palestinian lives in Israel, he will be sent back to Palestinian Occupied Territories. As an unofficial way to keep LGBTQ+ Palestinians from being deported, Aguda – LGBT Task Force created membership cards and a short letter for the Israeli police explaining the situation. This system had its effect in the beginning, but lost it when the Second Intifada started.

If the LGBTQ+ Palestinians manages to live in Israel, the next step would be to apply for asylum. As illustrated in previous chapters, this is not a straightforward process. Long waiting lines, summarily rejection and so forth can complicate one’s asylum application process. When a Palestinian would apply for asylum, he/she/they faces even more concerns. Palestinians who want to apply for asylum in Israel, could do this based on two grounds. The first ground is that they are being persecuted because they are suspected of collaborating with Israel. This falls under the category of persecution on the basis of political opinion. The second ground for asylum claim is being part of a specific social group, such LGBTQ+. (Kagan, M. & Ben-Dor, A., 2008)

Israel has several standard arguments to reject Palestinians. Firstly, Israel wants to prevent a flood of Palestinians applying for asylum. Secondly, Israel wants to keep the right to asylum separate from the ‘the right to return’. Thirdly, Palestinians are seen as enemies of the state and Israel supposedly has to protect its citizens. The possibility that a Palestinian forms a national threat to Israel seems to outweigh the possibility that a Palestinian faces a personal threat when deported.

The Refugee Convention of 1951 and its Protocol of 1967 contradict Israel’s actions, even though Israel signed and ratified this. Article 1 of the Convention states that people who flee homophobic violence and lack governmental protection fall under the formal status of refugee. Israel counters this reasoning with the argument that Palestinians, such as other nationalities, are enemies of the state. Article 42 of the Refugee Convention Article 42 contradicts this. This article prevents countries to add reservation to Article 1 of the Convention. Next to Article 1 and the corresponding Article 42, Article 33 states the non-refoulement principle. If a Palestinian faces danger and persecution in the originating area, Israel should not deport this person. Subsequently, article 3 states Israel should not discriminate based on race, religion or country of origin. (UNHCR, 2010)

6.4. AFTER THE REJECTION

LGBTQ+ members, whose asylum applications have been rejected, cannot return to their home country. The fear of persecution remains. When they are not offered protection as a recognized refugee, they often live with other nationals, such as the concentration of Sudanese nationals in the South of Tel Aviv. Within their community, they can again encounter discrimination based on their sexual orientation or gender identity. Once their sexual orientation has been voiced in the country of refuge, it is difficult to undo this. When other nationals in the community are in contact with people of the home country, the LGBTQ+ member’s identity could be disclosed to the family in the country of origin. The fear of persecution in the home country grows. (Migdalovich, E., 2018)

Little options are left for the rejected LGBTQ+ member. The only options seem to appeal to court or a resettlement in a third country that provides protection to sexual minorities. LGBTQ+ Palestians find themselves in the most difficult situation. When entering Israel, they cannot go to the Immigration and Population Authority to apply for asylum. They would get arrested or they would get deported without a judicial hearing.

6.5. CONCLUSION

When looking into specific cases – which are difficult to access in Israel – the ambiguity of the Refugee Status Determination Process stands out. Rejections are often based on stereotypical perceptions of the LGBTQ+ community rather than academic research and profound evaluation. It is of the most importance that LGBTQ+ asylum cases are handled by trained officials who are educated within the field of LGBTQ+. Even though Israel claims to have trained RSD Officials, the UNHCR Guidance Note of 2008 and the Guidelines of 2012 are not even followed.

Next to these oversimplified conclusions, summarily rejections make up for the largest part of rejections. Israel’s ethnocentric view on rights is most visible in this kind of asylum application: the discrepancy between rights granted to LGBTQ+ citizens and the rejection of LGBTQ+ asylum seekers in Israel is irrefutable.

7. Conclusion

This research aimed to answer the question: How does the state of Israel deal with LGBTQ+ asylum application to present itself as a safe haven? In order to answer this question, I analysed the international legal frame for asylum, the Israeli asylum policy and the specifics of asylum applications based on fear of persecution because of one’s sexual orientation. Israel’s presentation as a safe haven and a tolerant attitude towards LGBTQ+ was explained through the notions of homonationalism and pinkwashing and the situation of LGBTQ+ in Israel.

I conclude that Israel misuses LGBTQ+ rights to promote itself as a safe haven and a tolerant place for LGBTQ+ members. Though LGBTQ+ Jewish citizens of Israel enjoy several rights, this is not applicable to LGBTQ+ asylum seekers. At the time of writing, there are only four known cases of recognized LGBTQ+ refugees in Israel. The low number of four is at odds with the pride Israel propagates on its openness towards LGBTQ+. There seems to be no durable solution for sexual minority asylum seekers in Israel. Nonetheless, for a lot of LGBTQ+ asylum seekers, Israel seems to be the best option, because of its proximity and its promotion of tolerance and LGBTQ+ rights. Sexual minority asylum seekers in Israel live with uncertainty about their future. They can be rejected and deported: to a third country that does not recognise LGBTQ+ rights or to their home country that they initially fled. The ambiguity of the Refugee Status Determination Process adds to this uncertainty.

LGBTQ+ Palestinians have the least chance of recognition. Because the asylum seeker will be seen as an enemy national who also cannot return to Israel according to Israeli domestic law, he/she/they risk being sent back. This entails double danger: upon return to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the LGBTQ+ asylum seeker might be regarded as a traitor working with Israel. Regarding Palestine, the promotion of LGBTQ+ rights through pinkwashing illustrates the contradiction of tolerance and occupation. Israel attempts to distinguish itself from its enemy countries, which Israel claims to be are anti-gay. The tolerance towards LGBTQ+ Jewish citizens does not exclude the intolerance towards Palestinians and asylum-seekers. The openness Israel aims to express does not take away the institutionalised xenophobia and discrimination. Discrimination of sexual minorities and discrimination of any other kind cannot be separated, as Aeyal Gross pointed out.

The response to LGBTQ+ asylum seekers one expects from Israel after its extensive practice of pinkwashing, does not correspond with the actions of Israel. Since LGBTQ+ asylum seekers belong to the larger group of asylum seekers, they are victim of Israel’s questionable immigration and asylum policy.

Reference List

Avigal, N. & Marshall, S. (2019, December). I wanted to be like them but I could not Palestinian LGBT asylum seekers in Israel. HIAS.

Avigal, N. & Zuker, G. (2020, April). The numbers speak for themselves: The Israeli asylum Process. HIAS.

Berman, Y. (2012, March). Until our hearts are completely hardened: asylum procedures in Israel. Hotline for Refugees and Migrants.

Berman, Y. (2018, October). Falling on deaf ears: asylum proceedings in Israel. Hotline for Refugees and Migrants.

Biekša, L. (2011, December 12). The refugee qualification problems in LGBT asylum cases. Vilnius, Lithuania: Mykolas Romeris University, Faculty of Law, Department of International and European Union Law.

Cabrera, C. G. (2020, May 26). Costa Rica First in Central America to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/26/costa-rica- first-central-america-legalize-same-sex-marriage

Cue, E. (2002, January 25). Israel takes over review of local asylum claims from UNHCR. UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2002/1/3c5196494/israel-takes-review-local-asylum- claims-unhcr.html?query=israel

Damshenas, S. (2020). Sudan has abolished the death penalty for homosexuality. Gay Times. Retrieved from https://www.gaytimes.co.uk/life/sudan-has-abolished-the-death-penalty-for- homosexuality/

Dotan, Y. (2015). The Boundaries of Social Transformation through Litigation: Women's and LGBT Rights in Israel, 1970–2010. Israel Law Review, 48(1). 3-38.

Frankfort-Nachmias, C., & Shadmi, E. (Eds.). (2004). Sappho in the Holy Land: Lesbian existence and dilemmas in contemporary Israel. SUNY Press.

Gidron, Y. (2018, May 3). How Israel’s secret refugee deals collapsed in the light of day. News Deeply. Retrieved from https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2018/05/03/how- israels-secret-refugee-deals-collapsed-in-the-light-of-day

Government Israel (2020, June 28). Apply for Asylum in Israel. Retrieved from https://www.gov.il/en/service/apply_for_asylum_in_israel

Gross, A. (2010). The politics of GLBT rights in Israel (and beyond): Between queer politics and homonationalism. Columbia law school center for gender & sexuality law.

Gross, A. (2012, May 9). Michael Oren Pinkwashes the Truth About Israel and Gay Palestinians. Haaretz. Retrieved from https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/michael-oren-pinkwashes-the- truth-about-israel-and-gay-palestinians-1.5220872

Gross, A. (2015). The Politics of LGBT Rights in Israel and beyond: Nationality, Normativity, and Queer Politics. Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 46. 81.

Haaretz (2009, August 1). Two Killed in Shooting at Tel Aviv Gay Center. Haaretz. Retrieved from https://www.haaretz.com/1.5084988

Hartal, G. (2016). The politics of holding: Home and LGBT visibility in contested Jerusalem. Gender, Place & Culture, 23(8), 1193-1206.

Hartal, G., & Sasson-Levy, O. (2017). Being [in] the center: Sexual citizenship and homonationalism at Tel Aviv’s Gay-Center. Sexualities, 20(5-6), 738-761.

Hartal, G., & Sasson-Levy, O. (2018). Re-reading homonationalism: An Israeli spatial perspective. Journal of homosexuality, 65(10), 1391-1414.

Hochberg, G. Z. (2010) Introduction: Israelis, Palestinians, Queers: Points of Departure. GLQ 1,16 (4). p.493.

Human Rights Watch (2008, November 12). Sinai Perils: risks to Migrants, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers in Egypt and Israel. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/11/12/sinai- perils/risks-migrants-refugees-and-asylum-seekers-egypt-and-israel

Hotline for Refugees and Migrants – Israel (2020, June 16). Celebrating Pride with a spotlight on LGBTQ+ asylum seekers [Facebook]. Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/HRM.Israel

Hotline for Refugees and Migrants – Israel (2020). Refugees. Retrieved from https://hotline.org.il/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-en/

International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) (March 2007). Yogyakarta Principles - Principles on the application of international human rights law in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity. Retrieved from https://www.refworld.org/docid/48244e602.html

IRIN News (2006, December 26). Sudanese refugees: Little hope on the horizon. IRIN News. Retrieved from http://www.irinnews.org/report/62894/egypt-sudan-sudanese-refugees-–- little-hope-horizon.

Israel: Law No. 5710-1950, The Law of Return (1950, July 5). Retrieved from https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ea1b.html

Israel: Law No. 5712-1952, Entry into Israel Law (1952, September 5). Retrieved from https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ec0.html

Israel: No. 5712-1952, Nationality Law (1953, July 14). Retrieved from https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ec20.html

Israel: Prevention of Infiltration Law (1954). Retrieved from https://www.refworld.org/docid/55116dca4.html

Jansen, S. & Spijkerboer, T. (2011, September 6). Fleeing Homophobia: Asylum claims relating to sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe. Amsterdam, Nederland: Coc Nederland/Vu University Amsterdam. Retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097783

Jerusalem Open House (w.d.). Jerusalem Open House. Retrieved from https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/df5bd8_7fa4881f1c484593ac35cc81bcef77e6.pdf

Kagan, M. & Ben-Dor, A. (2008, April). Nowhere to Run: Gay Palestinian Asylum-Seekers in Israel. Tel Aviv University.

Kama, A. (2011). Parading pridefully into the mainstream. London, UK: Routledge.

Kritzman-Amir, T. (2009). “Otherness” as the Underlying Principle in Israel's Asylum Regime. Israel Law Review, 42(3), 603-627.

Library of Congress (2016, June 21). Refugee Law and Policy: Israel. Retrieved from https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/israel.php#_ftn21

Mendos L.R. (March 2019). State-Sponsored Homophobia 2019. International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association, 15-16.

Migdalovich, E. (2018, July 9). A peek into the lives of gay asylum seekers in Tel Aviv (translated by yanir dekel for A Wider Bridge). A Wider Bridge. Retrieved from https://awiderbridge.org/a- peek-into-the-lives-of-the-gay-asylum-seekers-in-tel-aviv/

Millo, Y., (2013, February). Invisible in the City: Protection Gaps Facing Sexual Minority Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Urban Ecuador, Ghana, Israel, and Kenya. HIAS.

Pinkwatching Israel (2012). (In)equality forum 2012: The year’s biggest pinkwashing event – take action. Retrieved from https://www.pinkwatchingisrael.com/2012/03/29/inequality-forum- 2012-update/

Puar, J. (2007). Terrorist assemblages: Homonationalism in queer times. Duke University Press.

Puar, J. (2010). Israel's gay propaganda war. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jul/01/israels-gay-propaganda-war

Puar, J. (2011). Citation and Censorship: The Politics of Talking About the Sexual Politics of Israel. Fem Leg Stud 19/133.

Puar, J. (2013). Rethinking homonationalism. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 45(2), 336- 339.

Puar, J. (2017). Terrorist assemblages: Homonationalism in queer times. Duke University Press.

Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03 (2004, July 7). New Zealand: Refugee Status Appeals Authority. Retrieved from https://www.refworld.org/cases,NZL_RSAA,42234ca54.html

Ritchie, J. (2015). Pinkwashing, homonationalism, and Israel–Palestine: The conceits of queer theory and the politics of the ordinary. Antipode, 47(3), 616-634.

Sabar, G. & Tsurkov, E. (2015, May). Israel’s Policies toward Asylum-Seekers 2002-2014. Instituto Affari Internazionali. New-Med Research Netwerk.

Schulman, S. (2012, October). Israel/Palestine and the Queer International. Duke University Press.

Spijkerboer, T. (2013). Sexual Identity, Normativity and Asylum, Fleeing Homophobia: Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Asylum. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.

Stelder, M. (2018). ‘From the closet into the Knesset’: Zionist sexual politics and the formation of settler subjectivity. Settler Colonial Studies, 8(4). 442-463.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (1961). Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/wp-content/uploads/1961-Convention-on- the-reduction-of-Statelessness_ENG.pdf

UN Office of the High Commissioner (1984, December). Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading reatment or Punishment. New York, United States. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2002, May 7). Guidelines on international protection: “Membership of a particular social group” within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.pdf

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2008, November 21). UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. Retrieved from https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/48abd5660.pdf

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2010). Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2012, October 23). Guidelines on International Protection No. 9: Claims to Refugee Status based on Sexual Orientation and/or Gender Identity within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/GIP/12/01. Retrieved from https://www.refworld.org/docid/50348afc2.html

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2017, November). UNHCR’s position on the status of Eritrean and Sudanese nationals defined as ‘infiltrators’ by Israel. Retrieved from https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1421986/1930_1516090714_5a5889584.pdf

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2018, February). Statistical Yearbook 2016, 16th edition. Table 9.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2019, April). UNHCR Comments on the European Commission's Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation, COM (2016) 467. Retrieved from https://www.refworld.org/docid/5cb597a27.html

A Wider Bridge (2019). Israel: LGBTQ+ History. Retrieved from https://awiderbridge.org/today-in- lgbt-israel-history/

A Wider Bridge (2019). Tel Aviv Gay VIbe. Retrieved from https://awiderbridge.org/tel-aviv-gay- vibe/

Yaron, H., Hashimshony-Yaffe, N. & Campbell, J. (2013). “Infiltrators” or Refugees? An Analysis of Israel's Policy Towards African Asylum-Seekers. International Migration, 51(4), 145.

Yaron, L. (2018, March 4). Israel to Deport LGBT Asylum Seekers to Rwanda, Uganda Despite Likely Persecution. Haaretz. Retrieved from https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-lgbt- asylum-seekers-in-israel-won-t-be-shielded-from-deportation-1.5868046

Yaron, L. (2020, April 23). Israel's Top Court Strikes Down Law Requiring Asylum Seekers to Deposit 20% of Salaries. Haaretz. Retrieved from https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium- israel-s-top-court-strikes-down-law-requiring-asylum-seekers-to-deposit-20-of-wages- 1.8794068

Appendix

Annex I: Berman, Y. (2018, October). Falling on deaf ears: asylum proceedings in Israel. Hotline for Refugees and Migrants. p 10-12.

Statistics of Israel:

Statistics of other countries:

Annex II: Chart 1: Kagan, M. & Ben-Dor, A. (2008, April). Nowhere to Run: Gay Palestinian Asylum- Seekers in Israel. Tel Aviv University. p.38.