APPENDIX

IDEEN I (SECTIONS 118-124): DRAWING-BACK TO THE EGO. SYNTHESIS AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL SCIENCE

Husserl's account of synthesis and the single ego in Ideen 1 finally explains how the ongoing process of interpretative lays out its own intentional history behind it as it goes. One tends to remember the central themes of Ideen 1 as being issues surrounding the absolute ego and the method­ ology of the transcendental reductions. But if we concentrate on sections 118-124 where Husserl discusses the problem of synthesis, we find that while ego and science are still in some sense treated as prior to ongoing con­ sciousness, they are here treated as having been constituted as prior by those syntheses. I offer the following pages not as a complete reading of Ideen 1, or as a general account of the relation between Husserl's early and later works, or even as a close exegesis of sections 118-124, but as a speculative reading of the theories of the ego, of synthesis, and of phenomenology, and in par­ ticular a reading of Husserl's descriptive category of "drawing back", that suggests a solution to the problems of synthesis left over from the Logical I nvestigations. The problem we have to solve is how the synthetic interpretation of actual experience both grounds and depends on the implicit containment of backward references in consciousness. Consciousness must be so constituted as to extend beyond its actualities into a prior unity of all that is possible; it must be so active as to have prepared for the passive reception of any experience what­ soever; so unified as to establish rational connections between distinct spheres of meaning; so committed to natural experience as to reflect back on phe­ nomenological science. In short, for the synthesis of acts of consciousness to keep going on, interpretative consciousness must in each act be going back for more of its own synthetic unity. The issues which guide sections 118-124 concern the unification of a plurality of acts of consciousness into a single, "all-enveloping", "original" unity or "stream" of consciousness. "Synthetic consciousness" is an "inten­ tional combination" wherein one act of consciousness is "bound up" with another into "one consciousness" (245). At the outset of s. 118, there is a proposal not to begin with the "unity of immanent time-consciousness", in spite of the fact that temporal unity is "the all-enveloping unity of all the experiences of a stream of experience", in which no act can be "foreign" (245). Instead, Husserl proposes to deal in these sections with syntheses which are not continuous but "jointed" (246), where the foreignness of the experiences is precisely what is at issue in the effort to synthesize them. As in LU, the account of synthesis in Ideen holds that individual contents of consciousness are each "self-limiting", and hence have a contributory value towards com-

196 IDEEN 1 197 pletable interpretation; they are therefore "bound" together as a plurality; the plurality can then be "crossed over" into a synthetic singularity of inter­ pretation (248); the "original" plurality thus functions as a "peculiar attach­ ment of thesis to synthesis" (248); finally, the singular synthesized result "removes" plurality from the content of the experiences, and the "simple" result presents a new object that is "original" to the synthetic consciousness (248). The "attachment" of a thetic assertion to a synthetic interpretation, and the constitution of the synthetic object, can occur only "through the back­ ward reference (Rückbeziehung) of a simple thesis to the originally con­ stituted collection" (248). The synthetic multiplicity of the result is at once the completion of, the removal of, and the return to, an original plurality of theses. It is in s. 122 that the details of the process and the results of "articulated synthesis" are spelled out (253-55). Husserl describes four "modes" in "the realm of theses and syntheses" (253). I will refer to these as the syntheses of (i) "insertion" (Einsetzen, 253), (ii) "grasping" (Ergreiffen, 253), (iii) "still retaining" (noch behalten, 253), and (iv) the ego's "drawing back" or "with­ drawal" (zurückziehen, 254). It is primarily the fourth that will concern uso

(I) "Insertion"

A synthesis can be carried out (vollzogen) step by step; it becomes, it comes into being in original production. This originariness of becoming in the stream of consciousness is a quite peculiar one. The thesis or synthesis comes into being, in so far as the pure ego actually takes the step, and takes every new step; itself lives in the step and "steps on" with it. Itsfree spontaneity and activity consists in positing, positing-as-result, positing-beforehand and positing-afterwards (Setzen, Daraufsetzen, Voraus- und Nachsetzen); it does not live within the theses as a passive indweller; rather the theses radiate from it as from an original source of generation. Every thesis begins with a point 0/ insertion (Einsatzpunkt), with a point of original positing; so it is with this first thesis, and with each further one in the synthetic context. This "inserting" even belongs to thesis as such, as a remarkable mode of original actuality. It is somewhat like the fiat, a point of insertion of will and action (253).

In the activity of synthesis, the subject deliberately gives himself so me thing new to experience. He interrupts whatever is going on in the stream of con­ sciousness, and inserts a thesis of his own choosing. And in this insertion, the subject becomes aware 0/ himself as the controller of the stream of con­ sciousness; the ego, as the self-identical "I" who thinks, steps onto the scene of experience. But there is more to the spontaneous insertion of theses than the deliber­ ateness and self-awareness of the experiencing subject. A "positing" act situates a thesis by declaring that its place follows or precedes some other. It differ­ entiates the insertion-point from an otherwise undifferentiated stream of beliefs, desires, feelings, etc. It is for this reason that the ego itself comes into being at the same time as its free positings come into being; not just because the ego notices its own power therein, but because it is due to the ego's intru­ sion that there is any point of origin for recognizing differences among theses 198 APPENDIX and relations within syntheses, for recognizing the distance between the steps and their relative priority and posteriority. For all the Kantian tradition of the transcendental ego as the agent of the synthetic unity of apperception, and for all of Husserl's talk earlier in Ideen of the absolute being of the ego as the necessary and indubitable phenome­ nological residuum (ss. 33-49), the role of the ego's directedness towards objects and capacity for synthesizing is quite specific, and even in a sense derivative, in s. 122. The ego's "free spontaneity and activity" consists just in the potentiality which the synthesis has of being "drawn out" or "completed" (vollziehen).

(11) "Having in One's Grasp" The second mode of carrying out articulated syntheses follows from the first with "essential necessity". The insertion-point "grasps" a new synthesizable content, and this inserting is "forthwith and without a break changed into 'having in one's grasp' ("im Griff haben")" (255). The self-giving character of the inserted thesis is tumed into the character of having been given. Husserl does not mention the active ego in describing the second mode - not because there is no longer an ego who has the thesis in his grasp, but because the grasping takes the form of receptivity.

(III) "Still Retaining"

The pure ego carries out a new step, and now in the pervading unity of the synthetic consciousness "still retains" in its grasp what it had just grasped (253).

The logic of "still retaining" theses wh ich have since been synthesized holds both in perception ("When collecting things together I do not allow the object just perceptually apprehended to slip away while I turn my apprehending glance to the new object", 253) and in reason ("In carrying out a proof, I run through in steps the thoughts that serve as premisses; I do not surrender any syn­ thetic step; I do not lose my grasp of what I have won", 253-4). In s. 119, the plurality of theses was said to be "removed" in synthesis; in s. 122, the distinct meaning of each is preserved. The first mode of articulated synthesis constitutes a discontinuity in the flux of consciousness; the second apprehends the meaning given to the dis­ continuous moment; the third transforms that moment into, and preserves it as, a "member" or "joint" belonging to a "jointed synthesis" (246), i.e. to a continuity of discontinuous theses. Every grasping of an object keeps its content in long enough to be connected with the next grasping of the object. IDEEN 1 199

(IV) "Drawing Back"

The third mode plays the role that the syntheses of identification play in LU vi, but only in cases where one apprehension of an object is succeeded by other apprehensions of the same object. Yet synthetic activity must allow a subject not only to focus continuously on one object, but also to stop looking at one object long enough to look at another; a subject must be able to treat the object no longer noticed as something that co-exists with whatever is being noticed, and as something that could be noticed aga in. The pure ego can draw itself back (zurückziehen) wholly from the theses; it releases the thetic correlates "from its hold": it "turns to another theme". What had just been its theme has not disappeared from consciousness; it is still consciously apprehended, but no longer in thematic grasp (254). The category of "drawing back" (zurückziehen) completes the "completing" or the "drawing out" (vollziehen) of synthesis. Husserl's example suggests that differentiations between objects are possible only if the ego can distance itself from the world of objects in general. I am at present meditating; a whistle from the street distracts me momentarily from my theme (in this case a thought-theme). For an instant I am turned towards the sound, but forthwith turn back (Rückkehr) to the old theme. The apprehension of the sound is not extinguished, the whistle is still consciously apprehended in a modified way, but no longer in amental grasp. It does not belong to the theme, not even to a parallel theme. One notices that this possibility of simultaneous themata and thematic syntheses which may cut across and 'interrupt' each other points to still further modifications ... (254-5).

Here we have adescription, not to be found in LU, of the mechanism of syn­ thetic activity whereby consciousness constitutes itself as having unnoticed and implicit experiential contents. Consciousness creates a storage space for the multiplicities it "releases", precisely by "drawing back" to its own self. This "drawing back" completes the developments of the ego and of the con­ tinuity of discontinuitites. The ego, which from the start was responsible for inserting discontinuities into the stream of consciousness, is only now capable of intemalizing or withdrawing into or retuming back to itself and distin­ guishing itself from its objective world. But to understand the function of the subject's "withdrawal" from objectivity in the constitution of the syn­ thesis of objectivity, we will have to consider Husserl's description of the possibility of withdrawal as a culmination of his description of possibility in general in sections 109-115. In ss. 109-113, there is a description of four types of acts of conscious­ ness whose objects are experienced as possible but not real. First, a proposition not known to be true may be "assumed". Second, an object may be "fanta­ sized" in fictions or paintings, or in imagination. Unlike recollection, whose objects likewise do not exist, fantasy requires no basis in any previous reality­ affirming experience. Third, an object may be posited as "potential" rather than "actual". In fact, every apprehension contains a surplus of meaning in poten­ tial form (234, 229). "Potential positings" subsist for consciousness as the 200 APPENDIX

"background" of, for example, a perception; they are the perceptions's "environment" (231), though they remain "hidden" (229). Fourth, there is a suggestion in s. 109 that the general form of positing objects while remaining neutral about their actual existence has, as one of its variations, the "brack­ eting" of existence which appears early in Ideen (s. 31) as the pre-condition of phenomenological science. The various "neutrality-modifications", which lead to the open-endedness of fantasy and the directedness of potentiality, lead further to scientific reflection on consciousness as such (also ss. 77-8). Taken together, consciousness's ability to construct hypotheses, fantasies, possibilities, and reflections expands the region of consciousness beyond actual experiences. The background experience which in some sense is contained within consciousness is opened indefinitely, with partly determined, partly undetermined, limits. The ego of actual experience has room to move around in, and this room is the space of the objective world. No matter what it actually experiences, the ego claims the right to experience whatever else may even possibly exist. Hence the opening of the region of consciousness beyond actual experience opens into the ideal completedness or closure of both conscious­ ness and the world; consciousness is closed when the open potentiality of its theses is exhausted, the world is closed in that an of its actuality can be experienced. But until the closure takes place (and after all it can never be more than ideal), the ego will continue to make demands on its experience, and will continue to be affected by the reception of new data about the world. The possibility of making space for possibilities in the actual world is correlated with the possibility of setting one theme aside in a storage space from which it may be retrieved, as wen as with both the ego's transcendental activity and its passive receptivity to what is actual. The guarantee (in Kantian terms) that all my experiences are mine, or in other words that the ego is transcendental, depends on the synthesis which involves stepping back from actual experiencing and subsequently returning to actuality through the mediation of the differences between themata within the medium of their co­ existence. The reason why the pure ego is not prominent in Husserl's decription of the building up of the modes of synthesis, even in the description of spon­ taneous thetic insertions, is that the pure ego does not fully come into being until a relatively late stage in the development of synthetic consciousness. The theory of the ego's absolute necessity in Ideen does not differ from the theory of the synthetic unity of acts in LU except in that the former draws an even more radical conclusion about the synthetic character of conscious­ ness, namely that contents of consciouness not only combine with one another, but also step aside in favour of a synthesis with what is posited as no content of consciousness. For while the ego may claim to control the stream of con­ sciousness when it inserts thetic interruptions into the flow of experience, it achieves transcendental only by its ability to step back from the activity of experiencing in order to let the being of the world be, or in other words, in order to regard as simply given from an external cause, the material contents of experience and their associative order. IDEEN 1 201

The ego posits its activity and its passivity, its transcendentality and the transcendence of its objects, the empirical world and the ideal sciences, the unity of its world-interpretation and the different spheres of , its actualities and its potentialities, all in the same synthesis of drawing back. For by grasping its points of entry into the world as something still retained, consciousness treats every new content of experience as a distraction - poten­ tially innocuous, potentially an explication of what has been, potentially a new thematic altogether - but in itself some kind of whistle that forces two dis­ tanced contents to be inserted and retained in one interpretation not quite big enough or organized enough to hold them both. At once meditating at his study and hearing the outside whistle, Husserl's ego takes up two per­ spective points at once; unlike Descartes's ego at a similar desk, Husserl's can be distracted, and this call from the external world to abandon a percep­ tual standpoint is at the same time a division between external causes and inner experience, and a confirrnation that the world is intact despite the distances that separate its parts. In fact, every look is a look away, every point of inser­ tion is a point of departure, every location leaves other locations behind - behind as behind. Indeed this is the only way that locations ever were and ever can be, namely in so far as they have had their places saved for them in advance by other places. Just as Fichte's ego posits an external world as non-ego, Husserl's ego posits itself by constituting a world-interpretation as the storage space for its own past experience. The underlying unity of interpretation stores the prior conditions for syntheses of identification and fulfilment by inter­ preting each content as that which the ego recognizes itself as being drawn back to. The ego withdraws from current concerns into self-reflection at pre­ cisely the same point as the map of the world itself is drawn up. The storage space in consciousness for presupposed conditions of experience, and the storage space in the world for co-existing states of affairs, are constituted in one and the same withdrawal/drawing back. In short, no content can gain a point of entry into consciousness except in so far as it is relocated into a storage space for retentions and backward referents. While the above is by no means a complete account of Husserl's theory of the ego in Ideen I, it does suggest an account. The ego is a product of completed synthesis. Yet at the same time, it would be correct to say that the ego is a pure identity prior to and indifferent to its experiences, its syn­ thesizing interpretations, and its objective world. For the priority of its own underlying self-identity is something that consciousness, as it were, slips underneath itself every time it synthesizes experiences under objectifying interpretations. The ego is a receptacle, a framework, and a storage space for actual and possible experience, and for explicit and implicit forward and backward referents, just because along with the insertion of any experiential content, consciousness achieves receptivity, prescriptive structure, and the self­ reflective ability to draw upon its own achievements. Finally, in addition to offering a solution to the problem of the storage of implicit backward referents, the synthesis of drawing back to the ego also 202 APPENDIX suggests a solution to the problem of the system of interpretative systems. If we consider now the connections between what Husserl calls the "spheres" of consciousness, we may draw final conc1usions about what becomes of the science of phenomenological description if the problematic of synthesis is placed at its forefront. In s. 121, Husserl affirms the parallel structure of cognitive, emotive, and valuative syntheses in so far as each has to "split up", "distribute", and "collect" phenomena together in order to intend synthetic objects (251). In asense, the whole phenomenological story is one of splitting and re-collecting Here and There, Now and Then, units and unity, ego and world, perception and emotion and , formal science and concrete description. But in this division and recovery, the science of phenomenology plays a double role. For phenomenology is both one of the many themes separated out in the unity of self-explicating consciousness, and is also the most developed sense in which all of consciousness is a self-explicating system. How is the unity of the detachable "spheres" of consciousness carried out by, or by returning to, one of those spheres? The drive towards science begins with every insertion-point of intentional consciousness, since every articulation of a content is a drawing-back from an obscure background (254). Every interpretative "scheme" is a search for "ground" (256-8), and the greatest degree of explicitness in the identifica­ tion of objects is attained when expressions are "lifted" into, and "reflected back" in, "the realm of the 'Logos' " (257). Hence what I have called mutual priority or backward reference pertains finally to the relation between everyday synthetic experience and scientific thought-contexts. For while it takes a transformative act to abstract to the "logical " that everyday experience needs for its own self-comprehension (260), this transformation is carried out every time a synthesis is brought to life. When synthetic consciousness draws back to a prior unity so as to hold apart discontinuous spheres of intentional objects, each with its own relatively autonomous syntheses of intentions and fulfilments, it draws back to an ego whose distinguishing function is to look back on the logic of its own self­ reflection. And when synthetic interpretation refers back to what was implicit, it refers back to the rationality of synthetic activity as such and its ability to separate and unify regions of interpretation. The challenge for the phenome­ nologist, and in this sense we might say that the task of every ego is to be a phenomenologist, is to describe the "interlacing of the different regions" (318), to provide a theory of evidence which "holds for all thetic spheres, and par­ ticularly also for the important rational relations that run between them" (290). This reconstruction of the spheres, which takes place at the end of the phenomenological enterprise, depends on the ability of the phenomeno­ logical end-point to reach back to an original unity of experience. The "interlacing" of spheres depends on that which "lies before" all thinking, the ultimate backward referent, the ground ofthe ego's storage spaces, the material IDEEN 1 203

"source" to which rationality "leads back" (320), namely the whole "system of manifolds" (318). The final section of Ideen 1 returns to the question of the unity of the philosophical sciences and its role in the unity of consciousness. Phenomenology marks out a region for itself as a distinct endeavor of con­ sciousness, namely to describe the structures of the rest of consciousness, and furthermore grounds its own possibility in its relations to the rest of con­ sciousness. In thereby carrying the demands for the unification of all synthetic consciousness, phenomenological science refers its rationality backward to its source and so reconstitutes the whole system of distinguished spheres of conscious acts under a new system of ordering, wherein consciousness as a whole is a system devoted to grounding its own rationality. In so far as phe­ nomenological science looks back on its own results, it finds without exception that objectivities which were at first given (or thought of in as given) in monothetic acts, in mere experiences, let us say, can be made subject to the play of synthetic operations, and through synthetic objectivities constitute increasingly higher formations which in the unity of the total thesis contain a plurality of theses, and in the unity of their total material contain a plurality of mutually detachable materials (320-1).

Phenomenology determines the constitution of collections, of parts and wholes, of the centerings and decenterings of frames of reference. Synthesis consti­ tutes a world of objectivities both by the forms of the detachability of its parts, and by the logic of its ultimate closures and origins. The carrying out of objectifying syntheses must be reasoned in order for consciousness to function, and consciousness doubles back on itself when it thematizes its functions for the sake of the completion of those same functions. The phenomenology of reason thus coincides with phenomenology as a whole:

An all-sided unravelling of the problems of constitution, looking back (berücksichtigend) equally to the noetic and the noematic levels of consciousness would be manifestly equivalent to a complete phenomenology of reason in respect of all its formal and material formations, both anomalous (negatively rational) and normal (positively rational). But it emerges further that such a complete phenomenology of reason would coincide with phenomenology in general, and that a systematic working through of all descriptions of consciousness, which are demanded under the collective title "constitution of the object", would have to concern itself with all descrip­ tions of consciousness whatsoever (323).

Phenomenology is all-sided when its categories are unravelled, systematized when its knot of problems is dissolved in a solution which separates and orders its elements. It is complete when it takes up a position from which it can look back on all of consciousness, when it can look back on itself, which it determines as the "normal" par excellence, but also on the anomalous, the negative, the corrupt, the gap-holding, the discontinuous, and the incomplete modes of synthetic consciousness in general. In one sense, the Copernican Revolution has not been entirely put down, 204 APPENDIX and the spheres of synthetic objectivities still revolve about consciousness. But in another sense, it is only when the spheres separate off that there is any centre to refer back to. The workings-through of the demands of objective consti­ tution make one solution out of both the rational and the not yet rational. The science of phenomenology is precisely the self-explicating dynamic that consciousness always already had to have been in advance. And conscious­ ness's investigation of the logic of its categories becomes the synthesis of backward reference that is its investigation of itself and of the world. Consciousness is Logical Investigations. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Apriori, 2, 5, 14, 18-20, 26, 41-2, 57, 99 Leibniz to Husserl, 4-10, 33-7 as backward referent, 33, 35,74, 86-7, as grounding category, 182-95 89, 103, 106-7, 143, 165, 192 in logic, 40-4 Absence, 97, 140-1, 163, 187 in objectification, 47-9 Absolute, 5-6, 29, 32-3, 35,121,173-4,200 in universals and individuals, 61-7 Abstraction, 4, 42, 44, 52-4, 59-66 in wholes and parts, 78, 85-7 Activity, 17,38, 156-7, 166, 199-201 in syncategorematic terms, 96,103,107-8 as starting-point, 7, 48, 52, 55, 67-8, 89, in names and judgments, 110, 112-23 106-8, 129, 173, 187-8 in syntheses of fulfi1ment, 132, 139, Actualization, of objective presence, 91, 157 142-3, 146-7, 156, 158, 163-5, 168, as fulfilment, 16, 30, 35,111-3,171,176, 179-95 189, 193,200 and the ego, 196-204 ofpossibilities, 39, 47-8, 56,102,137-9, Back sides (Rückseite) in perspective, 154, 142-3, 147, 157, 188, 193 156-60 Adequation, 110, 125, 161-2, 166-76 Background,54n, 75-6,91,93,136-43,148, Adorno, Theodor, 16,29,32 156, 168, 188, 200 Aggregates, 54-5, 110 Bar-Hillel, Yohoshua, 105 Agreement, 23, 144, 170-3, 193 Beginnings of interpretation (see starting­ Aguirre, Antonio, 28, 35-6 point), 34-6, 46-7, 52, 135, 146, 151, Aim, 17,26,125,128,169,171-2 172,183,186 Alberti, Leon Battista, 152 Belonging together (zusammengehören), 13, Always already, 59-60, 78, 85, 102, 107, 25,74-5,79-80,90,114,130-3,151 156, 159, 193,204 Beyond (hinaus), pointing, 26, 80, 82, 120, Alteration, 45, 62-4, 75, 80, 148 135, 150, 153 Analysis, 4-5,17,23, 105, 114, 116-7, 120, Blending, 73, 77, 79 168, 174 Bloch, Ernst, 176 Anticipation, 1-3,7,36,39,66,94, 114, Blurring, 44 135-7, 138, 141-2, 146, 154-5, 159, Bolzano, Bernard, 92 166,171,178 Borders, 76-9, 81-2, 86, 146, 153-7, 163 indeterminacy, 144-6, 155-7, 163, 173 Bracketing, 200 and backward reference, 159, 181, 183-4, Building, 53, 85, 106-7, 110, 164 189, 191 Bultrnann, Rudolf Karl, 176 Application, ofrules, 5,15-6,37,47,58-60, 64, 100, 104, 106, 134 Calling by name, 129-31 Arbitrariness, 75, 82-7, 189-92 Caputo, John D., 24 Arithmetic, 164-6, 173-4, 179, 187 Carr, David, 15, 25-6 Ars combinatoria, 88, 99, 101, 103-6 Carrying out (vollziehen) syntheses, 37, 39, Artificial , 89, 100 180, 197-8 Assertion, 172, 197 over into (vertragen), 147, 149, 157 Association, 3-4, 40-2 Cartesian Meditations, 124 Atoms, 76, 105, 117, 119 Categorematic terms, 24, 88-108 Attention, 33, 42, 52-3 Chains, 83, 164-5, 170-1, 179 Chomski, Noam, 97 Bachelard, S., 16 Circumscription of anticipations, 39, 42, 83, Backward Reference (zurückweisen, and 93,96, 127, 129, 138, 149 other zurück terms), problem of, 1-3 Closure, problem of, 6, 16, 19, 35-6

211 212 INDEX

and law, 42, 57 Contradiction (and opposition), 6, 19, 28-9, of meanings, 88, 92, 94-6, 98 145 and completion, 43, 46-7, 49, 73, 77, Copula, 88, 96, 102 81,86,100-1,156,169-81,187,200, Crisis of the European Sciences, 124 203 Coherence, 29-30, 64, 142 Davidson, Donald, 105 Combination (Verknüpfen, Verbindung), 4-5, Oe Almeida, G. A., 15,22,26--8,34,36--7 13, 39-40, 55 Oe Boer, Theodore, 16, 27, 54n Comparability, 52, 56--7, 60, 62-3, 135 De Muralt, Andre, 18,29,34 Completion, problem of, 3-7, 22, 25-6 De Saussure, Ferdinand, 100 in meanings, 44, 48-9 De Waelhens, Alphonse, 20, 26 in wholes and parts, 81, 87, 94-9 Oeferral, 19, 32, 73, 84, 139, 165-6, 185 in interpretation, 120-2, 125, 134, 141, Definition, 4, 164-5, 175 150-1, 159, 163, 165-6, 169-71, 173- Oerrida, Jacques, 19, 24, 32, 36, 100 80 Oescartes, Rene, 9, 59, 110, 201 in consciousness, 199-204 Description, 91-3, 95, 128, 144, 171-2 and backward reference, 65, 183, 186, Oeterminacy of anticipations, 2, 25, 39-40, 190-4 48-9 Complex, wholes, 42, 74, 76, 79-82, 84, 86 of parts in wholes, 78, 82-3, 85 expressions, 90-4, 102-4, 107-8, 113, in fulfilment, 119, 130, 135, 138-9, 142, 115-23 147-9, 151-2, 155-7, 163-7, 171-3 conflict, 143-8 and backward reference, 186, 189-90 perspectives, 150-1 Development, in Husserl's philosophy, 26--8 ordering, 164-5, 170, 179, 183 of consciousness, 194 Composition, 82-3, 86, 165 Dialectic, 6, 9, 28-33, 65, 120, 143, 193 Concept, 130-2, 135, 143, 155 Diemer, Alwin, 17,27,34-5 Conc1usion, 43-4, 57, 176, 180-1 Difference, role in synthesis, 2, 6, 18,21, Concrete, vs. abstract, 15, 40, 58-9, 84, 115 31-3,137,144,150,162,170-2,176, Conflict, in unifying synthesis, 33, 143-50 197 Conjunction, 92-4,96--9, 102-3, 117 elimination of, for identification, 56--7, Connection, 3-4, 25, 88-9,97-9, 105-6 125, 134 Consciousness, problems and definitions of, undifferentiated stream of consciousness, 1-9, 15, 17-21, 32, 34, 109-10 35,78, 197 as self-explication, 30-2, 34-7 differentiation of meanings, 44, 60, 78, and unconscious, 97, 103, 107 100, 129, 145-6, 148, 183, 199 synthetic unity of, 66--7, 73-4, 78, 81, 84, Direction (Richtung), 39, 73, 82, 85, 138, 107, 123, 142-3, 148, 153-4, 167, 151-3, 159 187, 192, 194-5 multiplicity of, 122, 142-3, 160, 165, as backward referent, 86--7, 109, 192-3, 177 196--204 Directness, 45, 56, 91-2, 96, 102, 122, 128, Construction (Konstruktion), 22, 58, 67, 106, 154, 161-2, 169, 177 166 Directedness, 78, 109-10, 167 Context (Zusammenhang), 2, 22 Discontinuity, 25, 76--80,137,147,167,171, of meanings, 43-4, 48-9, 57 198-9,202 of universals, 61, 64 Disposition, 188, 190 of parts, 73, 75-6, 81-4, 86--7 Distance, 48, 78-9, 81-2, 85-6, 134, 137, of expressions, 93-7, 103, 11 143, 150, 156, 163, 198-9 of names and judgments, 114, 119 Division, 56, 74, 78, 82-6, 90-1, 119-20, in syntheses of fulfilment, 133-53, 157, 165, 167, 174, 179,202 167-8, 191 Double movement of consciousness, 2, 18, Continuity, in streams of interpretation, 14, 26, 31, 35, 41, 66, 130-1, 152, 161, 35, 40, 43, 76, 138-9, 141, 150, 170, 172, 202 154-6, 163, 165, 198-9 Dove, Kenley R., 29 of parts, 76--80 Drawing back, see Withdrawal INDEX 213

Dreyfus, Hubert L., 15-7, 23, 34, 100 Filling in/out, 76, 85-7, 94, 115, 138-9, 147, Dynamic, 9, 73, 87, 133-5, 151, 183 154, 157-9, 170-2, 180 Finish, of fulfilment, 158-9, 165-6, 335 &lie, James Mo, 18, 100, 105 finishing touch, 180-1 Ego, 2, 20, 32-5, 45, 142 Fink, Eugen, 29, 54n as backward referent, 121, 192, 196-204 Fitting, 40, 134-8, 144, 151-2, 172, 190 Eley, Lothar, 16-8,20,22,27,31-3,35, 106 Fixing reference, 23, 44-9, 51, 78, 82, 87, Empiricism, 14, 16-7,52,54, 122, 127, 143 95-6, 103-4, 121, 128, 134-9, 168 Empty meaning-intention, 40, 134-7 and backward reference, 178, 183-4, 189 End-results, problem of, I, 3, 21, 34, 36-7 Flow, 18-20, 26-7, 32, 44, 81, 200 in meaning, 40, 46-7, 85, 117 Fluctuation, 38-40, 44-9, 56-7 content of, 125, 151-2, 158, 163-7, 202 Flux, 2, 24, 32, 38, 44, 139, 153-4 and backward reference, 120, 183-7, F011esdal, Dagfinn, 23 189-91, 194 Following, 4, 38, 43, 58, 97, 103, 138, 164, as limit, 169-73 175,177 as last fulfilment, 173-6 Foreground, 140-2 as closure, 176-81 Foreshortening (Verkürzung), 94, 152-4, Endless continuity, 28, 42, 48, 83, 95, 129, 157-60 162, 180, 183 Form, and content, 1~-9, 36, 55, 62-4, 84, Epistemological interpretations of Husserl, 89, 106-8, 116-7, 135, 159, 186 14, 21-3, 54n Formallogic, 15-7,42,60,67,86,92-3,96, Ergänzungsbedürjtigkeit, see Supplementa- 98-108, 145-6, 202 tion, demand/need for Forward reference (Hinweisen), problem of, Evans, Jo Claude, 19 1-4 Evidence, 21, 53, 55-8, 169, 170, 172, 175 Leibniz to Husserl, 4-10 Exactness, 44, 49, 57, 133, 151 to universals, 67-8 Excess, 26, 183, 189 to categorematic terms, 88, 90, 93, 96, Exchange (Vertauschung) (see Replacement, 107 Substitution), 99-102 to complete fulfilment, 35, 39, 43,120-1, Exclusion, 57, 92, 98-9, 145-7 125, 134, 151-2, 168, 180, 183, 185- Expansion, 47, 81, 83, 85, 93-6 6, 188-95 Expectation, 6, 25-6, 94,138-48, 153, 171- Foundation, 53, 67, 132 2, 183, 188 of wholes in parts, 81-5 Experience, lived (and lifeworld), 7, 35,64, of syncategorematic terms in synthetic 89,97,135,139,149-50,153,171, experiences, 94, 96-8, 102, 107-8 180 of expressions in presentations, 109-12, Explication, of singular meanings into judg­ 115, 121-3 ments, 91-2, 102, 112, 114-9, 121-2, of unity in conflict, 144-7 174 Fragment, 90-1, 93-5, 138, 140-1, 143, 156, and reference forward, 189, 194 159, 170, 173 self-, I, 184, 192, 202, 204 Freud, Sigmund, 89, 97-8, 103 Explicit, 26, 113, 139-41, 142-3, 149, 166, Frustration of meaning-fulfilment, 144-8, 180, 185, 202 175 Expression, 23-4, 38-49 Fulfilment, problem of, 1-2, 6-7 linguistic, 88-106 in secondary literature, 13, 17, 22, 26, 30, in linguistic philosophy, 105-6, 134-5 35 in dreams, 97-8 and intention, 38-40, 44 in names and judgments, 112, 117, 120 and universals, 52, 55, 58 and fulfulment, 125, 127, 172, 188-92 of names and judgments, 91, 95-100, 107 Fantasy, 75, 199 syntheses of, 125, 127-9, 133-46, 154-5, Fein, Ho, 20 157, 159, 161-6 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 33, 59 end of, 170-1, 173-80, 185-6, 188-90, Fields, visual, 41, 46, 75-9, 86, 137, 150, 152 201 214 INDEX

Functional distinction, 39, 45, 53, 59-60, 75, Ideen I, 27, 33, 47,123,195,196-204 88, 90-4, 102, 119 Identification, 5-7, 13, 16, 23-4, 36, 38, Futural anticipation, 6, 18, 176, 187, 189 43-5,63-7,125,127-35,144-5,150-- 1, 176, 183, 186, 197-8, 201-2 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 59 Images, 46, 52, 54n, 58, 60, 75, 97-8, 129, Gap-holding (lückenhaft), 36, 43, 94-5, 147, 160--1 154-5, 157, 159-60, 163, 167 Immanence, 19-21,29,30 role in synthesis, 170--2, 192, 203 Immediacy, 35, 45-6, 54n, 56-8,66, 81-2, gap-free synthesis, 160, 166, 168, 192 84-6,121-2,175,185-7,192 Genetic, 19, 28, 35-6, 53-4, 54n, 59, 177, Implicit possibilities, 2, 33-5, 39, 60, 73, 188 78, 85-6, 91, 113-4, 140--3, 167, Gestalt interpretations of Husserl, 17-9 169-70 Geyser, Joseph, 33 and backward reference, 183-6, 195-6, Givenness, synthesis prior to, 5, 7, 56, 75, 199,202 136, 193, 198,200 In advance (von vornherien), 2, 18, 62, 66- in secondary literature, 17, 21, 26, 31-4, 8, 86, 88-9, 103, 120--1, 131, 134-6, 73 138, 149, 151, 156, 166, 170 Glancing back ward and forward, 42-4, 47-8, and backward reference, 48-9, 181, 184, 116, 159, 171, 198 188, 191-3,201 Graduated fulfilment, 125, 133, 161-5 Inclusion (Inklusion, Inbegriff), 57, 83, 111- gradual alteration, 77, 156, 175, 177 3, 120, 145-7, 149, 163, 166-8 Grammar, 24, 90, 98-100, 103-6 and closure, 174-6, 179, 183 Grasping, 5, 85-7, 135, 197-9 Incompleteness, 49, 90--8, 125-6, 154, 170, Ground (Grund), 1-3, 20, 25, 28, 32, 35, 172, 175-80, 183 142-3,168,186,189,192,193-4,203 Independence, 3,'9, 20--1, 23, 33, 49, 67 of universals in individuals, 52-68 of universals, 52, 59, 63-4, 66 Gurwitsch, Aron, 17,19,27, 54n of parts, 63, 74-82, 87 Gutting, Gary, 54n of meanings, 88,92, 94-5, 101,104 of names, 110, 118-9 Habit, 2-4, 52, 138-42, 149, 151, 192 in synthesis, 143, 150, 194 Hanna, Robert, 21 Indeterminacy, 39-40, 83, 85, 138 Harris, Errol E., 29 Indexing (see Occasional), 14, 23-4, 45-6, Hegel, G. W. F., 5-6, 8-9, 28-33, 59, 84, 130 103, 106, 147, 176, 194 Indicative signs, 40--6, 97, 128, 130--1 Heidegger, Martin, 13, 24, 28, 30, 176 Individuals, 2, 7, 9, 33-7, 40--2 Herbart, Johann Friedrich, 17 meanings, 44-5, 48 History , in secondary literature, 6, 16, 27, and universals, 51-68 29-30, 33-6 parts, 76-7, 82-4, 86-7 retention of in synthetic results, 57, 59, synthesis of, 128-33, 156-7, 159, 180, 123-4, 131, 152, 165, 175-6, 178, 192-5 183, 187, 189-90, 193, 194 Ingarden, Roman, 20 Horizon, 22, 28, 31, 45-9 Inseparability, 75-9 Hoyos Vasquez, Guillermo, 18, 27 Insertion, 197-8, 200--202 Hülsmann, Heinz, 18 Insight, 43, 56 Hume, David, 3-4, 8, 61-2, 131 Instruments (and tools), 16, 18, 188, 190--1 Interpenetrating parts, 74, 77-80, 143 "1",44-6 Interruption, 49, 80, 93, 134, 137, 140--3, Idealism, 17, 20--1, 27, 36 159, 162, 197, 199 Idea, 3-4, 5, 58, 103-4, 106-7, 170 Intuition, 4-5, 7,13, 16-7,21,30,38-40, Ideal, 19, 30, 36 44-9 units of meaning, 38, 40--4, 46--9 and universals, 51, 53-5, 57-8 Species, 51, 53, 57, 66 and syncategorematic terms, 95-8, 100, closure, 73, 125, 151, 163, 166, 169-80, 107 182, 186-7,200 and names and judgments, 113-5 INDEX 215

and synthesis, 125, 127-36, 142, 145-6, and presentations, 109-11, 117, 119-20, 151, 169-76 122-3 and backward reference, 179-80, 183, fu1filment of, 125, 129-30, 135-6, 149, 186, 188-91 159 Itself, the object, 42, 48, 150-1, 157-8, 161- Mechanisms of synthesis, 1-3,25, 123, 168, 4, 168-74, 180, 183 193-5 Mediation, 6, 29, 46, 54n, 55, 81-2, 84-5, Judgment, 24, 57, 67, 96, 103-4, 109-21, 112,114,129-30,135,162-4,175, 144-5, 169 185-6 Medieva1 philosophy, 88, 101, 168 Kant, Immanuel, 5, 8-9, 15,20,26,59,69, Melody, 84, 135, 138-9, 141, 143 102, 106, 123, 135, 155, 198,200 Memory, 33-4, 43-4, 98, 165, 179, 183, 189 Kern, Iso, 17, 26 Mensch, James R., 18, 19-20,30 Kersten, Fred, 15, 54n Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 35 Kirkland, Frank, 29 Metaphysics, 8, 20, 176 Knowledge, 5-6, 14, 18, 21-2, 26 MiIler, Ischak, 25, 34-5 and meaning, 43, 54, 56-7, 62, 65 Modification, 102, 113, 136, 200 and synthesis, 125, 127-8, 139, 145, 147, Mohanty, J. N., 24, 26, 32, 54n, 106 154, 161-2, 169, 171-3, 187, 189-91, Moments, 6, 28, 74, 77-80, 83, 97,143,173, 199 178-9, 199 Kohak, Erazim, 21 More (Mehr-), 2, 25-6, 59,111,141,146, Kunz, Hans, 18 157, 163, 191, 196 Movement, 137, 141-2, 156-7, 177,200 Landgrebe, Ludwig, 27, 30, 33-5 Multiplicity (and plurality), 5-6, 13, 74 Language, 23-4,38,47-8,88-9,92-3, 117- unity in multiplicity, 38, 40-3, 48, 52-3 8, 131, 188-92 of individuals, and universals, 60-3, 66 Lauer, Quentin, 29 and synthesis, 90, 92-3,111,115-6,119, Law, 4, 41-2,54, 63,67-8, 74, 81-2, 86-7, 125, 129, 143, 145, 149, 152, 156-8, 92,99-107, 114, 131, 192-3 163-6, 170, 173-4, 176, 180, 192-3, Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhe1m von, 4-5, 8, 104, 194-5, 196-7,203 131 Multi-rayed acts, 13, 92, 111-6 Levin, David Michael, 16, 19,27, 54n Murphy, Richard T., 54n Levinas, Emmanuel, 21, 34, 54n Mutual (reciprocal) grounding, 28-33, 46, Lifeworld, see Experience, lived 54n, 65-7, 80-1, 83, 86, 92, 107-8, Lifting off (setting off in relief, Abheben), 115-7, 121-3, 132, 192,202 43-4,73,76-81,85-6,91, 155, 165, 170, 180 Name (see Nominalization), 52, 88,90-2,95, Limit, 5-8, 31-2, 44, 57, 63 99-103, 109-21, 126-32, 135 of parts and wholes, 77-8, 82, 84-7 proper, 91, 95,117-8,120,127-8,131 of meanings, 99, 129 Natorp, Paul, 20, 32, 34 of synthesis, 136, 138, 140-1, 153-4, 157, Necessity, 3, 8,19,43,54,57,65,73,81,84, 167-81, 183, 194, 196 200 Logic,4,17,27,40-4,48,54n,60,67,81-2, Negation, 6, 30, 74-6, 97, 105, 144-7 86,88-9,96-8, 104-6,204 Neutrality, 137, 200 Next-contents, 2, 25-6 Margins, 22, 52, 153-4, 162-3 in wholes, 77, 80, 82, 86, 140, 148 Mastering intention (herrschende Intention), in synthesis, 151, 155-8, 163-7, 175, 147, 149, 166, 178 178-81,183-7,193-4 Matterofacts,15,17,93,99,II0,115,134- Nominalization, 93,101-2,111,117,120, 5,149 130 McKenna, William R., 25, 33 Nominalism, 89, 101 Meaning, 2, 7, 13,38-40,57,83 Non-independent parts, 75, 77-9, 92, 94, 104, ideal units of, 40-8 140 complete and incomplete, 88-108 non-independent separability, 80-1 216 INDEX

Objectivity, 2-3, 7-8, 20, 23-4, 39, 44-9, 56, Pietersma, Henry, 21-2, 35 73-4, 79, 82-7, 89 Pivcevic, Edo, 54n, 59 and fulfilment, 110-1, 130-3, 141-2, Pointing, 33, 45, 61-2, 128-31, 138 153-6, 169-72, 178, 187, 192, 199- backward, 34-5, 67, 131 200,203-4 Posit, 59, 97, 111-2, 114, 116, 163, 197, Occasional expression (see Indexing), 38, 199-201 44-9,95 Possibility, 34-4, 36, 39, 54n, 57, 64, 76, Open-endedness, 8, 16, 19,36,49 78, 89, 91-2, 130-2, 141, 145, 147, of wholes, 73-5, 82-4, 86-7 149,178,192-3,195-6,199-200 of meanings, 98, 103 Possible worlds, 25, 105 of fulfilment, 141, 145, 170, 172, 179, Predication, 24, 60, 88, 91, 94, 101-2, 111-5, 192,200 119,148,172 Order, 4, 7,42,82-6,94,104-5,114,121-2, Prescription (Vorschreiben), 36-7, 39-41, 73, 149, 157-67, 176-81, 183, 194 81, 86, 100, 127, 134, 136, 139, 142, Origins, 1-7 151, 165, 186, 190 in secondary literature, 15, 17-8, 27-8, Presence,6-7, 13, 19,34,46,87, 107, 110-1, 31-7 123-4, 128, 134-5, 141, 150, 163, of universals, 52-4, 59, 66-8 168-74, 177, 180, 183, 187 of meaning, 109-10, 113-4, 120-3 Presentation,79, 104, 109-16, 119, 121-3, in fulfilment, 159, 165-7, 179, 194, 196- 149-50,162,166-7,173 7,202-3 Presupposition (Voraussetzung), 33, 47, 52, Over- (über-), -flow (überfliessen), 26, 47, 60,65-6,78,85-7,91,106,142,144, 77-8, 151, 157, 188-9 163, 186-7, 193-4,201 -come, 49, 149, 170, 173, 177 Process, 14-15, 17-19,32,35,64-7,120, carry- (übertragen), 81, 86, 147-8, 150, 139,143,159-60,174-5,180,185-6, 156 194 other "over"-terms, 46, 77-8, 129, 155, Production, 4, 8, 17,21,32,35-7,39,52-5, 157,161,164,169,197 122, 165-6, 174-5, 184, 189-90 see also Passing over Progress, 73-4, 82-3, 121, 161-6 Projection (see Perspective, Shadowing-off), Paradox, 24, 27, 37, 65-6, 120, 144 141, 152-160 Part, 32, 43, 73-87,93,113,119,135,142-4, Proposition, 24, 43, 48, 67, 105, 110-1, 171 150, 155, 170, 179 Psychologism, 9-10, 21, 23,52-4,57,63,83, Passing over (übergehen), 1-3, 5, 25 85, 89, 97-8, 101, 110, 114 in fluctuating meanings, 44, 48 from individuals to universals, 55, 60, 64 Rationalism, 15-6,54, 103, 122, 127, 155 from parts to wholes, 73-4, 76-82, 84-7 Re-interpretation, 145-50, 178, 180, 187, from non-independent to independent 189-90, 193-4 meanings, 95, 101 Re-ordering, 177-9, 183 in syntheses of fulfilment, 135, 150, 158, Re-production, 142, 189-90 163, 167-8, 180, 183, 187, 194-5 Readiness, 39, 48-9, 60, 171 Passivity, 16-7,27-8,33-4,56,149, 196-7, Realism, 20-1 200-1 Reason, 4, 57-9, 63, 82, 163, 198,203-4 Past, 6, 33-4,111,139,151,176,179,183-4, Receptivity, 8, 17,55,58, 196, 198,200-1 187-9 Recognition, 43, 61, 64, 76, 127, 129-33, Pattern, 23-4, 63-5, 81, 137, 139-43, 156 139,141,144-5,149,179,188-93, Perspective (see Projection, Shadowing-off), 201 2, 22-3, 31-2, 45-6, 54n, 91, 150, Reduction, 20, 30, 121, 161 152-64, 166-9, 173, 175-6, 180-1, Reference, 6-8, 23-5, 35 191,201 meaning, 39-40, 45-9 Phenomenology, 1, 14-5,20-1,25,29, 34, universals, 63-6 36,54-5,61,65,82-6,97,106,110, independent, 75, 88, 90-2, 100-2 114,121-2,130,152,154,168,192, names, 111-6, 119-21 196, 198,200-3 synthesis, 127-33, 144-5, 168, 171-2 INDEX 217

Regress, 28, 42, 83 Signification, 40--2, 45, 90, 130--1, 134, Relation, 75-6, 81, 178, 202-3 163-4, 188 internal, 6, 31, 76, 100, 135 Simplicity, 4, 7, 13, 33, 36, 42, 66 Replacement (see Exchange, Substitution), of parts, 74, 84 45, 47-9, 99, 101-3, 129, 156 of expressions, 90--2, 93, 104, 109, 113, Result (Endresultat), 3, 6-7, 33, 35-7, 54, 68, 115-23 81, 125, 158, 164-81, 185-7, 189-90, in synthesis, 145, 148, 150, 185-6, 197 197 Retention, 18,96,151,163-7,175-9,183, Single-rayed acts, 13, 92, 111-7, 203 198, 201 Singularity, 5-6, 13, 41-3 Rockmore, Tom, 28-9 and universals, 53, 59, 63, 66 Rosen, Klaus, 22 in parts, 76, 80, 83 Rules, 3, 5, 15-7, 43, 58, 66, 75, 82-3, 89, in expression, 95-6, 98, 104, 111-20 99-106, 130, 141, 165 and fulfilment, 127, 130--3, 143-4, 149- 50,152,154,156-8,172-6,179,183, Scherer, Rene, 54n 197 Schrader, George A., 29 Situation, 46, 153, 197 Schuhmann, Kar!, 18, 27, 30, 32-3, 35 Skepticism, 61-2, 83, 189 Schutz, Alfred, 54n Smith, David Woodruff, and McIntyre, Science, 38, 40-4, 48, 54-5, 57-8, 61-2, 86, Ronald, 16, 23-7, 105 103, 106, 167, 192-3, 196,200--4 Sokolowski, Robert, 15-6, 18-9, 25, 27, 32, Scientia intuitiva, 57-8 73 Seebohm, Thomas, 20, 84 Souche-Dagues, D., 21, 27, 32 Seeing, 56-8 Spatiality, 45, 77-83, 85-7,140--1,143,147, Self, 192, 194 158 Self-explication, 1, 192, 194, 202-3 Spiegelberg, Herbert, 22 Self-evidence, 53, 56-8, 104, 181 Spinoza, Baruch, 56-7 Self-identity, 45,127-8,146,150,170--1, Splitting (Spaltung), 17-19,202 197,201 Stapelton, Timothy J., 20 Self-propelling, 7, 80, 86 Starting-point, 6, 21, 28, 36, 40, 46-7, 54n, Self-consciousness (and related terms), 6, 85,115,121,163,180--1,183,185-6, 29,192,194,197,201-2 193-4 Self-directing (and related terms), 6, 8, Static, 18-9, 28, 32, 129, 133-4 59,78, 194 Storage space in consciousness, 123, 153, Self-fulfilling (and related terms), 155, 187, 199-203 157 Strasser, Stephan, 30--1 Self-limiting (and related terms), 92, 153, Stream of consciousness, 2, 18,42,81-2,87, 156, 196 109-10, 123, 143, 161, 168, 188-9, Self-presence (and related terms), 46, 75, 192-3, 196-7 78, 84, 173-4, 319 Structure, 15, 17-8,43,51,64,89,99-101, Semantic, 23-4, 92, 99, 105 104-7 Sensation, 4-5, 15-7, 26-7, 52, 56, 66-7, Structuralism, 99-101, 105 77-9, 98, 110-1, 119-21, 129-30, Stumpf, Karl, 17,79 135, 150, 174, 187 Subjectivity,8-9, 16,20--1,30,32-4,36,43, Sense-data,7, 16-7,33,36,66,110,119-21, 48,73-4,83,101,113-4, 152, 178, 173 192 Separability (Ab trennung , Sonderung), 41, Sublation, 30, 75, 79 60,74-80, 105, 118-20, 137, 144-6, Substitution (Substitution) (see Exchange, 150,203-4 Replacement), 83, 99-100, 104, 129, Severing, 44, 78-9, 85 164-6 Shadowing-off (Abschattung, see Perspec­ Supplementation, demand/need for (Ergänz• tive, Projection), 154-7 ungsbedürjtigkeit), 19, 73-4, 80--3, Sides, 41, 78, 83, 139-42, 152-60, 163, 85-8, 90, 92-6, 98, 102, 111, 115, 166-7, 169-70, 173-81, 183, 186 131, 138-40, 167 218 INDEX

Surroundings, 45-6, 75-6, 80, 82, 85, 137, Units, 41-3, 54, 62, 75-6, 83, 90--2, 100, 116, 141, 156 119,122,164-7,173-4,179 Syncategorematic terms, 24, 88-108 Unity, problem of, 5-7, 25, 31 Syntax, 90, 94-6, 98, 100, 105, 111, 113 of meanings, 38-43, 48,60 Synthesis, problem of, 1-3 of universals, 53-4, 60--2 Leibniz to Husserl, 3-9 of wholes, 75-9, 83-4, 86 in secondary literature, 15-37 of independent expressions, 91, 93, 99, in First Investigation, 38-40, 42, 44, 46, 107-8 48-9 ofnamesandjudgments, 114, 117-8, 120, in Second Investigation, 51-2, 54-6, 58, 122 61-8 through synthesis, 129-30, 132-6, 144, in Third Investigation, 81, 86 146-7, 149, 151, 153, 161,163, 176- in Fourth Investigation, 88-90, 97-101, 7, 192, 194-6,201-3 103-8 Universals, 6, 15,49,51-68, 101, 126-33 in Fifth Investigation, 113-24 in Sixth Investigation, 125-95 Vagueness, 44, 47-8, 56-7, 96, 155 Husserl's uses, 39, 51, 55,102,104-5, Van Peursen, Cornelius A., 17 115-7,127,131,144,149-50,177, Variation, 45-7, 54n, 56-60, 62-4, 74-6, 83, 180, 196-8 104,118-9,137,177 System, 5-6, 8, 29, 104, 203 Viewpoint, 152-8, 163 Szilasi, Wilhelm, 30 Waldenfels, Bernhard, 16, 18,26, 31, 34- Temporality, 5-6, 27, 36, 46, 78, 82, 133-4, 5 150--1,154,178,188,196 Watson, Stephen, 29 Theme, 54n, 198-9,202-3 Web (Gewebe), 42-4, 48-9, 55, 153-4, Thetic acts, 13,27, 115-7, 197-9,202-3 193 "This", 17-8,27,38,45-7,106,128-9 Welch, E. Pari, 54n Totality, 29, 34-5, 79-80, 84,157,167,172, Welton, Donn, 17, 19,26-7, 31, 35, 105 174, 176, 180, 183, 203 Westphal, Merold, 29 Tran-Duc-Thao,20 Whole, 6, 31-2, 63, 73-87, 91,116,140, Transcendental, 5, 19-21, 27, 36, 54, 106, 142-5, 147-9, 151, 154-6, 162, 165- 122, 140, 155, 192, 198,200--1 6, 172-80, 194, 202-3 Truth, 21-2, 24, 48, 56, 127, 169-72 Withdraw (drawing back, zurückziehen), 143, conditions, 17, 23-4, 105-6 198-203 Tugendhat, Ernst, 20, 24-5, 105-6 Word, 39, 45, 47, 88, 90--8, 101-3, 128-32, Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 54n 190,193 Wordless recognition (Wortlose erkennen), Unexpressed (and unnoticed, see Wordless 188-94 recognition), 44, 52, 77-8, 96-8, 135, World interpretation, 111-2, 114, 135, 143- 146,172,188-95,199 52, 200--1 Unexperienced (and related terms), 78, 85, Wundt, Wilhelm, 17 107-8, 141-3, 155-6, 158, 167-8, 185, 192-3 Yamaguchi, Ichiro, 17, 27 Unfolding, 99, 113-4, 127-8, 164 Unification, 5, 43-4, 51, 60--2, 73-4,107-9, Zahavi, Dan, 22 114-5,118-21,133-4,143-4,148- Zurückweisen, and other zurück terms, see 50, 170, 176, 178, 183, 192-3, 196, Backward reference 202-3 Phaenomenologica

44. E. Holenstein: Phänomenologie der Assoziation. Zu Struktur und Funktion eines Grundprinzips der passiven Genesis bei E. Husser!. 1972 ISBN 90-247-1175-4 45. F. Hammer: Theonome Anthropologie? Max Schelers Menschenbild und seine Grenzen. 1972 ISBN 90-247-1186-X 46. A. Paianin: Wissenschaft und Geschichte in der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls. 1972 ISBN 90-247-1194-0 47. G.A. de Almeida: Sinn und Inhalt in der genetischen Phänomenologie E. Husserls. 1972 ISBN 90-247-1318-8 48. J. Rolland de Reneville: Aventure de l'absolu. 1972 ISBN 90-247-1319-6 49. U. Claesges und K. Held (eds.): Perspektiven transzendental-phänomenologischer Forschung. Für Ludwig Landgrebe zum 70. Geburtstag von seiner Kölner Schülern. 1972 ISBN 90-247-1313-7 50. F. Kersten and R. Zaner (eds.): Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism. Essays in Memory of Dorion Cairns. 1973 ISBN 90-247-1302-1 51. W. Biemel (ed.): Phänomenologie Heute. Festschrift für Ludwig Landgrebe. 1972 ISBN 90-247-1336-6 52. D. Souche-Dagues: Le developpement de l'intentionnalite dans la phenomenologie husserlienne. 1972 ISBN 90-247-1354-4 53. B. Rang: Kausalität und Motivation. Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Perspek­ tivität und Objektivität in der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls. 1973 ISBN 90-247-1353-6 54. E. Levinas: Autrement qu'etre ou au-delil de l'essence. 2nd. ed.: 1978 ISBN 90-247-2030-3 55. D. Cairns: Guidefor Translating Husser/. 1973 ISBN (Pb) 90-247-1452-4 56. K. Schuhmann: Die Dialektik der Phänomenologie, I. Husserl über Pfänder. 1973 ISBN 90-247-1316-1 57. K. Schuhmann: Die Dialektik der Phänomenologie, II. Reine Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie. Historisch-analytische Monographie über Husserls 'Ideen 1'. 1973 ISBN 90-247-1307-2 58. R. Williame: Les fondements phinomenologiques de la sociologie comprehensive: Alfred Schutz et Max Weber. 1973 ISBN 90-247-1531-8 59. E. Marbach: Das Problem des Ich in der Phänomenologie Husserls. 1974 ISBN 90-247-1587-3 60. R. Stevens: fames and Husser/.· The Foundations ofMeaning. 1974 ISBN 90-247-1631-4 61. H.L. van Breda (ed.): Virite et Virification / Wahrheit und Verifikation. Actes du quatrieme Colloque International de Phenomeno10gie / Akten des vierten Inter­ nationalen Kolloquiums für Phänomenologie (Schwabisch Hall, Baden-Württemberg, 8.-11. September 1969). 1974 ISBN 90-247-1702-7 62. Ph.J. Bossert (ed.): Phenomenological Perspectives. Historical and Systematic Essays in Honor of Herbert Spiegelberg. 1975. ISBN 90-247-1701-9 63. H. Spiegelberg: Doing Phenomenology. Essays on and in Phenomenology. 1975 ISBN 90-247-1725-6 64. R. Ingarden: On the Motives which Led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism. 1975 ISBN 90-247-1751-5 65. H. Kuhn, E. Ave-Lallemant and R. Gladiator (eds.): Die Münchener Phänomenologie. Vorträge des Internationalen Kongresses in München (13.-18. April 1971). 1975 ISBN 90-247-1740-X Phaenomenologica

66. D. Caims: Conversations with Husserl and Fink. Edited by the Husserl-Archives in Louvain. With a foreword by R.M. Zaner. 1975 ISBN 90-247-1793-0 67. G. Hoyos Vasquez: Intentionalität als Verantwortung. Geschichtsteleologie und Teleologie der Intentionalität bei Husser!. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1794-9 68. J. Patocka: Le Monde naturel comme probleme philosophique. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1795-7 69. W.W. Fuchs: Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Presence. An Essay in the Philosophy ofEdmund Husser!. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1822-8 70. S. Cunningham: Language and the Phenomenological Reductions of Edmund Husserl. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1823-6 71. G.C. Moneta: On Identity. A Study in Genetic Phenomenology. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1860-0 72. W. Biemel und das Husserl-Archiv zu Löwen (eds.): Die Welt des Menschen - Die Welt der Philosophie. Festschrift für Jan Patocka. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1899-6 73. M. Richir: Au-dem du renversement copemicien. La question de la phenomenologie et son fondement. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1903-8 74. H. Mongis: Heidegger et la critique de la notion de valeur. La destruction de la fondation metaphysique. Lettre-preface de . 1976 ISBN 90-247-1904-6 75. J. Taminiaux: Le regard et l'excident. 1977 ISBN 90-247-2028-1 76. Tb. de Boer: The Development of Husserl's Thought. 1978 ISBN Hb: 90-247-2039-7; Pb: 90-247-2124-5 77. R.R. Cox: Schutz's Theory of Relevance. A Phenomenological Critique. 1978 ISBN 90-247-2041-9 78. S. Strasser: Jenseits von Sein und Zeit. Eine Einführung in Emmanuel Levinas' Philosophie. 1978 ISBN 90-247-2068-0 79. R.T. Murphy: Hume and Husserl. Towards Radical Subjectivism. 1980 ISBN 90-247-2172-5 80. H. Spiegelberg: The Context of the Phenomenological Movement. 1981 ISBN 90-247-2392-2 81. J.R. Mensch: The Question of Being in Husserl's Logical Investigations. 1981 ISBN 90-247-2413-9 82. J. Loscerbo: Being and Technology. A Study in the Philsophy of Martin Heidegger. 1981 ISBN 90-247-2411-2 83. R. Boehm: Vom Gesichtspunkt der Phänomenologie 11. Studien zur Phänomenologie der Epoche. 1981 ISBN 90-247-2415-5 84. H. Spiegelberg and E. Ave-Lallemant (eds.): Pfänder-Studien. 1982 ISBN 90-247-2490-2 85. S. Valdinoci: Les fondements de la phenomenologie husserlienne. 1982 ISBN 90-247-2504-6 86. I. Yamaguchi: Passive Synthesis und Intersubjektivität bei Edmund Husserl. 1982 ISBN 90-247-2505-4 87. J. Libertson: Proximity. Levinas, Blanchot, Bataille and Communication. 1982 ISBN 90-247-2506-2 Phaenomenologica

88. D. Welton: The Origins of Meaning. A Critical Study of the Thresholds of Husserlian Phenomenology.1983 ISBN 90-247-2618-2 89. W.R. McKenna: Husserl's 'Introductions to Phenomenology'. Interpretation and Critique. 1982 ISBN 90-247-2665-4 90. lP. Miller: Numbers in Presence and Absence. A Study of Husserl's Philosophy of Mathematics. 1982 ISBN 90-247-2709-X 91. U. Meile: Das Wahmehmungsproblem und seine Verwandlung in phänomeno• logischer Einstellung. Untersuchungen zu den phänomenologischen Wahrneh­ mungstheorien von Husserl, Gurwitsch und Merleau-Ponty. 1983 ISBN 90-247-2761-8 92. W.S. Hamrick (ed.): Phenomenology in Practice and Theory. Essays for Herbert Spiegelberg. 1984 ISBN 90-247-2926-2 93. H. Reiner: Duty and Inclination. The Fundamentals of Morality Discussed and Redefined with Special Regard to Kant and Schiller. 1983 ISBN 90-247-2818-6 94. M. l Harney: Intentionality, Sense and the Mind. 1984 ISBN 90-247-2891-6 95. Kah Kyung Cho (ed.): Philosophy and Science in Phenomenological Perspective. 1984 ISBN 90-247-2922-X 96. A. Lingis: Phenomenological Explanations. 1986 ISBN Hb: 90-247-3332-4; Pb: 90-247-3333-2 97. N. Rotenstreich: Reflection and Action. 1985 ISBN Hb: 90-247-2969-6; Pb: 90-247-3128-3 98. lN. Mohanty: The Possibility ofTranscendental Philosophy. 1985 ISBN Hb: 90-247-2991-2; Pb: 90-247-3146-1 99. lJ. Kockelmans: Heideggeron Art and Art Works. 1985 ISBN 90-247-3102-X 100. E. Levinas: Collected Philosophical Papers. 1987 ISBN Hb: 90-247-3272-7; Pb: 90-247-3395-2 101. R. Regvald: Heidegger et le Probleme du Neant. 1986 ISBN 90-247-3388-X 102. I.A. Barash: Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning. 1987 ISBN 90-247-3493-2 103 lJ. Kockelmans (ed.): Phenomenological Psychology. The Dutch School. 1987 ISBN 90-247-3501-7 104. W.S. Hamrick: An Existential Phenomenology of Law: Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 1987 ISBN 90-247-3520-3 105. I.C. Sallis, G. Moneta and I. Taminiaux (eds.): The Collegium Phaenomenologium. The First Ten Years. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3709-5 106. D. Carr: Interpreting Husserl. Critical and Comparative Studies. 1987. ISBN 90-247-3505-X 107. G. Heffernan: Isagoge in die phänomenologische Apophantik. Eine Einführung in die phänomenologische Urteilslogik durch die Auslegung des Textes der Fonnalen und transzendenten Logik von Edmund Husserl. 1989 ISBN 90-247-3710-9 108. F. Volpi, l-F. Mattei, Th. Sheenan, J.-F. Courtine, I. Taminiaux, l Sallis, D. Ianicaud, A.L. Kelkel, R. Bernet, R. Brisart, K. Held, M. Haar et S. IJsseling: Heidegger et I 'Idee de la Phenomenologie. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3586-6 109. C. Singevin: Dramaturgie de I 'Esprit. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3557-2 Phaenomenologica

110. J. Patocka: Le monde naturel et le mouvement de l'existence humaine. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3577-7 111. K.-H. Lembeck: Gegenstand Geschichte. Geschichtswissenschaft in Husserls Phänomenologie. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3635-8 112. J.K. Cooper-Wiele: The Totalizing Act. Key to Husserl's Early Philosophy. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0077-7 113. S. Valdinoci: Le principe d'existence. Un devenir psychiatrique de la pheno- menologie. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0125-0 114. D. Lohmar: Phänomenologie der Mathematik. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0187-0 115. S. IJsseling (Hrsgb.): Husserl-Ausgabe und Husserl-Forschung. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0372-5 116. R. Cobb-Stevens: Husserl and Analytic Philosophy. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0467-5 117. R. Klockenbusch: Husserl und Cohn. Widerspruch, Reflexion und Telos in Phänomenologie und Dialektik. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0515-9 118. S. Vaitkus: How is Society Possible? Intersubjectivity and the Fiduciary Attitude as Problems ofthe Social Group in Mead, Gurwitsch, and Schutz. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-0820-4 119. C. Macann: Presence and Coincidence. The Transformation of Transcendental into Ontological Phenomenology. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-0923-5 120. G. Shpet: Appearance and Sense. Phenomenology as the Fundamental Science and Its Problems. Translated from Russian by Th. Nemeth. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1098-5 121. B. Stevens: L'Apprentissage des Signes. Lecture de Paul Ricreur. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1244-9 122. G. Soffer: Husserl and the Question of Relativism. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1291-0 123. G. Römpp: Husserls Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Und Ihre Bedeutung für eine Theorie intersubjektiver Objektivität und die Konzeption einer phänomeno• logischen. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1361-5 124. S. Strasser: Welt im Widerspruch. Gedanken zu einer Phänomenologie als ethischer Fundamentalphilosophie. 1991 ISBN Hb: 0-7923-1404-2; Pb: 0-7923-1551-0 125. R. P. Buckley: Husserl, Heidegger and the Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1633-9 126. 1. G. Hart: The Person and the Common Life. Studies in a Husserlian Social Ethics. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1724-6 127. P. van Tongeren, P. Sars, C. Bremmers and K. Boey (eds.): Eros and Eris. Contribu­ tions to a Hermeneutical Phenomenology. Liber Amicorum for Adriaan Peperzak. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1917-6 128. Nam-In Lee: Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie der Instinkte. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-2041-7 129. P. Burke and 1. Van der Veken (eds.): Merleau-Ponty in Contemporary Perspective. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-2142-1 130. G. Haefliger: Über Existenz: Die Ontologie Roman Ingardens. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2227-4 131. 1. Lampert: Synthesis and Backward Reference in Husserl's Logical Investigations. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3105-2 Previous volumes are still available

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