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Case: 18-16663, 03/13/2019, ID: 11226862, Dktentry: 30, Page 1 of 96 Case: 18-16663, 03/13/2019, ID: 11226862, DktEntry: 30, Page 1 of 96 No. 18-16663 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CITY OF OAKLAND, a Municipal Corporation, and The People of the State of California, acting by and through the Oakland City Attorney Barbara J. Parker; CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, a Municipal Corporation, and The People of the State of California, acting by and through the San Francisco City Attorney Dennis J. Herrera, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. B.P. P.L.C., a public limited company of England and Wales; CHEVRON CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation; CONOCOPHILLIPS, a Delaware corporation; EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, a New Jersey corporation; ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC, a public limited company of England and Wales; and DOES, 1 through 10, Defendants-Appellees. On Appeal From The United States District Court, Northern District of California Case Nos. 3:17-cv-06011-WHA, 3:17-cv-06012-WHA (Hon. William H. Alsup) PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS’ CONSOLIDATED OPENING BRIEF Barbara J. Parker, City Attorney Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney Maria Bee, Special Counsel Ronald P. Flynn, Chief Deputy Erin Bernstein, Supervising Deputy Yvonne R. Meré, Chief, Complex Litig. Malia McPherson, Deputy Matthew D. Goldberg, Deputy Oakland Office of the City Attorney Robb W. Kapla, Deputy One Frank Ogawa Plaza, 6th Floor San Francisco City Attorney’s Office Oakland, CA 94612 Fox Plaza, 7th Fl, 1390 Market Street Telephone: (510) 238-3601 San Francisco, CA 94102 Counsel for City of Oakland and Telephone: (415) 554-4748 The People of the State of California Counsel for City and County of S.F. and The People of the State of California (Additional counsel on following page) Case: 18-16663, 03/13/2019, ID: 11226862, DktEntry: 30, Page 2 of 96 Michael Rubin Victor M. Sher Barbara J. Chisholm Matthew K. Edling Rebecca Moryl Lee Sher Edling LLP Altshuler Berzon LLP 100 Montgomery Street, Suite 1410 177 Post Street, Suite 300 San Francisco, CA 94104 San Francisco, CA 94108 Telephone: (628) 231-2500 Telephone: (415) 421-7151 i Case: 18-16663, 03/13/2019, ID: 11226862, DktEntry: 30, Page 3 of 96 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1 JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ..........................................................................2 ISSUES PRESENTED...............................................................................................2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................................................................3 I. State Court Proceedings ........................................................................3 II. Federal Court Proceedings ....................................................................4 STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................................7 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................7 ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................9 I. The District Court Erred in Denying the Motions To Remand, Because the People’s Claims Do Not Present a Federal Question .......9 A. The People’s California public nuisance claims are not “governed by federal common law.” ........................................10 1. The district court erred in concluding that the People’s claims are completely preempted by a federal common law that provides no rights or remedies..........................................................................10 2. To the extent the People’s public nuisance claims can be characterized as being based on greenhouse-gas emissions, federal common law has been entirely displaced by the Clean Air Act. ........14 B. Defendants’ other asserted grounds for removal jurisdiction are meritless...........................................................18 ii Case: 18-16663, 03/13/2019, ID: 11226862, DktEntry: 30, Page 4 of 96 1. The CAA does not completely preempt the People’s California public nuisance claims..............19 2. The People’s state law claims do not present any embedded federal questions within the meaning of Grable.............................................................................20 3. There is no basis for federal officer removal. ................23 4. There is no basis for OCSLA removal. ..........................23 5. There is no basis for federal enclave jurisdiction...........25 6 There is no basis for bankruptcy jurisdiction .................26 7. There is no basis for Defendants’ untimely assertion of federal admiralty jurisdiction......................28 II. The District Court Erred in Granting Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss.......................................................29 A. The district court erred in finding no CAA displacement, given its characterization of the People’s claims as seeking to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions ........................30 B. The district court erred in its repeated assertion that the People’s public nuisance claims seek to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions.........................................................32 C. The People’s state law claims are not preempted by federal common law or the CAA. .........................................................34 D. The People’s state law claims cannot be dismissed as extraterritorial or as unduly intruding upon foreign policy. .....42 III The District Court Erred in Declining to Exercise Specific Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants ExxonMobil, BP, Royal Dutch Shell, and ConocoPhillips..............................................47 A. The People satisfied the first and second prongs......................50 iii Case: 18-16663, 03/13/2019, ID: 11226862, DktEntry: 30, Page 5 of 96 B. Defendants cannot satisfy the third prong ...............................57 C. Personal jurisdiction may, in the alternative, be based on Defendants’ nationwide contacts..............................................58 CONCLUSION........................................................................................................59 STATUTORY ADDENDUM .................................................................................61 Cal. Const. art. XI, §7. Counties and cities; ordinances and regulations; authority...............................................................................................62 Cal. Civ. Code §3479. Nuisance; what constitutes. .....................................62 Cal. Civ. Code §3480. Public nuisance. .......................................................62 Cal. Civ. Code §3491. Remedies; public. ....................................................62 Cal. Civ. Code §3494. Abatement; parties authorized.................................62 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §410.10. Basis. ...........................................................62 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §731. Nuisance; action to abate, damages; parties authorized to sue; public nuisance. .....................................................63 28 U.S.C. §1291. Final decisions of district courts......................................63 28 U.S.C. §1331. Federal question...............................................................63 28 U.S.C. §1333. Admiralty, maritime and prize cases. ..............................63 28 U.S.C. §1334. Bankruptcy cases and proceedings..................................64 28 U.S.C. §1441. Removal of civil actions. .................................................65 28 U.S.C. §1442. Federal officers or agencies sued or prosecuted..............67 28 U.S.C. §1452. Removal of claims related to bankruptcy cases. .............68 42 U.S.C. §7401. Congressional findings and declaration of purpose.........68 42 U.S.C. §7604. Citizen suits......................................................................69 43 U.S.C. § 1349. Citizens suits, jurisdiction and judicial review................73 iv Case: 18-16663, 03/13/2019, ID: 11226862, DktEntry: 30, Page 6 of 96 46 U.S.C. §30101. Extension of jurisdiction to cases of damage or injury on land.......................................................................................75 STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES...................................................................77 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.......................................................................78 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................79 v Case: 18-16663, 03/13/2019, ID: 11226862, DktEntry: 30, Page 7 of 96 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Federal Court Cases Ajuba Int’l, L.L.C. v. Saharia, 871 F.Supp.2d 671 (E.D. Mich. 2012) ................................................................43 Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1975) disapp’d on other grounds by Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Demisay, 508 U.S. 581 (1993) .......26 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) ..................................................................................... passim Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2018)...............................................................................39 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) ............................................................................................47 ARCO Envtl. Remediation, LLC v. Dept. of Health & Envtl. Quality, 213 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2000).............................................................................28 Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987)
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