Domesticating the Cold War: Household Consumption As
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Domesticating the Cold War: Household Consumption as Propaganda in Marshall Plan Germany Author(s): Greg Castillo Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 40, No. 2, Domestic Dreamworlds: Notions of Home in Post-1945 Europe (Apr., 2005), pp. 261-288 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30036324 . Accessed: 18/10/2012 17:32 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Sage Publications, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Contemporary History. http://www.jstor.org Journalof ContemporaryHistory Copyright c 2005 SAGEPublications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi,Vol 40(2), 261-288. ISSN0022-0094. DOI:10. 1177/0022009405051553 Greg Castillo Domesticating the Cold War: Household Consumption as Propaganda in Marshall Plan Germany In 1951, sociologistDavid Reismanpublished a fictitiousaccount of a bomb- ing campaign involving consumer goods rather than explosives. What US officials called 'OperationAbundance' was soon dubbed'The Nylon War' by Reisman'simaginary reporters following its initial barrageof the USSRwith women's stockings.The offensivestrategy was inspiredand devious: Behindthe initialraid of June 1 were yearsof secretand complexpreparations, and an idea of disarmingsimplicity: that if allowedto samplethe richesof America,the Russianpeople would not long toleratemasters who gave them tanksand spies insteadof vacuumcleaners and beautyparlors. The Russianrulers would thereuponbe forcedto turn out consumers' goods, or facemass discontenton an increasingscale.' OperationAbundance 'was both violentlyanti-Soviet and pro-peace',accord- ing to Reisman'sparody, and entailed 'recruitmentof top-flight production and merchandisingtalent from civilian life'. Successivewaves of air-dropped free sampleswere said to throw socialistsociety into disarray'as Soviethouse- wives saw for their own eyes Americanstoves, refrigerators,clothing and toys'. Reisman described the war's outcome as a new Soviet policy that attempted to enfranchise consumers, but strained state resources. '[T]he Russianpeople, without saying so in as many words, are now puttinga price on their collaborationwith the regime.The price- "goodsinstead of guns".'2 Less than a decade after its publication,Reisman's fiction came to seem prophetic.In the summerof 1959, Russiansgot their first taste of the US con- sumer lifestyleat the AmericanNational Exhibitionin Moscow. Advisingon exhibition strategies,Llewelyn Thompson, the US ambassadorto the USSR, proposedthat displaysshould 'endeavorto make the Sovietpeople dissatisfied with the share of the Russian pie which they now receive'.3Consequently, the show's perfunctorysampling of American'high culture'was dwarfed by a consumer spectacle which showcased cosmetics, clothing, televisions, kitchens, soft drinks, mail order catalogues, fibreglass canoes and sailing- boats, automobilesand a prefabricatedsuburban house. Sovietpremier Nikita 1 David Reisman, 'The Nylon War' in Abundance for What? And Other Essays (Garden City, NY 1964), 67. I wish to thankGy6rgy Peteri for bringingthis essayto my attention. 2 Ibid., 68, 69, 73. 3 Llewelyn Thompson quoted in Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain. Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (New York 1998), 167. 262 Journalof ContemporaryHistory Vol 40 No 2 Khrushchevseemed testy on the firstof his two visits.He lost his composure whenconfronted by the 1100sq. ft tracthome, dubbed 'Splitnik' by American journalistsfor the rampsplitting the structurein half to allow crowdsof visitorsto moveunimpeded past the furnishedinteriors. Arriving at Splitnik's lemon-yellow,all-electric, GE kitchen, Khrushchev and his tour guide,Vice- PresidentRichard M. Nixon,confronted each other. Khrushchev declared that the US had no exclusivefranchise on advanceddomestic technology and claimedpreposterously that 'all of our houseshave this kindof equipment'.' Humiliatedby inadequacieson the Russianhome front, the Sovietpremier madea rashwager: 'In anotherseven years we will be on the samelevel as America.When we catchup withyou, while passing by we will waveto you.'" Officialsin Washingtonwere ecstatic,proclaiming the exhibition'probably the mostproductive single psychological [warfare] effort ever launched by the US in anycommunist country'.' Althoughhistorians sometimes credit the KitchenDebate with inducting modelhomes and household goods into the ColdWar, the American National Exhibitionwas the partingvolley of a successfulpropaganda campaign rather thanits openingshot. The US State Department had begun developing domes- tic consumptionas a propagandaweapon ten yearsearlier in dividedBerlin, a cityreconstructed as a set of competingideological showcases. Just as singular as the constructionof a habitablemetonym for Europe'spartition was the opportunityto constructa dailylife thattransgressed Cold War boundaries. Untilthe infamousWall went up in 1961,Berlin's socialist capital and capital- ist metropolismet at relativelyopen border crossings. Especially at thepeak of WestGerman unemployment in 1950, WestBerliners shopped in the 'Second World'for cheapgoods at favourableexchange rates.' East Berliners crossed overto the 'FirstWorld' for nylonsand jeans, or to takein a Hollywoodfilm at a matinee.8Propagandists from both sides, inspired by the waysconsumers exploitedBerlin's oddness for theirown ends,devised new strategies to reach audiencesacross the city's sector boundaries.9 Justas in Reisman's'Operation Abundance', household goods exhibitions sponsoredby the MarshallPlan in West Berlinrecruited 'top-flight' civilian talents,including Edgar Kaufmann Jr, design curator at New York'sMuseum 4 Khrushchev quoted in Hixson, Parting the Curtain, op. cit., 179. 5 Robert H. Haddow, Pavilions of Plenty. Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s (Washington, DC and London 1997), 215. 6 1960 USIA Annual Report, quoted in Hixson, Parting the Curtain, op. cit., 210. 7 Katherine Pence, 'The Myth of a Suspended Present. Prosperity's Painful Shadow in 1950s East Germany' in Paul Betts and Greg Eghigian, Pain and Prosperity. Reconsidering Twentieth- Century German History (Stanford, CA 2003), 153. 8 Uta G. Poiger, Jazz, Rock and Rebels. Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA 2000), 2. 9 Paul Steege uses the term 'messy location' in the context of the Cold War imperative to segre- gate ideological realms, to describe Berlin's geopolitical site. Paul Steege, 'Making the Cold War. Everyday Symbolic Practice in Postwar Berlin' at the 'Revising Alltagsgeschichte', paper presented at the German Studies Association Conference, New Orleans 2003. Castillo:Domesticating the ColdWar 263 of ModernArt (MoMA).They were assistedin their effortsby a federal employee,Peter G. Harnden.A California-bornarchitect, Harnden's wartime workas a US ArmyIntelligence officer was followedby a postwarcareer in exhibitiondesign and production- first for the MarshallPlan and later workingunder Federal sponsorship as an independentconsultant based in Paris.His useof modelhomes to promotethe US political economy was honed in occupiedGermany and culminateda decadelater in Moscow.The path towardKhrushchev's humiliating encounter with a lemon-yellowkitchen can be traceddirectly back to USpropaganda spectacles staged in WestBerlin. JohnConnelly has noted that 'the precise function of the openborder is one of the mostpressing questions in the historicalsociology of the GDR'.1'In an erabefore television could beam images of Westernlifestyles directly into East Germanhomes, the US StateDepartment exploited the geopoliticalanomaly of dividedBerlin to exposecitizens of theWest and East to householdexhibi- tions trumpetingthe MarshallPlan's social contract, which conflated demo- cratic freedomwith risingprivate consumption. US-sponsored exhibitions were scheduleddeliberately to coincidewith major socialistholidays, a strategywhich exploited the ease with whichEast Berlinerscould visit the city's westernhalf beforethe constructionof the infamousWall in 1961. MarshallPlan shows poached attendance from East Berlin's political rallies, whichwere stocked with crowdsshipped in fromacross the socialistnation. Bargain-rateadmissions for those holdingEast Germanidentity cards pro- videdan addedincentive for a daytrip to the capitalistwest, andallowed US officialsto keepa precisetally of socialistvisitors. To competewith the 1951 WorldFestival of SocialistYouth (Weltfestspiele), for example,Marshall Plan propagandistsintroduced colour television and projection-screen broadcasting to Europe.US techniciansbroadcast a programmeof live entertainmentvia closedcircuit to televisionsets displayedin shopwindows and to two large outdoorprojection screens, one at PotsdamerPlatz, just a blockfrom the East Berlinborder. Crowds began to gatherat 2 p.m.to claimperches atop piles of wartimerubble to securean unobstructedview of the eveningtelecast. This mediated,real-time communion with televisionviewers in outdoorlocations acrossWest Berlin was the MarshallPlan's