Monitoring and Research Report on the Gacaca Trials of Offences
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Monitoring and Research Report on the Gacaca Trials of offences against property committed during the genocide : a conflict between the theory of reparation and the social and economic reality in Rwanda With support from the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Direction of Development, and the Cooperation Suisse (DDC) July 2007 PRI - Gacaca Report – July 2007 PRI addresses PRI London First Floor 60-62 Commercial Street London E1 6LT Tel.: +44 (0) 20 7247 6515 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7377 8711 [email protected] PRI Rwanda BP 370 Kigali, Rwanda Tel.: +250 51 86 64 Fax: +250 51 86 41 [email protected] Web-site address: www.penalreform.org All comments on, and reactions to, this work are welcome. Do not hesitate to contact us at the above addresses. The information presented in this document was collected thanks to the entire PRI team in Rwanda, to whom we extend our gratitude for their work. PRI - Gacaca Report – July 2007 Summary Right from the outset, decisions by the Gacaca Courts at "Cell" and "Sector" levels in matters relating to property offences Gacaca during the genocide (looting, destruction of and damage to real estate and personal property) have proved to be a problem area and continue to give rise to numerous disputes for various reasons. Firstly, the large-scaled looting which took place during the 1994 tragedy and which, to a large extent, was organised from the top down, constitute a complex set of events. Although many people were involved in one way or another, the extent of each individual's responsibility varied widely. On the one hand, some members of the attaques stole and destroyed not only in order to acquire wealth for themselves, but also in the hope that by doing so they would wipe out all trace of the victims of the genocide. This formed part of the extermination plan and from that point of view, looting were an integral part of the genocide. On the other hand, whereas some individuals looted and benefited from the chaos in that they improved their standard of living by appropriating property that appeared to have been abandoned, others did so simply to survive when the general insecurity had made it impossible to farm the land. These two latter groups looted without agreeing to or forming part of the genocide plan. Consequently, it is not easy to determine the degree of each individual’s responsibility. There is a further complication in that there was a second round of looting which took place whilst the owners were in exile and some of them have been unable to recover their property since returning to Rwanda. Today, they feel frustrated because they can't claim their property in Gacaca proceedings and yet they themselves may be ordered to make repayments to the very people who were implicated in that second round of looting. A third problem is that upon their return from exile, some of the survivors received payment in respect of their property either as a result of a procedure known as the entente, (“friendly settlement”) or as a result of pressure by the authorities. Today, they may feel frustrated because they believe that what they received then is insufficient compared to what is currently being repaid at the outcome of a Gacaca hearing. So, some of them seek to reopen their claims. The absence of written evidence of the ententes makes it difficult to prove that they ever took place. Thirteen years after the events, the Gacaca Courts are faced with a very difficult task, further complicated by the fact that the procedure under the law on property offences itself may cause problems. The authorities contend that the Gacaca proceedings should only be used where parties have failed to reach a friendly settlement. Nevertheless, since the introduction of the formalised Gacaca procedure, there have been many instances where the intervention of the Gacaca courts in these ententes has been so far-reaching that the entente procedure is beginning to look like the more formal court proceedings. Two further major elements cause serious problems at the hearings. Firstly, the law provides that where the looter is absent (because he is dead, in exile or in prison - and there are a great number of these cases), he can still be tried and his or her heirs, or those who have taken over his or her business, must make the repayments. Inevitably this leads to disputes if the value of the property left by the looter is less than the sum ordered by way of repayment, or when the property has already been divided between members of the family. PRI - Gacaca Report – July 2007 Secondly, the use of the in absentia procedure means that the defendant’s mens rea (the defendant’s intent to commit the offence(s) (s)he is charged with) is not considered. Even where a defendant is represented at the hearing by members of his/her family, these often do not know what the defendant did or didn’t do and are therefore unable to run any defence. Furthermore, there may have been a series of events. For example, a house may have been looted on a number of successive occasions by a number of different people. This makes it difficult to establish who took what. The courts’ way of dealing with this is often to first find the value of the property at issue and then divide that value in equal parts by the number of co- defendants. The net result is that a person who has participated in the destruction of a house and who took a great number of personal belongings, may end up having to repay the same amount of money as a person who arrived last on the scene and took a bowl or some wood from the debris so as to be able to cook a meal. It is also worth bearing in mind that a number of these judgments are given at Cell level, the lowest level in the Gacaca proceedings and that the Panel, which is made up of lay judges, may find it difficult to cope with a procedure that changes continually. Once an order has been made, its enforcement may also run into problems. Decisions relating to property offences are usually expressed in monetary terms. Given that the people of Rwanda live in extreme poverty and that the sums ordered by way of compensation for loss of valuable property (houses, livestock, mattresses, etc.) are often quite considerable, the majority of those ordered to make repayments are unable to comply with such orders. Where that is the case, the law offers two "solutions". Firstly, a court can order confiscation or forfeiture of property. Since in Rwanda the property in question is usually land or livestock, such an order may then plunge people into even greater poverty as they lose not only tangible property but above all their main means of survival. Secondly, the court may order that the repayment be made in the form of work carried out for the benefit of the victim. This is contrary to international law and, in our view, could pose a serious social threat. Although the factual circumstances are difficult and complex, we believe that there may be a way of easing the tension which would also, to some extent, satisfy both the victims and those looters who did not commit any killings. That solution is compensation in respect of the loss of loved ones and of the loss of property, and this solution has been available since 1996. However, recent political developments show that the authorities are now considering setting up a social help funds on the same model as the earlier FARG (Fonds d’Assistance aux Rescapés du Génocide, the Help Funds for the Survivors of the Genocide) and have abandoned the whole concept of compensation. Yet, compensation might have been one way of helping Rwanda to move towards a more peaceful cohabitation by taking the edge off the disputes caused by, amongst others, Category 3 (property) offences. PRI - Gacaca Report – July 2007 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Summary ...................................................................................................................................2 METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................................5 PREFACE.................................................................................................................................7 The Loi organique N° 10/2007 of 01/03/2007 .......................................................................7 Speed at the expense of quality and fairness..........................................................................7 Life sentences: Gacaca Courts are now competent to impose the maximum sentence.....8 Introduction............................................................................................................................15 PART ONE.............................................................................................................................18 Genocide and exile as aggravating factors in property disputes ........................................18 Identifying the looters: a common problem.........................................................................31 Redistributing the victims’ land............................................................................................33 PART II –................................................................................................................................51 PROPERTY OFFENCES BEFORE THE GACACA COURTS ......................................51 More lenient sentences and reparation: in search of restorative justice?...........................52 A preference for "friendly settlements"................................................................................53