This Time Its Real: the End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana
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International Studies Quarterly (2012), 1–11 This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana Christopher Layne Texas A & M University Before the Great Recession’s foreshocks in fall 2007, most American security studies scholars believed that uni- polarity—and perforce American hegemony—would be enduring features of international politics far into the future. However, in the Great Recession’s aftermath, it is apparent that much has changed since 2007. Predic- tions of continuing unipolarity have been superseded by premonitions of American decline and geopolitical transformation. The Great Recession has had a two-fold impact. First, it highlighted the shift of global wealth—and power—from West to East, a trend illustrated by China’s breathtakingly rapid rise to great power status. Second, it has raised doubts about the robustness of US primacy’s economic and financial underpin- nings. This article argues that the Aunipolar moment is over, and the Pax Americana—the era of American ascendancy in international politics that began in 1945—is fast winding down. This article challenges the con- ventional wisdom among International Relations ⁄ Security Studies scholars on three counts. First, it shows that contrary to the claims of unipolar stability theorists, the distribution of power in the international system no longer is unipolar. Second, this article revisits the 1980s’ debate about American decline and demonstrates that the Great Recession has vindicated the so-called declinists of that decade. Finally, this article takes on the Ainstitutional lock-in argument, which holds that by strengthening the Pax Americana’s legacy institutions, the United States can perpetuate the essential elements of the international order it constructed following World War II even as the material foundations of American primacy erode. Before the Great Recession’s foreshocks in the fall trated by China’s breathtakingly rapid rise to great- of 2007, most American security studies scholars power status. Second, it has raised doubts about the believed that unipolarity—and perforce American robustness of the economic and financial underpin- hegemony—would be enduring features of interna- nings of the United States’ primacy. tional politics far into the future. Judging from some In this article, I argue that the ‘‘unipolar important recently published books and articles, moment’’ is over, and the Pax Americana—the era of many of them still do, the Great Recession notwith- American ascendancy in international politics that standing (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008; Zakaria 2008; began in 1945—is fast winding down. I challenge the Special Issue on Unipolarity 2009; Norrlof 2010).1 conventional wisdom among International Rela- Leading American policymakers, too, cling to the tions ⁄ security studies scholars on three counts. First, belief that US hegemony is robust. In August 2010, I show that, contrary to the claims of unipolar stabil- for example, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pro- ity theorists, the distribution of power in the interna- claimed a ‘‘new American moment’’ that will lay the tional system no longer is unipolar. Second, I revisit ‘‘foundations for lasting American leadership for the 1980s’ debate about American decline and dem- decades to come’’ (quoted in Kessler 2010). Even onstrate that the Great Recession has vindicated the those who grudgingly concede that US hegemony so-called declinists of that decade. Finally, I take on will end—sometime in the distant future—contend the ‘‘institutional lock-in’’ argument, which holds that the post–World War II Pax Americana will that by strengthening the Pax Americana’s legacy endure even if American primacy does not (Ikenber- institutions, the United States can perpetuate the ry 2001, 2011; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008). essential elements of the international order it con- In the Great Recession’s aftermath, it is apparent structed following World War II even as the material that much has changed since 2007. Predictions of foundations of American primacy erode. continuing unipolarity have been superseded by pre- This article unfolds as follows. First, I discuss the monitions of American decline and geopolitical competing claims made since the early 1990s by transformation. The Great Recession has had a two- balance-of-power theorists and proponents of unipo- fold impact. First, it highlighted the shift of global lar stability about how long the post–Cold War uni- wealth—and power—from West to East, a trend illus- polar distribution of power in the international system would last. Second, I look at how the rise of 1 China has undercut the claims of unipolar stability Notwithstanding his book’s deceptive title, Zakaria’s actual argument theory. Third, I look at the economic and fiscal driv- is that the United States will remain the ‘‘pivotal power’’ in international politics for a long time because there is ‘‘still a strong market for American ers of American decline. Fourth, I ask whether the power, for both geopolitical and economic reasons. But even more cen- Pax Americana can outlive the US hegemony on trally, there remains a strong ideological demand for it’’ (Zakaria which it was based. 2008:234). Layne, Christopher. (2012) This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00704.x Ó 2012 International Studies Association 2 This Time It’s Real (Brooks and Wohlforth 2002, 2008). The second, The Post–Cold War Debate about Unipolarity essentially a balance-of-threat argument, is that by The Soviet Union’s implosion transformed the bipo- practicing self-restraint, demonstrating sensitivity for lar Cold War international system into a unipolar sys- others’ interests, and acting through multilateral tem in which the United States—as senior US institutions, the United States can allay others’ fears officials never tired of pointing out—was the ‘‘sole that it will use its hegemonic power for self-aggran- remaining superpower.’’ Unipolarity objectively dizing purposes (Mastanduno 1997; Walt 1997, described the post–Cold War distribution of power 2005). The third prong is that the United States’ in the international system. At the same time, pre- ‘‘soft power’’—the attractiveness of its ideology and serving the United States’ hegemonic role in a uni- culture—draws others into its orbit (Nye 2002). polar world has been the overriding grand strategic objective of every post-Cold War administration from From the Unipolar Moment to the Unipolar Exit George H. W. Bush’s to Barack Obama’s. Since the Cold War’s end, US security studies scholars have Some twenty years after the Cold War’s end, it now been preoccupied by unipolarity and have debated is evident that both the 1980s declinists and the uni- its implications. This debate has focused on two key polar pessimists were right after all. The Unipolar questions: ‘‘How long will unipolarity last?’’ and ‘‘Is Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun. the maintenance of hegemony a wise grand strategy The Great Recession has underscored the reality of for the United States?’’ US decline, and only ‘‘denialists’’ can now bury their In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, a heads in the sand and maintain otherwise. To be few scholars—notably Christopher Layne and Ken- sure, the Great Recession itself is not the cause either neth Waltz—argued that unipolarity would be a of American decline or the shift in global power, short-lived transitional phase from bipolarity to mul- both of which are the culmination of decades-long tipolarity (Layne 1993; Waltz 1993). Unipolarity, they processes driven by the big, impersonal forces of his- argued, would spur the emergence of new great tory. However, it is fair to say the Great Recession powers to act as counterweights to US hegemony. has both accelerated the causal forces driving these These unipolar pessimists also questioned the trends and magnified their impact. wisdom of making the preservation of US domi- There are two drivers of American decline, one nance in a unipolar world the overriding goal of the external and one domestic. The external driver of United States’ post-Cold War grand strategy. Point- US decline is the emergence of new great powers in ing to a long historical record, they argued that fail- world politics and the unprecedented shift in the ure is the fate of hegemons. The hegemonic bids of center of global economic power from the Euro- the Habsburgs (under Charles V and Philip II), Atlantic area to Asia. In this respect, the relative France (under Louis XIV and Napoleon), and Ger- decline of the United States and the end of unipo- many (under Wilhelm II and Adolph Hitler) were larity are linked inextricably: the rise of new great all defeated by the resistance of countervailing alli- powers—especially China—is in itself the most tangi- ances, and by the consequences of their own strate- ble evidence of the erosion of the United States’ gic overextension. In a unipolar world, the unipolar power. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. Domes- pessimists argued, the United States would not be tically, the driver of change is the relative—and in immune from this pattern of hegemonic failure. some ways absolute—decline in America’s economic However, from the Soviet Union’s collapse until the power, the looming fiscal crisis confronting the Uni- Great Recession, unipolar pessimism was a distinctly ted States, and increasing doubts about the dollar’s minority view among security studies scholars and long-term hold on reserve currency status. US policymakers, and the conventional wisdom has Unipolarity’s demise marks the end of era of the been that unipolarity and US hegemony will last for post-World War II Pax Americana. When World War a very long time. II ended, the United States, by virtue of its over- Unipolar optimists have maintained, and still do, whelming military and economic supremacy, was that the United States will buck the historical trend incontestably the most powerful actor in the interna- of hegemonic failure for two reasons.