Interpretation A JOURNAL A OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY Winter 2000-2001 Volume 28 Number 2

119 Lee Ward Rhetoric and Natural Rights in Algernon Sidney's Discourses Concerning Government

147 Ian Donaldson Democratic Theory and the Significance of Walter Kaufmann's Aristotelian Nietzsche

Book Reviews

165 Scott R. Hemmenway The Paradox of Political Socrates' Philosophy: Philosophic Trial, by Jacob Howland

173 Harrison Sheppard What, Then, Is Time?, by Eva Brann

181 Susan Orr Philosopher at Work: Essays by Yves R. Simon, edited by Anthony O. Simon Interpretation

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Inquiries: (Ms.) Joan Walsh, Assistant to the Editor interpretation , Queens College, Flushing, N.Y 1 1367-1597, U.S.A. (718)997-5542 Fax (718) 997-5565 E Mail: interpretation [email protected] Rhetoric and Natural Rights in Algernon Sidney's Discourses Concerning Government

Lee Ward Kenyon College

Algernon Sidney's Discourses Concerning Government present something of a paradox for the modern reader. On the one hand, they were widely recognized in the eighteenth century as being among the seminal texts of early modern constitutionalism (Montesquieu, 1989, pp. 159-60; Wood, 1972, p. 298; Tren- chard and Gordon, 1995, pp. 188-94, 262-66; Karsten, 1978; Houston, 1991, chap. 6; Adams, 1971, p. 598; Jefferson, 1984, p. 479). On the other hand, until recently Sidney's work suffered from a widespread neglect among scholars of the history of political thought. The Discourses have received only cursory and generally dismissive treatment in the accounts of many notable twentieth- century commentators (e.g., Sabine, 1937, p. 514, and Pocock, 1975, pp. 420- 21). Even Sidney's more enthusiastic commentators criticize the lack of clarity and poor organization of the Discourses (e.g., Fink, 1962, p. 164). Happily, there has been a revival of interest in Sidney over the last two decades. This renewed interest, however, has not produced a consensus regarding the character of Sid ney's political thought. He has been identified variously as a Christian-Aristote lian, a classical republican, a Machiavellian republican, and as an exponent of a hybrid of these strands of thought (Brown, 1984; Fink, 1962; Pangle, 1988, pp. 64-65; Wood, 1972; Sidney, 1996, West's introduction, pp. xxiii-xxv; Nel son, 1993; Scott, 1991; Worden, 1985). While all of these elements are present in the Discourses, in the current debate among Sidney scholars his status as a natural rights thinker has been largely underappreciated (two notable and valu able exceptions are Houston, 1991, and Sullivan, forthcoming). This study will attempt to address this issue. In order to demonstrate Sidney's standing as a modern natural rights thinker we must overcome a central difficulty. The Discourses is a notoriously dense and voluminous book and inasmuch as Sidney offers it as a detailed refutation of the divine right monarchist Robert Filmer, it appears to contain no rhetorical structure or internal design independent of Filmer's unsystematic presentation in Patriarcha. In the course of his refutation of Filmer, Sidney presents and defends positions consistent with Christian-Aristotelianism and classical as well as Machiavellian republicanism. While this situation does invite the cacophony of interpretive voices that we hear in Sidney scholarship today, I argue that Sidney's modern natural rights teaching can be identified by paying careful

interpretation, Winter 2000-2001, Vol. 28, No. 2 120 Interpretation

the attention to the plan of the book and the movement of the argument in Discourses.

complex. he sought to Sidney's rhetorical strategy in this work was First, defend the doctrine of natural liberty against divine right theory. Filmer was a in a highly polemical writer who vigorously opposed and critiqued, typically disjointed and unsystematic fashion, practically every strand of thought in the natural liberty school of the mid-seventeenth century. This diverse body of thought, including Jesuit scholasticism, classical and Machiavellian republican ism, as well as the natural jurisprudence of Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes, was by no means univocal in the specifics of consent theory. The natural liberty school was, however, united in its opposition to divine right and in its support for the general principle of consent. With his critique of Filmer, Sidney sought to locate his own defense of the Whig position in England within the broad spectrum of the loosely aligned natural liberty camp. As such, he defended several theoretical positions, such as those commonly ascribed to him, which were grounded on that doctrine. By this Sidney hoped to demonstrate the nov elty, indeed the perversity, of Filmer's position by showing its hostility to the commonly accepted doctrine of natural liberty central to so many influential strands of thought in seventeenth-century Europe. Sidney's second and more fundamental aim was to use this defense of tradi tional notions of natural liberty in order to introduce, by means of these estab lished and respectable premises, his more radical version of that doctrine: a modem theory of natural rights. Like Locke, Sidney was not insensitive to the potential personal dangers and political disadvantages attached to his argument being publicly associated with the modern natural rights theories of the "justly decried" Hobbes and Spinoza. (For Locke's public disassociation of his work with that of Hobbes and Spinoza, see Locke, 1988, p. 74; and for good discus sions of Locke's famous caution, see Cox, 1960, pp. 1-44; Pangle, 1988, pp. 132-38; Strauss, 1953, pp. 206-9, 220, 246; Zuckert, 1974, pp. 544-64, 1977, pp. 55-66.) In the politically charged climate of Exclusion-era England, Sidney saw the necessity to devise a rhetorical strategy somewhat obscuring the radical character of his rights theory. The plan of the Discourses allowed him to make the case for natural rights in a manner possessing broader political appeal than that of the publicly condemned works of his philosophical kindred spirits Machi avelli, Hobbes and Spinoza. In effect, Sidney turned Filmer's eclectic combat- iveness to his own rhetorical advantage by using this defense of the natural liberty doctrine broadly conceived as a more or less respectable and largely unobjectionable platform for his own more radical position. Sidney guides his reader through carefully calibrated arguments from a moderate antiabsolutist stance to an increasingly populist version of consent theory and natural rights. shall argue that the first two of I the book's three lengthy chapters advance arguments and positions which are modified in Sidney's subsequent discussion. the phase of his of In initial refutation Robert Filmer, Sidney defends two major Rhetoric and Natural Rights in Algernon Sidney 121 alternatives to divine right monarchy: Christian-Aristotelian consent theory and classical republicanism. In the latter portion of the work, however, Sidney modi fies and ultimately rejects these traditional models of political thought in favor of a distinctly modern natural rights teaching paralleling and deeply influenced by Machiavelli, Hobbes and Spinoza. The unfolding and increasingly radical character of Sidney's argument culminates in a defense of liberal democratic republicanism, which he advances in his presentation of a reformed English Constitution informed by a constitutional theory rooted in popular sovereignty and radical legislative supremacy.

THE TRADITIONAL CASE FOR CONSENT

In chapter 1 of the Discourses Sidney defends the principle of consent against his divine right opponent Robert Filmer. He presents monarchy as only one of several regimes available to satisfy the needs and aspirations of naturally free and equal beings. In doing so, he expounds a theory of natural liberty broadly Christian- consistent with the Aristotelianism of Filmer's two most direct antago

nists, the influential Jesuit scholastics Francisco Suarez and Roberto Bellarmine (Filmer, 1991, pp. 3-6, 15-19). Like them, Sidney advances the argument for government founded on the consent of the naturally free and equal multitude. Moreover, Sidney endorses the Aristotelian position that the purpose of govern ment is to promote the common good by facilitating the development and per fection of the rational faculties of the members of the polity. In the first chapter Sidney defends the proposition that while political society is a product of con sent, it is nonetheless in a crucial sense natural to human beings as the form of association most conducive to promoting the distinctly human rational and polit ical nature. Sidney's refutation of divine right theory begins with a response to Filmer's position that just as Adam's dominion over humankind in Genesis rested on his

flesh," position as the universal "father of all so too must all political rulers originally have been Adam's direct descendents (Filmer, 1991, pp. 6-7). Sid ney's response is multi-layered. First, he denies that any consistent reading of dominion" scripture supports Adam's "natural and private over creation (Hous ton, 1991, p. 104). Sidney disputes Filmer's claim that Adam's unique creation directly by God is a sign of his sovereignty. Rather, Sidney contends that whether the creation had been of a single man or a multiplicity, "they had all

one" been equal, unless God had given preference to (Sidney, 1996, 1.7.24; hereafter in notes chapter, section and, where appropriate, page number). Father hood, Sidney claims, signified no such preference. The bare fact that "every family" man should be chief of his does not in any degree "signify an absolute

power." The existence of paternal power does not contradict natural liberty. Sidney maintains that far from elevating Adam above the rest of humankind, 122 Interpretation

gave to scripture actually suggests this primal equality: "the same law that my and had a father a power over me, gives me the like over my children, if I

children" thousand brothers each of them would have the same over their (1.6.22). It is important to note that while rejecting Filmer's absolute monarchy, Sidney fundamentally agrees with the patriarchal family. Whereas Sidney sees the subjection of children ending upon their reaching the age of reason (2.2.88), 1.18.59-61). he consistently denies the political capacities of women (e.g., Thus, throughout the work, when Sidney speaks of the sovereignty of the peo ple, he means exclusively adult males (cf. Houston, 1991, pp. 106-8). Sidney contends that scripture's Adam differs greatly from that of Filmer. In addition Sidney claims that even if Adam had an absolute right, his heirs did not. For example, scripture never suggests that the fratricide Cain "had any

posterity" dominion over his brethren, or their (2.2.89). Scripture, moreover, affords little help in determining the political status of Adam's heirs. The Bi ble's obscurity about what passed between the creation and the Rood means it

elder." is "not easy to determine, whether Shem or Japheth were the Sidney contends that if scripture had intended to teach the absolute right of Adam's heirs, it would have said so plainly rather than "leave us in a dark labyrinth,

precipices" full of (1.8.25-26, 1.6.23). The uncertainty in tracing the descent of Adam's line, he charges, ensures that even if scripture did intend to teach the supreme right of Adam's heirs to rule, they cannot be known in any reliable way in the present. In this opening salvo against Filmer, Sidney demonstrates both that scripture offers no political right to Adam and his heirs and that pater

nal power does not contradict natural liberty. Sidney also tries to prove that scripture does not even fully support Filmer's conception of the patriarchal family. First, he argues that while it endorsed patri archal rule in the family, it did not extend this into a model legitimating absolute monarchy (1.8.26). By the very fact that the Bible chronicles the establishment of the Hebrew regime under Moses and the later monarchy under Saul, scripture relegated patriarchal government to a very distant and primitive past. Sidney claims: "We may reasonably affirm, that mankind is forever obliged to use no

other clothes than leather breaches, like Adam; . . as to think all nations forever families" obliged to be governed as they govern their (1.6.22-23). Second, Sid ney excoriates Filmer's attempt to ground the practice of primogeniture in scrip ture. Filmer lauded primogeniture as the model for the transmission of political right most consistent with the pattern of subjection established by Adam's do minion (Filmer, 1991, pp. 6-7). Sidney points to the many obvious deviations from this rule in scripture, such as God's election of Moses before his elder

brother Aaron and Jacob's surpassing of Esau. The evidence in scripture gener ally contradicts Filmer's model, but even if it were only a rare instance, Sidney affirms: "If one deviation from it were lawful, another might be, and so to infinity." If primogeniture were sacrosanct, Moses, Joshua, David and Solomon would never have ruled (1.13.37, 2.4.93). Sidney strongly suggests that most of Rhetoric and Natural Rights in Algernon Sidney 123 the Bible's great figures came to prominence not by their status as the eldest heirs but on some other basis of selection to rule. Sidney responds that Filmer's providentialism all rulers are or "are to be

reputed" as Adam's heirs is simply a veil for justifying usurpation (Filmer, 1991, p. 9). It is as much as to accuse God of being the architect of violence and chaos. Sidney identifies Filmer's chief error as his inability to distinguish paternal power from political right. Paternal power is a natural one arising from the benefits conferred to children through education and nurturing. As a natural power connected to generation, it is not transferable to others or capable of being seized by force. Sidney claims: "The right of a father can only belong to

so" him that is (1.9.30, 1.17). Filmer's attempt to ground political right on the incommunicable paternal power leads him to justify the most brazen defactoism: whoever has power must be God's chosen, by the very fact that he has the power. Sidney maintains that Filmer's patriarchal-divine right theory contains a fatal contradiction. Paternal right belongs only to biological fathers, or perhaps surrogate fathers, but political power only belongs either to legitimate rulers sanctioned by the consent of the people or to violent usurpers who seize rule by force. Political rule cannot arise through generation and paternal rule cannot derive from consent or force. They reflect mutually exclusive sources of right and thus produce very different forms of authority. According to Sidney, Filmer's refusal to ground political rule on the principle of consent logically leads to the most destructive consequences for political life.

many" The only two ways to come "to command are through consent or by force. In delegitimating consent, Filmer encourages force. By the principle of consent, Sidney argues, "every man be free, till he enter into such a society as

good" he chuseth for his own (1.12.35). Consent includes the power to compre

stock" hend one's own good in the "common of the community and the right both to elevate one to rule over the community and to limit the power of these rulers (1.12.36, 1.11.32). For Sidney, consent proves to be compatible with so

ciety. Force, on the other hand, produces slavery. Sidney reveals that "by the name of slave we understand a man, who can neither dispose of his person or his

master." goods, but enjoys all at the will of his He draws from this that "there

slave" is no such thing in nature as a (1.5.17). Sidney posits force or usurpation as the antipode of consent and slavery as the antithesis of rightful political subjection. His general rhetorical strategy in this discussion is not unlike that of Bellarmine and Suarez. Like them, Sidney wants to demonstrate that natural liberty is not an anarchic doctrine, rather it is the violation of the principle of consent, which introduces confusion and misery. The Christian-Aristotelians whom Sidney seems to support in chapter 1 were concerned to assert the com patibility of natural liberty with society, in an attempt to refute the antinomian Christian sects of the period (cf. Bellarmine, 1928, p. 9). Filmer's presentation

of a communicable source of political right independent of the consent of the 124 Interpretation

governed is an encouragement to villains and usurpers. The prize of sole claim

passions of to the title of God's chosen, Sidney cautions, can only inflame the bold and violent men and lead to the kind of destructive controversies typical of the Roman Empire. In contrast to the moderating effect of consent theory, Sidney charges that by Filmer's doctrine no European monarch is legitimate because none can demonstrate his direct descent from Adam's line and none is as absolute as Filmer requires (1.18.52; cf. 1.16.50). Sidney proposes that re gimes founded on consent, whether monarchical or otherwise, contain an inter nal stability rooted in the support of the community. Divine right, on the other hand, Sidney presents as a recipe for confusion that "goes directly against the

scripture" letter and spirit of the (1.19.67). Sidney's main effort in chapter 1 is dedicated to the proof of natural liberty a priori. He claims the "principle of liberty in which God created us ... is writ

man" ten in the hearts of every (1.2.8). To demonstrate the self-evidence of natural liberty, Sidney indicates that even such bitter theological and political foes as the Jesuit scholastics and the Puritan divines agree on this fundamental proposition. Although liberty consists "in an independency upon the will of

another," Sidney insists that it is not "a licentiousness of doing what is pleasing to everyone against the command of God; but an exemption from all human

assent" laws, to which they have not given their (1.5.17, 1.2.9, 1.1.7). He thus locates his doctrine of natural liberty in an appeal to the Christian-Aristotelian understanding of a natural law with a force binding on the conscience. He de fends natural liberty as a moral or practical truth as demonstrable as the specula tive truths of mathematics, such as "the whole is greater than a part, that two halfs make a whole, or that a straight line is the shortest way from point to

point" (1.2.8. Cf. Aquinas, 1988, pp. 1, 46-48, Suarez, 1950, p. 100). These are truths as evident to pagan as to Christian, Euclid as to Bellarmine, like the deny" "principles of geometry which no sober man can (1.5.19). Sidney's dis cussion of natural liberty aims to display the perversity of Filmer's position; a position which Sidney claims to be contrary to the universal human experience. Moreover, while he is careful not to endorse Bellarmine's argument for papal pretensions in temporal affairs (see 2.1.77-78 and 1.2.8 where Sidney argues: "Tho the Schoolmen were corrupt, they were neither stupid nor unlearned"), Sidney nonetheless successfully places his own position in the context of the respectable Christian-Aristotelian tradition of Catholic and Anglican scholasti cism (see also Sidney's appeal to Richard Hooker at 1.5.18).

Sidney displays a careful and muted use of the state of nature concept in the first chapter. He affirms the condition of natural liberty only to demonstrate its

everything" fundamental compatibility with society. The "equal right to typical of man's condition outside of civil society produces inconveniences so great

them" "that mankind cannot bear (1.10.30). The natural condition unimproved human art is not a viable state by for human beings. Sidney appears to use the Rhetoric and Natural Rights in Algernon Sidney 125 state of nature image only to show that no rational person would persist in it (see Bellarmine, 1928, p. 20; Nelson, 1993, pp. 36, 58, and the excellent discus sions at Zuckert, 1994, pp. 124-26, 223-36). What Sidney achieves by his use of the precivil condition is to establish the origins of government in the "com

consent" mon of people joining into one body. The theoretical implication of natural liberty is the variety of regimes, not the war of all against all. Sidney emphasizes that a naturally free people may compose a democracy, aristocracy,

three" monarchy or "mixed governments composed of the (1.10.31; cf. Aristotle, 1984, 1288bl0-1290a30). With this appeal to the Aristotelian species of re gimes, Sidney affirms that human nature may be inclined toward political soci ety but not to one particular kind of government. He argues that men form political societies for two related purposes. The first is to secure the material advantages of society. Society secures the bodily necessities by establishing general rules of justice. Outside of political society

another," "the liberty of one is thwarted by and none can reliably enjoy their property with security (1.10.30). Sidney presents it as a truth immediately appar ent to reason that life outside of society is not good for human beings. He further testifies to humankind's essentially social nature by his argument for the central role of the family in the origins of political society. Sidney reveals that natural liberty is not synonymous with radical individualism. The multitude which forms political society is in a state of natural liberty until many family conve- heads join into "one civil body ... that they might better provide for the

children." niency, safety, and defence of themselves and their In this way, Sid ney presents political society as a product of the increasing complexity in social relations produced by the extended family (2.1.78. Cf. Aristotle, 1984, 1252bl0-53al; Suarez, 1950, p. 100). The political society originates in, but transcends, the needs of the family. The second purpose for the creation of political society is the satisfaction of the human rational nature. Sidney echoes the Aristotelian dictum "homo est

rationale." animal Politics stands, for Sidney, as the expression of reason. Rea is" son "cannot be in beasts, for they know not what government (1.18.60; 2.8.122. Cf Aristotle, 1984, 1253a2; Bellarmine, 1928, p. 20; Suarez, 1950, p.

reason" 105). Sidney asserts that "nature, which is clearly inclines people to society, inasmuch as they have "understanding to provide for themselves, and

other." by the invention of arts and sciences, to be beneficial to each Most importantly, people "ought to make use of that understanding in forming gov

convenience." ernments according to their own Sidney offers a privileged posi tion for practical wisdom, one denied by divine right: "Every people is by God and nature left to the liberty of regulating these matters relating to themselves

prudence" according to their own (2.8.121, 1.18.61, 1.1.5. Cf. Aristotle, 1934, 1094a30-bl2). The importance of prudence in constitution making reflects the architectonic character of politics; the activity which Sidney claims compre- 126 Interpretation

for." hends "all that in this world deserves to be cared Sidney demonstrates the fundamental compatibility of his doctrine of natural liberty with classical assumptions about human nature and politics.

Sidney's argument in chapter 1 is a broad defense of the Christian-Aristote lian consent theory and the doctrine of natural liberty. He defends several key elements of the Aristotelian teaching on human nature and politics against his divine right opponent. In doing so, he systematically isolates Filmer's argument from the respectable philosophical tradition of the middle to late seventeenth century. Sidney also locates his own position, at least initially, within a frame Christian- of reference offered by the widely accepted assumptions of Aristote lianism. In the following chapter he cautiously emerges from this venerable shelter.

CLASSICAL REPUBLICANISM AND THE MACHIAVELLIAN TURN

The complex movement of Sidney's argument in chapter 2 of the Discourses reveals the increasing antimonarchism of his position. In his defense of the classical republican tradition against Filmer's divine right attacks, Sidney gradu ally expands his argument against absolute monarchy and applies it to monarchy per se. In the latter sections of the chapter, however, Sidney turns away from the respectable and traditional Christian-Aristotelianism and classical republican modes of thought upon which he appears to rely. By the conclusion of the chapter, Sidney endorses a more distinctively modern conception of republican ism deeply influenced by Machiavelli. Chapter 2 begins very much where the previous chapter left off Natural

men," freedom, Sidney asserts, is a "truth planted in the hearts of and is thus accessible to Christian and pagan alike. Both the Christian-Aristotelian theory of government, seen in Bellarmine and Suarez, and classical republicanism, which Sidney associates with Aristotle and Plato, share the core teaching that "magis trates are chosen by societies, seeking their own good, and that the best men it" ought to be chosen for the attaining of (2.1.78). Sidney claims that these traditions shared two common assumptions about government. First, the end of government is both to provide for material security and to develop the rational faculties of the members of the community. Second, Sidney claims that all pre vious thinkers endorsed the mixed regime. In order to understand Sidney's claim for the superiority of republics over monarchies we will first examine the issue of virtue and then consider his account of the mixed regime.

Filmer had excoriated the classical republics as a den of demagogues and self-interested individuals in which the worst men ruled and civic virtue and patriotism suffered pp. 25-26). (Filmer, 1991, Sidney responds that only in regimes informed by republican principles is individual virtue rewarded with rule and is civic virtue actively promoted. For these classical republican theo- Rhetoric and Natural Rights in Algernon Sidney 127 rists, "magistrates are political architects; and they only can perform the work

virtues" incumbent on them, who excel in political (2.1.83; cf. 1.16.49). Both the architectonic character of political rule and the concerns of naturally free and equal beings indicate that a people will only entrust power to individuals capable of serving the common interest. Sidney suggests the fundamental agree ment of reason and revelation in this matter by proposing that both scripture and Plato affirmed that the "moral virtues are ripened and heightened by a knowledge" superinduction of divine (2.1.83, 86; here Sidney also equates Joshua, Samuel and Solomon with Plato's idea of excellent rule). The "noble

work" of magistrates requires such remarkable virtue and even divine support. Sidney grounds this conception of virtue on the classical republican position that political power is not intended for the private advantage of the ruler. Like Aristotle, who defines the deviant forms of the three simple species of regimes by their service to the private advantage of the ruling group at the expense of the common good, Sidney is concerned to demonstrate the connection between virtue and the proper end of government. Echoing Plato, Sidney even proposes that political power properly understood is a burden to rulers inasmuch as it binds them inextricably to the service of others (2.1.78-80. Cf. Aristotle, 1984, 1279b5-10; Aristotle, 1934, 1160b; and Plato, 1968, 345b-347a). He does, however, confront the vexing questions raised by Aristotle's praise of the su premely virtuous man. Aristotle's celebrated discussion of the superior claim of such a man to rule appears to contradict the republican principle of shared rule (Aristotle, 1984, 1288b). Sidney endorses monarchy when it is based on extraor dinary virtue; when one man possesses more of the virtues tending to the good it." of the commonwealth "than all they who compose He justifies this by ar guing that the absolute rule of such an individual would not contradict the prin ciple of natural liberty inasmuch as a people's liberty "is never more safe, than

others" when it is defended by one who is a living law to himself and (2.10. 132). However, Sidney seriously qualifies this position in a number of ways. First, he reminds the reader that Aristotle "nowhere dispraises a popular gov

ernment" and is indeed careful to warn that a virtuous people will never accept the rule of one who does not greatly excel them in virtue (2.10.133). Sidney even implies that Aristotle may have set the bar for legitimate monarchy so high placing it only in an individual of almost Godlike virtue in order to prove its impossibility in practice (2.1.85 and 3.23.453. For a contemporary interpretation of Aristotle's treatment of the problem of kingship, which is simi lar to that of Sidney, see Nichols, 1992, pp. 77-81.). Aristotle, thus, would be seriously questioning, rather than praising, the principle of monarchy. Sidney begins to show his concern to sever the idea of virtue from that of monarchy. Sidney then proceeds to demonstrate that virtue is, in fact, a serious problem for monarchy. He argues that monarchs have historically been hostile to the eminent men of the kingdom. For example, Alexander the Great "killed the best

friends," Senate," and bravest of his Tarquin the Proud of Rome "butcher'd the 128 Interpretation

and the Roman emperors Caligula, Claudius and Nero "hated and feared all

virtue" those that excelled in (2.11.139, 2.12.144, 2.25.256). Sidney even sug gests that the installation of the Roman emperors required the slaughter of the city's best men. By its natural hostility to virtue, one man rule, for Sidney, reveals its deviation from the proper end of government. He not only criticizes the abuses of power coincident with absolute monarchy but he also contrasts the meritocratic tendencies of republics with any species of monarchy based on hereditary right, even a limited one. Sidney presents heredity as the antithesis of virtue. He reaffirms his earlier contention that hereditary right is not a feature of divine or natural law. He appeals to the authority of figures no less than Plato, Aristotle and the Anglican scholastic Richard Hooker to prove that scripture and classical philosophy main tained that "no care was to be taken in the election or institution of him, who

altered" by his birth had a right annexed to his person that could not be (2.6.109-12, 2.11.135. Cf. Fink, 1962, p. 152). Sidney charges that hereditary right places people on the throne irrespective of their moral and intellectual capacity to advance the public good. A regime where "any regard is had to the blood" succession of risks violating the purpose of government. While Sidney praises succession laws which exclude women and children from the throne, he warns that even the virtue of an excellent king cannot be reliably transmitted to his successors (1.18.60-61, 2.21.135). The claim of blood is extremely dubious to Sidney.

Sidney's complex treatment of virtue includes a defense of classical republi

canism against the charge that it promoted radical individualism and eroded patriotism. Sidney lauds the capacity of republics to encourage public spirit. He

virtue" calls them the "nurses of in which the private interests of individuals were successfully comprehended into the common good (2.1.78, 2.19.190) Sid ney cites the two key elements in the republican success in encouraging civic virtue as a realistic assessment of human nature and a capacity to root virtue in the active defense of liberty. Classical republics, he argues, were not naive about the possibilities for virtue. They recognized that "mankind is inclin'd to vice,

encouragement." and the way to virtue is so hard, that it wants These republics recognized the need to institute and legislate rewards and honors as inducements to virtuous activity among the citizenry (2.12.146, Cf. Aristotle, 1934, 109b30 1 1 llOal). Moreover, these legislators managed to combine public ser

vice with the individual's natural love of liberty. This was reflected in the honor given to men who either defended communal self-government against foreign

powers or who defended their liberty against oppressive rulers. At this point in the discussion, Sidney wants to show that the individual's natural concern for is not not liberty only contradictory to the common good, but is its very life- blood.

Sidney's account of the importance of virtue to the classical republics is closely connected to his treatment of the structural aspects of the mixed govern- Rhetoric and Natural Rights in Algernon Sidney 129 ments typical of those regimes. The two major features of the mixed regime which Sidney contrasts favorably with monarchy are the popular element and "magistratical" the limits on power (2.8.126. In the rest of this paper, I will,

"magistratical" "magistracy" following Sidney, employ and to denote the su preme executive power in any constitutional order.). First, regarding the popular element, Sidney insists that "there never was a good government in the world that did not consist of the three simple species of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy." He is careful to identify mixed government as a worthy alternative to both absolute monarchy and democracy: "the variety of forms between mere infinite" democracy and absolute monarchy is almost (2.16.166). Sidney sug gests that practical reason operates within this wide range between two ex tremes. In doing so, he disassociates mixed government from democracy. This is a response to Filmer's accusation that all mixed government is actually a democracy. Sidney replies that in mixed regimes the "denomination was taken

prevailed" from the part that and this part typically in classical republics was not democratic. He dismisses democracy as being characteristic of very small, primitive societies. In defending mixed government, he is not defending democ racy but rather its popular element only. He points to Sparta, Rome and Venice as aristocratic mixed regimes with strong popular representation. Moreover, the

polity" "Gothic in the successor states to the Roman Empire in northern Europe

had "kings, lords, commons, diets, assemblies of estates, cortes, and parliaments

reside" in which the sovereign powers of those nations did (2.16.167). These Gothic polities, like the classical republics, may not have been democracies indeed, they may have been elective monarchies but Sidney maintains that they contained a strong popular feature. Sidney argues that the popular voice given institutional expression in mixed regimes encouraged an ethos of civic equality consistent with natural equality. The principle of civic equality embodied in the popular element of government found expression in the republican emphasis on the rule of law. For Sidney, law

abidingness is a republican virtue. This virtue recognizes that while government requires a restraint on natural liberty, this restraint must be general. Only in a regime governed by law can the structures of the state preserve a measure of civic equality. Moreover, the rule of law allows the redress of injury without recourse to force. Sidney argues that the rule of law secures justice among citizens and allows the state to restrain and punish the ambition of private citi zens seeking to usurp power. In the case of absolute monarchy, which he poses force" as antithetical to the rule of law, then "every man has recourse to in pursuit of justice and the defense of liberty (2.30.297). In fact one key aim of the rule of law, in Sidney's view, is to limit magistratical power. He appeals to the philosophical authority of Hugo Grotius, who maintained that the law gives and measures the power of magistrates. Sidney also appeals to the authority of the ancient practice in Rome and Sparta, whereby the consuls and ephori were "created by the people for the publick good, and always were within the power 130 Interpretation

him" of those that created (2.7.115, 2.27.265. Cf. Grotius, 1925, 1.3.14,16; 1.4.11). Sidney asserts that magistratical power, as a creature of law, is of an inherently limited character. The final thrust of Sidney's defense of classical republicanism expands be yond the particular criticism of absolute monarchy to identify a problem inher ent in monarchy per se. He reduces his opposition to the principle of monarchy into the formula: "Whatever is done by force or fraud to set up the interests and lusts of one man in opposition to the laws of his country, is purely and abso

monarchical" lutely (2.24.250). In this curious play on the meaning of the words "purely" "absolutely," and Sidney classifies monarchy as an idea, a regime point ing to a deeper principle of corruption in human nature. The purest expression of monarchy is a form of lawlessness. This is the tendency of one-man rule of any kind and this is why republics were so careful to restrain magistrates. Even mixed monarchies, Sidney suggests, will find it difficult to resist the slide into absolutism.

At a point roughly two-thirds through the second chapter of the Discourses, Sidney's defense of classical republicanism takes a dramatic turn. He begins to jettison some of the central elements of classical republican thought. Instead of defending traditional republican moderation and anti-imperialism, Sidney praises wars of territorial expansion; rather than lauding the classical republican concern for civic unity, he commends the salutary consequences of popular tumults. In praising the imperialistic and turbulent Roman Republic at the ex pense of Sparta, the classical exemplar of moderation and civic unity, he follows

Machiavelli rather than respected ancient commentators like Plutarch and Polyb- ius (Plutarch, 1952, pp. 49-79; Polybius, 1987, VI 10-11, 48; Cicero, 1998, II: 33). Sidney reveals his movement toward a theory of republicanism rooted in a Machiavellian conception of human nature rather than that of the ancients.

The classical republican argument for citizen armies rested on a concern to ensure communal self-government. While Sidney praises both Sparta and Rome as regimes dedicated to war, he presents a distinction between the ends these

republics pursued through war. He relates: "some of those that intended war desir'd to enlarge their territories by conquest; others only to preserve their own, and to live with freedom and upon them. safety Rome was of the first sort; .. . Spartans." On the other side the A few pages later Sidney implicitly refers to Machiavelli to decide the contest between Sparta and Rome: "the best judges of these matters have always given the preference to those constitutions that .. . think it better to aim at conquest, rather than simply to stand upon their own defence" (2.22.203, 205; Machiavelli, 1996, 1:2, 1:6). What is perhaps most striking in Sidney's choice of Rome over Sparta is that he bases this decision on an understanding of politics alien to the classical re publican tradition these two regimes represent. Sidney justifies Roman imperial expansion reference to a by theory of the natural process of growth and decay. As he if a nation does not states, grow, "it must pine and perish; for in this Rhetoric and Natural Rights in Algernon Sidney -131

worse." world nothing is permanent; that which does not grow better will grow "better" Sidney reveals that by he means stronger:

That government is evidently the best, which, not relying upon what it does at first enjoy, seeks to increase the number, strength, and riches of the people; and by the best discipline to bring the power so improved into such order as may be of most use to the publick. (2.23.209)

The inevitable process of expansion and demise is rooted in the natural state of hostility between peoples. Sidney's preference for Roman imperialism over Spartan moderation depends on his reflections on the harsh character of nature. In their concern for virtue and decent political life, the classical republican theo rists who praised Sparta did not, he suggests, adequately appreciate that the natural state of international relations is a brutal struggle and competition for scarce resources.

With this presentation of an essentially Machiavellian view of the natural state of war, Sidney indicates the dramatic shift from his earlier position. God and nature are no longer assumed to be hospitable to and providing for human needs. Classical republican theorists assumed a greater beneficence in nature than there actually is. In praising war as good in itself, because it reflects the natural order of power, Sidney registers his increasing distance from Aristotle (Aristotle, 1984, 1333a35, 1271M-2, 1333b4-15; Sullivan, pp. 14-15). One of

the prominent features of Sidney's Machiavellian turn is the reduction of reason into an instrument of the passions. Sidney's presentation of reason's inability to secure justice in a violent world reveals that, contrary to his earlier position, he no longer posits the benefits of association as a truth immediately apparent to human beings. Rome surpassed its classical republican contemporaries not be cause of the genius of its founders or the carefully crafted reason behind its institutions but rather because the regime unleashed the passions of its citizens in brazen, lupine wars of expansion. Sidney also defends the classical republics against the royalist charge that they were seething cauldrons of civil unrest. For Sidney, the Roman popular tumults were a salutary device, which corrected defects in the original constitu tion. The inherent imperfection of human wisdom means that people cannot see all at once what may happen later. Even the best laid constitutions contain de defects," fects and "Rome in its foundations was subject to these but the prob

remedi'd" lems "were by degrees discover'd and (2.13.150; Machiavelli, 1996, 1:44-46). Opening the magistracies to the plebs was one such correction. As Sidney presents it, the genius of Rome was its appreciation of the positive bene fits of mutability in constitutional orders. Popular discontent acted as a vehicle for change. Sidney goes so far as to practically equate the legislative power in Rome with the popular will expressed through tumults. Of these disturbances, he argues, "they were composed without blood; and those that seemed to be the 1 32 Interpretation

laws" most dangerous produced the best (2.14.153-54; Wood, 1972, pp. 290, 296). Apart from this quasi-legislative power reflected in class warfare, Sidney also expresses a concern to justify popular sedition as a means to secure repub lics from the dangers of monarchism. In contrast to the classical republican tradition of Plato and Aristotle, Sidney does not posit perfect domestic harmony or even civic concord as the proper goal of political life. Sidney defends the passionate self-interest expressed in the class warfare of the Roman tumults as the animating principle in a republic of liberty. At one point in the discussion in chapter 2, Sidney uncharacteristically col lapses the distinction between republics and absolute monarchies. Regarding war, Sidney contends, it does not "less concern monarchies than common wealths; nor the absolute less than the mixed: All of them have been prosperous or miserable, glorious or contemptible, as they were better or worse arm'd,

conducted" disciplin'd or (2.23.210-11). Despite his general approbation of re

valour" publics vis a vis monarchies, he then proceeds to laud "the Assyrian

Asia." under Nebuchadnezzar and "the Persians who under Cyrus conquer'd These examples of powerful despots raising obscure peoples to the heights of conquest cast a troubling shadow over Sidney's Machiavellian turn. If military success is the only standard by which to judge regimes, then on what basis can Sidney condemn the absolute monarchies of Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus or any modern despot who might emerge with their virtu? Sidney's rather tepid re sponse is that absolute monarchy may allow exceptional leaders wide scope to display their talents but it does not generally produce these leaders. Poor and unknown nations have been carried to military glory "by the bravery of their

princes," but there is no reliable guarantee that their virtues will be transmitted to their successors. Sidney claims: 'The impossibility of this is a breach never to be repaired"(2.23.211).

In the harsh light of Sidney's treatment of war, the biggest problem of abso lute monarchy is not its violation of the principle of consent but rather the very practical problem of its inability to vouchsafe a perpetual stream of great mili tary leaders. It appears that utility, rather than legitimacy, is the central problem of despotism. In the closing sections of the second chapter Sidney subtly ac knowledges the growing uneasiness of even his most sympathetic readers. The partisans of natural liberty can only be chilled by Sidney's praise of the king craft of two ancient despots. The argument for consent returns as a major theme after a short but painful absence. Sidney's position toward democracy becomes more conciliatory than hitherto, he reaffirms the contractual origins of govern

ment (2.30.298-302, 2.32). He even registers an implicit criticism of Machia

prophets," velli by citing two of the Florentine's "armed Romulus and Theseus, to prove that no single man, regardless of his extraordinary courage and strength, was ever able to subdue many (2.31.305; Machiavelli, 1985, chap. 6). In the final chapter Sidney tries to purge Machiavellian republicanism of its Rhetoric and Natural Rights in Algernon Sidney 133 crypto-monarchical tendencies by planting it on a firm foundation of natural rights. From Sidney's reformed and popularized English Constitution, a liberal democratic republic is born.

A NEW ENGLAND: SIDNEY'S NATURAL RIGHTS TEACHING

The third chapter of the Discourses begins as a defense of England's mixed constitution against the charges of Filmer's divine right absolutism. By chapter's end, however, he reformulates the theoretical basis of the traditional English Constitution by rejecting the principle of mixed government in favor of liberal democratic republicanism. On the way to this final position, Sidney purges the Machiavellian republicanism of the previous chapter of its monarchical tenden cies by grounding legitimate government on the principle of popular sover eignty. He does so by appealing to a Hobbesian notion of natural rights. But Sidney rejects Hobbes's absolutist implications in favor of a popular govern ment, on the grounds that only popular governments have the strength to secure individual rights while remaining consistent with the principles of legitimacy derived from natural liberty. In the early sections of the chapter Sidney makes an appeal to the particular and historical understanding of rights as corporate political rights. He hearkens back to the Magna Carta and the authority of one of England's "ancient law-

writers," Henry Bracton, to demonstrate that his country's mixed constitution is an inheritance of freedom from a distant past and not a product of the royal plenitude of power (3.9.366, 3.14.394). Later, however, Sidney identifies a dif ferent conception of rights. These are the rights and liberties of individuals

mind." which are "innate, inherent, and enjoy d time out of Unlike historic rights, the character of these rights "subsists as arising from the nature and

man." being of They derive from a source independent of their particular civil manifestation. The ground for Sidney's new version of rights is the natural

society" equality existing "in a multitude that is not entered into any (3.29.495). This natural equality is more reminiscent of Hobbes than Bellarmine or Suarez:

"one man can justly demand nothing . . where there is no society, one man is

another" not bound by the actions of (3.33.510-11). In contrast to his earlier use of the Thomistic natural law affecting the conscience, Sidney now proposes that moral obligation only arises when individuals offer "a publick declaration

assent" of their to resign their natural liberty. Contrary to his earlier position, Sidney now indicates that there are no natural duties. Sidney's understanding of natural rights is the underlying, often implicit, premise of his treatment of the origin and ends of government in the final chap ter. Sidney claims: "the only ends for which governments are constituted, and

protection" obedience rendered to them, are the obtaining of justice and 134 Interpretation

(3.33.512). As with Hobbes, the core of Sidney's natural rights teaching is the universal right of self-preservation. The state of natural liberty, for Sidney, is one of gTeat insecurity in which "a private man from knowledge of his own weakness and inability to defend himself, must come under the protection of a

own" greater power than his (3.41.548-49). But what do natural rights imply for government? In contrast to Hobbes, Sidney is comfortable expanding this right of self-defense into a more general right of revolution against oppressive rule (3.40.340. Cf. Hobbes, 1994, pp. 142-43; Robbins, 1947, p. 293; Worden, 1985, p. 15; and Houston, 1991, pp. 209-18). Yet while Sidney accords individ ual rights a status unseen in Christian-Aristotelian or classical republican thought, he is, for most of these early sections, reticent about the precise charac ter of individual civil rights. Only the issue of property rights makes a signifi cant, though sporadic, appearance. Commentators on Sidney have typically observed that he does not treat the issue of property with nearly the same degree of attention as many of his Whig contemporaries (e.g., Houston, 1991, pp. 111-14 and Nelson, 1993, pp. 35, 59. Cf. Locke, 1988, II, chap. 5 and Tyrrell, 1680, pp. 109-13 of second pagina tion). While this is certainly true, this should not blind us to its importance for Sidney. The few and scattered references to the connection between property and individual rights are all contained in chapter 3 the Discourses. Sidney evinces the individualistic character of natural rights in his assertion that "liberty

will." consists only in being subject to no man's But, he adds, a necessary component of this idea of liberty is the means to self-preservation:

Property also is an appendage to liberty; and 'tis as impossible for a man to have a right to lands or goods, if he has no liberty, and enjoys his life only at the pleasure of another, as it is to enjoy either when he is deprived of them. (3.16.402-3; see also 3.42.557 and 3.43.558. Cf. Wood, 1972, p. 294)

As such, Sidney charges one of the main duties of political rulers is "to preserve

subjects." the lands, goods and liberties of their By identifying the primary end of government to be the protection of the individual "in the peaceful enjoyment

possess," and innocent use of what I Sidney denies the logocentric telos of classical philosophy and the spiritual end in Christian thought.

Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of Sidney's treatment of the origins of political society is his attempt to mediate between the positions of Hobbes and Machiavelli. As we saw near the end of chapter 2, Sidney suggested that Machi avelli's republicanism was prejudiced by his indiscriminate praise of men like Cyrus, the founder of the Persian autocracy. In this respect Sidney differs from the pattern of Spinoza and Rousseau. They expressed the view that Machiavel li's of kingcraft study in The Prince was actually a satire of princes intended to educate a republican audience (Rousseau, 1988, p. 129; Spinoza, 1951, p. 315). In treats contrast, Sidney Machiavelli's monarchical tendencies as a problem Rhetoric and Natural Rights in Algernon Sidney 135 inherent in the latter's conception of the origin of political society. In chapter 6 of The Prince Machiavelli exalts Cyrus in addition to Moses, Romulus and

prophets" Theseus as "armed who founded great empires. Machiavelli presents these men as extraordinary individuals who gained command of a relatively small armed force capable of dominating an obscure and distressed people and then transforming them into a conquering nation. Although Theseus, Romulus and Moses were, in contrast to Cyrus, founders of republics, this founding was not an expression of popular consent but rather showed the effective and cal culated use of terrifying force. In Machiavelli's view only the simulation of the anxiety and insecurity of a state of natural liberty can produce the proper conditions for founding any well-ordered political society, whether republican or monarchical (Sullivan, pp. 6-7; Mansfield, 1996, chap. 6; Strauss, 1969, pp. 25, 70-71; and see Worden, 1985, p. 19, for a contrary view). And Machiavelli implies that the power to do this, at least initially, is generally not popular.

It is certainly an irony that Sidney employs an essentially Hobbesian natural rights teaching to expunge the crypto-monarchical tendencies in Machiavelli. Of course, this is not to diminish the importance of Sidney's disagreements with

Hobbes with respect to the latter's denial of natural justice and the right of revolt, as well as Hobbes's preference for absolute monarchy. Sidney is not a Hobbist, but rather is attempting, I argue, to synthesize Hobbesian natural rights with Machiavellian republicanism. In this attempted synthesis I believe Sidney parallels, and possibly even follows, Spinoza. The antipathy of the arch-royalist Hobbes to the republican school associated with Machiavelli is a prominent feature in the former's work (Hobbes, 1994, pp. 139-41; Hobbes, 1991, pp. 228-33). In order to understand Sidney's complex position regarding these two giants of early modern political thought, it is necessary to identify an important element in Hobbes's treatment of the origin of government. Hobbes understood the origin of political society in terms of two distinct processes: the "Common Institution" Acquisition." wealth by and the "Commonwealth by While the rights of the sovereign were the same in both, these concepts differ inasmuch

another," as in the former individuals choose their sovereign "for fear of one whereas in the latter they "subject themselves to him they are afraid of Acquisition" (Hobbes, 1994, pp. 127-28). Hobbes's "Commonwealth by is but

prophets." another version of the regimes founded by Machiavelli's "armed Sid ney's method is to defend the popular and freely given consent of the "Com Institution" monwealth by against the coercive models offered by Machiavelli founder- and Hobbes. Although Hobbes was open to the possibility of violent ism, he was less taken by its furious charms than the famous Florentine. It is the popular aspect of Hobbesian natural rights theory to which Sidney appeals. Even in the midst of his defense of classical republicanism, Sidney offered circumspect praise of Hobbes. He observed that, "Hobbes fearing the

advantage" taken by bold and violent men: 1 36 Interpretation

Has no regard at all to him who comes in without title or consent; ... and allows all things to be lawful against him, that may be done to a publick enemy or pirate: which is as much as to say, any man may destroy him who can. (2.24.221)

Sidney wryly notes that whatever Hobbes "may be guilty of in other respects,

mankind." he does in this follow the voice of While Sidney never goes so far as to call Romulus, Theseus et al. public enemies or pirates, he does, in contrast to Machiavelli, consciously diminish their importance as founders in favor of a more popular notion of consent. For example, Sidney finds the origin of Rome

prophet" not in the "armed Romulus, but rather in the meeting of "a company Tuscans" of Latins, Sabines and on the banks of the Tiber. These men, Sidney

continues, "carried their liberty in their own breasts. . . . This was their charter;

them." and Romulus could confer no more upon When Machiavelli speaks of

principles," the need periodically to return states to their "first it often means a return to a condition of fear like that produced by its founder-conquerors (3.25.462, 3.33.511). When Sidney speaks of returning to first principles, it always means popular freedom. Sidney's Rome was clearly a commonwealth by institution. Despite Sidney's reliance on an essentially Hobbesian understanding of natu ral rights, his politics is more akin to Machiavellian republicanism. Sidney em ploys Hobbes's consent theory against Machiavelli's founderism in order to correct a fundamentally Machiavellian position. The greater part of chapter 3 signals Sidney's serious disagreement with Hobbes over the character of sover eignty. In contrast to Hobbes, Sidney maintains that as a product of human contrivance, magistratical power is subject to important limitations. He proposes

magistracy" "the moderate government of a legal and just (3.10.370). Sidney emphasizes that the popular foundation of regimes precedes the magistracy and thus can limit and direct it through law. As such, he endorses a separation of powers theory whereby the distinct functions of government are placed in differ ent and mutually limiting bodies. Moreover, Sidney's concern to preserve the integrity and supremacy of constitutional law animates his strong opposition to the principle of royal or magistratical prerogative. (For Sidney's discussion of the separation of powers, see 3.10.374-75 and 2.24.219, and for his hostility to prerogative 3.12.442-43, 3.22.447, 3.38.528, 3.34.515-16.) In his denial of the legitimacy of prerogative Sidney differs from most other Whig thinkers (e.g., pp. Locke, 1988, 158-68; Tyrrell, 1680, p. 138 in second pagination; and cf. pp. Houston, 1991, 195-98). Consent implies the power to limit the power created by the people. Another more fundamental on limit magistratical power, which Sidney iden is natural tifies, the limit of any individual's physical power. In his discussion about the difference between the coactive and directive power of law, he equates right and power: one has the right to do what one has the power to do, and by nature a magistrate's power is very limited. Sidney's reflections on the'relation Rhetoric and Natural Rights in Algernon Sidney 137 between the right to command and the power to command are at the core of his defense of liberal democratic republicanism. Sidney denies that the coercive power of law is inherent in the magistratical office. For example, although Nero exercised the coercive power of the Empire for a time, when the legions over threw him it became apparent that Nero, as an individual man, had little or no coercive power over a multitude of people (3.11.382). The unifying thread in Sidney's observations on the directive and coactive power of law is his concern to show the natural foundations of democracy. It is only in popular regimes that these two aspects of law, right and power, are entirely consistent. Unlike mili tary dictatorships, popular regimes secure the public good because they compre hend the good of all the individuals in society (not just the army) and they have the power to act in pursuit of the public interest. The equating of power and right in Sidney's treatment of law rests on a deeper metaphysical reflection on the natural order of power. It is at this stage in his argument that the similarity to, or influence of, Spinoza emerges as a key element in Sidney's thought. While accepting the fundamentally Hobbesian premise of the origin of government in the natural rights of individuals, Sidney follows Spinoza in advancing a harsh criticism of the absolutist implications Hobbes drew from this premise. Sidney associates strength, and thus right, with popular government because it alone among regimes actively engages the col lected power of the multitude of individuals (Spinoza, 1951, pp. 205, 309, 347; and compare Spinoza, 1951, pp. 333, and Sidney, 3.24.455 and 32.508, on the dangers of a corrupted military). The right to rule is coextensive with the power to rule. Thus, Sidney responds to Hobbes that democracy is stronger than autoc racy. The weakness of the individual Nero is indicative of the natural weakness

of the individual per se. The government which best secures the rights of the individual is that which most effectively augments the power of the individual with the collected power of the multitude of individuals. Sidney's defense of popular sovereignty against Hobbes's absolutism mirrors that of Spinoza little more than a decade earlier. In the Theologico-Political Treatise Spinoza implic itly responded to Hobbes:

Men have never so far ceded their power as to cease to be an object of fear to the

rulers who received such power and right. ... If it were really the case that men

could be deprived of their natural rights so utterly as never to have any further influ maintain with the most vio ence on affairs . . it would then be possible to impunity lent tyranny, which, I suppose, no one would for an instant admit. (Spinoza, 1951, pp. 205; see also pp. 309 and 347)

While there is no evidence of a formal connection between Sidney and Spi Discourses there is a sub noza Sidney never refers to Spinoza in the strong stantive connection. My argument is that Sidney may have been a follower of Spinoza (an English Spinozist) or may have developed independently a natural 138 Interpretation

rights theory with deep and important parallels to Spinoza. While my argument does not require that Sidney have read Spinoza, the fact that Spinoza's entire corpus was published by 1677 and Sidney wrote the Discourses in the early 1680's makes it possible for Sidney to have read and been influenced by Spi noza. Moreover, the fact that Sidney spent time in exile in Holland in the 1660's and shared acquaintances with Spinoza, men like the republican leader Jan De- Witt and the Rotterdam Quaker leader Benjamin Furly, provides circumstantial evidence that it is more than likely that Sidney was familiar with Spinoza's work. Given the great controversy Spinoza provoked at the time, it would not be surprising that Sidney did not refer to him directly in the Discourses, even as he made characteristically Spinozist arguments (for evidence of Sidney's con nection to Spinoza and the Dutch republican theorists of the 1670's, see Scott, 1988, chap. 13 and Feuer, 1958, pp. 50 and 289). As Sidney argues repeatedly in the last chapter of the Discourses, echoing Spinoza, democracy is the most natural and, thus, the best regime. This is true for two reasons. First, it is physically impossible for an individual or even an unarmed but substantial minority to govern a multitude without their consent. Simply put, democracies, or at least governments with important popular ele ments, are stronger than aristocratic and monarchic regimes because popular governments reflect this natural order of power relations. From this Spinozist modification of natural rights theory, Sidney offers a defense of democracy against Hobbesian absolutism (see Spinoza, 1951, p. 317, where he argues: "they are mistaken, who suppose that one man can by himself hold the supreme right of a commonwealth. For the only limit of right, as we showed [Chap. 2] is power. But the power of one man is very inadequate to support so great a load."). Second, both Sidney and Spinoza joined in defending democracy and attacking absolute monarchy precisely because popular regimes were able to bring rulers and ruled under the control of reason (compare 3.13.387, 389; 3.15.401; 3.16.404; 3.43.558,and Spinoza, 1951, pp. 206 and 303-4). They shared the view that a nation governed by a system of laws passed by a freely consenting people would be more rational than a monarchy or an aristocracy. Indeed, Sidney's defense of parliament's rights in England echoes Spinoza's of defense popular councils: "The will of so large a council cannot be so much

reason" determined lust as by by (Spinoza, 1951, p. 348; also compare 3.1.323, and 3.14.396, 3.40.543-44, Spinoza, 1951, pp. 313, 317, 341 and 342; and see the good discussion in Houston, 1991, p. 135). Sidney's proof of Clearly, natural liberty in chapter 3 differs from his earlier discussions. In the first chapter he referred to natural liberty mainly to prove that people are free to create whatever form of government they please. In chapter 2 he modified this position to argue for the superiority of mixed republics over monarchies. It is in the and only third, final, chapter that Sidney links the doc trine of natural to the contention liberty that all legitimate rule rests on popular and is directed to the sovereignty security of rights. It is in this light that his Rhetoric and Natural Rights in Algernon Sidney 139 discussion of the democratic origins of the English regime becomes such a cru cial feature of his natural rights theory. Sidney's argument for popular sovereignty underlies his entire treatment of the English Constitution. Initially Sidney defends the popular origins of the English Constitution against the royalist position rejecting the independence of parliament (Filmer, 1991, pp. 52-57). He gradually uses this discussion to con trast his theoretical defense of popular sovereignty with the actual practice of the English constitutional order, however. In Sidney's presentation of his country's

"ought" government, the theoretical is popular sovereignty expressed through parliamentary supremacy. Yet in his account of actual English constitutional "is" development, the practical differs substantially from this principle of legiti macy. Sidney's reflections on the historically unresolved problem of royal pre tensions to supremacy and the uncertain future of England's hereditary nobility cast serious doubt on the future success or even survival of the English Constitu

tion. He suggests that the English experiment in mixed government has failed and can only be corrected by a radical reordering culminating in an unshakable legislative supremacy. Sidney asserts that the popular origin of the English regime lies with those liberty," "lovers of the Saxons. He claims that "the Saxons in their own country

present," had their councils, where all were and they carried this practice with them to England. These radically democratic councils pre-existed and actually

created the monarchy: "tho our ancestors had their councils and magistrates .. .

kings" they had no (3.28.479 [emphasis supplied], 481-82). It was by these

assemblies" made." "general councils and that "kings were Sidney emphasizes that the legislative power inhering in the people and expressed through their universal participation in the general assemblies is the source of the monarchy. Sidney also aims to demonstrate the popular foundation of the English nobil ity. The important role of the nobility in the creation of England's mixed gov ernment is central for Sidney. He claims: "In all the legal kingdoms of the North, the strength of the government has always been placed in the nobility; kings" and no better defense has been found against the encroachment of ill

(3.28.484). The Saxon nobility in Sidney's account did not signify the exclusive, hereditary aristocracy of the later England, however, but rather the nobility itself foundation. This can be was originally inseparable from England's democratic

seen "if we consider that those called noblemen . . are often by the historians

multitude." democratic interpretation of the said to be ... an infinite Sidney's

"nobility" term rests on his association of noble titles with military service.

arms," Among a people like the Saxons "perpetually in military service as a claim to title provides for a highly egalitarian understanding of nobility (3.28.487, 490-91). Conniff (1982, p. 406) also notes that Sidney is unique among Whig theorists inasmuch as his notion of popular sovereignty contains no clearly formulated idea of property qualifications. In principle, the Saxon popular assembly and their council of nobles could have been virtually identical. 140 Interpretation

Sidney's argument for England's original and natural democracy arises from his derivation of political right from objective analysis of the natural order. Like Spinoza, Sidney draws a crucial lesson from the observation of nature: the cen tral measure for the natural operation of things is power (1.5.17, 2.23.210, 3.16.402, 3.43.561; cf. Spinoza, 1951, p. 200, and Spinoza, 1989, pp. 191, 202). In Sidney's treatment of Saxon England, we see democracy presented less as a formal system of government than as an actuality of power relations. The core

multitude" of Saxon democracy is the "infinite of armed men who grounded the nation's institutions. Sidney cautions his audience that with the narrowing of the popular foundations of the English Constitution, the legal and institutional devices intended to preserve some measure of popular control risk becoming obsolete. Sidney's stance toward the English Constitution becomes increasingly critical through the course of the final chapter. His earlier praise of the Magna Carta sours when he accuses it of failing to ensure that the law "for annual parliaments

observed." constitution" was Sidney's distance from the "ancient becomes grad ually more palpable:

In England our ancestors who seem to have had some such thing in their eye as bal ancing the powers, by a fatal mistake placed usually so much in the hands of the

king, that ... his extravagances could not be repressed without great danger. (3.27.475)

These two major departures from the government's popular foundation the failure to secure annual parliaments and the delegation of sweeping powers to the Crown combined to deal a serious blow to England's balanced constitu tion. These seeds of royal supremacy came to fruition, Sidney relates, in the

mischiefs," "horrid series of the most destructive known as the War of the Roses (3.35.517). The constitution's incapacity to restrain regal power encouraged am bitious nobles backed by armed factions in their struggle for the crown. Sidney strongly implies that, despite his earlier protestations to the contrary (3.9.366; 3.18.430), the parliament has not always settled the succession in England. The balance of power has historically failed. He identifies both a structural and a socio-political dimension to the balance of power problem. The English attempt to balance the powers of government

structurally by assigning the monarch a role in the legislative and judicial func tion in a did, Sidney's view, produce strong public impression that all the pro ceedings of government and the legal system depend on the will and judgment of the and his ministers. king Sidney systematically examines the historical royal powers of and calling proroguing parliament, vetoing legislation, pardoning criminals and the presiding in courts of law in order to reveal parliament's superior claim in these matters (for the power to call parliament, see 3.31, 3.38; the veto, the pardon 3.27.476, 3.34, 3.36; power, 3.22, 3.45.555; and the courts', Rhetoric and Natural Rights in Algernon Sidney -141

3.26 and 3.42). In their effort to produce an effective executive power to check the popular assembly, the English produced a constitutional order, which consis tently and gradually eroded the legitimate claims of the popular branch.

The socio-political dimension to the balance of power problem relates to Sidney's assessment of the collapse of the feudal nobility and the demise of England's Gothic Polity. Sidney suggests that the nobility was prominent for checking royal power when noble title was rooted in military service and large property holdings. With their independent source of arms and wealth these feu dal lords had the wherewithal to resist monarchical pretensions (3.28.484; cf. Harringon, 1992, pp. 52-56). This reliance on social bases of institutional power proved mistaken, however, for the feudal nobility was unable to prevent or even survive the vicious succession disputes of the later Middle Ages. Sidney claims the War of the Roses "was the first step towards the dissolution of our ancient

government." The great losses sustained by the old nobility destroyed their standing in relation to the new nobility created by the victorious contenders for the crown. These new nobles were not independent of the king, but were his creatures (3.29, 30). The centralization of power in the monarchy, especially regarding the distribution of titles and land, made nugatory the nobility's capac ity to resist the king. Sidney implicitly contrasts the democratic character of the Saxon nobility with the increasingly narrow and dependent position of their successors.

The consequence of the collapse of the feudal nobility is the stark division of the nation into two camps. Sidney claims: "all things have been brought into the hands of the king and the commoners, and there is nothing left to cement

union" "ancient" them, and to maintain the (3.37.527). In the dissolution of the English Constitution, Sidney finds the formation of, or devolution to, a civil society of increasingly autonomous individual rights bearers. Unforeseen devel opments have shattered the illusion of England as an organic whole composed of different social classes with competing and mutually limiting claims to rule. History has put to the sword the classical assumptions of English mixed regime theory. For Sidney, England is returning to her first principles: the balance can not hold.

The argument for a democratic republic in England rests on Sidney's view of the radical legislative supremacy necessary for any legitimate and stable con stitutional order. He does not endorse a return to the pristine Saxon republic of the past or advocate the restoration of the feudal nobility. While he makes ges

ancestors," tures excusing the wisdom of "our Sidney primarily uses English history as a foil for his presentation of a natural rights republic. He cautions that it is best to make "new constitutions to repair the breaches made upon the

old" (3.37.527). The solution to England's constitutional problem, the problem of mixed government, is the institutionalization of the popular will through par liamentary supremacy. Such a regime is both the form of rule most consistent with Sidney's natural rights teaching and, he argues, indicative of a constitu- 142 Interpretation

tional order better able to adapt to shifting socio-political conditions. The En glish Constitution, like its Roman ancestor, collapsed when "its foundations

narrow." were become too Sidney agrees with absolutists such as Filmer, Hobbes and Bodin that su preme power must be located somewhere in any proper constitutional order. Indeed, he charges that the inability to locate the supreme power has been the cause of England's constitutional woes. In this respect, Sidney differs from the strand of parliamentary contractarianism of the English Civil War period typi fied by Philip Hunton. Hunton maintained that the English Constitution was composed of three coequal branches, each with some share of the supreme power (Hunton, 1643; cf. Filmer's critique of Hunton in Filmer, 1991, pp. 131- 71). In the reformed English Constitution Sidney presents in the concluding sections of the Discourses, supremacy rests unmistakably in parliament. Parlia mentary supremacy, in turn, points to a radical popular sovereignty: "The legis

lative power that is exercised by the parliament, . . . must be essentially and

people." radically in the While in rejecting magistratical prerogative he virtually abolishes the monarchy, Sidney asserts that "the Legislative Power is always Arbitrary" (3.44.564, 3.45.569). By this Sidney does not mean that parliament's authority is unrestrained or not responsible but rather that by nature it can as sume the executive and judicial functions of the government at its own discre tion (Houston, 1991, pp. 195-96). These functions are essentially delegated powers. Indeed, by its capacity to express the collected power of individuals, Sidney finds the coercive power of law proceeding from the authority of parlia ment.

This admission of the arbitrary character of legislative power must be under stood in the context of Sidney's theory of popular sovereignty. He conceives of the arbitrariness of parliament as qualitatively different from the arbitrary com mands of a monarch. For one person to make law for many distorts the natural order of power. Parliament stands as the institutional expression of popular sov ereignty. Popular governments for Sidney, as for Spinoza, locate the supreme right to govern in the one body possessing the actual power to govern in a supreme or irresistible manner; namely, the people. The central tenet of Sidney's natural rights teaching is that only popular institutions reflecting the natural power of the people can guarantee political liberty. In this sense, Sidney's argu ment for the power enhancing of the Commons in England's struggling mixed constitution may have a prudential dimension similar to the pattern and method ology of Spinoza's treatment of monarchy and aristocracy in the Political Trea tise. In this work Spinoza invariably advocates the establishment or extension of popular assemblies and general councils in order to improve (i.e., strengthen) nondemocratic regimes (Spinoza, 1951, pp. 320-31, 345-47). In contrast to the king" earlier identification of the "invisible as the supremacy of law, by the sections of the work king" concluding Sidney's "invisible takes on a more radi cal and popular tone. No the longer product of the cooperation of the various Rhetoric and Natural Rights in Algernon Sidney 143 branches of government, this invisible and omnipotent ruler is now the general will of the multitude of individual wills. Sidney claims: "No nation that has a king" sovereign power within itself, does want this (contrast 3.9.367 and 3.42.555). The equal abridgement of natural liberty which grounds political soci ety subjects all to the general rule but subjects none to any particular will. Despite the many movements in the argument of the Discourses, Sidney's original definition of liberty persists throughout its entirety: "liberty solely con

another" sists in an independency upon the will of (1.5.7). The full implications of this understanding of liberty, however, come to light only in the final sections of the book. Political liberty is synonymous with living in a government of general rules, whereby all individuals are equally subject to law because all participate in the same legislative power of the people. As such, the balance of legally constituted powers delegated by the legislature means each individual is subject to a law of his own making. Sidney makes balanced government virtu ally identical to popular government. The final aspect of Sidney's presentation of a new English liberal democratic republic is his treatment of representation. Sidney denies that the representative principle in a legislature undermines its arbitrary right. He does so primarily because of the idea of equal subjection to law. Sidney claims that delegates who make law for the nation, in effect, make laws for themselves. He observes: "We hope they will take care of our concernments, since they are as other men so soon as a session is ended, and can do nothing to our prejudice that will not

posterity" equally affect them and their (3.43.558; cf. Houston, 1991, p. 200). The democratic rule of law combines the self-interest of delegates with the public interest. Sidney is careful, however, to suggest several vital reforms to give even greater assurance of parliament's responsible character. Among these important reforms are annual parliaments (3.27.475), the freedom to instruct delegates (3.44.567, though he later suggests it may be wise to forego this prac tice, 3.44.569) and his suggestion that an expanded parliament may be salutary (3.21.444, 3.27.495). With these structural reforms, in addition to the establish ment of a public philosophy of popular sovereignty, England could embody Sidney's vision of a democratic republic directed to the securing of individual

rights and free institutions.

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