Corruption and Its Consequences in Equatorial Guinea
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE Soviet Military Policy In
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE Soviet Military Policy in the Third World tnlit ..2.1'P.Oetbbei41976'4 T October 1975, the Soviets initiated an air and sealift from the USSR to help its client and in January 1976 began providing an airlift for Cuban forces between Cuba and Angola. 94. The Soviets evidently believe that the victory of a Soviet-supported national liberation movement has increased Soviet prestige in the Third World. The Soviets probably hope that Angola—where a substan- tial Cuban presence will probably remain for some [Omitted here is text unrelated to Africa.] time—may also assist the USSR in providing Soviets an entree to other national liberation movements in southern Africa—such as SWAPO. In October 1976 the Soviets signed a treaty of friendship and coopera- tion to consolidate their political position. In addition, they may hope to obtain access to port and air facilities as an alternative to those in Guinea. 95. Mozambique. Although not as extensive as that of the Chinese, Soviet aid in the form of military equipment, training, and funds assisted the Mozam- bique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) to come to power when Mozambique achieved independence in June 1975. FRELIMO will probably continue to receive substantial financial and military aid both from the USSR and the PRC. Mozambique provides training and base areas for guerrilla operations against - the white minority government of Rhodesia, an B. Africa activity to which the Soviets have given both military and political support. President Machel kept the 92. In absolute terms, Soviet military aid to sub- Soviets at arm's length immediately after independ- Saharan Africa is quite small. -
Protecting Politics: Deterring the Influence Of
Protecting Politics Deterring the Influence of Organized Crime on Elections Protecting Politics: Deterring the Influence of Organized Crime on Elections Elections are essential elements of democratic systems. Unfortunately, abuse and manipulation (including voter intimidation, vote buying or ballot stuffing) can distort these processes. However, little attention has been paid to an intrinsic part of this threat: the conditions and opportunities for criminal interference in the electoral process. Most worrying, few scholars have examined the underlying conditions that make elections vulnerable to organized criminal involvement. This report addresses these gaps in knowledge by analysing the vulnerabilities of electoral processes to illicit interference (above all by organized crime). It suggests how national and international authorities might better protect these crucial and coveted elements of the democratic process. Case studies from Georgia, Mali and Mexico illustrate these challenges and provide insights into potential ways to prevent and mitigate the effects of organized crime on elections. International IDEA Clingendael Institute ISBN 978-91-7671-069-2 Strömsborg P.O. Box 93080 SE-103 34 Stockholm 2509 AB The Hague Sweden The Netherlands T +46 8 698 37 00 T +31 70 324 53 84 F +46 8 20 24 22 F +31 70 328 20 02 9 789176 710692 > [email protected] [email protected] www.idea.int www.clingendael.nl ISBN: 978-91-7671-069-2 Protecting Politics Deterring the Influence of Organized Crime on Elections Protecting Politics Deterring the Influence of Organized Crime on Elections Series editor: Catalina Uribe Burcher Lead authors: Ivan Briscoe and Diana Goff © 2016 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance © 2016 Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael Institute) International IDEA Strömsborg SE-103 34 Stockholm Sweden Tel: +46 8 698 37 00, fax: +46 8 20 24 22 Email: [email protected], website: www.idea.int Clingendael Institute P.O. -
West and Central Africa Region COVID-19
West and Central Africa Region COVID-19 Situation Report No. 9 ©UNFPA United Nations Population Fund Reporting Period: 1 - 31 October 2020 Regional Highlights Situation in Numbers ● The West and Central Africa region is not experiencing a second wave of COVID-19 as seen 247,429 Confirmed COVID-19 Cases on other continents. The WCA region has recorded a steady decrease of cases over the last two weeks. 3,770 COVID-19 Deaths ● The total number of COVID-19 cases has reached over 247,429 in the 23 countries in West and Central Source: WHO, 4 November 2020 Africa. By the end of October 2020, there were 3,770 deaths, with a mortality rate of about 1.5%. Nearly 15,000 (9.6%) patients were still under treatment, Key Population Groups while 92.5% had recovered. ● The pandemic continues to spread at a much slower 13 M Pregnant Women rate. The five countries with the highest confirmed caseloads are: Nigeria (63,036), Ghana (48,124), Cameroon (22,103), Côte d'Ivoire (20,753) and 108 M Women of Reproductive Age Senegal (15,630). ● Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea record the highest percentage of recovery: 98.3% 98% and 148 M Young People (age 10-24) 97.6% respectively, while Chad and Liberia have the highest case fatality rates, 6.5% and 5.8%. 13 M Older Persons (age 65+) ● Health worker infections continue to increase gradually with 8,437 infections reported in 22 WCA countries since the beginning of the outbreak. Nigeria remains the most affected, with 2,175 health Funding Status for Region (US$) workers infected, followed by Ghana (2,065), Cameroon (808), Guinea (513), Equatorial Guinea (363), Senegal (349) and Guinea-Bissau (282). -
ANALYSIS and MAJOR FINDINGS Analysis and Major Findings
Preface PART3 ANALYSIS AND MAJOR FINDINGS Analysis and Major Findings 3.1 OVERVIEW (AFCEs), individual government consumption expenditures Purchasing power parities are used to contrast estimates of the size (IGCEs), collective government consumption expenditures of a country’s economy, its aggregate welfare, the well-being of its (CGCEs) and investment. Africa regional values include only the residents and how its prices compare with those in other countries. 48 African countries that participated in 2005 ICP-Africa. The main results are presented in tables and figures. The main indi- The results of 2005 ICP-Africa are presented below. The descrip- cators used are price level indices (PLIs) and per capita GDP, its tive analysis covers gross domestic product (GDP) and some of expenditure components and their expenditure shares in terms its main components: actual final consumption expenditures of the total Africa region. Figure 1: Real GDP By Country in Billion AFRIC, 2005 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 e r os de r r oon ogo Mali e r T occo Niger Chad unisia Benin r V Egypt Kenya Sudan Liberia Ghana T Congo Gabon Malawi Nigeria Angola Guinea Djibouti Zambia anzania Gambia Uganda Ethiopia Senegal Lesotho Namibia Rwanda T Mo Mauritius Como Botswana Swaziland Mauritania Zimbabwe Came Cape South Africa Madagascar Sierra Leone Côte d'Ivoi Mozambique Burkina Faso Guinea-Bissau ome and Principe Equatorial Guinea T Sao Central African Republic Congo, Democratic Republic Note: For more details, see Table T10 in part 6. Burundi is not shown because it did not supply national account data. -
EQUATORIAL GUINEA Malabo Vigatana
Punta Europa EQUATORIAL GUINEA Malabo Vigatana Basupú San Antonio Basapú Rebola Sampaca de Palé Basilé Baney I. Tortuga Balorei BIOKO NORTE Cupapa Ye Cuín Basuala ATLANTIC Isla de Batoicopo OCEAN Pico Basilé Annobón 3,011.4 m Basacato Bacake Pequeño Lago a Pot del Oeste ATLANTIC OCEAN Baó Grande ANNOBÓN Anganchi BIOKO SUR Moeri Bantabare Quioveo Batete 598 m National capital Luba Bombe Isla de Boiko (Fernando Po) Provincial capital Musola Bococo Aual City, town Riaba Major airport Caldera 2,261 m International boundary Malabo Misión Mábana Provincial boundary Eoco Main road Bohé Other road or track Ureca 0 1 2 km The seven provinces are grouped into 0 5 10 15 20 km two regions: Continental, chief town Bata; and Insular, chief town Malabo. 0 1 mi 0 5 10 mi Punta Santiago Río Ntem Punta Epote B ongola The boundaries and names shown and the CAMEROON Tica designations used on this map do not imply official Yengüe CAMEROON endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Bioko N etem Macora EQUATORIAL Andoc Ebebiyin Ayamiken Ngoa Micomeseng Acom Esong GUINEA Mbía Anguma Mimbamengui KIE NTEM GABON Ebongo Nsang Biadbe San Joaquín Nkue Tool Annobón lo de Ndyiacon San o Dumandui G B Utonde Carlos Oboronco u Mfaman Temelon a o Abi r Ngong Monte Bata o Mongo Bata Ngosoc ATLANTIC Nfonga Mindyiminue Niefang Añisok OCEAN Mfaman Niefang Nonkieng Ayaantang Movo Mondoc Efualn Elonesang Ndumensoc Amwang Ncumekie LITORAL Bisún Mbam Pijaca Nyong Masoc Ayabene Bingocom ito Manyanga en Mongomo B Añisoc Mbini Bon Ncomo Nkumekie Yen U Nsangnam o ro Mbini Mangala -
Post-Communist Mafia State
REVIEWS 275 tion’s wealth for themselves: rather, as is the Magyar, Bálint: case in Hungary, it could be a country whose corrupt, kleptocratic leaders also go out of POST-COMMUNIST MAFIA STATE. their way to actively control illicit societal THE CASE OF HUNGARY. activities and organized crime. These leaders do not simply steal from the state: they rot Budapest: Central European University it and create a society of thieves dependent Press. 2016. 311 pages. upon the elites who sanction their crimes (pp. 81–82). It is a vicious cycle that makes DOI: 10.5817/PC2018-3-275 everyone complicit in the state’s corruption. Magyar’s latest text successfully tests his An unequivocal condemnation of the Fi expanded theory of the mafia state, con deszcontrolled Hungary, Bálint Magyar’s cretizing it and demonstrating how Hun Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of gary’s authoritarian government can mas Hungary could not be timelier. This book querade as a ‘good’ state whilst eroding civil explores the deceitful mechanisms by which society and democratic institutions – even the hybrid regime installed by Prime Min without exerting any physical mass violence ister Viktor Orbán and his fellow Fidesz of (see Levitsky, Lucan 2010). It argues that ficials has systematically stripped Hungari Hungary is a corrupt, parasitic state (p. 13). ans of civil liberties (p. 255) with impunity, The book begins with the premise that upon ironically owing to its control over the rule its accession to the European Union in 2004, of law. While this text specifically investi Hungary was the model of liberal democrat gates democratic backsliding in Hungary, its ic consolidation for other former Commu framework will surely prove crucial for un nist states. -
Power and Plunder in Putin's Russia Miriam Lanskoy, Dylan Myles-Primakoff
Power and Plunder in Putin's Russia Miriam Lanskoy, Dylan Myles-Primakoff Journal of Democracy, Volume 29, Number 1, January 2018, pp. 76-85 (Article) Published by Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2018.0006 For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/683637 Access provided by your local institution (13 Mar 2018 16:12 GMT) PRE created by BK on 11/20/17. The Rise of Kleptocracy POWER AND PLUNDER IN PUTIN’S RUSSIA Miriam Lanskoy and Dylan Myles-Primakoff Miriam Lanskoy is senior director for Russia and Eurasia at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). She is the author, with Ilyas Akhmadov, of The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won and Lost (2010). Dylan Myles-Primakoff is senior program officer for Russia and Eurasia at the NED. Since Vladimir Putin rose to power in 1999, the quest to restore the might of the Russian state at home and abroad has been a hallmark of his rule. Yet another such hallmark has been rampant looting by the country’s leaders. Thus Russia has figured prominently in recent schol- arly discussions about kleptocracies—regimes distinguished by a will- ingness to prioritize defending their leaders’ mechanisms of personal enrichment over other goals of statecraft. In a kleptocracy, then, cor- ruption plays an outsized role in determining policy. But how have the state-building and great-power ambitions of the new Russian elite coex- isted with its scramble for self-enrichment? Putin’s Russia offers a vivid illustration of how kleptocratic plunder can become not only an end in itself, but also a tool for both consolidating domestic political control and projecting power abroad. -
Corruption Perceptions Index 2020
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2020 Transparency International is a global movement with one vision: a world in which government, business, civil society and the daily lives of people are free of corruption. With more than 100 chapters worldwide and an international secretariat in Berlin, we are leading the fight against corruption to turn this vision into reality. #cpi2020 www.transparency.org/cpi Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. All information was believed to be correct as of January 2021. Nevertheless, Transparency International cannot accept responsibility for the consequences of its use for other purposes or in other contexts. ISBN: 978-3-96076-157-0 2021 Transparency International. Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under CC BY-ND 4.0 DE. Quotation permitted. Please contact Transparency International – [email protected] – regarding derivatives requests. CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2020 2-3 12-13 20-21 Map and results Americas Sub-Saharan Africa Peru Malawi 4-5 Honduras Zambia Executive summary Recommendations 14-15 22-23 Asia Pacific Western Europe and TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE European Union 6-7 Vanuatu Myanmar Malta Global highlights Poland 8-10 16-17 Eastern Europe & 24 COVID-19 and Central Asia Methodology corruption Serbia Health expenditure Belarus Democratic backsliding 25 Endnotes 11 18-19 Middle East & North Regional highlights Africa Lebanon Morocco TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL 180 COUNTRIES. 180 SCORES. HOW DOES YOUR COUNTRY MEASURE UP? -
Equatorial Guinea Home to the Fourth Highest Species Richness of Primates in Africa Including Many Endemic Subspecies
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service Equatorial Guinea Home to the fourth highest species richness of primates in Africa including many endemic subspecies. Unsustainable hunting is the single greatest threat to the majority of wildlife in Equatorial Guinea’s forests. Equatorial Guinea’s national development plan, Horizonte 2020, has led to rapid infrastructure development which also represents a severe threat to the country’s wildlife and their habitat. New road network exacerbate commercial bushmeat hunting and trade by increasing access to forests and urban bushmeat markets. Higher income among the urban elite and a lack of suitable alternative protein options and jobs in rural areas is leading to an increase in bushmeat demand. The lack of wildlife law enforcement exacerbates the bushmeat The frog species Afrixalus paradorsalis sits on a leaf in a forest in Equatorial Guinea. trade. Credit: Matt Muir/USFWS. Marine Turtle Mortality Equatorial Guinea while waters off the coast of the The intentional or incidental capture of (EG), the only mainland are particularly important as marine turtles and the raiding of nests Spanish-speaking feeding sites. The dense forests on for eggs constitute the greatest threats country in Africa, is Equatorial Guinea’s mainland contain to marine turtles in Equatorial Guinea. home to an the endangered forest elephant and Poachers often target nesting females. incredibly diverse central chimpanzee, and the critically In urban areas on Bioko Island and on range of species. In endangered western lowland gorilla. the mainland, turtle meat sells for as addition to a mainland, it stretches much as $10 per kilogram and a live across an archipelago of islands in the Given its small size, Equatorial adult turtle for more than $500. -
UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations
UC Berkeley UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title The Logic of Kleptocracy: Corruption, Repression, and Political Opposition in Post-Soviet Eurasia Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/92g1h187 Author LaPorte, Jody Marie Publication Date 2012 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California The Logic of Kleptocracy: Corruption, Repression, and Political Opposition in Post-Soviet Eurasia By Jody Marie LaPorte A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Jason Wittenberg, Co-chair Professor Michael S. Fish, Co-chair Professor David Collier Professor Victoria Bonnell Spring 2012 The Logic of Kleptocracy: Corruption, Repression, and Political Opposition in Post-Soviet Eurasia Copyright 2012 by Jody Marie LaPorte Abstract The Logic of Kleptocracy: Corruption, Repression, and Political Opposition in Post-Soviet Eurasia by Jody Marie LaPorte Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Berkeley Professor Jason Wittenberg, co-chair Professor Michael S. Fish, co-chair This dissertation asks why some non-democratic regimes give political opponents significant leeway to organize, while others enforce strict limits on such activities. I examine this question with reference to two in-depth case studies from post-Soviet Eurasia: Georgia under President Eduard Shevardnadze and Kazakhstan under President Nursultan Nazarbayev. While a non- democratic regime was in place in both countries, opposition was highly tolerated in Georgia, but not allowed in Kazakhstan. I argue that these divergent policies can be traced to variation in the predominant source and pattern of state corruption in each country. -
Turning the Tide on Dirty Money Why the World’S Democracies Need a Global Kleptocracy Initiative
GETTY IMAGES Turning the Tide on Dirty Money Why the World’s Democracies Need a Global Kleptocracy Initiative By Trevor Sutton and Ben Judah February 2021 WWW.AMERICANPROGRESS.ORG Contents 1 Preface 3 Introduction and summary 6 How dirty money went global and why efforts to stop it have failed 10 Why illicit finance and kleptocracy are a threat to global democracy and should be a foreign policy priority 13 The case for optimism: Why democracies have a structural advantage against kleptocracy 18 How to harden democratic defenses against kleptocracy: Key principles and areas for improvement 21 Recommendations 28 Conclusion 29 Corruption and kleptocracy: Key definitions and concepts 31 About the authors and acknowledgments 32 Endnotes Preface Transparency and honest government are the lifeblood of democracy. Trust in democratic institutions depends on the integrity of public servants, who are expected to put the common good before their own interests and faithfully observe the law. When officials violate that duty, democracy is at risk. No country is immune to corruption. As representatives of three important democratic societies—the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom—we recognize that corruption is an affront to our shared values, one that threatens the resiliency and cohesion of democratic governments around the globe and undermines the relationship between the state and its citizens. For that reason, we welcome the central recommendation of this report that the world’s democracies should work together to increase transparency in the global economy and limit the pernicious influence of corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance on democratic institutions. -
Venezuela: Background and U.S
Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations Updated January 21, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R44841 {222A0E69-13A2-4985-84AE-73CC3D FF4D02}- R-065134085251065165027250227152136081055238021128081004254222131230149124116165025173059138019212092197094082070147241055138103109125167218148070191159004086199008187015230011144177144130039148251243207037022138160186199154124002209111056023137069245037120015094018080157060102122054208115 Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations Summary Venezuela remains in a deep political crisis under the authoritarian rule of President Nicolás Maduro of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Maduro, narrowly elected in 2013 after the death of Hugo Chávez (1999-2013), is unpopular. Nevertheless, he has used the courts, security forces, and electoral council to repress the opposition. On January 10, 2019, Maduro began a second term after winning reelection on May 20, 2018, in an unfair contest deemed illegitimate by the opposition-controlled National Assembly and most of the international community. The United States, the European Union, the Group of Seven, and most Western Hemisphere countries do not recognize the legitimacy of his mandate. They view the National Assembly as Venezuela’s only democratic institution. Maduro’s inauguration capped his efforts to consolidate power. In 2017, protesters called for Maduro to release political prisoners and respect the opposition-led National Assembly. Security forces quashed protests, with more than 130 killed and thousands