Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Cognitive Contact

Western University Scholarship@Western Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 11-20-2015 12:00 AM Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Cognitive Contact Christopher A. Young The University of Western Ontario Supervisor Dr. Andrew Botterell The University of Western Ontario Joint Supervisor Dr. Angela Mendelovici The University of Western Ontario Graduate Program in Philosophy A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy © Christopher A. Young 2015 Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd Part of the Philosophy of Mind Commons Recommended Citation Young, Christopher A., "Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Cognitive Contact" (2015). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 3386. https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/3386 This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Cognitive Contact by C.A. Young Graduate Program in Philosophy A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies The University of Western Ontario London, Ontario, Canada © C.A. Young 2015 Abstract Part 1 of the thesis questions the traditional relation model of intentionality. After fixing reference on the target phenomenon, intentionality, and explaining my interest in it, I ask what sorts of things intentionality might be a relation to. I consider ordinary objects, properties, propositions and hybrid views, and conclude all make the intentional relation appear rather mysterious. From there, I move on to examine the relation view’s most prominent proponents, the tracking theorists—pointing out some challenges such views face, and concluding that it might be worthwhile looking into alternatives to the relation view. Part 2 asks whether the newly emerging phenomenal intentionality movement can provide a viable alternative to the relation model of intentionality. After focusing on a specific kind of phenomenal intentionality theory—something I call modificationism—I examine three such accounts. From there I go on to discuss some common complaints/challenges these kinds of views face, and consider how they might be addressed within the modificationist framework. In Part 3, I address what I call the problem of cognitive contact: how do our contentful mental states manage to make cognitive contact with the ordinary objects (e.g. tables and chairs) that they appear to. The problem is particularly acute for any version of phenomenal intentionality that denies the relation view, and has been given very little attention in the literature. I consider how a modificationist might address this problem, and conclude that though some avenues appear promising, there is nevertheless a great deal of work to be done if modificationism, and phenomenal intentionality theory, is to overcome this problem. ii Keywords: Phenomenal Intentionality, Intentionality, Phenomenality, Consciousness, Internalism, Cognitive Contact iii Acknowledgements I am assuming there are unofficial protocols for writing the acknowledgement section of one’s thesis. That being the case, I ask your forgiveness for what will undoubtedly (and predictably) be an exercise in not following protocol. First, I want to express my most sincere thanks to my supervisors, Dr. Angela Mendelovici and Dr. Andrew Botterell. ‘Extraordinary’ can be used to denote a great many things, and extraordinariness is measured and attributed in just about as many ways. As I want to use it here, it denotes the kind of accommodating, challenging, shrewd and, above all, helpful support that managed to make me a better philosopher. More importantly, it also denotes the attribute of never showing anything but the utmost confidence that I could actually do this; and this even when I was pretty darn sure that I couldn’t. As much as anything else, this sense that at least two people believed in my philosophical competence was always a source of that one thing that keeps you going through the dark times: hope. To my supervisors: You are both most extraordinary! I suppose that by the time one completes his doctoral thesis, his philosophical beginnings are often but a distant memory—like the starting line of a marathon, or one’s own driveway after a cross-country journey. Not so with me. I consider my undergraduate days not as merely the distant beginning of this long and arduous trek, but as the formative years that laid the philosophical foundations upon which this project was built— foundations that, for all the weight and abuse they took, never betrayed a fissure. To the man who taught me how to read, write and think, Dr. Peter Campbell: Thank you. Sine qua non! Perhaps unconventionally, yet no less sincerely, I would like to thank Jason Cruz, Jake Kiley, Jordan Burns, Chris Aiken and Rob Ramos. During the darkest times, when I was strung out and stressed to the max, when failure seemed assured, you convinced me to put that next foot in front of the other. You were the peace of mind that kept me going on, got me out of bed, and out that door! And for that, I owe you more than words alone could say. I seem to remember a story about a philosopher who often became so defeated by the crushing weight of his own revelations that he had to head down to the pub to play cards just to get out of his own head. Earth shattering revelations aside, I too have needed to be brought back to earth by those wise people whose grasp on what is really important in life is eminently firmer than mine will ever be. To Dan, Arlene, Mark, Jenna, Ryan, Noah, Natalie, Sarah, Amy and Lily: Thank-you. iv Finally, and most importantly, I want to thank my family. For Matt: I hope the completion of this document is one step closer to making you as proud of me as I am of you, and of having you as a brother. For Sue: For reasons best known to yourself, you always believed in me; and, when I felt I could confide in no one else, you were there. For my parents: Everything good about me is due to you; everything not so good about me is due to my not listening to you. I could never, never, have done this without your love, support and your unfathomable faith that I could. Finally, to my wife Michelle: Though all the forgiveness in the world couldn’t pardon the crime of a guy like me convincing a girl like you to marry him, I hope that, small gesture though it is in comparison, the completion of this thesis stands as a tribute to the love, support, and unwavering patience you’ve shown me. v Dedication To those who weren’t with us too long, Amstel and Duke: I miss you beyond the count of tears. This one’s for you. Also, to Dan Redick: I’m so sorry you couldn’t see the end of this project. Too soon my friend. vi Table of Contents Abstract .................................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. iv Dedication .............................................................................................................................. vi Part 1 ......................................................................................................................................... 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 1. Intentionality: Fixing Reference ................................................................................. 3 1.1 Original/Derived Intentionality............................................................................... 3 1.2 Introspection and Intentionality ............................................................................. 5 1.3 Intentionality and Content ......................................................................................... 6 1.4 A brief Recap ................................................................................................................... 9 2: The Objects of Intentionality .................................................................................... 11 2.1 Intentionality and the DR-relation view ............................................................ 11 2.1.1 Intentional Inexistence and the DR-relation View ..................................... 12 2.1.2 A Word on Externalism ......................................................................................... 16 2.1.3 The DR-relation View and Thinking About Things Under an Aspect or Description .......................................................................................................................... 20 2.1.4 Summary .................................................................................................................... 21 2.2 Abstracta as Intentional Contents ........................................................................ 22 2.2.1 Intentionality as a Relation to the Forms ....................................................... 24 2.2.2 Intentionality and properties In Re .................................................................. 30 2.2.3 Intentionality and Propositions .......................................................................

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