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Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic

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Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic DANGEROUS LITTLE STONES: DIAMONDS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Africa Report N°167 – 16 December 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION: THE EVOLUTION OF DIAMOND MINING IN THE CAR .... 1 II. MISGUIDED GOVERNANCE OF THE DIAMOND SECTOR ................................. 5 A. TIGHTENING POLITICAL CONTROL ............................................................................................... 5 B. THE FLIGHT OF INDUSTRIAL MINERS ........................................................................................... 8 C. THE POVERTY TRAP OF INFORMAL ARTISANAL MINING .............................................................. 8 D. A STAGE SET FOR SMUGGLERS .................................................................................................. 12 III. DIAMONDS AND CONFLICT ..................................................................................... 15 A. THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR UNITY (UFDR) ........................................................ 16 B. THE CONVENTION OF PATRIOTS FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE (CPJP) .............................................. 18 IV. MINING REFORM AS A PEACEBUILDING PRIORITY ....................................... 20 A. IMPROVE GOVERNANCE ............................................................................................................. 20 1. Increasing democratic control .................................................................................................... 20 2. Enhancing transparency ............................................................................................................. 20 3. Building capacity ....................................................................................................................... 21 4. Strengthening anti-smuggling measures .................................................................................... 21 B. STOP DIAMONDS PERPETUATING CONFLICT ............................................................................... 22 C. BOOST DEVELOPMENT IN MINING AREAS .................................................................................. 22 V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 23 APPENDICES A. MAP OF DIAMOND MINING ZONES IN THE CAR ............................................................................... 24 B. MAP OF REBEL ACTIVITY IN EASTERN CAR IN 2010 ....................................................................... 25 C. DIAMOND EXPORTS FROM THE CAR, 1990-2010 ............................................................................ 26 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 27 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2007 ..................................................... 28 F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 30 Africa Report N°167 16 December 2010 DANGEROUS LITTLE STONES: DIAMONDS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS In the diamond mines of the Central African Republic and openly ran his own diamond mining company. Bozizé (CAR), extreme poverty and armed conflict put thousands is more circumspect. His regime maintains tight control of lives in danger. President François Bozizé keeps tight of mining revenues by means of a strict legal and fiscal control of the diamond sector to enrich and empower his framework and centralised, opaque management. own ethnic group but does little to alleviate the poverty that drives informal miners to dig in perilous conditions. Since Bozizé came to power in 2003, industrial diamond Stringent export taxes incentivise smuggling that the min- mining companies have almost all left, in part because the ing authorities are too few and too corrupt to stop. These authorities’ high demands erode potential profits. Infor- factors combined – a parasitic state, poverty and largely mal artisanal mining carries on apace, but the govern- unchecked crime – move jealous factions to launch rebel- ment’s closure in 2008 of most diamond exporting com- lions and enable armed groups to collect new recruits and panies – a ruse to better control the market – severely cut profit from mining and selling diamonds illegally. To en- investment in the production chain, cost many miners sure diamonds fuel development not bloodshed, root and their jobs and helped cause a spike in infant malnutrition. branch reform of the sector must become a core priority Expensive licences and corrupt mining police make it of the country’s peacebuilding strategy. harder for miners to escape the poverty trap. A 12 per cent tax on diamond exports, the highest in the region, makes Nature scattered diamonds liberally over the CAR, but smuggling worthwhile and fosters illicit trading networks since colonial times foreign entrepreneurs and grasping that deprive the state of much needed revenue. regimes have benefited from the precious stones more than the Central African people. Mining companies have The government’s refusal to distribute national wealth repeatedly tried to extract diamonds on an industrial scale fairly has led jealous individuals and disenfranchised and largely failed because the deposits are alluvial, spread groups to take up arms for a bigger slice of the cake. The thinly across two large river systems. Instead, an esti- Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (Union des forces mated 80,000-100,000 mostly unlicensed miners dig with démocratiques pour le rassemblement, UFDR), more eth- picks and shovels for daily rations and the chance of nic militia than rebel group, has signed a peace agreement striking it lucky. Middlemen, mostly West Africans, buy but still mines diamonds in the north east and sells them at meagre prices and sell at a profit to exporting compa- on the black market. Poor miners joined its ranks to im- nies. The government lacks both the institutional capacity prove their lot, and though taking power is no longer a to govern this dispersed, transient production chain and prospect, diamond profits are a strong incentive not to the will to invest diamond revenues in the long-term disarm. Meanwhile, the Convention of Patriots for Justice growth of mining communities. and Peace (Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix, CPJP), the most active rebellion, preys on miners Chronic state fragility has ingrained in the political elite a and traders in the east. This insecurity, largely banditry winner-takes-all political culture and a preference for under a rebel flag, severely restricts economic activity, short-term gain. The French ransacked their colony of its inhibits the holding there of elections set for 23 January natural resources, and successive rulers have treated 2011 and puts civilian lives at great risk. power as licence to loot. Jean-Bédel Bokassa, the CAR’s one-time “emperor”, created a monopoly on diamond ex- Reform of the diamond sector is a crucial element, along- ports, and his personal gifts to French President Giscard side wider governance and conflict resolution measures, d’Estaing, intended to seal their friendship, became sym- for improving the living conditions of miners and their bols of imperial excess. Ange-Félix Patassé saw nothing families, boosting the state’s scant domestic revenues and wrong in using his presidency to pursue business interests helping break the cycle of armed conflict. The govern- Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic Crisis Group Africa Report N°167, 16 December 2010 Page ii ment needs first to improve governance of the mining b) help the government create a new Special Anti- sector, which is a question more of political will than ca- Fraud Unit (Unité spéciale anti-fraude, USAF) to pacity. Only when Bozizé has shown commitment to in- replace the current mining brigade, incorporating stituting more democratic control of mining revenues and it into the wider security sector reform; and en- enhancing transparency in management processes should sure that the new force has a multi-ethnic, multi- international partners support mining authorities in the regional composition and is accountable to an in- capital and mining zones. The reform strategy should pri- ter-ministerial body including the mines, internal oritise artisanal above industrial mining, which has less security and defence ministries; direct impact on mining communities, aim to reduce in- c) the World Customs Organisation (WCO) should centives for smuggling and tighten controls to stop armed propose to the governments of the region, in par- groups profiting from diamonds. ticular those of the CAR, Cameroon, Chad and Sudan, that it lead and coordinate their customs authorities in investigating smuggling methods and RECOMMENDATIONS routes; and d) the UN Peacebuilding Commission should help Improving governance of the mining sector the government organise in 2011 a donors confer- To the government of the Central African ence to mobilise funds for implementing the PRSP Republic: 2011-2013, including funds dedicated to mining sector reform. 1. Transfer the power to award mining contracts and grant licences to exporting companies from the presi- Stopping diamonds from perpetuating armed conflict dency to the mines ministry and require the minister to give appropriate public airing to draft contracts,
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