The President's Chief of Staff: Lessons Learned Author(S): James P
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The President's Chief of Staff: Lessons Learned Author(s): James P. Pfiffner Source: Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1, Democracy in Transition (Winter, 1993), pp. 77-102 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27551081 . Accessed: 15/10/2011 09:07 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Blackwell Publishing and Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Presidential Studies Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org The President's Chief of Staff: Lessons Learned JAMES P. PFIFFNER Government and Public Professor of Policy Mason George University Abstract are two House This paper argues that there firm lessons of White organization can he Presidents at their own no. a is essential that ignored hy only peril: 1, chief of staff in the modern no. a will almost lead White House; 2, domineering chief of staff certainly to is trouble. After outlining the argument for thefirst lesson, the hulk of the paper devoted to a detailed examination of the conductof the chief of staff office hy each of thefour H. R. domineering chiefs of staff Sherman Adams for Eisenhower, Haldeman for Nixon, Donald Regan for Reagan, and John Sununufor Bush. Each of these chiefs of staff resigned a under varying degree of pressure after considerable controversy. The paper concludes that a is a the preferred rolefor chief of staff that of facilitator, coordinator, and neutral broker. a new a to At the superficial level President has free hand in choosing how on or organize theWhite House based personal preference management style. After a two all, the presidency is very personal office. There are, however, firm lessons of can at own White House organization that be ignored by Presidents only their peril. Lesson Number One: A chief of staff is essential in the modern White House. Lesson Number Two: A domineering chief of staff will almost certainly lead to trouble. to a The bulk of this paper will be devoted arguing for the second principle: or to domineering "strong" chief of staff will likely lead disaster.1 But first, the argument that aWhite House chief of staff is necessary will be outlined in order to put the second lesson into perspective. was to Dwight Eisenhower the first President establish the office of chief of as to run staff, and he designated Sherman Adams the person his White House. But to own no one after Eisenhower John Kennedy decided be his chief of staff and had was to staffer whose scope of duties comparable the sweeping authority Adams had to in the 1950s. Lyndon Johnson sporadically tried organize his White House and a was to designate chief of staff, but he unwilling delegate sufficient authority and remained in charge of everything himself. President Nixon increased the size of theWhite House staff and continued to even centralize control because he distrusted the executive branch bureaucracy and own was ran his political appointees. H. R. Haldeman his chief of staff and theWhite an name a House with iron hand. With Eisenhower and Nixon choosing to chief to as of staff and the two intervening Democrats choosing act their own, it still 77 78 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY seemed in 1976 that the issue of whether a chief of staff is necessary was an open one. to But two trends had converged preclude the option of operating the White House without a chief of staff. The White House office had grown to over 500 staffers, and control of domestic and foreign policy had been increasingly centralized in the White House. to name When Gerald Ford took over, he reacted against Watergate by refusing a to run an chief of staff and intended open presidency. Ford first asked Donald to was Rumsfeld join his White House staff, but he refused because Ford unwilling to a a to run designate chief of staff. But after year of trying the White House by as were himself Ford concluded that his broader duties President suffering from the a lack of chief of staff. Ford called Rumsfeld again to ask him to join the administra to tion, and Ford agreed make him chief of staff in fact, though officially the "staff was coordinator."2 When Rumsfeld appointed Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney became Ford's chief of staff. Jimmy Carter, also running against the specter of H. R. Haldeman and Wa to own tergate, wanted be his chief of staff and ignored the lessons that Ford had learned. But after two years of trying to manage theWhite House himself, Carter own also admitted that his "spokes-of-the-wheel" approach of being his chief of staff was not to working and designated Hamilton Jordan be his chief of staff. When Jordan left theWhite House to join the campaign, Jack Watson took over as chief of staff. not a Thus Lesson Number One is that the President does have realistic option not to have some sort of chief of staff; the role is necessary in the modern White to a House.3 The chief of staff is necessary perform number of functions. Among them are included:4 on now so 1. Impose order the policy process. The White House office is large a to run soon that President who tries it alone will be overwhelmed with managerial to details the neglect of broader responsibilities. A broad range of functions in to to now domestic and foreign policy that used be delegated cabinet secretaries is centralized in the White House. are 2. Arbitrate among cabinet secretaries. Contemporary public policy issues cut across are over complex and usually several departments. Cabinet secretaries rivals not to a policy turf and will cede coordination of policy peer. A chief of staff is needed to on impose the President's perspective policy disputes among the departments and agencies. access on 3. Control and play the heavy. Someone has to take distasteful tasks as no to for the President, such controlling access, saying requests, and firing people. to no The chief of staff is the right person be the "abominable man" and also to act as a lightning rod by absorbing attacks meant for the President. someone must In sum, short of the President be in charge of coordinating the run a White House. No president has successfully the White House without chief of staff since 1968, and since 1979 no President has tried. But Lesson Number Two of White House organization is that a chief of staff too an to to who takes domineering approach the position will lead major problems. THE CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED 79 PRESIDENT'S | There have been four domineering chiefs of staff in the modern presidency: Sherman Adams for Eisenhower, H. R. Haldeman for Nixon, Donald Regan for Reagan, and John Sununu for Bush. Each of these domineering chiefs of staff has resigned under a varying degree of pressure. The rest of this paper will examine the service of these come to a strong chiefs of staff and the conclusion that the preferred role for chief of staff is that of a facilitator, coordinator, and neutral broker. The best model for this role was James Baker in Ronald Reagan's first term, although Donald Rumsfeld, to Richard Cheney, and Jack Watson took the facilitating approach the chief of staff office before Baker. Eisenhower Institutionalizes the White House While FDR began the modern staffing system in the White House and more was Truman organized it explicitly, it under Eisenhower that theWhite House staff became institutionalized. Before he became President Dwight Eisenhower had an the advantage of having been executive for many years, directing U.S. forces to during World War II, and having coordinated the allied effort victory in theWar. career to During his he had given considerable thought leadership in organizations came to and the presidency with firm ideas about how theWhite House should be was organized. He of the strong opinion that White House organization needed improving. contact For years I had been in frequent with the executive office of theWhite House, and I had certain ideas about the system, or lack of system under was which it operated. With my training in problems involving organization it inconceivable to me that the work of the White House could not be better case systemized than had been the in the years I observed it.5 a Eisenhower stressed the importance of organization: "Organization cannot make out an . can genius of incompetent. On the other hand, disorganization scarcely fail can to result in inefficiency and easily lead to disaster."6 Thus Eisenhower organized his more or White House much formally than either Truman Roosevelt. a Eisenhower introduced number of organizational innovations to the White were House, among them the offices of Cabinet Secretary and Staff Secretary and the to upgrading of the staff director of the National Security Council Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. most to But perhaps the important and lasting contribution of Eisenhower the was was to organization of the presidency the office of chief of staff whose function oversee more and coordinate the much enlarged and complex staff for the president.