The President's Chief of Staff: Lessons Learned Author(S): James P

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The President's Chief of Staff: Lessons Learned Author(s): James P. Pfiffner Source: Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1, Democracy in Transition (Winter, 1993), pp. 77-102 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27551081 . Accessed: 15/10/2011 09:07

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http://www.jstor.org The President's Chief of Staff: Lessons Learned

JAMES P. PFIFFNER Government and Public Professor of Policy Mason George University

Abstract are two House This paper argues that there firm lessons of White organization can he Presidents at their own no. a is essential that ignored hy only peril: 1, chief of staff in the modern no. a will almost lead White House; 2, domineering chief of staff certainly to is trouble. After outlining the argument for thefirst lesson, the hulk of the paper devoted to a detailed examination of the conductof the chief of staff office hy each of thefour H. R. domineering chiefs of staff Sherman Adams for Eisenhower, Haldeman for Nixon, Donald Regan for Reagan, and John Sununufor Bush. Each of these chiefs of staff resigned a under varying degree of pressure after considerable controversy. The paper concludes that a is a the preferred rolefor chief of staff that of facilitator, coordinator, and neutral broker.

a new a to At the superficial level President has free hand in choosing how on or organize theWhite House based personal preference management style. After a two all, the presidency is very personal office. There are, however, firm lessons of can at own White House organization that be ignored by Presidents only their peril. Lesson Number One: A chief of staff is essential in the modern White House.

Lesson Number Two: A domineering chief of staff will almost certainly lead to trouble. to a The bulk of this paper will be devoted arguing for the second principle: or to domineering "strong" chief of staff will likely lead disaster.1 But first, the argument that aWhite House chief of staff is necessary will be outlined in order to put the second lesson into perspective. was to Dwight Eisenhower the first President establish the office of chief of as to run staff, and he designated Sherman Adams the person his White House. But to own no one after Eisenhower John Kennedy decided be his chief of staff and had was to staffer whose scope of duties comparable the sweeping authority Adams had to in the 1950s. Lyndon Johnson sporadically tried organize his White House and a was to designate chief of staff, but he unwilling delegate sufficient authority and remained in charge of everything himself. President Nixon increased the size of theWhite House staff and continued to even centralize control because he distrusted the executive branch bureaucracy and own was ran his political appointees. H. R. Haldeman his chief of staff and theWhite an name a House with iron hand. With Eisenhower and Nixon choosing to chief to as of staff and the two intervening Democrats choosing act their own, it still

77 78 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

seemed in 1976 that the issue of whether a chief of staff is necessary was an open one. to But two trends had converged preclude the option of operating the White House without a chief of staff. The White House office had grown to over 500 staffers, and control of domestic and foreign policy had been increasingly centralized in the White House. to name When Gerald Ford took over, he reacted against Watergate by refusing a to run an chief of staff and intended open presidency. Ford first asked Donald to was Rumsfeld join his White House staff, but he refused because Ford unwilling to a a to run designate chief of staff. But after year of trying the White House by as were himself Ford concluded that his broader duties President suffering from the a lack of chief of staff. Ford called Rumsfeld again to ask him to join the administra to tion, and Ford agreed make him chief of staff in fact, though officially the "staff was coordinator."2 When Rumsfeld appointed Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney became Ford's chief of staff.

Jimmy Carter, also running against the specter of H. R. Haldeman and Wa to own tergate, wanted be his chief of staff and ignored the lessons that Ford had learned. But after two years of trying to manage theWhite House himself, Carter own also admitted that his "spokes-of-the-wheel" approach of being his chief of staff was not to working and designated Hamilton Jordan be his chief of staff. When Jordan left theWhite House to join the campaign, Jack Watson took over as chief of staff. not a Thus Lesson Number One is that the President does have realistic option not to have some sort of chief of staff; the role is necessary in the modern White to a House.3 The chief of staff is necessary perform number of functions. Among them are included:4 on now so 1. Impose order the policy process. The White House office is large a to run soon that President who tries it alone will be overwhelmed with managerial to details the neglect of broader responsibilities. A broad range of functions in to to now domestic and foreign policy that used be delegated cabinet secretaries is centralized in the White House. are 2. Arbitrate among cabinet secretaries. Contemporary public policy issues cut across are over complex and usually several departments. Cabinet secretaries rivals not to a policy turf and will cede coordination of policy peer. A chief of staff is needed to on impose the President's perspective policy disputes among the departments and

agencies. access on 3. Control and play the heavy. Someone has to take distasteful tasks as no to for the President, such controlling access, saying requests, and firing people. to no The chief of staff is the right person be the "abominable man" and also to act as a lightning rod by absorbing attacks meant for the President. someone must In sum, short of the President be in charge of coordinating the run a White House. No president has successfully the White House without chief of staff since 1968, and since 1979 no President has tried. But Lesson Number Two of White House organization is that a chief of staff too an to to who takes domineering approach the position will lead major problems. THE CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED 79 PRESIDENT'S |

There have been four domineering chiefs of staff in the modern presidency: Sherman Adams for Eisenhower, H. R. Haldeman for Nixon, Donald Regan for Reagan, and John Sununu for Bush. Each of these domineering chiefs of staff has resigned under a varying degree of pressure. The rest of this paper will examine the service of these come to a strong chiefs of staff and the conclusion that the preferred role for chief of staff is that of a facilitator, coordinator, and neutral broker. The best model for this role was James Baker in Ronald Reagan's first term, although Donald Rumsfeld, to Richard Cheney, and Jack Watson took the facilitating approach the chief of staff office before Baker.

Eisenhower Institutionalizes the White House

While FDR began the modern staffing system in the White House and more was Truman organized it explicitly, it under Eisenhower that theWhite House staff became institutionalized. Before he became President Dwight Eisenhower had an the advantage of having been executive for many years, directing U.S. forces to during World War II, and having coordinated the allied effort victory in theWar. career to During his he had given considerable thought leadership in organizations came to and the presidency with firm ideas about how theWhite House should be was organized. He of the strong opinion that White House organization needed improving.

contact For years I had been in frequent with the executive office of theWhite House, and I had certain ideas about the system, or lack of system under was which it operated. With my training in problems involving organization it inconceivable to me that the work of the White House could not be better case systemized than had been the in the years I observed it.5

a Eisenhower stressed the importance of organization: "Organization cannot make out an . . . can genius of incompetent. On the other hand, disorganization scarcely fail can to result in inefficiency and easily lead to disaster."6 Thus Eisenhower organized his more or White House much formally than either Truman Roosevelt. a Eisenhower introduced number of organizational innovations to the White were House, among them the offices of Cabinet Secretary and Staff Secretary and the to upgrading of the staff director of the National Security Council Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. most to But perhaps the important and lasting contribution of Eisenhower the was was to organization of the presidency the office of chief of staff whose function oversee more and coordinate the much enlarged and complex staff for the president. The combination of the powers of the office and the personality of its first occupant, most Sherman Adams, made it the powerful position short of the president in the government. Adams' official title was Assistant to the President, but his function was chief of staff. "I think of Adams as my Chief of Staff, but I don't call him that too because the politicians think it sounds military," admitted Eisenhower.7 Though Eisenhower never laid out in detail what Adams' duties were to be it was clear that PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES 80 I QUARTERLY

was Adams to be in charge of theWhite House. He told Adams that "The organiza must to am to to tion plan make it plain everybody that I looking you coordinate this office."8 saw as sure was Adams his job making that staff work complete and that any to were to issues brought the president ripe for presidential involvement. According man Eisenhower: "A like that is valuable because of the unnecessary detail he keeps away from the President. A President who doesn't know how to decentralize will to be weighed down with details and won't have time deal with the big issues."9 a amount to Adams spent considerable of time forcing reluctant cabinet secretaries settle their disputes and turf battles short of the president. "Either you make up your minds or else tell me and Iwill do it.We must not bother the President with this. to He is trying keep the world from war."10 As Adams explained his role, "Eisenhower me to a simply expected manage staff that would boil down, simplify, and expedite . . . as the urgent business and keep much work of secondary importance off his desk as most matters came possible."11 Adams had within his jurisdiction domestic that a on to the President and he spent good portion of his time political appointments. own not act as a He did not have clear policy preferences of his and did policy advocate as within theWhite House system, though Republican conservatives regarded him suspiciously moderate. access to Much of Adams' power stemmed from his control of the president. to Given Eisenhower's preference be spared details, his absence from theWhite House much of the time, and his conscious decision to stay behind the scenes, Adams' more position became that much powerful. Despite organization charts and official access to to a policy that gave direct the president all cabinet officers and number of was as to White House staffers, the reality that Adams usually had final say who see once in would the president and what papers would reach him. Adams said a access to response to question about cabinet the president: "What you say about correct. shielding people from the President [sic] is essentially Anybody who had to legitimate business of sufficient importance occupy the attention of the President I Cabinet members were correct got in; those that didn't didn't. knew the difference."12 access to was in blaming Adams for enforcing tight control of the President. This the source of much of the resentment of Adams. can successor as The tightness of Adams' control be contrasted with Adams' more to chief of staff, General Jerry Persons, who reported that he allowed people see Eisenhower than Adams had and gave him more details than had Adams.13 But access was one controlling only of the important roles that Adams played for the as president chief of staff. He took the heat for the president for tough political as as a decisions, such firing people and negotiating political patronage. He acted an buffer for the President and organized the White House and Cabinet with iron hand. After Eisenhower's first heart attack in 1955 Adams ran the executive branch

virtually by himself for several months. are These all legitimate and often necessary roles for the chief of staff but the are can a can in a way they handled make large difference. They be done heavy handed manner or can a overt they be accomplished with firm hand, but without hostility. THE CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED PRESIDENT'S | 81

Cabinet members and staff may chafe under the decision in either case, but hostility news and ill feeling will result if the bearer of the bad is gratuitously rude also. ran Although Adams theWhite House the way Eisenhower wanted, his tight control to and personal style contributed his eventual undoing. a Adams' downfall began when it became public in June of 1958 that textile manufacturer and old friend of Adams, Bernard Goldfine, had on several occasions status requested that Adams determine the of charges against him with federal to regulatory agencies. Adams made the calls for Goldfine from the White House status cases not find out the of the but did suggest any change in agency actions. While the calls in themselves may have been free of improper intent, the very fact an to was that official of Adams' status, power, and proximity the president making the call cannot help but to be taken seriously by any agency in the government. not seem to to or Adams did be sensitive the implications appearance of his calls. was Adams became doubly vulnerable when it disclosed in congressional hear rooms ings that he had accepted gifts from Goldfine who had paid for hotel for a coat an Adams and had given his wife vicuna and oriental rug.14 Despite Adams' to context protestations that he had also given gifts Goldfine in the of their friendship, to the combination of gifts Adams with the inquiries from theWhite House appeared too much like official actions in exchange for gifts. were The charges given added weight because in the 1952 elections the Republi cans had severely criticized the Democrats for instances of corruption in the Truman Administration. Several of Truman's aides had been fired for accepting financial and other goods while in office. Republicans had promised the electorate that they would mess "clean up the inWashington" and that their administration would be "clean as a wore hound's tooth." Adams proudly the badge of righteousness and had swiftly censure moved to and fire members of the administration who had been tainted by on own was too any hint of impropriety. The irony of Adams being hoist his petard to much for his political enemies resist. not The publication of these actions, while serious in themselves, might have to led disaster, but in combination with other aspects of Adams' personality ultimately led to his resignation. The first of these factors has already been mentioned: Adams' access to even tight control of the President. People resented it though the President was was wanted it that way. The public image of Adams that he virtually running was an was the presidency by himself. This exaggerated perception and part of Eisenhower's conscious decision to exercise his power behind the scenes, but the true to current popular image rang many Americans.15 One joke had it that it would a be unfortunate if Eisenhower died and Nixon became president but disaster ifAdams was to died and Eisenhower forced be president. cause was An additional important of Adams' downfall his personal rudeness on an to colleagues and others he dealt with official basis. To Eisenhower, Adams' was . curtness merely his way of communicating in the most efficient manner, ". .he never added a word to his 'yes' or 'no' if such an answer sufficed. It never occurred . . . to him to say 'Hello'. For Sherman Adams this was neither bad manners nor was no to pretense; he busy. Absorbed in his work, he had time to waste."16 But 82 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

common were others the lack of the usual elements of courtesy and civility perceived as as his disdain for them fellow workers and human beings. He seldom said "hello" or on not came to "goodby" the phone and would say "good morning" when he once the office. Adams explained: "Why should I say hello? They know I'm here."17 not While Adams' brusqueness did bother his boss, it often did bother his subordinates and others he dealt with. Adams' habitual harshness frequently reduced one his secretaries to tears, and at time he allegedly had five of them crying at the same same time.18 Adams treated members of the Cabinet and Congress the way, no not feeling need for the usual amenities of human communication. This did endear him to many, and when he was in trouble and needed friends to defend him, few were to come willing forth. Many in Congress and the executive branch felt that was an was he arrogant, power-hungry tyrant who getting his just deserts. to to storm Particularly damaging Adams' ability weather the about his supposed was were corruption his alienation of the Republican leadership in Congress who put saw as off by his arrogance. But GOP conservatives also him biased against their to policies and sympathetic the liberal wing of the party. Congressional Republicans were afraid that in the upcoming congressional elections that the Democrats would use to at the Adams issue make gains the polls and defeat Republican candidates. The came coup de grace when Republican leaders informed Eisenhower that campaign not was contributors would open up their purses until Adams gone.19 a vote not save Even personal plea and of confidence from Eisenhower could Adams. After Adams' congressional testimony in which he argued that he had done nothing wrong, Eisenhower said "I believe that the presentation made by Governor Adams to the Congressional Committee yesterday truthfully represents the pertinent I facts. I personally like Governor Adams. admire his abilities. I respect him because was seen more as a of his personal and official integrity. I need him.20 But the plea on an weakness the part of Eisenhower than effective defense of Adams. Finally was to Adams persuaded resign. stature was A further irony concerning Adams' moral made public by The New York Times columnist William Safire in 1986 upon Adams' death. Safire, who had worked with Adams in the 1952 New Hampshire primary, reported that 1RS investi not over gators had found that Adams had reported $300,000 in income. At the request of former President Eisenhower, President Johnson told the 1RS not to taxes were a set prosecute Adams, and the eventually paid by fund up by Adams' friends.21

Nixon's Tight Hierarchy as When Richard Nixon returned to the White House after serving Eisenhower's Vice President and observing the Kennedy/Johnson years, he resolved more that his administration would be formally organized than the Democrats had been and closer in tone to Eisenhower's. Nixon began his term with intentions of to to own delegating authority his cabinet secretaries select their subordinates and to He on accomplish the goals of his administration. would spend much of his time international affairs; in domestic policy he would take only the big plays. In May THE CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED PRESIDENT'S | 83

1968 Nixon declared:

one For thing, I would disperse power, spread it among able people. Men are to at operate best only if they given the chance operate full capacity.

Iwould operate differently from President Johnson. Instead of taking all power to myself, I'd select cabinet members who could do their jobs, and each of them to would have the stature and the power function effectively. Publicity would not center at theWhite House alone. Every key official would have the opportu a man a nity to be big in his field. On the other hand, when President takes to all the real power himself, those around him become puppets. They shrivel . . . most up and become less and less creative. your creative people can't develop a in monolithic, centralized power set-up.22 were Nixon's initial intentions echoed by H. R. Haldeman: "Our job is not to do to out to out to the work of government, but get the work where it belongs? the intentions were in secre Departments."23 Nixon's reflected his selection of cabinet stature a taries of and independent political standing and White House staff that included the disparate viewpoints of liberal Patrick Moynihan and conservative Arthur Burns. soon set But disillusionment in, Nixon found that the Democratically controlled was to an Congress not about to give him what he wanted, and he shifted administra to use tive strategy accomplish his goals. He would all of his tools of the executive at a were branch his disposal. Nixon became convinced that wide array of forces not intent upon frustrating his aims. The Congress would pass his proposals, the were career media critically hostile, and the bureaucracy would drag their collective even came to own feet and sabotage his policies. He the conclusion that his appointees more in the executive departments had "gone native" and become concerned with own areas their power and standing in their policy than in carrying out his priorities. to He decided rein in the departments and agencies and created several mecha nisms to facilitate White House control. Thus instead of getting the work of the to administration out the departments and agencies, Nixon decided to bring the work of the departments and agencies into the White House where he could carefully oversee control policy development and implementation. was to Nixon's concept of the presidency that the executive branch ought be at a his disposal. As John Ehrlichman put it: "There shouldn't be lot of leeway in a following the President's policies. It should be like corporation, where the executive are to or to vice presidents (the Cabinet officers) tied closely the chief executive, put extreme it in terms, when he says jump, they only ask how high."24 As Nixon became disillusioned with the executive branch he gave correspond to came to ingly greater power his White House staff. The role of the staff to be to so buffer the President and protect his time that he could read, write, and ponder to see the big picture. In Nixon's words, "My disposition is that the President's time is not frittered away. I've found away to do it. I'm a reader, not a buller."25 Nixon's preference for time alone reinforced the tendency of theWhite House staff to guard access to him. The line between protecting the President's time and isolating the 84 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

a one. to President became fine According Henry Kissinger, Nixon usually made decisions "in solitude on the basis of memoranda or with a few very intimate aides. . . . He abhorred confronting colleagues with whom he disagreed and he shunned or persuading inspiring his subordinates. He would decide from inside his self-imposed cocoon. . . . All this led to a vicious circle in which the President withdrew ever more into his isolation and pulled the central decisions increasingly into the White House."26 a run From the beginning Nixon had wanted chief of staff to his White House, came a and the role naturally to H. R. Haldeman, brilliant and hard nosed organizer who had been with Nixon since his 1960 campaign for the presidency. To the rest of the executive branch and the outside world Nixon seemed isolated behind his "Berlin Wall" of Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Kissinger. "The White House became an true echo chamber that magnified the voice of the president but sacrificed pitch."27 was Haldeman the lynchpin in the White House staff system. He became the most ran an powerful White House aide since Sherman Adams and the system with over iron hand. He clearly took precedence the other staffers. "We all knew where we were us were as was fit. There five of that equal, but [Bryce] Harlow said: there a was me. never first among equals, and it clearly Nobody questioned it. I asserted never never to someone it; I argued it. I had to."28 According Haldeman, "If I told to me was an do something, he knew it wasn't ?he knew exactly what it was; it an order from the President. They knew appeal wouldn't get anywhere.29 as saw to a His role, he it, was institute "zero defects system" in the staffing ensure were operation. He would that all issues and options for the President fully "staffed out" and that all bases had been touched. Access to the President by anyone was except Kissinger carefully controlled by Haldeman, and cabinet members fre to see quently resented his gatekeeping. When cabinet secretaries actually did get in to the President, Haldeman would be present take notes, and the agenda for the to a as to meeting would often be presented the president in such way determine the outcome to the staffs satisfaction but not the visitor's.30 was a He controlled the paper flow andWhite House staffing. There follow-up system that would impose deadlines for staff projects. As the deadline approached or was or the staffer his secretary would be reminded, and if the work not ready of unacceptable quality, increasingly heavy handed reminders would hound the person was to until the work completed Haldeman's satisfaction. run was to save The ostensible purpose of the tightly system the President from so concentrate on non-presidential details that he could the big picture. The irony was was that despite the time that Nixon reserved for thinking great thoughts, he obsessed with details of theWhite House operation, both of substance and style. He was concerned with White House furniture, who had what photographs of former memos to presidents in the Executive Office Building, and he wanted extensive him on what wines would be served atWhite House functions. He had White House comments on west staffers log the visitors made the paintings displayed in the lobby and he kept careful inventory of small gifts (cufflinks, ash trays, and copies of Six were out to were Crises) that given visitors about the White House. There many memoranda about the White House tennis courts.31 THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED | 85

the scandals were not Although Watergate caused by the staffing system, both and the staff were Watergate organization reflections of Nixon's psychology and character. fact was Despite the that Haldeman close enough to the President to occasionally delay implementation of questionable off-the-cuff orders and demands an was never by irritated Nixon there any question or doubt in the White House about the initial tone was covering up Watergate break-in. The set by Nixon, and the staff out was unquestioningly carried his wishes. The problem that Haldeman set and the staff system he up faithfully reflected and reinforced Nixon's dark side and need isolation. for Thus the zero-defects system allowed theWatergate "horrors" to and led the resignations and convictions of top White House staffers and the a unprecedented resignation of U.S. President.

Reagan's Contrasting Chiefs As it is with all presidents, the shape and role of the White House staff was a reflection of Ronald Reagan's personality. By all accounts, both friendly and was critical, Reagan extremely passive in his approach to theWhite House staff. He was not with to the or passive respect major direction of his presidency public policy; his was an active once was presidency. But the direction set by Reagan, his aides formulated the and was policies carried them out; Reagan interested only in outcomes and did not want to be bothered with details. Part was of his passiveness his lack of intellectual curiosity, but part of it was due to trust in or his uncritical whatever people told him what he read.32 This made him on his staff to sure was not passiveness dependent who had make he unduly most recent influenced by the person he saw.33 Donald Regan recalled, "I cannot remember a case in a or an or single which he changed time canceled appointment ever an on complained about item his schedule."34 hands-off to his was on a Reagan's approach staff based management philosophy that on In relied delegation of authority. his words: "Surround yourself with the best can as as people you find, delegate authority, and don't interfere long the policy is you've decided upon being carried out."35 This approach occasionally frustrated officials because to administration of Reagan's unwillingness give them policy guid ance. "In as Donald Regan complained: the four years that I served Secretary of the I never saw President never Treasury Reagan alone and discussed economic philos ... I had to these out ophy. figure things like any other American, by studying his and . . . speeches reading the newspapers. After I accepted the job, he simply hung up and vanished." Reagan "laid down no rules and articulated no missions" and on thus conferred great "latitude his subordinates."36 To David Stockman, Reagan so serene no "seemed and passive," "He gave orders, no commands; asked for no no . . . information; expressed urgency. Since I did know what to do, I took his quiet message of confidence to be a mandate."37 Stockman observed that whenever there was an argument Reagan would smile and say: "Okay, you fellas work it out."38 Reagan's passivity and penchant for delegation made his staff crucial to his in a was not true or presidency way that of Franklin Roosevelt, John Kennedy, in term a George Bush. The unique division of labor his first worked in particularly PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES 86 I QUARTERLY

felicitous way for Reagan. The definition of staff roles began before the inauguration, were structure immediately after the election when the decisions made about the and outcome was organization of the top staff. The driven by the widespread expectation run run that Edwin Meese, who had the campaign, headed the transition, and had Reagan's Governor's office in California, would naturally be named Reagan's White House chief of staff. But others around Reagan judged that Meese, though unques not or tionably loyal and ideologically dedicated, did have the organizational talent to as discipline perform well chief of staff. a Reagan must^be given credit for accepting their advice that he needed Wash no ington insider for his chief o? staff and saying to the loyal Meese, despite Baker's to to work for George Bush in 1976 and 1980. In order get Meese go along with to a the plan, he had be convinced that he would still play major role in the administra was amemo tion. This task accomplished by initialed by both Baker and Meese that two was divided up the responsibilities of the advisers. On the surface, the division over heavily slanted toward Meese, giving him jurisdiction administration policy, was to to both foreign and domestic. Meese have the title of "Counselor the President was to for Policy" along with cabinet rank and participate in all meetings of the full was cabinet. He in charge of "coordination and supervision" of the domestic policy was a staff and the National Security Council.39 Thus Meese given very wide range was of responsibilities indeed. What left for Baker? Baker was to get the formal title of chief of staff and the traditional process and was over staffing powers of that position. He given control "Coordination and over supervision of White House Staff functions," "Hiring and firing authority all elements of White House Staff," "Coordination and control of all in and out paper was flow to the President and of presidential schedule and appointments," and he to "Preside over meetings ofWhite House Staff." Baker also claimed the traditional Chief of Staff office in theWest Wing. An addition, written in longhand, assured ? that both Meese and Baker had the right to "attend any meeting which Pr?s, attends w/ his consent."40 a On the surface Meese had huge advantage, with cabinet participation and memo was so control of foreign and domestic policy. The written that Baker received no substance and all process.41 But in the White House process often determines as a as policy outcomes, especially with detached President Ronald Reagan, and thus over Baker had the advantage Meese in the administration's policy deliberations. to As chief of staff Baker hired skilled Washington insiders help him, and he term. orchestrated the Administration's policy agenda for the first He did not seek over access to complete control the president, sharing it with Meese and Deaver and a a he exercised his power in subtle rather than heavy handed way. With his reputation was for pragmatism that invoked the suspicion of the ideological reaganites, he careful to to keep open his lines of communication the right wing of the Republican party, to was and he assiduously maintained his ties members of Congress. He accessible news to and trusted by the press and often received favorable coverage which he used to was to the administration's advantage. He thus attentive the major constituencies to that Reagan would need in order accomplish his agenda. Richard Darman became staff secretary and controlled paper flow7 to the Oval Office. THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED | 87

Michael Deaver, the third member of the Troika, had been with Reagan for in an many years California and had almost filial relationship with both Nancy and Ronald Reagan. Deaver became Deputy Chief of Staff, but he was not concerned as as much with the substance of policy with the staging of the President and his to presentation the public.42 He concerned himself with everything that affected as a Ronald Reagan person: his comfort, his schedule, the backdrops for his political etc. most was actions, Perhaps importantly, Deaver the primary link to the East or as Wing, that is, Nancy Reagan. He would convey her wishes, either explicitly own to his ideas, theWest Wing staffers. Baker appreciated the importance of Mrs. Reagan and was careful to accommodate her wishes. was not in across Nancy Reagan active policy the board, but she selectively inserted her views very effectively when she felt that the President's person or was at times reputation stake. Several this affected foreign policy and quite often a staffing decisions; she played role in the resignations of cabinet secretaries James a Watt, Raymond Donavan, Edwin Meese, and number of White House staffers, including Donald Regan.43 House was to The White change drastically inReagan's second term with large at scale changes of personnel the top. Despite the 1986 tax reform, there were no to sweeping victories comparable the economic agenda of 1981, and the administration slid into the disaster of the Iran-Contra scandal. The second term troubles were due, in no to small part, the change in chiefs of staff. Treasury Secretary Donald Regan and to chief of staff James Baker decided exchange jobs, and characteristically, Regan, was Baker, Deaver, and Nancy Reagan had agreed upon the switch before it presented to to Reagan. Characteristically, Reagan agreed the staff decision with no questions. came in to run When Regan theWhite House he had several personal priorities. to He wanted do away with the coll?gial staffing arrangement of the first term which he felt led to staff conflict and leaks, which it did. He also wanted to make some most to personnel changes, but importantly he wanted "let Reagan be Reagan." career a Regan's personal style and suggested that he would take different to an approach running the White House than had James Baker. Regan had been was to officer in the Marines and used being CEO of Merrill Lynch. "When Iwas executive I chief and said, 'Jump,' people asked, 'How high?' As Secretary of the I mean Treasury, when said, 'Jump,' people said, 'What do you by jump? What do mean one you by high'?"44 According to of Regan's aides, "He considers the Executive to a are Branch be like corporation. Cabinet members vice presidents, the President is the chairman of the board, the chief of staff is the chief operating officer."45 Regan was to a not a used being principal and did easily slide into staff role. to Whereas Baker had brought strong subordinates work with him, Regan no would brook rivals for influence. The staffers he brought from his days at the were Treasury Department known around theWhite House as "the Mice" because to to of their meek approach their boss. According White House staffers Regan's were personal staff aides "almost obsequious and scared stiff of him."46 A former colleague of Regan said: "His weakness is that his ego was so strong he did not pick good subordinates. Or if they were, he broke them. He couldn't stand the

competition."47 88 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

same was as At the time that Regan establishing himself chief of staff other were strong advisers to the President leaving the White House. Baker and Meese were was to a taking cabinet positions; Deaver leaving theWhite House be lobbyist; Darman left with Baker; David Stockman was on his way to Wall Street. Max a soon Friedersdorf and Ed Rollins stayed for while in the second term, but left. Regan's determination to "let Reagan be Reagan," led him to think that his own was a was lack of strong policy preferences guarantee that he serving the no one to serve president's goals and else's. But best the President theWhite House staff must compensate for his weaknesses. In this case the President's weakness was not to out on own. his passivity and being willing search alternatives his This placed on to assure were to the responsibility the staff that contrasting views brought the term was President's attention. In the first this assured, despite the staff's intentions to protect the President from conflict, because the rivalries among the staff and the not struggle between conservatives and moderates could be entirely suppressed. were Reinforcing the President's conviction that many policy problems simple was was a another consequence of "letting Reagan be Reagan," but this not favor to the President. In criticizing Regan, David Stockman called this "the echo principle" to and argued that it shielded Reagan from hard economic realities.48 According one term was Richard Darman, of the advantages of the first conflictual triumvirate was to to some that the President forced face up complex realities. "Seeing the a interplay between us, lot of things happened. First of all, Ronald Reagan learned more much about reality."49 to But Don Regan did his best stifle this safety valve of White House conflict. access to He dominated the White House, controlling the President, scheduling, paper flow, public appearances, appointments, and phone calls. He also, unlike other to assert over strong chiefs of staff, attempted control national security policy. But to too Regan's heavy handed attempt control everything became much. Long time a Reagan intimate Stuart Spencer observed that Regan "became prime minister, he a was became guy that in every photo op, he wasn't watching the shop. And he were surrounded himself with yes people. Those all signs of weakness to me."50 was so Regan's control of the White House tight and his demands of subservience so a was great that joke circulating around theWhite House held that Regan going to resign to become a Catholic Cardinal. The White House staffers' response was: now to that's good, we'll only have kiss his ring.51 to to a Contrary the Brownlowian admonition have passion for anonymity, was to Regan sought the limelight, and constantly trying get into photographs with most the President that would appear in the newspapers. The egregious example of was at this the official photograph of Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev the Geneva two on a Summit. The White House photo showed the leaders sitting couch with as were Don Regan behind them leaning forward if he the orchestrator of their as agreement. Regan, who chief of staff made the final decision, insisted that this be the only photo of the summit agreement released by the White House.52 as were In "letting Reagan be Reagan" Regan acted if the President his only not seem to to serve constituent. He did realize that in order the President effectively THE CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED PRESIDENT'S | 89

a chief of staff needs to cultivate other constituencies, especially Congress and the as press. Regan soon alienated members of Congress with his disdain for Congress an institution and his distaste for politics. He antagonized the press because of his to over heavy handed attempts control leaks and his hostility unfavorable coverage of the administration. Unlike Baker, he acted as if he did not realize that the press as a use "serves bulletin board" upon which Washington insiders post notices, and to it his (and his President's) advantage.53 as Regan had other drawbacks chief of staff. According to David Stockman he an to had "insatiable ego" that led him to want take public credit for the Administra tion's victories and to be jealous when others got favorable press coverage. "I had me more always wished Regan would stop blaming for being inadvertently conspic uous than he."54 According to Nancy Reagan, Regan liked the sound of "chief" but care not the sound of "staff."55 Nor did Regan much for Nancy. "Mrs. Reagan as ... as regarded herself the President's alter ego if the office that had been bestowed upon her husband by the people somehow fell into the category of worldly goods covered by the marriage vows."56 He also resented the influence of Nancy's astrologer on move the management of the presidency. "Virtually every major and decision the as was Reagans made during my time White House Chief of Staff cleared in advance a to with woman in San Francisco who drew up horoscopes make certain that the were a planets in favorable alignment for the enterprise."57 At times the President's at or set at schedule would have to be changed the last minute for precise timing the behest of Joan Quigley, the Reagans' astrologer.58 Regan, like other strong chiefs of staff, seemed to think that all criticisms of him were attestations to his role as buffer for the President. "If someone gets a cold reasons so in this town, I get blamed," he asserted.59 "One of the I've gained much prominence is because of the blame coming my way. It's kind of nice for the President was to be able to lay the blame off and say: 'I didn't do it, it somebody down the as as two line.' There's nothing wrong with that long it goes ways. Remember when to things go right that maybe Regan had something do with it, however little."60 to But Regan wasn't always willing take the heat for administration failures. After the disclosure of the administration's dealings with Iran, and the failed Reyk to javik summit, Regan tried distance himself from the embarrassment. "Some of us are a a like shovel brigade that follow [sic] parade down Main Street cleaning up. was a sour We took Reykjavik and turned what really situation into something that turned out pretty well."61 What is troublesome about this statement is that Regan is shifting blame for administration embarrassments away from himself and toward was at the person who in charge of U.S. performance the Reykjavik Summit: as President Reagan. The strong implication here is that Regan presented himself amess cleaning up after the President made of things. This public shifting of blame to a the president is unacceptable for White House staffer. term as was The final straw in Regan's chief of staff the Report of the Tower over Commission. Despite the fact that Regan denied that he had any control foreign policy, the Tower Commission held him responsible for part of the Iran-Contra to over disaster. According to Brent Scowcroft, Regan claimed have jurisdiction 90 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

to reasons foreign policy advice the President. "He kept saying he did. One of the was to McFarlane quit because Regan wanted McFarlane report through him."62 The Tower Board that investigated the Iran-Contra scandal did not accept not Regan's denials. Although it did conclude that Regan participated in the scandal or to on the cover-up, it did hold him responsible for allowing it happen his watch. In citing the "failure of responsibility" the Board.pointed out that ultimate responsi bility for theWhite House staff system belongs to the President, but that Regan was partially responsible for the disaster. "More than almost any Chief of Staff of recent over to memory, he asserted personal control the White House staff and sought to was extend this control the National Security Advisor. He personally active in national security affairs and attended almost all of the relevant meetings regarding ... must the Iran initiative. He bear primary responsibility for the chaos that descended upon the White House when such disclosure did occur."63 as as After resisting long he could and after much prodding from his wife and other intimates, the President asked for Regan's resignation, but agreed to wait until as a several days after the release of the Tower Report face saving gesture. But the was coup de grace administered by Nancy immediately after release of the Report was to when it leaked the press from her office that Howard Baker would be Reagan's new soon as chief of staff. As he heard of the press announcement, Regan immediately

resigned.64 on were After the resignation February 27, 1987 Regan's problems summed a up by former Reagan White House staffer: never runs one Don realized that while Wall Street way; Pennsylvania Avenue a street. never a an is two-way He realized there is difference between being an never elected and appointed official. He realized the distinction between a never being staff person and the chief executive officer. He realized that the White House demands talent throughout, rather than talent derived. He never was to realized his job compensate for the perceived strengths and weaknesses of others, rather than to dominate those weaknesses."65

Bush's Pit Bull a George Bush recruited competent White House staff marked by profes a to sionalism and low visibility approach White House service. The best inWhite was House staff service exemplified by Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who had filled the same role in the Ford Administration. was to a Scowcroft tireless in his service Bush, and often provided personal sounding to board Bush's thoughts about foreign affairs. Another model White House staffer was Roger Porter who had served in the Ford and Reagan administrations and was given responsibility for domestic and economic policy staff coordination in the Bush White House. He provided experience, expertise, and sound policy analysis without over or status or arm engaging in public disputes policy trying to strong members of the cabinet.

Bush's White House staff did not tend to interpose themselves between the or President and cabinet secretaries have major fights with the cabinet departments THE CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED 91 PRESIDENT'S |

a to because Bush knew his cabinet well, and unlike Reagan, made it habit keep in no or touch with them. So Bush's White House had major ego problems conflicts one with the cabinet, with major exception: his Chief of Staff, John Sununu. to was to In order understand why John Sununu chosen by Bush be chief of to staff, it is helpful recall the desperation of Bush's political situation after the Iowa caucuses come in the Republican primaries of 1988. Bush had just in third behind Senator Robert Dole and evangelist Pat Robertson. New Hampshire had always been a state a to rock-ribbed conservative and key the Republican nomination, and Bush's conservative credentials were somewhat suspect. a an But John Sununu had plan. When aide began to commiserate with him about the disaster of Bush's third place finish in Iowa, Sununu explained how the was an see to situation in fact opportunity. "Don't you how much good I'm going be able to do for the next President of the United States?"66 Sununu then took the was offensive in calling in every favor he had earned while he governor of New a Hampshire and designed media blitz that helped Bush win. The strategy centered new around having the Vice President "take the pledge" of "no taxes" while television as spots bashed Senator Dole "senator straddle" by charging that he might consider a tax increase as one element of an attempt to shrink the deficit.67 The strategy went on to worked, and Bush win New Hampshire and the nomination without any serious difficulties. arose over Hints of future problems after the election in the maneuvering how two the Bush White House would be organized. After reportedly turning down on cabinet positions and insisting the chief of staff slot, Sununu began to define his future role in press interviews. In an interview with The Boston Globe Sununu gave a a the impression that he would play the role of strong chief of staff by being "strong a saw doorkeeper," "tough critic" of OMB's budget before the President it, and the was over setter of the daily White House agenda. Sununu also fighting publicly the M. was possible role of Robert Teeter, who offered the position of deputy chief of a staff, but whose relationship with Bush would have guaranteed him strong voice to in theWhite House. The problem for Teeter, and probably why he decided decline a was not job in the administration, that Sununu insisted that Teeter be allowed into the Oval Office to see the President alone.68 over access to This jockeying for position in public and fighting the president or before he even took office made his own decisions about White House organization was unseemly and provided early warnings about how Sununu would conduct the course occurs a office of chief of staff. Of maneuvering for position always during were presidential transition, but the Meese-Baker negotiations less acrimonious and were out not fought in public. a as President Bush, who had chief of staff Vice President (Craig Fuller), clearly a to wanted chief organize the White House and coordinate policy development. And Sununu performed well many of the traditional chief of staff roles. He made the trains run on time. He was the enforcer with respect toWhite House staffers, the Cabinet, and Congress. He fired people. He took the heat for unpopular decisions. over at AM in Sununu presided the senior staff meeting every day 7:30 the 92 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

to Roosevelt Room inWhite House. Typically he spent from 8 9:30 AM in the Oval Office with the President for the national security briefing and setting priorities for to the day and ended the day with the President from 4:30 5 PM. During the day see a he would the president about 10 times and would spend total of 35-45 percent of the day with the President.69 One common mistake of chiefs of staff that Sununu did not make was to a as reinforce presidential weakness had Haldeman and Regan before him. He provided a contrast to was sharp in personal style the President. He the President's "pit bull" act mean to dog who would and allow the President take the "kinder and gentler" stance. Sununu, unlike the three previous strong chiefs of staff, had firm ideological own convictions and advocated his policy preferences. But what would ordinarily be a a to case. major drawback in chief of staff worked the President's advantage in this was more was to Sununu conservative politically than the President and willing play a as highly visible role keeper of the conservative flame and representative of the was conservative wing of the Republican Party in theWhite House. This useful for a on Bush when Sununu would stake out very conservative position, for instance a more reas environmental policy, and let the president take moderate stance, thus were suring conservatives their interests being represented in theWhite House while to letting the president still claim be "the environmental president." a a to The danger of chief of staff who is also policy advocate is that advice the to outcome. President might be skewed favor the chief of staffs favored The other common a access to danger of strong chief of staff is that the President will be to a was a to constricted trickle. But neither of these potential pitfalls danger George to Bush. He knew enough about the policy issues himself be able to discount the not bias of his staff. And his personal style assured that he would become isolated, even access to though Sununu did control the Oval Office. The danger of becoming was isolated averted because the President knew his cabinet members well and kept assure in touch with them. They had the personal relationship with Bush that would to. was on they could talk with him if they needed The President constantly the was current phone touching base with anyone who involved with policy issues. But the President's penchant for keeping in touch, while avoiding the danger not of isolation, did entirely eliminate Sununu's attempts to control communication to at the President. Sununu's personal policy agenda made it times difficult for those or to a in the cabinet staff who wanted speak with the President about different to approach get through Sununu's gauntlet. This problem became public when both ran were so at cut Time and Newsweek stories that senior Bush aides upset being off a by Sununu that the President was forced to open post office box at his summer as a so home inKennebunkport, Maine backchannel that his top advisers could contact him directly without Sununu's censorship.70 avenue was The existence of this of communication publicly confirmed by HHS on Secretary Louis Sullivan who admitted television that he used the channel to to communicate advice the President.71 After the admission Sullivan quickly covered no himself by saying that he had trouble meeting with the President when he needed to on issues public policy but that he had used the post office box for "political THE CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED PRESIDENT'S | 93

advice." The point is not what Sullivan had to say to the President, the point is the to set a very fact that President Bush felt compelled up private post office box was an physically and organizationally outside theWhite House admission of organi as a zational failure. John Sununu was not acting "neutral broker" of ideas for the President so that others would have confidence their ideas would get to the President to was seen intact if they submitted them the White House staff. Instead, Sununu as a out not biased filter screening ideas he personally did like. to Despite his rapport with the President and his ability perform very valuable chief of staff functions, Sununu made four strategic errors as chief of staff: 1. He let his ego cloud his judgement and affect his behavior. to 2. He succumbed the "John Tower syndrome," thinking that he did not to have to be nice people. to was so 3. He fell victim the "Gary Hart syndrome," feeling that he important not to to that he did have pay attention the conventions of public morality. 4. He developed the "Don Regan syndrome": stay in the limelight, and if things go wrong, blame the President. out Professional colleagues in and of the White House criticized Sununu for came to was his large ego. When he the Republican convention in Houston it was reported that Sununu had Vice Presidential aspirations.72 When he chief of staff to out was he had his staff do research find if the fact that he born in Cuba disqualified was him from being president.73 One of his soft spots his stratospheric IQ, which was to reportedly 180. But it struck many with whom he worked that he seemed have to put others down in order to demonstrate how smart he was. White House not staffers and assistant secretaries did appreciate being denigrated in front of their peers when their staff work did not seem to measure up to Sununu standards. He one told reporter who asked about his interpersonal skills that it "Depends how badly the other guy's screwing up."74 was run An administration joke had it that theWhite House by "John Sununu a was to and thousand interns," because he unwilling hire high quality subordinates as own his aides for fear that they would challenge his authority.75 Another aspect was extreme to of the ego problem Sununu's sensitivity criticisms in the press. one When critical articles appeared he would have of his aides highlight the negative source comments, deduce their in theWhite House, and then upbraid the presumed one offender.76 To journalist he said, "Small minds ask small questions."77 to a Sununu really seemed believe his oft stated maxim that he had constituency to error two: of only one, the President. This led Sununu's strategic number the was John Tower syndrome. Senator Tower President Bush's first nomination to be on Secretary of Defense. After many years in the Senate the Armed Services Com as a was no mittee and several years Reagan appointed negotiator there doubt that was came Tower qualified. But after he had been nominated people forward with allegations about his private life, including excessive drinking, sexual misconduct, a an and possible conflicts of interest. Normally Senator will be given easy time by so former colleagues in confirmation hearings, but Tower had been rude and arrogant as a were come Senator that few of his former colleagues willing to to his defense 94 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

were was when the charges of misconduct raised. Thus Tower the first initial a to a to nomination by President cabinet position be defeated in history. A similar fate would befall John Sununu when he got into hot water. to a Far from being responsible constituency of only one, strong chiefs have means learned the hard way that serving the President being able to cultivate other constituencies for his use. Sununu did not recognize this, and thus felt free to alienate as as Congress, the cabinet, the press, and interest groups well hisWhite House subordi as were: am so nates. It is if his attitude 'I powerful that I do not have to be nice, or even to was minimally civil, other people.' In this he ignoring the old Lebanese one cannot proverb that holds, "One kisses the hand that yet bite."78 When Sununu to got into trouble those who previously had kiss his hand turned to bite it. Sununu systematically alienated and insulted many members of Congress. He once a called Republican Senator Trent Lott "insignificant," serious insult inWash to a at ington, especially member of the Senate.79 His behavior the 1990 Budget so Summit in formal meetings with the leadership of Congress was obnoxious that to he prompted Senator Robert Byrd chastise him: "I have had thirty years in the never U.S. Senate, and I have participated in many such summits, and I have in my as life observed such outrageous conduct that displayed by the representatives of the It president of the United States. Your conduct is arrogant. is rude. It is intolerable."80 was as as Sununu also willing to alienate cabinet secretaries well their subordi nates. to He often undercut their policy proposals the president, which may very well as have been part of his job chief of staff policing the policy development function. on or When he fought HHS Secretary Louis Sullivan civil rights policy EPA Adminis on was trator William Reilly environmental issues, it arguably part of his job and carrying out the President's wishes. But the tone of his communications often left more were cabinet members feeling that than policy differences being conveyed. The not a gratuitous insulting of others is necessary part of the policy coordination a function. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, close friend of the President's, told a was friend that he sick of being denigrated by Sununu.81 Commerce Secretary to Robert Mosbacher complained about being forced by Sununu accept unwanted a error to political appointees. Sununu also made tactical when he refused let Defense use to to on Secretary Cheney the presidential helicopter fly Camp David official business.82 an Even though the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is important Republican not to constituency, Sununu did hesitate brutalize its president, Dick Lesher, when a cut taxes. so a he supported in Social Security payroll He did in series of four letter was a tax cut expletives.83 That Lesher supporting that the Bush Administration was a might very well have backed in different circumstances (i.e., it not matter of extreme to a principle) highlights Sununu's response relatively minor policy differ ence.

In defense of his behavior Sununu echoed other chiefs of staff in claiming he was no meet merely doing the President's bidding. "I'm freelancer. I with the . . . president dozens of times during the day. The president knows I'm following ... his agenda. I know enough about the president to do exactly what he wants THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED | 95

statement was done. Exactly what he wants done."84 In this Sununu both claiming own presidential authority for all of his actions and subtly shifting the blame for any of them to the President. taste Sununu's explanation for his lack of civility is that each breach of good manners was and carefully calculated: "I guarantee you that contrary to the legend, statements on are to any strong my part both controlled, deliberate and designed an no achieve effect. There is random outburst. It all is designed for purpose. And I think the efficiency of the result is underscored by what we've been able to achieve."85 one This rationalization is consistent with important role of the chief of staff, playing the heavy for the President, being the enforcer of tough decisions and bringer of bad to care as as me tidings others. "I don't if people hate me, long they hate for the was right reasons," said Sununu.86 But that the problem. Washington professionals are understand that the policy preferences of the President the responsibility of the to are chief of staff, and they expect him be tough for the President. Professionals willing to accept being beaten in the policy arena, but Sununu's gratuitous ad hominem resentments mere insults and rude behavior generated much greater than policy defeats as would have. Sununu acted if he did not understand the import of his own words. not was People hated Sununu because he enforcing the President's wishes but because was Sununu gratuitously insulting and personally obnoxious to them. error was Sununu's third strategic the Gary Hart syndrome. Senator Gary Hart was married and running for the Democratic nomination for President in 1984. When was he confronted by the press with allegations of adultery, he denied them and to to challenged the press follow him around prove his innocence. Not surprisingly, next they did, and reported the time he spent the night with model Donna Rice. This doomed Hart's bid for the nomination. The point here is not about sexual behavior; it is rather about respect for conventional morality and appearances. Any must on or person running for President accept constraints his her personal behavior to not to to in deference public opinion. If he is willing conform his behavior general not to standards of public morality, he does have enough self restraint be President. not to The parallel with John Sununu is that he felt that he did have restrain himself use in the of the privileges and perks of his office. In spring of 1991 The Washington Post reported that the chief of staff had taken more than 70 trips around the country aboard military aircraft. Almost all of the trips were as even designated (by the chief of staff) official business, though the purpose some to to of of them seemed be provide skiing trips for Sununu and his family. None to state were as of the 27 trips his home of New Hampshire designated personal. One as was to an of flights categorized personal Boston for appointment with his personal was to dentist. On such trips he required reimburse the government at commercial rates cost to for comparable flights, far less than the the government of operating one to planes for person.87 In addition, Sununu allowed ski-industry organizations pay for his meals, lodging, lift tickets, and air fare for his wife. a in When the disclosures caused public scandal May 1991, the President (whose was to an early priority have administration above ethical reproach) ordered Sununu to clear all future flights with theWhite House Counsel's office. But in June Sununu 96 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

had aWhite House limousine take him to New York for a stamp auction he wanted to to to attend and solicited corporations provide air travel back Washington and was to other trips. The President again forced restrict Sununu's travel practices.88 an to In eerie parallel another governor of New Hampshire, Sherman Adams, Sununu made several calls to EPA and the U.S. Forest Service to ask the status of to resort a applications double the size of the Loon Mountain ski owned by friend was a of Sununu, Philip T. Gravink. Gravink contributor to Sununu's previous was political campaigns and had let him ski for free when Sununu governor. While not a outcome Sununu did demand favorable for his friend's applications, his actions were an as described by official "a lot of bullying and bluster" that "made it clear what outcome theWhite House wanted in this case."89 Ironically Sherman Adams, a whose acceptance of favors from New England businessman forced his resignation, was one of the founders of the Loon Mountain resort. no on There is argument here that Sununu's trips government planes constituted or or outrageous illegal behavior, thatWhite House staffers should always fly coach. a on Few would begrudge few trips official planes with occasional combinations of business with pleasure. High level officials in Congress and the executive branch have done this for decades, and it is standard practice in corporate America. The point is to excess. that Sununu abused his privileges and pushed them His bending of the rules was was to routine, pervasive, and systematic. He unable restrain himself from taking was to even advantage of his position and amazingly unwilling rein himself in after the President publicly admonished him. As with the Sherman Adams case, the small were not to gratuities he accepted from corporations likely affect his behavior. But to the combination of those favors with White House inquiries regulatory agencies too presented the appearance of conflict of interest. By pushing his privileges far Sununu became an embarrassment to the President who was forced to defend him never in public. A chief of staff should put the President in this position. error was Sununu's final strategic the Don Regan syndrome: take credit when turn sour to a things go well, and when they shift blame the President. At November 1991 campaign fund raising speech inNew York President Bush remarked that people rates on were in the financial community felt that interest charged credit cards higher came a next than necessary and that it might spur the economy if they down bit. The to a day Senator Alphonse D'Amato (R-NY) introduced legislation impose legal limit on the interest rates credit card companies could charge their customers. The economic was wisdom of the proposal challenged in the financial community and the Dow to Jones industrial average fell 120 points. The administration had back away quickly from the proposed legislation and publicly argue against it. When asked by reporters about this embarrassing episode, Sununu said that the rates was not text remark about interest in the President's prepared but that the President had "ad-libbed" the remarks on credit card interest rates. This attempt to on was blame the embarrassing remarks the President rebutted by Marlin Fitzwater, were text the president's spokesman. He told reporters that the lines in the printed were not even of the speech and ad-libbed. Some administration officials said that was Sununu, himself, the author of the offending lines.90 THE CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED 97 PRESIDENT'S |

case were text or not. The issue in this is not whether the lines in the speech an In case The issue is who publicly takes the blame for embarrassing incident. this to to were Sununu publicly tried shift blame the President. If Sununu lying about was even were the speech text, his behavior outrageous. But if he telling the truth, it is not the role of the chief of staff to blame the President for an administration to in blunder. The appropriate behavior for the chief of staff is take the heat order to protect the President. case can a Sununu's actions in this be contrasted with contemporaneous flap over to a memo civil rights. Counsel the President C. Boyden Gray circulated draft that instructed the end of using affirmative action racial preferences in federal govern ment to hiring. When the uproar from the civil rights community threatened embar rass the President, Gray said that he acted without the knowledge of the President. an was not It is highly unlikely that such important and controversial policy change save discussed with the President. But Gray took the blame in order to the President an from embarrassment, thus demonstrating important role forWhite House staffers as and acting Sununu should have.91 was Sununu's general attitude toward the press reflected in his public reaction to a of card After Washington Post reporter who covered the story the credit flap. a on bill signing ceremony theWhite House lawn, he told Ann Devroy loudly and a are in front of others: "You're liar. Your stories all lies. Everything you write is a lie."92 soon The final downfall and firing of Sununu took place after the credit card was term incident, which merely the final straw. The striking thing about Sununu's as was to chief of staff is how long he allowed stay. It speaks strongly of President in Bush's gratitude for Sununu's support the New Hampshire primary and of the to was President's personal loyalty his subordinate, but it also demonstrates that he performing highly valued functions for the President. came at a was The firing low point in the Bush administration; the economy was in doing poorly, the President sliding public opinion polls from his huge popu to larity after the Gulf War, and the administration seemed be in disarray. Sununu personally could only be blamed for the last of the three, but the scapegoat factor a one is real inWashington. Nevertheless, without Sununu's strategic miscalculations, storm was not he could probably have weathered the of problems for which he responsible. ax When the finally fell, and the President asked for Sununu's resignation, he to still would not admit being at fault. He blamed the press, theWhite House staff, was and pro-Israeli groups (supposedly because he of Lebanese origin and had been Even in his letter Sununu active in Arab-American groups).93 of resignation implied that all of his actions were at the behest of the President. "I assure you that in pit or cat mode as I am to bull mode pussy (your choice, always) ready help."94 to But in searching for enemies who would have liked do in John Sununu if one on they had the chance, is reminded of the Agatha Christie novel, Murder the a in on train Orient Express, murder mystery which many suspects the had sufficient motive to have killed the victim. The mystery is solved when it is disclosed that each 98 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

was same of the suspects guilty because each had plunged the knife into the victim. cause as was own Although the primary of John Sununu's demise chief of staff his behavior, he had made so many enemies that there were abundant motives for many to people do the deed.

Conclusion

The experience with White House organization in the modern presidency has highlighted several important lessons. White House staff and organization will to counter faithfully reflect the President, but should strive presidential weaknesses. to If the President is reclusive (as Nixon was), the staff should try bring ideas and to too people him (as Persons did for Eisenhower). If the President is open, the staff some on access to should impose order the President (as Cheney did for Ford). If the too on was President is focused details (as Carter), the staff should encourage him to at too look the big picture. If the President is detached, the staff should raise issues, even to unpleasant ones, the president's attention (as the Baker system did for Reagan, but Regan did not). we or Beyond this have learned that, regardless of personal style preference, a to on the contemporary White House needs chief of staff impose order policy access to development, guard the President, and settle administration disputes that are not of presidential importance. As the Ford and Carter presidencies demonstrated, someone or over short of the President must be in charge, the President will be whelmed. a But if that necessary chief of staff takes domineering approach to the job, it a is likely prescription for disaster. Each of the strong chiefs of staff (Adams for Ike, Haldeman for Nixon, Regan for Reagan, and Sununu for Bush) have:

alienated members of Congress, alienated members of their own administration, common had reputations for the lack of civility, had hostile relations with the press.

And each of them has resigned under varying degrees of pressure, having done to own harm his president and the presidency. A can number of lessons about the role of chief of staff be gleaned from the over experience the past four decades of the Presidency. These lessons which were too often ignored by the domineering chiefs of staff, include: 1. out some Carrying the President's wishes will often make people angry, but not or gratuitous harshness will help the President the chief of staff. to access as as a 2. It is appropriate guard tightly the President wishes, but heavy-handed assertion of personal power will unnecessarily anger members of the Cabinet.

3. The chief of staff has a constituency of more than one. It includes: a. sooner or Congress: The President (or chief of staff) will later need support so in Congress, fences should be mended carefully after congressional feelings have been hurt. THE CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED PRESIDENT'S | 99

b. The Press: The President needs favorable press coverage. Having a cordial, not ensure professional working relationship with the press may favorable can to coverage, but it help mitigate bad coverage. not in to 4. The President should be put the position of having defend publicly aWhite House staffer. cannot 5. A chief of staff do the job in complete anonymity, but people will notice if the chief of staff squeezes into every photo-opportunity. 6. As Jack Watson says, the chief of staff is the President's "javelin catcher." The chief of staff should take the heat for the President, and in no circum stances to publicly shift blame the President. seem a This list may bit preachy and obvious. But the lessons bear repeating because so they have often been ignored by the four domineering chiefs of staff in the modern presidency. to The ideal approach the job is exemplified by James Baker, Jack Watson, and as an Richard Cheney. Each served his president well by performing honest broker were no or and coordinator of administration policy. These people in way soft access to ineffectual. They controlled their presidents with firm hands and enforced a on discipline the policy development process. They performed the other chief of as success to staff functions such giving credit for the President and taking blame for own failures without letting their egos get in the way. Each demonstrated that the can one chief of staff job be done without absolute control by person. There is, of no a a course, guarantee that good chief of staff will lead to successful presidency, can but avoiding the mistakes of the four domineering chiefs of staff improve chances. In the end there is no salvation from staff. As Presidential scholar Bert Rockman or can save a puts it: "No system organization ultimately President from himself when he is inclined to self-destruct. And no system that a President is uncomfortable with will last."95 A President cannot manage theWhite House alone, but he must sure someone to must make that is managing it his specifications.96 Presidents be are not ruthless in their judgments of aides who serving the presidency. If presidents to to do not pay attention these precepts their presidencies will be vulnerable being run for others' purposes rather than their own.

Notes

1. For a full see P. The CA: Brooks/ argument James Pfiffner, Strategic Presidency (Pacific Grove, 2. an a is nor see Cole, 1988), Ch. For argument that chief of staff neither necessary desirable, in Bruce Buchanan, "Constrained Diversity: The Organizational Demands of the Presidency," Pfiffner, The Managerial Presidency (Brooks/Cole, 1991), pp. 78-104. at on 2. Remarks by Donald Rumsfeld the American Political Science Association Meetings, Panel The on the "Presidential Staffing," (4 September 1992), Chicago. author participated panel. 3. in a memo to in 1960 he should Presidency scholar Richard Neustadt argued John Kennedy that be his own chief of staff. By 1988, however, Neustadt had concluded that a chief of staffwas not a necessary in theWhite House, though domineering chief. Richard Neustadt, "Memorandum on "Does House a both Staffing the President-elect," and the White Need Strong Chief of Staff," in The Pfiffner, Managerial Presidency. 4. For other analyses of the office of chief of staff see Samuel Kernell and Samuel Popkin, Chief of Staff (Berkeley. University of California Press, 1986) and Bradley Patterson, Ring of Power (New York: Basic Books, 1988). PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES 100 I QUARTERLY

5. Mandate New York: and Dwight Eisenhower, for Change, (Garden City, Doubleday Company, 1963), p. 87. 6. D. New York: and Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (Garden City, Doubleday Company, 1963), p. 114. 7. Michael Medved, The Shadow Presidents, p. 243. 8. R.T. Johnson, Managing the White House, p. 82. 9. Men Patrick Anderson, The Presidents' (New York: Doubleday, 1969), p. 161. 10. Michael Medved, The Shadow Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1979), p. 245. 11. Richard Tanner Johnson, Managing theWhite House (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 93. 12. Anderson, The Presidents' Men, p. 184; emphasis added. 13. Fred Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency (New York: Basic Books, 1982), p. 148; Hess, the 65. Organizing Presidency, p. 14. See Michael Medved, Shadow Presidents, p. 253. 15. See The Hidden Hand Greenstein, Presidency. 16. in the 65. Quoted Hess, Organizing Presidency, p. 17. Medved, The Shadow Presidents, p. 248. 18. Medved, The Shadow Presidents, p. 248. 19. Anderson, The Presidents' Men, p. 196. 20. Medved, The Shadow Presidents, p. 254. 21. William Safire, "Abominable No-Man," The New York Times (3, 1986 [check date], p. A23. 22. in the 105-106. Quoted Stephen Hess, Organizing Presidency (Washington: Brookings, 1988), pp. 23. Quoted inWilliam Safire, Before theFall (New York: Doubleday, 1985), p. 116. 24. in Frederick C. et. al. Government Quoted Mosher, Watergate: Implications for Responsible (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 44. 25. in the 118. Quoted Hess, Organizing Presidency, p. 26. in The Nixon York: Greenwood Quoted Genovese, Presidency (New Press, 1990). 27. the 119. Stephen Hess, Organizing Presidency, p. 28. Author's interview, Los Angeles, CA (25 May 1983). 29. Author's interview, Los Angeles, CA (25 May 1983). See T. 30. Richard Johnson, Managing the White House, p. 218-221. 31. See of House Committee the testimony Alexander Butterfield before the Impeachment reprinted in The New American 264-272. Larry Berman, Presidency, pp. 32. See Lou President The Role a York: Simon and Cannon, Reagan: of Lifetime (New Schuster, 1991), Chapter 10 and p. 181. 33. Hedrick Smith, The Power Game, p. 305. 34. Donald Regan, For the Record, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), p. 272. Ann Learn Fortune 35. Reilly Dowd, "What Managers Can from Manager Reagan," (15 September 1986), p. 33. 36. Regan, For the Record, pp. 142-143, 144. 37. 76. Stockman, Triumph of Politics, p. 38. 109. Stockman, Triumph of Politics, p. 39. See Power memo is in Smith, The Game, pp. 314-315. The reproduced Bob Schieffer and Gary Paul York: E. P. 83. Gates, The Acting President (New Dutton, 1989), p. 40. in Memo dated 11/13/80, reproduced Schieffer and Gates, The Acting President, p. 83. 41. Author's interview with Elliot L. Richardson, Washington (1 April 1988). 42. Smith, The Power Game, p. 299. 43. See in in the insightful discussion of Nancy Reagan's role the Reagan administration Richard Free Neustadt, Presidential Power and theModern Presidents (New York: Press, 1990), pp. 312-316. 44. "For Time William R. Doener, Rhyme and Reason," (21 January 1985), p. 20. 45. at Time Ed Magnuson, the White House," (21 January p. 10. "Shake-Up " 1985), 46. Bernard Weinraub, "How Don Regan Runs the White House, The New York Times (5 January 1986), p. 33. THE CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED PRESIDENT'S | 101

47. in Role a 563. Quoted Cannon, of Lifetime, p. 48. The No. 42. Stockman, Triumph of Politics, p. 18-19, Photograph, 49. Quoted by Bob Schieffer and Gary Gates, The Acting President (New York: Dutton, 1989), p. 200. 50. Quoted by Cannon, The Role of a Lifetime, p. 721. 51. 306. Bradley Patterson, Ring of Power, p. 52. Face Means It in Maureen Dowd, "Saving Having the Picture," The New York Times (16 June 18. 1991), p. 1, 53. Smith, The Power Game, p. 81. 54. David The 243. See also the under No. Stockman, Triumph of Politics, p. caption photograph 16., pp. 118-119. 55. a 566. Cannon, Role of Lifetime, p. 56. Regan, For the Record, p. 288. 57. Regan, For the Record, p. 3. 58. See Lou The Role A 583-588. Cannon, of Lifetime, pp. 59. Bernard Weinraub, "How Don Regan Runs the White House," The New York Times (5 January 1986), p. 38. 60. Quoted in BusinessWeek (9 September 1985), p. 79. 61. Quoted by David Hoffman, "Regan: Chief of Risk" Washington Post (28 February 1987), pp. rest comments were: was it 1, 16. The of Regan's "Who that took this disinformation thing and to turn it? was it on in Senate out a managed Who [sic] took this loss the and pointed few facts to I to it in a row. But we and managed pull that? don't say we'll be able do four times here go again, and we're trying." Lou a 720. 62. Quoted by Cannon, The Role of Lifetime, p. 63. the President's Review Board 26 IV-10-IV-11. Report oj Special (Washington, February 1987), pp. 64. See the account Lou The Role a 722-732. by Cannon, of Lifetime, pp. 65. David Hoffman, "Regan: Chief of Risk," Washington Post (28 February 1987), pp. 1, 16. Reagan Lou as His was biographer Cannon argued that Regan had four deficiencies chief of staff: 1) ego too He in He did not in large. 2) held politics disdain. 3) appreciate Nancy's role the administration. He "mice" him to the White House instead of a as 4) brought the with recruiting strong staff Baker See The Role a 567. had. Cannon, of Lifetime, p. Time 66. Dan Goodgame, "Big, Bad John Sununu," (21 May 1990), p. 24. 67. See Bush Owes Post A19. David Broder, "What Sununu," Washington (1 May 1991), p. 68. Ann "Sununu on Size of His White House See Devroy, Swiftly Backpedals Role," Washington Post (9 December 1988), p. A9; and "Transition Watch," The New York Times (8 December 1988), p. B20. 69. See Burt "No-Nonsense National 2251. Solomon, Sununu," fournal (16 September 1989), p. 70. See Time (30 September 1991), p. 19; andNewsweek (30 December 1991), p. 4. 71. "This Week with David Brinkley," ABC News, Transcript of program of 2 February 1992, p. 13. "The Post 72. See Eleanor Randolph, Washington Chain-Saw Massacre," The Washington Magazine (2 December 1990), p. 37. 168. 73. Sidney Blumenthal, "So Long, Sununu," p. 74. in Sununu: What Color Is Your Parachute?" 31. Quoted "John Spy magazine (March 1992), p. 75. See The New York Times (4 December 1991), p. B12. 76. Ibid.

77. Blumenthal, "So Long, Sununu," p. 168. 78. Quoted in Time (21 May 1990), p. 25. 79. "So Fair 168. Sidney Blumenthal, Long, Sununu," Vanity (February 1992), p. 80. Blumenthal, "So Long, Sununu," p. 168. 81. Blumenthal, "So Long, Sununu," p. 113. 82. Blumenthal, "So Long, Sununu," p. 168. PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES 102 I QUARTERLY

83. See Blumenthal, "So Long, Sununu," p. 113. 84. Bush's Post November C4. Juan Williams, "George Flying Circus," Washington (24 1991), p. Cl, Year of Sununu Post 85. Quoted by Ann Devroy, "Citing Triumph, Defends Actions," Washington (12 December 1990), p. A25. A 86. Quoted inMaureen Dowd, "Sununu: Case Study in Flouting the Rules," The New York Times (5May 1991), p. 34. 87. and Ann "Sununu Deems 4 Plane Charles Babcock Devroy, Only Trips 'Personal'," Washington Post (24 April 1991), p. 1, 6. 88. The New York Times (4 December 1991), p. B12. 89. Dan Free or Time 18. Goodgame, "Fly Die," (13 May 1991), p. 90. The New York Times (23 November 1991), p. 1, 10. 91. The New York Times (22 November 1991), pp. 1, 20. 92. Quoted in The New York Times (23 November 1991), p. 1, 10. 93. Ann "Sununu Sees Vendetta As Source of Post Devroy, Troubles," Washington (26 June 1991), "So Fair Burt p. A5; Sidney Blumenthal, Long, Sununu," Vanity (February 1992), p. 112; "Sununu Will Leave With 'Low Solomon, Washington Opinion' Unchanged," Nationalfournal, (11 January 1992), pp. 90-91. 94. in New York Times B12 Letter of resignation reprinted The (4 December 1991), p. (emphasis added). 95. Bert Rockman, "The Style and Organization of the Reagan Presidency," in Charles O. Jones, ed. Chatham 27. The Reagan Legacy (Chatham, NJ: House, 1988), p. 96. See P. "Can the President the Government?" in ed. James Pfiffner, Manage Pfiffner, The Managerial Presidency (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1991).