The Organisation and Structure of Central Banks. Dissertation
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The Organisation and Structure of Central Banks Dissertation Approved as fulfilling the requirements for the degree of Doctor rerum politicarum (Dr. rer. pol.) at the Department of Law and Economics of Technische Universität Darmstadt by Jan Weidner, M.Sc. (born in Darmstadt) First supervisor: Prof. Dr. Volker Nitsch Second supervisor: Prof. Dr. Michael Neugart Date of submission: April 20, 2017 Date of defense: July 13, 2017 Place of publication: Darmstadt Year of publication: 2017 D17 Acknowledgments At this point, I would like to take a moment to thank those who have supported and guided me over the course of writing this dissertation. First and foremost, I owe my doctoral advisor Prof. Dr. Volker Nitsch a huge debt of gratitude for a number of reasons. Firstly, for agreeing to supervise my thesis and, secondly, for offering me a position at his chair. Above all however, I must thank him for the expertise he has shared with me and the moral support he provided me throughout this process. His knowledge, opinions, and advice have always been of great assistance and value to me. I thank Prof. Dr. Michael Neugart greatly for being my second supervisor and for his guidance and advice on many issues. Additionally, my great experience of a Winter School in Shanghai is thanks to him and I will remember this always. Finally, it would be remiss of me not to thank him for the happy hours spent on the football pitch. I wish to express my gratitude to the chairman of my examination committee, Prof. Dr. Jens Krüger, and to the other members of the committee, Prof. Dr. Ingo Barens and Prof. Dr. Dirk Schiereck. I am grateful for the time I have enjoyed with my colleagues and former col- leagues Dr. Metin Akyol, Uros Djuric, Dr. Thomas Fischer, Dr. Johannes Rode, Dr. Izabela Sobiech, Selen Yildirim, and Savas Yildiz. I thank Falk Laser for his cooperation on one important chapter of this dissertation in particular and Philip Savage for his remarkable organisational skills and all the help he has provided over the last few years. Finally, I would like to thank and acknowledge TU Darmstadt for the excellent working conditions and their support in helping me to participate in conferences and seminars at home and abroad. Contents List of Figures IV List of Tables VI List of Abbreviations VIII 1 Introduction 1 2 Organisational Aspects of Central Banks 4 2.1 Motivation . 5 2.2 Literature . 6 2.3 Areas of Change . 8 2.3.1 Staffing . 10 2.3.2 Regional and Foreign Representations . 12 2.3.3 Hierarchies and Organisational Relations . 14 2.3.4 Involvement in Financial Supervision . 15 2.3.5 Exchange Rate Regimes . 16 2.3.6 Monetary Unions . 18 2.3.7 Inflation Targeting . 19 2.3.8 International Reserves . 22 2.3.9 Ownership . 23 2.4 Conclusions . 26 3 Evolving Hierarchies in Central Banks 27 3.1 Motivation . 28 3.2 Some Background on Organisational Economics . 29 3.2.1 Theories on Organisational Structures and Change . 29 3.2.2 Empirics on Organisational Economics: What Has Been Done so Far? . 31 3.2.3 Flat or Tall Hierarchies: An Applied Perspective . 32 3.3 Central Bank Structures over Time: Data and Measurement . 34 3.3.1 Data . 34 I Contents 3.3.2 Features and Limitations of Organisational Charts . 36 3.3.3 Measures of Hierarchies and Relations . 37 3.4 Descriptive Analysis . 41 3.4.1 Remarks on the Entire Sample . 41 3.4.2 The Balanced Sample: Descriptive Statistics . 43 3.4.3 Regression Results . 51 3.5 Discussion and Policy Conclusions . 59 4 Currency Compositions of International Reserves and the Euro Crisis 61 4.1 Motivation . 62 4.2 Literature . 64 4.2.1 Motives for International Reserve Holdings . 64 4.2.2 Determinants of Currency Compositions . 65 4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics . 67 4.3.1 Data . 67 4.3.2 Descriptives . 71 4.4 Empirical Analysis . 75 4.4.1 Determinants of the International Reserve Composition . 75 4.4.2 Robustness Checks . 82 4.4.3 Effect of the Euro Crisis on Euro Holdings . 86 4.4.4 Actual and Model Predicted Currency Compositions . 92 4.5 Conclusions . 96 5 Political Determinants of the Financial Supervision Architecture 98 5.1 Motivation . 99 5.2 Literature . 99 5.3 Data and Descriptive Analysis . 102 5.3.1 Data . 102 5.3.2 Historical Development and Descriptive Analysis . 105 5.4 Empirical Analysis . 109 5.5 Conclusions . 121 6 Conclusions 123 Bibliography 126 Volumes of Central Bank Annual Reports 137 Volumes of the “Central Bank Directory” 156 II Contents Volumes of “How Countries Supervise their Banks, Insurers and Securities Markets” 158 Appendix 160 Appendix to Chapter 2 - Organisational Aspects of Central Banks . 161 Appendix to Chapter 3 - Evolving Hierarchies in Central Banks . 166 Appendix to Chapter 4 - Currency Compositions of International Reserves and the Euro Crisis . 181 Appendix to Chapter 5 - Political Determinants of the Financial Supervi- sion Architecture . 187 Appendix Central Bank Handbook . 191 Affidavit III List of Figures 2.1 Central bank staff numbers 1990 to 2015 . 11 2.2 Central bank employees per 100,000 inhabitants in 2015 . 11 2.3 Central bank branch networks 1990 to 2015 . 12 2.4 Number of regional branches 1995 and 2015 . 13 2.5 Foreign representations 1990 and 2015 . 14 2.6 Organisational changes (annual averages, balanced sample) . 15 2.7 Number of integrated supervisors 1990 to 2015 . 16 2.8 Evolution of de facto exchange rate regimes 1999 to 2016 (%) . 17 2.9 States in monetary unions 1990 to 2016 . 19 2.10 Central banks with inflation targeting frameworks 1990 to 2016 . 20 2.11 Holdings in major reserve currencies (trillion USD) . 23 2.12 Central bank ownership 2015 . 24 2.13 Stock prices of selected publicly traded central banks (local currency) 25 2.14 Stock price Bank of Greece (EUR) . 26 3.1 Organisational chart Bank of Italy 2015 . 35 3.2 Organisational chart Central Bank of Russia 2015 . 36 3.3 Fictional organisational chart for 1990 . 40 3.4 Fictional organisational chart for 2015 . 40 3.5 Organisational chart Bank of Lithuania 2011 . 42 3.6 Organisational chart Bank of Lithuania 2012 . 43 3.7 Number of elements . 46 3.8 Height . 46 3.9 Span of control governor . 47 3.10 Centralisation . 48 3.11 Staff . 49 3.12 Measures of hierarchies and relations, small and large central banks . 51 3.13 Country-specific centralisation and central bank centralisation . 53 4.1 Volume of international reserves 1996 to 2015 (trillion USD) . 62 IV List of Figures 4.2 Volumes of international reserves according to different sources (tril- lion USD) . 71 4.3 Holdings in major reserve currencies (trillion USD, Laser/Weidner) . 72 4.4 EUR share in total reserves (2007=100) . 87 4.5 Actual and model predicted shares of USD, EUR, and JPY . 94 5.1 Number of integrated supervisors 1990 to 2015 . 107 5.2 Shares of supervisory designs 1990 to 2015 (%) . 108 5.3 Predictive margins with 95% confidence intervalls: Federalism . 119 5.4 Predictive margins with 95% confidence intervalls: Political system . 120 6.1 Areas of major organisational change in central banks (% of 40 central banks) . 166 6.2 Early organisational chart of Erie Railroad . 167 6.3 Organisational chart Bank of Italy (1894) . 168 6.4 Organisational chart Bank of Canada (1936) . 169 6.5 Organisational chart Oesterreichische Nationalbank (1946) . 170 6.6 Organisational chart Norges Bank (1985) . 171 6.7 Organisational chart Bank of England (2000) . 172 6.8 Organisational chart Banque de France (2015) . 173 6.9 Frequency distributions dependent variables . 178 6.10 Frequency distributions independent variables . 179 V List of Tables 2.1 Main data sources used in this dissertation . 8 2.2 Data used in Chapters 3-5 . 9 2.3 Countries with inflation targeting framework . 21 3.1 Advantages and disadvantages of flat and tall hierarchies . 33 3.2 Countries in sample (industrial and emerging markets) . 44 3.3 Correlation matrix organisational measures . 45 3.4 Regression power distance on central bank hierarchies . 54 3.5 Regression fiscal centralisation on central bank hierarchies . 55 3.6 Explanatory variables . 56 3.7 Regression results: Hierarchies and relations . 57 4.1 Ten biggest holders of international reserves . 63 4.2 Data sources on the composition of international reserves . 68 4.3 Data coverage and sources . 70 4.4 Individual international reserve composition (%) . 73 4.5 Share of currencies in total reserve holdings (%) . 74 4.6 Explanatory variables . 76 4.7 Models estimated . 77 4.8 Pooled regression results: Model A, OLS . 78 4.9 Pooled regression results: Model A, Tobit . 79 4.10 Panel regression results: Model A, Tobit . 80 4.11 Panel regression results: Model B, Tobit . 81 4.12 Panel regression results: Model C, Tobit . 82 4.13 Comparison of regression results: Model A (USD) . 84 4.14 Comparison of regression results: Model B (USD) . 85 4.15 Comparison of regression results: Model C (USD) . 86 4.16 Crisis impact on EUR shares . 88 4.17 Regression results with interaction terms . 89 4.18 Difference-in-Differences estimation results: USD share . 91 4.19 Difference-in-Differences estimation results: JPY share . 91 VI List.