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Bolivia After the 2020 General Elections. Despite the Return To NO. 55 NOVEMBER 2020 Introduction Bolivia after the 2020 General Elections Despite the Return to Power of the MAS, a New Political Era Could Be About to Begin Claudia Zilla and Madeleyne Aguilar Andrade On 8 November Luis Arce and David Choquehuanca took office as the new president and vice-president of Bolivia, respectively. Less than a month earlier, they had won the elections in the first round with more than 55 per cent of the vote. Thus, the Move- ment towards Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo or MAS) was returned to power and obtained an absolute majority in the parliament after a one-year interregnum follow- ing the fraudulent ballot in 2019. This outcome can be attributed not only to the desire of the people for economic and political stability as well as social peace but also to the poor performance of the transitional government of Jeanine Áñez and the oppo- sition’s fragmentation and polarizing campaign. The dethronement of Evo Morales and the current adverse conditions – not least Covid-19 – are among those factors that will make it impossible for the MAS to conduct business as usual. It was a long and extremely difficult path to the first round of the elections, Bolivians the October 2020 general elections, which for and against him had already taken to were a re-run of the annulled October 2019 the streets. In its final report, published ballot. Evo Morales had pushed through in December, as well as in its preliminary four presidential mandates in a row by reports of October and November, the elec- means of violating constitutional provisions toral observation mission of the Organiza- (2009), ignoring the results of a plebiscite tion of American States (OAS) testified to against his re-election (2016) and obtaining significant irregularities in the counting of both the Constitutional Court’s recognition the votes. On 10 November, as the protests of re-election as a human right (2017) and continued unabated and became more vio- the Supreme Electoral Court’s authorization lent, Morales had initially announced both of his repeated candidacy (2018). In last year’s the replacement of electoral officials and general elections, serious accusations – the holding of repeat elections, only to both in Bolivia and elsewhere – of elec- resign a couple of hours later. That step had toral fraud were made after Morales’s lead been suggested – separately and in front of had grown significantly following an inter- the cameras – by both the commander-in- ruption in the speed-count. By 25 October chief of the armed forces and the chief of 2019, when the Supreme Electoral Court police (see SWP-Aktuell 69/2019). Moreover, officially declared Morales’s victory in members of the police force had joined in the mutiny against the government and left to Mexico to seek political asylum and finally sensitive public buildings unprotected. settled in Buenos Aires, along with his vice- president, Álvaro García Linera. Argentina is the country that has the largest Bolivian dias- Transition as Prelude to a pora, including numerous MAS supporters. New Order From there, Morales coordinated political activities and gave press conferences until Jeanine Áñez, Senator for the conservative his return to Bolivia on 9 November 2020. Social-Democratic Movement and second The composition of Áñez’s first cabinet vice-president of the upper chamber, did not serve to integrate and pacify a coun- assumed the interim presidency of Bolivia try in turmoil but rather signalled an anti- on 12 November 2019. She was the highest MAS approach at the political, social, re- political authority to remain in office after gional and ethnical levels: that is, its mem- the president and vice-president of the coun- bers came from the opposition, the upper try, the presidents of both the upper and classes and mainly eastern Bolivia and were lower chambers, and the first vice-president predominantly white. Two politicians who of the Senate had all resigned. For this had run for the presidency in the 2019 elec- reason, Áñez assumed first the presidency tions were also included in the interim of the Senate and then the interim presi- president’s cabinet. All in all, she made dency of the state, which was possible only around 15 ministerial changes in her one at a joint session of the two chambers of the year in office; high-ranking (political) Plurinational Legislative Assembly attended appointments continued to take place just exclusively by parties in opposition to MAS. one week before Luis Arce’s inauguration. A first attempt to hold a session in the In a similar way behaved Karen Longaric, Senate had failed owing to the absence of a lawyer and expert in international law MAS members, who held a majority of two- from Sucre, who was appointed minister of thirds and had prevented a quorum. foreign affairs and had already held various On the night of her inauguration, Áñez positions at the Foreign Ministry. She was entered the presidential palace holding up soon making public announcements and a huge book in front of the cameras and decisions that revealed her intention to over- exclaiming “God has allowed the Bible to haul Bolivian foreign policy in terms of re-enter the Palace. May He bless us!” This both content and personnel: around 80 per pseudo-religious scene contrasted with cent of ambassadors were replaced and Morales’s policy of the secularization of the diplomatic relations with the United States Bolivian state. Áñez’s restorative emphasis restored following an 11-year interruption. anticipated the approach of her one-year transitional government, which showed signs of seeking revenge against the MAS The ‘Adaptability’ of the and its supporters, saw itself as the pre- Institutions of Law and Order cursor of “post-MASism” and cultivated ambitions of pushing through long-term Remarkably quickly, the (old) judiciary policies. From the very beginning, officials and security apparatus adapted to the new embarked on a campaign of defaming and narratives and policies of the civilian tran- stigmatizing the previous government, sitional government. In breach of consti- which was persistently labelled as narco- tutional provisions, it was the head of the terrorist. Several members of the new cabi- armed forces, Williams Kaliman, who net, first and foremost Government Minis- placed the presidential sash on Áñez at her ter Arturo Murillo, even promised that inauguration ceremony. The following day, (violent) enemies would be “hunted down”. Áñez replaced the military leadership. Considering himself to be in danger, Mora- The police and military operations under- les first went into hiding in Bolivia, then flew taken to restore public order were by no SWP Comment 55 November 2020 2 means free of excessive use of force. On of the coronavirus. On 10 March 2020, Bo- 16 November the transitional government livia reported its first two confirmed cases passed Supreme Decree No. 4078 to exempt of infection. A state of national sanitary the armed forces from any criminal liability emergency was declared under Supreme for the consequences of their actions. The Decree No. 4196 on 17 March. Four days interim president denied that any repres- later, lockdown was imposed throughout sive abuses had been committed against Bolivia (Supreme Decree No. 4199). There- civilians by the law enforcement agencies. after, Interim President Áñez introduced While the Bolivian Prosecutor-General’s successive complementary measures aimed Office supported her claim, the Inter-Ameri- at pandemic containment. can Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) As early as May 2020, the transitional documented several fatal incidents in which government, which had vocally decried the the state security forces had been involved. Morales administration for corruption and In a report released on 10 December fol- clientelism, found itself involved in a scan- lowing an IACHR observation team’s visit to dal over the alleged purchase of 170 respi- Bolivia, the commission noted the deaths rators from Spain at inflated prices. The recorded on 11 November in the Pedregal incident led to the resignation of the Boliv- neighbourhood of the South Zone of the ian minister of health. Moreover, the equip- municipality of La Paz, the massacre of ment turned out to be unfit for its intended Sacaba, Cochabamba on 15 November and purpose as it was not suitable for use in in- the massacre of Senkata, El Alto on 19 No- tensive care units. Further corruption cases vember. These repressive actions targeted (some 24 in total) engulfed the interim MAS protestors and local residents and presidency, including those related to the took place under the implementation of state-owned telecommunications (Entel), the immunity decree. The interim president oil (YPFB), electricity (ENDE) and aeronautic eventually repealed that decree on 27 No- (DGAC) companies. vember, arguing that it was no longer nec- essary as social peace had been restored. For its part, the IACHR not only condemned Voting Once Again racist acts against the indigenous people but also criticized plans of the parliament On 24 November 2019, Áñez signed Law (in which the MAS had a majority) to grant No. 1266 on the “Extraordinary and Tran- amnesty to former President Morales and sitional Regime for Holding General Elec- former Vice-President García Linera. Thus, tions”, which the MAS-controlled parlia- the transitional government squandered ment had passed. Among other things, the the opportunity to establish judicial inde- law provided for the appointment of new pendence. Instead, it put pressure on prose- judges at of the Supreme Electoral Court, cutors and judges to conduct criminal in- the annulment of the 2019 general elec- vestigations against more than 100 people, tions and the holding of repeat elections including Morales himself and others linked in 2020. At the same time, it banned those to his government, for sedition and/or ter- who had held elected office at the national rorism.
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