A Synchronic Justification for Aristotle's Commitment to Prime Matter Author(S): Margaret Scharle Source: Phronesis, Vol

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A Synchronic Justification for Aristotle's Commitment to Prime Matter Author(s): Margaret Scharle Source: Phronesis, Vol. 54, No. 4/5 (2009), pp. 326-345 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40387994 . Accessed: 06/02/2015 02:19

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brii i Phronesis54 (2009) 326-345 hriii.ni/phr«,

A SynchronieJustification for Aristotle's Commitmentto PrimeMatter

MargaretScharle Reed College,3203 SE WoodstockAve, Portland, OR 97202, USA scharlem@reed. edu

Abstract The currentdebate overAristotle's commitment to primematter is centeredon diachronic considerationsfound in his theoryof substantialchange. I argue that an appeal to this theoryis not requiredin orderto establishhis commitmentto the existenceof primemat- - ter.By drawingon PhysicsII. Is conceptionof what it is foran elementto have a nature thatis, to have an innersource of movementand rest- I introducea synchroniejustification forthe existence of primematter. By tradingon the relationshipbetween the thingthat has a sourceof change and the sourceit has, I show thatsomething that has a source in itself cannot be identicalwith itssource, and thata typeof matterthat has no natureof itsown (a kindof primematter) is requiredto block thisidentification at the levelof theelements.

Keywords Aristotle,metaphysics, elements, nature, form, matter

Therehas been muchdebate as to whetheror notAristotle is committedto "primematter" - an indeterminate,ultimate substratum of substances.The debatehas centeredon thepart of Aristo tie s philosophythat seems most to demandprime matter - his theoryof elementalsubstantial change. In thispaper, I presenta radicallydifferent argument, revealing that an appeal to Aristotle'stheory of substantialchange is not necessaryto establishhis commitment to theexistence of prime matter. In contrastto whatwe mightcall the "diachronicjustification for prime matter",1 I introducea "synchronie"justification drawn from Aristotle s conception of what it is for

!) "Diachronie"because it focuseson the roleprime matter must play in Aristotle'saccount of substantialchange.

This content downloaded from 134.10.2.4 on Fri, 6 Feb 2015 02:19:12 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions M. SchadeI Phronesis54 (2009) 326-345 327 an elementto havea nature- thatis, what it is foran elementto have an innerprinciple of movementand rest.As I will show,the view of prime matterthat emergesfrom the synchroniejustification is quite different fromthe traditional view of primematter that arises out of thediachronic justification. In thefirst section, I presentan overviewof thesynchronie justification and its textualbasis. In the nextsection, I demonstratethat the premises used in the synchroniejustification represent core featuresof Aristotle's - metaphysics featuresthat he takes to distinguishhim fromhis most prominentpredecessors, Plato and Parmenides.Finally, in thelast section, I presentan overviewof the currentdebate surroundingprime matter alongwith the advantages of mysynchronie justification and the untradi- tionalconception of primematter it entails.Whereas the diachronic justi- ficationof prime matter rests on detailsof Aristotle's philosophy which are perhapsonly of antiquarianinterest, I hope to show thatthe synchronie justificationrests on weightyphilosophical grounds.

I. The Argument Considerthe following synchronie justification for prime matter:

1. Natureis a principleand cause of being moved and of comingto restin that to which it belongs primarily,in virtueof itselfand not accidentally,[ώς οΰσηςτης φύσεωςαρχής τίνος και αιτίαςτου κινεισθαικαι ήρεμειν έν ω υπάρχειπρώτως καθ' αυτό.] {PhysicsILI 192b21-3)2 2. Somethingcannot be in itselfprimarily, [δτι μενουν αδύνατονέν έαυτωτι είναιπρώτως, δήλον.] {PhysicsIV.3 210b23) 3. There must be a differencebetween that which has a natureand the natureit has. (1,2) 4. If thatwhich has a naturewere simplyform, or if thatwhich has a naturewere simply matter, there could be no differencebetween thatwhich has a natureand the natureit has. 5. Therefore,that which has a naturecannot be simplyform or simply matter.(3, 4)

2) Translationsare my own unless otherwise noted.

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6. If that which has a natureis neithersimply matter nor simply form,then it is a compositeof matterand form. 7. That whichhas a natureis a compositeof matterand form.(5, 6) 8. Each of the elementshas a nature.{Physics II. 1 192b8-15) 9. An elementis a compositeof matterand form.(7, 8) 10. An elementis the lowest-level(that is, simplest)thing that has a nature. 1 1. The matterof an elementis prime (in the sense that it has no natureof its own). (9, 10)

Let us considerthe premises of the argument presented above. Premise one is thedefinition from Physics ILI: "natureis a principleand cause of being movedand ofcoming to restin thatto whichit belongsprimarily, in virtue of itselfand not accidentally"{Physics ILI 192b21-3). Since theword "in" willplay the central role in thesynchronie justification for prime matter, it is worthemphasizing that it is the internalityof theirsource of movement and restthat distinguishesnatural from artificial things: although both artificialand naturalthings have principles of movementand rest,for naturalthings, the principle is internal,while for artificial things, the principle is external:

- The second premisein the synchroniejustification for prime matter the - premisethat somethingcannot be in itselfprimarily carriesmuch of the weightof the argument.Aristotle's proof for premise two appearsin the contextof his reconstructionof Zeno s puzzle in PhysicsIV.3: ifevery- thingthat is is in place,and place itselfis, thenplace itselfrequires a place, and thatplace requiresa place,and so on (209a25-6). Aristotleultimately haltsthe regressby denyingthat everything that is is in place. However, Aristotlefirst affirms one crucialpremise in Zeno's regress- theclaim that it is impossiblefor something to be in itselfprimarily:

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Thusif we lookat thematter inductively we do notfind anything to be in itself(έν έαυτω)in anyof the senses that have been distinguished; and it can be seenby argu- mentthat it is impossible.For each of two things will have to be both,e.g. the jar will haveto be bothvessel and wine, and thewine both wine and jar, if it is possiblefor a thingto be in itself;so that,however true it might be thatthey were in eachother, the jarwill receive the wine in virtuenot of itsbeing wine but of the wine's being wine, andthe wine will be in thejar in virtue not oí itsbeing a jarbut of the jar's being a jar. Nowthat they are different in respect of what they are [το είναι] is evident;for that in whichsomething is and that which is in itwould be differentlydefined [ό λόγος].Nor is it possiblefor a thingto be in itselfeven accidentally [κατά συμβεβηκος]; for two thingswould be at thesame time in thesame thing. The jar would be in itself-if a thingwhose nature it is to receivecan be in itself;and thatwhich it receives,namely (ifwine) wine, will be in it.Obviously, then, a thingcannot be in itselfprimarily, [οτι μενουν αδύνατον έν έαυτω τι είναιπρώτως, δήλον.] {Physics IV.3 210b8-23;trans. Hardieand Gaye in Barnes1971)

HereAristotle agrees with Zeno thatsomething cannot be in itselfprimar- ilysince there must always be a differencebetween the containerand the contained.Something cannot even be in itselfprimarily accidentally because thentwo thingswould occupythe same place, which is impossible. It is importantto note thatalthough Aristotle uses the place sense of "in" to illustratehis argument,he explicitlyclaims a much widerconclu- sion thatwould coverthe senseof "in" used in the definitionof natureas an internalprinciple of movementand rest.In PhysicsIV.3, Aristotledis- tinguishesthe eightdifferent senses of "in,"3and states,"we do not see anythingin itself[έν έαυτω] in anyof thosedistinctions [among meanings of"in"], and byreason it is clearthat it is impossible"(210b8-10). Aristotle not onlyshows, with respect to each of theeight senses of "in,"that some- thingis not in itselfprimarily, but he uses the wine and jar exampleto illustratehis moregeneral argument ("by reason")for the impossibilityof something'sbeing in itselfprimarily. So, even thoughthe wine and jar - examplemakes use of theplace-sense of "in" whichAristotle singles out as the most "authoritative/principal"(κυριώτατον, 210a24) of the mean- - ings he usesthis sense to illustratewhat are quite general points about the functionof "in." Thus, regardless oí whichsense describes the way in which

3) (1) a partis in thewhole, (2) thewhole is in thepart, (3) thespecies is in thegenus, (4) thegenus is in thespecies, (5) formis in thematter, (6) thingsare in theirfirst mover, (7) thingsare in theend, and (8) a thingis in a vesseland in place.

This content downloaded from 134.10.2.4 on Fri, 6 Feb 2015 02:19:12 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 330 M. ScharleI Phronesis 54 (2009) 326-345 a natureis "in" thatto whichit belongs,4it is clearthat Aristotle is committedto thefact that a naturecannot be in itselfprimarily. We are now in a positionto draw sub-conclusionthree, which states thatthere must be a differencebetween that which has a natureand the natureit has - and in fact,when we look at thetext, we findthat Aristotle oftentakes pains to emphasizeprecisely this distinction. In PhysicsILI, he carefullymarks off the distinction between having a nature,being a nature, and beingby nature:

Of thethings that are, some are by nature, others due to othercauses: by nature are animalsand theirparts, plants and thesimple bodies, for example earth, fire, air and water(for we saythese things and suchthings are by nature). And it is clearthat all thesediffer from the things which have not been put together by nature. For each of thesehas in itselfa principleof movement and rest. [. . .] So a natureis whathas been said [thatis, a principleand causeof beingmoved and of comingto restin thatto whichit belongsprimarily, in virtue of itselfand notaccidentally] . And thingsthat havea principleof this sort have a nature.And each of these [that is, those which have a nature]is a substance.[. . .] Theseare in accordancewith nature, and thingsthat belongto theseof themselves,as beingcarried upwards [belongs to] fire-forthis neitheris a naturenor has a nature,but is bynature and in accordancewith nature. {Physicsll.l192b8-193al)

In thispassage, Aristotle carefully marks off "is a nature"from "has a nature" and "is by nature":a natureitself is an innerprinciple of movementand rest,while that which has a naturehas an innerprinciple of movementand rest.Further, he introducesthe locution "by nature"as a descriptionof thatwhich is byan innerprinciple of movementand rest.5As we learnin thispassage, animals and theirparts, plants, and theelements, are by nature in thesense of havinga nature.Moreover, we can sayproperly that fire and theactivities it undergoesqua fireare bynature. However, it is improperto saythat the fire'sactivity is a natureor has a nature,since the fire'sactivity is bya naturefire has. Aristotlereturns to thesedistinctions after offering his accountof form as a nature:

4) As I go on tosuggest, the sense in which nature is in thatwhich has a natureseems to be coveredby meaning (1) above,as a partis in a whole. 5) I excludea discussionof "is in accordancewith nature" since Aristotle seems to treat it as justanother expression for "is by nature." If there is a differenceto be foundbetween these expressions,it is notone theissues at handwould differentiate.

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A naturewould be, of the things which have in themselvesa principle of movement, theshape and theform, which is notseparate except in respectof its account. What comesfrom these [that is, matterand form],for example a humanbeing, is nota nature,but by nature. {Physics II. 1 193b3-6)

This passageapplies the distinctions made in theprevious passage to form and also to a human being.We now learnthat while formis a nature,a human beingis not. A human being is not a nature,since a natureis an innerprinciple of movementand rest,and a human being is byan inner principleof movementand rest.Moreover, a humanbeing is by naturein thesense of havinga nature(confirmed by ILI 192b8-15). Now let us takea look at the followingpassage from Physics II.7 where Aristotlecontinues to applythe distinctions to formsqua natures:

But thereare two principles which cause movement naturally, of whichone is not natural,for it does not have a principleof movement in itself.And such a oneis what- evercauses movement without being moved; such as thatwhich is completely unchangeable,the first of all [thatis, God] , and thewhat it is and theform; for it is theend or that for the sake of which. {Physics II.7 198a37-198b4)6

Here Aristotlesuggests that the formis not natural(that is, by nature) sinceit does not havea nature(and it is understoodthat it is not by nature in anothersense, for instance,as a movementof somethingthat has a nature).Rather, form is itselfa nature.As Simpliciusputs it, "For this [that is, form]is not a naturalprinciple, but a principlein what is natural;if it had a principleof changewithin itself it would be natural."7 Likewise,matter serves as a naturefor natural things:

Thisthen is one accountof nature,namely that it is theprimary matter underlying eachof thosethat have a principleof movementand changein themselves.{Physics II. 1 193a28-30)8

6) Thispassage mentions two principles of naturalmovement, only one ofwhich is not natural.As I argue,the one that is notnatural is form.The text does not explicitly name the principlethat is natural,but it is clearthat this principle is thecomposite acting as an effi- cientcause, for example, the father as theefficient cause of the child. 7>Trans. Fleet 1997, 367, 10. 8) Thus,Aristotle claims that the natural scientist should study both material nature and formalnature {Physics II.2 194al2-bl5,De partibusanimalium I.I 64lal5-32, De anima I.I 403b'-l9, MetaphysicsVIA1025b31-1026a7, VII.ll 1037a 10-20, and V.4 1015al5). See alsoPhysics ll.l 193a9-ll and 193b7-8.

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ForAristotle, matter, like form, is a naturein thingsthat have a nature.9 We are now in a positionto show thatsomething that has a naturecannot be simplymatter or simplyform. For if thatwhich has a naturewere simplymatter or simplyform, then there would be nothingbut itselfto serveas itsnature (premise four). But Aristotlehas shownthat it is impossible forsomething to serveas its own nature,because somethingcannot be in itselfprimarily. If thatwhich has a naturecannot be simplymatter or simplyform, it mustbe somethingother than simply matter, or otherthan simplyform, so thatit makessense to say thatmaterial nature is in it, or thatformal nature is in it (sub-conclusionfive). To determinewhat thiscould be and to defendpremise six, let us first look to howAristotle characterizes things that have a nature.Aristotle con- sistentlycharacterizes them as compositesof matterand form.For example, thefollowing passage suggests that which comes from both material nature and formalnature is somethingthat has a nature:

A naturewould be, of the things which have in themselvesa principle of movement, theshape and theform, which is notseparate except in respectof its account. What comesfrom these [that is, matter (a clearreference to 193a30) andform] , for example a humanbeing, is nota nature,but by nature. {Physics II. 1 193b3-8)

As the distinctionsoí PhysicsILI make clear,there are two waysin which somethingcan be by nature- eitheras somethingthat has a nature,or as thatwhich is due to the natureof somethingthat has a nature(for example, a movement).Clearly, that which is a compositeof materialnature and formalnature (for example, a humanbeing) is bynature in theformer sense.Thus, this passage maintains that composites of materialnature and formalnature have a nature.

9) Notethat, unlike form, higher level matter that is a.nature also has a natureof its own. See, forexample, Physics II. 3 195al6-18,De generationeet corruptioneII.5 332a4-6, De generationeanimalium I.I 715a9ff.and 715alO-13,and De partibusanimalium II. 1 646a20-3and 646b5ff.,and MeteorologicaIV. 12 389b27-8.In thesepassages Aristotle claimsthat the elementsserve as a materialnature of the uniformparts (e.g., flesh and bone) and the uniformparts serve as a materialnature of thenon-uniform parts (e.g.,eye, face, and hand).However, even in suchcases, there remains a cleardistinction betweenthe nature and that which has the nature, because the nature (the element and the bone,for instance) is neveridentical to thatwhich has the nature (the bone and the hand, respectively).

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This compositeview of naturalthings is also supportedby Aristotle's discussionin PhysicsII.2. He states,"nature is in twoways, both formand matter"(II.2 194al2), and goes on to positthat the object of naturalsci- ence is "thatwhich comes fromboth" (194a 17-8), in additionto the formal and materialnatures of naturalthings considered separately.10 Premisesix articulatesthe reasoningbehind his claim thatthings that havea natureare composites of matterand form.We haveseen thatthings thathave a naturecannot be simplymatter or simplyform since their naturesare in them.This suggeststhat things that have a naturehave a compositestructure: given that something cannot be itsown nature,it must haveits naturein it as a component.So understood,the natureis in the thingthat has a natureas the formis in the compositeor as the matteris in thecomposite, or, more generally, as thepart is in thewhole.11 Aristotle insiststhat both formand matterare naturesand thatthat which has a natureis a compositeof both.12 The restof theargument proceeds straightforwardly:

7. That whichhas a natureis a compositeof matterand form.(5, 6) 8. Each of the elementshas a nature.{Physics II. 1 192b8-15) 9. An elementis a compositeof matterand form.(7, 8) 10. An elementis the lowest-levelthing that has a nature. 11. The matterof an elementis prime (in the sense that it has no natureof its own). (9, 10)

The elementsare the lowest-levelnatural substances (premise ten) in the sense theyare the simplestbodies thathave a nature;there is no simpler

10)Just as thescience of housebuilding is not only about houses, but also about the form of thehouse and the building materials, so toothe science of nature is notonly about natural things,but also about their form and matter.See alsoPhysics II. 1 193a9-l1 and 193b7-8, PhysicsII.2 194al2-bl5,De partibusanimalium LI 64lal5-32, De animaLI 403bl-19, MetaphysicsWlA1025b31-1026a7, VII.ll 1037a 10-20, and V.4 1015al5. H) MetaphysicsV.25 s fourthdefinition of "part" shows that matter and form are each con- sideredparts of thecomposite whole (1023b20-3). If matterand formare partsof the composite,the nature-sense of"in" can be seento fallunder Physics IV. 3 s firstmeaning of "in"- thesense in which the part is in thewhole. 12)The philosophical considerations ofcontainment atwork in thesynchronie justification onlystrictly imply that which has a natureis a compositeof two components, at leastone ofwhich is a nature;nonetheless, the text suggests Aristotle is committedto thestronger claimthat both components are natures.

This content downloaded from 134.10.2.4 on Fri, 6 Feb 2015 02:19:12 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 334 M. ScharleI Phronesis 54 (2009) 326-345 naturalsubstance that composes them.13 Thus, theirmatter does not have a natureof itsown, and is, in thatsense, "prime" (conclusion eleven).14 The conclusionswe have drawnhere findvalidation in the following passagefrom De generationeet corruptione,where Aristotle states:

Ourown doctrine is thatalthough there is a matterof the perceptible bodies (a matter out ofwhich the so-called elements come- to-be), it has no separateexistence, but is alwaysbound up with a contrariety.[. . .] We mustreckon as a principleand as primary thematter which underlies, though it is inseparablefrom, the contrary qualities; for thehot is notmatter for the cold nor the cold for the hot, but the substratum is matter forthem both. {De generationeetcorruptione II. 1 329a24-32;trans. Joachim in Barnes 1971)

Here, Aristotlerefers to the "so-called"elements because his considered view,with which he ends the chapter,is that the materialand formal naturesfrom which the elements are composedmust, of necessity,be even more"elementary" than the elements themselves.15 To reviewthe argumentbriefly, then, Physics ILI insiststhat the elementshave a nature- "a principle[αρχή] and cause ofbeing moved and of comingto restin thatto whichit belongsprimarily, in virtueof itselfand - not accidentally"{Physics ILI 192b21-3) and thispassage from De generationeet corruptioneconfirms that the elementshave both a material principle(αρχή) and a formalprinciple (αρχή), the contraries. Then, given thatthis material principle does not itselfhave a nature,it is, in thatsense, "prime"or as Aristotlealso calls it, "first"("πρώτην" 329a30).16

13) Aristotlebelieves the elements are the simplest bodies since they move with the simplest motions{De cáelo1.2 268b26-269a8). 14) Note thatI am committedto theheavenly bodies having a materialnature if they indeedhave a nature.Metaphysics XII. 2 confirmsthat the heavenly bodies in fact have matter,but it states that their matter is nota principleof generation, but a principleof move- mentfrom place to place(1069a25-6). For more on thesense in whichthis topical matter is a principle,see Charles(2000), who considers whether "Aristotle aimed to treattopical matteras theprimary matter of eternal sensible substances" (90). 15) " On 'so-called'elements", see Crowley 2008. 16) Hereagain Aristotle is clearthat the composite element is composedof both matter and form,and he explicitly denies one possible permutation - that the elements are a composite oftwo forms. De generationeetcorruptione II.2 identifiesthe hot, the cold, the wet, and the dryas theprinciples and forms (εϊδη και αρχάς, 329b 10) ofperceptible body.

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AlthoughAristotle never explicitly makes the argumentfor the synchroniejustification of primematter, it findssolid textualsupport and, as I will demonstratein the followingsection, the spiritof the argument underliesAristotle's critiques of his twomost prominent predecessors, Par- menidesand Plato.

II. Aristotle'sCritiques of Parmenidesand Plato In thissection I showthat Aristotle s argumentsagainst Parmenides' meta- physicalmonism, Plato's theory of Forms,and Plato'sconception of matter ("the receptacle")all reston premisesclosely related to sub-conclusion - threeof thesynchronie justification of primematter theclaim that there mustbe a differencebetween that which has a natureand thenature it has. Let us firstconsider Aristotle's case againstParmenides. Aristotleconceives of Parmenidesas a strictmetaphysical monist who is therebyunable to distinguishthat which has a naturefrom the nature it has:

Nowto investigatewhether being is oneand motionless is notto investigateconcern- ingnature. For just as thegeometer has nothingmore to sayto one whodenies the principlesof his science - thisbeing a questionfor a differentscience or for one com- monto all- so a maninvestigating principles cannot argue with one who denies their existence.For there is no longera principleif there is one thingonly, and one in this way.For a principleis ofsome thing or things, [ου γαρ ετι αρχή έστιν, ει εν μόνον και οΰτωςεν έστιν ή γαραρχή τινός ή τινών]{Physics 1.2 184b26-185a5;trans. Hardie andGaye in Barnes1971, modified)

Given thatall Parmenidesallows into his ontologyis "The One," he does not investigateconcerning nature. To investigateconcerning nature is to investigateprinciple(s). But principlesmust be of (genitive)some thingor things,so in investigatingprinciple(s), one must admit thatthere are at leasttwo things in existence:the principleand thatof whichit servesas a principle.By countenancingonly The One in his ontology,Parmenides, in effect,denies that thereare any principle(s)whatsoever: for if The One werea principle,there would be somethingelse whose principleit would be, and ifThe One weresomething that itself had a principle,there would be somethingelse thatserved as itsprinciple. This argumentrelies on the assumptionthat something cannot be its own principle,and giventhat naturesare principles{Physics II. 1), Aristotlemust think that something

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cannot be its own nature.Thus, he is committedto somethinglike the inferencefrom step one to threein thesynchronie justification.17 In distinguishingthe Forms(principles) from that for which they serve as principles(the manyparticulars), Plato movesbeyond Parmenides in a sense;however, Platos conceptionof the Forms nonetheless falls prey to an erroranalogous to thatof Parmenides.By makingthe Forms paradigms or ideal exemplars,he hypostatizesthem as entitiesthat themselves stand in need of principles.18Throughout his corpus,Aristotle argues against Plato thatthe Formsfail to serveas principlesof explanationbecause theyare not,in theend, realprinciples, but ratherindependent things that require explanationby yet furtherprinciples.19 So, just as Parmenidesfailed to recognizethat The One cannotserve as itsown principle,thereby commit- tinghim to at leasttwo things, Plato failedto recognizethat a Formcannot serveas itsown principle,thereby committing him to an infiniteregress of Forms.20

17)However, notice that the argument against Parmenides trades on theuse of the genitive andnot on theuse of "in": instead of arguing that a principlecannot be in itself,Aristotle maintainsthat a principlecannot be of (genitive)itself. But a returnto PhysicsIV shows Aristotleto movefreely between the two sorts of expression: Andif place is in theobject [i.e., composite] (it must be, if it is eitherform or matter) placewill be inpkee [εσταιό τόποςέν τόπω]. (For both the form and theindefinite moveabout and changetogether with the object, not always in thesame [spot] , but justwhere the object itself is.) So therewill be apkee ofthe place [ώστε του τόπου εσται τόπος]."{Physics IV.2 210a6-l1; trans.Hussey 1983, my emphasis) HereAristotle restates the claim "place will be in place"(210a7) by use of thegenitive: "placewill be ofplace" (210al 1). Andwhen he returnsto theargument in IV.3,Aristotle reiteratesthe point using only the genitive (210b30-2). 18) As StephenMenn pointed out to me,the third hypothesis ofthe Parmenides (157C1-2) showsthe others have a principle/naturein addition to beinga principle/nature. 19)Wieland 1975, 136.Aristotle that"no common indicatesa 'this,'but argues predicate " rathera 'such.'If not, many difficulties follow and especially the 'third man' {Metaphysics VII.14 1038b35-1039a3). 20) The"Third Man Argument,"can be laidout in termsof principles: One-over-ManyIf a collectionof things, a> b, r,etc., are all F, thereis a principle/ Formby virtue of which they are all F. Self-PredicationThe Form F is itselfF. Non-Identity Nothingis F in virtueof being its own principle. So, forinstance, if there is a collectionof thingsthat all havethe property of being just, then,by One-over-Many, there must be a principle/Form(The Just) in virtue of which they

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Interestingly,just as Plato errsby attemptingto reifythe formal principles of entitiesinto naturalthings as the Forms,he errsagain by attempt- ing to reifythe materialprinciple of entitiesinto a naturalsubstance. Accordingto Plato,just as the trianglefashioned out of gold is gold, the elementwater, fashioned out of thematerial principle - whichhe calls"the receptacle"- is thereceptacle (De generationeet corruption* II. 1 329a9-23). If so, gold and thereceptacle are naturalsubstances in theirown right,and the changefrom, for instance, a triangleto a square or the changefrom waterto air is merelyan alterationof the underlyingsubstance. However, Aristotleargues that the materialnature cannot be a "this,"or substance, withwhich other things can be identified,but rather,should be conceived as a principlethat "has no separateexistence, but is alwaysbound up with a contrariety"{De generationeet corruptioneII. 1 329a30-2; trans.Joachim in Barnes1971).21 When he takesup thesethemes in MetaphysicsIX.7, he suggeststhat one should not say thatthe triangleis gold,but rather,that the triangleis golden(1049al8-b2) so thatthe materialnature is cast as a non-separableprinciple of the triangle.Likewise for the receptacle.For if thematerial nature is made intoa separablesubstance, one createsa reified principlethat itself stands in need of an explanationby some furtherprin- ciple,which creates an infiniteregress as it did withthe Forms.The very same philosophicalconsiderations that led Aristotleto rejectPlatos conceptionof Formalso lead him to rejectPlato's conception of matter.22

areall just.But The Just is itselfjust (according to theprinciple of Self-Predication), so if TheJust is notjust in virtueof itself (in accordancewith the principle of Non-Identity), theremust be someother principle/Form (The Just-2) in virtueof which it and theother thingsare just. This pattern will repeat again for The Just-2, and so on ad infinitum.IfOne- over-Manyrests on solidground, and if Plato insists on Self-Predication,then each Form is simplyanother thing in needof explanation, and Plato must either reject Non-Identity, or elseface an infiniteregress of Forms. 21) De generationeetcorruptione II. 1 329a9-23shows that Anaximander (or perhaps Dem- ocritusor the Pythagoreans, as Stephen Menn has pointed out to me)makes an errorsimi- larto thatof Plato. Anaximander maintains that, in additionto thefour elements, there is anotherprinciple, the Boundless,that is "corporealand separable[σωματικην και χωριστήν]"from the four elements. However, something that is corporealmust be lightor heavy,hot or cold. That is, Anaximander makes a naturalthing out of the material principle ofthe elements, and therebyis committedto attributingbasic characteristics to it, but to havethese characteristics makes it either an elementitself or composed of the elements. 22)See also MetaphysicsXII.2 1069b21-4.Charles argues that in thispassage, Aristotle "censureshis predecessors precisely because they "materialized" (or reified) matter, the principle,as a specifictype of matter (such as theunbounded, atoms, fire, the cosmic mixture),"

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Underlyingall threecritiques is Aristotle'scommitment to theidea that nothingcan serveas itsown principle,and therefore,to theidea thatnothing can be a naturalthing in virtueof being its own nature.23Aristotle appearsto thinkthat both Plato and Parmenidesfail to recognizethis fact: Parmenides'failure precludes him fromcountenancing nature, while Pla- tos failureleads him to a regressof Formsand of materialprinciples.24 In the followingsection I will show that contemporarycommentators on both sidesof theprime matter debate make analogous mistakes.

III. ContemporaryCharacterizations of Prime Matterand the Advantagesof the SynchronieJustification Traditionally,Aristotle is thoughtto haveposited the existence of prime matteras an indeterminate,ultimate substratum of substances.Over the past fiftyyears, commentators have called the traditionalview into question.25 Althoughearly debates centered on theinterpretation of particularpassages in whichAristotle supposedly refers to primematter, the disputantsnow agreethat the question hangs on Aristotles philosophical requirements.

butthat Aristotle "seeks to avoida 'materialized'way of understandingmatter" (Charles 2004, 167). 23) phyS¿csili} takentogether with Physics IV. 3, showsAristotle to be committed(at least in thePhysics) to the impossibility ofsomething's being its own nature, and thus to be committedto Non-Identity,at least as appliedto theprinciples of nature: something is nota naturalthing in virtueof being its own nature. I add thequalification "at least in thePhys- ics,"since some commentators, beginning with Owen (1965), think Aristotle denies Non- Identityin Metaphysics VII. 24)See Wieland 1975, 136; Charles 2000, 97-103; 2004. Aristotle also thinks this problem is evidentin Plato'sview of soul. Phaedrus 245C suggeststhat soul is notonly the principle oflife in otherthings, but is theprinciple of its own life: the principle of life is thething thatis itselfliving. Plato thereby collapses Aristotle's distinction between the nature/prin- cipleitself and thatwhich has a nature/principle.At De anima1.4 408b1-1 8, Aristotle maintainsthat although the soul is thecause of certain movements such as beingangry, the soulis notitself angry. Rather, the composite, which possesses the soul, is theproper subject ofanger. See Menn2002. 25) Thosewho hold that Aristotle is notcommitted to primematter include King 1956, Charlton1983 and 1992,Jones 1974, Furth 1988, Gill 1989,Scaltsas 1994, and Broadie 2004. Traditionalistproponents of his commitmentinclude Solmsen 1958 and 1960, Lacey1965, Robinson 1974, Dancy 1978, and Williams 1982.

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The currentdebate is centeredon Aristotle'stheory of substantial change becauseit is thispart of his philosophythat seems most to demandprime matter.The traditional,diachronic argument is as follows:

Aristotleargues that every change has something which underlies it(e.g., 190a31-b9). Whatunderlies a change is thematter ofthat change (e.g., 1042b9-l 1). Thishas tra- ditionallybeen taken to meanthat, in everychange, there is somethingwhich is first a partof thewhole which precedes the change, and thena partof thewhole which succeedsit; thus what underlies a change persists through it. When a substancealters inan accidentalfashion the matter of the change is thesubstance itself, for that persists throughthe change. When the change involves the forming of a newsubstance from an old one,then the matter of the change is thatwhich constitutes first the one sub- stancethen the other: thus if I turnan ironstatue into cannonballs the iron is what underliesthis change. Aristotle believes that the elements (air, fire, earth and water) canchange into one another (e.g., 305al4-35). As thereis no identifiablematter more primitivethan the elements (305al4-35) there is a problemabout what underlies such change.The traditionalinterpretation ofAristotle's treatment of thisproblem is that he positsaprime matter, a bare "stuff", lacking all positivedeterminations, which is thematter of theelements and whichmakes elemental change possible. The prime matteris nothingbut a potentialitywhich can exist only as actualizedin somedeter- minatematter - i.e.,in one of theelements - and whichis whatpersists when one contrarietyis replaced by another and the identity of an elementchanges.26

Thus,those whom I will call "traditionalists"argue that Aristotle's analysis ofchange requires something to underlieelemental substantial change and, second,that what underliesthe substantialchange cannot be the element itself,or else substantialchange could not be distinguishedfrom accidental change.Thus, they conclude that Aristotle is committedto theexistence of primematter as thatwhich underlies elemental substantial change. Sarah Broadie persuasivelyargues that Aristotle's theory of substantial changedoes not requirethe existence of primematter, thereby undermin- ing the traditionalist'sbest argumentfor its existence.She maintainsthat - onlyalteration - not substantialchange involvessomething remaining, notingthat De generationeet corruptione1.4 statesthat substantial change is the exchangeof one ύποκείμενονfor another,while alterationis an exchangeof πάθη.27In this passage, she argues,Aristotle distinguishes alterationfrom substantial change without positing prime matter as it is traditionallyunderstood.

26) Robinson 1974, 168. 27) Broadie2004, 138.

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Because it does not relyon Aristotle'stheory of substantialchange, the synchroniejustification of primematter remains unaffected by Broadie's new readingof the passage.Indeed, the synchroniejustification need not takeany stand on whether,or how,prime matter persists through elemental transformations.I presume that the answer to thisquestion is thesame as the answerto the questionof whethermatter underlies generation and corruptionin any case (organicor elemental).So, forall I have argued, Broadie may be correctin arguingthat matterdoes not underliesub- stantialchange. But thisis only one of the advantagesof the synchronie justification. Notice thatthe synchronie justification yields a notionof primematter quite differentfrom the traditionalconception. The synchroniejustifica- tiondoes not commitAristotle to thetraditional view that prime matter is - all thingsin potentiality in otherwords, that it is the materialnature of all things.28For it is perfectlycompatible with the synchronie justification forprime matter to be thematerial of the simple bodies, earth, air, fire, and water,which themselvesserve as the materialnature of uniformparts, whichthemselves serve as thematerial nature of non-uniform parts, which themselvesserve as the materialnature of organisms.Some adherentsto the diachronicjustification are forcedto claim thatprime matter is the matterof all thingsbecause, on theirview, prime matter underlies all substantialchange. However, my view is agnosticon thispoint. Further,because the synchroniejustification demonstrates that nothing thathas a nature(including the elements)can be just matteror just form, and not thatnothing whatsoever can be just matteror just form,it avoids the errorsome traditionalistsmake of castingprime matter as thatwhich "givesbeing" to form,entailing that form cannot exist without matter.29 By limitingthe application of myargument to thingsthat have a nature,I can accommodatethe fact that, for instance, Aristotle considers God to be pureform: for on Aristotle'saccount, God does not havea nature.30

28)Williams 1982, 211. 29)For example, see Robinson 1974, 183, and Dancy 1978, 391. 30) Unmatteredthings whose essence is theirsubstance are not things that have natures. Langpoints to thefollowing passages in supportof theclaim that God is notby nature (Lang1998, 44n32): PhysicsNWA 24lb37-242a46, VIII.5, esp. 256b28-258b8, and VIII.4 254b24-33.If anything,God is a nature- a natureof thewhole {Metaphysics XII. 10 1075all).

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Perhapssurprisingly, my synchronie justification for prime matter turns out to be compatiblenot onlywith the unapologetic traditionalist conceptionof primematter as bareand characterless(often found in theMediev- ais), but also with the anti-traditionalisttheory put forwardby Mary Louise Gill and MontyFurth.31 On thisanti-traditionalist view, the contraries(hot, cold, wet, and dry)themselves serve as thelowest-level matter, and theythereby avoid the mistakeof reifyingthe lowest-levelmatter. Focusingexclusively on diachronicconsiderations, Gill and Furthdetail theirtheory in termsof elementalsubstantial change: on theirview, when watertransforms into air, forexample, cold servesas the matterof the transformation,while wet and dry serveas formand privation(respectively).Nonetheless, I thinktheir theory could be adapted in lightof the synchronieconsiderations I put forward.The proposalwould be thatthe elementsare compositesof a singlehumid component(wet or dry)and a singletemperature component (hot or cold). Neitherof thesecomponents has a natureof itsown, but each simplyserves as a natureof theelement.32 So understood,their view would acknowledgethe factthat the elements must have a compositestructure in order to have a naturewhile not attemptingto reifythe natures of the elements into things that have natures of theirown. The factthat it is now fashionableto denyAristotle's commitment to primematter is, in fact,itself a symptomof thewidespread failure to rec- ognize the importanceof the notionscentral to the synchroniejustification.And it is not only the foesof primematter who failin thisregard. Even thefew traditionalists still around today who maintainthat Aristotle is committedto primematter consider the view to be somethingof an embarrassment;as William Charltonquips, "therewill be no empirically discoverabledifference between a worldwhich contains prime matter" and a worldthat does not.33In an attemptto avertembarrassment, traditional- istshave tried to dressup primematter to makeit look a littlebit more like a naturalsubstance and a littleless bare and natureless."If thereis anyway

31>Furth 1988 and Gill 1989,243-252. 32)This view would still be compatiblewith my reading of De generationeetcorruptione II. 1 in mysection IV above.Although I findGill's reading a bitstrained, she points out that Aristotlesimply states "the hot is notmatter for the cold nor the cold for the hot" but this does notexclude the suggestion that the humid component serves as thematter for the temperaturecomponent. 33)Charlton 1983, 197.

This content downloaded from 134.10.2.4 on Fri, 6 Feb 2015 02:19:12 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 342 M. ScharleI Phronesis 54 (2009) 326-345 to save prime matterfrom the chargeof incoherence,"Daniel Graham states,"it mustbe by showinghow primematter is a something."34So, for example,Sheldon Cohen arguesthat prime matter is not bare,but "essen- tiallyspatially extended and capable of motion and rest,"35and Richard Sorabji arguesthat understandingprime matter as extensionis a philo- sophicallycompelling interpretation of Aristotle.36 However,Aristotle explicitly states, "Those thinkersare in errorwho postulate,beside the bodies we have mentioned[the four elements], a sin- gle matter- and thata corporealand separablematter" {De generationeet corruptioneILI 329a9-ll; trans.Joachim in Barnes 1971). Further,a "bare"prime matter should only be an embarrassmentto thetraditionalist ifAristotle thought prime matter to play the role of somethingthat has a nature.Certainly something that has a naturemust be a "something"with characteristics.But if,given the distinctionbetween having a natureand beinga nature,prime matter is a materialnature, why should it be a "something"with characteristics?That is, why should thatwhich is a material naturealso havea natureof itsown? Although it is truethat some material naturesalso have a natureof theirown in Aristotles philosophy(for instance,earth has a natureand servesas a materialnature of wood), Aris- totledoes not addressthe question of whether a materialnature must have a natureof itsown. He does, however,address the question with respect to formalnature, and theanswer is clearlyno. As we have seen,Aristotle states that form is not natural(that is, it does not have a nature);rather, it is a nature(198a35-198b2). The factthat formalnature has no natureof its own does not undermineits claim to - beinga nature.We mightsay, then, more generally accordingto whatwe mightcall "thelogic of natures"- it is not necessaryto have a naturein orderto be a nature(just as, conversely,it is not necessaryto be a naturein orderto havea nature(recall the exampleof a humanbeing at PhysicsILI 193b5-6)). ForAristotle, formal nature is always"prime" in thesense that it does not have a natureof itsown.

34)Graham 1987, 484f. 35) Cohen1984, 179. Cohen(1996, 62) andSokolowski (1970, 263-88) agree that prime mattermust be extendedand occupyspace, while Byrne argues that prime matter must have"a natureof its own" and suggeststhat prime matter's "essential attributes are exten- sion,mobility, and corporeality" (Byrne 2001, 87). 36) Sorabji1988, 3-43.

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As illustratedby Aristotle's arguments against Plato and Parmenides,the failureto recognizethis "primacy" of principlesleads to trouble.A similar errorstands behind the tendency of commentatorsto denythe primacy of the lowestlevel of matter.Traditionalists have attemptedto make prime matterinto a naturalthing by attributingcertain characteristics to it, and even,in some cases,giving it its own principleof movementand rest.On the otherhand, opponentsof Aristotle'scommitment to prime matter - arguethat the elements themselves whichAristotle takes to havea nature of theirown - are thelowest-level matter on Aristotle'saccount. In giving the lowest-levelmatter (whether, on theirview, prime matter or the elements)a natureof itsown, commentators on bothsides of thedebate err in theexact same way Aristotle suggests Plato and Parmenidesdid: ifone rei- fiesthe lowest-level matter into something that itself has a nature,it cannot be the lowest-levelmatter without being its own nature?1The synchronie justificationsuggests that the lowest-levelmatter is mostproperly consid- eredto be a principle/nature,not somethingthat has a principle/nature.

IV. Conclusion

In puttingforward a new argumentfor Aristotle's commitment to prime matter,I hope to have shown that commentatorson both sides of the debateover prime matter have been wrong to thinkthe solution rests solely on theinterpretation of Aristotle's diachronic analysis of thecyclical trans- formationof the elements. For, even if Aristotle is not dependenton prime matterto tellthe diachronic story of elementaltransformation, he is none- thelesscommitted to it to give a synchronieaccount of the lowest-level naturalthings. If Aristotle's commitment to primematter were to restsolely on thedetails of elementaltransformation, the question of whether or not he is committedto it would perhapsbe of only antiquarianinterest.38

37)See also Charles2000, 87. Thatis, in attemptingto reifythe lowest-level matter into somethingthat itself has a nature,one is opento what we mightcall a "ThirdMatter Argu- ment"(Charles 2004, 162). Notethat the reification I have in mindis reificationinto a naturalsubstance. This qualifi- cationis importantsince Aristotle thinks God is botha substanceand a principle/nature, so he countenancesthe reification ofa formalprinciple (God) intoa substance(albeit not a naturalsubstance). Could he countenancethe reification of primematter, then, into a substancethat is nota naturalsubstance? Perhaps this is thedeeper question. 38)Dancy, a proponentof the diachronic justification ofprime matter, insists that "[t]his is

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However,the synchroniejustification suggests a metaphysical^instead of a physical,justification for prime matter39 and shows thereto be a philo- sophicallyrich a priorimatter at stakein Aristotles commitmentto prime matter- whethersomething that has a natureshould be distinguished fromthe naturein it. As I argued,this issue dividedAristotle from his foremostpredecessors, Plato and Parmenides.The driveon both sides of the contemporarydebate to make the lowest-levelmatter something that - itselfhas a nature- therebymaking the lowest-level matter its own nature betraysthe widespread failure to countenancethis distinction that Aristo- tle takesto have separatedhim fromhis predecessors.40

References

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