A Synchronic Justification for Aristotle's Commitment to Prime Matter Author(S): Margaret Scharle Source: Phronesis, Vol
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
A Synchronic Justification for Aristotle's Commitment to Prime Matter Author(s): Margaret Scharle Source: Phronesis, Vol. 54, No. 4/5 (2009), pp. 326-345 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40387994 . Accessed: 06/02/2015 02:19 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 134.10.2.4 on Fri, 6 Feb 2015 02:19:12 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions '"'-'& ¿ PHRONESIS brii i Phronesis54 (2009) 326-345 hriii.ni/phr«, A SynchronieJustification for Aristotle's Commitmentto PrimeMatter MargaretScharle Reed College,3203 SE WoodstockAve, Portland, OR 97202, USA scharlem@reed. edu Abstract The currentdebate overAristotle's commitment to primematter is centeredon diachronic considerationsfound in his theoryof substantialchange. I argue that an appeal to this theoryis not requiredin orderto establishhis commitmentto the existenceof primemat- - ter.By drawingon PhysicsII. Is conceptionof what it is foran elementto have a nature thatis, to have an innersource of movementand rest- I introducea synchroniejustification forthe existence of primematter. By tradingon the relationshipbetween the thingthat has a sourceof change and the sourceit has, I show thatsomething that has a source in itself cannot be identicalwith itssource, and thata typeof matterthat has no natureof itsown (a kindof primematter) is requiredto block thisidentification at the levelof theelements. Keywords Aristotle,metaphysics, elements, nature, form, matter Therehas been muchdebate as to whetheror notAristotle is committedto "primematter" - an indeterminate,ultimate substratum of substances.The debatehas centeredon thepart of Aristo tie s philosophythat seems most to demandprime matter - his theoryof elementalsubstantial change. In thispaper, I presenta radicallydifferent argument, revealing that an appeal to Aristotle'stheory of substantialchange is not necessaryto estab- lishhis commitment to theexistence of prime matter. In contrastto whatwe mightcall the "diachronicjustification for prime matter",1 I introducea "synchronie"justification drawn from Aristotle s conception of what it is for !) "Diachronie"because it focuseson the roleprime matter must play in Aristotle'saccount of substantialchange. © KoninklijkeBrill NV, Leiden, 2009 DOI: 10.1163/003188609X12486562883138 This content downloaded from 134.10.2.4 on Fri, 6 Feb 2015 02:19:12 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions M. SchadeI Phronesis54 (2009) 326-345 327 an elementto havea nature- thatis, what it is foran elementto have an innerprinciple of movementand rest.As I will show,the view of prime matterthat emergesfrom the synchroniejustification is quite different fromthe traditional view of primematter that arises out of thediachronic justification. In thefirst section, I presentan overviewof thesynchronie justification and its textualbasis. In the nextsection, I demonstratethat the premises used in the synchroniejustification represent core featuresof Aristotle's - metaphysics featuresthat he takes to distinguishhim fromhis most prominentpredecessors, Plato and Parmenides.Finally, in thelast section, I presentan overviewof the currentdebate surroundingprime matter alongwith the advantages of mysynchronie justification and the untradi- tionalconception of primematter it entails.Whereas the diachronic justi- ficationof prime matter rests on detailsof Aristotle's philosophy which are perhapsonly of antiquarianinterest, I hope to show thatthe synchronie justificationrests on weightyphilosophical grounds. I. The Argument Considerthe following synchronie justification for prime matter: 1. Natureis a principleand cause of being moved and of comingto restin that to which it belongs primarily,in virtueof itselfand not accidentally,[ώς οΰσηςτης φύσεωςαρχής τίνος και αιτίαςτου κινεισθαικαι ήρεμειν έν ω υπάρχειπρώτως καθ' αυτό.] {PhysicsILI 192b21-3)2 2. Somethingcannot be in itselfprimarily, [δτι μενουν αδύνατονέν έαυτωτι είναιπρώτως, δήλον.] {PhysicsIV.3 210b23) 3. There must be a differencebetween that which has a natureand the natureit has. (1,2) 4. If thatwhich has a naturewere simplyform, or if thatwhich has a naturewere simply matter, there could be no differencebetween thatwhich has a natureand the natureit has. 5. Therefore,that which has a naturecannot be simplyform or simply matter.(3, 4) 2) Translationsare my own unless otherwise noted. This content downloaded from 134.10.2.4 on Fri, 6 Feb 2015 02:19:12 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 328 M. SchadeI Phronesis54 (2009) 326-345 6. If that which has a natureis neithersimply matter nor simply form,then it is a compositeof matterand form. 7. That whichhas a natureis a compositeof matterand form.(5, 6) 8. Each of the elementshas a nature.{Physics II. 1 192b8-15) 9. An elementis a compositeof matterand form.(7, 8) 10. An elementis the lowest-level(that is, simplest)thing that has a nature. 1 1. The matterof an elementis prime (in the sense that it has no natureof its own). (9, 10) Let us considerthe premises of the argument presented above. Premise one is thedefinition from Physics ILI: "natureis a principleand cause of being movedand ofcoming to restin thatto whichit belongsprimarily, in virtue of itselfand not accidentally"{Physics ILI 192b21-3). Since theword "in" willplay the central role in thesynchronie justification for prime matter, it is worthemphasizing that it is the internalityof theirsource of movement and restthat distinguishesnatural from artificial things: although both artificialand naturalthings have principles of movementand rest,for nat- uralthings, the principle is internal,while for artificial things, the principle is external: Of thethings that are, some are by nature, others due to othercauses: by nature are animalsand theirparts, plants and thesimple bodies, for example earth, fire, air and water(for we saythese things and suchthings are by nature). And it is clearthat all thesediffer from the things which have not been put together by nature. For each of thesehas in itselfa principleof movement and rest.On theother hand, a bed and a coatand anythingelse of that sort, qua receivingthese designations - i.e. in so faras theyare products of art - haveno innateimpulse to change.{Physics II. 1 192b8-19; trans.Hardie and Gaye in Barnes1971, modified) - The second premisein the synchroniejustification for prime matter the - premisethat somethingcannot be in itselfprimarily carriesmuch of the weightof the argument.Aristotle's proof for premise two appearsin the contextof his reconstructionof Zeno s puzzle in PhysicsIV.3: ifevery- thingthat is is in place,and place itselfis, thenplace itselfrequires a place, and thatplace requiresa place,and so on (209a25-6). Aristotleultimately haltsthe regressby denyingthat everything that is is in place. However, Aristotlefirst affirms one crucialpremise in Zeno's regress- theclaim that it is impossiblefor something to be in itselfprimarily: This content downloaded from 134.10.2.4 on Fri, 6 Feb 2015 02:19:12 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions M. SchadeI Phronesis54 (2009) 326-345 329 Thusif we lookat thematter inductively we do notfind anything to be in itself(έν έαυτω)in anyof the senses that have been distinguished; and itcan be seenby argu- mentthat it is impossible.For each of two things will have to be both,e.g. the jar will haveto be bothvessel and wine, and thewine both wine and jar, if it is possiblefor a thingto be in itself;so that,however true it might be thatthey were in eachother, the jarwill receive the wine in virtuenot of itsbeing wine but of the wine's being wine, andthe wine will be in thejar in virtue not oí itsbeing a jarbut of the jar's being a jar. Nowthat they are different in respect of what they are [το είναι] is evident;for that in whichsomething is and that which is in itwould be differentlydefined [ό λόγος].Nor is it possiblefor a thingto be in itselfeven accidentally [κατά συμβεβηκος]; for two thingswould be at thesame time in thesame thing. The jar would be in itself-if a thingwhose nature it is to receivecan be in itself;and thatwhich it receives,namely (ifwine) wine, will be in it.Obviously, then, a thingcannot be in itselfprimarily, [οτι μενουν αδύνατον έν έαυτω τι είναιπρώτως, δήλον.] {Physics IV.3 210b8-23;trans. Hardieand Gaye in Barnes1971) HereAristotle agrees with Zeno thatsomething cannot be in itselfprimar- ilysince there must always be a differencebetween the containerand the contained.Something cannot even be in itselfprimarily accidentally because thentwo thingswould occupythe same place, which is impossible. It is importantto note thatalthough Aristotle uses the place sense of "in" to illustratehis argument,he explicitlyclaims a much widerconclu- sion thatwould coverthe senseof "in" used in the definitionof natureas an internalprinciple of movementand rest.In PhysicsIV.3, Aristotledis- tinguishesthe eightdifferent senses of "in,"3and states,"we do not see anythingin itself[έν έαυτω] in anyof thosedistinctions