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The Epistemological Skyhook

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The Epistemological Skyhook The Epistemological Skyhook Throughout philosophical history, there has been a recurring argument to the effect that determinism, naturalism, or both are self-referentially incoherent. By accepting determinism or naturalism, one allegedly acquires a reason to reject determinism or naturalism. The Epistemological Skyhook brings together, for the first time, the principal expressions of this argument, focusing primarily on the last 150 years. This book addresses the versions of this argument as presented by Arthur Lovejoy, A. E. Taylor, Kurt Gödel, C. S. Lewis, Norman Malcolm, Karl Popper, J. R. Lucas, William Hasker, Thomas Nagel, Alvin Plantinga, and others, along with the objections presented by their many detractors. It concludes by presenting a new version of the argument that synthesizes the best aspects of the others while also rendering the argument immune to some of the most significant objections made to it. Jim Slagle is Adjunct Assistant Professor at the University of Portland and George Fox University in Oregon. He has published articles in several jour- nals, including Philosophia and Logique et Analyse. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy For a full list of titles in this series, please visit www.routledge.com 73 On the Genealogy of Color A Case Study in Historicized Conceptual Analysis Zed Adams 74 Reification and the Aesthetics of Music Jonathan Lewis 75 Intellectual Virtues and Education Essays in Applied Virtue Epistemology Edited by Jason Baehr 76 Embodied Emotions A Naturalist Approach to a Normative Phenomenon Rebekka Hufendiek 77 Normativity and Naturalism in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences Edited by Mark Risjord 78 The Concept of Violence Mark Vorobej 79 A Social Theory of Freedom Mariam Thalos 80 The Cognitive Basis of Aesthetics Cassirer, Crowther, and the Future Elena Fell and Ioanna Kopsiafti 81 Interactive Justice A Proceduralist Approach to Value Conflict in Politics Emanuela Ceva 82 The Epistemological Skyhook Determinism, Naturalism, and Self-Defeat Jim Slagle The Epistemological Skyhook Determinism, Naturalism, and Self-Defeat Jim Slagle First published 2016 by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2016 Taylor & Francis The right of Jim Slagle to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Slagle, Jim, author. Title: The epistemological skyhook : determinism, naturalism, and self-defeat / by Jim Slagle. Description: 1 [edition]. | New York : Routledge, 2016. | Series: Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy ; 82 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016003267 | ISBN 9781138651425 (alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Determinism (Philosophy) | Naturalism. Classification: LCC B105.D47 S53 2016 | DDC 146—dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016003267 ISBN: 978-1-138-65142-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-62480-8 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC For Krista Jean Slagle my own personal theistic argument This page intentionally left blank Contents Preface ix 1 Introduction to the Skyhook 1 2 Defining Terms 23 3 Paradox Lost 46 4 Eliminationist Rhetoric (or, Truth Takes the Hindmost) 63 5 Mental Problems 78 6 Knowledge and Normativity 95 7 Language Games 110 8 Popper Function 124 9 Being Thomas Nagel 136 10 Epistemology Supernaturalized 149 11 Leftovers 164 12 Object Lessons 186 13 An a Priori Teleological Argument 205 Conclusions 225 Bibliography 237 Index 251 This page intentionally left blank Preface This book addresses an argument purporting to show that determinism, naturalism, or both are self-defeating. It is one of the arguments that got me interested in philosophy in the first place, as it has radical repercussions that reverberate throughout the field: from epistemology and philosophy of mind to logic, metaphysics, philosophy of science, philosophy of religion, and beyond. Indeed, in many ways, my philosophical pilgrimage has been my attempt to refute this argument. I have failed. Here I make the case that the argument, at least in some of its guises, is successful. The present work began life as part of my doctoral dissertation, and whereas a few chapters are relatively unchanged, there is a significant amount of new material, as well as extensions, alterations, and abridgements. It addresses the argument as presented by Epicurus, Immanuel Kant, Arthur Lovejoy, A. E. Taylor, Kurt Gödel, C. S. Lewis, Karl Popper, J. R. Lucas, Norman Mal- colm, William Hasker, Thomas Nagel, Alvin Plantinga, and others, as well as its many detractors. The value of the present work is threefold: first, it demonstrates that this argument has a unified history, one that has not hitherto been expounded. Second, it points the way forward to further avenues of research by a) sum- marizing the main versions of the argument and the objections they have received, and b) providing a substantial bibliography. Third, it presents a new version of the argument that attempts to synthesize the best features of the others, while also suggesting its relevance for and repercussions in several philosophical areas. Chapter 1 presents the argument and gives an initial statement of it, before going over two historical versions of it from Epicurus and Kant. Chapter 2 defines the terms I will be using, which also make up the book’s subtitle: determinism, naturalism, and self-defeat. Chapter 3 addresses whether the self-reference employed by the argument is even possible, concluding by presenting J. R. Lucas’s Gödelian argument against physical determinism (also known as the Lucas-Penrose argument). Chapters 4 and 5 apply the argument to the particular targets of eliminative materialism and physical determinism (or mechanism) respectively, the latter chapter focusing on Norman Malcolm’s version of the argument, and the responses made to it x Preface by Alvin Goldman, Jaegwon Kim, and William Hasker. Chapter 6 addresses epistemic norms and the problem they present for determinism, building up to a normativity-based argument. Chapters 7 through 10 go over the argu- ment as it has been defended by C. S. Lewis, Karl Popper, Thomas Nagel, and Alvin Plantinga, as well as the responses they have received (notably G.E.M. Anscombe in Lewis’s case). Chapters 11 and 12 focus on other authors that have gone unmentioned, and several broad objections that have been raised against the argument. Chapter 13 concludes by presenting my own version of the argument, which integrates the best features of the others, while neu- tralizing many of the objections. The bibliography includes all of the academic references I have been able to find on the argument, excluding a few particular traditions that have developed their own literatures so that including them would extend the bib- liography beyond reason. I am certain, however, that I have missed plenty of references and even entire traditions, including influential and well-known ones, as the argument is ubiquitous. If the reader knows of any academic references I have unwittingly excluded, she is invited to contact me so I can continue compiling as exhaustive a bibliography on the argument as possible. Also, I limit myself in the present volume to references in English, and I am equally certain that there are plenty of academic references on the argument in other languages. The number of people who have helped in writing this book is too large to list, so I will limit myself to a few. First, I thank God for sustaining and guiding me throughout this process. Second—and given the eminence of the first, it is amazing how close a sec- ond she is—I thank my wife, Krista. She has been my champion and biggest fan, and has supported me in every possible way during this entire process. Without her I don’t think I would even be alive, much less writing philoso- phy. I can never thank her enough. This, and everything else I write, is for her. Third, I thank my wonderful son Joah and my beautiful daughter Kira, two of the greatest people I have ever known. “Children complicate life, but so sweetly that they should serve to give the worker fresh courage rather than to lessen his resources. [T]hey give you a love-lit reflection of nature and of man and thus defend you against the abstract; they bring you back to the real, about which their questioning eyes are waiting for an exact com- mentary from you.” (Sertillanges 1998, 45) Fourth, I thank teachers and professors who have helped me in my phil- osophical studies, including, but not limited to Gerry Breshears, Arnold Burms, Paul Cortois (my promoter for the dissertation on which the present work is based), William Desmond, Russell Friedman, and Jerome Wernow. Fifth, I thank those who proofread rough drafts of this book. Those who read it in dissertation form include Matko Gjurašin, James Hannam, and Jacob Longshore. Those who read it in monograph form include Paul Her- rick and Terry Mazurak. If there are any glaring problems that remain, the fault is obviously my own (nonglaring problems are another matter). Preface xi Sixth, I thank those who gave me emotional and spiritual support through- out the writing process. To list them all would nearly constitute its own book, so I will just briefly mention Aunt Suni, DDR and the Robinson clan, John Johnson, Tom Grey, and move along.
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