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Microphysicalism and Rationality: the Hasker/Reppert Argument from Reason

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Microphysicalism and Rationality: the Hasker/Reppert Argument from Reason University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2020-08-17 Microphysicalism and Rationality: The Hasker/Reppert Argument from Reason Van Dyk, Matthew Van Dyk, M. (2020). Microphysicalism and Rationality: The Hasker/Reppert Argument from Reason (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. http://hdl.handle.net/1880/112426 master thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY Microphysicalism and Rationality: The Hasker/Reppert Argument from Reason by Matthew Van Dyk A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS GRADUATE PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY CALGARY, ALBERTA AUGUST, 2020 © Matthew Van Dyk 2020 ii Abstract The Argument from Reason is a name given to what is actually a family of arguments. The common thread is arguing that some philosophical position (usually Naturalism or Physicalism) is incompatible with the (supposed) reality of rational inference. In this thesis I analyze versions of the argument from reason presented by William Hasker and Victor Reppert, ultimately concluding that while their arguments are at best incomplete there is a plausibly sound version of the argument which I go on to defend. After laying some groundwork, I define physicalism and microphysicalism and present the latter as the most plausible target of my version of the argument. I then distill two distinct versions of the argument from reason as found in the works of Hasker and Reppert. The first I call the ontological argument from reason which argues that various features or necessary conditions of an event's being a case of rational inference (intentionality, mental causation, truth, unity of consciousness, or the reliability of our rational faculties) are incompatible with microphysicalism. I conclude that their arguments in each case either add nothing to the ongoing debate on each issue, are wholly misguided (particularly in their understanding of the supervenience relation), or at best incomplete with no clear road forward to resolution. I then consider what I call the epistemological argument from reason by Hasker and argue with him that in order for rational inference to justify our beliefs it must be the case that logical relationships between propositions are able to play a causal role in the forming of the inference. I argue that microphysicalism's ontological commitments preclude logical relationships from playing such a role and as such they preclude justification via rational inference. I then consider possible objections and replies, chief of which is the intelligibility of logical relationships playing any causal role. In response I argue that the causation involved is not mechanistic/efficient and then offer as an alternative a brief sketch of a non-reducible conscious linguistically capable agent. I contend that such an agent would be capable of grasping logical relationships in order to make them suitably causally efficacious. iii Acknowledgements There are many people to thank when it comes to the completion of a work like this that took years – probably too many years – to complete. At the very top of the list is my wife, Jacquie Van Dyk, who sacrificed so much to allow me to get to this point, and whose strength and support really carried this project to completion. I wouldn't have blamed her if she asked me to give up years into this but she only encouraged me to continue on even though it meant so much sacrifice for her. Her love and support meant and mean everything to me, and this accomplishment belongs to her as much as it does to me. Thanks as well to my kids, Malakai, Asher, Elijah, and Adelyn, who also gave up so much of their "daddy-time" while I worked on this thesis, even if they didn't have much say in the matter. Their constant stream of encouragement, homemade cards, and sneaking in on daddy's "thesis-time" for a quick snuggle were essential fuel to keep the motivation going. There's also a long list of family and friends who offered their own support and encouragement throughout, and I'll make special mention of Allan and Aneta Van Dyk (mom and dad), Bill and Teresa Selles (the in-laws), and Mitchell Van Dyk, a friend of immeasurable worth who never let me give up and who was always willing to listen about the thesis even if he didn't know what on earth I was talking about. Right behind my wife on the list of most deserving of my gratitude is Noa Latham, who had to have the patience of a saint to guide this project to completion. The many hours you spent offering insightful critiques, feedback, and guidance were so appreciated, and your willingness to work with me over a span of far too many years is a gift of incredible value and was essential for getting this thing over the finish line. I thoroughly enjoyed our conversations and interactions, and you will forever have my gratitude. A thanks as well to the examination committee members and host, Nicole, John, and Ann, who gave of their valuable time to read my thesis and offer an engaging and challenging discussion in the examination in an enjoyable and non-too "interrogation" style – regardless of the lighting situation. And a thank you as well to everyone at the University of Calgary philosophy department – professor and student – who made my time there a wonderful experience. In particular I want to thank Denise Retzlaff who provided essential administrative guidance, and whose wonderfully generous spirit genuinely brightened up the department, and Jen Smith who had to deal with the uniqueness of my case and did it with great kindness, patience, and was always very happy and capable to provide help. Finally, to everyone who has shepherded my intellectual journey another big thanks. There are too many to name but I'll mention three (one of whom I've never actually met in person): Paul Viminitz, Bryson Brown, and William Lane Craig. Each of you have left an indelible mark on my life. iv Contents Abstract ....................................................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. iii Chapter 1 ..................................................................................................................................................... 1 The Argument from Reason .................................................................................................................... 1 1. A Brief Overview............................................................................................................................ 1 2. Microphysicalism .............................................................................................................................. 2 3. Explanation ........................................................................................................................................ 7 4. Inferential Rationality ................................................................................................................... 12 5. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 18 Chapter 2: ................................................................................................................................................. 19 The Ontological Argument from Reason ............................................................................................ 19 1. Inferential Rationality and Explanation ..................................................................................... 19 2. The Ontological Argument From Reason ................................................................................... 25 2.1: The Hasker/Reppert Ontological Argument from Reason .............................................. 25 2.2: The Hasker Ontological Argument from Reason............................................................... 32 2.3: The Reppert Ontological Arguments from Reason ........................................................... 38 3. Conclusion: ....................................................................................................................................... 41 Chapter 3: ................................................................................................................................................. 42 The Epistemological Argument from Reason .................................................................................... 42 1. The Conditions Reconsidered: ..................................................................................................... 42 2. The Epistemological AfR ................................................................................................................ 48 3. Causal Drainage? ............................................................................................................................. 60 4. Ontological vs Epistemelogical
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