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Técnicas Para La Captación De Nuevos Clientes En La Banca Española: Estudio Comparativo De Costes Y Rentabilidad
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Repositorio Universidad de Zaragoza Técnicas para la captación de nuevos clientes en la Banca Española: Estudio comparativo de costes y rentabilidad. Techniques for attracting new clients in the Spanish Bannking: Comparative study of costs and profitability Autor/ Winter: Ana Valera Bautista. Director/ Director: Aurora Sevillano Rubio. Facultad de Economía y Empresa. 2019 Resumen ejecutivo: El proyecto a desarrollar tiene como objetivo la comprensión del proceso de restructuración de la banca llevado a cabo en los últimos años. Para ello se analizará el problema de rentabilidad que tiene la banca actualmente. Para el estudio, se han analizado aquellas entidades que actualmente poseen el 70% de mercado según el Banco de España. Estudiando de esta forma el ROA, ROE, ROTE y CET1 de cada una de ellas, siendo BBVA y Santander las entidades que más han destacado en el último ejercicio (2018), superando el coste de capital. La rentabilidad que obtienen las entidades con los productos renting y leasing ha sido estudiada de forma comparativa. Estudiando aquellos productos que ofertan de forma similar unas y otras entidades y las condiciones establecidas por cada una de ellas. Se ha estudiado el coste que le supone al cliente optar por esta forma de financiación a plazos y cuotas, y el coste que le supondría si optara por otras vías de financiación. Ya que muchos de los productos ofrecidos le suponen al cliente un coste de más del 100% del valor del bien. Así mismo, se analizará el método de obtener rentabilidad y captar clientes mediante las nominas bancarias, de estas se ha estudiado las condiciones ofertadas y han sido comparadas de manera que aquellas entidades que ofertan regalos en efectivo, materiales o rentabilidades, implican que el cliente se comprometa a unas condiciones conocidas y no conocidas en la firma del contrato. -
18 February 2019 Solvency and Diversification in Insurance Remain Key Strengths Despite Change in Structure
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ISSUER IN-DEPTH Lloyds Banking Group plc 18 February 2019 Solvency and diversification in insurance remain key strengths despite change in structure Summary RATINGS In 2018, Lloyds Banking Group plc (LBG) altered its structure to comply with the UK's ring- Lloyds Banking Group plc Baseline Credit a3 fencing legislation, which requires large banks to separate their retail and SME operations, Assessment (BCA) and deposit taking in the European Economic Area (EEA) from their other activities, including Senior unsecured A3 Stable the riskier capital markets and trading business. As part of the change, LBG designated Lloyds Bank plc as the“ring-fenced” entity housing its retail, SME and corporate banking operations. Lloyds Bank plc It also assumed direct ownership of insurer Scottish Widows Limited, previously a subsidiary Baseline Credit A3 Assessment (BCA) of Lloyds Bank. The changes had little impact on the creditworthiness of LBG and Lloyds Adjusted BCA A3 Bank, leading us to affirm the deposit and senior unsecured ratings of both entities. Scottish Deposits Aa3 Stable/Prime-1 Widows' ratings were unaffected. Senior unsecured Aa3 Stable » LBG's reorganisation was less complex than that of most UK peers. The Lloyds Lloyds Bank Corporate Markets plc Banking Group is predominantly focused on retail and corporate banking, and the Baseline Credit baa3 required structural changes were therefore relatively minor. The group created a small Assessment (BCA) separate legal entity, Lloyds Bank Corporate Markets plc (LBCM), to manage its limited Adjusted BCA baa1 Deposits A1 Stable/Prime-1 capital markets and trading operations, and it transferred its offshore subsidiary, Lloyds Issuer rating A1 Stable Bank International Limited (LBIL), to LBCM from Lloyds Bank. -
What Makes a Good ʽbad Bankʼ? the Irish, Spanish and German Experience
6 ISSN 2443-8022 (online) What Makes a Good ‘Bad Bank’? The Irish, Spanish and German Experience Stephanie Medina Cas, Irena Peresa DISCUSSION PAPER 036 | SEPTEMBER 2016 EUROPEAN ECONOMY Economic and EUROPEAN Financial Affairs ECONOMY European Economy Discussion Papers are written by the staff of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, or by experts working in association with them, to inform discussion on economic policy and to stimulate debate. The views expressed in this document are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official views of the European Commission, the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. Authorised for publication by Carlos Martinez Mongay, Director for Economies of the Member States II. LEGAL NOTICE Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this publication, or for any errors which, despite careful preparation and checking, may appear. This paper exists in English only and can be downloaded from http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/. Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union. Freephone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you). More information on the European Union is available on http://europa.eu. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016 KC-BD-16-036-EN-N (online) KC-BD-16-036-EN-C (print) ISBN 978-92-79-54444-6 (online) ISBN 978-92-79-54445-3 (print) doi:10.2765/848761 (online) doi:10.2765/850297 (print) © European Union, 2016 Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. -
Informe Bancario Anual
Anexo 5 - Informe bancario anual En cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en el artículo 87 de la Ley 10/2014, de 26 de junio, de ordenación, supervisión y solvencia de entidades de crédito, a partir del 1 de julio de 2014 las entidades de crédito tendrán la obligación de publicar por primera vez, especificando por países donde estén establecidas, determinada información en base consolidada correspondiente al último ejercicio cerrado: En virtud de lo expuesto, se detalla a continuación la información requerida: a) Denominación, naturaleza y ubicación geográfica de la actividad CaixaBank, SA, con NIF A08663619 y domicilio social en Barcelona, Avenida Diagonal, 621, es la entidad surgida del proceso de transformación de Criteria CaixaCorp, SA que culminó con la inscripción de CaixaBank en el Registro de Bancos y Banqueros del Banco de España el día 30 de junio de 2011, y el inicio de su cotización en bolsa, ya como entidad de crédito, desde el día siguiente, 1 de julio de 2011. Asimismo, CaixaBank es el banco a través del cual la Caja de Ahorros y Pensiones de Barcelona ”la Caixa” ejercía su actividad como entidad de crédito de forma indirecta de acuerdo con sus estatutos. En el marco de la entrada en vigor de la Ley 26/2013, de 27 de diciembre de cajas de ahorros y fundaciones bancarias, la Asamblea General Ordinaria de ”la Caixa” aprobó en su reunión celebrada el 22 de mayo de 2014 llevar a cabo la transformación de ”la Caixa” en Fundación Bancaria (en adelante, la Fundación Bancaria ”la Caixa”), que se hizo efectiva el 16 de junio mediante la inscripción en el Registro de Fundaciones. -
Evolución De Los Principales Grupos Bancarios Españoles (2009-2021)
Evolución de los principales grupos bancarios españoles (2009-2021) Intervenida por BE (sustitución de administadores) Capital controlado por el FROB Integración SIP Constitución del banco 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Integration processes I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D Santander Santander Banco Popular Banco Popular Banco Pastor BBVA Caixa Sabadell BBVA Caixa Terrasa Unnim Unnim Banc Caixa Manlleu BBVA Caixa Catalunya Caixa Tarragona Catalunya Caixa Catalunya Banc CX Caixa Manresa La Caixa Caixa Girona La Caixa Caixabank Caja Sol Caja Guadalajara Caja Sol Caixabank Caja Navarra Banca Cívica Caja Burgos Banca Cívica Caixabank Caja Canarias Banco de Valencia Banco de Valencia Caja Madrid Bancaja Caixabank Caja de Ávila Caja Segovia BFA-Bankia Caja La Rioja Caixa Laietana Caja Insular de Canarias Bankia Caja Murcia Caixa Penedés Caja Granada Mare Nostrum Banco Mare Nostrum BMN Sa Nostra Banco Sabadell Banco Guipuzcoano Banco Sabadell Banco Sabadell Caja de Ahorros del Mediterráneo CAM Banco CAM Banco Sabadell Banco Gallego (Grupo NCG) Banco Gallego Bankinter Bankinter Unicaja Caja Jaén Unicaja Unicaja Banco Caja Duero Unicaja Banco Caja España Caja España de Inversiones Banco CEISS Cajastur Unicaja CCM CCM Cajastur Banco Caja Cantabria Liberbank Liberbank Caja Extremadura Caja de Ahorros Inmaculada CAI Caja Círculo Católico de Burgos Caja 3 Banco Grupo Caja 3 Caja Badajoz Ibercaja Banco Ibercaja Ibercaja Banco Kutxa Caja Vital BBK BBK Kutxabank Kutxabank CajaSur CajaSur Banco Etcheverría Caixa Galicia Abanca Caixa Nova Novacaixagalicia NCGBanco Evo Banco C.R. -
Banco Santander: Extending Financial Se Vices to Low-Income Communities in B Azil
CASE STUDY Banco Santander: Extending financial se vices to low-income communities in B azil Initi ti e Descriptio In September 2013, Santander Microcrédito joined the Business Call to Action with a commitment to serve 124,799 low-income consumers with microfinance services and to disburse up to US$490 million in microcredit loans by 2015. The goals of Santander Microcrédito are to: • Disburse R$540 million (US$230 million) in microcredit operations by the end of 2014; and R$600 million (US$260 million) in 2015; and • Attain 126,000 active microcredit clients by the end of 2014 and 131,000 additional clients Business Model Santander Microcredit is an example of how Banco in 2015. In Brazil, 52 million people and Santander Brasil contributes to approximately 25 million informal reducing social inequalities in entrepreneurs lack access to the for- the country. When we started mal banking system. Santander Brasil thinking about how to launch Microcredit, a company affiliated with the microcredit programme, we Banco Santander Brasil, was founded decided that it should be a in 2002 to offer microcredit operations model in which all involved to support business entrepreneurs parties could benefit. that could not access formal banking services. To this end, Santander Brasil Microcredit offers loans that con- tribute to employment and income generation for low-income people. Currently, Santander Microcredit The average monthly income in Brazil operates in more than 600 municipali- is US$6801 and 21 percent of the pop- ties (in 10 Brazilian states), and has 25 ulation live below the poverty line2. branch offices. -
Retirement Strategy Fund 2060 Description Plan 3S DCP & JRA
Retirement Strategy Fund 2060 June 30, 2020 Note: Numbers may not always add up due to rounding. % Invested For Each Plan Description Plan 3s DCP & JRA ACTIVIA PROPERTIES INC REIT 0.0137% 0.0137% AEON REIT INVESTMENT CORP REIT 0.0195% 0.0195% ALEXANDER + BALDWIN INC REIT 0.0118% 0.0118% ALEXANDRIA REAL ESTATE EQUIT REIT USD.01 0.0585% 0.0585% ALLIANCEBERNSTEIN GOVT STIF SSC FUND 64BA AGIS 587 0.0329% 0.0329% ALLIED PROPERTIES REAL ESTAT REIT 0.0219% 0.0219% AMERICAN CAMPUS COMMUNITIES REIT USD.01 0.0277% 0.0277% AMERICAN HOMES 4 RENT A REIT USD.01 0.0396% 0.0396% AMERICOLD REALTY TRUST REIT USD.01 0.0427% 0.0427% ARMADA HOFFLER PROPERTIES IN REIT USD.01 0.0124% 0.0124% AROUNDTOWN SA COMMON STOCK EUR.01 0.0248% 0.0248% ASSURA PLC REIT GBP.1 0.0319% 0.0319% AUSTRALIAN DOLLAR 0.0061% 0.0061% AZRIELI GROUP LTD COMMON STOCK ILS.1 0.0101% 0.0101% BLUEROCK RESIDENTIAL GROWTH REIT USD.01 0.0102% 0.0102% BOSTON PROPERTIES INC REIT USD.01 0.0580% 0.0580% BRAZILIAN REAL 0.0000% 0.0000% BRIXMOR PROPERTY GROUP INC REIT USD.01 0.0418% 0.0418% CA IMMOBILIEN ANLAGEN AG COMMON STOCK 0.0191% 0.0191% CAMDEN PROPERTY TRUST REIT USD.01 0.0394% 0.0394% CANADIAN DOLLAR 0.0005% 0.0005% CAPITALAND COMMERCIAL TRUST REIT 0.0228% 0.0228% CIFI HOLDINGS GROUP CO LTD COMMON STOCK HKD.1 0.0105% 0.0105% CITY DEVELOPMENTS LTD COMMON STOCK 0.0129% 0.0129% CK ASSET HOLDINGS LTD COMMON STOCK HKD1.0 0.0378% 0.0378% COMFORIA RESIDENTIAL REIT IN REIT 0.0328% 0.0328% COUSINS PROPERTIES INC REIT USD1.0 0.0403% 0.0403% CUBESMART REIT USD.01 0.0359% 0.0359% DAIWA OFFICE INVESTMENT -
UBS Investment Research European Banks
ab Global Equity Research Europe Including UK UBS Investment Research European Banks Banks Market Comment Euroviews – that vertiginous feeling The rally increases the probability of equity issuance… Financials have rallied strongly, reflecting recognition that policymakers will do 30 April 2009 what it takes to reflate the global economy and that nationalisation is a very last www.ubs.com/investmentresearch resort. However, this does not mean that dilution risk from equity issuance is no longer a concern, and we believe a number of European banks need new equity – John-Paul Crutchley either for loss absorption capacity or to support market risk within their businesses. Analyst [email protected] …but timing is back in the banks’ control +44-20-7568 5037 Governments (ex UK) have avoided dilutive recapitalisation of banks through the Alastair Ryan creation of “buffer” core Tier 1 – an instrument that satisfies regulators and more Analyst senior creditors – but this capital does not ultimately bear losses. “Buffer” capital is [email protected] useful where a bank is suffering from cyclical capital stress and may buy time – +44 20 7568 3238 giving a bank the opportunity to raise equity on more advantageous terms as the Daniele Brupbacher cycle improves. The alternative is a “zombie” work-out with operating profits Analyst utilised in absorbing losses and rebuilding capital for years to come. [email protected] +41-44-239 1493 Buying recapitalised banks… Nick Davey Through choice, we are taking money off the table following the market rally. Our Analyst preference is for banks with strong business models whose capital strength is close [email protected] to undoubted, such as HSBC, Lloyds and Intesa. -
La Reestructuracion De La Banca En Galicia
LA REESTRUCTURACION DE LA BANCA EN GALICIA FACULTAD DE ECONOMÍA Y EMPRESA MASTER EN BANCA Y FINANZAS AUTORA: DÑA. MARIA ECHAGÜE PÉREZ-MONTERO TUTOR: DR. PABLO CASTELLANOS GARCIA CURSO 2013/2014 1 INDICE Resumen ……………………………………………………………..…4 1. Introducción general ………………………………………………...…5 2. Reestructuración sistema financiero………………………………….7 2.1. El FROB …………………………………………………………..8 2.2. Memorándum de entendimiento ……………………………….9 2.2.1. Prueba de Oliver Wyman ……………………………………9 2.2.2. LA SAREB ……………………………………………..……..12 2.3. Acuerdos de Basilea……………………………………………...18 3. La banca en Galicia (2009-2013) ……………………………………...20 3.1. PARTE I: DESCRIPCION DE LOS HECHOS …………………21 3.1.1. NovaGalicia Banco ………………………………………….. 21 3.1.1.1. Introducción ……………………………………………21 3.1.1.2. Fusión de Caixanova y Caixagalicia ………………..22 3.1.1.3. Intervención y creación de NCG Banco …………….24 3.1.1.4. Evo Banco ……………………………………………..25 3.1.1.5. Adquisición en subasta por el banco Etcheverría (grupo Banesco) …………………………………………………………..27 3.1.2. Banco Pastor ………………………………………………… 28 3.1.2.1. Introducción …………………………………………... 28 3.1.2.2. Fusión Banco Popular ………………………………..29 3.1.3. Banco Gallego ………………………………………………...30 3.1.3.1. Introducción…………………………………………….31 3.1.3.2. Intervención …………………………………………....31 2 3.1.3.3. Adquisición en subasta por el Banco Sabadell ……32 3.1.4- Banco Etcheverría ……………………………………………. 34 3.1.4.1. Introducción ………………………………………… 34 3.1.4.2. Compra de Banesco ………………………………. 35 3.2. PARTE II: ANALISIS DE LOS HECHOS ……………………….. 36 3.2.1. NovaGalicia Banco ……………………………………36 3.2.2. Banco Pastor …………………………………………..41 3.2.3. Banco Gallego …………………………………………44 3.2.4. Banco Etcheverría …………………………………….47 3.2.5. Comparativa de las cuatro entidades ………….…….50 3.3. -
Outlooks on Five Spanish Financial Groups and Three European Bank Branches Revised Following Outlook Revision on Spain
Outlooks On Five Spanish Financial Groups And Three European Bank Branches Revised Following Outlook Revision On Spain Primary Credit Analyst: Elena Iparraguirre, Madrid (34) 91-389-6963; [email protected] Secondary Contacts: Luigi Motti, Madrid (34) 91-788-7234; [email protected] Carlos Cobo, Madrid +34 91 788 72 32; [email protected] Fabio Mostacci, Madrid +34 91 788 72 09; [email protected] Alexander Ekbom, Stockholm (46) 8-440-5911; [email protected] Nigel Greenwood, London (44) 20-7176-7211; [email protected] Thierry Grunspan, Paris (33) 1-4420-6739; [email protected] E.Robert Hansen, CFA, New York (1) 212-438-7402; [email protected] • On Nov. 29, 2013, Standard & Poor's revised the outlook on the long-term sovereign credit rating on Spain to stable from negative. • Spanish banks continue to rebalance their funding profiles. They are reducing their reliance on funding from the ECB and foreign sources, increasing the weight of more stable domestic retail funding in the mix, and sharply reducing the cost of domestic deposits. We expect this trend to continue, particularly in the context of stabilizing sovereign creditworthiness. • We now see a stable trend for industry risk in Spain. We continue to view the trend for economic risk as stable. • We are revising to stable from negative the outlooks on four Spanish banking groups and three branches of European banks, and to positive from stable the outlook on one institution. We are maintaining negative outlooks on six other Spanish banking groups. • In three cases, the stable outlooks reflect the diminishing likelihood of a rating downgrade as risks in the operating environment in Spain are abating. -
2018 EU-Wide Transparency Exercise
2018 EU-wide transparency exercise European Banking Authority (EBA) © Management Solutions 2019. All reserved All rights Solutions 2019. Management© www.managementsolutions.com Research and Development © Management Solutions 2019. Todos los derechos reservadosFebruary Página 2019 1 Index Introduction Aggregated results Results per country Outlook and recommendations Annex © Management Solutions 2019. All rights reserved Page 2 Introduction Context and objective In December 2018 the EBA published the results of the 2018 EU-wide transparency exercise, which provide detailed information on, among others, capital, leverage, risk weighted assets (RWA), P&L, credit risk, market risk, or asset quality Introduction • The EBA has been conducting transparency exercises at the EU-wide level on an annual basis since 2011. These exercises are part of the EBA's ongoing efforts to foster transparency and market discipline in the EU financial market, and complements banks' own Pillar 3 disclosures, as laid down in the CRD IV. • Further, the transparency exercises are, unlike the stress tests, disclosure exercises where only bank-by-bank data are published and no shocks are applied to the actual data. • In this context, the EBA has published the results of the EU-wide 2018 transparency exercise1, which will facilitate the consistent comparison and assessment of the resilience of banks across time and at a country and a bank-by-bank level. In particular, this document assesses the results relative to the potential impact on: • Capital (CET1 phase-in and -
Corporate Presentation
CaixaBank + Bankia Creating value for all stakeholders 18 September 2020 Disclaimer The information contained in this presentation may not be used as the basis to enter into any contract or as such, should not be relied upon. Certain financial and statistical information contained in the presentation is agreement and nothing herein constitutes an offer, invitation or recommendation to engage in investment in the subject to rounding adjustments. Accordingly, any discrepancies between the totals and the sums of the amounts shares, or any other financial instrument, of CaixaBank, S.A. (“CaixaBank”), especially in the United States, the listed are due to rounding. United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Australia or any other country where the purchase and sale of these shares is Neither this presentation nor the historical performance of CaixaBank’s management team constitute a guarantee prohibited under applicable legislation. The distribution of this presentation in certain jurisdictions may be of the future performance of CaixaBank and there can be no assurance that CaixaBank’s management team will be restricted by law. Consequently, persons to which this presentation is distributed must inform themselves about successful in implementing the investment strategy of CaixaBank. In addition to the financial information prepared and observe such restrictions. By receiving this presentation the recipient agrees to observe any such restrictions. under IFRS, this presentation may include certain alternative performance measures (“APMs”) as defined in the This presentation may include forward-looking statements, projections, objectives, estimates and forecasts which Guidelines on Alternative Performance Measures issued by the European Securities and Markets Authority on 5 have not been verified by an independent entity, and the accuracy, completeness or correctness thereof should October 2015.