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A Active Radar, 1103 Adaptive Adversary, 1259 Adaptive Dynamics Index A G-atom, 297 Active radar, 1103 Attack strategy, 1188, 1207, 1214 Adaptive adversary, 1259 Attenuation level, 434, 437, 444 Adaptive dynamics, 477–484, 489, 490, Aubin, J.-P., 971 502, 503 Auction, 1187, 1197, 1204, 1206 asymmetric game, 502 Augmented proportional navigation, 1081 multi-dimensional, 489 Automatic generation control (AGC), 1189, Adaptive utility, 1260 1207, 1216, 1217, 1220 Additive reward and additive transitions Auxiliary problem, 438 (ARAT) game, 295 Availability, 1207 Adjoint equation, 645 Average Stackelberg cost, 43 Adjoint variable, 381 Averaging dynamics, 911–913 Admissible control, 163, 195 Avoidance, 1001 Advertising games, 869–875 Aggregative game, 589 Agreement, 637, 647–649 B Aircraft Ba¸sar, T., 1003 control, 957 Backward constructions, 953 landing, 957 Backward induction, 498 take-off, 957 Backward stochastic differential Airport security, 1250–1251 equations, 405 AK model, 180 Bankruptcy games, 829, 837–845 Algebraic Riccati equation, 1095 Barrier, see Barrier line Algebraic sum, see Minkowski sum Barrier line, 968, 970, 973, 977, 981, 986, 987, Altruism 990, 993, 995, 997 non-paternalistic, 327 Battery degradation, 1200 paternalistic, 323 Battle of the sexes, 1054 Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), 1257 Bayesian games, 55 Angular frequency, 1216, 1217 Bayesian Nash equilibrium, 56 Anonymous sequential games, 351 Bayesian Stackelberg game, 1229, Anti-Bourgeois, 1056 1250, 1254 Approachable set, 267, 268 Behavioral models, 1244, 1257, 1259, 1266 Approximating sets, 756 Behavioral Stackelberg equilibrium, 35 ARMOR, 1225, 1228, 1236, 1251 Behavior strategy, 750 ASPEN, 1237–1239 Belief-free equilibrium, 754 Asymmetric games, 1053 Bellman equations, 173, 176, 196, 203, Asymptotically stable, 1049 207, 646 Asymptotic uniform value, 271 Ben-Asher, J.Z., 1029 Asymptotic value, 255, 266 Bequest games, 742, 761 Asynchronous model, 921 Bernhard, P., 953, 956, 992 © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018 1271 T. Ba¸sar, G. Zaccour (eds.), Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4 1272 Index Bertrand competition, 781, 784, 786, 788, Chain store game, 496 801–803, 808, 810, 815 entry deterrence game, 497 Bertrand equilibrium, 787, 788, 801–803 Channel coordination, 882–884 Best response, 351, 355, 358, 1053, 1064, Characteristic function, 602, 603, 605 1068, 1194 ˛-characteristic function, 603 -Best response, 568 ˇ-characteristic function, 603 Better reply path, 524 ı-characteristic function, 604 Better response process, 534 -characteristic function, 603 Biased proportional navigation, 1103 Characteristics, 977 Bias injection attack, 1218 Cauchy, 963 Big Match game, 253 Charging pattern, 1199 Bimatrix game, 194, 195, 198, 1059 Charging rate, 1200 Bishop-Cannings theorem, 468 Cheating period, 647 Blackout, 1207 Chentsov, A.G., 956, 970 Blackwell condition, 267 Chernous’ko, F.L., 957 Blackwell game, 251 Climate change, 704, 709, 710, 720 Bolza problem, 377, 385 Closed-loop, 436, 437 Bonds, 831 information structure, 163 Bonds and embedded options, 831–832 Stackelberg equilibrium, 198 Borda rule, 936, 937, 939, 941 Close-knit family, 580, 581 Bottom-up approach, 360 r-Close-knit, 581 Bounded confidence, 912, 920–924 Clustering, 911, 947, 1218, 1219 Bounded rationality, 1226, 1232, 1233, 1235, Coalition, 1204, 1205 1236, 1243, 1245, 1249, 1256–1262 Coalitional game, 1204, 1205 Bounded rationality models, 1258–1259 Coalition formation, 910, 944–947, 1199, Bounded surveillance, 1226, 1232, 1236, 1205, 1206 1262–1264 Collision, 1000 Bounded surveillance model, 1262–1264 Collision course, 1082 Bourgeois, 1056 Collusive equilibrium, 102–108, 201, 203, Braess’ paradox, 1160 205, 208 Breakwell, J.V., 958, 983, 989 Command signal, 1012 Browder’s fixed point theorem, 313 Commit, 164 Brownian motion, 1201 Commitment-short-term, 184 Bushaw, D.W., 952 Common noise, 366 Communication networks, 368, 1144 Comparison principle, 394, 402 C Competitive contagion game, 573, 575–577 Caching game, 549 Competitive market, 1193, 1195 uncapacitated, 562, 565, 569 Complete information game, 6, 56 Callable/redeemable bonds, 831 Computational methods, 16 Candidate stability, 943, 944 Computing correspondences, 757, 765 Capacitated selfish replication game, 565, Condition 567–570 irreducibility, 307 Capitalists, 200, 202, 212 strict diagonal dominance, 286 Caplow’s theory, 946 strong stochastic dominance, 299 Car, 960, 961 Conditional Pareto efficiency, 662 Dubins’, 961, 1003 Condorcet criterion, 936, 938 Reeds-Shepp’s, 962, 995, 1003 Confidence bound, 921, 924 Carathéodory theorem, 284 Conformity, 913, 920, 926, 934 Cardaliaguet, P., 971, 991 Congestion control, 1146 CASS, 1241–1243 Congestion game, 549–553, 555, 556, 559, 589 Causality, 436, 448 asymmetric network, 555 Cell problem, 424 definition, 550 Cesaro limit, 161 in market sharing, 555–559 Index 1273 network, 551, 553 Core, 596, 605, 606, 616, 622 player-specific, 555 Corporate games, 829, 845–859 pure-strategy NE, 553–555 Corrector, 424 symmetric network, 553–555 Correlated equilibrium (CE), 18–20, 519 Conjectural variations, 782–784, 794 Correspondence, 115, 730 Consensus algorithm, 515 lower measurable, 218 Consistency condition, 363 upper semicontinuous, 218 Constant injection attack, 1218 weakly measurable, 218 Contingent claim, 829 Co-state variable, 645, 647 Continuation payoff, 173, 190 Cost function(al), 4, 9, 11, 14, 21, 26, 35, Continuous-kernel games, 5, 36 38–40, 43, 45, 50, 51, 55, 1189, formulation, existence and uniqueness, 1199–1201, 1214, 1215 36–38 Cost learning, 876 stability and computation, 38–40 Cost measure, 439, 453 and Stackelberg equilibria, 40–44 Coupled constraint, 114 Continuously stable strategy (CSS) Coupled constraint equilibrium (CCE), concept, 476 114–116 and adaptive dynamics, 477–479 Coupled-constraint problem (CCP), 134 asymmetric game, 503 Coupled-reaction mapping, 115 multi-dimensional, 489 Coupled state-constraints Continuous opinion dynamics, coupled dynamic game, equilibria for, 913–924 136–138 Continuous trait space, 476 discounted case, 143–152 asymmetric game, 502 global change game, 138–143 one dimensional, 476 Hamiltonian systems, 119, 124 Contradictory criteria, 937 model and basic hypotheses, 133–135 Control m-person games, 114, 119 adaptive, 958, 1023 open-loop differential games, 124–133 extremal, 979 steady-state normalized equilibrium feedback, 953, 968, 1026 problem, 135 inputs, 1201 Cournot competition, 781, 783, 784, 786, 788, inseparable, 955 791, 794, 795, 799–801, 803, 808, open-loop, 954, 956 810, 812, 815, 817 separable, 955 Cournot equilibrium, 781, 782, 789, 791, 794, strategy, 1200–1202, 1214 795, 797, 799–804 Convenience cost, 1200 Cournot stochastic game, 302, 303 Convergence stable, 477 Crandall, M.G., 967 Convex hull, 1007, 1029 Credibility, 648 Convex optimization, 1212 Credible threats, 668 Cooperation, 1045 Critical tube, 1010, 1013, 1016–1018, Cooperation duration, 644 1021, 1023 Cooperative differential games, 600 Current-valued value function, 176 with random duration, 623–628 Curse of dimensionality, 178 Cooperative dynamic games, 634–668 Cyber attacks, 1207, 1212–1215, 1217 Cooperative games, 4, 634–668, 706, 718, 720, Cyber-physical power system, 1187, 726, 1199, 1203 1215, 1216 Cooperative outcome, 636 Cyber-physical system, 1187, 1212, 1213 Cooperative strategies, 657–661 Cyber security games, 1234–1235 Cooperative trajectory, 636, 650, 654, 661 Coordination games, 913 D bounded confidence, 920–924 Darwinian dynamics, 482–488, 505 definition, 909 Data injection, 1207–1210, 1217, 1218 innovation spread, 927–935 Day-ahead market, 1195, 1209 stubborn individuals, 914–920 Decision theory, 433 1274 Index Decomposed Optimal Bayesian Stackelberg Distribution, 1186–1189, 1197–1200, Solver (DOBSS), 1228–1230 1202–1206 DOBSS MILP, 1229 Disturbance attenuation, 1099–1106 DOBSS MIQP, 1229 Double oracle, 1239–1241 Defaultable game options, 832–833 Dove, 1042, 1056 Defender, 1000 DS-continuity, 290 Defense strategy, 1188, 1207, 1211–1215 Dubins, L., 961 Deffuant-Weisbuch (DW) model, 921 Duhamel principle, 365 Definability, 257 Dynamic(s) DeGroot model, 912 best response dynamics, 472 Delay function, 550, 554–556 compensator, 436, 442, 443 Delta-Nash equilibrium, 923 consistency, 635, 648 Demand learning, 876–877 game(s), 6, 8, 19, 21, 23, 28, 35, 55, Demand response, 1187 634–668 Demand-side management (DSM), 1187, game theory, 1188 1188, 1197, 1199, 1202 instability, 637 Deregulated market, 1187 linear, 956, 1003 Deterministic games, 5, 45–50, 53 monotone selection dynamics, 471 Stackelberg solution, 52–53 nonlinear, 954 team problems, 51 programming, 390, 398, 953, 1220 two-person zero-sum games, 50 programming principle, 1006 Diagonally strictly concave, 119, 127, 129, reaction functions, 185 137, 141 simple motion, 952, 955–957, 960, Diet choice model, 1067 1000, 1006 Difference equations, 158 stability, 1207 Differential games, 6, 8, 57, 639, 649–652, system, 158, 1188, 1207, 1212–1214, 1216 704, 706–708, 868, 874, 878, Dynkin game, 332 880, 881, 952, 953, 1200, 1201, 1213, 1215 with hard bounds, 1089 E nonzero-sum, 62–108 Economic dispatch, 1190, 1217 zero-sum, 62, 105 Electricity demand, 1199, 1202 Diffusion game, 549, 570, 573, 582, 589 Electricity prices, 1187, 1198, 1202, 1206 competitive contagion in networks, Electric vehicles, 1187, 1197, 1199, 1203 573–578 Empirical measure, 350, 351, 362, 364 coordination-based, 578–582 Encryption, 1210 deterministic, 571–573 Endogenous growth model, 202 Dilution effect, 833 Energy market, 1187, 1189, 1191,
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