Biodiversity and International Stakes: a Question of Access
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Ecological Economics 53 (2005) 573–583 www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon Biodiversity and international stakes: A question of access Michel Trommetter Grenoble Applied Economic Laboratory (GAEL), INRA and University P. Mende`s-France, Grenoble, France Laboratoire d’Econome´trie de l’Ecole Polytechnique, Paris, France Received 19 March 2004; received in revised form 1 July 2004; accepted 4 November 2004 Available online 11 March 2005 Abstract This paper examines three main questions: Is it possible to create a market for genetic resources? Is it a perfectly or an imperfectly competitive market? What impact could this market have on the management of biodiversity in the context of sustainable development? I analyse the conditions for baccessQ and buseQ of knowledge of genetic resources and the genetic resources themselves. I then consider the consequences on the management of genetic resources and social welfare trends in the context of sustainable development. I present product and technology transfers in terms of access and user rights. I show that the lack of information on the quality of biological resources and on their value on both the demand and supply sides lead to an imperfect market model. I examine how benefit-sharing can be achieved via public research institutions in developed countries and the conditions of their access to private patent licences. My main conclusion is that a valorisation of developing countries’ genetic resources is a means, among others, of accomplishing a sustainable management of biodiversity by an equitable access and benefit-sharing from the use of biodiversity: direct use of natural and biological resources, valorisation of genetic resources, development of new economic sectors, etc. Furthermore, it enables taking part in the economic and social development of these countries (increasing the social welfare in a context of sustainable development) by widening the access to genetic resources. D 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Trade Organization (WTO). These various conven- tions may be contradictory for the management of The stakes involved in the implementation of biodiversity: The CBD recognizes each State’s sover- intellectual property rights vary for developing coun- eignty on its genetic resources whereas the FAO tries. They are linked to the implementation of the proposes a multilateral system of exchange of genetic Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the resources; The precautionary principle is at the origin International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for of the biosafety protocol of the CBD for the Food and Agriculture of the Food and Agricultural circulation of Living Modify Organisms (LMOs) Organization (FAO) and the Trade-Related Aspects of whereas the TRIPs agreement proposes a liberaliza- Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) of the World tion of trade. 0921-8009/$ - see front matter D 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2004.11.017 574 M. Trommetter / Ecological Economics 53 (2005) 573–583 In the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Moreover, in the agricultural valorization of bio- international community recognizes each State’s sov- diversity, intra-species genetic diversity is very impor- ereignty on its genetic resources and its responsibility tant for the improvement of seeds and for the in the management and conservation of biodiversity. agricultural sustainability according to pathogenic The management of biodiversity is constrained by the mutations or the migration of pathogens because of implementation of national (local) incentive policies. the climate change. This context of substitutability is At the local or national level, rights markets can be presented by Kassar and Lasserre (2004), they propose introduced to guarantee a minimum of self-financing of that bthe focus is on good or service provided by the biodiversity (conservation) management programmes. species rather than the survival of species itself.Q There is an extensive literature on the economic I propose an extension of these works. I analyse the implication of species conservation (Cardoso de market conditions (perfect or imperfect competition) Mendoc¸a et al., 2003; Odom et al., 2003; Eiswerth of access to and use of genetic resources and their and Haney, 2001, etc.) and on the potential benefits of consequences on the management of those resources genetic resources (Simpson et al., 1996; Koo and and biodiversity in a context of sustainable develop- Wright, 2000, etc.). Some economists analyse the ment. However, I do not analyse the definition of marginal value of species. Simpson et al. (1996) assert access rights to renewable natural resources (trees, that: bwe are able to derive an upper bound on the value plants and animals). In the first section I study the of the marginal species [...]. We demonstrate that this market conditions of access to genetic resources and upper bound is relatively modest even under very knowledge. In the second section I present product optimistic assumptions and that the value of the and technology transfers in terms of access and use marginal species falls off very rapidly if the probability rights. Lastly, I analyse how benefit-sharing for of discovery differs from the one that maximizes the developing countries can be achieved through the marginal valueQ. In that paper, the substitutability public research institutes of developed countries and between the species is a factor that determines the their conditions of access to private patent licences. marginal value of species. The marginal value of species is close to zero, so Simpson et al. conclude bthis paper is concerned solely with pharmaceutical 2. Access to living organisms and knowledge researchers’ willingness to pay for biodiversity as an input into commercial product [...]. Our point is not The sovereignty of States on their genetic resources that biodiversity is not valuable. If biodiversity is implies that each State must define the initial determined to have great value, however, the interna- allocation of rights on plant, animal and microbial tional community should be seeking other mechanisms genetic resources. to finance its conservation.Q But there exist some limits to the work of Simpson et al.: 2.1. The suppliers of living organisms ! Polasky and Solow (1995) prove that there exists a States must define the conditions of access to and share of characters between genetically close uses of their genetic resources (e.g. CBD bprior species (notion of dependence) and give the informed consentQ). These conditions are essential example of the anticancer drug taxol where there for the economic growth of developing countries and is no perfect substitutability and no independence; for global development in a context of sustainable ! Rausser and Small (2000) explain that the marginal development.1 The effective exercise of this sover- value of a species on an ecosystem is closed to zero, as Simpson et al., if researchers are able to ex- ante classify the species by there economic 1 In this paper my goal is not to make a critical view on the importance, but it is generally impossible. So they relationship between economic growth and sustainable develop- b ment. I suppose that the decision maker takes into account the conclude, the pivotal issue concerns whether sustainability of her decision. If readers are interested by the every species–more generally every unit of bio- relationship between economic growth and sustainable develop- diversity–can be consider equally marginal.Q ment: see Islam et al. (2003) or Tisdell (2003). M. Trommetter / Ecological Economics 53 (2005) 573–583 575 eignty is carried out if States have the latitude to genetic materials. This clause has to be included in define who a State representative is, i.e. who signs the bioprospecting contract. bio-prospecting contracts and Material Transfer * For the collection of genetic resources for food and Agreements.2 agriculture: the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture of 2.1.1. In situ management of genetic resources the FAO proposes a multilateral system of A State defines the characteristics of the rights: exchange of genetic resources which leads the property rights on land (public, private, collective, countries concerned to create National Collections. etc.) and on genetic resources (access and use rights). All the signatories of this treaty have facilitated It also grants these rights: to an institution (ministry, access to National Collections (for more details see non-governmental organization, environmental insti- Section 3.1). tution, etc.); to indigenous and local community (collective right); or to an individual, thus granting a 2.2. The suppliers of knowledge on genetic resources private property right on genetic resources (Trommet- ter and Weber, 2003). The State decentralizes deci- States have the obligation to brespect, preserve and sion-making, thus instituting private or collective maintain knowledge, innovation and practices of management of biodiversity at local level. The State indigenous and local communities embodying tradi- representative manages the resources and the con- tional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and ditions of access and benefit-sharing (royalties, sustainable use of biological diversityQ Article 8j of technology transfers, etc.) when a laboratory (public the CBD (1992). The implementation of the Farmers’ or private) wants to bio-prospect an ecosystem.3 The rights (International Treaty on Plant