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4.112.4

Abkhazia-

During 2005 the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) witnessed a series of UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) promising developments in the region, al- though a mutually acceptable settlement on • Resolution passage 24 August 1993 (UNSC Res. 858) ’s status within Georgia remained and start date elusive. Following an eight-month hiatus in • SRSG Heidi Tagliavini (Switzerland) contact between the two parties, a UN-hosted • Chief military observer Niaz Muhammad Khan Khattak meeting in April 2005 signaled a resumption (Pakistan) of the formal peace process. The Georgian • Senior police adviser Colonel Jozsef Boda (Hungary) leadership affirmed its commitment to a • Budget $34.56 million peaceful solution and its readiness to engage (1 July 2005–30 June 2006) with the new Abkhaz leadership, elected in • Strength as of Military observers: 120 31 October 2005 Civilian police: 12 January 2005. However, Abkhazia questioned International civilian staff: 102 this commitment in view of Georgia’s in- Local civilian staff: 184 creased military expenditure and its closure of the Abkhaz portion of the Black Sea to inter- national maritime traffic. Strains between the parties and between the Georgian government especially in the Gali district.” The CISPKF and Russia culminated in a vote by the Geor- was initially composed of 3,000 peacekeepers, gian parliament in October that called for a but later reduced to 1,200. Although originally withdrawal of the CIS peacekeeping force envisaged as a multinational force, the reluc- (CISPKF). tance of other states to contribute troops under UNOMIG was established in August 1993 Russian command resulted in a solely Russian with an initial mandate to verify compliance force. The UN Security Council adopted Reso- with a cease-fire agreed by the government of lution 937 in July 1994, expanding UNOMIG’s Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities. After a mandate to include observation of the CIS period of resumed fighting, the two parties force, monitoring of the cease-fire, verification signed an agreement on a cease-fire and sepa- of troop withdrawals from the security zone, ration of forces (the Moscow Agreement) in and oversight of the withdrawal of Georgian May 1994, mediated by the Russian Federa- troops from the Valley. tion. On the basis of that agreement, the Humanitarian and human rights concerns in CISPKF was established to observe the cease- the conflict zone posed a major challenge for fire, conduct joint patrols with UNOMIG in the UNOMIG throughout 2005. The mission Kodori Valley, maintain a “security zone” free worked with a range of organizations to provide of armed forces and heavy military equip- assistance to vulnerable groups affected by the ment, and through its presence “promote the conflict. Human rights protection and promo- safe return of refugees and displaced persons, tion has been a core activity of UNOMIG

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112 • MISSION NOTES

UNOMIG military observers and two inter- CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia, Abkhazia preters, the mission increased the security level for its personnel operating in the lower • Authorization date 14 May 1994 Gali district. The Georgian government reacted 21 July 1994 (UNSC Res. 937) to increased levels of crime by tightening its • Start date June 1994 border with Abkhazia. • Head of mission Sergey Chaban (Russia) The deteriorating security situation prompted • Budget as of — the Special Representative of the Secretary- 30 September 2005 General to convene a meeting on 12 May • Strength as of Troops: 2,325 2005 between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides 30 September 2005 at UNOMIG’s Gali headquarters, also attended by the force commander of CISPKF. The dis- cussion concluded with the signing of a proto- since 1996, when a joint UNOMIG–Office of col to the Moscow Agreement by both parties, the High Commissioner for Human Rights UNOMIG and the CISPKF. The parties com- office was established in . Although mitted to making force strength figures trans- the reporting and capacity-building functions parent in the conflict zone, enhancing com- of the office proceeded well in 2005, the munication by law enforcement agencies, unwillingness of Abkhaz authorities to permit maintaining a minimum distance between the the opening of a human rights suboffice in positions of law enforcement agencies and the the Georgian-populated Gali district was a cease-fire line, exchanging information on setback. With a new political leadership in criminal activities, and ensuring the continued Sukhumi that has sought to exert its auton- safety of the staff of international organiza- omy, human rights will likely remain a criti- tions in the region. Despite these commit- cal function for UNOMIG. ments made in May, the situation failed to UNOMIG’s civilian component contin- improve in the months that followed. In early ued to work closely with local law enforce- November, UNOMIG expressed concern that ment agencies. Although Abkhaz authorities the security situation in Gali had deteriorated, have been relatively open to collaboration and maintained its offer to establish a human with the UN civilian police force, they have rights office and to deploy a UN police force been reluctant to permit UNOMIG to deploy in the area. police advisers on the Gali side of the cease- UNOMIG and the CISPKF continued to fire line. This has limited the mission’s capac- cooperate on security matters. Regular meet- ity to address crime. In a continued effort to ings between the chief military observer of build local capacity, UNOMIG hosted a train- UNOMIG and the CISPKF force commander ing course on human rights, law enforcement, as well as respective liaison teams helped to and community policing for the Georgian improve working relations between the mis- police force. sions, which over the years had been strained The lack of security in the region re- by the issue of compliance with UN norms mained a core concern throughout the year. In regarding rules of engagement and codes of the Gali district, armed robberies, shootings, conduct. abductions, detentions, and explosions were Nevertheless, the presence of CISPKF in reported. Similar incidents were documented in the region remains a source of tension. The other areas, where local populations have re- Georgian government has long held that Rus- ported threats by the Georgian armed forces sia’s dominating role has complicated its and by Abkhazis, and violence prompted by efforts to reestablish authority in the Abkhaz criminal activity such as smuggling. In response region. Although Russia officially recognizes to these incidents, and to the robbery of eleven Georgian sovereignty in Abkhazia, Peacekeeping_4_v11.qxd 2/2/06 5:06 PM Page 113

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accuses Moscow of backing, arming, and fi- remove its forces from Abkhazia if the Geor- nancing the rebels, and for supporting Ab- gian government made a clear request. Al- khazia in the 1992–1993 civil war. Moreover, though CISPKF remained in Georgia through the provisions of the Moscow Agreement per- the end of November, the Georgian govern- taining to the repatriation of approximately ment continued to argue that the presence of 200,000 displaced , most of whom Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia posed a continue to be housed in the Zugdidi region threat to its national security due to their en- close to the conflict zone and Tbilisi, have gagement in criminal activities and support of not been fulfilled, which remains one of the the Abkhaz “separatist” government. single largest issues for the Georgian govern- The Abkhaz conflict and tension regarding ment. Return of internally displaced persons the role of the CISPKF in Abkhazia is only one was one of the UN’s core functions; in Octo- piece of the troubled Russian–Georgian rela- ber 2005 it hosted a meeting of Georgian and tionship. In the past year, Tbilisi has repeatedly Abkhaz officials to discuss the issue. accused Moscow of providing military assis- The interposition of peacekeepers has tance to separatists in both Abkhazia and South played a constructive short-term role in sepa- Ossetia. On the Russian side, Moscow insists rating opposing forces, stabilizing cease-fire that Tbilisi is enabling Chechen separatists to lines, and creating an environment conducive seek shelter in the isolated Pankisi Gorge in to the provision of humanitarian assistance. northern Georgia. Russian media reports allege However, the UN and CIS’s effort to share that elements of the Georgian military and security tasks in Abkhazia has been deeply political leadership have joined forces with affected by regional and geopolitical strains. In Chechen separatists in an alliance against the October 2005, the Georgian parliament voted to Russian Federation. It remains to be seen what plan for a possible withdrawal of the Russian- impact these geopolitical tensions will have on led CISPKF on the grounds that it had not the future of UNOMIG and the CISPKF, which been able to provide adequate security. Soon remain mutually dependent in both structure thereafter, Russian president Vladimir Putin and function. stated that the Russian Federation would