Running Head: BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 1

Disentangling beliefs about emotions from emotion schemas

Jennifer C. Veilleux

Kaitlyn D. Chamberlain

Danielle E. Baker

Elise A. Warner

University of Arkansas

Corresponding Author:

Jennifer C. Veilleux, Ph.D.

University of Arkansas

216 Memorial Hall

Fayetteville, AR 72701

Phone: 479-575-5329

Fax: 479-575-3219

Email: [email protected] BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 2

Abstract

The current study sought to empirically evaluate a new clinical tool, the Individual

Beliefs about Emotion (IBAE) which assesses nine beliefs about emotion. The goal was to examine the overlap of the IBAE with the Leahy Emotional Schema Scale (LESS; Leahy, 2002) and indices of psychopathology. Participants (n = 513) completed the IBAE, the LESS, and measures of depression, anxiety, and borderline personality features. Results indicated that both emotion beliefs (IBAE) and schemas (LESS) were influenced by age and gender. Both measures significantly predicted variance in depression, anxiety and borderline symptoms, although the

LESS was a stronger predictor. We conclude that the LESS total score is a particularly useful measure of maladaptive schematic attitudes toward emotion, with additional evidence that the

IBAE can quickly assess a variety of emotion beliefs and also predicts psychopathology outcomes.

Keywords: Emotion beliefs, Emotion Schemas, Emotion Attitudes, Psychopathology BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 3

The beliefs people hold about emotions have implications for their emotional well-being.

In clinical settings, beliefs about emotion are often assessed as emotional schemas (Leahy,

2002), which may be problematic because although emotional schemas include emotion beliefs, schemas are broader. Emotional schemas are beliefs and attitudes people hold about emotions as well as perceptions of self-efficacy in controlling and managing emotions (Leahy, 2015; Leahy,

Tirch, & Napolitano, 2011). These schemas are perhaps most salient in the context of Emotional

Schema Therapy (EST; Leahy, 2002, 2015; Leahy et al., 2011), a treatment approach which helps train people to identify and shift their emotional schemas in the service of more effective emotional functioning. Whether adopting EST or a more traditional cognitive-behavioral approach, understanding a client’s beliefs about emotions could be extremely helpful in guiding case formulation and subsequent treatment planning, particularly with knowledge about how specific beliefs about emotions are related to different symptom presentations.

Individual Beliefs About Emotion

The current study is primarily focused on an initial empirical investigation of a new clinical tool to assess emotion beliefs, the Individual Beliefs About Emotion (IBAE). The IBAE assesses nine beliefs about emotion. (1) Cause, the belief that emotions come out of the blue

(versus have clear causes), (2) Judgment, the belief that negative emotions are destructive, (3)

Complexity, the belief that a person should feel only one emotion at a time, (4) Expression, the belief that emotions should be kept inside and not expressed, (5) Preference, the belief that logic is preferable to emotion, (6) Controllability, the belief that it’s difficult (perhaps impossible) to act differently than emotions, (7) Malleability, the belief that emotions are hard to change, (8)

Uniqueness, the belief that other people’s emotions are different, and (9) Longevity, the belief that negative feelings seem to last forever. In the IBAE, each belief is assessed with a single BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 4 item, with bipolar response anchors. For example, one pole of the Expression item is the belief endorsing the necessity of emotional expression (“Emotions must be ‘let out’ and expressed to the world”) whereas the other pole reflects the belief that expression should be limited

(“Emotions should be kept inside the self; no one wants to deal with other people’s emotions”).

See Table 1 for all of the questions and anchors.

The IBAE was developed as a clinical tool, after noting that the workbooks and treatment guides which involve informal identification of “myths” about emotions (Linehan, 2015;

Spradlin, 2003) have not been subject to clear empirical support. The IBAE was intended to expand upon social psychological research highlighting the importance of beliefs about malleability (i.e., the belief that emotions are changeable or controllable; Ford & Gross, 2018;

Tamir, John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2007) in predicting emotion regulation and emotional outcomes (De Castella et al., 2013; De Castella, Platow, Tamir, & Gross, 2017; Kneeland,

Dovidio, Joormann, & Clark, 2016; Kneeland, Nolen-Hoeksema, Dovidio, & Gruber, 2016).

Specifically, the IBAE corresponds with efforts to expand assessment of emotion beliefs beyond beliefs about malleability (Veilleux, Salomaa, Shaver, Zielinski, & Pollert, 2015) and quantitatively addresses clinical material on emotion myths. Stated differently, the IBAE was developed to be a brief clinical tool, similar to the emotion “myth” worksheets, and building upon prior assessments of emotion beliefs (Tamir et al., 2007; Veilleux et al., 2015). We have used the IBAE clinically to help clients identify and work with their emotion beliefs, and we wanted to take the next step by obtaining empirical data to verify that the beliefs assessed by the

IBAE are indeed associated with symptoms of psychopathology.

Measuring Emotion Schemas BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 5

Those familiar with EST might wonder why a new assessment of emotion beliefs is needed, due to the existence of the Leahy Emotional Schema Scale (LESS; Leahy, 2002). The

LESS is a 50-item scale assessing 14 schema dimensions, which was recently revised into a shorter 28-item version (LESS-II; Leahy, 2016). The 14 schemas assessed on the LESS/LESS-II cover a wide variety of beliefs about emotions, including the belief that emotions are clear and comprehensible, the belief that emotions should be simple, the belief that emotions make people lose control, the preference for logic over emotion, the belief that emotions linger or persist, the belief that emotions are common universal experiences, the belief that emotions should be expressed, and the belief that emotions are destructive and should be avoided. When taken together, the entire LESS measure is thought to assess negative attitudes toward emotion

(Batmaz, Ulusoy Kaymak, Kocbiyik, & Turkcapar, 2014; Leahy, Tirch, & Melwani, 2012;

Silberstein, Tirch, Leahy, & McGinn, 2012; Tirch, Leahy, Silberstein, & Melwani, 2012). Total scores on the LESS have been associated with increased alexithymia (Edwards, Micek,

Mottarella, & Wupperman, 2017), a history of childhood abuse (Edwards et al., 2017; Rezaei,

Ghazanfari, & rezaee, 2016)m depressive symptoms (Leahy, 2002; Leahy et al., 2012), bipolar symptoms (Batmaz et al., 2014), anxiety symptoms (Tirch et al., 2012), a tendency toward risk aversion (Leahy et al., 2012), low mindfulness (Silberstein et al., 2012) and low psychological flexibility (Leahy et al., 2012; Silberstein et al., 2012). Considering that this measure is known and clearly predicts a wide variety of related phenomena, why not simply use the LESS or

LESS-II to assess emotion beliefs?

Our view is that the LESS and LESS-II remain useful measures of emotional schemas.

However, there are two areas of concern about the LESS if the intention is to understand the role of emotion beliefs in predicting psychopathology and emotion dysregulation. The first is whether BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 6 there are meaningful distinctions between emotion beliefs and emotion schemas that are important to disentangle. The second is whether the LESS dimensions are truly distinct and provide unique independent predictors, or if the LESS is better conceptualized as an overall measure assessing negative judgments and attitudes about emotion as well as emotion regulation tendencies. We address each of these concerns in turn.

Separating Beliefs from Schemas

It should be noted that the schemas assessed by the LESS (and the LESS-II) assess dimensions that actually go beyond beliefs about emotion (Leahy, 2002). Indeed, descriptions of the LESS and of emotional schemas cover beliefs about emotions and related attributes regarding responses to emotions. For example, the LESS assesses validation, or the degree to which a person feels as though other people understand their emotions, which is certainly a belief related to emotional experiences. People who believe that others understand and accept their emotional responses have fewer psychological symptoms and better emotion regulation strategies (Zielinski & Veilleux, 2018), but perceptions that there are validating individuals in the person’s life is not truly a belief about the self. In addition, the tendency to connect emotions to higher values, the tendency to experience numbness or lack of emotion, and the tendency to engage in rumination are likewise tendencies that relate to emotional experience which are not truly beliefs about the construct of emotion or how emotions operate for a given person (De

Castella et al., 2013).

Specific Schema Dimensions

Considering the breadth of schema dimensions assessed by the LESS, one question is: which of the specific schema dimensions are particularly salient in predicting symptoms of psychopathology and/or problematic emotion regulation strategies? Using zero-order BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 7 correlations, each of the schemas except emotional expression and the preference for rational thought over emotion has been associated with depressive and/or anxiety symptoms in at least one study (Batmaz & Özdel, 2015; Leahy, 2002; Leahy et al., 2012; Tirch et al., 2012). In addition, dimensions of validation, simplistic views of emotion, values, controllability, numbness, the need to be rational, duration, acceptance of feelings, rumination, and expression are likewise associated with irritable bowel syndrome in the one study to look at the relationship between beliefs and medical symptoms (Erfan, Noorbala, Afshar, & Adibi, 2017).

In a more stringent test, when examining the set of schemas together to ascertain which dimensions uniquely and independently predict outcomes, results suggest that validation, comprehensibility, guilt, control, duration, consensus, and rumination are predictive of depressive symptoms (Leahy, 2002; Leahy et al., 2012). In addition, dimensions reflecting simplistic views of emotions, control, duration, consensus, acceptance of feelings, and rumination seem to predict anxiety symptoms (Leahy et al., 2012; Tirch et al., 2012). These are promising findings, but the research on how individual emotional schemas predict emotional outcomes are limited. There are only a few studies so far, and these typically used samples of individuals presenting for treatment (Batmaz & Özdel, 2015; Leahy, 2002; Leahy et al., 2012;

Silberstein et al., 2012; Tirch et al., 2012). Considering that people in treatment may have higher levels of maladaptive schemas to begin with (Khaleghi et al., 2017), as well as heightened symptoms of psychopathology, little is known about the relationship between schemas and psychological symptoms in a broader sample of the population. Relatedly, understanding how age and gender differences in schemas and beliefs might also provide useful additional information for both researchers and clinicians. In sum, understanding if specific schemas are associated with symptoms of psychopathology in broader samples (and accounting for potential BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 8 age and gender effects) might provide insight toward prevention programs in addition to giving clinicians targets to reduce distress and dysfunction.

Clinical Utility

In addition, from a clinical utility perspective, the LESS (and to a lesser extent, the

LESS-II) also suffers from the same problem as many self-report measures: it is on the long side to take, and needs to be scored before discussing in depth. Many of the items require reverse scoring, and thus to be able to discuss a client’s emotional schemas with them, the client would need to complete the measure, and then either score it themselves or give the clinician time to score it. In contrast, beliefs or “myths” about emotions in the context of workbooks (Linehan,

2015; Spradlin, 2003) allow for quick and easy discussion of beliefs, but are not clearly amenable to data collection, whether routine outcome monitoring (Boswell, Kraus, Miller, &

Lambert, 2015) or clinical research. The tradeoff is the LESS has at least some empirical validation, but the client worksheets are more amenable to in-session discussion without considerable prior preparation. The IBAE, with single items for each belief, provides a middle ground of an easy-to-administer measure that allows for immediate discussion.

The Current Study

There are two major functions of the current study, as well as two secondary aims. First, although the IBAE was developed as a clinical tool for use in therapy sessions, we want to provide empirical evidence that the IBAE is predictive of symptoms of psychopathology

(depression, anxiety, borderline personality features) and problems with emotion regulation.

Without empirical evidence that these beliefs are related to clinical phenomena, the tool lacks validity and utility. Second, we wanted to compare the IBAE to the LESS. If the IBAE and the

LESS measure similar beliefs about emotion, the IBAE beliefs should correlate the highest with BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 9 the corresponding belief on the LESS. Specifically, the IBAE belief about complexity should correlate with LESS simplistic view of emotions, the IBAE belief about preferring logic to emotion should relate to the LESS rationality schema, IBAE belief about longevity should correlate with the LESS duration schema, the IBAE belief about uniqueness should relate to

IBAE consensus beliefs, and the IBAE and LESS expression scales should likewise be associated with one another. The other IBAE beliefs (cause, judgment, behavior control, and malleability) have less clear correspondence with LESS schemas, though it seems reasonable to propose that the IBAE behavior control belief would relate to the LESS control scale, and that the IBAE beliefs about cause and judgment may relate to comprehensibility and acceptance on the LESS, respectively.

Our secondary goals are to provide additional exploration on the scope of the LESS, such as by evaluating the psychometrics of the individual dimensions and the total score, and investigating how age and gender influence endorsements of schematic beliefs. Finally, beyond examining demographics and correlations associated with the LESS and IBAE, we hypothesized that both measures would predict symptoms of psychopathology.

Method

Participants & Procedure.

Participants were recruited from two sources; a university subject pool in the mid-South

(n = 303) and from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (n = 251) via TurkPrime (Litman, Robinson, &

Abberbock, 2017). Participants were forwarded to Qualtrics where they informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study, after which participants completed the study measures. Subject pool participants were compensated with partial course credit, and mTurk participants were paid $2.00 for completing the 15-minute study. BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 10

We excluded 41 people (40 from the subject pool) who admitted to not paying attention

(n = 16) and who indicated we should not keep their data (n = 25). After exclusions, the final sample size was 513 (263 subject pool, 250 mTurk). The subject pool was significantly younger

(M = 19.03, SD = 1.15) compared to the mTurk sample (M = 37.90, SD = 12.302, t(510) =

24.68, p < .001. The subject pool also had a higher percentage of women (62.3%) compared to the mTurk sample (43.8%), χ2 = 17.55, p < .001. There were no sample differences in % minority

(18.1%) across samples, χ2 = .58, p = .45.

Measures

Individual Beliefs About Emotion. Individual Beliefs about Emotions (IBAE). This is a 10-item measure, with the first 9 items each assessing individual beliefs and the final item assessing beliefs about emotion changeability. The individual beliefs are as follows: (1) beliefs that emotions come from out of the blue, (2) the belief that negative feelings are bad, (3) the belief that emotions should be simple, (4) the belief that emotions should not be expressed, (5) the belief that logic is better than emotion, (6) the belief that emotions control behavior, (7) the belief that emotions can be changed (i.e., malleability), (8) the belief in emotional uniqueness, or that a person’s emotions are unlike other people’s, and (9) the belief that negative emotions last forever. The anchors are different for each item, with each representing opposite poles of each belief. Low anchors are assigned a value of 1 and high anchors are assigned a value of 5, with no verbal labels given for the middle responses (2-4). For example, the belief about emotion cause

(i.e., item 1) has both a low anchor (“Emotions come out of the blue, for no reason”) and a high anchor (“Emotions happen because of clear identifiable causes). The tenth and final item assesses belief changeability and is dichotomous (Yes/No). It asks, “Do your beliefs about emotions (all of the above) change when you are in a strong emotion?” BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 11

Emotional Schemas. The Leahy Emotional Schema Scale (LESS; Leahy, 2002) is a 50- item measure that assesses 14 emotional schemas. All of the items are given on 1 (very untrue of me) to 6 (very true of me) Likert-type scales. All of the dimensions were scored so that high scores suggest maladaptive responses: invalidation, incomprehensibility, guilt, simplistic views of emotion, lacking of values (devalued), loss of control, numbness, overly rational, duration, low consensus, non-acceptance, rumination, low expression, and blame. Alpha values for each separate dimension and the overall score are reported in Table 2.

Depression and Anxiety. The Depression Anxiety and Stress Scales-21 item version

(DASS-21; (Henry & Crawford, 2005) was used to assess recent symptoms of depression and anxiety. Items are given on a 0 (did not apply to me) to 3 (applied to me very much, or most of the time) Likert-type scales. There are three subscales, a Depression scale which assess symptoms of depressed mood, an Anxiety scale which assess symptoms of physical anxiety such as panic, and a Stress scale which is more consistent with generalized anxiety (Brown, Chorpita,

Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997). All three scales had good reliability, Depression α = .93, Anxiety α

= .86, Stress α = .88.

Borderline Features. The Borderline scale of the Personality Assessment Inventory

(PAI-BOR; Morey, 1991) was given to assess symptoms of borderline personality disorder. The scale has 24 items, given on a 0 (False, Not at all True) to 3 (Very True) scale. There are four subscales which assess emotional instability, identity problems, negative relationships, and self- harm. However, for the purposes of this study, an overall scale was used as an index of borderline symptoms. This scale correlates highly with other measures assessing borderline symptomatology (Gardner & Qualter, 2009) and differentiates clinical from non-clinical groups

(Stein et al., 2007). In the current study the internal consistency was good (α = .90). BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 12

Analytic Strategy

We first wanted to examine the descriptive statistics of the IBAE, as this is a new measure; Table 1 also reports the items including the specific wording of the questions and the anchors, as well as the mean and standard deviation for each item, along with inter-item correlations. We then report descriptive statistics, Cronbach alpha and interitem correlations for the LESS, where we also included the total score, as the overall LESS has been used in prior studies and we thought it valuable to understand the relationship between the individual dimensions and the overall score.

As we had two distinct samples which differed on both age and gender, we anticipated there might be differences on the IBAE and the LESS based on sample. To fully evaluate the separate and combined role of sample, age and gender, we first conducted zero-order correlations among each scale, sample, gender and age (see Table 2). In these analyses, Sample was coded such that positive correlations indicate mTurk (coded as 1) had higher scores than the subject pool (coded as 0), whereas negative correlations indicate the opposite. Similarly, gender was coded so that positive correlations indicate women (coded as 1) had higher scores than men

(coded as 0), and negative correlations indicate men had higher scores than women. We also conducted simultaneous regressions, with each scale as the outcome and sample, age and gender entered together as the predictors. This method allowed us to test for differences between the samples and to also ascertain whether these sample differences were driven by age and/or gender. Of note that in all regression output, we present standardized regression coefficients (β) to facilitate greater comparison between different outcome variables.

One central question of this study was whether the IBAE and LESS assess overlapping beliefs about emotion. To examine this, we conducted correlations between the IBAE and the BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 13

LESS. In the resulting table (Table 3), the highlighted boxes represent the dimensions that should correlate the highest due to conceptual overlap. For example, the IBAE Cause belief assesses whether the cause of the emotion was clear and understandable, which best matches the LESS incomprehensibility (understandability) schema.

To understand the relationship between emotion beliefs and schemas with indices of psychopathology (depression, anxiety, stress and borderline personality symptoms), we conducted three hierarchical regressions. We first examined the set of IBAE beliefs in predicting each indicator of psychopathology, after controlling for age and gender. Second, to examine the

LESS, we used a 3-step model, where age and gender were again entered in Step 1 as control variables. In Step 2 we included the LESS dimensions most consistent with beliefs— incomprensibility, guilt, simplistic views, loss of control, overly rational, duration, low consensus, non-acceptance, low expression, and blame. Step 2 thus isolates the LESS dimensions that are more “belief-like” from the other emotional-related attributes, which were entered in Step 3 (invalidation, devalued, numbness and rumination). Essentially, Step 2 of the

LESS model is similar to Step 2 of the IBAE model, and then Step 3 of the LESS model examines the incremental addition of non-belief dimensions in predicting symptom outcomes.

Finally, the third model included age and gender in Step 1 as controls and included the total score of the LESS in Step 2, and then the set of IBAE beliefs in Step 3 to evaluate if the IBAE explains incremental variance in the symptom outcomes above and beyond the overlap attributed to the LESS.

Results

Descriptive Statistics and Inter-Correlations BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 14

Endorsement of problematic emotion beliefs was relatively low, with the majority of means below the midpoint of the scale (see Table 1). The correlations between the beliefs were relatively low, with the highest correlation (r = .37) between beliefs that emotions should not be expressed and a preference for logic. The remainder of the correlations were low (even the significant ones were less than .25), suggesting that these dimensions are distinctly different from one another. Indeed, an index of internal consistency of the overall scale suggests these items do not “hang” well together as an overall scale and are better conceptualized as individual beliefs (α = .35).

LESS correlations and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. The majority of the

Cronbach’s alphas were considerably lower than the typical level of acceptability (.70; Cortina,

1993). For specific schemas, only the incomprehensibility, guilt and loss of control dimensions were actually above .7, the rest were much lower and some quite low (e.g., duration, which only has two items, had an alpha of .24). In contrast, the overall index of internal consistency was quite high, reflected also by the relatively high correlations of each individual score and the overall score, as well as the significant correlations among most of the schema dimensions.

Sample differences driven by age and gender.

Although sample differences were evident on many of the scales (see Table 3), the only index where sample differences remained after controlling for gender and age was IBAE

Preference where the mTurk sample reported a stronger preference for logic (M = 3.75, SD =

1.10), than the subject pool sample, (M = 2.95, SD = 1.22). However, on many dimensions, there were significant effects of gender and/or age effects. Men, compared to women, were more likely to endorse a preference for rationality and logic and the belief that expressions should be suppressed, across both the IBAE and the LESS. On the LESS only, men had higher devaluation BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 15 and numbness beliefs, and women had greater beliefs that emotions should be simple and that emotions linger. In terms of age, older age was typically associated with more adaptive beliefs and schemas. On the IBAE, this included beliefs that emotions can be changed, that one can act differently than their emotions, and that other people’s emotions are similar. However, on the

IBAE older age was associated with stronger judgments that negative emotions are bad, as well as beliefs that people should feel one emotion at a time. On the LESS, older age was associated with more adaptive schemas on all dimensions except invalidation, simplistic views, rationality and expression.

Correlations between LESS and IBAE

For the most part, the dimensions with conceptual overlap were significantly correlated

(see Table 4), with the exception of the non-significant correlation between the IBAE complexity belief and the LESS schema assessing a simplistic view of emotion; both of these address a preference for single or simple emotions rather than “mixed” or complex emotions. However, many of the correlations were small (less than .20), and often did not have the highest magnitude with a given dimension. For example, the IBAE judgment dimension, which assesses the belief that negative emotions are bad and destructive, correlated with the Non-Acceptance dimension on the LESS as expected, but also at the same relative magnitude as the Guilt LESS dimension.

Also of note, the IBAE dimensions of Uniqueness and Longevity correlated significantly with most of the LESS dimensions, and moderately with the overall LESS negative schematic beliefs measure.

Predicting Symptoms of Psychopathology

Table 5 includes the zero-order correlations between the IBAE beliefs and LESS schema dimensions along with the measures of psychopathology (depression, panic, generalized anxiety, BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 16 and borderline symptoms). A few patterns are noted. First, on the IBAE, beliefs about judgment and complexity were not significantly associated with any of the outcomes. However, beliefs about behavior control, malleability, uniqueness and longevity all predicted greater symptoms of psychopathology. Beliefs about cause, expression and preference had small but significant correlations with one or more outcomes. In contrast, the LESS dimensions had stronger magnitudes of correlations with the outcome variables. In particular, the total score, reflective of negative schematic beliefs about emotion, had moderately high correlations, suggesting these beliefs are strongly associated with symptoms of psychopathology, with perhaps the exception of the overly rational schema.

Results of the hierarchical regressions with each measure separately are reported in

Tables 6 and 7. For the IBAE, beliefs about restricting emotional expressions, beliefs that emotions are not malleable, beliefs that emotions are unique and beliefs that emotions last a long time were all unique predictors of both depression and borderline symptoms. Uniqueness and longevity beliefs predicted symptoms of panic (DASS-Anxiety) and generalized anxiety (DASS-

Stress). These results confirm that the IBAE accounts for significant variance in symptoms of psychopathology.

For the LESS, the second step (with the LESS belief dimensions) accounted for a significant amount of variance (between 25% and 43%), comparatively greater than the IBAE.

The belief that emotions are incomprehensible, beliefs associated with guilt (i.e., “I shouldn’t have some of the feelings that I have”), and beliefs that emotions are associated with loss of control were associated with all of the outcomes. In addition, overly rational beliefs and non- acceptance were paradoxically protective—rationality was associated with lower panic (i.e.,

DASS-Anxiety) and borderline symptoms, and non-acceptance was associated with lower BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 17 depression and borderline symptoms. In addition, ruminative tendencies (entered in Step 3) were likewise predictive of all outcomes. Overall, the regression coefficients for each dimension were fairly small considering the fairly high variability accounted for, which suggests (consistent with the high correlations among LESS dimensions) that a general overarching factor may be more valuable than examining each dimension separately.

Finally, we assessed the ability of the IBAE to predict variability in the symptoms after controlling for the total score LESS. Results are presented in Table 8. Consistent with our interpretation that the overall total score on the LESS likely captures the brunt of the variability in the outcomes, we see that the variance accounted for in Step 2 of these models is sizable. We also find that the IBAE did predict variability in symptoms of psychopathology above and beyond the LESS. This is a fairly stringent test of incremental validity, as there should be considerable overlap between the LESS and the IBAE, but this analysis confirms that the two measures are not redundant and that the IBAE—particularly beliefs about judgment, preference for logic over emotion, and beliefs about longevity –seem to uniquely predict symptoms of psychopathology.

Discussion

The current study generated initial empirical support for the IBAE, a nine-item clinical tool designed to assess nine individual emotion beliefs. The overall goal was to establish the utility of the IBAE by confirming the overlap with a current measure of emotion schemas (i.e., the LESS) and to confirm that the IBAE is indeed predictive of symptoms of psychopathology.

In doing so, we also provided additional empirical examination of the LESS and established that responses to both measures are influenced by gender and age. Our overall results suggest that the IBAE and LESS are both useful instruments that are not redundant in their potential uses. BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 18

Age and Gender Differences

Although not an original purpose of the study, we found age and gender differences on both the LESS and the IBAE accounted for the differences between our university student participants and online adults from across the U.S. Across both the LESS and the IBAE, men endorsed stronger beliefs that emotions should not be expressed. This belief is consistent with research suggesting that men express fewer emotions than women (Brody, 1993), a phenomenon that appears to begin in childhood (Chaplin & Aldao, 2013). Whether the belief prompts the behavior, or the behavior reifies the belief, remains to be determined. In the IBAE, we were able to link this belief about emotional expression in men to a preference for logic over emotion—of

“thinking” over “feeling,” consistent with past work suggesting that men are more responsive to

“thinking” types of primes, whereas women are more responsive to “feeling” types of primes

(Mayer & Tormala, 2010).

In terms of age, results indicated that younger people endorsed more maladaptive schemas on the LESS, with age negatively correlated with ten of the LESS dimensions. These results are corroborated by how the higher total score on the LESS is associated with younger age. The LESS findings were somewhat inconsistent with IBAE results, where older participants reported stronger beliefs that negative emotions are destructive and that one should feel only one emotion at a time, whereas younger participants reported greater beliefs that emotions control behavior, emotions cannot be changed, and that emotions are unique. Overall we find evidence that emotion schemas and beliefs are influenced by gender and age and suggest that researchers studying schemas and beliefs take gender and age into account.

Value of the LESS BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 19

We found moderate-to-large correlations between most of the LESS dimensions and poor reliability for many of the individual dimensions. In contrast, the total score had excellent internal consistency and seems to represent the brunt of the variability from the individual dimensions. Thus, our conclusion is that the LESS scale likely functions best as a unidimensional measure with a total score.

We also saw that the LESS does very well in predicting psychopathology in a large, non- clinical sample, consistent with past work done in smaller clinical samples (Leahy et al., 2012;

Silberstein et al., 2012; Tirch et al., 2012). The LESS scale was designed to measure emotion schemas broadly, and therefore includes items reflecting not only emotion beliefs (e.g.,

“Everyone has feelings like mine”) but also symptoms (e.g. “I often feel ‘numb’ emotionally— like I have no feelings”), behaviors (e.g. “When I feel down, I sit by myself and think a lot about how bad I feel”), and experiences (e.g., “No one really cares about my feelings”). Considering that the LESS measures more than emotion beliefs and that some items directly measure symptoms of psychopathology (i.e., feelings of numbness consistent with depression and tendencies toward rumination consistent with both depression and anxiety), it makes sense that the LESS was a more effective predictor of psychopathology than the IBAE scale. The alternative—and admittedly less positive—view of the LESS is that it is heavily clouded by psychopathology. Because the LESS assesses symptoms indicative of affective disorders, it is potentially assessing both schematic vulnerabilities to psychopathology and cognitive processes altered by the presence of psychopathology. Without longitudinal prospective designs it is difficult to tease these apart.

In the current study, we attempted to separate the “beliefs” from the “non-beliefs” (see

Table 7) although this distinction is actually not truly feasible, as even the dimensions we BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 20 characterized as “beliefs” have some items that measure things other than beliefs. For example, the Acceptance of Feelings dimension includes the item “You have to guard yourself against having certain feelings,” which is certainly a belief suggesting that some emotions are bad or destructive. Another item on the same dimension is “I try to get rid of an unpleasant feeling immediately,” which is less of a belief and more of a behavior, consistent with the belief that unpleasant feelings are destructive, but not measuring the belief directly. In addition to including beliefs, symptoms, behaviors and experiences, the LESS uses items that vary in their phrasing.

For example, some items are phrased in general terms (i.e., “Everyone thinks…”) and others are phrased in personal terms (i.e., “When I feel down, I ….”). Together, the broad scope of the items and the variation in phrasing may explain the low internal consistency of some of the scales, while simultaneously supporting the breadth of the LESS. Our conclusion is that the

LESS is a strong measure of schematic attitudes about emotion but not truly a specific index of beliefs.

Value of the IBAE

In our clinical work, we find it useful to integrate clients’ beliefs about emotions into our case formulations and treatment planning processes. We created the IBAE to satisfy our need to assess beliefs about emotion quickly and accurately during therapy sessions without the burden of scoring a measure, a goal we were unable to accomplish with the LESS. The IBAE assesses beliefs much faster than the LESS and therefore enables clinicians to be more efficient with session time with less of a focus on diagnostic clarity. Since “maladaptive” and “adaptive” item response options are likely evident for at least some of the items, this may result in greater socially desirable responding; however, because the IBAE is appropriate for use during therapy BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 21 sessions, clinicians are afforded time to discuss responses with clients, as well as compare and integrate client responses and clinical observations.

Considering the conceptual overlap between the IBAE and the LESS, we certainly expected to see significant statistical relationships between dimensions, and results confirmed this. For the most part, LESS dimensions were significantly correlated with the predicted IBAE beliefs, although the correlations ranged from small to moderate in magnitude, suggesting lack of redundancy between the two measures, and likely related to the LESS assessing more than beliefs, as discussed above.

We expected to find that the IBAE would predict current psychopathology, and our results suggest this is the case. The belief that a given person’s emotions are unique (not shared by others), and that emotions last and linger seem to be particularly problematic. Both of these beliefs are consistent with theories of depression which emphasize isolation from others

(Cacioppo, Hughes, Waite, Hawkley, & Thisted, 2006) and a “stable” attributional style

(Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & von Baeyer, 1979) and the distancing and emotional sensitivity evident with borderline personality pathology (Crowell, Beauchaine, & Linehan,

2009). Overall, the current study provides initial empirical evidence that the beliefs assessed by the IBAE are similar to—but distinct from—beliefs assessed by the LESS, and are predictive of affective distress.

Limitations

There are some limitations of this study. We recognize that single item measures lack precision and are more susceptible to measurement error compared to multi-item measures

(Hays, Reise, & Calderón, 2012; Konrath, Meier, & Bushman, 2014). However, single item measures often perform surprisingly well in research (Hays et al., 2012). For example, there are BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 22 psychometrically sound single item measures of such constructs as narcissism (Konrath et al.,

2014) and self-esteem (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001). Considering that single item emotion “myths” are already included in some skills manuals and treatment workbooks

(Linehan, 2015; Spradlin, 2003), our view is that even if these are psychometrically limited, validated individual emotion belief items can enhance current therapeutic practices, particularly as we have now established connections between these individual belief items and emotional processes.

We also recognize that this study used only a few measures for confirmation of concurrent validity, and future work may benefit from examining emotions and beliefs with measures of other psychopathology (i.e., eating pathology, obsessive-compulsive symptoms, post-traumatic stress symptoms) and/or using interview-based measures to assess diagnostic criteria for psychopathology more stringently. We also recognize the value in examining indices of emotion beliefs and schemas alongside other emotional traits, such as emotion regulation strategies (Gratz & Roemer, 2004; John & Gross, 2004), emotion expression tendencies (Kring,

Smith, & Neale, 1994), perceptions of distress tolerance (Simons & Gaher, 2005), and others.

Additionally, the current study is a cross-sectional design where we are unable to make causal claims or even claims about temporal ordering. Future work may wish to adopt a prospective design and potentially control for emotional sensitivity or propensity to experience negative affect (i.e., neuroticism).

Strengths and Future Directions

The current study extends prior research in several ways. Historically, research using the

LESS has focused on treatment-seeking samples (Leahy, 2002; Mazloom, Yaghubi, &

Mohammadkhani, 2016; Rahabarian et al., 2016; Silberstein et al., 2012; Tirch et al., 2012), BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 23 which is certainly important. Yet, it is also important to understand emotional schemas and emotion beliefs in people in general, some of whom may have a history of psychopathology or may develop symptoms in the future. Our results here replicate and extend work on the LESS, where we find that the total score of the LESS is a useful index of maladaptive attitudes toward emotion in a broader sample. In addition, evaluating age and gender differences confirms that emotion schemas and beliefs are likely influenced by gender socialization and may shift with experience, suggesting further attention be paid to age and gender in the context of emotional attitudes.

One of the central aims of this study was to empirically examine a new measure of emotion beliefs, the IBAE. Our results provide evidence that the IBAE is associated with clinically-relevant symptoms, though we also note that the IBAE was never intended to be a marker of current psychopathology. Rather, the IBAE was intended to be a clinical tool to identify the specific patterns of beliefs held by a client, and are not specific to therapy clients; we have also used the measure with undergraduates in courses. The IBAE is a tool for facilitating discussion, such as by initiating a conversation about the origin of specific beliefs and the implications of those beliefs for people’s choices around emotion regulation. It is certainly plausible that someone without symptoms of psychopathology could endorse high maladaptive beliefs. For example, if someone felt like the origin of emotions was unclear, that emotions just

“fell” from out of nowhere but they still felt capable of identifying and regulating their emotions, the belief would not have to have negative repercussions. The results presented here suggest that the beliefs assessed by the IBAE are conceptually consistent with the schematic attitudes assessed by the LESS and provide initial validation that the IBAE has utility as a clinical tool.

Clinical Implications and Conclusion BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 24

Incorporating beliefs and schematic attitudes about emotion into therapy likely has many benefits. Certainly there are benefits for therapy based on emotion schemas (EST; Leahy, 2015), but considering that most therapy addresses emotions in some fashion, understanding the beliefs people hold about emotions can provide useful insights into particular targets for change. For example, someone who holds the belief that their emotions are “unique” may benefit from group therapy or targeted therapist self-disclosures. Someone who believes that emotions last a long time may benefit from emotion tracking or charting affective dynamics (Kuppens, Oravecz, &

Tuerlinckx, 2010; Trull, Lane, Koval, & Ebner-Priemer, 2015) in conjunction with emotional exposures to help a person understand that emotions do rise and fall. In addition, evaluating emotion beliefs at the start of treatment may be helpful to assess change, consistent with evidence showing that a successful course of therapy can shift beliefs (Khaleghi et al., 2017).

In conclusion, beliefs and schematic attitudes toward emotion matter—they are influenced by demographic factors and predict symptoms of psychopathology. Moreover, beliefs and schemas are not identical concepts, as beliefs are accepting particular stances as facts, whereas schematic attitudes are points of view or positions on a topic that often reflect behavior and the consequences of behavior. The work presented here confirms that when people believe that emotions are maladaptive (i.e., isolating, not malleable, not worth expressing, are difficult to understand, etc.) and they hold the attitude that they cannot adequately handle or manage their emotions, heighted symptoms of psychopathology are likely. Understanding how to shift beliefs about emotions may thus be an important future avenue of both clinical and empirical inquiry. BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 25

Conflict of Interest Statement

On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of interest. BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 26

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BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 33

Table 1. Individual Beliefs About Emotion (IBAE) items, anchors, descriptive statistics and frequencies

Construct Question Adaptive Anchor Less Adaptive M (SD) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Anchor 1. Cause+ Where do Emotions happen Emotions come 2.11 (.81) -- emotions because of clear from out of the come from? identifiable blue, for no reason causes 2. Judgment What is your Negative feelings Negative feelings 2.96 (1.10) -.03 -- attitude are helpful and are bad and toward useful; I welcome destructive; I negative my negative would prefer to emotions? feelings never feel bad. 3. Complexity Should I can feel a I should only feel 2.59 (1.00) -.04 .29** -- emotions be variety of one thing at a time simple or conflicting complex? emotions at once 4. Expression Should Emotions must Emotions should 2.49 (1.54) -.07 .16** .17** -- emotions be be “let out” and be kept inside the shared with expressed to the self; no one wants others? world to deal with other people’s emotions 5. Preference Which do you Feeling is Logic is preferable 3.34 (1.23) -.11* .18** .14** .37** -- prefer, preferable to to emotion thought or effortful thought. feeling? 6. Behavior Do emotions It is possible, It is extremely 2.86 (1.14) .17* .02 -.03 -.06 -.10* -- Control+ control maybe even easy, hard, maybe * behavior? to act differently impossible, to act than how I feel differently than inside. what my emotions tell me to do. 7. Malleability+ Can emotions Everyone can Emotions have to 2.63 (1.17) .09 -.05 -.04 -.10* -.17* .22** -- be changed? learn to control “run their course”; their emotions they are hard to change or alter 8. Uniqueness Are your My emotions are No one seems to 2.64 (1.13) -.03 .05 -.01 .04 -.06 .10* -.03 -- BELIEFS ABOUT EMOTIONS AND EMOTION SCHEMAS 34

emotions similar to experience different from everyone elses emotions the way I other peoples? do 9. Longevity+ How long do Negative feelings Negative feelings 2.68 (1.06) .20* .09 -.01 .08 .02 .20** .23** .12* negative are difficult but seem to last forever * feelings last? don’t last very long

*p < .05, **p < .001 +Items were presented to participant with the less adaptive anchor on the low side (1); all items keyed here with the less adaptive anchor on the high side (5) Table 2. Correlations among LESS dimensions

α M 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. (SD) 1. Invalidation .63 3.17 -- (1.11) 2. Incomprehensibility .82 2.89 .55** -- (1.19) 3. Guilt .71 2.86 .59** .66** -- (1.08) 4. Simplistic Views .62 3.77 .25* .35** .37** -- (.96) 5. Devalued .47 2.51 .45** .44** .45** .02 -- (.82) 6. Loss of Control .79 2.57 .52** .65** .63** .31** .43** -- (1.27) 7. Numbness .40 3.06 .46** .48** .42** .22* .27** .36** -- (1.23) 8. Overly Rational .57 3.94 .19** .01 .15** .24** -.13* .004 .20** -- (.98) 9. Duration .24 3.28 .29** .41** .34* .22** .22** .48** .17** -.12* -- (1.12) 10. Low Consensus .64 3.06 .43** .57** .46** .18** .43** .49** .24* -.14* .40** -- (.96) 11. Non-Acceptance .62 3.31 .54** .62** .69** .41** .30** .56** .38** .23** .38** .39** -- (.80) 12. Rumination .47 3.19 .43** .50** .43** .24** .51** .43** .24** -.11* .31** .49** .23** -- (.82) 13. Low Expression .39 3.25 .49** .17** .30** -.01 .26** .15* .33** .33** .06 .08 .25** .13* -- (1.23) 14. Blame .57 3.18 .47** .46** .44** .36** .26** .36** .41** .13* .22* .31** .43** .27** .14* -- (1.17) Total Score .90 3.17 .77** .82** .73** .51** .55** .75** .59** .24** .49** .59** .78** .59** .42** .58** (.62) *p < .05, *p < .001 Table 3. Associations between IBAE Beliefs and LESS Schema measures with sample, age and gender, using zero-order correlations and multiple regression.

Zero-Order Correlations Simultaneous Regressions of Demographics Predicting Beliefs and Schemas Sample Gender Age R2 Sample Gender Age Β β β

IBAE Cause -.11* .13** -.09* .03* -.06 .12* -.04 Judgment .03 .03 .09* .01 -.08 .03 .16* Complexity .10* -.01 .18** .03* -.08 -.01 .23** Expression .16** -.15** .13** .04** .11 -.12** .05 Preference .32** -.24** .24** .14** .26** -.19** .04 Behavior Control -.10* .11* -.13** .03* .03 .11* -.14* Malleability -.03 .07 -.10* .02* .11 .07 -.17** Uniqueness -.16** .03 -.26** .07** .08 .02 -.32** Longevity .02 .06 -.02 .01 .10 .07 -.09

LESS Invalidation .001 -.02 -.04 .002 .05 -.02 .07 Incomprehensibility -.26** .01 -.32** .10** -.07 -.02 -.27** Guilt -.16** -.04 -.20** .04** -.05 -.06 -.16* Simplistic Views -.22** .14* -.21** .06** -.13 .10* -.10 Devalued -.08 -.10* -.15* .03** .05 -.10* -.19** Loss of Control -.14* .09* -.19** .04** .01 .08 -.19** Numbness -.20** -.08 -.25** .07** -.07 -.11* -.20** Overly Rational .08 -.22** .10* .06** -.05 .22** .12 Duration -.28** .19** -.33** .14** -.03 .17** -.29** Low Consensus -.18** .06 -.26** .07** .04 .05 -.28** Non-Acceptance -.20** .05 -.23** .05** -.06 .03 -.18** Rumination -.15** .04 -.19** .03* -.02 .03 -.16* Low Expression .05 -.24** .01 .06** .02 -.24** -.02 Blame -.01 .02 -.08 .01 .11 .03 -.15* Total LESS -.21** -.002 -.27** .07** -.04 -.03 -.24**

Sample coded such that 0 = Subject Pool and 1 = mTurk. Gender coded as 0 = Male, 1 = Female Table 4. Correlations between the IBAE beliefs and LESS schemas.

IBAE Beliefs LESS Schemas Cause Judgment Complexity Expression Preference Behavior Malleability Uniqueness Longevity Control Invalidation .06 .11* .004 .33** .15** .05 .08 .26** .33** Incomprehensibilit .13** .02 -.04 .13** -.04 .16** .12** .36** .28** y Guilt .03 .20** .09* .28** .08 .04 .05 .27** .25** Simplistic Views -.06 .12** .08 .07 .05 .10* -.001 .11* .14** Devalued .09* .10* .05 .17** -.02 .12* .18** .19** .31** Loss of Control .08 .10* .03 .13* -.01 .18** .10* .26** .27** Numbness .004 -.05 .000 .27** .11* .02 -.02 .29** .16** Overly Rational -.17** .13* .02 .30** .43** -.19** -.22** -.04 -.04 Duration .14* .04 -.05 -.03 -.19** .18** .18** .19** .31** Low Consensus .08 .07 -.08 -.01 -.15* .15* .15* .55** .31** Non-Acceptance .01 .17** .05 .18** .03 .05 .01 .27** .17** Rumination .16** -.02 -.08 .04 -.06 .22** .21** .22** .37** Low Expression .05 .11* -.02 .41** .29** -.01 -.01 .03 .21** Blame -.04 .06 .03 .16** .01 .07 .11* .19** .32** Total Score .07 .15** .02 .29** .09* .14* .10* .37** .38**

*p < .05, *p < .001 Table 5. Zero-order correlations between IBAE Beliefs and LESS Schema measures with symptoms of depression, anxiety, stress, and borderline features.

DASS DASS DASS PAI- Depression Anxiety Stress BOR

IBAE Cause .11* .10* .09* .13* Judgment -.01 -.04 .02 02 Complexity -.03 -.04 -.06 -.06 Expression .11* .01 .04 .06 Preference .03 -.10* -.02 -.11* Behavior Control .11* .11* .12* .21** Malleability .15** .11** .13** .19** Uniqueness .21** .19** .18** .27** Longevity .33** .20** .28** .35**

LESS Invalidation .53** .32** .42** .52** Incomprehensibility .54** .49** .52** .62** Guilt .50** .43** .49** .57** Simplistic Views .20** .14** .27** .33** Devalued .47** .40** .38** .46** Loss of Control .49** .49** .49** .60** Numbness .39** .33** .30** .39** Overly Rational .005 -.12 -.01 -.08 Duration .32** .32** .29** .41** Low Consensus .44** .37** .41** .53** Non-Acceptance .35* .32** .39** .45** Rumination .57** .43** .49** .62** Low Expression .21** .08 .10 .15* Blame .33** .25** .37** .44** Total LESS .61** .49** .57** .70** Table 6. Hierarchical regressions with IBAE beliefs predicting symptoms of psychopathology.

Predictor DASS DASS DASS PAI-BOR β Depression Anxiety Stress β β β Step 1 ΔR2 = .03* ΔR2 =.08** ΔR2 = .05** ΔR2 =.11** Age -.11** -.28** -.21** -.32** Gender -.06 -.01 .03 .08 Step 2 ΔR2 = .17* ΔR2 = .06* ΔR2 = .09* ΔR2 = .16** Cause .05 .05 .02 .03 Judgment -.05 -.03 .01 .02 Complexity -.02 .01 -.05 -.03 Expression .10* .05 .05 .12* Preference .03 -.06 .03 -.05 Behavior Control .000 .01 .02 .06 Malleability .09* .04 .06 .09* Uniqueness .15** .11* .09* .16** Longevity .28** .16** .24** .27** Overall R2 = .18** R2 = .13** R2 = .14** R2 = .27** Model Table 7. Hierarchical regressions with LESS schemas predicting symptoms of psychopathology, with belief dimensions entered prior to non-belief dimensions

Predictor DASS DASS DASS PAI-BOR β Depression Anxiety Stress β β β Step 1 ΔR2 = .03* ΔR2 =.08** ΔR2 = .05** ΔR2 =.11** Age -.16** -.28** -.21** -.32** Gender -.06 -.01 .03 .08 Step 2 ΔR2 = .35** ΔR2 = .26** ΔR2 = .30** ΔR2 = .43** Incomprehensibility .26** .20** .17** .18** Guilt .20** .15* .18** .18** Simplistic Views .002 -.05 .04 .07 Loss of Control .15** .27** .18** .22** Overly Rational -.01 -.10* -.03 -.09* Duration .07 .03 -.02 .04 Low Consensus .14** .03 .11* .15** Non-Acceptance -.16** -.08 -.04 -.10* Low Expression .09* .001 -.01 .07 Blame .07 .03 .12** .15** Step 3 ΔR2 = .11** ΔR2 = .04** ΔR2 = .04** ΔR2 = .07** Invalidation .20** -.04 .07 .13** Devalued .09 .08 .01 .01 Numbness .12** .12** .01 .05 Rumination .29** .18** .25** .29** Overall R2 = .48** R2 = .37** R2 = .39** R2 = .61** Model Table 8. Hierarchical regressions with IBAE beliefs predicting symptoms of psychopathology after controlling for LESS schemas.

Predictor DASS DASS DASS PAI-BOR Depression Anxiety Stress β β β β Step 1 ΔR2 = .03* ΔR2 =.08** ΔR2 = .05** ΔR2 =.11** Age -.16** -.28** -.21** -.32** Gender -.06 -.01 .03 .08 Step 2 ΔR2 = .34** ΔR2 = .18** ΔR2 = .27** ΔR2 = .39** LESS Total .60** .44** .54** .65** Step 3 ΔR2 = .03* ΔR2 = .03* ΔR2 = .03* ΔR2 = .04** Cause .05 .05 .01 .02 Judgment -.10** -.08* -.05 -.04 Complexity -.01 .02 -.03 -.02 Expression -.06 -.07 -.11* -.06 Preference -.002 -.09* -.004 -.09* Behavior Control -.01 -.01 .01 .04 Malleability .05 .01 .02 .06 Uniqueness .003 -.01 -.05 -.01 Longevity .11** .03 .08 .09* Overall R2 = .40** R2 = .29** R2 = .35** R2 = .54** Model