READY to Govern Improving the Presidential Transition

Home , Blake Gottesman, John Podesta, Pete Rouse

JANUARY 2010 PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE READY TO GOVERN | IMPROVING THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION

The Partnership for Public Service is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that works to revitalize the federal government by inspiring a new generation to serve and by transforming the way government works. READY TO GOVERN | IMPROVING THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As more than one million people poured onto the Na- were elected, leaving only two-and-a-half months to as- tional Mall for Barack Obama’s historic January 20, sume leadership of the most important government in 2009 presidential inauguration, outgoing and incoming the world. In some cases, outgoing administrations have national security officials huddled in the White House not been fully cooperative or the incoming team has not Situation Room monitoring reports about a possible at- always been receptive to even hearing advice from de- tack on Washington, D.C. by a militant Somali terrorist parting officials. group with links to al Qaeda. During the 2008-2009 transition, the Bush White This was the nightmare transition scenario for Joshua House worked very hard to ensure that there would be a Bolten, President George W. Bush’s chief of staff. The smooth transfer of power to whoever won the election. political leadership of the country was gathering at the Capitol and the president’s staff had cleaned out their Republican presidential candidate John McCain laid White House offices, but the new president and his team down a basic foundation and established a game plan for were not yet in charge. a formal transition, but devoted few financial resources to the task and relied mainly on a small circle of trusted “So there I am with the president until he got into the associates. He personally took a hands-off approach, in limousine with the president-elect. I had no assistants large part because he did not want to be distracted from because everyone had turned in their badges, even me, campaigning and was wary of moving ahead too quickly. and yet there was this threat,” recalled Bolten. “By inauguration time they concluded it was not credible, but it Obama’s pre-election transition was highly organized, could have been a serious problem.” well financed, and had a policy and personnel operation that carried over into the formal transition after his No- The transfer of power from President Bush to President vember 2008 electoral victory. While Obama’s operation Obama turned out to be smooth and peaceful on that in many ways offers a model for how presidential transi- cold, sunny January day, an American democratic ritual tions should be run, the process began to break down on that occurred in the midst of the ongoing threat of ter- the personnel front after he entered the White House. rorism, the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the most se- This was partly due to a shift in personnel directors from vere economic crisis since the Great Depression. the transition to the White House, Senate delays, a decision to stiffen vetting requirements following nominee Although a false alarm, the inauguration terror alert mag- tax issues and other problems. nified how important it is for a new administration to immediately take charge in case of a national emergency. In truth, as smooth as the latest transition was and even with the considerable effort put into it by all involved, In today’s world, the American people expect their fed- in many ways our nation was simply lucky. No effort to eral government to be equipped for any contingency. date has been adequate to truly enable any newly elected The national security issues facing an incoming president president to hit the ground running, an inexcusable fact are too important to be left to chance, and in 2009, the in today’s volatile, fast-paced world where the stakes have economic crisis required immediate engagement. This never been higher. means presidential transitions must be highly organized, professional, and involved in extensive advance prepara- It is time to better enable new presidents to get their full tion. Hope and luck are not a strategy. team in place as quickly as possible. It will not be easy, but we must strive to change the status quo. This will There have been times in our history when newly elect- require institutionalizing a number of steps now left to ed presidents have been well-prepared and other times the discretion of the participants, and creating a new set when they have not been ready to govern on the day of goals and expectations that set a higher standard for they assume office. Some politicians have been sosu- all involved—the presidential candidates, the outgoing perstitious or fearful of seeming presumptuous that they administration, a president-elect and then his new ad- intentionally avoided detailed planning until after they ministration, and the Senate. PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE READY TO GOVERN | IMPROVING THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION

To provide a framework for the future, the Partnership take over from political appointees at the departments for Public Service examined the 2008-2009 presidential and agencies during a change of administration. transition, including the pre-election period, the phase • The vetting process and disclosure requirements for nom- between the election and the inauguration, and Obama’s inees have become too onerous and complicated. Too first year in office. We interviewed a number of key play- many political appointee positions require Senate confir- ers from the Bush White House and the transition teams mations, and it takes far too long—sometimes a year or of Obama and McCain. We studied the public record, more—for a new president to get all of his nominees in talked to outside experts and interviewed officials at the their jobs and engaged in governing. The Senate needs Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Gen- to address the above issues to remove barriers to public eral Services Administration (GSA), which handles office service. space and logistics for the president-elect. • Too little attention is paid—and insufficient resources are This report recounts many of the 2008-2009 presidential devoted—to preparing and training political appointees. transition activities, includes observations from the par- Many political appointees are policy experts, but the suc- ticipants, and identifies notable successes and shortcom- cess of those polices may depend on how well they are ings. Based on our study, we propose a series of legisla- able to manage and lead the career civil servants who tive changes to the Presidential Transition Act, and we must carry out the mission. The new leadership needs to highlight some best practices that could be employed in prioritize selecting and preparing its team to govern. future transitions by the White House and presidential campaigns. The 2008-2009 presidential transition was historic in From our study, several key issues stand out. many respects. Without an incumbent president or vice president in contention, a major transfer of power was a • To institutionalize effective presidential transitions, we certainty. This created an environment in which it was need to change the cultural norm. Rather than viewing easier for President Bush to openly facilitate a smooth early, pre-election transition planning as premature and transition, a process that also was driven by his own con- presumptuous, our nation must recognize it as prudent cerns about the terrorist threat. and necessary, and acknowledge that failing to plan for the transition can leave the country vulnerable to issues Bush decided a year before the 2008 election that he ranging from national security to the stability of financial wanted “the best transition possible regardless of who was markets. going to win,” and after the election, publicly declared • The preparation to govern must not wait until the two- that a smooth transition of power would be a “priority.” and-a-half-month period between the election and the inauguration; it should begin during the height of the In this report, we detail the ways in which the Bush ad- presidential campaign season though the outcome of ministration cooperated with both political campaigns the political contest will still be unresolved. This requires and then the president-elect. The White House under- a strong commitment and leadership from presidential took extensive transition planning long before the elec- candidates, a commitment of federal resources to help the tion, and provided assistance in many areas, including candidates do the planning and the selection of respected homeland and national security, the economy and agen- transition leaders with past experience in government. cy reviews.

• A new president must fill, at the very minimum, top Sen- McCain’s transition relied on a volunteer staff and a bud- ate-confirmed national security and economic positions get of only $25,000 to $30,000. His planning commit- immediately after the election, ensuring candidates have tee began talks in the spring of 2008, and by summer be- already been vetted, hold security clearances, are familiar gan engaging in preparatory work about jobs that would with issues and procedures, and have been prepared to need to be filled. His transition developed preliminary work as part of a team. lists of potential Cabinet, sub-Cabinet and White House • The White House should provide cooperation and guid- appointees, had a plan for handling a range of logistical ance to the major party presidential candidates in the issues, and laid out timelines for what would have to be pre-election period, and later to the president-elect. If the accomplished in a formal transition if he won the elec- president is running for re-election, there still should be tion. a transition plan in place that includes designating and training senior career executives who can temporarily ii READY TO GOVERN | IMPROVING THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION

But McCain did not plan to send sizable fact-finding By August 7, 2009, when Congress took its summer re- teams into the agencies after the election because he be- cess, only 240 or 46 percent of his nominees had been lieved it would be a “friendly takeover” and unnecessary. confirmed by the Senate. By December 31, 2009, just He also arranged for only five campaign aides to obtain 305 or about 59 percent of the nominees were in their advanced security clearances so they would have had im- jobs and 67 others were nominated and awaiting confir- mediate access to classified briefings after the election. mation. Even with so many jobs unfilled, some political McCain was described by staff members as being “super- appointees already were preparing to depart, including stitious” about engaging in too much advanced planning the deputy attorney general at the Justice Department. before the election. On occasion during the campaign, McCain accused Obama of “measuring the White House Bush also experienced problems getting his full team in drapes” before the election had taken place. place after the 2000 election. His transition was delayed five weeks because of the electoral dispute with Democrat Obama began preparing for his transition in the spring Al Gore, but Bush began planning in the spring of 1999, of 2008, had a budget of roughly $400,000 from pri- privately funded his initial post-election transition, and vately raised funds, engaged in detailed planning on the quickly named his White House staff and Cabinet nomi- issues, began preparing for expert teams to descend on nees after the outcome of the election was settled. Due in the agencies after the election, identified the top jobs that part to the election dispute and delays in the Senate, the needed to be filled quickly, and arranged for more than incoming Bush administration did not have its deputy 100 individuals to get security clearances so they would Cabinet officials in place until the spring of 2001 and its be prepared to receive classified briefings right after the sub-Cabinet officials on the job until that summer. election. President Bill Clinton had a particularly hard time, President-elect Obama raised in excess of $4 million in with controversies over a number of his nominees and private donations for his post-election transition to sup- a personnel operation that was slow off the mark. Three plement the roughly $5.3 million in taxpayer funds that months after his election, only 50 of his top political ap- were made available once he was elected. He grew his pointees had been confirmed by the Senate. At the end transition staff to several hundred people, and he quickly of June 1993, only 10 of 24 positions in the Defense named his top White House aides and other top political Department requiring Senate confirmation were filled. appointees. He set strict ethical guidelines, had national security and economic appointees in place early, and sent There is no way to guarantee the success of a presidential review teams into every agency to gather information. transition, control the political dynamic or account for Obama also prepared his policy agenda including the the personalities and idiosyncrasies of individual candi- economic stimulus package and plans to deal with fail- dates. But there is no doubt that there can be significant ing banks and an auto industry that was on life support. improvements. One month into his presidency, Obama still had only 13 of his 15 Cabinet secretaries confirmed. Improving presidential transitions will require institutionalizing some important activities now often left to The Obama transition, however, was not all smooth sail- chance, setting higher standards and raising expectations. ing. Throughout the government, key posts remained Extensive cooperation from all sides is needed along with unfilled in the early months of the administration, and thorough and early transition planning to ensure a new those in place struggled to meet the demands of Obama’s administration is fully staffed and ready to govern. That ambitious agenda. Additionally, several of Obama’s high- is not a luxury; it’s a necessity. level appointees ultimately did not make it into office, sometimes for reasons that proved embarrassing, leading Obama to tighten the already strict vetting requirements.

According to a Washington Post count, of the top 516 Senate-confirmed positions, Obama managed to get 76 political appointees confirmed and 108 nominated in his first 100 days. This amounted to about 15 percent of those positions that were filled.

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Based on our study, we recommend, among other ac- • Reduce the number of politically appointed positions that tions, the following: require Senate confirmation to help reduce delays that have traditionally prevented a new administration from getting a full team in place.

• To prevent a leadership vacuum and give transition plan- THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES ning a sense of urgency, Senate leaders should commit to • Publicly name a transition director within two weeks after work with the president-elect to have 50 top officials con- their respective nominating conventions. This will signal the firmed on or shortly after the inauguration, including all key campaign’s intention to position itself well for assuming of- posts within the departments of Defense, Homeland Secu- fice, take the transition out of the shadows, and remove the rity, Justice, State and Treasury. stigma of presumptuousness.

• Appoint a personnel director for the transition who also will serve as the White House personnel director (if elected) as a THE PRESIDENT-ELECT’S TRANSITION way of ensuring continuity and enhancing the effectiveness of the personnel process. • Provide the names of the top 50 officials, including key posts within the departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Jus- • Fully utilize the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Pre- tice, State and Treasury, to the Senate by January 1 (or a date vention Act provision (P.L. 108-458, Title VII, Subtitle F) that certain) to enable the Senate to act on their nominations on allows select individuals to be screened for security clear- or shortly after the inauguration. ances before the election. • Put in place early orientation and training for incoming political appointees who will be managing the departments and agencies, and plan for ongoing training. CONGRESS

• Assess the true costs incurred for the presidential transition and allocate an appropriately increased sum for transition THE WHITE HOUSE activities in future years, in part to minimize the need for private funding of transition activities that are now a necessity. • Create a White House Transition Coordinating Council com- To facilitate early transition planning, require campaigns to prised of administration, campaign and outside organiza- publicly name their transition director within two weeks of tion representatives to plan transition activities prior to the the nominating convention and assign a small percentage presidential election and through the inauguration. Each of appropriated transition funding to pre-election activities campaign’s transition director will represent their respective accessible only when the transition director is named. campaign on the council. This may present an especially difficult challenge for an incumbent seeking re-election. • Create in statute an Agency Transition Directors Council, led by the GSA transition coordinator and a representative • Install a high level official who has the strong backing of the named by the White House, to ensure early and meaningful president to be in charge of handling the transition and en- planning across federal agencies for the presidential transi- suring the transfer of power is smooth and seamless. tion. • Stage table top exercises that bring together incoming and • Mandate that the head of each Cabinet-level department, outgoing officials to participate in a crisis management sce- independent agency and critical agency subcomponent nario such as a national security threat or natural disaster. name a top-level careerist to lead that agency’s transition • Ensure that the president-elect and appropriate agencies efforts, with appropriate decision-making authority, six have sufficient resources and vetting personnel to carry out months before Election Day. ethics and background investigations between the elec- • Require the incumbent White House, as part of prudent con- tion and the first six months of the new administration. This tingency planning, to select and prepare career executives would help eliminate delays that have impeded the nomina- to temporarily fill the positions of top political appointees tion process. who will leave in the wake of an election. This should be done even if the president is running for re-election. If Con- gress does not mandate this action, the incumbent White House should take such steps on its own.

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INTRODUCTION

The constitutional transfer of presidential power has $5,000 from a single individual or organization, and re- been one of the hallmarks of American democracy—a quired disclosure of how this money was spent. Congress peaceful ritual that provides continuity for our govern- also extended public transition funding for 30 days fol- ment as well as an opportunity for change and renewal. lowing the president’s swearing-in instead of terminating it on Inauguration Day. Yet with all the hope, pomp and circumstance that comes with the swearing-in of a president, the ability of a new Twelve years later, in 2000, Congress for the first time administration to effectively begin governing often rests authorized the GSA to coordinate and help develop an on the preparation undertaken long before Inauguration orientation program for the president-elect’s Cabinet Day. and high-level political appointees, providing up to $1 million in funding. In 2004, Congress again revisited the For much of American history, presidential transitions transition, this time as part of the Intelligence Reform were carried out without very much advance planning and Terrorism Prevention Act that reorganized the in- or even cooperation from the sitting chief executive. A telligence community in the aftermath of the Septem- president-elect was not expected to come to the nation’s ber 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. capital until the inauguration and had few if any substantial policy or procedural discussions with the outgo- This law required that the incumbent administration ing administration. provide the president-elect with detailed classified sum- maries of all ongoing military and security issues. It en- President Harry Truman charted a positive course by couraged the president-elect to nominate “candidates for extending his hand to President-elect Dwight D. Eisen- high level national security positions through the level hower after the 1952 election, inviting him to the White of undersecretary” as soon as possible after the election House and ordering federal agencies to assist the new ad- and to expedite their background checks. In addition, ministration with the transition. John F. Kennedy funded the 2004 law allowed candidates from the major politi- his own transition just like his predecessors, and engaged cal parties to request security clearances for prospective in extensive transition planning on domestic and foreign transition team members prior to the general election. policy issues, but did not meet with Eisenhower until January 6, 1961, two months after the election. We have come a long way since the early days of presidential transitions, and the various legislative changes of It was not until March of 1964 that a formal transition the past four decades have been helpful, but there still framework was established with the congressional passage is vast room for improvement. Even with the assistance of the Presidential Transition Act, a measure designed to provided by the transition act, preparation for the trans- “promote the orderly transfer of executive power” and to fer of power has varied widely in every presidential elec- “ensure continuity” while “minimizing disruption.” tion cycle.

This law for the first time provided federal funding after The world today is volatile, the pace of events is rapid an election for a presidential transition and was intended and the stakes are so high that it’s time to bring the tran- in part to reduce reliance on the use of private donations. sition process to a new level of stability and predictabil- The law authorized the GSA to provide the president- ity. There must be a change in the cultural norm so that elect and vice president-elect as well as the outgoing pres- it is perceived as absolutely essential for presidential can- ident and vice president, with office space, paid staff and didates to make detailed plans for governing, and to do consultants, travel expenses, communications services so well before the election. There must be expectations and the temporary use of agency personnel. placed on the candidates that engaging in the planning process is a duty, not an option. There also must be a The transition law was amended in 1976, 1988 and strong commitment from the Senate to expedite consid- again in 2000, each time raising the amount of money eration of key officials and to vote on the nominations available to the incoming and outgoing administrations. of at least the top 50 defense, foreign policy, economic, Amendments in 1988 also capped private donations at

1 PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE READY TO GOVERN | IMPROVING THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION homeland security and law enforcement officials on or as quickly as possible after Inauguration Day.

Based on our examination of presidential transitions, and in particular the 2008-2009 experience, it is time once again to revisit and amend the presidential transition law to place requirements on the White House to better facilitate transition activities, and to enable campaigns and the president-elect to be better prepared to govern.

Beyond enacting changes into law, there are a number of operational practices that could improve future presidential transitions, and they should be adopted as standard procedure by presidential campaigns, the president-elect and outgoing administrations.

In most regards, the 2008-2009 transition was successful. Although there were a variety of glitches and shortcomings, President Bush’s White House created a climate of cooperation and professionalism. The circumstances helped create the dynamic—a two-term president, a vice president who was not on the ballot, and an overriding concern about terrorism that fueled the sitting president’s desire to fully prepare his successor.

At the same time, Barack Obama devoted substantial resources, thought and planning to governing, and came to office highly prepared amid difficult economic and national security circumstances.

The central problem we face, as one former White House aide told us, is “how to make a transition not depend on personalities and good will. It worked this time because you had two grown-ups.”

This report seeks to answer that question, and to move the process from the vagaries of fate and good will to a higher standard. We examine the three phases of the 2008-2009 transition—the pre-election timeframe, the period from the election to the inauguration and Presi- dent Obama’s first year in office. In each section, we provide a short narrative based on the experiences and reflec- tions of some key participants in the transition, and offer a series of recommendations for each phase on a broad range of transition issues.

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PHASE ONE PRE-ELECTION DAY TRANSITION PLANNING

A critical phase of every presidential transition occurs THE OBAMA PRE-ELECTION TRANSITION PLANNING before Election Day. In the most effective and successful Democrat Barack Obama created a highly structured, presidential transitions, planning begins well before the well-funded and well-managed transition, with Obama’s outcome of the election is clear—in many cases, a year aides saying that he felt strongly about the need to lay a before the election. Yet in recent times, campaigns have firm foundation so that he would be prepared to govern portrayed such advance planning as “presumptuous,” if elected. when in fact it is both prudent and necessary. Christopher Lu, the executive director of the Democratic Even if conducted quietly behind-the-scenes, a campaign candidate’s transition, said Obama had referred to the can powerfully argue that preparing to govern is essential scene in the 1972 classic political film The Candidate to the safety and security of the nation. It is necessary to when actor Robert Redford, playing the role of a young reset expectations and create a climate that encourages liberal lawyer and the winner of a hard fought Senate the need to properly prepare for a transfer of power. race, turned to his campaign advisor on election night and asked, “What do we do now?” During the period before the election, presidential campaigns must take steps to identify key White House staff “Obama did not want to be in that position of saying, positions and the individuals who might fill them if their ‘What now?’” recalled Lu. candidate is elected. They need to prepare lists - ofpo tential Cabinet nominees and other senior politically ap- Obama conferred with trusted advisers about the need pointed leadership posts, and prioritize important issues for transition planning in May 2008. By Election Day, that will need to be addressed early in a new administra- Lu said they had identified about 300 top jobs, and had tion. a sense of “what order we wanted to fill them” including placing a priority on quickly naming a White House The campaigns also must work with the General- Ser chief of staff and other key White House personnel. vices Administration (GSA) to plan for office space and other logistical and personnel requirements in the post- John Podesta, a former chief of staff to President Bill election period—a time when the formation of a new Clinton, became head of the Obama transition effort in government must be put into full gear. June of 2008 and presided over a high-level board of advisers who each had different policy expertise. The group The White House should play a role even if the sitting met regularly during the pre-election period. president is seeking re-election. In such a case, the White House still must facilitate security clearances for key Podesta came to the transition after having founded the aides of a challenger, help agencies with coordination for Center for American Progress in 2003. This Washington, a possible transition, and include funding in the budget D.C.-based think tank put together a voluminous book for transition activities. If the incumbent is not running, on how to run a Democratic administration, and had there are a variety of steps that should be taken before compiled detailed background on past presidential tran- the election to help provide information and facilitate sitions and important policy considerations. a smooth post-election transition and transfer of power. Podesta said a key to his role as a kind of chief executive officer was not having any ambitions to go into the government again, making him an honest broker and allow- ing him to devote his full energies to the task from the summer right through the election and the inauguration.

A similar pattern had been followed in 1960 when John F. Kennedy named Clark Clifford, an experienced Wash- ington hand with no ambition to serve in the new ad-

3 PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE READY TO GOVERN | IMPROVING THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION ministration, as his transition director. In contrast, Bill “We would provide Obama with a memo every week Clinton’s transition lost continuity when Warren Chris- on what had been happening in the transition and then topher, the director of his transition, was nominated to John (Podesta) and Pete (Rouse) would talk to him, and be secretary of state after the 1992 election. brief him in greater detail,” said Lu.

In addition to Podesta, Lu and the top-level advisory Looking back, Podesta said solid work had been done in board, the Obama transition had a paid staff of about the pre-election period because of the early start, good 10 people during the summer of 2008, dozens of volun- resourcing and organization. teers, and a budget funded from private donations that reached about $400,000 during the pre-election period. Lu said the transition “laid out pretty good plans up to The money was used to pay for office space, salaries, November 4.” But even so, Lu said, a lot of those plans computers and software, travel, and telephones. changed after November 4, “because once the reality of what we were doing set in, you just have to make a lot of The transition produced policy options on a wide range adjustments.” of issues, including national security and had “parachute teams” ready to go into the agencies after the election to collect information. In addition, the Obama team THE MCCAIN PRE-ELECTION TRANSITION PLANNING worked out the logistics and processes for handling an John McCain engaged a small circle of six friends and expanded and formal transition operation in the post- advisers to begin the transition planning in the spring election period, conferring frequently with officials from and summer of 2008, and they worked through the fall the GSA. They also began compiling names of potential to lay down a basic foundation while keeping their ef- political appointees for top jobs, and engaged in some forts closely guarded. preliminary vetting by scouring public sources of information. Aides said the Arizona Republican felt it was premature to move too aggressively before a presidential victory was The transition also obtained security clearances- inad in hand. Rick Davis, McCain’s campaign manager and a vance of the election for well in excess of 100 people who member of the transition’s inner circle, said there was “a would be dealing with national security, economic and level of superstition involved” on the part of the senator other important issues. who wanted to take a cautious approach and have a transition that “operated in a discreet environment.” He said Lu said one problem that arose during this pre-election McCain believed there would be ample time to deal with phase involved ensuring the integrity of the sensitive pol- a number of issues after the election if he were victorious. icy documents developed by Obama’s national security team. He said the transition rented computers at great “He didn’t want to take his eye off of the election,” said expense that had anti-virus software and other security Davis. “He knew what he wanted to do when governing. features, but noted there were no guarantees that the data He had very specific ideas.” would be fully protected. Lu said it would have been saf- er and less costly if the intelligence community or the Members of McCain’s Transition Planning Committee, Defense Department could have provided the transition as the group called themselves, said they felt they had a with secure computers. solid framework in place and would have been prepared if McCain had won the election. A good deal of the transition’s organization had been laid out in the early part of 2008 by Peter Rouse, Obama’s “We had a good plan, we had a good book ready,” said former Senate chief of staff and top campaign aide. Lu Will Ball, a former Navy secretary who handled many reviewed the detailed plans from the 2004 transition of of the day-to-day operations of the transition. “Based losing Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry, on what we understood to be the level of planning un- which he said “turned out to be a road map for how to dertaken by previous transition planning teams, we were do transitions.” pretty far along, but we never got to take the final exam.”

While Podesta and Lu ran the transition, Rouse served as “In April and May of 2008, we were gathering informa- the primary liaison to the campaign, and all three were tion and then in May, I started writing down some of the in regular contact. basic outlines of what we needed to do going forward with some specific recommendations and a timeline,”

4 READY TO GOVERN | IMPROVING THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION said Ball. “We had a blueprint with fairly general steps rorist attacks, concentrated on national security issues. and then as each week went by we would flesh out more Trevor Potter, the campaign’s counsel, was also part of specific goals to reach in the three phases, the pre-nomi- the transition’s inner circle that met at least every week as nation phase, the nomination to election phase, and then the election drew closer. the post-election phase.” McCain’s transition operated out of the campaign’s head- Russ Gerson, a New York executive recruiter and the quarters in Arlington, Va., and ran on a shoestring bud- transition’s personnel director, said he began work in get of $25,000 to $30,000. The operation consisted of June of 2008, and put together a volunteer team of 29 the six key players, a relatively small group of volunteers, mostly private-sector subject matter experts in different and the part-time advisors spread around the country. fields from across the country. Gerson said he built a da- Davis said that he did not think that more money for tabase that included job descriptions, and with the input the transition was necessary and felt the small budget from his volunteers, developed lists of potential candi- “did not have a material impact.” He added that it was dates along with their biographical material that went important to devote scarce resources to the campaign, five deep for the top 125 Cabinet and sub-Cabinet posi- particularly in the final month-and-a-half. tions. He also said he developed job descriptions and a list of candidates for 50 or so White House staff jobs. Unlike the Obama transition, McCain did not have review teams prepared to go into federal agencies to obtain Gerson said the individuals on the lists were not con- information and make assessments on policy and opera- tacted directly, although in most cases preliminary pub- tions. Ball said it was “a conscious decision” not to pull lic record vetting was undertaken. He said the lists of these groups together prior to the election because Mc- potential candidates were ready for McCain to see right Cain “would have relied to a greater extent on selected after the election, along with a week-by-week timetable carry-over personnel” from the Bush administration. He for assessing and naming appointees. Gerson said he was said the process would have been like a “friendly take- proud of the work product, but noted that the task was over,” and large groups would not have been necessary. enormous and said it would have been helpful to have started the planning much earlier. The McCain transition also did not take advantage of the opportunity to obtain a sizable number of security clear- Throughout the process, Gerson said, McCain kept his ances for aides to gain quick access to classified briefings distance but knew the work was taking place. “We did after the election. Davis said there were just five cam- this with very little direct input from Sen. McCain. Sen. paign aides who went through the clearance process— McCain’s philosophy was, ‘I want to be prepared to gov- individuals who would have been directly involved with ern, but I don’t want to think about any of these de- intelligence briefings for the president-elect. cisions until after November 4,’” said Gerson. He said McCain “knew he could trust us to do an effective job.” Ball said the transition did not follow through with more names. “We met with Justice Department officials and Ball made the same point about McCain’s view of the went over the procedures with the Justice Department transition. “While McCain understood why this is im- and the FBI,” said Ball. “We didn’t have names we were portant and what the major objectives of the transition ready to put into clearance at the time, but we knew the should be, he was still not going to devote any significant process was there, and had the election gone the other amount of time to this planning, leaving that to us up way, we would have been ready to take advantage of it.” until it became the real thing,” said Ball. Throughout the summer and fall, the McCain and Besides Ball, Davis and Gerson, William Timmons Sr., a Obama campaigns were reluctant to talk about their prominent Washington lobbyist and veteran of Republi- transition activities for fear of being viewed as presump- can transitions, was part of the core group. He provided tuous even though representatives from each group were a thick book filled with administrative details for a for- engaged in planning, conferring with the White House, mal transition, including office space requirements, the and meeting with the GSA about post-election office way to conduct travel arrangements, the placement of space and other issues. telephone lines, and the ins and outs of building security and many other logistical issues. John F. Lehman Jr., a The McCain campaign, however, sought to exploit former Navy secretary, friend and member of the com- Obama’s extensive transition preparation. mission that investigated the September 11, 2001, ter-

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In July of 2008, a senior Obama campaign adviser was THE WHITE HOUSE PRE-ELECTION quoted as saying, “Barack is well aware of the complexity TRANSITION PREPARATION and the organizational challenge involved in the transi- While the Obama and McCain transitions were seeking tion process and he has tasked a small group to begin to operate quietly and their political campaigns were at- thinking through the process.” A McCain press spokes- tacking each other on a daily basis, the two sides were man immediately accused Obama of “dancing in the end privately consulting with the Bush White House in the zone” before crossing the 50-yard line. summer of 2008 to prepare for a smooth transition of power. Ball called this remark “unfortunate” and said McCain and his planning committee took the transition seriously. These consultations had been preceded by a good deal of Yet McCain at various times during the campaign ac- White House planning that was set in motion earlier in cused Obama of overconfidence and suggested during the year after President Bush instructed his chief of staff, the fall campaign that he was already “measuring the Joshua Bolten, to make this “the best transition possible drapes.’’ regardless of who was going to win.’’ According to aides, Bush wanted an effective, cooperative and seamless tran- Lu said Obama transition team members felt “burned” sition in large part because of his concerns over national by some of these comments, reinforcing the need to keep security, particularly the ongoing terrorist threat and the their activities as quiet as possible. Davis said the Mc- wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cain camp was constantly under attack on personnel issues by Obama, with the Democrat accusing the Re- Bush’s commitment to a thorough and professional tran- publican of having a staff top-heavy with lobbyists. “This sition process, which he communicated to his Cabinet, kind of culture doesn’t allow you to open up,” said Davis. set the tone and direction for the White House effort. This stance was made easier given the fact that neither he Some of participants in the 2008 transition agreed that nor his vice president was on the ballot. finding a way to bring the pre-election transition out of the shadows and make it an accepted part of the process A cornerstone of the administration’s contact with the would be a positive development and would avoid the campaigns was what it called “uniformity of access.” possibility of it being used as a campaign issue. One way Seeking to avoid any charges of favoritism, all materi- to do this would be to make it a statutory requirement als, meetings, and guidance given to one transition team for each campaign to publicly name a transition direc- were simultaneously offered to the other. tor following their nominating conventions, and to be eligible to receive federal funds for transition activities Bush created a White House Presidential Transition Co- during this period. This would legitimize the pre-election ordinating Council by executive order that included se- transition and provide the resources to begin the proper nior economic, national security and homeland security planning without having to worry about private fund- officials, representatives from the two presidential cam- raising or criticism from an opponent. paigns, and outside experts. The council, similar to one created by President Clinton in 2000 after the November Others interviewed saw a downside to placing the pre- election, met in the 2008 pre-election period and after- election transition in greater public view, feeling it might ward to discuss pertinent issues and plan for a smooth inhibit planning, create problems for the presidential transfer of power. campaigns, and in the end cause some transition teams to shut down activities that should actually occur. Ac- During the period before the election, the White House cording to this view, it is better to operate under the ra- also helped expedite security clearances for key advisers dar and provide campaigns with greater flexibility. The and top transition aides of the campaigns so that the low key approach, they said, serves to avoid raising issues winner’s staff would have access to classified briefings that should not be publicly addressed, such as personnel and important information quickly after the election. matters. There was also concern that accepting federal This process, permitted by the Intelligence Reform and funding would bring unwanted scrutiny. Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, was used extensively by the Obama campaign as noted earlier, but not by Mc- Cain.

6 READY TO GOVERN | IMPROVING THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence -pro agenda. He was attacked by Democrats and outside vided briefings to the two major candidates after their groups who said the edict prompted agencies to rush to political party nominations. There also were briefings meet the new deadlines with a higher than normal vol- on the deepening financial crisis as the campaign pro- ume of new regulatory proposals. gressed into the fall. The Office of Government Ethics held meetings with both campaign transition teams to The president and his staff won praise from both camps discuss financial disclosure rules. and outside experts.

Aware of the importance of personnel matters in the Ball, the McCain transition aide, said he found the transition, Bolten said the Bush White House prepared White House to be very cooperative, “offering plenty of “a complete inventory and description of all the ap- information” after the Arizona senator had secured the pointed jobs in government” that was turned over to the Republican presidential nomination. transition directors of the two campaigns. The White House also prepared briefing papers on “hot” domestic, Similarly, Lu of the Obama transition said, “Anything we economic and national security issues that the new ad- ever wanted, they always got to us, before Election Day, ministration would face in the first 90 days after Election Day.”

The White House, with the input of both campaigns and assistance from the GSA, helped facilitate the de- THE WHITE HOUSE PRIMES THE AGENCIES sign of a new presidential personnel computer system In April of 2008, Bolten instructed Clay Johnson, the to replace the antiquated software program it had been deputy director of the Office of Management and Bud- using. The outdated White House personnel database, get (OMB), to “prepare the agencies” for the presidential called TeleMagic, had been used by Bush when he was transition. Johnson said that meant “helping them figure governor of Texas. out what to do, getting them to focus on this and devote resources.” The template for this new personnel database had been developed initially by Gerson, McCain’s personnel di- Johnson said he had his first meeting with the -Presi rector. He said he offered to let the Obama transition dent’s Management Council in May that resulted in a use his software so that both campaigns could jointly re- July 18 transition guidance memo. This memo directed quest that the Bush administration adopt it as the model the management council, comprised of the deputy sec- for the new system that would be in place at the White retaries and chief operating officers of major agencies, to House on Inauguration Day. Gerson said he believed begin identifying by August 1, 2008, the career officials that having both sides using the same data manage- responsible for assuming the positions of departing po- ment system that would be available at the White House litical appointees at each major bureau and office of their would help ensure a smoother personnel process for the department or agency, and by October 15 to sign off on new president. He said both campaigns agreed, and the the individuals who would temporarily fill those jobs. White House fast-tracked the approval with the GSA by late September 2008. The Johnson memo told the agencies to identify a career official to serve as their transition coordinator and as On policy issues, Bolten months earlier issued a memo the liaison to the president-elect’s team. In addition, the to the heads of all executive departments and agencies agencies were asked by November 1 to prepare a brief urging them to resist last minute regulatory activity ex- summary of their department’s basic organization, cur- cept in “extraordinary circumstances.” His March 2008 rent missions and performance goals, and to identify and memo directed that all regulations be proposed no later summarize their important policy, internal management, than June 1, 2008, and that final regulations be issued no and legal and infrastructure issues. later than November 1, 2008. Although the agencies were given these instructions, Bolten said he felt he was pursuing a prudent course that Johnson said he did not think it was necessary to require would give sufficient airing of new regulations and avoid them to report back to him on their progress. “If they the appearance that the administration was seeking to were not doing what was asked, then they were going to walk out the door while imposing “midnight” rules. The pay the price when their new bosses got there,” he said. chief of staff said he drew criticism from inside the ad- He added that all of the agencies completed their work ministration for constraining the agencies and the Bush by October 31.

7 PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE READY TO GOVERN | IMPROVING THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION

The administration for the first time ever also brought PHASE ONE RECOMMENDATIONS together a number of career agency transition coordina- The experiences of the 2008 transition offer some -im tors in the fall, prior to the election, to discuss common portant insights into best practices and effective policies issues they would need to confront during the post-elec- that should be part of a pre-election transition period tion transition. After the election, additional meetings for presidential campaigns, the White House, and the were held. These sessions were arranged by Gail Lovelace, federal departments and agencies. Based on our study, the director of the presidential transition at the GSA. we recommend:

Lovelace got involved in the transition because of the GSA’s role in providing office space and support services THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES to the president-elect after the election, but she worked with Johnson to initiate pre-election agency activities in- • Establish a transition team to conduct early planning long cluding the meetings to discuss how to prepare for the before the general election, with a trusted liaison between new administration. Lovelace said most of the agency the transition and the campaign. people had never been through a transition before and • Publicly name a transition director within two weeks after did not know what to expect. the official nominating convention. This will signal the campaign’s intention to take the transition out of the shadows, “Nobody said, ‘Gail, do this job,’ before I became the and remove the stigma of presumptuousness. This would official person here at the GSA,” said Lovelace. “There’s not be applicable for an incumbent’s campaign. nobody in government, so to speak, in charge of transition.” • Select a transition director with significant federal or White House experience, and who does not plan to join the admin- Lovelace said agency coordinators should have been en- istration, so the focus can be on the transition alone. This gaged much earlier and an effort should have been made would not apply to an incumbent president who would not to ensure they were making the necessary preparations. have the same needs. “I think some agencies scurried at the last minute,” she • Assign transition directors to learn about past transitions, in said. “I think a lot of the agencies weren’t focused. They many cases, leveraging the plans from previous transition didn’t understand the level of effort needed to transition teams. They should consider how to archive the new tran- to a new administration.” Attendance at the meetings sition plans for future teams, viewing the transition in the convened by Lovelace for the agency transition leaders broader perspective of effective federal operations. varied from session to session. • Send transition advisors to key agencies (such as the Depart- ment of Homeland Security and the Defense Department) to receive briefings during the pre-election phase so that they will be well-informed on key issues early in the process.

• Name a personnel director for the transition early in the planning process who will also serve as the White House personnel director (if elected) and who intends to stay in that role for at least the first year of the administration. This will build continuity and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the personnel process.

• Begin compiling lists of possible appointees during the pre- election phase, and start public record vetting.

• Utilize the early security clearance process permitted by the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to expedite getting key national security aides and other important staff access to classified material immediately after the election.

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• Require by law that by September 15 of a presidential elec- CONGRESS tion year, agencies identify and prepare career executives to fill critical positions on an interim basis until a new adminis- • Assess the true costs for the presidential transition and al- tration’s political appointees are in place. This would apply locate an appropriately increased sum for transition activi- even if an incumbent is seeking re-election. ties in future years, in part to minimize the need for private funding of transition activities. With modern security concerns and enhanced technology needs, building on past THE WHITE HOUSE budgets—rather than actual expenses—may underesti- • Create by presidential executive order, during a president’s mate resource requirements. In 2008-2009, $8.5 million was second term, a White House Transition Coordinating Coun- federally allocated for the presidential transition, divided cil, led by White House officials and comprised of adminis- as follows: $5.3 million for the incoming administration (62 tration, campaign and outside organization representatives percent), $2.2 million for the outgoing administration (26 to plan transition activities prior to the presidential election percent), and $1 million for the GSA to provide initial train- and through the inauguration. Each campaign’s transition ing for appointees (12 percent.) But even with this funding, director will represent the campaign on the council. Con- President-elect Obama had to raise millions of dollars more duct regular meetings leading up to a presidential election in private donations to finance his transition. and during the period between the election and the inau- • Assign a small percentage of appropriated funding to pre- guration and follow up with agencies throughout the transi- election transition activities, accessible only once the tran- tion until the formal transfer of power. sition director is public named, to facilitate early transition • If Congress does not legislatively require it, voluntarily select planning. For example, 2.5 percent of the incoming admin- and prepare career executives to temporarily fill appointed istration’s appropriation could be provided to each major positions of departing officials even if the incumbent presi- campaign immediately following the party’s nominating dent is seeking re-election. When choosing career execu- convention, contingent upon a campaign identifying its tives to temporarily assume these roles, train them to be transition director. This could obviate the need for private contingency-ready and able to support incoming appoin- transition fundraising, and provide money for important tees from the transition phase into the new administration. activities. Eligibility for this pre-election federal transition funding should be determined by the same standards es- • Direct agencies to develop briefing materials for the incom- tablished by the Commission on Presidential Debates. A ing administration dealing with the top issues and problems candidate who participates in commission-sponsored de- on their agendas with guidance from the Agency Transition bates during the general election would be eligible. The GSA Directors Council regarding the content and format (and representative would track the expenditures to ensure this input from the candidates’ representatives) by November 1. funding is used for transition planning activities. • Provide to campaigns, through presidential personnel, a list • Create in statute an Agency Transition Directors Council, of all Senate-confirmed positions and their related responsi- led by the GSA transition coordinator and a representative bilities in the early fall of an election year. Position descrip- named by the White House, such as the deputy director for tions for high-level jobs would be especially helpful. management at the Office of Management and Budget, to • Set guidelines and negotiate protocols for access to mate- ensure early, consistent and meaningful planning within rials and personnel at the agencies and departments with federal agencies for the presidential transition. This would the two campaign transition teams if the president is leaving enhance GSA’s significant transition role, which includes office, and with the transition team of the opponent if the managing logistical elements such as securing office space incumbent is running for re-election. and coordinating preparatory activities across federal agencies.

• Mandate legislatively that the head of each Cabinet-level THE GSA department, independent agency and critical agency sub- • Arrange for the transition teams of the major party nomi- component name a top-level career civil servant to lead that nees to have access to secure computers and state-of-the agency’s transition planning, with appropriate decision- art software that will protect sensitive national security in- making authority, six months before Election Day. These formation. individuals will comprise the Agency Transition Directors Council.

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THE 2008-2009 TRANSITION SPOTLIGHT ON THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

The 2008 presidential election marked the first transi- outlined issues that affect more than one component tion for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a such as cybersecurity, and included a detailed roster of six-year-old organization created in the aftermath of the decision points that would be faced in the first 30, 60 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. and 90 days of the new administration.

Ensuring continuity of operations and the readiness to According to several knowledgeable individuals, progress handle a national security crisis or a natural disaster were on the transition was slow at the start because the day- the top transition priorities for DHS, an often troubled to-day implementation of many issues was left to DHS and complex conglomeration of 22 separate agencies employees who did not have the stature and authority with different missions, cultures and 216,000 employees. needed to do the job.

Recent events have shown that elections are times of in- This changed in June 2008 when Schneider, the DHS creased vulnerability, with terror attacks taking place in deputy secretary, appointed U.S. Coast Guard Rear Ad- Madrid in 2004, in London in 2005, and in Glasgow in miral John Acton to head the transition. Acton was a 2007 during political transitions. The 1993 World Trade career officer free of politics, highly organized andre- Center attack as well as the 9/11 attacks occurred within spected. When he came on board, Acton said, “DHS had the first year of new administrations. no transition playbook, no binder to pull off the shelf as a starting point because it was the department’s first real DHS began its preparations in 2007, long before the transition.” He immediately set clear goals, determined presidential election. President Bush issued an executive the functions that needed to be performed and the or- order in August 2007 delineating a line of succession ganization that was required to accomplish those tasks. for DHS, and Secretary Michael Chertoff in September Initially, he started with six full-time staffers and later 2007 established task forces to develop recommenda- called on some 80 others to help on a part-time basis tions and best practices for the presidential transition. across the department.

These actions were followed by a number of positive and Acton said his efforts were enhanced by several factors, concrete steps taken by DHS in 2008 that included: including the clear signal sent to the entire department from Chertoff and Schneider in the summer of 2008, • Establishing a succession plan that designated career well before the national party political conventions, that executives to backfill roughly 80 senior political ap- everything possible must be done to ensure the new ad- pointees at DHS headquarters and subcomponents to ministration succeeds. He said a successful transition preserve continuity of operations before, during and requires strong support from leadership and “someone after the administration changeover. The succession senior” heading the effort. “If the secretary and the com- plan went three levels deep in each organization. Paul ponent heads are not on board, it could be a very long Schneider, the former DHS deputy secretary, said, road,” he said. “On January 20, we assumed that every political appointee would be gone, which for the most part is The Coast Guard admiral said another positive factor was exactly what happened.” that President-elect Obama’s DHS review team was “very • Organizing seminars, training programs and hands- informed on homeland security issues, knew what ques- on group exercises in crisis management and operations to ask and were ready to hit the ground running.” tions for the senior career employees (and later for the He said his DHS staff moved as quickly as they could to new political appointees) to ensure that each compo- remove roadblocks and give the Obama team access to nent and office within DHS had capable leadership requested information. He said they gave them private ready to take the reins and respond to an incident. workspace, laptops, phones, printers, shredders, building passes, and provided training and crisis management • Providing briefing materials for the new administra- exercises for incoming political appointees. tion, as well as making sure that policies issued over the years were validated and memorialized into manage- Acton said there were a number of lessons learned from ment directives. The materials contained descriptions the 2008-2009 transition. He said his full-time effort of the missions and capabilities of each component,

10 READY TO GOVERN | IMPROVING THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION should have started a year before the election, not in June Throughout 2008, there were a number of emergency of 2008. “That was too late and really compressed our response exercises for career officials who had been des- timelines,” he said. He also said the effort would have ignated to backfill departing political appointees. Some benefited greatly from a line item in the DHS budget for observers felt that the earlier training efforts were not as the transition, to avoid having to scratch out resources effective as they could have been, but Acton said DHS from others to get the job done. sought to make them meaningful and he believes they were successful. There were other issues as well. Acton said DHS would have preferred direct contact with the campaigns of both Aside from the internal DHS training, Acton said there Obama and Republican John McCain immediately after was “no formal mechanism to get the entire federal the national conventions, but neither the White House government to train together” and engage in joint op- nor the campaigns supported early contact. He also not- erations. “We presented our DHS transition training ed that, initially, only a handful of Obama’s DHS review proposal to other federal agencies and Cabinet-level de- team held top secret security clearances and therefore had partments. Some took part and others did not,” he said. access to classified briefings. Though this later changed as “No one was telling them you must do this.” the review team grew, he said that was inadequate and slowed down the review team’s work. Outside observers found that the DHS transition, while experiencing a bumpy start and its share of shortcomings In addition, Acton said it was a challenge getting all of and frustrations, involved a high degree of advance prep- the new political appointees to engage in the initial train- aration and offers a guide for other agencies to follow in ing and crisis management sessions, since they were new the future. Acton said that he would “give us a B, because to their jobs, had a lot on their plates, and in some cases while we did well for the first time out of the blocks, we did not grasp the urgency. “We sat down with them to could improve substantially.” say this is important and you really need to do it now,” said Acton.

PHASE T WO THE FORMAL TRANSITION BETWEEN ELECTION DAY AND THE INAUGURATION

The finish line of the presidential campaign represents top echelon positions. His personnel team also must the start of the formal transition for the victor, assum- begin processing applications for other administration ing that the individual is not the incumbent. It marks jobs, and set up computer systems and Web sites to help a short, but extremely crucial, two-and-a-half months handle the task. for the president-elect to shift away from the campaign mode, build an administration and get ready to govern. The personnel process for the high-level jobs is a deli- cate one, requiring political and policy considerations, A failure to handle this phase properly can have serious and demanding extensive background vetting. It requires consequences for a new administration, leaving it unpre- consultation with congressional leaders and, in particu- pared and squandering the chance to get off to a fast and lar, Senate committee chairmen and their staffs. productive start. The post-election transition operation must grow quickly, be highly organized, and be able to Cooperation from the White House is needed on a range communicate with the public, the Congress, the outgo- of matters, including high-level briefings on national ing administration and party, and campaign allies. security, the economy or other issues that may be important at the time. Lame duck administrations are not In this period between early November and the inaugu- always helpful, however, and sometimes seek to cement ration, the president-elect must select the key players for their legacy with last-minute rulemaking, executive or- his White House staff, 15 Cabinet secretaries and nu- ders, national security directions, spending decisions and merous others to head independent agencies and other appointments not requiring Senate confirmations.

11 PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE READY TO GOVERN | IMPROVING THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION

THE BUSH WHITE HOUSE incoming Cabinet and national security officials. Bolten The 2008 transition, marked by a shift of power between described it as “one giant table top exercise” that required the two major political parties, unfolded in the midst of the participants to work together on handling a scenario the financial meltdown, two foreign wars, and the ongo- involving the coordinated detonation of improvised ex- ing terrorist threat. Although the president-elect had run plosive devices in several major cities. a campaign that was highly critical of the outgoing Bush administration and its policies, President Bush put poli- “The most important thing for us to accomplish was to tics aside and emphasized cooperation. prepare our successors as best we could for a national security event that might happen early in their tenure,” Two days after Obama’s 2008 election, Bush spoke to his said Bolten. “We brought them all into one big room. I White House staff and pledged that a smooth transition think (incoming national security adviser) Jim Jones was of power would be “a priority,” declaring “over the next sitting next to (outgoing national security adviser) Steve 75 days, all of us must ensure that the next president and Hadley and (incoming homeland security secretary) Ja- his team can hit the ground running.” net Napolitano was sitting next to (outgoing homeland security secretary) Michael Chertoff and so on.” “We face economic challenges that will not pause to let a new president settle in,” Bush said. “This will also be Bolten suggested that future transitions should include America’s first wartime presidential transition in four additional training exercises for incoming White House decades. We’re in a struggle against violent extremists personnel and key Cabinet members and their staff to determined to attack us—and they would like nothing develop a working familiarity with each other and the more than to exploit this period of change to harm the processes that need to be followed. American people.” The Bush team established written protocols and guid- Such an approach was not taken by President Clinton in ance for the new White House and key responders to 2000, a transition that was complicated by the ballot dis- handle a national security event, and provided the pres- pute in Florida between George W. Bush and Vice Presi- ident-elect’s staff with briefings on these issues. They dent Al Gore. The dispute ended up delaying the out- catalogued President Bush’s conversations and commit- come of the election for more than a month. After Bush ments with foreign leaders in a way that could be easily was declared the victor, there were complaints about a retrieved by the new president; helped ensure Obama’s lack of cooperation from the president-elect’s side, and team members received security clearances; and they in- angry responses from the Clinton camp. tervened with Cabinet officers and political appointees to remove roadblocks and resolve conflicts to ensure the The muddled 2000 experience contrasted with 1988 president-elect’s agency review teams had access to the when Vice President George H.W. Bush succeeded Presi- information they needed. dent Reagan. In that case, the elder Bush benefited from being Reagan’s vice president and getting the close cooperation of Reagan aides before and after the election. PRESIDENT-ELECT OBAMA But Towson University political science professor Mar- Obama, for his part, set an early and swift pace during tha Kumar has pointed out that Reagan did not force his post-election transition, having laid a solid founda- any of his political appointees to resign. As a result, Bush tion during the pre-election phase. His early preparation and his Cabinet officers had to clear out people who re- was fortuitous given the daunting task he faced putting mained in order to put their own appointees in place, together a government and seeking to implement major creating resentments. policy shifts under extremely difficult circumstances.

Following the November 2008 election, George W. Bush One day after his historic election, Obama formally and his staff followed through on his commitment to named the leaders of his transition team that included help President-elect Obama. The White House provided John Podesta; Valerie Jarrett, a senior campaign adviser high-level intelligence, national security, defense and and close confidante; and Peter Rouse, his campaign chief economic briefings, access to the federal agencies and of staff. He also named Christopher Lu as the executive created a climate of collaboration. The White House, for director and appointed other close allies to handle com- example, organized a national security crisis training drill munications, congressional relations, personnel, legal af- on January 13, 2009, that included key outgoing and fairs and the vetting of job candidates. That same week, Obama named a White House chief of staff, Rep. Rahm

12 READY TO GOVERN | IMPROVING THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION

Emanuel (D-Ill.), who brought congressional and previ- a failure to pay $946 in unemployment compensation ous White House experience to the table. Obama also taxes on household help. ramped up his transition staff, which grew to hundreds of people. Many of them were former campaign staffers. These problems prompted Obama to tighten what was already an extensive vetting process requiring unprec- Aides said Obama did not want to repeat the mistakes edented scrutiny of the personal financial and profes- of former President Clinton, whose 1992 transition was sional backgrounds of prospective nominees. This policy considered chaotic. Clinton did not name any Cabinet required so much detailed information that it delayed nominees or White House staff until six weeks after the the appointment and confirmation of many qualified election, and most of the key White House positions nominees for important administration positions. In were not announced until a few days before the inaugu- some cases, the vetting disqualified some of the -presi ration, providing them little time to prepare for the huge dent’s choices. tasks at hand. While the personnel side had some issues, the president- The Obama transition staff, divided between Chicago elect did not miss a beat on policy preparation. and Washington, was funded with about $5.3 million in taxpayer funds. Obama also collected more than $4 Obama began receiving top level briefings two days af- million in private donations to cover the additional costs ter the election from Michael McConnell, the Director of the transition. of National Intelligence, and on November 10, 2008, went to the White House to confer with President Bush. The transition process for Obama went smoothly at the Obama’s national security team received regular brief- beginning, but hit some bumps along the road. ings, and had the opportunity to work together on major issues as the transition progressed. Podesta said it was Obama had picked most of his Cabinet nominees before positive to have the national security staff not just read- Christmas, and filled all of his top West Wing jobs being memos and getting briefed, but meeting together, fore the inauguration. His staff appointments included a getting to know each other and really working on the number of policy “czars,” special assistants to the presi- problems in the transition phase. dent with important portfolios who did not have to face Senate confirmation. Some of these appointees would Podesta said a similar process unfolded “out of neces- come under fire from Republicans and some Democrats sity” with members of his economic team who conferred in the Senate who felt Obama deliberately created the with Bush administration officials and deliberated on the positions to sidestep Senate oversight. banking and auto industry bailouts and an economic recovery plan. He said the same process took place on en- “We got the White House staff, senior staff, put in place ergy issues as well. Podesta said Obama pulled together first,” said Podesta. “We had a very rigorous and man- many experienced people, but it was just as important to aged process of handing off decision-making from the engage in “team building” and to “focus on how they are transition to the incoming White House staff through going to work together.” the transition.”

While the Cabinet nominations flowed out at a regular AT THE AGENCIES pace following the election, Obama was dealt a setback Two weeks after Obama’s presidential election victory, in early January 2009 when Commerce Secretary-desig- his review teams began their assessments of more than nate and New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson withdrew 100 federal departments and agencies to identify pro- from consideration amid a federal investigation into how gram and policy priorities, pour over budgets, identify a political donor from Beverly Hills won a lucrative state potential minefields, and prepare detailed briefing ma- contract. Questions also were raised regarding Treasury terials. nominee Timothy Geithner, who had been delinquent in paying $42,000 in back taxes, and Health and Hu- The teams, said transition leader Podesta, were designed man Services nominee Tom Daschle, who withdrew two to “ensure that senior appointees have the information weeks after the inauguration due to his failure to pay in necessary to complete their confirmation process, lead excess of $140,000 in taxes. Nancy Killefer, Obama’s their departments and begin implementing signature choice to become deputy director for management at policy initiatives immediately after they’re sworn in.” OMB, also withdrew at the same time after disclosing

13 PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE READY TO GOVERN | IMPROVING THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION

The review team leaders and members had been picked Lu said having a transition point of contact at every long before Election Day, trained, and given strict ethi- agency and someone in charge of pulling information cal guidelines. Many had experience at the agencies they together was “incredibly important.” were reviewing or substantial knowledge about the policy issues, and they were given strict timelines to produce “It was necessary to help guide those agencies’ transition information for the transition leaders. planning such that they were ready on November 5 to start downloading information to us,” he said. “I thought one of the most important things that we did in the agency review process was the tremendous clarity Although the White House issued explicit instructions to in the work product of these groups,” said Podesta. “I the agencies, some were better prepared than others with think that was a reflection that we made based on past background materials and procedures for access. And transitions.” while many were helpful to the Obama transition teams, there was conflict at some agencies. The Bush administration helped facilitate the process by bringing the agency career transition leads together early Lu said that there had been a rules of engagement memo in November just after the election to meet directly with signed by the Bush White House and the president- some of the top people from the Obama campaign. elect’s transition detailing how review team members would obtain access to the agencies and their materials. “This was right before they were going to go in and start He said these protocols had to be renegotiated regarding these agency reviews with their agency review teams,” the level of access, space requirements and who could said Johnson, the Bush administration’s OMB deputy be interviewed at some of the departments and agencies director. “And so they heard it straight from the horse’s when disputes developed. mouth, what their general approach would be, what they were looking for, and what these reviews were going to “Our original idea was that we would have people in the be.” agency doors the following Monday after the election or, perhaps, even a week after that,” said Lu. “Many people Some Obama team leaders met directly with Cabinet did not get into the agencies until weeks later.” Lu said it secretaries and agency directors, while others inter- was up to the agency review team leaders to fight on “a viewed senior managers and employees at lower levels. case-by-case basis,” and when an impasse arose, to take it The Washington Post reported on December 3, 2008, to the next level. He said this sometimes meant conven- that Obama’s State Department leads, Tom Donilon and ing conference calls with White House Deputy Chief of Wendy Sherman, met with Secretary of State Condo- Staff Blake Gottesman and principals from the noncom- leezza Rice. pliant agencies.

At the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who There were also many positive stories, with reports of would stay on as secretary in the Obama administration, transition team members being warmly greeted and designated four senior officials to directly handle the given full cooperation. Lu said there were no problems transition reviews. at the vast majority of the approximately 110 agencies involved in the transition reviews Government Executive.com reported on Nov. 6 that a Pentagon task force “outlined a list of events and mile- A former aide in the Bush White House noted that even stones taking place within the next 90 days that the pres- with explicit direction, various personal, political and ident-elect’s team should be aware of, including the first territorial tensions arose that no directive or order could budget submission, upcoming conferences and deploy- completely erase. ment orders for troops heading to Iraq and Afghanistan.” The Pentagon developed a succession plan for some 200 “There was a fair amount of sensitivity, and it took a lot political appointees, and cleared office space for the tran- of work to iron out and manage,” said the former White sition team, although one Obama aide said the review House aide. team encountered some difficulties with access at the Pentagon during the transition that had to be resolved by the Bush White House.

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PHASE TWO RECOMMENDATIONS • Make preparations and begin training sessions to help fa- Based on our interviews with principals engaged in the miliarize White House advisers, Cabinet nominees and other 2008 transition and the views of a number of outside high level appointees with their department and manage- experts, we believe there are steps that should be taken ment responsibilities. Hold pre-inauguration sessions, par- by the president-elect and an outgoing administration ticularly in key areas like national security, the economy and during the period between the election and the inaugu- energy, so individuals who will work together can get going ration. We recommend that: early on the new agenda, become familiar with each other and develop processes for decision-making.

THE PRESIDENT-ELECT’S TRANSITION THE WHITE HOUSE • Name a White House chief of staff as the first order of business followed by key positions at the White House and then • Install a high-level official with the strong backing of the members of the Cabinet, and other top level appointees. president to handle the transition and ensure the transfer of With a significant number of positions to fill, selecting criti- power is smooth and seamless. cal White House staff members will help incoming Cabinet • Ensure that the president-elect and appropriate agencies and subcabinet level officials’ transition into their roles. have sufficient resources and vetting personnel to carry out • Utilize the outgoing administration’s position descriptions ethics and background investigations between the elec- as an outline of the issues that specific jobs cover. This will tion and the first six months of the new administration. This help facilitate a smooth transfer of knowledge by providing would help eliminate delays that have impeded the nomina- better specifications regarding job requirements. tion process.

• Create a personnel operation with sufficient resources and • Provide access to the agencies and departments by the in- staff to properly screen, interview and fully vet the- back coming administration’s transition team, and be prepared to grounds of potential administration nominees. Launch the intervene to settle disputes when they arise. security clearance process as early as possible for key per- • Stage table top exercises bringing together incoming and sonnel who will assume high-level or mission-critical posi- outgoing officials to participate in a crisis management tions to reduce lag time early in the administration. event such as a national security threat or an emergency • Hire enough professional vetters to screen nominees for ap- such as a natural disaster. pointments. Bringing executives into an administration re- • Provide high-level briefings to the president-elect, his- na quires the type of talent found by an executive search firm tional security team and key advisers. and greatly varies from the type of hiring done on a campaign in level, magnitude and number. • Provide written protocols and guidance for the incoming White House staff and national and homeland security • Dispatch expert teams to the departments and agencies teams on how to handle a national security event. with clear instructions on the type of information they should gather regarding operations and policy. Aim to collect only data that will be most useful to the incoming team, THE SENATE particularly in a brief, readable format. Set a timetable for the information to be submitted and reviewed by transi- • Set goals for committees and the Senate as a whole for con- tion team leaders. To the extent possible, select agency re- firmation of political appointees in an effort to create high view team members who are likely to serve in the agency to expectations and speed the process. Agree to vote on the which they are assigned. The formal transition phase is most confirmation of the 50 top officials on or immediately after beneficial to those who will leverage what they learn as an the inauguration, including all key posts within the Depart- employee of the same organization. ments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State and Treasury, provided they were received by a date mutually • Identify top-caliber political appointees in the departments agreed upon with the incoming administration and no prob- and agencies who want to stay on an interim basis and keep lems with the candidate are surfaced. The Senate should them on the job to help fill the vacuum created by the slow strive to have 100 appointees confirmed within the first 100 Senate confirmation process for new political nominees. days of the administration and close to all 516 key positions Promote highly capable career executives with institutional filled by the August recess. knowledge and management skills to political management positions to help ensure continuity.

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THE 2008-2009 TRANSITION FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AND VETTING FOR PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES REQUIRING SENATE CONFIRMATION

The high level of scrutiny given to presidential nominees nees must provide the names of every client or cus- requiring Senate confirmation involves numerous writ- tomer with whom they performed more than $5,000 ten questionnaires, interviews, background investiga- worth of personal services and offer a brief descriptions and extensive financial disclosure. The vetting starts tion of those services. This financial disclosure form with the White House and includes the Office of Gov- is reviewed by the White House Counsel’s Office, by ernment Ethics, the FBI and Senate committees. Many the department to which the nominee is headed and nominees with considerable wealth or complicated busi- by the Office of Government Ethics prior to a Senate ness holdings choose to hire an attorney or an accoun- confirmation hearing. Any financial conflicts must be tant to help fill out the reports and comply with informa- remedied by divestiture, recusal, waivers, regulatory tion requests. The confirmation process has grown slower exemptions or the creation of special trusts. and more cumbersome over the years in part because of • The Questionnaire for National Security Positions (SF-86). the rigorous disclosure requirements and the number of This questionnaire is used for the FBI background nominees that now require Senate approval. In 2009, investigation and the security clearance process. The President Obama tightened his already stringent vetting SF-86 requires very detailed information on where a process following embarrassing revelations of past tax nominee has lived, worked and gone to school over problems by several nominees. Along with Senate delays, the last 10 years. Additionally, information must be this heightened scrutiny impeded Obama’s efforts to provided on affiliations, foreign contacts, mental quickly get his full team of political appointees in place. health, drug use, foreign travel, friends and relatives. The current vetting requirements include: • The FBI Background Investigation. Current practice requires a full field investigation for positions that any • The White House Personal Data Statement. This ques- agency or department head designates as “sensitive” tionnaire varies from administration to administra- due to the ability of the occupant to “bring about, by tion, but generally focuses on a nominee’s personal, virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse professional, legal and financial information. It asks effect on national security.” There are three levels of questions about a nominee’s professional experience, sensitive positions, with each having its own investi- political affiliations, physical and mental health, pub- gative requirements. Generally, an FBI background lished material, club memberships, alcohol and drug inquiry includes interviews with the nominee, fam- use, litigation and potential conflicts. There are ques- ily, friends, neighbors and co-workers. Issues related tions about employment of domestic help (surfacing to the nominee’s employment, professional, personal, “nanny tax” and immigration concerns), and other foreign travel, medical, financial, legal, military and information that could be used to attack a nominee’s educational history also are explored. qualification or character. There also are questions that screen for policy opinions that would show any • Senate Committee Questionnaires. Each relevant com- inconsistencies between the nominee and the White mittee that confirms nominees has one or more unique House that might create an embarrassing situation. disclosure forms, often duplicating information already provided to the executive branch. Committees • The Public Financial Disclosure Report (SF-278). Mandat- frequently follow up with requests for interviews and ed by the Ethics in Government Act, this question- additional information, and in some instances, have naire requires detailed reporting on assets, income, required lengthy tax audits of nominees. liabilities, transactions, gifts, travel expenses, loans, arrangements for future employment and recent organizational positions held outside government. Nomi-

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PHASE THREE AFTER THE INAUGURATION

The inauguration marks the formal launch of a new ad- OBAMA: NOMINATION PROGRESS ministration and the starting point for measuring the President Obama got off to a fast start after his- Janu effectiveness of the presidential transition. While many ary 2009 inauguration in terms of naming and filling view the period between the election and the inaugura- Cabinet and other high-level administration positions, tion as the formal transition, the first few months, and and was ahead of his predecessors even with withdrawals in some instances the first year of a new administration, of two Commerce secretary nominees, Gov. Richardson often reflect the depth of the planning and advance prep- of New Mexico and Sen. Judd Gregg (R-N.H.), as well aration. as former South Dakota Sen. Daschle, his first choice to head the HHS. The post-inauguration period, in fact, actually represents yet another phase of the presidential transition. New ad- As he was seeking to staff his new administration, Obama ministrations spend enormous energy to scrutinize, an- also moved forward at a rapid pace on his policy agenda nounce and then shepherd a long list of political appoin- that included drafting and passing a $787 billion eco- tees through the Senate confirmation process, a task that nomic stimulus package, dealing with the collapse of the can stretch through the first year of an administration U.S. auto industry, the crisis in the banking and financial and sometimes longer. sectors, the housing foreclosure stampede and the economy as whole. He also quickly turned to health care, and The 2008 edition of the Plum Book (United States Gov- sought to address foreign policy matters regarding the ernment Policy and Supporting Positions) listed 1,141 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as relations in the Senate-confirmed positions, including the Cabinet, im- Middle East and Iran. portant sub-Cabinet management positions, the heads of agencies, U.S attorneys, ambassadors, judges and mem- Although Obama was prepared on appointments, there bers of various boards and commissions. was a lack of continuity in the operation of the presidential personnel office. Jim Messina, the chief of staff A Washington Post tracking system lists 516 of these during the presidential campaign, was named as the positions that it considered top tier. These include the transition personnel director after the election, but soon Cabinet and high-level department management posi- was appointed White House deputy chief of staff and tions, the heads of independent regulatory agencies and became more focused on responsibilities related to those members of the Executive Office of the President, such duties. Two weeks before the inauguration, Don Gips, as the Council of Economic Advisers and key people in who had handled agency review teams during the transi- the Office of Management and Budget. tion, took over the presidential personnel position until he was nominated as ambassador to South Africa in the The confirmation process is often regarded as too slow, summer of 2009. frequently encumbering the progress of a new administration. Many experts and officials who have served in Podesta said that changing personnel directors between both Republican and Democratic administrations be- the transition and the entry into the White House caused lieve that far too many jobs require Senate approval, and some disruptions and should have been handled differ- that there are too many delays stemming from political ently. Podesta also said in hindsight it would have been gamesmanship and extensive and, in some cases, exces- better to keep the transition operation running at the sive vetting requirements. office down the street from the White House for at least a month after the inauguration with the “personnel functions staying at the transition” to create better continuity. He said the communications problems and other issues that came up in the early days at the White House resulted in some slowdown on the personnel front.

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A similar void occurred in 1992 when Richard Riley, the Agriculture Department’s undersecretary for food President-elect Bill Clinton’s transition personnel direc- safety, the inspector general of the CIA, the administrator tor, was named education secretary. In contrast, Pendle- of Maritime Administration, the Defense Department’s ton James served as Ronald Reagan’s personnel director principal deputy undersecretary for personnel and readi- during the pre-election summer and fall of 1980, during ness, and the head of the U.S. Agency for International the post-election period, and through the first year-and- Development (USAID). a-half of the administration. James came to the job with personnel experience in the Nixon administration. On the December 25, 2009, more than 11 months into Obama term and the day a terrorist unsuccessfully Despite the extensive planning and appointee vetting sought to blow up a jetliner headed from Amsterdam to that took place in the pre-election and post-election Detroit, the two agencies charged with keeping terror- transitions and a record of early confirmations that sur- ists off of airplanes and out of the country were with- passed some of his predecessors, Obama still ran into out leaders. The president had nominated individuals to staffing problems as he worked to confront serious prob- head the Transportation Security Administration and the lems facing the nation. News stories began appearing in Customs and Border Protection agency, but they were late February and early March of 2009 that Treasury Sec- among some 200 political appointees still not confirmed retary Geithner was “home alone” without top deputies by the Senate. confirmed to handle major economic policy issues. A number of reasons have been cited for the hold-up There were reports during the same timeframe of the of nominees. In some instances, the Senate Finance billions of dollars in stimulus money that needed to Committee demanded extensive tax records going back be allocated and key appointees at major departments many years and audits that ended up sidetracking some expected to handle this aid not yet confirmed. Energy nominees and delaying others for Treasury posts. Some Secretary Steven Chu, for example, was the only Sen- senators blocked nominees for a variety of political and ate-confirmed appointee in his department in March. policy reasons—a common occurrence for every new ad- Despite the importance of the upcoming health care de- ministration—while some nominees ran into problems bate and the need for serious planning to deal with the with their personal background checks. unusual H1N1 flu epidemic, Kathleen Sebelius was not confirmed to head HHS, with its 64,000 employees and But part of the problem also can be attributed to Obama a $700 billion budget, until late April. and his team, whose stringent standards and detailed disclosure requirements, including examination of years of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton commented in July tax records, discouraged some qualified individuals from 2009 that she was frustrated by the long-standing pursuing positions, disqualified others and resulted in USAID vacancy. “The clearance and vetting process is long periods of inaction. a nightmare,” she said. “And it takes far longer than any of us would want to see. It is frustrating beyond words.” This vetting process is onerous and requires three lengthy Obama did not make a USAID nomination until No- questionnaires and detailed financial and tax information vember 2009, with a Washington Post story on Novem- in addition to an FBI background check and additional ber 11, 2009, attributing the delay in part to an internal Senate questionnaires and disclosure requirements. The debate between the White House and State Department nominees are interviewed numerous times, including by over how much autonomy and authority should be given Senate committee investigators. to the agency director. Nominees are asked about small financial transactions, A Washington Post tracking system lists 516 of these travel and personal and business contacts going back de- positions that it considered top tier. These include the cades. They also are routinely fingerprinted and required Cabinet and high-level department management posi- to provide detailed medical records, reveal if they have tions, the heads of independent regulatory agencies and employed domestic help, provide information on their members of the Executive Office of the President, such families and job history, and disclose any information as the Council of Economic Advisers and key people in going back years that might prove embarrassing. the Office of Management and Budget. A number of government experts, including Norman Or- Some vacant posts in late October 2009 included the nstein of the American Enterprise Institute, argue that head of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the disclosure requirements have become unreasonable

18 READY TO GOVERN | IMPROVING THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION and unwieldy and need to be streamlined. They also argue Clearly something needs to be done both on the length that the number of Senate-approved political executive and extensive nature of the vetting, and on the ever- positions has grown exponentially in recent decades, and growing number of administration jobs that require Sen- that far too many administration positions require Sen- ate confirmation. These have been intractable problems ate confirmation. The result has been difficulty getting for a long time, and altering the status quo will mean a talented individuals to serve, delays in the nomination new mindset and strong leadership in the Senate, and process that keep political leadership jobs vacant, and cooperation from the president. constraints on the ability of a new president to govern.

There have been a number of commissions, studies and PREPARING APPOINTEES legislative initiatives calling for changes, but to no avail. The congressional revisions to the Presidential Transition In 2003, The National Commission on Public Service Act of 2000 included $1 million for an incoming admin- led by Paul A. Volcker called for turning at least one- istration to provide leadership training and orientation third of Senate-confirmed political executive positions sessions for “individuals the president-elect intends to into career positions or even terminating some of the job nominate as department heads or appoint to key posi- titles altogether to streamline the government leadership tions in the Executive Office of the President or federal structure of federal agencies and departments. agencies.”

Early in President Bush’s first term, discussions were held The Obama White House worked with GSA to select a with the Senate about reducing the number of Senate- contractor to handle the orientation program, with a bid confirmed appointees. This proposal met with resistance awarded in the summer of 2009. One session was held from senators reluctant to surrender power and preroga- for about 50 Cabinet secretaries and top White House tives. staff in July 2009 and another for deputy secretaries took place in November. The White House also scheduled Besides these issues, there have been routine delays re- training sessions in early 2010 for assistant secretaries lated to completion of security clearance reviews, with and chiefs of staff. some appointees having to be fully investigated even if they already hold a clearance from another job that meets Since many appointees are unfamiliar with the inner the standards of their new position. This needless dupli- workings of their departments and agencies, and many cation of effort could be eliminated by a government- are schooled more in policy than management, earlier wide policy that requires agencies to accept use of secu- orientation and ongoing training could have been ben- rity clearances already held by individuals that meet their eficial to the administration’s efforts to implement its same standards. Another problem in this arena centers agenda. on the government having too few people available to undertake the ethics and security reviews of appointees, Some of the appointee preparation, in fact, should as a creating another serious choke point in the nomination matter of course take place before the inauguration—as process. was intended by the 2000 Presidential Transition Act amendment. This would enable nominees to have some of the background and tools needed to make a quick start.

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PHASE THREE RECOMMENDATIONS cept the security clearances already held by individuals that The problems encountered by President Obama in the meet their same standards instead of having to repeat the post-inauguration period, even with all of the advanced background investigation. planning and preparation, reflect many of the same ex- • Investigate, analyze and understand the consequences of periences of previous administrations in getting their the ethics requirements, financial disclosures and overarch- appointees confirmed and their government up and ing political appointment process on getting the nation’s running. To deal with some of these problems, we rec- top talent to consider government service. Task the Govern- ommend: ment Accountability Office with developing the measure- ments that would allow a better understanding of the costs and benefits of the process. CONGRESS

• Provide the Office of Government Ethics statutory authority THE NEW ADMINISTRATION to revise and update financial disclosure forms for the executive branch to address the changing nature of “conflict of • Recognize the challenges associated with vetting nominees interest” and other increased complexities in finance. and hire appropriate staff to serve during the first year of an • Reduce the number of Senate-confirmed politically ap- administration, when the greatest influx of new hires will pointed positions. Congress should take the lead, and work join the government ranks. cooperatively with the administration. • Ensure White House personnel has adequate resources to • Expand the 2000 Presidential Transition Act amendment’s help usher nominees through the political appointment appointee training target audience to include a broader process. cross-section of political appointees. • Conduct training for political appointees early in the admin- • Provide funding for ongoing training of incoming appoin- istration. Elements of this orientation could be standardized, tees throughout an administration’s tenure, not only at the with added components that focus on a specific president’s beginning of a presidential term of office. agenda.

• Order an interagency effort to consolidate and streamline the political appointee background questionnaires into a THE GSA single, secure electronic form, providing each investigating agency the opportunity to add jurisdiction-specific ad- • Permit the incoming administration to use a portion of the denda. GSA-provided office space for a period of up to six months following the inauguration to better facilitate, without in- • Address impediments that slow down political appointees terruption, the personnel selection process. This extension from assuming their new government roles including adop- would also offer nominees for appointed positions neces- tion of a government-wide policy requiring agencies to ac- sary office space as they prepare for confirmation.

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PHASES ONE THROUGH THREE IDEAL PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION MILESTONES

PHASE ONE PHASE TWO PRE-ELECTION DAY TRANSITION PLANNING BETWEEN ELECTION DAY AND THE INAUGURATION

Spring and summer of election year: President-elect names a White House chief of staff as the first order of business followed by key Campaigns establish a transition team to conduct positions at the White House and then members early planning, with a trusted liaison between the of the Cabinet transition and the campaign, and pick a personnel director. President-elect dispatches expert teams to the departments and agencies with clear instruc- Agencies designate a top level career executive tions on the type of information they should to lead their transition activities. gather regarding operations and policy.

Incumbent administration activates Agency Tran- White House stages table top exercises for in- sition Directors Council and names White House coming and outgoing officials to participate in a official to assist agency transition effort and work crisis management event such as a national se- with agency transition leaders. curity threat.

Agencies pick and help prepare top level career President-elect agrees to timeline with key com- civil servants to fill in on an interim basis for de- mittees on when nominees need to be received parting top-level political appointees. in order to have them in place on or shortly after Inauguration Day. White House begins regular meetings of a high- level Transition Coordinating Council to plan im- President-elect expands personnel operation portant government-wide transition activities. with resources and staff to properly screen, interview and fully vet the backgrounds of potential administration nominees. Agencies identify and prepare career executives to fill critical positions of outgoing political appointees, on an interim basis.

PHASE THREE Nominating convention: AFTER THE INAUGURATION

Campaigns publicly name their transition director within two weeks after the official nominating President has national security and economic convention to take planning out of the shadows. aides in place who have working familiarity with the procedures and protocols needed to marshal action by the government Campaigns request security clearances for top advisers. Administration has 50 top officials confirmed on or immediately after the inauguration, including Transition teams prepare briefing books on top all key posts within the departments of Defense, policy priorities, and ready plans for review teams Homeland Security, Justice, State and Treasury. to visit agencies.

Administration conducts management training Transition teams begin preliminary vetting of po- and orientation for new political appointees. tential nominees for top positions.

Administration has top 500-plus Senate-con- The Senate creates a mutually agreeable confir- firmed political appointees in place by summer mation schedule with the new administration. congressional recess.

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THE NEXT TRANSITION STEPS CONGRESS SHOULD TAKE NOW TO PREPARE FOR THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Provide realistic financing for the transition. Allocate Mandate that each department and agency name a a portion of the money to the major party pre-elec- top-level career civil servant six months before Elec- tion transition teams contingent upon campaigns tion Day to lead that agency’s transition efforts, and publicly naming their transition directors following be part of the Agency Transition Directors Council. their nominating conventions. Require by September 15 of a presidential election Reduce the number of politically appointed posi- year that departments and agencies identify and pre- tions that require Senate confirmation. pare career executives to fill critical positions on an interim basis until new political appointees are in Create an Agency Transition Directors Council led place. by the GSA and the White House to coordinate early planning across federal agencies for the presi- Consolidate the multiple political appointee back- dential transition. ground questionnaires into a single, secure electronic form, providing each investigating agency the opportunity to add jurisdiction-specific addenda.

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APPENDIX A BUSH ADMINISTRATION MEMO LAYING OUT TIMELINE FOR TRANSITION ACTIVITIES TO PRESIDENT’S MANAGEMENT COUNCIL

July 18, 2008 To: PMC Members From: Clay Johnson CC: Josh Bolten, White House Chief of Staff

Transition Direction I provide you the attached, minimum transition preparation guidance, which you helped develop. I ask each of you to formally assure me (by brief, return email) that your agency will perform these tasks by the dates indicated. I know that most of you have already done this and more to ensure the continuity of public services during the transition to the new Administration, and to assist the current non-career employees to exit successfully.

Transition Direction for Agencies

Goal 1: Help ensure continuity of public services during the transition to the new Administration • By 8/1: Identify a knowledgeable, capable career official to lead/coordinate the transition, and communicate internally and externally. • By 10/15: Indentify the career official who will be responsible for acting in place of the departing/departed political official, for each major bureau and office of the department/agency, and communicate internally and externally. Ensure compliance with your agency’s delegation of authorities and the Vacancies Act. • By 11/1: Ensure all COOP and NRF procedures are tested and understood by the senior career officials referenced above. • By 11/1: Prepare a brief summary of the department’s basic organization, current mission/function/performance goals, and key personnel. • By 11/1: Identify and summarize the “hot” policy, internal management, legal and infrastructure issues to require immediate attention by the new Administration officials. Ensure the information is approved for release to the intended audience. • By 11/1: Prepare to provide the work tools and new employee briefings: badges, computers, blackberries, parking, work spaces, access to secure information and areas, ethics briefings and the like. • In mid-October and, if desired, again after the election: OMB DDM to create the opportunity for career transition leads to meet to confer with each other and others from whom they seek counsel. • In general: • Work to ensure every program/initiative is as you are proud to have it, as of 1/20/09. • Ensure all program improvement, high risk improvement and management improvement goals and plans are as all stake- holders are proud to have them, and available to the public, as planned. • Do transition planning with (not to) career officials.

Goal 2: Help current non-career employees exit successfully • By 8/04, develop for delivery as needed a briefing on what a departing political can and cannot take with them. • By 8/04, develop for delivery as needed a briefing on “exit ethics” and post-service health benefit coverage, retirement estimates, etc. Include information about who to contact with related questions after they have left government service.

Source: http://transition2008.files.wordpress.com/2008/08/omb-transition-memo-07-18-08.pdf

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APPENDIX B PRESIDENT BUSH’S EXECUTIVE ORDER ON THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION

Executive Order 13476 of October 9, 2008 Facilitation of a Presidential Transition

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 7301 of title 5, United States Code, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458) (IRTPA), and in order to further the purposes of the Presidential Transition Act of 1963, as amended, and to assist the presidential transition, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Presidential Transition Coordination. (a) To assist and support the transition efforts of the transition teams for the “major party” “candidates,” as those terms are used in the IRTPA and defined in section 9002(2) and (6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. 9002(2), (6)), and the President-elect, there is established a Presidential Transition Coordinating Council (Council). (b) The Council shall be composed of the following officials or their designees: (i) Chief of Staff to the President, who shall serve as Chair; (ii) Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, who shall serve as Vice Chair; (iii) Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy; (iv) Counsel to the President; (v) Assistant to the President for Presidential Personnel; (vi) Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; (vii) Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism; (viii) Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and Director, National Economic Council; (ix) Attorney General; (x) Director of National Intelligence; (xi) Director of the Office of Management and Budget; (xii) Director of the Office of Personnel Management; (xiii) Administrator of General Services; (xiv) Archivist of the United States; (xv) Director of the Office of Government Ethics; and (xvi) Such others as the President or the Chair of the Council may select. (c) The Council shall assist the major party candidates and the President-elect by making every reasonable effort to facilitate the transition between administrations. This assistance may include, among other things, providing information relevant to facilitating the personnel aspects of a presidential transition and such other information that, in the Council’s judgment, is useful and appropriate, as long as providing such information is not otherwise prohibited by law. (d) In order to obtain a wide range of facts and information on prior transitions and best practices, the Council, its members, or their designees may, from time to time, seek information from private individuals, including individuals within outside organizations, who have significant experience or expertise in presidential transitions. The Council, its members, or their designees shall endeavor to obtain such facts and information from individuals representing a range of bipartisan or nonpartisan viewpoints. If the Council, its members, or their designees find it necessary to seek advice from private individuals or outside organizations, such counsel should be sought in a manner that seeks individual advice and does not involve collective judgment or deliberation. (e) It shall be the policy of the Council to provide appropriate information and assistance to the major party candidates on an equal basis and without regard for party affiliation.

Sec. 2. Transition Activities and Materials. (a) At the direction of the Council or its designee(s), the Administrator of General Services shall coordinate orientation activities with the appropriate agencies, including the Office of Government Ethics and the Office of Personnel Management, for key prospective presidential appointees. (b) At the direction of the Council or its designee(s), the White House Office of Presidential Personnel shall supplement as appropriate and necessary the electronic record of all title 5 presidentially appointed positions provided by the Office of Personnel Management to the major party candidates pursuant to section 8403(b) of IRTPA. (c) The Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council shall coordinate with the Council when per- forming those functions authorized by Executive Order 13467 of June 30, 2008, that are necessary to assist in transition-related activities.

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(d) At the direction of the Council or its designee(s), executive departments and agencies shall prepare a set of briefing materials for new political appointees before the inauguration of the President-elect. The current Administration shall work with the incoming transition team to provide copies of all such materials. (e) At the direction of the Council or its designee(s) and consistent with the Presidential Transition Act of 1963, as amended, the Administrator of General Services, in consultation with the Archivist of the United States and other appropriate agencies, shall develop a Transition Directory. This directory shall include Federal publications and other materials that provide information on each executive department and agency.

Sec. 3. Transition Agreements. To assist and support the transition, transition agreements between the White House or appropriate executive branch departments and agencies and the transition teams for the major party candidates and the President-elect will be entered into, as necessary, regarding transition procedures and identification of transition contacts.

Sec. 4. General Provisions. (a) In order to take appropriate account of the transition reforms made by IRTPA and to further update and clarify the presidential transition process, this order supersedes Executive Order 13176 of November 27, 2000. (b) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect: (i) authority granted by law to a department or agency, or the head thereof; or (ii) functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budget, administrative, or legislative proposals. (c) This order is intended only to facilitate the transition and is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, by any party against the United States, its agencies, instrumentalities, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. (d) Unless extended by the President, this order shall expire on February 20, 2009.

George W. Bush

The White House, October 9, 2008

Source: http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-24465.pdf

25 PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE READY TO GOVERN | IMPROVING THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION

APPENDIX C TIMELINE OF 2008-2009 TRANSITION AND POST-INAUGURATION ACTIVITIES

PHASE ONE PRE-ELECTION DAY TRANSITION PLANNING

Early 2007 September 18, 2008 Transition preparations begin at the Department of Homeland Reports emerged that Bill Timmons will serve on John Mc- Security. Cain’s transition team along with former Navy secretary and 9/11 commission member John Lehman. Mid-April 2008 David Bibb, deputy administrator of the General Services Ad- September 24, 2008 ministration (GSA), indicates the agency had identified tem- GSA and the White House convene senior career transition porary office space for the transition. coordinators from each agency to discuss their preparations for the transition. Late April 2008 Top officials in the McCain campaign began meeting weekly October 9, 2008 to discuss transition preparations. President Bush, through executive order, creates the Presiden- tial Transition Coordinating Council. May 5-6, 2008 Representatives of federal agencies, good government groups, October 15, 2008 and major political campaigns meet to discuss transition plan- Presidential Transition Coordinating Council meets for first ning at a conference organized by the Partnership for Public time, with both major campaigns’ transition representatives Service at the Pocantico Conference Center of the Rockefeller and White House officials. Brothers Fund in Tarrytown, N.Y. October 15, 2008 May 2008 Deadline for agencies to identify career officials to fill the posi- Top officials in the Obama campaign begin regular meetings tions of departing political appointees. to discuss transition-related activities. October 28, 2008 June 10, 2008 Presidential Transition Coordinating Council meets for the The Senior Executives Association holds a conference to pre- second time. pare its members for the transition. November 1, 2008 June 2008 Deadline for each agency to prepare a brief summary of its ba- Russ Gerson begins limited personnel planning for the Mc- sic organization, current mission/function/performance goals Cain campaign. and key personnel.

June 2008 November 1, 2008 John Podesta assumes role as transition coordinator of the Deadline for each agency to summarize the most pressing pol- Obama campaign. icy, internal management, legal and infrastructure issues facing the incoming administration’s officials. July 18, 2008 President Bush issued an executive order mandating certain November 1, 2008 transition preparations by agencies. Agencies are required to finish preparing work tools and briefings for incoming political appointees August 1, 2008 Deadline for each agency to identify a “knowledgeable, ca- November 4, 2008 pable career official” to lead the transition preparations in that Election Day. Democrat Barack Obama defeats Republican agency. John McCain.

September 2, 2008 Barack Obama receives first intelligence briefing as a presidential candidate.

26 READY TO GOVERN | IMPROVING THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION

APPENDIX C TIMELINE OF 2008-2009 TRANSITION AND POST-INAUGURATION ACTIVITIES

PHASE TWO PHASE THREE BETWEEN ELECTION DAY AND THE INAUGURATION AFTER THE INAUGURATION

November 5, 2008 January 20, 2009 President-elect Obama names John Podesta, Valerie Jarrett and Inauguration Day. In five hours, White House staff and GSA Pete Rouse as co-directors of his presidential transition. prepare the White House and the Eisenhower Executive Office Building for the new administration. By noon, the National November 6, 2008 Archives Administration collects papers from the Bush White President Bush promises that a smooth transition will be a House with the support of 400 employees. “priority” so that Obama and his team can “hit the ground running.” February 5, 2009 President Obama holds his first address to government- em November 6, 2008 ployees at a visit to the Department of Energy. Obama receives his first intelligence briefing as the president- elect. February 17, 2009 President Obama signs massive $787 billion economic stimu- November 10, 2008 lus bill. President-elect Obama visits the White House and confers with President Bush. February 26, 2009 President Obama presents his fiscal 2010 budget proposal to November 11, 2008 Congress. The President-elect’s staff announces new ethics guidelines for the presidential transition. April 1, 2009 Forty-nine political appointees, or 9.5 percent of the 516 top November 12, 2008 tier positions, have been confirmed by the Senate. White House Chief of Staff Josh Bolten sends a memo to agencies and departments detailing transition coordination April 29, 2009 between the outgoing and incoming administrations. At the 100-day mark, 76 political appointees, or 14.7 percent, have been confirmed. November 12, 2008 The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Govern- June 9, 2009 ment Affairs publishes the 2008 version of the Plum Book. GSA selected the Hay Group to provide an orientation program for the new administration’s political appointees. November 14, 2008 President-elect Obama’s transition review teams begin operat- June 24-25, 2009 ing in agencies. The Office of Personnel Management holds orientation for new career and non-career Senior Executive Service. November 17, 2008 Under President Bush’s order, agencies submit lists of crucial July 20, 2009 issues to Obama transition teams. Six months into the new administration, 191 political appointees, or 37 percent, have been confirmed. December 1, 2008 President-elect Obama’s agency review teams began reporting August 20, 2009 back findings to the main transition office. Administration has 240 nominees confirmed, or 46.5 percent.

January 8, 2009 November 13, 2009 President-elect Obama introduces the primary goals of the Administration has 285 nominees confirmed, or 55.2 percent. American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan to provide a stimulus to the ailing economy. December 31, 2009 Administration has 305 nominees confirmed, or 59 percent.

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APPENDIX D CONTRIBUTORS

External Contributors

The Partnership gratefully acknowledges the following contributors for their time and expertise in creating this publication. The recommendations proposed in this report are those of the Partnership and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, the following contributors.

Coast Guard Rear Admiral John Acton Paul Light Transition Director, Department of Homeland Security Paulette Goddard Professor of Public Service, New York University William L. Ball Member of Sen. John McCain’s Transition Planning Gail Lovelace Committee Director of Presidential Transition, General Services Administration Josh Bolten President George W. Bush’s White House Chief of Staff Christopher Lu Barack Obama Transition Executive Director/ Charles Borden White House Cabinet Secretary Partner, O’Melveny & Myers Norm Ornstein Rick Davis Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute Sen. John McCain’s Presidential Campaign Manager and Member of McCain’s Transition Planning Committee Howard Paster Executive Vice President for Public Affairs and Public Jennifer Dorn Relations, WPP President and CEO, National Academy of Public Administration John Podesta Chairman, Barack Obama Transition Russ Gerson Sen. John McCain’s Transition Planning Committee David Rawlinson Personnel Director White House Fellow

Clay Johnson Robert Rizzi Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, Partner, O’Melveny & Myers Bush Administration Paul Schneider Martha Kumar Former Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Director of White House Transition Project and Professor, Security Towson University

Partnership Contributors

Bob Cohen John Palguta Bevin Johnston Lara Shane Jeff MacMullen Kristine Simmons Katie Malague Max Stier Amelia Mann Tina Sung Christopher Nenno Craig Swaisgood

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