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Minerva at large: A study of the leadership styles and educational philosophies of the Department of Education secretaries
Herring, Mark Youngblood, Ed.D.
Cast Tennessee State University, 1990
UMI 300 N. Zccb Rd. Ann Aibor, MI 48106 MINERVA AT LARGE: A STUDY OF THE LEADERSHIP
STYLES AND EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHIES OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SECRETARIES
A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Department of Educational
Leadership and Policy Analysis
East Tennessee State University
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Education
by
Mark Y. Herring
May, 1990 APPROVAL
This is to c e rtify that the Graduate Committee of
Mark Y. Herring
met on the
Second day o f April 1 9 9 0
The Committee read and examined his dissertation, supervised his defense of i t in an oral examination, and decided to recommend that his study be submitted to the
Graduate Council and the Associate Vice-President for
Research and Dean of the Graduate School, in partial fu lfillm e n t of the requirements for the degree Doctor of
Educational Policy and Leadership Analysis,
aduate C
t Signed on behalf of the Graduate Council Graduate School
ii ABSTRACT
MINERVA AT LARGE: A STUDY OF THE LEADERSHIP STYLES
AND EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHIES OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SECRETARIES
by
Mark Y. Herring
In 1979, President James E. Carter signed into law the thirteenth Cabinet-level o ffice , the Department of Education. Although the United States has had a department, bureau, or office of education since 1867, the newly established Department of Education gave education a seat at the Cabinet table. Since that time, four individuals have served as secretaries: Shirley M. Hufstedler, Terrel H. Bell, William J. Bennett, and Lauro F. Cavazos.
Examined in this study were the importance of leadership styles and educational philosophies as exhibited by the four secretaries. A tertiary concern viewed the role of the federal government in education. Leadership styles were determined along the p o litic a l taxonomy of leadership (transactional or transformational) developed by Burns in 1978. Educational philosophies were examined under the traditional guise given them in most textbooks (Realism, Idealism, Pragmatism, e tc .). Two views of government and education were also studied, limited and unlimited.
The study was q u alitative rather than quantitative. A content analysis was performed on the secretaries speeches, monographs, a rtic le s , addresses, and annual reports. Interviews were also conducted with the secretaries or th eir proxies.
Conclusions of the study called into question the appropriateness of the federal Department of Education and its role as a reform agent In the schools and the ability of a given leader to lead at a federal level of responsibility. Educational philosophies were found to be nearly exact predictors of polices formulated and pursued and may act a good barometers for predicting what direction future secretaries may follow. The historical understanding of limited government may be lost on future secretaries, given the proliferation of federal programs by the government.
i i i I
DEDICATION
For Jim, Chris, and Dee virtus probata florescit
iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Acknowledging those who have helped with this project is at once wonderful and awful. It is wonderful, for it gives me pause to thank those who dedicated so much of their time and talent to see this study come to pass. It is also awful for I fear on the one hand that I have implicated the innocent, and on the other, that I have not been thankful enough: Deo g ratias. in both its senses.
F irs t, I thank my wife Carol who endured the hardships of a husband who worked only part time and looked to her to furnish our material needs. As always, you did your job with panache and grace. Thank God you have not bowed the knee to the Baal of Feminism.
To my daughters, Adriel and A reli, thanks are certainly in order for their endurance of a long race fought hard. You gave up much for this; I hope i t w ill eventually prove of value to you.
To Dr. Bob McElrath goes a very hearty thanks for the casual remark he made two and half years ago that effloresced into this study. The flower may not look anything like the seed, but I do believe you may see something of i t here if you look carefully.
To my chairman, Dr. Hal Knight, I owe my sincerest thanks. Although it is hard to be sincere or thankful during the birthing stages such a work, as it stands now, I offer my heartiest thanks for your meticulous eye and carking care to produce something we could both be proud of. My sincerest thanks also goes to the other members of my committee, Drs. Charles Burkett, Ernest Bentley, Floyd Edwards, and Ronald Green. Your contributions were always thought-provoking and helpful.
Lastly, but most importantly, I must thank Jim Holcolmb, Chris Ecoles, and Dee Kafalas. Jim is a state representative, and Chris and Dee work in the Washington congressional o ffice of my d is tric t. Without the unstinting efforts of these three people, this dissertation would not have made It to its present form. Government is supposed to be of, by, and for the people. Many in Washington have forgotten th is, or perhaps never knew it. These three people helped me remind others that this Republic was founded for the people, and no other. If it does not serve them, i t does not serve at a ll. Thanks so very, very much for a ll your help, letters, phone calls, and leg work.
v CONTENTS
Page APPROVAL i i
ABSTRACT...... i i i
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... v
LIST OF TABLES...... ix
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1
Statement of the Problem ...... 3
Purpose of the S tu d y ...... 6
Significance of the Study ...... 8
Assumptions and Definitions ...... 12
Research Questions ...... 15
Procedures , ...... 16
Organization of the study 17
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE...... 19
Education and the Founding Fathers . . . 20
Federal Involvement in Education .... 37
Evolution of the Office of Education . . 46
Bureau of Education: 1860-1900 .... 56
Bureau of Education: 1900-1953 .... 69
The Office of Education: 1953-1980 . . 80
The Department of Education: Carter's Prom ise...... 91
Leadership ...... 114
Burns' Taxonomy ...... 123
v i Chapter Page
Transactional Leadership ...... 135
Transformational Leadership ...... 141
Philosophies of Education ...... 153
Summary of the Literature Review .... 177
3. METHODOLOGY...... 181
Unitization ...... 187
Samp 1 i n g ...... 191
R e c o r d in g ...... 194
Interviews ...... 199
Construct for Inference ...... 199
Reliability ...... 200
V a l i d i t y ...... 202
4. FINDINGS ...... 205
Shirley M. Hufstedler ...... 215
Sum m ary...... 240
Terrel H. Bell ...... 242
Summary...... 274
William J. B e n n e tt...... 274
Summary ...... 301
Lauro F. Cavazos . 302
Sum m ary...... 330
5. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 333
Summary ...... 334
Conclusions ...... 344
v i i Recommendations ...... 352
Recommendations for Future Studies . . . 355
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 359
APPENDIX A ...... 404
APPENDIX B ...... 419
VITA ...... 424
v i i i LIST OF TABLES
TABLE Page
1. SELECTED FEDERAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS .... 38
2. COMMISSIONERS OF EDUCATION SINCE 1867 . . . 57
3. EARLY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION BILLS, 1918 - 1927 ...... 73
4. SAMPLING UNITS OF THE SECRETARIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ...... 208
5. OCCURRENCES OF THEMATIC UNITS AS OBSERVED IN SAMPLE MATERIALS BY INDEPENDENT REVIEWERS...... 212 CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Since 1980, more than $100 b illio n in federal funds have been spent on education in the United States (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1984, 1988). Representing only about 8% of the total expenditures on education from all categories (private funding, foundations, etc.), the federal government’ s involvement s t i l l represents a sizable investment with equal influence. Federal government has been involved in education since the passage of the 1785 Land Ordinance, an enactment that granted land to the states for schools (U.S. Department of Education, 1980), That means that federal involvement in education in some form has lasted for more than 200 hundred years. With the publication of A.
Nation at Risk (U.S. Commission on Excellence in
Education, 1983), and with the recent foreboding of an educational structure still caught in the throes of mediocrity (Finn, 1989), the time seemed ripe to investigate individuals occupying the highest education office in our federal government.
In recent years, federal involvement with education has been made a ll the more obvious. On July 17, 1979,
President James Carter established the Department of
1 partly to fu lfill a perceived need in the education arena. That development was but one more link in a long chain that has bound the federal government and the states together on educational matters. But how did this come about? No mention is made of education in the
Constitution. The "Common Defense" clause (A rticle I, section 8) of the Constitution has been used by educators to allow for federal involvement in education.
The Tenth Amendment of the B ill of Rights, in which education is obliquely referred to, deferred schooling to the states. By silence alone, then, 1s education even linked to government in the Constitution. So what caused the change from state education to strong federal involvement?
The controversy between the Federalists and the
A nti-federalists at the Constitutional Convention focused on a number of things, not the least of which was education. In the end, education or schooling was omitted from the Constitution. But that solution appears not to have satisfied fully either state leaders or the Congress. Educational leadership from Washington has not always been obvious. The federal philosophy of education appears on the face to be the establishment of new programs with large amounts of funding. The state philosophy of education appears to be a pursuit of those federally funded programs.
With the establishment of the Department of
Education in 1979, a new target of debate emerged: The secretaries of the department called to serve i t .
Questions about the secretaries naturally turned to questions of leadership; How have the secretaries led the department and, in turn, led the nation educationally? Have the secretaries in the department attempted to make any of these perplexing questions, especially questions regarding educational leadership, clearer?
In examining the philosophy of the founding fathers and th eir omission of education from the Constitution, the question naturally arose, what were the philosophies of education of the Department of Education Secretaries?
How had these philosophies Influenced educational policy, and how important were they to the leadership of the department its elf?
Statement of the Problem
Educational theorists have taught that leadership styles were Important 1n education, as were philosophies of education (Hoy & Miskel, 1987; Pulliam, 1987). But how effectively were leadership styles being used, as evinced by the Secretaries of the Department of
Education, and what connections were drawn between the styles of leadership followed by the secretaries, their philosophies of education, and the policies they pursued? Now in Its ninth year and operating under Its fourth secretary, what has been the record of the
Department of Education Secretaries concerning
leadership styles and educational philosophies? Was a particular leadership style important? Were philosophies of education essential at the federal level?
In nearly all the leadership materials to date, the authors of each leadership theory—Feidler (1967),
Reddin (1971), Hersey and Blanchard (1982), Blake and
Mouton (1985), and more--have written about style.
James McGregor Burns (1978) had, more specifically, spoken of the leadership a b ilitie s of those involved in the po litical process. Burns identified a number of strategies to successful leadership by identifying two important streams of style: transactional and transformational. Transactional leadership bargained, strove for consensus at v irtu a lly any cost, and could be mandated executively. Transformational leadership bordered on what once was called charismatic leadership.
It was leadership that transformed. It took the mantle of reform leadership or revolutionary leadership (Burns,
1978), In either case, Burns' yardstick had been a simple one: Had p o litical leaders succeeded in changing— i.e ., transforming--the process through
leadership excellence? In this context, how had the
Department of Education Secretaries— Shirley Hufstedler,
Terrel Bell, William Bennett, and Lauro Cavazos—fared in the area of leadership? Did they follow one style
(transactional or transformational)? Had they been able to bring into concert thought and action on style, or had theory been one distinct thing, practice another?
Given the current interest in educational reform, had leadership style at the federal level been conducive to reform concerns?
Moreover, i f , as Pulliam (1987) said, philosophies of education do matter to individuals, then did they matter to those who occupied the Secretary's seat of the
Department of Education? All educators have been encouraged to adopt some visible philosophical habit with which to adapt their educational world view. These philosophies helped to regularize one's thinking and often acted as finely cut pigeon-holes for varying ways of dealing with educational crises. Have the
Secretaries of the Department of Education articulated one predominant philosophy, and, 1f so, what was it?
Have these philosophies been evident in their policies and the formation of educational goals for the Department?
In summary, the problems this study investigated included, first, the leadership styles of the Department of Education Secretaries, specifically whether these styles were more transactional or transformational in nature. Second, this study investigated the problem of educational philosophies of the secretaries, attempting to descry whether philosophies were evident, if they influenced policy, and the importance of their philosophies with the Secretary's work at the Department of Education. Lastly, the study investigated the relationship between education and the federal government.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to investigate the leadership styles and educational philosophies of
Shirley Hufstedler, Terrel Bell, William Bennett, and
Lauro Cavazos. This study examined leadership in its transactional and transformational meanings (Burns,
1978) and arrived at some generalizations about the secretaries, the policies they supported, and the offices they led. Burns (1978) pointed out that there was "no school of leadership, intellectual or practical"
(p. 2). But he indicated that there was "an Immense reservoir of data and analysis and theories" (p. 2) that had been developed. Two such strands, already
identified, were transactional and transformational
leadersh ip .
It was the intent of this study to focus on these two main thrusts of leadership in order to find out which one of them played a more significant role. It must be added that whichever thrust was chosen, the choice may have been a subconscious one. This made necessary the investigation of speeches, books, articles, and other written materials authored by the secretaries. The purpose of examining these materials was to get at the thrusts of the department. It was assumed that what the secretaries wrote about most frequently, spoke about most often, and deposited into the Department of Education for future reference represented what was most important to them in the context of education at the federal level. The Idea was to analyze these thrusts to see whether or not they reflected a leadership style and a philosophy in action.
As Burns also pointed out, transformational and transactional leadership styles were the most common styles used in political contexts. They were not exclusive to the p o litic a l context, but they were certainly the most frequently found. It was important to this study, in examining leadership styles, to focus on those styles found to be most common to the subject.
Burns also noted that transactional and transformational leadership styles splintered Into many different substrata (i.e ., reform leadership, revolutionary leadership, opinion leadership, party leadership, executive leadership, etc.) (Burns, 1978, sic passim).
It was necessary to Identify these substrata 1f they presented themselves during the course of the work.
Fin ally, a te rtia ry area of this study focused on how the secretaries understood the place of education in a federal government. Did they see any connection with what they were doing and the Constitution of the United
States? Was there a sense of connection with the notion of limited government and the secretaries' understanding of the work they were doing?
It was thought that by examining the leadership styles and education philosophies, some general conclusions could be made about the nature of reform in education and the role of the federal government in it.
It was also thought that this study could make some tentative conclusions, pending further study, about the secretaries of education and the role they played in forming the early work of the Department of Education.
Significance of the Study
The controversy surrounding the nature of education at the national level has long been heated. Since the decision of the founding fathers placed education at the state level by virtue of the Tenth Amendment, the contest has been, nearly ever since, to find a way to allow federal support without Influence.
Neither the states nor federal government has been able to claim education entirely for Itself, states worked with autonomy, yet looked to Washington to fund many of their educational endeavors in a disinterested way. Federal government, meanwhile, having relinquished its right to control education at a national level with the penning of the Constitution, attempted to remain a disinterested party and yet exact accountability from the states. This accountability requirement expressed its e lf in regulations which both focused and blurred the relationship the federal government had with education among the states (Eidenberg & Morey, 1969). Moreover, the fragmented nature of legislative power, the myriad of special interests (not the least of which were educational experts, the National Education Association
[NEA], and the lik e ), further complicated the role of the federal government in education (Radin & Hawley,
1988). With so many diverse and interested groups,
(i.e ., Congress, special interest groups, national unions), the issue of influence on state education by Washington became more complex and d iffic u lt to trace to one source.
In 1978, President Carter, in answer to a campaign promise, made arrangements to do something about education. That something turned out to be the
'cabinetization' of the Office of Education. Teacher unions and professional organizations were quick to lend support. At that time, NEA, the fifth largest organizational lobbying power in Washington (Kimbrough &
Nunnery, 1980), entered the debate. The lines, drawn between those who favored the establishment of a department and those who did not, were now clear.
Proponents claimed that it would nationalize education; opponents claimed it would wreck the educational system, allowing government to take more control of individual lives by disrupting them further, and departing sig n ifican tly from what they viewed as the promise of the Constitution: to establish a repub lie and not a democracy (Radin & Hawley, 1988).
The leadership of this new Department of Education was essential to its success. More than partisan politics was at stake. It was important at this early stage in the department's development to take stock of what had so far come to pass. By examining leadership styles and educational philosophies, Important investigative light would be shed on the nature of the department's ability to attain goals, and the obstacles
in the path to those goals. By understanding better the role of leadership styles and educational philosophies
In this department, educators and future secretaries would be helped. First, educators would get a clearer understanding of the obstacles that prevent goal attainment. They would be able to use this information to th eir advantage in working with the department in coming years.
Second, future secretaries, by studying this research, would be able to see the Importance of leadership styles, which of two thrusts seemed more likely to achieve goals, and which of the two moved toward stronger reform of education nationwide.
In sum, the significance of this study lay in how leadership styles and philosophies were portrayed. The re la tiv e strength or weakness of the importance of leadership styles and educational philosophies led to a reassessment of the u t i l i t y of the Department of
Education in its present form. By virtue of this reassessment, some light was cast on how to make the department a more useful tool for the reform of education, and for the positioning of education's importance in our culture. If on the other hand, certain trends were established and certain patterns closely aligned with good practices emerged, then this information could be generalized for use by future secretaries.
Assumptions and Definitions
Because the federal government has been involved in education for more than 100 years, and because some form of an office of education has been in existence for more than a century, i t became necessary to establish a working vocabulary that would distinguish the historical life of education within the federal structure. Below are listed a few terms that were used to distinguish such periods.
The Bureau of Education--that organization which was established in 1867 and continued until 1939.
The Office of Education—that entity that took shape under the Roosevelt adminstration*s reorganization of the Bureau, removing it from the Department of the
Interior, to the Federal Security Agency. The term referred to that entity until 1978.
The Department of Education—that en tity that took shape after President Carter established it with
Cabinet-1evel status in 1979.
Secretaries of the Department of Education— the highest position held by a presidentialTy appointed person in the Department of Education.
Transactional leadership— leadership by excambion, or by exchange. It is leadership that is marked or distinguished by a willingness to compromise, or exchange one thing for another.
Transformational leadership— leadership that transforms followers. It is characterized by the leader's expression of a vision in such a way as to
"engage" (Burns, 1978, p. 20) leaders and followers to higher levels of motivation and morality. The leader in this case is often said to possess charisma. His or her legacy is often observable change.
Philosophies of Education— This study did not attempt to establish any new meaning for the various philosophies that were not already a part of the educational vocabulary (Ozmon & Graver, 1986, for example). Individual educational philosophies were elaborated on in Chapter 2.
Philosophy of Education--a phrase taken to refer to a world view held by a given secretary that determined how he or she understood education as a consequent in culture. It referred to how a given secretary viewed the action and interaction of knowledge in the world, what undergirded that knowledge, how that knowledge was to be transferred to others, and what that body of knowledge represented.
It was assumed that the conditions under which the
Interviews took place did not adversely Impact the outcome of those interviews. The secretaries interviewed for this study were a ll public people and had long been involved as leaders in their non-public professions. Because they were inured to being the center of attention, interviews, in whatever conditions they needed to take place, did not seriously alter the outcome of this study. This study did not include an investigation into lesser line positions.
Although the history of the federal o ffice of education extended to 1867, the lite ra tu re survey for this study focused on some materials dating back to the late 1780s, when discussion of a department was f ir s t formulated. The history moved rapidly between the years
1939 and 1953, where the Office of Education remained a veritable non-entity. Owing to the crisis created by the 1957 Soviet launching of Sputnik, coupled with the previous 1954 Brown decision, education and its concerns took a prominent place in American p o litic a l thought
(Kimbrough & Nunnery, 1980). While this study did not focus on the interplay of political partisanship, the emergence of re a lp o litik had certainly affected American education. Hence, the history examined here focused more directly the years from 1950 to the present. It was s till important, however, to examine the history of education In the federal structure in order to gain a proper historical perspective.
Research Questions
1. Were there identifiable leadership styles evinced by the Secretaries of the Department of Education?
2. If yes, could these styles be characterized as either transactional or transformational?
3. Was one style considered by the secretaries to be either more useful or more necessary, given the department's present political configuration?
4. Were these leadership styles consistent with
Constitutional demands of limited federal involvement?
5. Were there identifiable philosophies of education exhibited by the Secretaries of the Department of
Education?
6. Were these philosophies important 1n setting or helping to set department policies?
7. Were these philosophies of education in agreement with statements about education made by the secretaries?
8. How were leadership styles and philosophies converted into public action? Procedures
The study began with the usual lite ra tu re review, encompassing not only the history of federal involvement in education, but also a history of the Bureau and
Office of Education. By necessity, this plan required an enlargement of the p o litic a l a c tiv itie s of the Carter administration and of Congress in bringing about the establishment of the Department of Education. Because of the volatility of the subject matter, Congress split fairly evenly into three camps: a segment against the department, another segment favoring the department, and a sizable segment undecided about the proposed Cabinet act (Radin & Hawley, 1988). It was this undecided population in Congress which determined the outcome of the department's fate, in spite of enormous public sentiment against it (Radin & Hawley, 1988).
The heart of this study, however, was the analyses of the speeches, books, artic les w ritten by the secretaries, and the interviews with them by this researcher and others. (Brief resumes of the secretaries are supplied in Appendix 1.) A survey of the literature by and about the secretaries and their work was included in Chapter 2. The interviews shed great light on the questions this study raised.
Interviews performed by this researcher followed the procedures and guidelines outlined in Krippendorff
(1980), Banner & Canter (1985), and Briggs (1986).
Once the data had been collected, the author began the content analysis, concluding in generalized recommendations. The content analysis, including reliability and validity Issues, followed largely upon the work by Andren (Rosengren, 1981), but not neglecting the Krippendorff (1980); Lasswell, Leites, and
Associates (1965); and Berelson (1952) tradition. The units of study were the speeches, books, artic les of the secretaries, and interviews with each of them. A random sample of the texts, as advised by Krippendorff (1980), selected the printed matter to be analyzed by outside reviewers for r e lia b ility and v a lid ity purposes.
Organization of the Study
Chapter 2 examines the lite ra tu re surrounding the study. It involves a number of parts. The first part examines the establishment of the office in 1867, along with the history preceding that date. It also touches upon some of the more significant debates of the period, including Henry Barnard, the f ir s t Commissioner of
Education, and the debates between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists over the place of education in the newly established government. A second part deals with the Office of Education from 1900 to 1978. This section also contains the history of the change for the office from the Department of the Interior to Health,
Education, and Welfare in 1953. A final section deats with the establishment of the Department of Education during 1979, the Congressional debates, and the department's beginning.
Chapter 3 outlines the methods and procedures for the study, including a lengthy discussion of content analysis, its merits and defects, and its defense for
Inclusion in this study.
Chapter 4 includes the findings, with a discussion of the four secretaries and their work in the new department.
Chapter 5 concludes with the results and directions for future studies. CHAPTER 2
Survey of the literature required focus on three
areas. First, the connection of the federal government
with education, and the absence of education from the
Constitution. This led to an investigation of education
and the founding fathers, attempting to shed tight on
why so many in te l1ecutally capable men could have
omitted from the most important document of the infant
nation, something as Important as education.
Second, the survey of lite ra tu re examined the
history of education in the federal government, from the
formulations of plans for a national office in the late
1780s, to the department's full Cabinet status in 1979.
Some important figures were noted along the lengthy span
of the more than 200 years of history catalogued.
Third, the main thrusts of leadership styles,
transactional and transformational leadership, were also
examined. The function of these leadership styles,
their characteristics, and their treatment in the
literature were noted.
Philosophies of education concluded the literature
survey. The main philosophies of education as noted by
Ozmon & Craver (1986), Rippa (1988), and Pulliam (1987)
were reviewed. The importance of philosophies of
education to educators in whatever the educational
19 context were also treated.
Education and the Founding Fathers
Scholars and laymen alike have been puzzled on
first looking into the Constitution and coming to the
realization that no. straightforward directive is
provided by that august document for education. What
could the framers have intended by leaving out
education? Were they ignorant of its absence? Was it
oversight? Did they simply disregard it?
More than one scholar has made the mistake of
attributing to the framers oversight, or worse,
ignorance of the importance of the matter (Cubberley,
1919; Pulliam, 1987; and Rippa, 1988, for example).
Education was not mentioned in the Constitution not
because of oversight; it was more by design.
The Consititut ion was framed during a b itte r debate
drawn between two warring factions: the Federalists and
the Anti-Federalists. Both groups boasted of eminent men. Of the Federalist faction, the names of George
Washington, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John
Jay spring to mind: men of considerable intellectual
achievement. Anti-Federalists like George Mason, Thomas
Jefferson, Henry Lee, George Clinton, Samuel Adams, and of course Patrick Henry were also men of no mean
in tellectu al accomplishments (8urns, 1982). Yet the theory that education was left out of the Constitution because it was deemed unimportant persists.
Cubberley (1919) in his massive history of public education admitted as much when he wrote,
It is not surprising, however, when we consider the
time, the men, and existing conditions, that the
founders of our Republic did not deem the subject
of public education important enough to warrant
consideration in the Convention or inclusion in the
document, (p. 53)
This was simply not the case. The framers were not ignorant men, A more educated group of men than those who assembled to ra tify our federal government has not been found in the annals of history (Burns, 1982).
Moreover, the signers had more p o litic a l experience than any other gathering of a newly elected independent nation at any time in history. The groups were also re la tiv e ly young: a ll were in th eir forties (Burns,
1982; Hofstadter, Miller, & Aaron, 1972).
For both Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike, the question of the education of the men themselves cannot be impugned: these were eminently educated men.
Nine were products of Princeton, four of William and
Mary, four of Yale, and three each of Harvard and
Columbia (Burns, 1982). How could i t be charged that education was unimportant to these men?
Oversight of education as an important enough issue also fa ils as a reason. Although relying on much of what had "worked" before in government, Madison, when he drew up the branches of government in the Federalist papers (#51) (Cooke, 1961), was essentially establishing a new e n tity .1 In doing so, however, it was clear that he took into account Locke, Hume, Hobbes, and others to formulate his views about government. It was unlikely that men as meticulous as Madison, Hamilton, and Jay could be charged with overlooking education. This le ft only disregard as a possible solution.
But disregard led to another historically inappropriate conclusion. If anything, the framers were more than a l i t t l e conscious about the matter of education, and therefore may be said to have regarded it too much. We are le ft, then with only one soultion:
Both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists were concerned with the appropriateness of education in context of a federal republic (Cremin, 1951).2
Could the federal government, established for
'. For a most fascinating discussion of the development of the governmental powers see J. M. Burns (1963). The deadlock of democracy. Englewood C liffs , NJ: Prentice Hal 1.
2. As with most everything the Constitution touches— laws, commerce, economic— the framers were greatly influenced by the work of the monarchial states. See, for example, Thomas Hobbes (1968), Leviathan. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, and John Locke (1964), An essav concerning human understanding. New York: The New American Library. certain reasons, allow itself to include education as one of those "inalienable rights" spoken of so eloquently by Jefferson in the Declaration of
Independence? The answer, when the historical context is understood, was negative. In brief, the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists agreed on its importance; they disagreed on its place (Storing, 1981). Education sought to te ll people something about lif e . Questions regarding the nature of life and its purpose centered on what the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists would have understood as religion (Neuhaus, 1984). Religion was a private a ffa ir that should not be controlled by government (Cooke, 1961). A nti-Federalists, then, saw education as a right to be regulated by the states;
Federalists, by a centralized government. This was the succinct answer. In the long run, however, the answer was more complex than this and deserved a more extended response.
At least four legitimate reasons can be given for why the framers left education out of the Constitution.
The f ir s t one had to do with the idea of government as self-limiting (Storing, 1981). The second had to do with the governing power already held by the states
(Storing, 1981; Cooke, 1961). The third reason had to do with the nature of the debate between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists (Storing, 1981; Neuhaus, 1984). Tha final reason why education was le ft out of the
Constitution had to do with the manner in which the
Federalists on the one hand, and the Anti-Federalists on
the other, viewed the link between education and
religion (Storing, 1981).
F irs t, government for both the Federalists and the
Anti-Federalists was to be self-limiting. The
Constitution was drafted as a document that limited the
powers of the newly formed Republic (Hofstadter, Miller,
& Aaron, 1972). The issue of controversy was whether or
not it would be centralized or decentralized. Like Mill
who wrote after them, the framers liked to think of the
self-educated society as one that secured liberty. Like
Mill, they saw this self-educated society existing only
in a democratic society (Garforth, 1980, emphases
added).
Indeed, the very framework of the Constitution,
which limned these rights for the infant nation,
expressed its e lf in an understanding of government that was self-1imiting. Hamilton, writing in the first of the Federalist papers, indicated as much. It was
thought by some, he said, that the Thirteen States were already "of too great extent for any general system"
(Cooke, 1961), implying at once that the work of the states was self-sufficient, but needed centralization.
Hamilton feared a sprawling government that differed with each state line. He was equally fearful
of the one thing that would wreck any government:
ambition (Cooke, 1961). With thirteen state governments
and therefore thirteen sets of o ffic ia ls , ambition could
run amok. Education, Hamilton thought, would prevent
this among the people, while three branches of
government would prevent this, or at least slow it down,
in government. Even Jefferson, Hamilton’s formidable
opponent, saw education as a way of checking the
tendency of a government to degenerate into a tyranny.
Education would help the people recognize "ambition
under a ll its shapes" (Warren, 1974, p. 25). But
education was already a matter the states had undertaken
to oversee. How could this new and untried system of
government snatch out of the hands of the states, and
place into the newly formed federal ones, a thing which
the states had supervised so well? It could not be done without a fight.
Second, there remained, a s t i l l stickier item, and
Hamilton expressed i t best in the f ir s t Federa1i s t :
Among the most formidable of obstacles which the
new Constitution will have to encounter, may
readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a
certain class of men in every State to resist all
changes which may hazard a diminution of the power.
. . . [M]en who w ill . . . aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country . . , than from its
union from one government. (Cooke, 1961, p. 4)
Ambition and a change in power, two potential desires of men in government, could not be erased by a written document, however elegant or a rtic u la te. So much more had to be done in order to overwhelm these ambitions, that Hamilton declared his wonder "whether societies of men are re a lly capable or not of established good government from re fle c tiv e choice," or whether they must forever be "destined" to depend on "accident and force" for th eir government (Cooke, 1961, p. 3).
From the beginning, centralized government must be argued for, or so Federalists thought. The loss of state power must be avoided, or so the Anti-Federalists posited. The Federalist. and its counterpart, The Anti-
Federal ist papers, attempted to change the minds of men on the issue of long-distance government, the former for it, the later suspicious of it. But neither tried to out tine in great detail what powers that government should have, other than the very general powers of security and commerce a ll governments were known to possess. Neither group was w illing to specify something as special and personal as education to be a power that a nascent government should have.3 The truth was that
3 . See Federalist #3 where Jay argued that the pre-eminent right of government was for safety. This is important for it underscores how far away from practical the Anti-Federalists feared that the proposed
Constitution provided for too strong a national government, not a federal one. To some degree, the
Federalists agreed, but were w illing to suspend belief for the government's formation. The Anti-Federalists were not (Main, 1961).
Government, after it began to do things for its people, could by the very nature of habit, become more involved in the lives of those it served. Hamilton saw this opportunity and may have been hinting at the powers of government to come when he said that " [T]he more . ,
. the ordinary exercise of government [is witnessed]; the more citizens are accustomed to meet with it , . .
[in] their public life . . . the greater will be the probability that it will [win] the respect and attachment of the community" (Cooke, 1961, p. 173). He may, then, have been thinking of other extended powers that the government would acquire later. But even so, throughout the Federalist. Madison, Hamilton, and Jay were bold to go so far, but careful to go no farther. matters of government the debate about the Constitution was before it could come to discuss the powers of government in specific. In Federalist #5, Jay approvingly quoted Queen Anne's speech to the Scottish Parliament, that government w ill secure for its people religion, liberty, property, while increasing strength, riches, and trade. Later, in # 5, Jay showed that commerce was yet another reason for government,and that without such agreements concerning it , the several states would be trading in spite of one another rather than with one another. They wanted a centralized government, but they would not risk it for the sake of including even an important item such as education if it meant the possible expense of the whole.
It must be pointed out that Hamilton and Madison
(one cannot say for sure about Jay) thought the matter of education was already settled in what is commonly referred to as the Welfare Clause, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution: "To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States . . . ." (emphasis added)
Hamilton said that "... no doubt that whatever concerns the general interests of teaming . . .all are within the sphere of the national councils, as far as regards an application of money" (Stickney fit Marcus,
1984, p. 6). Jefferson and Madison supported a
Constitutional amendment for an active federal role in education; Monroe later called for the establishment of seminaries; and John Adams and John Q. Adams favored the establishment of a national university (Stickney &
Marcus, 1984, p. 6), Yet, while being of great importance to the framers, none were w illin g to step out and wrest education from the states.
Third, there was the matter of the nature of the debate itself. The fight between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists also involved stating logical reasons for every addition of power to the newly formed government. Since most were at best suspicious of a huge government, powers added to it had to be added abstemiously. This led to debates and very b itte r ones.
The B ill of Rights was ra tifie d some three years after the Constitution. But the Constitution itself underwent an acrimonious debate throughout the states,
In Pennsylvania, for example, the opponents of the
Constitution stayed away. The Federalists seized enough of them and lit e r a lly dragged them into chamber to make up the quorum (Hofstadter, M ille r, & Aaron, 1972, p.
156; Kilpatrick, n.d., pp. 60-61), The Federalists, once everyone was in place, won ra tific a tio n . Even though ratification was not nearly so difficult, opposition was mounted in every state. It may be said that the Federalists held the Anti-Federalists hostage in order to get the Constitution signed (Burns, 1982, p.
98). It should come as no wonder that with so many difficulties facing them, the framers left out as much as they possibly could in order to get the "bare bones" of a government up and running.
Finally, there was the matter of how religion was viewed in connection with education. The two warring factions, the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, consisted of supporters with their minds made up. The Federalists, however, held positions homogenously. The
Anti-Federalists did not. "The Federalists claimed that the opposers of the Constitution could not agree among themselves, that they shared no common principles, that th eir arguments canceled each other out" (Storing, 1981, v . 1, p. 5).
This was surely an exaggeration, for the
Federalists were also a disputatious group. The Anti-
Federalists, however, held no litmus test for ideological membership to the group. Always at the heart of a given position, there was a dilemma or a tension that had to be articulated. Occasionally this resulted in an impasse. The Anti-Federalists " [C]ould neither fully reject nor fully accept the leading principles of the Constitution. They were indeed open to Hamilton's charge of trying to reconcile contradictions" (Storing, 1981, v. 1, p. 6). But the imbroglios to which this habit of mind often led were not owing to a lack of courage or to a double mindedness. While the Federalists seized upon the potential power that the Union proposed, the Anti-
Federalists relied on the kinetic power already exhibited in the states.
At its best, Anti-Federal thought explores these
tensions and points to the need for any significant
American political thought to confront them; for they were not resolved by the Constitution but are
inherent in the principles and traditions of
American p o litic a l lif e . (Storing, 1981, v. 1, p.
6 )
This led to a marshalling of intellectual forces against any item in the Constitution which could not be happily resolved. The amendments, or rather the promise of them, resolved some of the doubts of some Anti-
Federalists. But on the matter of religion and education, the issue could not rest.
The Anti-Federalist could not abide a republic which did not encourage religious virtue (Storing, 1981, v. 1, p. 22). Religion was the guardian of morals, and the guardian of religion was the state. The state was confirmed, as has been pointed out, by an educated electorate. Religion, education, and politics were all inextricably intertwined. Adams himself argued as much when he wrote,
We have no government armed with power capable of
contending with human passions unbridled by
morality and religion. Our Constitution was made
only for a moral and a religious people. It is
wholly inadequate for the government of any other.
(Neuhaus, 1984, p. 95).
It did not matter to the Anti-Federalists that some individuals might be le ft out by such a framework as this. They criticized the Constitution for its absence of protection for the liberty of conscience. The principle of extending such protection to professed atheists or agnostics simply did not enter their minds
Storing, 1981),
In the face of this opposition, then, the
Federalists, having established government as being for safety, commerce, defense, and the common welfare, chose not to add anything more that could possibly draw up yet another specter for debate, and another reason for clashing swords. Education, because it had for too long been linked to home and church (as Cubberley had rightly pointed out), would be better left alone. School fit in as a way, not of liberalizing the mind, but of trimming the w ill (Banner, 1970). But did this satisfy the debate? Moreover, what role did this revolution leave for the federal government to follow?
In answer to the fir s t question posed, it may be said that the matter is anachronistically stated. For both Federalists and Anti-Federalists, nothing could have been more natural than to pair religion and education. The tension between church and state, between education and religion, was a modern invention.
It was true that President Grant experienced his d iffic u ltie s with the Catholics, and even introduced a b ill to prevent sectarian teaching in the public schools (Williams, 1848; Van Holst, 1881), But the division was never dramatic until the 1900s.
In modern times ( i . e . , post-1900), the view that the resolution of education and the Constitution stranded education between a religious concern for questions regarding life and a political concern for providing for the welfare of a nation, was simply that-- a modern matter. The tensions between religion and education formed sharply after the publication of
Dewey's Democracy and Education, a book which sought to replace the Messiah of Christianity with a secular
Messiah, one who reigned through education (Rushdoony,
1963).
Education, so long as it fulfilled the religious role of trimming the w ill and answering the questions of life, satisfied Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike.
Both groups settled on the idea that there would be other agencies outside of government that would help resolve the matters of everyday living (Neuhaus, 1984).
Religion and church establishment were considered as one essential among others. It was only when government sought to shape education in a certain direction that it began to bedevil politicians, clergy, and laymen. That bedevilment did not begin to occur until the beginning of this century (Neuhaus, 1984).
Both Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike shared a belief in the Judaeo-Christian world view handed down by Calvin and the Reformation (Lindsay, 1970; Rushdoony,
1963), They disagreed not on this tradition, but on how much of this tradition was to be preserved and protected by government. It was easier, therefore, to disagree about where education should go in the new government, yet s t i l l maintain a very heightened sense of the sp iritual qualities in the world. Government documents even 50 to 100 years hence reflected this acceptance of a shared religious trad itio n . Of course, even agreement in theory, if disagreement in practice, did not make the issue of education, religion, and government disappear.
Education and religion grew together, the one supporting the other. Without the infusing values of the one, and the enlightenment of the other, a nation would not find the will to survive, or so the framers thought. But it was just this connection, as much as anything, that kept education (and for that matter, established religion) out of the Constitution. The now famous establishment clause of the First Amendment, generally accepted by most to be a proscription for the government not to interfere with religion, was for both factions a proscription to keep government out of religion (Storing, 1981; Rushdoony, 1963).
The issues were too many for the framers to resolve at once: states’ rights, a centralized or decentralized government, the fierceness of the debate that waged between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, and the matter of the appropriateness of education and government. The Federalists were sure of one thing.
They wanted a centralized government and would have stopped at v irtu a lly nothing to secure it. Faced with the problem of getting the Constitution ratified—a
Constitution that had every reason to fa il had it been put to a vote—they did not place any more into it than they fe lt had a chance of getting passed. The
Federalists banked on a promised B ill of Rights, which came later, as a way of resolving the outstanding issues of debate (Burns, 1982).
The Federalists on one side saw the engine of federal powers ready to take on the problems of a new nation. Anti-Federalists, on the other, feared that power might run amok among the states, destroying their powers, or, at best, impeding them. In the end both parties ratified a Constitution that left out these practical matters of religion and education because there was simply no debate about their linkage. The only Issue that needed settling was how much would go into the new Constitution, and later, the new centralized government. The framers determined to keep education as a state right. When later generations of politicians came to this issue with a burning desire to establish federal control in some form, the boundary between states’ rights and the rights of the federal government became more and more blurred.
This lengthy discussion of religion and education is appropriate because the matter s till influences leadership and public policy in education today. It also framed what the Department of Education can and cannot do in the nation's schools, besides lim iting what active leadership the secretaries in this department can compel the schools to do morally. It hampers greatly how active a role secretaries may take in the matter of prescription in education.
What has fascinated observers about this very early, pre-Office of Education period, however, was that
Congress appeared not to decide how strong a role it would take in education; to what extent it would preempt states' rights over education. Yet history left us a long record where Congress proceeded with its influence of education as if it had decided unequivocally in favor of a nationalized form of education in America. One wonders what would have happened, how the terrain in education might look today if , in fact, the Framers had included as one of the powers of the newly federated government, control of education in the nation's schools. Federal Involvement in Education
Almost from the beginning, federal involvement in education was a re a lity . Although many scholars placed this involvement with the advent of the M orrill Act
(Miles, 1974; Kursh, 1965), it was clear from Table 1 that this involvement came much before the M orrill Acts.
Congress fe lt that in order to improve education, it had to become their bailiwick. Federalists and Whigs saw education as a way of controlling the discipline of an unruly, but democratic people (Burns, 1982, p. 502),
Anti-Federalists saw it as a way of preserving the moral fabric of the country. Jefferson, as well as many others, saw education as a means of securing men from tyranny (Burns, 1982; Cooke, 1961). Virtually all of them saw education as the one vehicle through which the goals of the democratic state in its republican mode would be vouchsafed for a ll time,
The evolution of federal involvement in education focused on the formation of the Bureau of Education in
1867 and, ultimately, the Department of Education in
1979-1980, in at least two ways. F irst, the early involvement of Congresses in the passage of education b ills served to establish the link between Washington and the public schools, from elementary to the college level. Once Congress passed b ills for land, b ills for social enlightenment, and the like, it was not so giant 38
Table 1
Selected Federal Education Programs^
Date______Program______
1785 Land Ordinance (Northwest)
1802 United States M ilitary Academy
1862 M orrill Land Grant
1867 Bureau of Education
1887 Hatch Act
1890 Second M orrill Land Grant
1914 Smith-Lever Act
1917 Smith-Hughes Act
1932 New Deal Programs
1944 Servicemen’ s Readjustment Act
1954 Cooperative Research Act
1958 National Defense Education Act
1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act; Higher Education Act
1967 Bilingual Act
1975 Education for All Handicapped ChiIdren Act
1976 Education Appropriat ions
1980 Department of Education
1. See also J. Johnson (1927), Federal Aid for Education. New York: H. W. Wilson Company, and M. Justiz and L. Bjork (1988), Higher Education and Public Policy. New York: American Council on Education and MacMillan Company. a step for it to pass bills for the creation of specific
agencies or offices to deal with previously established
programs.
Second, Congress, once the involvement was secure,
began to see that it could place itself in the position
of protecting the general welfare by protecting
education* As mentioned above, most of the founding
fathers saw education as a way of preserving the
republic. But later Congresses saw i t as a way of
rooting out ignorance. It was not by accident, as shall
be shown, that what ultim ately came to be called the
Bureau of Education, commenced in 1867. shortly after
the C ivil War. The war brought to light a number of
things, but primarily it said to Congress that a portion
of the nation ( i . e . , the South) was living in ignorance
and needed reformation. In this lig h t, the Department
of Education may be seen as a social in stitu tio n .
In order to follow this brief history, it will be
necessary to examine the federal involvement in
education from its beginnings to more modern times in a
truncated chronology. Nevertheless, the abbreviated
history helped to show that the formation of a national o ffice to deal with education issues occurred with great ambivalence toward education. This ambivalence occurred because the true ties between government and education had been resolved by the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution: education was a state right. But time and the interest of government caused that right to be impinged upon by the federal extension of power. Once this occurred, but without an amendment to "correct" education as something other than a state right,
Congress went through cycles of ambivalence toward education, at times thinking its educational Initiatives fully correct, at other times, thinking it had over stepped its bounds.
With the adoption of the 1785 Land Ordinance of the
Northwest T errito ries, Congress outlined regulations for national lands west of the Alleghenies, north of the
Ohio River, and west of the Mississippi River (Pulliam,
1987). This territory was to be arranged so that in each township of th irty six sections, the sixteenth was to be set aside for schools within the township. This one square mile of land was the f ir s t movement of the federal government to align itself with education.
Although this was two years before the signing of the
Constitution, it nevertheless spoke of the underlying theme to come.
Congress tied together religion and education in a way that was reminiscent of the debate between the
Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. Article Three of the Ordinance of 1787 (which strengthened the 1785 Land
Ordinance against the lawlessness of squatters and the tyranny of Indians) read in part that, "Religion, m orality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encompassed"
(Carter, 1934, v. (I, p. 47).
The Ordinance also did something else, however. It linked government to education. That this was unmistakable was evidenced by no less a person than
Daniel Webster, who later remarked that no law, ancient or modern, had a more lasting character. "It set forth and declared it to be a high and binding duty of government to support schools and the means of education" (Stickney & Marcus, 1984, p. 5). Moreover, later Congresses took the matter most seriously: No state was ever admitted into the Union unless i t made a provision for education (Hales, 1954; also in Stickney &
Marcus, 1984, p. 5). Even so, "[T]he fact that the public has legitimate interests in education that e n title government some forms of cooperation does not entail [it] ... to control everything about schooling"
(Strike, 1982, p. 160).
While it may be argued that federal involvement did not extend this fa r, this established an important precedent. It now began formulating the language of education. This often led to an inadvertent by-pass of an important capitalistic invention: competition (LeFevre, 1973),
Education was important to government because "A democratic society can only be as good as the electorate" (Pearl, 1972, p. 110). But the size to which federal involvement would extend grew slowly. The schools, as they emerged in the early part of the 19th century were, as one writer had i t , "pure socialism"
(Burns, 1982, p. 501). Because those.schools could, as was pointed out earlier, establish a way of achieving the goals of the state, politicians sought ways of making the alliance with education more dramatic, yet more commonplace. Education was also important because liberty was an effective choice to achieve the nation's deepest desires. How to go about establishing this mandate in light of the Constitution proved more than a little difficult.
Federal involvement in education turned out not to be a consistent policy, but a "web of related policies and one of federal statues, regulations, and judicial rulings" (Larson, 1980, p. 53), largely owing to the weakness of the constitutional bond between education and the federal government. Through these statues, regulations, and judicial rulings, federal involvement came to rest (and continues to rest) on essentially two things: compliance and assistance (Elmore 8t McLaughlin,
1982). As education developed, it became more and more professionalized and identified with federal policy.
Without Congress' realizing it , education in the United
States came to be defined "according to the categories
of discourse at the federal level"; in other words, by
federally funded programs (Elmore & McLaughlin, 1982, p.
181).
Although not the f ir s t of the acts of involvement
with education by the federal government, the Morrill
Act of 1862 was one of the most massive. It must be
noted that the Act presented problems for the then
s ittin g Congress, Was it a breach of federal government
on states' rights? President Buchanan thought so. When
the Act made its rounds, President Buchanan vetoed it in
1859, calling it "unconstitutional" and said it would
"contribute to the deterioration of the relations
between the states and federal government" (Richardson,
1897, v. 7, p. 3074).
The Act was also a "protest act," a "culmination of
a choice for greater democratization of higher
education" (Kursh, 1965, p. 9). But it was more than
that. The M orrill Act was a move on the part of
Congress to enlighten Southerners, The Act's staunch
supporter, Senator J. P. Wickersham, in 1865 positively preached at one point of the "deplorably ignorant" in the South. "As long as they are ignorant they w ill remain demagogues," he said, "and therefore be incapable of self-government. They must be educated . . .
(Chodes, 1989, p. 21), By this act, then, Congress placed its e lf squarely in the position of educating
America, of being able to set standards and saying, in effect, "We w ill not have this," and then doing something about it. More b ills soon followed, hoping to achieve the same effect.
The Blair B ill, which passed the Senate three times, but failed the House, and the Hatch Act (1887), which did pass and allocated money to land-grant states to operate agriculture experimental stations, were also sociological acts. The Purnell Act, an extension of the
Hatch Act, said this specifically. tt was to include
"sociological investigations as have for their purpose the development and improvement of rural home and rural life " (Chodes, 1989, p. 24). Echoes of this idea--that education can be used to improve lifestyles and even the economic conditions— are s t ill heard today (Morrison,
McGuire, & Clarke, 1988).
It was only natural that once federal involvement was secure, the federal machinery would sh ift easily into high gear. As the system grew with each act of
Congress (the M orrill Acts, The Hatch Act, later, the
Bankhead Act, and s t ill later, the numerous acts of the
Great Society), there developed, quite naturally, a policy system that contributed to the establishment of elite s and individual groups. Whether Congress wanted it to or not, the federal infrastructure became a way of
"controlling the schools nationally" (Eidenberg & Morey,
1969, p. 11). While this control did not materialize during the early formative years of involvement in education, it cannot now be doubted that the control which Congress had exercised over the schools was, and continues to be, of no small amount. Aaron (1978) indicated that the machinery eventually led to the implementation of party platforms under the guise of federal education. Though Aaron may have overstated the case, i t cannot be doubted that, "Whatever the arguments offered for or against federal aid to education-- especially the argument that federal aid leads to federal control— the federal government has been involved in both the support and control of education
[from the beginning]" (Lapati, 1975, p. 2).
What remained for Congress at this point was to establish some structure to oversee these and other educational programs. The C ivil War had helped highlight one area of regional weakness within the nation: education, or lack of it. Now it would help to establish an Office of Education to oversee the programs meant to eliminate that weakness.
Congress repeatedly tried to make sure that the rights of the states would not be infringed upon by the establishment of such an office (Lapati, 1975). But these assurances were pointless when the large sums of money from Washington began to flow.
The Office of Education, established in 1867, was meant to oversee what was going on in education in the country, both what was clearly federal involvement, and what was not. The o ffice located areas of need and helped educators press Congress for additional help
(Lykes, 1960). In many ways, the Office also helped to reproduce federal involvement in such a way that "there is a massive Federal role in education, involving more than the Office of Education" (Kursh, 1965). Congress, even as it was putting together the finishing touches on the Constitution, was already providing federal aid to the states for education. Even though the establishment of what later was called the Office of Education was pursued openly by Congress, Congress often treated that office with indifference or disinterest. Was this indifference or disinterest an exemplification of how uneasy Congress was in its relationship to education in the states? The next section will shed light on that question.
Evolution of the Office of Education
The Department of Education was established when President Andrew Johnson created i t on March 2,
1867, P. L. 815-874. Most observers are surprised by the fact that a department had been created, though without Cabinet-level status. The history of the department's beginning, its evolution as it were, began many years before that. Congress, along with presidents, had spoken often of the need to link education and government together, but a number of other p o litic a l issues arose to prevent th is. Once, however, political leaders began acting as if. such links already existed, the necessity of the Office of Education emerged.
As early as 1795, organizations, groups, and p o litic ian s, such as James Madison and Charles Plckney, were calling for a national educational system (Pulliam,
1987), By 1806 Jefferson was petitioned by DuPont de
Nemours on the setting up of an educational council that would oversee educational affairs and present to
Congress an annual report (Smith, 1967; Stickney &
Marcus, 1984, p. 38). Jefferson was, of course, a lik ely target, His "B ill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge," which he proposed to the Virginia legislature in 1779, contained his basic beliefs about education (Rippa, 1988). Edward Coles, governor of
Illinois in 1818, used a plan for education in that state which drew largely on Jefferson's ideas. The
Nemours’ proposal of an annual report would speak of the
'condition of American education.' Of course, Jefferson favored a very limited form of government, and would
never have abided a national structure, though he did
not disfavor a national university (Burns, 1982). His
greatest efforts were at the state and local levels
where he thought them most fe lic ito u s .
What later became a Bureau of Education did not
develop as a full-grown en tity . Rather, a strong
tradition of education, alluded to earlier in the
discussion of education and the Constitution, was firmly
in place by the time the 18S7 formation of the bureau
occurred. The history prior to that date is
informative, serving to show us at once that education
was important, and that the creation of the bureau
occurred long after discussions of education had already
commenced.
For example, unlike Jefferson, Madison campaigned
vigorously for a national educational plan and a
university. Madison, in 1815, speaking at his seventh
address, said,
The present is a favorable season also for bringing
again into view the establishment of a national
university of learning within the District of
Columbia .... (Williams, 1848 p. 332)
Two years later, Monroe, speaking at his f ir s t address,
echoed the sentiments of his Democratic-Republican
cohort when he urged Congress to establish, " [A] right . . . to institute . . . seminaries of learning for . .
. our fellow citizens throughout the United States'*
(Williams, 1848, p. 402). Both comments underscored the
gravity with which political leaders had come to view
education.
Eight years following Monroe's observations, John
Q. Adams was making a few of his own. Adams, the f ir s t
National-Republican, conjured the near mythic stature of
Washington to coerce Congress to move on the education
issue:
[P]ublic institutions and seminaries of learning
are essential. . . . [B]ut in surveying the city
which [Washington] had honored with his name he
would have seen the spot of earth which he had
destined and bequeathed to the use and benefit of
his country as the site for an university still
bare and barren. (Richardson, 1897, v. 12, p. 878)
P oliticians were not the only ones who were
concerned about education and its relation to molding
the minds of young men and women. Dale Owen, along with
"Fanny" Wright, sought to form a c tiv is t labor
organizations through education. He viewed education as most powerful, and no wonder:
State schools must receive children, not for six
hours a day, but altogether; must fed them, clothe
them, lodge them, must direct not th eir studies only, but their occupations and amusements ....
(Warren, 1974, p. 29)
When their education was complete (and no time lim it was provided), only then would they be released to the world as "useful, intelligent, virtuous citizens" (Warren,
1974, p. 29). Such pronouncements, while strong, were not uncommon. With the slow realization by Congress that education was very uneven among the States, made more apparent by the C ivil War, it became more and more convinced it, would have to take matters into its own hands, especially in regards to the South. Thus, the wish became father of the thought.
Plans to place education in the hands of Congress were p len tifu l. One 1845 plan placed a Bureau of
Education in the soon-to-be created Smithsonian
Institute; another, in 1849, called for a permanent sta tis tic a l bureau which would present the progress of state education; s t i l l another called for the establishment of a Department of Education in 1851 and
1854 (Smith, 1923, pp. 2-3). But no plan was as significant in scope and depth as the one presented by
Henry Barnard, an educational reformer for the school systems in Rhode Island and Connecticut. Barnard began in 1838 calling for a national, federal agency for education (Smith, 1923).
Barnard formulated his plan in 1838 and secured the support of various groups over time. He complained in various presses, but most often his own American Journal of Education. that the government needed some o ffice , some agency that would keep up with s ta tis tic a l items on the schools (Stickney & Marcus, 1984; Johnsen, 1927;
Kursh, 1965; Smith, 1967; Smith, 1923). In 1854, his plan was submitted by the Association for the
Advancement of Education. In February 1866, the
National Association of School Superintendents passed a resolution appointing three members of the association to present a modified plan based on Barnard's work to
Congress. Representative James Garfield of Ohio was asked to deliver the charge for an Office of Education to Congress (Stickney & Marcus, 1984; Johnsen, 1927;
Smith, 1967). His was not the only plan floating in
Congress, but it held center stage.
Barnard's plan was much too long to examine in depth here. But he called for a secretary or agent
"with a salary, and . . . a room for an office and depository of educational documents and apparatus, and beyond this not to be liable for any expense" (Barnard,
1855, p. 134). His outline of duties for the new
"secretary or agent" were;
1. To devote himself exclusively to the "increase
and diffusion of knowledge" on the subject of
education, and especially of the condition and means of improving Popular Education, and
particularly,
2. To answer a ll personal and written inquiries on
the subject, and collect and make available for
use, information as to a ll advances made in the
theory and practice of education in any one State
or country. (Barnard, 1855, p. 134)
This was by no means all that the plan included. What
Congress fa iled to take note of, however, was Barnard's insistence to publish a journal with a title such as,
"American Journal and Library of Education." It was to be at least 600 pages long (Barnard, 1855, p. 134).
This later proved to be Barnard's undoing as
Commissioner.
By 1840, Barnard and others had been able to shoulder enough of the burden to mount an attack on
Congress for approval. Joseph L. Smith and 95 of his fellow citizens petitioned Congress for a "Department of
Agriculture and Education" (Smith, 1967, p. 307). But this idea was immediately attacked by the proponents for a separate Department of Education. Moreover, when
Congress created the Department of Agriculture without its education tag in 1862, the cry for a Department of
Education rose to a much higher pitch. Andrew Rickoff
(1866) spoke most often for them when he said,
The Government must recognize the cause of general education as a part of its care, not by direct
encouragement alone, but, so far as may be, by
influences of every kind, which can induce a people to
regard the matters that concern it as of the highest
interest. A Department of Education must be established
along side the Department of Agriculture, (p. 303)
For Rickoff and many others, Congress had only a
few options. It could establish and maintain a national
system of education throughout the te rrito rie s . It
could enforce the maintenance of the public schools from
Washington. Or, i t could establish a federal o ffice , a
National Bureau of Education, that would encourage each
state to maintain itself (White, 1866), Clearly the
first two appeared too unconstitutional to attempt
(White, 1866), The latter, while it, too, suffered the charge of being unconstitutional, was more vague and ambiguous on that score, and was therefore arduously pursued (White, 1866).
Meanwhile, educators like E. E. White, Samuel A
Greene, and James Wickersham turned up the heat on
Congress with numerous addresses. The extravagance of metaphor was not spared. White (1866) said that
"Universal education next to universal liberty is a matter of deep national concern" (p. 176), Governments were nothing more than "an organized people" who constituted a state. In order to preserve this liberty and this education, "No human agency but the common is capable of accomplishing this great work. Aided and v ita lize d by relig io n , it i3 the only sure foundation of the sovereignty of the people—the strength of shield and liberty" (White, 1866, p. 179). But how did all this connect its e lf with a bureau? White supplied the answer. "I remark, fin a lly , that the creation of a
National Bureau would be a practical recognition by the government of the value and necessity of universal education as a means of perpetuating free institutions"
(p. 185).
Apparently White's remarks and the remarks of his fellow educators proved to be all that was needed. On
February 14, 1866, Representative Garfield presented to the House a bill that included the establishment of a
Bureau of Education. Garfield raised hackles by including in the bill the salary of the new secretary:
$5,000. It represented a $2,000 increase over the salaries of s ittin g congressmen (Judd, 1939). Then as now, the issue of pay proved v o la tile .
Pay was not the only v o la tile issue, however. Some found the establishment of the department to be a direct breach of the Tenth Amendment. Of those hurling
"unconstitutional" to the bureau's establishment were
Andrew J. Rogers, Samuel J, Randall, and W illard
Saulsbury. Rogers charged that "[T]here is no authority under the Constitution" (Smith, 1967, p. 311).
Such complaints, however, were too l i t t l e too late.
With so many voices, coupled with the powerful voice of the National Teachers Association since 1864, Congress could not resist. On March 2, 1867, Andrew Johnson signed into law the U. S. Department of Education
(Smith, 1967). President Johnson had threatened to veto it all along, but his other p o litical troubles, unrelated to education, caused him to relent on this issue.
The firs t office was set up in two very small, nearly dungeon-like rooms of a rented building at 430 G
Street in northwest Washington (Kursh, 1965). The office was to move eleven more times before it became a part of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1953.
The time had fin a lly come to name a Commissioner.
Johnson named Henry Barnard, probably because Barnard carried with him the least amount of political baggage.
Barnard was also named, perhaps, to spite some of the
President's enemies (Smith, 1967} Kursh, 1965).
Barnard, a disciple of Mann, was not coy about wanting the appointment (Smith, 1923). He confided to
Daniel Coit Gilman that he wanted to add as a capstone, as a headpiece to his professional service, the opportunity to inaugurate the office (Smith, 1967). He let it be known to Gilman, Garfield, and to anyone else who would listen that he wanted the job. Barnard brought with him his American Journal of Education, a prestige that soon turned albatross, and what can only be described as administrative eccentricities. Those idiosyncratic s k ills w ill be enlarged upon in the next section.
Bureau of Education; 1860-1900
It w ill not be necessary to relate here a ll the details of the many Commissioners. Table 2 lis ts them all with their accompanying tenures and Presidents who appointed them. But in order to understand the
Department of Education in the 1980s, it is necessary to discuss the early beginnings of the bureau.
The f ir s t matter to be resolved in the department was the matter of its mandate. Through a curious glitch in the bureaucratic process, the word "bureau" in
Garfield's bill had become "department" when the bill was signed. Garfield had presented his bill on
February 14, 1866. It had been debated in the House and
Senate for more than a year. F in ally, i t had come to fru itio n in the form of a b ill signed by President
Johnson (Lykes, 1960). Though the o ffice had no
Cabinet-level status, it did have all the other trappings common to a federal department at that time.
Further confusing this matter, however, was the mandate 57
Table 2
Commissioners of Education Since 1867
Commiss ioner Pres ident Years
Henry Barnard Andrew Johnson 1867-1870
John Eaton Ulysses Grant 1870-1886
Nathaniel Dawson Grover Cleveland 1886-1889
Wi11iam Harris Wi11iam Harrison 1889-1906
Elmer Brown Theodore Roosevelt 1906-1911
Philander Claxton Wi11iam Taft 1911-1921
John Tigert Warren Harding 1921-1928
Wi11iam Cooper Herbert Hoover 1929-1933
George Zook Franklin Roosevelt 1933-1934
John studebaker Franklin Roosevelt 1934-1939
Earl McGrath Harry Truman 1945-1953
Lee Thurston Harry Truman 1953
Samuel Brownell Dwight Eisenhower 1953-1956
Lawrence Derthick Dwight Eisenhower 1956-1961
Sterling McMurrin John Kennedy 1961-1963
Francis Keppel Lyndon Johnson 1963-1967
Harold Howe, 11 Lyndon Johnson 1967-1968
James Allen Richard Nixon 1969-1970
Sidney Marl in Richard Nixon 1972-1973
John Ottina Richard Nixon 1973-1974
Terrel Bell Gerald Ford 1974-1976
Ernest Boyer Jimmy Carter 1976-1980 the law (14 Statute L. 434) its e lf contained.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of
Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled, That there shall be
established, at the city of Washington, a
Department of Education, for the purpose of
collecting such statistics . . . as shall show the
condition and progress of education . . . and of
diffusing such information respecting the
organization and management of schools and school
systems, and methods of teaching, as shall aid the
people of the United States in the establishment
and maintenance of e ffic ie n t school systems, and
otherwise promote the cause of education throughout
the country. (Warren, 1974, p. 204)
What caused so many disagreements between Congress and the states was the phrase, "and otherwise promote the cause of education throughout the country." What
"promote" meant to those who created the office has expanded enormously over time. Even subsequent administrations not many years removed found the words
"and otherwise promote the cause of education , . . ." debatable. What did it mean for education and where did this act leave the states in the matter? Kursh (1985) provided the best answer:
It did not take Congress long to fear, for 59
instance, that an independent "department of
education," even without cabinet representation,
was perhaps too vague if not too sweeping a
designation, one that left the door open to
unlimited, undesired, uncontrolled growth in the
manner of a ministry of education, with tentacles
around the throat of local education.
In about a year, by means of an appropriation
act, Congress changed the name to "Office of
Education" and transferred it to the jurisdiction
of the Interior Department, (p .13)
Until this change, for some the law meant that
Congress had the right to "enforce" education wherever it wanted to; for others, it meant that Congress had merely mandated the way for the collection of statis tica l information and no more (Warren, 1974;
Smith, 1967; Smith, 1923). With this amendment, added as an afterthought, subsequent observers thought the department was a statis tica l office alone. This conception of the Bureau of Education reigned for nearly
100 years.
The second matter to be resolved, however, focused on the appointing of a fir s t Commissioner, Once this was done, the problems associated with that appointment gave rise to yet a third problem. Henry Barnard eagerly pursued the job of Commissioner (Kursh, 1965; Smith, 1967). But upon receipt of hie appointment, Barnard found Congress and President Johnson were not his instant friends (Smith, 1967). Both made clear to
Barnard that they did not want him to use the office to publish his journal. The law creating the department
(Sec, 2) established his salary at $4,000 per annum, and provided the Commissioner with a chief clerk at $2,000 annually, and two other clerks at $1,800 and $1,600 annually (Warren, 1974). The department ran quite well on such a small budget, but the game of po litics entered the equation, and soon Barnard found himself at the center of a huge controversy.
Almost at once, Barnard, never adept at the political game, set about to destroy his own credibility. The law gave Barnard the right to appoint his own chief clerk, but President Johnson and Edward
Duffield Neill had other plans. Neill eventually won the appointment, most probably a campaign pay-back by
Johnson (Smith, 1967). Barnard had the last word, however, and later dismissed N e ill, a move which
Infuriated President Johnson (Smith, 1967).
But Barnard was not content to anger the President of the United States. He maintained some personal eccentricities that also contributed to his downfall.
Barnard, as White later pointed out, "scattered too broadly" (Smith, 1967, p. 319). Moreover, he was nervous, in poor health, and, worst of a ll, continued to publish his Journal despite repeated congressional warnings not to. The p iece de resistance came when
Barnard's first annual report, more than a year late, was issued in 900 tig h tly packed pages, over half of which contained reprints of articles from the Journal.
Congress immediately cut off the order to print it after a few dozen copies came o ff the press,
Barnard did make some very important suggestions.1
Congress, however, was too outraged to care, Barnard simply had to go. After demoting his department to a bureau, Barnard's salary was reduced from $4,000 to
$3,000 (U. S. Department of the In terio r, 1875), The demotion of the department to a bureau was contained 1n the office's July 20, 1868 Appropriations Act. The enactment, 15 Stat. L., 92, 106, might have occurred anyway, but most scholars viewed it as the result of
Barnard's egregious p o litic a l behavior (Smith, 1923, p.
4).
In 1870, his health wrecked, his professional
"It is obvious," he said, as recorded in the 1867 U.S. Bureau of Education’s Annual Report, "that neither constitutional provisions, legislative enactments, nor the existence of the most perfect schoolhouses, w ill secure the right of education of the children of the Nation, without a body of teachers devoted to the work of public instruction, possessing in a sufficient degree, the requisite qualifications of character, attainments, and skill." This report expressed many concerns that are s t i l l with us today. esteem tarnished, Barnard stepped down. President
Grant, in 1870, established a Bureau of Education
(Richardson, 1897, v. 9, p. 4066). Grant found the ideal successor in John Eaton, a Tennessean and prominent C ivil War brigadier-general. Eaton knew his way about in the swamp of p o litic s , and quickly proved the Bureau's salvation (Smith, 1967j Kursh, 1965),
Eaton served under four presidents, holding the office 16 years, second only to the much-revered
William T. Harris. Where Barnard had scattered, Eaton supervised, administered, ordered, and corrected. He was also given to extreme carefulness.2 But he never had anything but the highest regard for Barnard, as did many of Barnard's successors.3
In President Rutherford B. Hayes' f ir s t address to
Congress, he hinted at the extension of the work
2 . In his 1882 Annual Report. Eaton was at great pains to explain the difference between the "running hand" and the "round hand" in w riting. The difference in the straight lines was the square root of 25, he said, and the stroke of the running hand was equal to those of a round hand "written between five m illim eters apart" (p. cccliii).
3 . This may be only somewhat overstated. In Eaton's 1875 Annual Report. Eaton complained of the shambles he found the o ffice in. Besides complaining of the reduced salary, the clerks whose salary had also been reduced, and the furniture its e lf, Eaton said the o ffice was "so crowded with books and pamphlets, and desk as to be wholly unfit for successful clerical work," or work of any other kind (p. 5). Without saying so, he offered a backhand to Barnard organizational ski 1 Is. commenced by the creation of the Bureau:
The wisdom of legislation upon the part of Congress
in aid of the States, for the education of the
whole people in those branches of study which are
taught in the common schools of the country is no
longer a question. (Richardson, 1897, v. 9, p.
4431)
In his fourth and last address to Congress, his
hints were more bold. There he said he was convinced
that the "subject of popular education" deserved the
attention of the people of the whole country.
Consequently, he recommended to Congress, "by suitable
legislation and with proper safeguards, supplement local
educational funds in the several States where the grave
duties and responsibilities of citizenship have been
developed on uneducated people , . , (Richardson,
1897, v. 10, pp. 4554-4555).
What President Hayes and others were feeling was
understandable. The Bureau was in place. After a false s ta rt, a leader of the office had been found. A philosophy of education had been descried, but all was not w ell. As Draper (1896) had later put i t , the national bureau of education had been "given . . . no power, for apparently it had none to give. This bureau may collect information . . . [b]ut it cannot join an
issue, i t cannot exact compliance, it cannot enforce a request" (pp. 204-205). The question remained, what good was a bureau that was powerless to confront basic issues?
The bureau did serve as a pulpit of sorts to preach about the problems of education. It began to do this after Barnard was replaced. Eaton took to heart
President Hayes' concerns for education and immediately set out what the national government might do for i t .
Eaton called for what could be named recommendations or a c tiv itie s ; whatever they were, they came quite close to infringement on the right of the states.
Eaton said the government might require certain things in the territories, "do all things required for education" in the District of Columbia, do what was required for the Indians educationally, assume oversight responsibilities for accountability by calling "all persons or states to account" (Smith, 1923, p. 11).
This probably came about owing to the charge Eaton fe lt he had from Congress, via Reconstruction (U, S,
Department of the In terio r, 1875). Education in the
South was s t i l l a dubious matter, or so congressmen thought. But the power to reform it far exceeded the ability of the bureau to undertake.
Eaton ended by saying that the government had a responsibility to the bureau by providing it with "all the means for the fulfillment of national educational obligations" (Smith, 1923, p. 11), All of this was couched in a rightful or righteous indignation, for ignorance, Eaton pointed out, the government could not tolerate because it threatened the very liberty the nation held so dear.
Eaton also provided a blueprint for all future annual reports. All of his were orderly and painstakingly executed. He covered, for example, the
"colored," Indians, kindergarten, Hebrew education, education in foreign countries, education for the "deaf and dumb," illiteracy, crime, and education for the insane. He also spoke of the inspiration of the "genius of Christianity" which, he thought, should be used to tame the Indians (U.S. Department of the In terio r, 1875, p. 20).
It may be said that all of these things greatly influenced more than the generation who heard the words.
Politicians heard these things, presidents echoed them, and soon, by degrees, the federal government began
( thinking about its role in education and the tension between its e lf and the Tenth Amendment. Straining the relationship between education and government more was the "problem" of how the government was going to deal with religious instruction in the schools. Grant had broached the matter. But he could not proceed without the help of Congress, Chester Authur complained to Congress in 1881 that it fe ll down on its job. He said government "should provide or support a system for the education of our people" because it had been calculated, by intelligence and virtue, to preserve the nation's institutions.
Congress regarded it "with indifference" (Richardson,
1897, v. 10, p. 4645).
President Arthur's excoriation did not have time to sink in. Newly elected Grover Cleveland dealt the bureau another blow, appointing p o litic a l payoff
Nathaniel H. R. Dawson. Almost immediately the bureau's work fell off, especially in foreign education and higher education outreaches (Smith, 1923, p. 13).
Dawson was an incompetent manager. His appointment also raised, for the second time, the very interesting question of the bureau's connection with politics, something that most everyone had taken for granted would not occur.
Dawson was not a complete fa ilu re , however. He launched a publication series that stands today as an important contribution to higher education. The plan called for an educator, usually someone from an institution of higher education, to write about that state's progress in education at the university level.
Even up to the 1930s, the series was s till holding a powerful sway among university c lie n te le , even though it was uneven in content and scope (Lykes, 1960, pp. 28-
29).
The next appointment, made by President Harrison,
was William T. Harris, the fourth Commissioner of
Education. Harris served for 17 years and probably did
more than any other Commissioner to establish forever
the bureau's permanence until its change to a department
in 1980. Smith (1923) fa irly summed up H arris’ work, a
tenure that was marked by alternating highs and lows:
Dr. Harris, from the standpoint of inspirational
leadership . . . was undoubtedly the outstanding
figure among a ll United States Commissioners of
Education, but . . . he displayed a degree of
indifference with regard to administrative detail.
Internally it was said that those of the
personnel who were loyal were . . . in e ffic ie n t and
those . . . efficient . . . were too out of
sympathy .... [T]o add to the difficulties the
Commissioner developed an aversion to asking
Congress for money; a fatal weakness, (p. 15)
President Harrison appeared to have made Harris*
aversion unnecessary when, in his f ir s t address (1889)
he said that while government had always sought to
promote education through land grants, and that this had not been seriously questioned for some time, he did not
think it could "be successfully questioned when the form is changed to that of a direct grant of money from the public Treasury" (Richardson, 1897, v. 11, p. 5489).
Thus began a practice that continues until the present day,
By the end of Harris' reign, the bureau had expanded to include Alaskan education, educational societies, criminological studies and education, bibliographies on special education topics, statistical tables, and virtually all else that became common to the discussions of education today (U. S. Department of the
Interior, 1896). Harris had even begun, by this time, to include a chapter on values training and how it related to schools. But more than a small change was taking place. Apart from the funding element touched on by President Harrison, Harris himself talked of capitalism as being something of a "sacrament." The notions of democratic capitalism, and what constituted citizenship, were about to change, and along with them, the focus of the Bureau of Education, and its aims and functions as seen by the federal government.
The early years of the Bureau of Education were marked by internal squabbtes, p o litic a l machinations, and the continued debate among politicians over the right, that is, proper role of government in education.
Some of the internal fights, namely the one with
Barnard, nearly shut down the bureau for good. The p o litic a l gamesmanship, coupled with the weak or indifferent relationship of government with education, served to make leadership of the bureau d iffic u lt. As the bureau entered the 20th century, changes were seen to occur in the orientation and direction of the bureau, and for that matter, all of American education.
The Bureau of Education; 1900-1953
The f ir s t change in orientation occurred under
Harris. He ushered in a new wave of thinking about education for citizens who had heretofore been overlooked, either purposely or accidentally. In his
1901 report on the bureau, Harris focused on opportunities for citizens in education. He pointed to law and called it "the woman's opportunity" (p. 1).
Women were well-suited for this because the new century called for a new understanding of law, and education could help provide that, He defined the purposes of education in 1901 as "first, a knowledge of principles and . . . causes, and secondly, a knowledge of human nature and an a b ility to create confidence in one's leadership" (U. S. Department of the In terio r, 1901, p. l i ) .
Harris was joined later in his concerns for education by President Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt applauded the work of the bureau, saw i t as a helper to government and the states, and made a point of letting the nation know that the bureau was not to be considered an intruder. He ended his remarks in Congress, his last address before that body, by encouraging it to make more funding available (Bureau of National Literature, n.d,, v■14, p. 7227-7228).
Harris' leadership in the office was arresting because he showed how the federal government's concern with education should have a direction, should have a purpose, and should embody a defined set of principles.
It was arresting, too, because it marked a new initiative in the office to be more involved with what the states were doing in education, and enlarged the ju risdiction of the federal government into those activities,
Elmer Brown, Harris' successor, in his 1910 report clearly distinguished this change. While the government did not have a national school administration, he said, it did have a "national programme of education" (ll.S
Department of the In terio r, 1910, p. 1). He did not want to see the states relieved of their duties in this regard, but the politicians and citizens in them must come to understand that "... the nation cannot be indifferent to that which forms the character of its citizens, upon which every national hope and aspiration depends" (p. 1).
Philander P. Claxton, Brown's successor, had even higher hopes for the role of the federal government in education, but in a behind-the-scenes manner. Miles
(1974) said of him that "He was . . . a national missionary for the extension of educational opportunity to all citizens of the nation ..." even though his financial support from Congress was exiguous (p. 114).
But Claxton's desire to see the bureau succeed extended only so fa r. When asked by the President to draw up a b ill to establish a separate Cabinet-level Department of
Education and Welfare with Claxton at its head, he did, but let the President know, in no uncertain terms, that he opposed this intrusion by government in education
(Miles, 1974, pp. 141-142). The bill came to nothing.
Claxton also brought a ll the annual reports up to date. His plans for education in the country included the construction of schools, school administration education, industrial education, education for housekeeping, school hygiene, rural schooling, and much more. Congress did not object to the plan so much as it did to the funding. The plans were also eventually rejected, however (Smith, 1923).
As the Civil War had shown in the middle of the previous century, World Wars I and I I pointed out to
Congress that education was nationwide, yes, but hardly equitable (Smith, 1923; Johnsen, 1927; Studebaker,
1942). As President Woodrow Wilson said, "War teaches us to value democracy and the broader conceptions of national life" (Bureau of National Literature, n.d., v.
16, p. 8331).
Those "broader conceptions" of national lif e resurrected again the desire for a separate Department of Education. Between October 10, 1918 and March 4,
1925, more than 70 b ills were submitted to Congress entertaining some form of a Department of Education, with onty small modifications on each other (Stickney &
Marcus, 1984), These b ills a ll had the same fate.
After making it through one or more committees, they failed, either owing to lack of interest, to a change in the Congress, to deadlock, or to a lack of general agreement in th eir construction by th eir proponents.
Table 3 lists the more important bills and their fates.1
Of course, debate about these b ills ranged from gentlemen's quarrels to full-fledged donnybrooks. A writer in the Nation (1919) complained that if these b ills and the bureau its e lf only served to increase the power of "administrators . . . who already overload the schools ..." then they and it should be ignored (May
17, p. 780), "Education" wrote Campbell in "Proposed
Federal Department of Education, "is the very f ir s t corollary of democracy and as such should be given the
For fuller descriptions of these bills, see Johnsen, 1927. 73
Table 3
Earlv Department of Education B ills . 1918-1927
Date B ill Name Action
February 1910 Qouldner B ill Committeed
May 1910 Cary B ill Referred
December 1915 Abercombie B ill No action
April 1917 Owen B ill Referred
October 1918 Smith B ill No action
January 1919 Baer B ill Referred
July 1919 Smith-Towner B ill No vote
April 1921 Towner-Ster1ing Withheld
April 1921 Owen B ill Referred
May 1921 Fess-Kenyon B ill Failed
December 1923 Ster1ing-Reed No action
January 1924 Dal 1inger B ill Fa i1ed
December 1924 Smoot-Mapes B ill Adjourned
December 1925 Curtis-Reed B ill No action
December 1925 T i 1lman B ill No action
December 1925 Smoot-Mapes B ill Reorganized
January 1926 Means B ill Referred
March 1926 Phipps B ill Defeated governmental recognition which its high function demands" (Johnsen, 1927, p. 4). Paul Blakely, on the other hand, argued against the department idea on the basis of economic problems: "Truly there is something in the air in Washington," he said, "which demands that every bureau grow as soon as possible into a complete parlor and bedroom set" (Johnsen, 1927, p. 213).
Confronting these concerns was the demand that the department had to be established owing to the rise of illite ra c y , problems of adult education, inadequacies of educational facilities, and the myriad of unrelated educational activities taking place at the state and national levels (Johnsen, 1927). Charles Judd (1926) argued that the bureau needed to be upgraded to a
Cabinet-1evel department because without it , it would be impossible to "secure a type of information that would not be accessible to anyone who does not sit with the
President and his councils" (p. 518). In 1929,
President Hoover called for and established the National
Advisory Council on Education. Its report, Federal
Relations to Education. drew the conclusion that the establishment of a department of education was d e fin ite ly needed. The members of the committee were less defin ite: the report was not a unanimous one
(Stickney & Marcus, 1984, p. 41).
But opponents on the other side would not give in. They said that the matter of illiteracy had been overstated, no evidence had been produced that a department would be any improvement over a bureau (other than making the mess larger), and that the creation of a department would not create instant leadership (Johnsen,
1927). Moreover, they argued that it would lead to further control of education by the government, that it would politicize education further, and that it would only serve to increase funding for education while not increasing, necessarily, the amount of learning which students, whether adults or children, were doing
(Johnsen, 1927, pp. x x v -x x x iii). Opponents would have agreed that, "The principle once admitted, the agency once established, the Federal power will ultimately direct, guide, and control the whole educational system from the mother's knee to the final departure from the campus" (Johnsen, 1927, p. 197).
While opponents argued against it , proponents, even unwitting ones, made the case for it . Amid the demands against it came another reason for an agency to oversee education's concerns: foreign education. Harding put to Congress in 1922, during his second annual address, that foreigners presented a peculiar problem for the states. Yes, he said, the states have rightly been in charge of education and so they should be. Moreover, they have done an effective job, for the most part. "But it is the especial obligation," he reminded
Congress, "of the federal Government to devise means and effectively assist in the education of the newcomer from foreign lands" so that the level of American education would be raised to the highest level possible.
President Coolidge echoed his predecessors' claims that education was rightly in the hands of the states.
He went further to say that direct appropriations out of the treasury might not be what was needed. But he did see that the federal government "might well give benefit of its counsel and encouragement more freely in this direction" and therefore saw it as "worthy of a separate department and a place in the Cabinet." Coolidge was even known, despite revisio n ists’ warning to the contrary, to even thrust a sally:
An educated fool is a sorry spectacle, but he is
not nearly so dangerous . . . as a rich fool. We
want neither in this country. We want the educated
to know how to work, and the rich to know how to
think. (Bureau of National Literature, n.d., v. 18,
p. 9350, and p. 9447)
All of these discussions served to accentuate the need for one office to oversee a ll the functions of education as ordained by the federal government.
By this time, education at the federal level was involved with the illite ra c y problem, adult education, education of the handicapped, education of foreigners,
and education from the elementary grades through the
university. Was one Bureau large enough to handle all
of this? It can be safely said that it was not.
Congress s t i l l could not decide the role of the federal
government in education, A Department of Education
seemed just too big a step to the ever dangerous thrust
of nationalized education (Stickney & Marcus, 1984).
Nearly a decade after all the proposals offered in
the mid-1920s had died, and the b ills (see Table 3) had
failed or been forgotten, Franklin D. Roosevelt decided
that something had to be done about education.
He already had before him the National Advisory
Committee's report that the "federal government has no
inclusive and consistent public policy as to what it
should or should not do in the fie ld of education"
(National Advisory Committee, 1931, p. 8).
The one thing he did about education was move it in
1939 to the newly created Federal Security Agency, and
out of the Department of the Interior (Stickney &
Marcus, 1984, p. 42). This move may have reflected the
problems that the Depression had caused. Before the move to the FSA, the Depression, along with the way of
escape from it , the war, was the only subject that
Commissioner George Zook fe lt necessary to talk about in
his annual report (U. S. Department of the In terior, 78
1933).
The change also reflected the new mood about education. In 1936, Commissioner John W. Studebaker boasted about the department: "An outstanding function of the Office of Education is to cooperate with State departments of education in the in itia tio n and development of progressive educational practices" (U, S.
Department of the In terio r, 1936, p, 251), Under the reorganization in FSA in 1939, the office committed its e lf to even more new ideas: elementary and secondary school enrollments, higher education concerns, library service, and educational broadcasting (U.S. Department of the Interior, 1939).
Commissioner Studebaker stressed the new thrust for education when he said that the USOE served three purposes: as administering education programs, providing leadership, and as a liaison between education and the federal government (Studebaker, 1942, p. 455), He also admitted that the office's history had been primarily one of "fact-gathering" and "fact disseminating" and that it must look to enlarge its "clearinghouse" functions (Studebaker, 1942, p. 454). But the fractured nature of the bureau's work and Congress* on-again, off- again attitude about education were more to the point.
The Bureau of Education generally acquired new roles through leg islative concerns touched on by Congress. Often these concerns were best handled by the Bureau of
Education (Radin & Hawley, 1988).
This was not the best way to gain leadership in education: by default. Because no direct communication from Congress came in the form of a b ill clearly stating the role of the federal government in education, the bureau picked up in itia tiv e s here and there, from bits of legislation in one b ill, and bits in another. This satisfied no one because it fragmented the approach to education. Some pieces of legislation went to the bureau while others went to another agency entirely, for example, Agriculture or Welfare.
It came as no surprise then, that a 1945
Educational Policies Commission summed up the frustrations of everyone involved in its Sourcebook on
Federal-State Relations in Education:
In spite of the several official comprehensive
studies which have been made and the numerous
detailed recommendations that have been submitted,
it seems that most federal officials, including
members of Congress, are s t ill not w illing to
recognize the fact that the federal government, as
shown by actual developments, has no definite and
consistent public policy as to what it should and
should not do in the fie ld of education, (p. i i i )
Unfortunately, this languent assessment had l i t t l e if any noticeable effect on the outcome of the Bureau of
Education. More programs were funded, and more
Commissioners named. The states continued to look to
the government to do something about education. What
appeared to be happening instead was a slow but steady
enslavement by the federal government of the schools.
When Congress could not see a way clear for escape, it
turned, once again, to reorganizing and moving the
education agency.
The Office of Education; 1953-1980
In 1953 the Office of Education was moved once
again, this time to the newly created Health, Education,
and Welfare Department. This move did not make anyone
associated with education at the federal level very
happy (Radin & Hawley, 1988), The history of education
as exercised by government played out its fam iliar role:
for proponents of a separate department, the move was
too small; for opponents, it was too large.
"We had in mind," said the chair of another reorganization group in the early 1960s, "a larger office, and one that enjoys more elevated status within the structure of government" (Exton, 1961b, p. 35),
Representative Lipscomb (Republican, California), a member of the House Appropriations Committee, offered the rebuttal: "[This is] a proposed blueprint for the takeover of education" (Exton, 1961b, p. 36). Lipscomb's Republican cohorts echoed his sentiments by calling it a role that was far beyond anything that had ever been envisioned. They cited the history of the
Bureau of Education as follows; The o ffice under
Barnard had four employees and cost under $15,000 to run the f ir s t two years (Smith, 1923). Less than 100 years later i t had thousands of employees and a thirteen million dollar price tag for salaries and expenses
(Exton, 1961b p. 39). With the advent of FDR’s New
Deal, and Fair Deals, and the coming of Kennedy and
Johnson's Great Society, a whole generation of individuals had grown up thinking that government was a solution to its problems (Edwards, 1988).2 Education leaders followed suit.
The commissionership had, by the late 1950s and early 1960s, grown into a highly uncompetitive job.
James E. Allen, then Commissioner of Education, had recently turned the job down (Robinson, 1962, p. 110)-3
Allen said the job simply was not worth the e ffo rt
2 . That government f e lt this way about its e lf may be evidenced in a 1966 publication title d Education; An Answer to Poverty (Washington, D.C., GPO). The document is more bold than its t i t l e in that it calls for more money which w ill fund education, which w ill in turn put an end to poverty. A good antidote to this kind of thinking is a b r illia n t empirical study by Charles Murray (1984) called Losing Ground. His study indicates how far short government's education and welfare programs missed the mark.
3 . Almost a decade la te r, however, he accepted the Commissioner's job under President Richard Nixon. without a Cabinet-level rank. The job also, even with its $13 m illion price tag, could not compete with a superintendent’s salary (Robinson, 1962).
In 1962 the commissionership was vacant. "Congress has persistently hedged its operation with too precise mandates" resulting in a distrustful attitude to the
Office of Education (Robinson, 1962, p. 110). One hundred years ago, the Bureau’ s chief had scattered too broadlyj now it was too precise. Moreover, the money offered for the top position was seen as a lack of seriousness on the part Congress for this office
(Robinson, 1962).
Equally problematic was the tension between
"whether [the O ffice] should continue the trad itio n of assisting state and local officials to do the job the way they want [ i t ] done or whether it should assume initiative . . . to follow what the office considers the most effective way" (Robinson, 1962, p. 111). The debate slowly grew to speculation that the problem with the office was its lack of credibility and its Cabinet- less status (Stickney & Marcus, 1984} Radin & Hawley,
1988).
On the matter of Cabinet-level status, advice from former commissioners was generous; so were b ills in
Congress. In one decade, 1965 to 1975, nearly f if t y b ills were submitted to Congress favoring some form of a separate Department of Education (Radin & Hawley, 1988, p. 24). These b ills reopened debate, of course, and also spawned a new alternative, a national board of educators and laymen, set up like the National Science
Foundation (McGrath, 1962). The proposal was reminiscent of Claxton's idea of a national foundation.
James E. McGrath (1962) nixed the idea of a national board of education made up of laymen and educators alike (a recommendation that appeared again in the middle 1980s (Bell, 1988), but strongly favored a
"secretaryship" of education "with cabinet rank" (pp.
309, 311). He was joined in this chorus, now a fam iliar refrain , by then current or former Commissioners
Sterling McMurrin, Lawrence Derthick, and Samuel
Brownell. Then American Federation of Teachers
President, Carl J. Megel, also joined those favoring a separate department.1
The national board idea also had its s te lla r cast:
James Allen, Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover, John Fischer
(then Columbia University’s president), and Edgar Fuller
(Robinson, 1962). Clearly, what hampered the Office as much as anything else was the educational community's own indifference about what role the office should play in its own drama. Neither Congress nor the educational
1, Nearly 20 years la te r, during the debate on the current Department of Education, AFT president Albert Shanker was a vocal opponent. community, however, appeared to pay any attention to the role by referencing it to the Constitution.
During the 1960s, neither educators nor Congress did much to help cla rify the role of education directly
(U.S. Office of Education, 1964), But indirectly,
Congress, meanwhile, had changed from an active body to a reactive one (Wolfe, 1985). Although legislation appeared to be more in the suggestion category and less in the recommendation category, it s t ill ended up as law
(Wolfe, 1985). The Supreme Court handed down numerous decisions, and Congress, in turn, made them permanent laws (Wolfe, 1985). The impact upon the schools was tremendous. For example, Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in 1964. Among other things, this act, considered the father of all subsequent acts, helped to in itia te a number of other concerns for the schools.
The signing of ESEA took place in Stonewall, Texas in a one-room school house where President Johnson's education had taken place (Miles, 1974).
ESEA was an important step in another way, too.
Schools were now to be at the vanguard of c iv iliza tio n
(Stickney & Marcus, 1984). This piece of legislation also made it imperative that Congress see to it that schools carried out their mandate. Heretofore the office had been accused of being "discouraged [from] adapting a vigorous interpretation of its mandate" owing
to the "extreme sen sitivity to the issue of federal
control of education" (U. S. Office of Education, 1964,
p. 7). But now it had to assume a more vigorous
leadership role.
Executive Order #11185 tried to assist the office
and its myriad supporters and detractors. It gave the
Secretary of HEW and the Commissioner of Education a
mandate to "identify the educational goals of the
nation" (Exton, 1965, p. 72). The mandate was not lost
on then Commissioner Francis Keppel. He said that
American education "... must not only provide an
education for everyone, but transmit the values of a
democratic society and provide equal access for all to
the best that education has to offer" (Keppel, 1966, p.
2 ).
The Office of Education embarked upon a two-fold mission: education and moral training. Under the weight of these two massive burdens, the Office of
Education began to sink (Johnson, 1983). It simply
could not do both and remain loyal to a separation of
church and s ta te --a l1 of this on a budget that was already creaking beneath the strain of too many demands.
But education, as Dewey had pointed out in the Humanist
Manifesto I . was to provide salvation from secular woes.
Indeed, the idea that education was the miracle cure, so strong in the 1950s, plummeted in the late
1960s and the early 19703. Spending in education rose between 1950 and 1970 by over 100* per person.
Meanwhile, test scores as measured by the ever-reliable
Scholastic Aptitude Test fell, the verbal test by more than 45 points, and the mathematical test by more than
30 points (Johnson, 1983, pp. 641-642).
This brought to centerstage an idea, unthinkable during the 1960s: government simply could not do the social job society required. Many reasons have been given for th is, but Vaizey and Clarke's (1976) seemed most apropos of the moment. They pointed to the fa ilu re of equality of opportunity, and said that the failure
"proved that we could not do what we hoped" (p. 1).
It came as no surprise, then, that the pendulum began to swing in the opposite direction. Whereas it had been swinging in favor of education as the panacea for all social ills, it now swung in the direction that education must be held accountable for all that it did.
At the forefront of this self-examination of government programs, but especially the Office of Education, was
Senator Edith Green. The o ffice had not fa iled its job, she argued, but had gone about it in the wrong way:
Over and over again, we have found educators
enriching themselves at public expense through
sizable consulting fees, often for work of which there is no record at a ll . . . . (Green, 1971, p.
8 )
Green's straightforward manner endeared her to no one in the education establishment, but it did uncover many "closet" critics of education and the office.
Green argued,
[W]e have set up a monstrous apparatus that can no
longer be supervised or controlled by even the best
men. This tremendous p ro liferatio n of programs and
a c tiv itie s is leading to a major collapse of
rational management. (Green, 1971, p. 7)
Arriving in the mid-seventies to help sort these matters out was Terrel H. Bell, a man known in education circles and widely respected in Washington.
Commissioner Bell would have two shots at the o ffice , one in the mid-1970s as President Richard Nixon’ s appointee, and one later, in the mid-1980s, as President
Ronald Reagan's f ir s t Secretary of the Department of
Education. In the mid-1970s, Bell called for tighter control, aggressive leadership on the part of the commissioner, teacher advocacy, a better job of overseeing the Office's programs, school accountability, and the promise not to interfere with state-controlled curricula (Bell, 1974c, 1984f),
Under Bell, and mandated by the Educational
Amendments of 1974, The National Center for Education Statistics began investigating charges made by Green and
others that something was wrong with the Office of
Education. The center began examining the condition of
American education with an eye to "describe and
interpret the condition of American education in a
comprehensive report" (National Center for Education
S tatistic s, 1975). What they found alarmed many
educators who read the report.
Education in America was found to be at a
crossroad. Students were not performing as well as they
had been on standardized tests, college boards were
showing a marked decline over several decades in student
achievement, and high-school graduates were found to be,
at best, affable, and at worst, virtually ignorant
(Johnston, 1985). Of course, as many claims to the
contrary could be found. The truth reposed about half
way: American education was s t i l l one of the best
systems in the world, but there could be no denying that
it had fallen somewhat from its pre-eminent position of
having no equals (Dalin, 1978; Keppel, 1976). The
decline noted in the 1970s continued through that decade
and into the next, insofar as standard measures (i.e .,
ACT, SAT scores) of one decade were compared to one
another (B ell, 1988; Johnston, 1985).
Some were impatient and wanted action immediately.
Others wanted to wait and see. S t ill others were w illing to wait, but only i f curricula across the nation were designed to focus on basic s k ills , such as reading, w riting, and 'rithm etic (Johnston, 1985). While
Washington debated f ir s t one side under President
Carter, and then the other under President Reagan, educators of every stripe began to be heard.
Academic reform was but one thing on the reformers’ minds. Discipline was another. In 1940, among the top ten disciplinary school problems were talking out of turn, chewing gum, making noise, running in the halls, and getting out of line. In 1982, among the top ten in school discipline problems were rape, robbery, assault, arson, and murder (Johnston, 1985, p. 20). clearly something had gone wrong in 40 years. While the schools could not be charged with a ll of the evils, they certainly had done l i t t l e to assuage them. Complete reform was touted by some as the panacea to education's ills; to others it was only a stop-gap measure (Pierce,
1987).
Federal funding, the politicization of teacher unions, increasing discouragement with the condition of the schools, and disciplinary problems that, while rare before, were now found to be commonp1 ace. All worked with equal force to create for the Office of Education a new set of very difficult problems that then-current structures were unable to meet head-on. Wasn't it clear that a new department was needed to handle these new problems? Not to everyone. Washington, in a characteristic manner, heard a ll of these concerns, but chiefly it heard the siren song of politics, and addressed itself to that matter first.
It was in this milieu--a whirl of things that were both right and wrong with education and the federal government's responsibility for both— that discussion of a new Department of Education mounted the p o litic a l stage. In 1976, a virtually unknown politico to
Washington insiders from the state of Georgia, took
Washington by storm. James Earl Carter's fresh approach to politics, his "outsider" image as many then called it
(Radin 8t Hawley, 1988), came to Washington seeming to promise two opposites. On the one hand, Carter called for an end to the ever-increasing government in
Washington, On the other, he promised, in at least one case, to increase government, this time in the form of the long awaited and much-debated Department of
Education.
The work for the department, as well as its birth after a 100-plus year gestation period, was no small matter. The Department of Education began amid what some schotars called two of the worst decades in
American education (Finn, 1989; Johnston, 1985). Not everyone was happy with the role federal education had played so fa r, and they were thus not happy with any
possible new role. Chodes (1989) painted the picture as
bleak as possible:
Declining test scores, illiterate, spiritless and
passive graduates who have little motivation to
find a job or succeed. Youngsters with no s k ills
to compete in the marketplace. This is the tragic
record of American public education, after billions
of dollars, and 127 years of direct federal
funding. (Chodes, 1989, p. 20)
President Carter not only was to bring forward a
Department of Education, but he was also to convince
critics that the federal role was not as bleak as some
were making it seem.
The Department of Education; Carter's Promise
In winning the National Education Association's
f ir s t ever Presidential endorsement, President Jimmy
Carter naturally felt obliged pay back the education
lobby that had helped him get elected. Carter had come out during the 1976 Presidential campaign as favoring a
Department of Education. NEA, a 1.47 million-strong
union, delivered the votes when the time came, taking
Carter to a dramatic but close election win (Radin &
Hawley, 1988; Education department wins final approval,
1980). As Radin and Hawley (1988) pointed out, "Had it not been for the NEA and the campaign promise, it is likely there would not have been a department" (p. 228).
The proposed plan for the Department of Education met
with such divided opinion that the debate itself
probably focused more national attention on education
than anything else had ever done.
Carter brought to Washington a keen desire for
reorganization (Carter, 1982). His work in reorganizing
Georgia’ s state government proved largely successful in
the short run. It seemed only natural that Carter
undertook to do the same in Washington. The Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare was not the first area
Carter targeted for change. It became, however, a
p rio rity item because Carter campaigned for a cabinet-
level Department of Education nationwide, but especially when he spoke to NEA groups (Radin & Hawley, 1988).
When the NEA spent more than $400,000 on the Carter campaign, the promise appeared more necessary to f u l f i l l
(Radin & Hawley, 1988).
In 1977, President Carter's Task Force on the
Condition of Education called for one of three things: either the creation of a Cabinet-level Department of
Education outright, the creation of branches of the
Department of Education and Human Development, or the raising of the status of education within HEW (Stickney
& Marcus, 1984; Radin & Hawley, 1988). The arguments that were brought out for the Cabinet-1evel department differed hardly at a ll from those that had been paraded about between 1918 and 1926. But arguments against the department's creation differed not at a ll from those heard sixty years ago.
What differed, however, was the power of special interest groups' lobbying efforts, in this case the
NEA's. In the mid-1970s, Rufus Miles (1977), a former
Director of Administration for Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW), examined the need for a Cabinet-level department for the American Council on Education. NEA followed this up with advocacy-lobbying of Congress and groups around the country. By 1976, NEA was ready to issue a report on the idea of a Cabinet-level department. Calling it "Needed: A Cabinet Department of Education," the union proved its power in lobbying for education. The paper impressed Carter (Radin &
Hawley, 1988). By 1977, the time was ripe to place it on the Carter agenda (Radin and Hawley, 1988).
In a ll, 60 educational organizations supported
Carter's idea of a Department of Education, but NEA was easily the hardest working, the group with the most capital to spend on the idea, the most to gain, and the interest group the most w illin g to spend time and money to see the p o litic a l action through to completion (Radin
& Hawley, 1988). Senator Ribicoff and Congressman
Heftel also made impassioned pleas for the department's establishment (Stickney & Marcus, 1984). Clearly, without R ibicoff's early and continued support, the
department might s t i l l be in the incipient stages. He
was a strong and ardent supporter throughout (Radin &
Hawley, 1988).
Numerous reasons were given why the department ought to be supported outright. Some pointed to the 150 programs the department would bring together under one roof as reason enough for its support (Donnelly, 1979).
The mood surrounding the department's creation
fluctuated between love for the department and hate for the very idea of it .
On the pro-department ledger, W illard McGuire, then president of NEA, said that the department would, "mean
less paperwork and less red tape .... It's going to have real impact on education" (Heisner, 1979, p. 20).
Tom Shannon, the executive director of the National
School Board Association, was equally optimistic, but also cautious. "[W]e're going to watch this new department like the circling hawk watches the scrambling ground squirrel. We're not going to let anything go by; we're dedicated to local control of and accountability for, public education" (Heisner, 1979, p. 20). Barbara
Day, ASCD President, said that educators had asked for the department and now that it was here, fu ll attention could be focused on education (Heisner, 1979). On the contra-department side, the voices were equally loud and strong. Carter’s close friend and HEW
Secretary, Joseph Califano, was more than a l i t t l e troubled over the freedom education had when its ties were so closely allied to federal interests. He felt the department's establishment was clearly a po litical payback and a m u lti-b illio n dollar mistake, and even said so (Califano, 1981). Moreover, he felt that the establishment of a Department of Education would clearly step over the lines of federal involvement on a state issue that the Constitution had warned against.
Finally, Califano (1981) was struck by the limited capacity of government to solve major problems, On 26
November 1977, Califano wrote a memo to Carter expressing his opposition with all forcefulness to the
Department of Education (Califano, 1981).
Even among supporters there was disagreement.
Ribicoff supported a broad-minded version of a
Department of Education; NEA called for a narrow one
(Radin & Hawley, 1988). Carter himself fluctuated over fir s t a broad department, then a narrow one, and back to a broad one again (Radin & Hawley, 1988).2 It was clear
a . Some of the diffidence about what kind of department to create may be seen in OMB Director James McIntyre's testimony at the Senate Committee on Government Operations Hearings (April 14, 1978). McIntyre had been told by Carter less than three hours before his testimony to change it from a narrow focus favoring, to a broad one (Radin & Hawley, 1988). The tha Carter administration wanted a Department of
Education. It was not so clear what kind they wanted.
The Califano memo fe ll on deaf ears. Probably by
1977 the issue had been resolved p o litic a lly by Carter.
The NEA represented the fifth largest contributor to union PACs in Washington, with a total contribution of
$1,069,853 (Kimbrough & Nunnery, 1980, p. 481). Nearly half of that sum had gone into the Carter campaign directly. Some of the remaining amount had been used to lobby for the Department of Education on Capitol H ill
(Radin & Hawley, 1988). Califano, when it became clear that the department was presidential policy, came on board, albeit with great reluctance (Education department wins final approval, 1980).
Was Carter's Department of Education a po litical payback? It cannot be said with absolute certainty that it was. The role played by NEA in the development of proposals, the lobbying of Senators and Congressmen, the money contributed to the Carter candidacy, and the opposition to the department on the part of other educational associations owing to the NEA involvement certainly point to a pivotal part in the department's development. Angry opponents fe lt that the Carter
Senate Hearings reflect the jocoserious bantering that took place between the Senate members, who received McIntyre's testimony an hour later than when he was scheduled to give it , and McIntyre! proposal represented a fa ll from grace: "His move to
establish a federal Department of Education looked like
a cynical payoff of a campaign debt, undermining his
carefully cultivated reputation for moral rectitude"
(Robinson, 1987, p. 9). Whether or not the department
was a payoff, the Wash ington Post. the New York Times.
and the Chicago Sun-Times atl reported that the
Department of Education represented a payback to NEA
(Stickney & Marcus, 1984).
Opponents of the department also characterized it
as such. Albert Shanker, American Federation of
Teachers* President, was convinced it was not a federal
Department of Education, but an NEA Department of
Education in Washington (Stickney & Marcus, 1984).
Fears were expressed by other higher education groups in
like manner. They feared that the new Department of
Education would be a strong constituent department,
"dominated by groups involved in elementary and
secondary education, which are led by the NEA and
organizations of school administrators" (Separate
education department proposed, 1978, p. 84; Education
department survives crucial test, 1979, p. 64). They
feared these groups would eclipse all others, and "run" the department, Califano (1981) said that as the b ill made its way through Congress, each special interest group carved out its fiefdom. That this is partially true may be seen in the
confusion the b ill underwent to get through both Houses
(Stickney & Marcus, 1984). A score card was needed to
keep the b ill straight in the two congressional bodies.
In the House, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Child
Nutrition programs, and Head Start were le ft with HEW, a
change from the Carter b ill for the department in 1978.
The National Science Foundation was deleted from the
b ill by amendment. On the Senate side, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and the Child Nutrition programs were
transferred, but only barely, and after much heated
debate. During a July 11 markup in 1978, Senator
Ribicoff dropped Head Start from the b ill because of
outside pressures (Radin & Hawley, 1988). NSF would make the transfer to the Department of Education (Radin
& Hawley, 1988; Department of Education, 1978, p. 574).
Senator R ibicoff's deletion of Head Start was
unquestionably Carter-influenced (Separate education
department proposed, 1978).
All of this "fiefdom-protecting" led to an inherent weakness for proponents. A major argument for the department's creation had been that it would bring under one roof dozens of separate programs in different departments. Now, with many of the programs being protected by departments that already controlled them, how could proponents answer th eir critics? No answer was forthcoming. Senator Ribicoff made the matter no less easy by arguing, "Today's federal education efforts are really scattershot; there is no focus on coordination" (Separate education department proposed,
1978, p. 83). In effec t, he said that Congress should make a department that would collect a few of them, but still leave some scattered.
But the proponents focused less on the "minuscule" in the debate, and more on the larger picture (Separate education department proposed, 1978). The new department would provide more money for education. It would also establish a force dedicated to the aims of education exclusively. The new department would give education more prestige, greater White House access, increase coordination of programs (they pointed to the hundreds of educational programs that existed in forty different agencies), and provide the country with a better focus on education (Separate education department proposed, 1978, pp. 85-86). They also argued that the old commissioner's job was a low-profile job with l i t t l e p o litic a l clout. Remaking the commissioner into a secretary of a department with Cabinet-level status would give it the political clout it needed (Separate education department proposed, 1978, p. 84).
C ritic s , apart from pointing out that a department which sought to centralize programs but did not was pointless, also complained that reshuffling a mess would only secure a new mess, not a solution (Separate education department proposed, 1978). Congressmen Dan
Quayle of Indiana and John Erlenbon or Illin o is believed that educational programs did not need to be centralized in any form, since each program addressed separate needs
(Stickney & Marcus, 1984).
Senator Helms of North Carolina sought to k ill the bill by attaching a prayer amendment to it. It passed in committee 47-37 but represented a major obstacle to the b i l l 's passage (Education department survives crucial house test, 1979). Legislative leadership by
Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd of West Virginia removed the prayer amendment from S, 210 and attached it to S. 450, a bill relating to the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. A House version with the same prayer amendment was poorly worded and presented no obstacle to the department in that chamber (Education department survives crucial house test, 1979).
By this time, the Department of Education b ill had acquired more than 100 amendments giving c ritic s an added advantage by requiring it to be read in fu ll.
Such an action made certain it would be tabled
(Department of Education, 1978). Finally, c ritic s pointed out often that the b ill had l i t t l e support from the public (Department of education, 1978). Although Senate 991 and H.R. 13778 made it through
Congress, the House b ill just did make i t out of committee, 26-25 (Department of education, 1978, p.
573). Both b ills had sections in them which sp ecifically pointed out that the department was "not intended to interfere with local or state programs in education" (Department of education, 1978). The political fighting was intense. Califano (1981) said that the proponents argued in such a way as to inject an element of "McCarthyism" into the debate.
In June of 1979, David Obey of Wisconsin, sought to k ill the b ill enacting the department by offering a motion to strike the enacting clause (Education department survives crucial house test, 1979). House
Speaker O'Neill Jr., however, turned the vote against the Obey motion by asking, "Are we being fa ir to ourselves? Are we being fa ir to the President of the
United States who sent this message to Congress? Do not let the b ill go down this way" (Education department survives crucial house test, 1979, p. 63). President
Carter also lobbied strongly for the bill's passage.
The strongest argument against the b i l l , however, was the now-familiar refrain that the new department would mean more federal control of education (Separate education department proposed, 1978). After the department's miss in 1978, opponents in 1979 were convinced more than ever that its establishment would mean a nationalized educational program run by
Washington and special interest groups. The one cited
often was the NEA (Donnelly, 1979). Co-sponsor of
Senate B ill 210, William V. Roth J r., vowed to withdraw
his support if supporters did not guarantee that state
and local control of education would continue.
Congressman John Erlenborn complained, "What they want
is a central, nationat voice for establishing
educational policy. Just as night follows day, this
will establish a national education policy" (Donnelly,
1979, p. 296).
When the b ill came to a showdown, it made it , but
only barely; the final vote was 215-201. What is more
by this time the bill had such negative publicity that
those without a professional interest in education were
strongly uncommitted to the idea. Many of these usual!
strong education proponents saw it as a means for
increased government spending, and l i t t l e more
(Education department survives crucial house test,
1979). Even with all of these matters opposing it,
Senate B ill 210 became Public Law 96-88, making the
Department of Education the thirteenth federal Cabinet-
level creation of the United States (Congress creates
department of education, 1979).
On October 17, 1979, Carter signed a b ill creating a Cabinet level Department of Education. For sheer size, the act was impressive: 152 programs, 17,000 employees, and fourteen b illio n dollars earmarked for the first year (Florio, 1980b, p. 25). But the department was only a creation on paper. The real nuts and bolts construction of the department was s t i l l to come (Radin & Hawley, 1988).
Educational leaders were quick to offer advice.
Former Commissioner of the USOE, Terrel Bell said that the new secretary should be "lean and hungry and mean as h e ll” with a voice that would be "loud and clear"
(N e ill, 1979, p. 236). Shanker was s t i l l "unconvinced it would be of any benefit to this country's schools"
(Neill, 1979, pp. 236-237).
In late 1979, Carter named the first Secretary of the Department of Education: Shirley Mount Hufstedler.
Hufstedler was the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge.
The Senate confirmed her on November 30, 1979 by a vote of 81-2 and she was sworn in on December 6 of the same year (Congress creates department of education, 1979, p.
467). Hufstedler, coming as she did to the job as an
Appeals Court judge in C alifornia, looked to many as an appointment made because of her keen interest in c iv il rights issues (Hufstedler, 1980c, d). She took the job with the understanding that if a Supreme Court appointment came up, she would not be overlooked (Hufstedler, 1980c, d; Radin & Hawley, 1988). Others
were simply bewildered by the announcement and
questioned whether a non-educator per se should be
allowed to have the highest ranking federal job in
education (Radin & Hawley, 1988).
The arguments made by the proponents for the
department were not borne out in re a lity . F irst, the
establishment of the office did mean more publicity for
education, but that publicity was not always what the
department's creators had envisioned. Second, it did
not mean more money for education. The f ir s t three
years under Carter, education in the HEW saw greater
increases without a secretary than it did with one
(Savage, 1980). Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan sought
to clear up this inconsistency:
There is no greater illusio n in the minds of peopl
who really do not study bureaucracies very much
that the great efficiency somehow arrives from
drawing a line around a ll the l i t t l e boxes and
making one big box. That is simply not the case
(Savage, 1980, p. 33).
Shirley Hufstedler did make some significant
strides in taking over the office. Her leadership sty! and educational philosophy w ill be discussed in much detail below. She worked with Carter, for example, to simplify some of the regulations and guidelines in the department (Hufstedler, 1980 a, c). While the guidelines became more clear, they did turn out to require more. not less, paper to explain them (Hundemer,
1980). Judge Hufstedler did, moreover, help to create some of her own c ritic s (Radin & Hawley, 1988). She, too, was an outsider to Washington. Her transition team was made up of outsiders. Much of her early work was destined to be obstructed while her outsiders learned what Washington insiders already knew: Washington-style p o litic s was a game played for keeps (Radin & Hawley,
1988; Hufstedler, 1981, January 11).
What turned many against her, however, was Carter's re-election campaign; it was turning into a dog-fight for a second term in the Oval Office. Secretary
Hufstedler often campaigned for Carter while on speaking tours. NEA lined up in a veritable phalanx against challenger Ronald Reagan. For those educators who wanted a non-partisan o ffic e , these were not happy times.
For Reagan, the Department of Education symbolized all that was intrusive of the federal government into the lives of the people (Radin & Hawley, 1988; Stickney
& Marcus, 1984). From the beginning of his campaign,
Reagan began making noises that the department must go.
Because public support for the department had been weak from the beginning, grassroots support for Reagan's ideas about the department was v irtu a lly instantaneous.
Forces on the other side mobilized just as quickly, with professional organizations arguing that Congress must oppose anv plan to dismantle the department (Florio,
1981).
When Reagan swept into o ffice , he appointed Terrel
H, Bell as his Secretary of the Department of Education.
Bell had longstanding ties to education, having spent nearly all of his adult life in the discipline. Unlike
Judge Hufstedler, whose experience with education was en tirely personal (Radin & Hawley, 1988), Bell represented a man, not quite of the education establishment, but certainly one fam iliar with the language and the lay of the land. While education enthusiasts greeted the appointment with delight, many
Reagan supporters saw it as the first evidence of a reneged campaign promise to scuttle the department
(Cabinet profiles, 1981). B ell's enthusiasm for a vigorous educational system did not help matters (Bell,
1984a, d, f ) .
Bell began to talk of plans to dismantle the department in one of three ways: dispersal into other offices or agencies; merging the department with another
Cabinet-level department; demotion of it to an agency with no Cabinet-level designation; or establishing a national foundation (Florio, 1981). But his talk seemed double-minded. E a rlie r, during the Department of
Education hearings, Bell had pledged support. That support, he now argued, "grew out of the frustration I had as education commissioner in the huge structure of
HEW." Later he did say, "We've got to look at alternatives" (Cabinet profiles, 1981, p. 76).
Betl now favored a Department of Education transformed into a national foundation. Although the idea had been proposed in the 1970s and defeated as not serving the best interest of education, Bell was convinced that the foundation view was an idea whose time had come (B ell, 1988; Hook, 1981a; Hook, 1981b).
He knew he was in for a rough go of it in Washington, especially on the Hill (Rosenau, 1982). The special interest groups who had, in Califano's words, carved out th eir fiefdom, were back. They were ready to do battle with anyone who tried to dismantle the department.
The Department of Educational Coalition helped hold onto the Department of Education (American Vocational
Association, 1983). This coalition of representatives of a ll the major educational organizations cut off any strong efforts on the part of the Reagan administration to jettiso n the o ffice (America Vocational Association,
1983). Conservatives, a group Bell was to later excoriate in articles and in his book, liked neither the department nor the idea of a foundation. They wanted dismantlement (Education department, 1982, p. 68).
Senator Baker of Tennessee opposed the foundation idea so strongly that the idea was soon to be dropped (ED dismantlement, 1982, p. 501).
The so-called Conservative Coalition which had helped get Reagan elected also wanted the department dismantled (Docksai, 1981). The Heritage Foundation, a
Washington think-tank, had even published instructions for the dismantlement in the early weeks following the
1980 election. The plan called for a gradual scaling back of the department, with much of the department's work going to the states (Docksai, 1981).
Yet dismantlement also posed a problem. Although the department had limped its way through Congress, and never convinced the majority of the public of its value, it had a strong position now that it was on the books, at least with Congress (B ell, 1986a, b; Health/
Education/Welfare, 1983). Bell had also articulated well the problems with public education (Bell, 1984a, c, d; 1983a, b, d; 1982b, e, f ) . The overtures of the
Reagan administration to dismantle it in the early 1980s were so coolly received by the Hill that they were later withdrawn for lack of support (ED dismantlement, 1982).
Even in a year in which reducing governmental spending was at the top of the agenda, the department managed to get an increase in its budget (Bell, 1988). But budget woes were not a ll that Bell had to contend with. He was also having to deal with his own in te r-o ffic e struggles. His appointments, with the help and advice of the White House and conservative supporters, made B ell's staff look like "a Blue Book" of proponents for the Right. Bell (1986 a, b) admitted that he despised some of these appointments. In some cases i t was clear, however, that B ell's anger was kindled more against outside interference with his work, than it was with outright dislike of proposed candidates.
Conservative appointments meant, of course, that ideas held by the now deposed Carter-backed appointees were in for some rough going. The work NEA had done to gain a Department of Education looked as if it was going to be undone. NEA and other pro-Department of Education individuals had campaigned vigorously against Reagan.
Had its involvement in p o litic s backfired? After a ll its work in bringing the office to fruition, it appeared that the winds of politics had shifted, and its very opponents were now in charge.
Bell viewed his o ffice in the department as a
"bully pulpit" for education. He brought to the department a strong sense of leadership and focus (B ell,
1988, 1986b), He also brought to the department ideas based on sound educational practice. All of these things were important and to his credit. Yet when he left the ED, he left under a cloud, one that he briefly described as vituperative (1986b). Later in more pejorative terms, he described this 'cloud' in a written vendetta against the Right (B ell, 1988). Here, in his memoir, Bell argued that the extreme Right had v irtu a lly thwarted a ll his work in the department (B ell, 1988).
When Bell le ft the department, President Ronald
Reagan announced that William H. Bennett would replace him. Bennett was an instant success with the Right
(Bennett, 1988 a, b; 1987 a-dj 1986 a, b; and 1985).
Bennett appeared to be the man to carry out the Reagan initiatives in education. He drew on Bell's Nation at
Risk report and did everything in his power to see that the nation's schools did not forget they were at risk
(Bennett, 1988). He also did something that delighted the Reagan constituency: he spoke in stark, almost blunt language to the education establishment, letting it know he was in charge (Radin & Hawley, 1988).
Moreover, Bennett surrounded himself with lik e - minded believers. He believed, along with Chester Finn, later an Assistant Secretary under Bennett, that the federal government had done a considerable job financially for education.1 Bennett initiated either
1. For example, Finn had pointed out in 1978 that the "feds" had put into higher education more than ten times the Harvard endowment, shelling out more than direc tly , or indirectly by working with governors and state departments of education, many reform movements.
He liked the realistic analogies of Bill Honig (1985) who argued that, "We don't have any problem with
[toughness] when it comes to a spit and polish school band or a dominant football team. Somehow, though, we forget i t holds true in academics" (p. 19).
At the end of Bennett’s stint as secretary, he released a final "report card" for the schools. They were s t i l l making progress, he said, but making it too slowly. Bennett believed that there were things schools could do, and so endorsed a report by
Undersecretary Finn (What. Works: Research and Teaching about Learning. 198S) on what works.2 It was like adding kindling to a blazing fir e .
Bennett resigned rather unexpectedly during the last year of Reagan's term in o ffice . It gave Reagan the chance to name the first Hispanic to a Presidential administration: Lauro Cavazos. Secretary Cavazos was the alter idem of Bennett. He spoke the party line of
$1,560 per student. But what had the federal government done? Finn concluded that federal involvement in education had been "immensely disorderly." For a fu lle r discussion see S. Hook, P. Kurtz, & M. Todorovitch (1978), The university and the state: What role for government in higher education? Buffalo. N. Y .: Prometheus Books,
2 . Responses to this document have been nuclear. See, for example, A. Franza, (1986). Reagan's Schoolbook: Does It Work? English Journal 75: 20-22. the education establishment, not the administration's.
His tenure in office has confused both education proponents and c ritic s . F irst in favor of the administration's view of choice in the schools, he then opposed it.
Cavazos has made enemies of the Right in
Washington; but his score with Left has also been uneven. Speeches prepared for him to give have been discarded for approaches he has wanted to take. These approaches have been h it or miss: with the administration on some issues, apart from it on others.
This may mark Cavazos as "his own man," but it does l i t t l e to help establish a unified view on education from Washington (Conservatives disappointed with Cavazos re-appointment, 19B8, December 3), Mixed signals such as these have le ft many educators confused about direction from the federal office.
The history of education in the federal government has not been a smooth one. From the bureau's early formation in 1867, to the department's creation in 1979, the history of education at the federal level has been marked by p o litic a l vacillatio ns, some caused by opponents, others caused by in -fighting among those who agreed about its place in the federal hierarchy. This long survey has been necessary in order to lay the foundations for the study of leadership and educational 113 philosophies.
The Secretaries of Education did not merely assume a post. They could not simply walk into a job and begin work. Rather they assumed a tradition, a history which was as much formed by time as it was by indecision over the appropriateness of its place in the federal framework. Because this tradition was couched in a p o litical context, leadership issues were not approached from the usual context, All leadership involved some politics from the ethos of the context. But surely when the context was at the federal level, the issue of politics became far more crucial.
It was not enough, either, that the secretaries possessed philosophies of education. The adumbration of a philosophy of education had been formed by the tradition. Individual philosophies of education held by the secretaries had to conform themselves to the context in which they were allowed to operate, a context that was shaped by the role of education in government, as well as education legislation that grew out of po litical decision making.
Some of the more particular aspects of the secretaries themselves, namely leadership styles and educational philosophies, must now be examined. The questions which sought answers were, how much leadership could take place in this context? How was style molded by the political context? What were the educational philosophies and what role of importance did they play?
Before, however, these questions could be answered, it was necessary to define the area identified by leadership styles, and the area marked by the phrase philosophy of education.
Leadership
A comprehensive review of the lite ra tu re was a formidable task, given the magnitude of the fie ld . But the esoteric approach chosen for the study of leadership truncated the size of the body of literature that needed to be consulted. Leadership occupied a co-primary position of importance with educational philosophies in this study. Because the nature of the leadership studied was political, its treatment was confined to the stated parameters of transactional and transformational leadership, identified by Burns (1978) as major thrusts in p o litic a l leadership.
Leadership had about as many definitions to it as it did researchers investigating it. Stogdill's (1974) work on leadership was the standard fare, covering more than 3,000 books and articles on the subject. Bass'
(1981) revision and expansion of the text to include
1974 to 1980 citations increased the base of Stogdill's work by thousands more citations, and, it must be added, scores more definitions of leadership. Leadership has been defined as a power relationship
(Etizioni, 1961; Janda, 1960); an initiating structure
(Hemphill & Coons, 1957); a matter of direction and
coordination of activities of a group (Fiedler, 1967); a
matter of influence (S to gdill, 1950; Elmore, 1987);
influence by one through compliance (Katz & Kahn, 1978);
or as involving the appropriate, compatible, and
consistent use of power (Cribben, 1981). Yukl (1981)
saw i t as a panoply of aspects over which consensus
could be reached, Lerner (1938) found that leadership
was too social a concept to "be fu lly at ease in an
individualistic society. To have great and mature
leaders, a culture must have great and mature
followers," (p. 229) thus predicting by several decades
the work of Hersey and Blanchard (1982), Kanter (1983)
discovered that participatory leadership was "the
existence of people with power to mobilize others and to
set constraints" (p, 249). Maccoby (1981) felt that the
old views of leadership were no longer functional in an
age where individual rights, limits, and such like,
governed with social constraint. "Leaders only
succeed," he said, "when they enlarge and express, for
better or worse, values . . . in the social character of
group, class or nation" (p. 23),
The approaches to leadership, now fa irly evident to researchers of leadership, needed but brief rehashing here. A ristotle fP o litic s . Book I, Chapter 5) indicated
that from birth some were marked out to lead and some
were marked out to follow. This began what came to be
called the great man theory of leadership. It received
its fullest treatment in Carlyle's work on heroes
(1966). That view held the day on leadership until it
was brought into serious question by Stogdill (1948).
Stogdill by no means disproved this theory of
leadership* but his survey of more than 100 studies
revealed very confusing findings about great men and
1eadership.
It appeared that leadership was influenced by six
areas: capacity, achievement, responsibility*
participation, status, and situation (Bass, 1981, p.
66). But the variability within each of these
categories made it rather difficult to come to any
resounding conclusions about the trait-approach to
leadership.
This led rather naturally to an investigation of
leadership that began examining many relationships and
variables within the leadership environment. The fir s t of these studies* the Ohio State Leadership Studies*
grew out of the work of Hemphill and Coons (1950).
These two men developed the now famous Leaders Behavior
Description Questionnaire (LBDQ). This questionnaire was later refined by Stogdill (1963) and Halpin and Winer (1952). The LBDQ has long been used in leadership studies since its inception.
Hemphill, Coons, and others discovered that leadership could be defined in two contexts: in itia tin g structure, which demarcated the relationship between the leaders and subordinates, and consideration, which defined the leader's behavior in terms of trust, warmth, interest, and respect between him and his charges (Hoy &
Miskel, 1987). Initiating structure and consideration, though they were to dominate the lite ra tu re for the next decade, shared the spotlight with the Michigan research studi es.
Likert (1961) provided a very ample review of these studies. While the Ohio State studies had been designed for use with the Defense Department, the Michigan studies focused on organizations and businesses, The idea behind these studies was to descry clusters or leader characteristics that were closely related to one another (Hoy & Miskel, 1987). Two styles were identified: production-oriented approaches, or leaders who stressed the task of the work needing to be done, and employee-centered styles, or leaders who stressed the importance of decision-making delegation and the satisfaction of employees placed under their charge.
S t ill another group of leadership studies gained the spotlight about this same time. The Harvard studies on group leadership stressed participation and the importance of interacting with members in one defined social or work-related environment (Kahn, 1956). This research produced the finding that, within each work group or 1eader-environment situation, there was generally another person who had leadership qualities and who, if overlooked by the designated leader, would be overlooked at that leader's own misfortune. In other words, the group context might produce more than one leader, and the designated leader's success or failure depended largely on whether or not he addressed these other would-be leaders to their satisfaction, and so established harmony and group cohesiveness.
The t r a it theory approach gave way to behavioral approaches which, in turn, gave way to the situational approach as a means for investigating leadership. The idea here was that leaders were not born, but made by the situation (Hoy & Miskel, 1987). The work of William
Reddin's Tri-Dimensional Leadership Effectiveness Model
(1971), the Ohio State Leadership Studies, and Hersey and Blanchard, themselves drawing on the work of the previous two, proved crucial in defining the fie ld ,
Reddin's (1971) work focused on a three dimensional cube as a way of uniting leaders and followers,
Reddin's work provided the underlying foundation for
Hersey and Blanchard's work (Hoy & Miskel, 1987). Although complicated, Reddin's work proved useful in ferreting out the relationship between leaders and followers in a way that made sense, and in a way that offered many practical uses.
Hersey and Blanchard (1982) argued for an approach that examined both the leader's a b ility to lead and the maturity of his or her followers to be able to follow.
The idea behind this notion was that, equal in importance to the leader's abilities, was the maturity of his or her followers. This maturity depended, to a large extent, not on a psychological factors so much as on a willingness and an ability to take responsibility.
The higher this level of responsibility occurred in situations, the more likely it wa3 that a given leader could behave in a given way: directional, participatory, relations-oriented, and dynamic.
Another approach to the leadership enigma was to focus on contingencies in the relationship of leaders to the task at hand and on the followers being supervised.
Fiedler's (1967) work focused on two major aspects.
One, that the style of leadership was contingent on the motivational system of the leader. Two, that the effectiveness of the group was a combined product of the leader's style and the favorableness of the situation in which the leader found himself.
Style for Fielder denoted the need structure that the leader used to motivate behavior in a given context of leadership. The situation in Fielder's model hung on position power, task structure, and leadei—member relations. Fielder was convinced that given these areas, the 1eader-member relations being the most important of the three, that leader effectiveness could be predicted. He called for managers and chiefs of organizations to suit the style to the situation (Boone
& Bowen, 1987).
Fiedler also determined that there were octants of leadership upon which one could plot situational favorableness. In the first three areas, where situational favorableness was high for the leader, a task-oriented leader would be most effective. In a situation of moderate favorableness (octants 4-6), a relationship-oriented leader was more likely to succeed.
Finally, in situations of low leader favorableness, a task-oriented leader was again considered to be the most effective (Boone & Bowen, 1987).
Closely a llie d to Fielder's approach was House's
Path-Qoal Theory (Boone & Bowen, 1987; Hoy & Miskel,
1987; Fleishman & Hunt, 1973). House argued that how a leader influenced a subordinate's view of work had a lot to do with the success of both the leader and the follower. Leader behavior can be directive, supportive, achievement-oriented, or participative. These various behavioral modes influenced either personal perceptions
(the directive or the supportive styles), which in turn
influenced job satisfaction and acceptance of the
leader, or stimulated motivation (achievement or
participative), which in turn influenced motivational
behavior and performance.
House's Path-Goal Theory focused mainly on
performance of the worker and the leader, tying closely
together the idea of job performance and expectation and
job satisfaction. House believed that the theory had
strong integrative powers and could be used to explain
more of the contingent factors than did previous
approaches to the subject matter. This can be likened
in some way to Cribben's (1981) ROI, return on ideas, or
a measurement of successful leadership by the
performance of ideas acted upon.
Robert Blake and Jane Mouton (1985) developed the
Managerial Grid as yet another way to explain the mysteries of the leadership puzzle. The Grid was
structured around, by now, two fam iliar themes: concern
for production and concern for people. The grid has 81
possible connections of production and people, but so
far, only nine have been identified by the authors as
being central, the remaining 72 presumably exist as
variations on the nine major themes.
The pure task oriented style, 9, 1 on the grid, is one that evidenced a high concern for production and a low concern for people. Conversely, the "country club" style, the 1,9, was just the reverse. The impoverished style of management, 1,1, was characterized by a low concern for people and task, a manager who was headed for disaster, not to mention the area of oversight to which he had been assigned. The "organization man" approach was designated on the grid as 5,5 and could be seen as a half-way house to team management. Team or participatory approach to leadership, the 9,9 style, was considered by Blake and Mouton as being the best approach because i t exercised a high regard for individuals and a high interest in achievement.
Leadership studies also identified a number of types or kinds of leaders: crowd leaders, organizational or institutional leaders, educational, student, public, and legislative leaders (Bass, 1981).
It is this last type that interested the subject matter of this study, for it was in the legislative structure that leaders of the highest federal educational office in the land would be found.
Leadership studies also looked at power as the defining emotion, the dependence and interdependence of leaders and followers, leaders under stress, leaders in d ifferen t cultures, and many, many more (Bass, 1981).
The question that imposed its e lf upon this study required one significant answer at the outset: which method to study leadership in a federal o ffice . Burns*
(1978) opus on the subject opened up new possibilities.
Long recognized as an historian of American politics, particularly as his work touched on the Constitution and the work of Madison and Jefferson, Burns' leadership work was instantly recognized as an important contribution to our understanding of leadership. Not relegated to just one endemic area of study, politics,
Burns* work also received much scholarly attention in corporate and non-legislative contexts. The work was, however, considered to be something of a handbook in the area of political leadership.
Burns' definition of leadership (given below), while succinct, also offered a myriad of positions from which i t could be examined. Although it must be admitted the work had a rough go of operationalizing its psychometric properties (Bass, 1985), it nevertheless continued to be one of the major streams of research, especially when the context of leadership is po1i t i c a l .
Burns' Taxonomy
The cordoning off of leadership into transactional and transformation strands of thought was not new when
Burns (1978) made i t an academic concept. Plato spoke of it in The Reoublic when he talked about the exchange of leadership between leaders, or the 'exchange' of power between leaders and followers, clearly a transactional articulation. When Aristotle (Politics) spoke of distribu tive justice, he was, in many ways talking about a kind of transactional leadership that foreshadowed a fuller, higher form of leadership that would catch up followers in its wake.
Closer to our own time was the work of Locke, and his "social contract" was a prelude to the formation of leadership ties which emphasized a transactional relationship between the followers of a government and their leaders. It was an im plicit agreement in which government provided a series of necessary benefits to which citizens responded with civil obedience, insofar as it was possible.
Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and David Hume a ll focused on transaction between groups, whether p o litic a l or not, in a context that can be said to be one that
Burns later described. It was important to this study to highlight these findings because they point to an underlying theme in the course of leadership since its beginnings. It also helped to stave o ff the charge that
Burns* view was an en tirely academic one (Burns, 1980).
Leadership in Burns' economy included followers and was exercised when "persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize in competition or conflict with others" in order to "arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers" (Burns, 1978, p. 18). The study used this as an all-encompassing view of leadership because it identified several important elements.
Leadership was purposeful; it was in conflict; and it was indicated by change. Since Burns believed that leaders induced followers to act for certain goals (p.
19), then implicit in that assessment was the notion of needs.
Needs played an important role in Burns' view of leadership, needs in the Maslowian sense (Burns, 1980).
Needs had to be f u lf ille d , and the better or more successful a teader was at f u lf illin g the highei—order needs, esteem, self-actu alization , then the more successful that leader was deemed to be by Burns. "The original sources of leadership and followers," wrote
Burns, " lie in vast pools of human wants and in the transformation of wants into needs, social aspirations, collective expectations, and p o litic a l demands" (Burns,
1978, p. 61). A sense strongly emanated from Burns' study that transformational leaders lifte d people out of themselves (p. 462) by redefining needs in terms that followers could understand and assent to. This had to be done carefully, however, for a continual pull and tug at the values of followers could lead, eventually, to ambiguity, unless a base for shared values was secured 126
(p. 45).
The real heart of leadership for Burns was the fulfillment of these needs in a context of conflict and power:
[T]he processes of leadership must be seen as part
of the dynamics of co n flict and power; that
leadership is nothing if not linked to collective
purpose; that the effectiveness of leaders must be
judged not by th eir press clippings but by actual
social change measured by intent and by the
satisfaction of human needs and expectations; that
p o litic a l leadership depends on a long change of
biological and social processes, of interaction
with structures of political opportunity and
closures, of interplay between the calls of moral
principles and the recognized necessities of power;
that in placing these concepts of p o litic a l
leadership centrally into a theory of historical
causation, we affirm the possibilities of human
vo litio n and of common standards of justice in the
conduct of people's affairs. (p. 3-4)
Leadership in this context was considered to be demanding, intense, even deific in order for it to be fu lly accomplished. But the parts of it , by synecdoche, allowed the use of several measuring rods: actual accomplishments, social change measured by the intents and satisfaction of human needs and expectations, and the interplay of moral principles, or euphrasy, i.e ., right action.
This formulation led Burns to talk of two major vehicles of change and therefore leadership styles: transactional and transformational. Transactional leadership for Burns was essentially excambion in nature
(p.4). It was bargained-for leadership, leadership that was t it - f o r - t a t . It was also the most common form of leadership between leaders and followers (p. 4).
Transactional leadership was leadership in which leaders and followers approached each other with an eye to exchanging one thing for another.
Transformational leadership, on the other hand, was a much higher form of persuasion. For Burns it was more comp1 ex:
Transforming leadership, while more complex, is
more potent. The transforming leader recognizes
and exploits an existing need or demand of
potential followers. But, beyond that, the
transforming leader looks for potential motives in
followers, seeks to satisfy higher needs, and
engages the fu ll person of the follower. The
result of transforming leadership is a relationship
of mutual stimulation and elevation that converts
followers into leaders and may convert leaders into moral agents. (1978, p. 4)
Transactional and transformational were not, as Mann
(1987) pointed out, Has opposite ends of a continuum"
(p. 14). Rather they were seen more as stepping stones, the lesser leadership, transactional, leading up, if so desired, to the higher, moral agency of the other. In nearly a ll cases, both were to be used "for a vision creating consensus" (Burns, 1982, p. 62).
Transformation did become for Burns a "bold statement of the effectiveness of certain types of leadership acts"
(Mann, 1987, p. 29).
Burns did not attempt to operationalize these concepts anywhere in his work. Others, notably Bass
(1985) and Kuhnert and Lewis (1987) did. But the effect was not nearly as successful as the conceptualization.
Bass was unable to provide an explanation of what processes generated the action of the leader (Kuhnert &
Lewis, 1987, p. 648). While the action of transactional leadership was not always equivalent in exchange
(Dinesch 8t Liden, 1986), it was recognizable in most cases, Bass failed to do more than identify a number of personality traits that were endemic to first transactional and then transformational leadership
(Kuhnert & Lewis, 1987). He did not show how these traits moved together to produce the styles of leadership. Kuhnert and Lewis (1987) did see something to be gained in using Kegan’ s (1982) five stages of
development to illu s tra te the subject-object
relationship of leader behavior, but again, the
illu s tra tio n proved less than impressive.
Transactionat leadership for Burns was, then,
negotiated, bargained-for leadership; transformational
was a veritable carrot and stick replay of needs and
objects or expectations (Burns, 1963). The distinction
was one of reciprocity (Burns, 1978, p. 425).
Transformational leadership was an opportunity to shape
and to mold, to a lte r, and to transform, through "the
vital teaching role of leadership" (p. 425),
Moral leadership, a kind of synonym for
transformational leadership, meant for Burns a
relationship between leaders and the led that was not
focused on power alone, but of mutual needs,
aspirations, and values. It also meant that in
responding to leaders, followers had adequate knowledge of "alternate leaders and programs and the capacity to
choose among those alternatives" (p. 4). It also meant that leaders took responsibility for their commitments as they brought about change. In other words, in both cases, actual accomplishment was the key (p. 22). Moral
leadership proved central because values in a culture often dictated what form of leadership could emerge.
Values inherent in both leader and follower often prophesied what type of leadership transpired (pp. 30-
32). Leaders who shared the moral vision of a culture, or who could articulate deep-seated values and in stilled the fear of the loss of them in followers, were also
able to inspire leadership (p. 34).
This meant for Burns that leadership was causative
if it was to be more than ceremonial or symbolic. The movement of change over leaders and followers w ill lead them awash in change of some sort, change that both w ill be able to point to with mutual satisfaction because both w ill have brought it about (p. 454). "The ultimate test of . . . leadership is the realization of intended, real change that meets people's enduring needs" (p.
461).
In order to accomplish this, however, Burns interjected two other elements into the equation: choice and conflict. Of the two, conflict is quintessential (p. 453). "The central process involved, as we have emphasized, is one of conf1ict and choice (p.
42B). Leaders, successful leaders, Burns argued, were those who shaped conflict as well as they could produce and resolve it (p. 39).
Conf1ict--disagreement over goals within an array
of followers, fear of outsiders, competitions for
scarce resources--universally invigorates the
mobilization of consensus and descensus. But the fundamental process is a more elusive one; it is,
in large part, to make conscious what lies
unconscious among followers." (p. 40)
In other words, leaders sought to take their own goals with the goals and needs of followers and mold them into a process that secured change consonant with both, and in accordance with the values of all (p. 41).
A last factor emerged in this context for Burns: power. For Burns, power was a subject that had been overemphasized in the literature, at least theoretically, because "not all human influences are necessarily coercive and exploitative, that not all transactions among persons are mechanical, impersonal, ephemeral" ( p. 11). Burns fe lt that many had been blinded to the notion of politics as power and had therefore missed the opportunity of power in politics.
The role of power in this regard made it possible to accomplish social change for the transformational leader. Consequently, power for Burns, while not absent in any stretch of the imagination, was a process in which or through which "power holders," in possession of certain goals and motives, has the ability to secure changes in followers (p .13). On the contrary, power was necessary and inevitable, and in a po litical context, even more so. Power was able, for Burns, to bring in its scope a "vast range of human behavior" (p. 15). His notion shed light on the leadership capacities of the Department of Education Secretaries in the sense that the study sought to find interstices in which they had exercised the power in their politics in order to secure social change on any scale, large or small.
Before moving into a fu lle r discussion of transactional and transformational leadership, it was necessary to point out the role of ultimate importance that conflict had in the leadership relationship for
Burns. Conflict was a head of forces fille d with power and prestige and influence that the leader resolved, according to the time and place he deemed best for all parties involved. Conflict always emerged, Burns maintained. It was the timing of this resolution
(though the leader could choose to use an issue that remained unresolved as a catalyst to resolve other issues) that provided for the leader an auspicious tenure, or created for himself an unsightly mess. The dealing with conflict then was crucial for the leader's a b ility to achieve success.
(t was appropriate to note that Burns signified that, for leaders, the most important force in shaping them was learning. This learning included learning from people, learning from successes and failures, learning from other leaders and followers. Learning from the ethos of the cultural context was also included here. These constraints, if they can be so called, created the conflict and kinetically held the power in which leadership could emerge as transactional, a bowing to the pressures and, in some ways, a resignation of defeat on a given issue, or transformational, in which constituents, and leader, were all united to find a higher, better way.
For Burns, this was only logical because the matter of leader and the led was "not only . . . the chicken and egg problem of which comes f ir s t . . . [but] the fact that leaders are also followers ..." (Burns,
1963, pp. 213-214). This was also tied to Burns' prescription for democracy: "leadership [that is] responsible, committed, effective and exuberant . ■
(1963, p. 340).
Planning was also important for leaders of Burns' description, and it was also instrumental in this study.
How did the secretaries plan? Were they able to plan, given the constraints of congressional, executive, and judicial restraints, not to mention the restraints of special interest groups? Did they understand, as Burns pointed out, that ”[p]lanning leaders must recognize purpose--indeed planning is non-existent without goals— and recognize that different purposes will inform the planning process" (Burns, 1978, p. 420)? Or that planning for change, real change, is the leader's most potent weapon (p. 419)? Planning goals to meet what
Burns f e lt were the most "potent sources of . . . motivation"— esteem needs— seemed especially important in this study also. How did the secretaries go about assessing those needs and marrying them to goals and policies?
It must be said that Burns' taxonomy was not found to be faultless. The objectivity that empirical studies often called for can be seen in Burns to be lost. For example, Burns described himself as a left-leaning a c tiv is t who ran for election on the Democratic Party’ s tic ket back in the 1960s (Burns, 1986, 1965). He found the party machine to be dead on both sides, and the legislative configurations to be in a state of virtual gridlock (Burns, 1984). Burns did not believe in limited government either (MacDonald, 1984). Although this could be considered simply a matter of preference,
Burns used it as a way of arguing for an end to the system of checks and balances government inherited from
Madison (Burns, 1984, 1966). Further, Burns' notions of government often bordered on the romantic, or utopic, as if politics would somehow rise above politics (Wilson,
1972).
Burns (1984) believed the system to be so perverse that nothing, not even charismatic leadership could save it, leaving Congress in a state of institutional drag forever (Burns, 1980, p. 13). Burns called for moral leadership, a matter that will be made more clear below in the discussion of transformational leadership. Yet he found the discussion of Gary Hart(pence)'s withdrawal from the presidential race, based on Hart's well- publicized philandering, to be old-fashioned and puritanical (Burns, 1987). How moral leadership can be allowed to overlook this matter is never made clear by
Burns.
Although many styles of leadership presented themselves as equal candidates on which to base a study,
Burns' taxonomy appeared to be the most logical for this one, given the political context in which the main characters of this study found themselves. The main components of the theory, transactional and transformational leadership, conveyed the styles of leadership that seemed most likely to have been employed by the Secretaries of Education. Their limits and definitions w ill now be discussed.
Transactional Leadership
As was pointed out earlier, transactional leadership for Burns, and for this study, was leadership by exchange, a bringing of something to the leader- follower relationship that can be exchanged for mutually agreed upon goals, "Transactional leaders," wrote
Burns, "seek to minimize their economic and psychic income through trading and brokering in a restricted arena" (1984, p. 153). It meant giving in order to get, a transaction that was not always equal in the exchange.
But transactional leadership was not always destined to failure from the start, as might be thought.
"Pragmatic, transactional leadership," wrote Burns,
"requires a shrewd hand for proportions, a goal for bargaining, persuading, reciprocating" (p. 169). It was also used to raise, rather than lower trust in certain contexts. It was, however, seen to be a way of
"marginally improv[ing] and maintain[ing] the quality and quantity of performance, [and] how to substitute one goal for another" (Bass, 1985, p. 27). It was also considered to be the day to day leadership we all engage in (Burns, 1985),
In transactional, as well as transformational leadership, intellectual "replenishing" was considered absolutely essential. In a word, successful transactional leadership depended more on substance than on style, more on constantly replenishing the intellectual capital to get out the best idea (Horton,
1985). This seemed to insure success and also made it possible to attain change in the process (Horton, 1985;
Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978). Martin (1987) served an unprecedented seventh term as Speaker of the Maine House of Representatives, and contended that the single 137 greatest asset he had as Speaker was the Intellectual capital of knowing the rules, of knowing that ”[t]here
is no substitute for the ability to make an immediate and correct ruling ..." (p. 252). This was also underlined by Peters (1987).
How essential this proved to be for the Department of Education Secretaries cannot be overemphasized. It figured in transactional leadership, more so than in transformational, because crisis proved the battle ground on which transactions were won or lost (Burns,
1978, pp. 193-194). Crisis was essential to bring out in high re lie f the issues and where the battle lines were drawn. Crisis or conflict provided the transactional leader a chance to exert himself of herself, but only if he or she did so in a way to make the crisis slave to the transactional process, not the other way around. How did secretaries address themselves to the handling of crisis or conflict?
The degree to which transactional leaders identified the conflict or the crisis depended on a number of factors identified by Burns: the conflict situation its e lf; the roles they assumed to address 1t; the values they held and the goals derived from them; and the extent to which they could manipulate conflict situations to obtain actions that helped them realize their goals (p. 350-351). Transactional leadership Burns (1978) often described as a car being driven by another. This was nowhere more evident than in the handling of compromise by the secretaries. "Transactional leadership," wrote
Burns, "thrives in small groups. Formal and informal heads of groups act as brokers both within th eir groups and among groups" (Burns, 1978, p. 289). This yielded transactional leadership of mutual support and expectation, but not consistently and not always en tirely . It also led to the age-old co nflict of fidelity to self and fidelity to the group served.
For the secretaries, this proved even more crucial.
How did they maintain distance and closeness in the midst of compromise? How did they avoid the p itfa lls of influence by special interest groups, as well as other influences on their leadership? How were they able to remain fa ith fu l to a President who appointed them, a party that had control over the White House, a strong and vocal teachers' interest group that some said put the department in Washington in the f ir s t place, and to themselves and what they f e lt had to be done? Was it , in fact, because of this transactional arrangement, that moral leadership was impossible (as Burns implied) and transactional leadership the only alternative? If, as
Burns pointed out, "transactional leadership is crucial to group leadership and it is just as crucial to the more encompassing forces of party, leg islative, and
executive leadership" (p. 307), where did this leave the
secretaries? Did the fact of a federal office omit
moral action because i t was hemmed in on all sides by
professional, legislative, party, and other groups'
needs, thereby making transactional leadership the only
style to employ?
Legislative leadership Burns pointed out—a kind or
form of transactional 1eadership--"does not naturally
make for positive, comprehensive, principled--that is,
transform ing--1eadership; it makes for an accommodating,
brokering, incremental--that is, transactional
leadership" (p. 362).
This led to a corollary. Was it possible in
transactional leadership to avoid the "footdraggers,
bootb1 ackers, empire builders, adjusters, and others
with their own drumbeats," as Burns warned (p. 379)? It
was, he conceded, but only by monumental e ffo rt on the
part of the executive leader. Barnard (1938) indicated
the difficulty of this transaction when he pointed out
that to move a telephone pole from one side of the
street to another required 10,000 decisions of 100
individuals located at 15 different places involving
social, legal, and physical facets of the environment,
not to mention the refinements and changes of purpose.
Burns (1978) admitted that the transactional level of leadership could often be mere coping (p. 382).
In the end, however, transactional leadership could only go so far. Burns (1978) found that transactional
leadership, while indispensable in some cases, and positively demanded in other, limited contexts; that because it involved so many makers of decisions, so many movers of interest, so many varied interests, it cannot secure change for an extended period of time (pp. 382-
383). The science of muddling through can be transactional analysis piecemeal, and while it may add up to gradual change, the sheer weight of its many
levels can also collapse the edifice of transactions on top of itself (p. 409). It may be that very form of the
American political context made these decisions difficult, as Burns (1963) pointed out, but it did not make them impossible. Bass (1985) pointed out that the transactional leader clarified the role and task requirements of followers, and provided direction toward goa1s.
Nevertheless, transactional leadership, because of lim itations imposed upon it from outside sources seeking exchanges, and inside forces calling for them, led Burns to identify another, higher order form of leadership.
If leadership was as Burns depicted it , a measuring of needs and the fulfilling of them, then the fulfillment of physiological, safety, and belonging needs were resigned, to greater and lesser degrees of satisfaction of success, to transactional leadership. The higher order needs, esteem and se lf-actu alizatio n , Burns called transformational leadership.
Transformational Leadership
The transformational style, as had been pointed out, was found to be a higher, in te lle c tu a l, even moral leadership. It was leadership that caused, as Burns said, people to pull more out of themselves (Burns,
1978). But this was found to be misleading because, again Burns (1980), "Great leadership does not dictate; rather it engages the fundamental needs, wants, aspirations, and expectations of followers" (p. 10).
The best example of the transforming leader, for Burns, was not the statesman, but the teacher.
Political leadership was for Burns anti-1eadership with its insistence on checks and balances (Burns,
1980). The checks and balances have proven to be godsends, however, and may show a reliance more on the idea of the framers that the human "heart was deceitfutly wicked, who can know it?" as opposed to the modern day version of, "I'm okay, you're okay." Without some check on each of the branches of government, it seemed unlikely that leadership would ever rise above nasty bidding wars.
The transformational leadership theory for Burns, like the transactional theory, was again needs-based.
The leader drew on the needs of individuals, even needs that may be latent on the surface, but later burst forth when summoned, and transformed those needs into an agenda, a movement of concern for a particular change.
The transforming leader has been rightly linked with the charismatic leader, or in Burns' use, the heroic leader
(Mann, 1987; Waldman, 1987; Bass, 1985, 1981; Nejedlo,
1983; Burns, 1978). This did not mean that the transformational leader was the classic Weberian charismatic (Weber 1957; 1946). But he did portray many of the same qualities that the classic Weberian charismatic possessed.
Transformational leadership required, as Waldman
(1987) pointed out, that the leader and the follower go beyond themselves. Bass (1984) argued that transformational leaders focused on raising the confidence level of followers in order for them to achieve beyond themselves. Transactional leadership was easier to secure, but transformation produced profound change. It was also found to be a reciprocal relationship: "Transforming leadership occurs when one or more persons engage with others in such a way that leadership and membership raise one another to higher levels of motivation and human development" (Nejedlo,
1983, p. 5). It was a metamorphosis of leaders and the led, dynamic because it changed the behavior, the
"ethical aspirations" of those involved, by transforming them to a level beyond that which they evinced before the transformational leadership began (p. 6),
Transformational leadership had in the literature a definite messianic quality about it . Burns (1979) hinted at this when he talked about the growing decline of leadership in the United States and the need for a moral transformation in leadership, especially since the post-Watergate milieu. Transformational leaders came as great "fixers" or "saviors" for a given social or political condition.
A disturbing undercurrent was also found in transformational leadership. Although it was moral and intellectual, nothing seemed to bridle it from fu lfillin g its own needs as a replacement of the needs of others. This was seen by Burns to be especially true in the anti-leaders of Stalin, Hitler, Mao, and Jim
Jones. All spoke to a strong need or urge in their followers, and all called their followers to a higher level of attainment. It so happened that that attainment was heinous and incomprehensibly blood thirsty, Hitler with his thousands of Jews, Stalin and
Mao with their millions of civilians, and Jones with his hundreds of followers (Johnson, 1983). Burns did not neglect this charismatic aspect of transformational leaders. But for Burns, the transformational leader was one who always sought the best (Burn 1978). If he sought less than the best, he became something other than a transformational leader (Burns, 1978).
The theoretical-on 1y charges to which Burns' theory has been put was never stronger in the litera tu re than in connection with transformational leadership. Mann complains that i t "has been judged to be theoretical desperation because of the individuality of its variables to emerge as distinct . . . (1987, p. 103).
Others (Kuhnert & Lewis, 1987) have made similar claims regarding the identification of the variables as unmeasurable constructs.
MacMillan (1987), however, argued that "there may be opportunity for Human Resources managers to a rtfu lly orchestrate the transformation leadership process" and thereby realize the development of truly remarkable programs (p. 439), Elmore (1987) argued that there were opportunities in transformational leadership for creative change, even in rig id systems. Bass (1985) seemed unconcerned over the d iffic u lty in identifying the variables as distinct, bargaining and higher ordered needs being rather no more d iffic u lt to discern than a number of other variables in widely recognized and generally accepted constructs with less explanatory power. Moreover, Tichy and Ulrich (1984), and Tichy and
Devanna (1986a, b) contended that the key to the
"revitalization" of American industry, especially the mega-giants of AT&T, General Motors, and General
Electric required the development and evolution of transformational leaders. Transformational leaders were seen as those leaders who could visualize (Burns' intellectual element) the new corporation, transform it into new goals (Burns' reform element in transformational leadership), and lead it toward the achievement of a new breed of corporatism (Burns' moral leadership element). Although their choice of today's leader as transformational ( i . e . , Lee lacocca, in which it appeared that egomaniacal leadership had been confused with transformational leadership), Tichy and
Ulrich (1984) were very pessimistic about American business unless such new leaders emerged in the business world soon.
Burns (1978) argued that people admired strength in
Presidents and other leaders because strength implied a command of situations. Transformational leaders assumed that role of defining, articulating, and being the torchbearer in cases of conflict where true leadership is needed. To define leadership in this manner--i.e., in terms of the motivation, values, and purposes--was to see leadership as the central role in the process of 146 historical causation (p. 433). To act as a transformat ion leader was to act in terms of values and purposes (p. 408). This appeared to have been substantiated by the work of Singer (1986). He found that most of his subjects preferred transformational leaders to transactional leaders. This indicated that not only are both theories operational in the minds of followers, but that they can be known and even preferred. A purely academic theory could not, of course, have any ectypes outside the purely academic realm.
The denouement, as i t were, was again the central role of conflict or crisis. This was touched on in the earlier sections on leadership in general and transactional leadership in specific. But it was here, in transformat ion, that Burns gave i t fu ll scope. The way a leader handled c ris is , what he did with it , how he managed it spelled disaster or success for him. If he chose, for example, to pursue it transactionally, he would end up with one set of changes, some more durable than others, but a ll less than what he may have hoped for and wanted. If he turned to the conflict with transformational leadership, then he turned to it with an eye to securing permanent change. This, for Burns, was the key ingredient of any leader:
Leaders, whatever th eir professions of harmony, do not shun conflict) they confront it, explain it,
ultimately embody it . Standing at the points of
contact among latent co nflict groups, they can take
various roles, sometimes acting directly for their
followers, sometimes bargaining with others,
sometimes overriding certain motives of followers
and summoning others into play. But leaders also
shape as well as express and mediate co n flict, (p.
39)
It was this approach to the conflict that singled out
transformational (and transactional) leaders.
"Ultimately, the moral legitimacy of transformation
leadership . . . is grounded in conscious choice among
real alternatives. Hence, leadership assumes
competition and c o n flict, brute power denies it" (p. 36,
emphases in the o rig in a l).
This, along with the role of empathy in transactional leadership, may have led to Burns' (1980)
acceptance of the charge that the theory may be only academic. The transactional leader must show a "genuine capacity for empathv--the v ita l leadership quality of entering into another's feelings and perspectives. That
is the beginning of moral leadership" (p. 100). But how were they able to do this? Again, the element of
learning in these leaders was paramount for Burns.
Transactional and/or moral leaders were willing to learn from others. Those who strove to help others to self- actualization did so by their own ability "to lead bv being led" (p. 117). Failure on the part of the leader to ascribe to this notion would result in the evasion and fogging of the issues, rather than sharpening and resolving them (Burns, 1963).
These inherent qualities of learning from others, of leading by being led, and of genuinely stepping into another's needs made it possible not only to secure the following of others ready to follow, but also of being able to secure the needs of those who were dormant.
"Heroic, transcending, transforming leadership excites the previously bored and apathetic" (Burns, 1978, p.
137).
Burns used fam iliar terms to help enlarge and crystallize the notions of transformational leadership.
Charismatic was one already mentioned, and one that occurred throughout Burns' work. But he also used the images of the revolutionary leader as a way of contrasting the transformational leader. The revolutionary was willing to risk his life, undergo imprisonment, e x ile , even persecution and continual hardship for his cause (p. 202). But the revolutionary differed in one respect. The animating idea could consume the ends and blur the means. Rather than speak to the needs of the people, the revolutionary leader often supplanted them. Nevertheless, the revolutionary
leader displayed the heart and passion of the
transformational leader to secure permanent change,
real, measurable social or p o litic a l change.
The intellectual leader, as different from the
intellectual, also provided Burns with another example.
Conscious purpose of the intellectual leader was drawn
from the values and needs of the people (p. 142).
Intellectual leadership was transforming leadership
because i t " . . . conceive[d] values or purposes in
such a way that ends and means are linked analytically
and creatively and that the implications of certain
values for political action and governmental
organizations are clarified. The test is one of
transforming power" (p. 163). Intellectual leadership
was like Moses leading the Israelites out of bondage, or
Plato leading men out of the Cave. It sought to define matters so articulately and carefully, to link them
obviously to needs of a higher and better quality, that
followers would be drawn to them in the same way that
they are drawn to themselves, for it would, in fact, be
issuing from themselves (Burns 1978, 1963),
Reform leadership also provided Burns with a chance
to elaborate on his model. Reform leadership was
transforming leadership, but only when it did not avoid
conf1ict (pp. 188-190), When it did move away from co n flict it dwindled into senseless dreams and small
deeds, excited by the particularisms of unopposed
conflict that excited no one else. It also virtually
killed any hope of lasting change, but rather inured the
system in its recalcitrance. Reform was poised between
the transactional and the transformational —
"transforming in spirit and posture, transactional in
process and results" (Burns, 1978, p. 200).
Transformational leadership Burns also called moral
leadership, often using the terms interchangeably,
because, "it is the kind of leadership that operates at
need and va1ue 1 eve!s hi gher than those of potential
fo 1 lowers (but not so much higher as to lose contact). .
. , [l]t is [also] the kind of leadership that can
exploit conf1i ct and tens ion with i n persons * va1ue
structures (Burns, 197B, p. 42). Conflict created the
need for leadership and transformational leadership and
exploited it to everyone's benefit. But how? Burns did
not offer many recipes for success. He did point out
that moral leadership must win, not by any means, but by
some means (p. 170).
Approaching leadership in this manner, with an eye
to exploiting conflict, also led to the leader's success
in dominating change (Burns, 1963). The
transformational leader sought change, of course, but never just any change, or never change for its own sake. And herein lay the secret of the transformational
1eader:
The secret of transformational leadership is the
capacity of leaders to have their goals clearly and
firmly in mind, to fashion new institutions
relevant to these goals, to stand back from the
immediate events and day-to-day routines and
understand the potential and consequences of
change. (Burns, 1984, p. 103)
Resolution of conflict into permanent change was the transformational leader's trademark. Evidences of this kind of change, however, diminished by the twists of p o litic a l gerrymandering that is so common to p o litic s, was sought from the Secretaries of the Department of
Education.
Transformational leadership was, then, intellectual, revolutionary, reformatory, and, most of a ll, moral. The demands made on the leader by Burns seemed almost academic. He admitted that leadership was a ship at sea without rudder, anchor, or navigating instruments. Yet he called on leaders to evidence a truly remarkable form of leadership, leadership that, as has been said, bordered on the messianic. Burns was not opposed to such formulations himself:
The essence of transformational leadership is the
capacity to adapt means to ends to shape and reshape institutions and structures to achieve
broad human purposes and moral aspirations. The
dynamic of such leadership is recognizing expressed
and unexpressed wants among potential followers,
bringing them to fu lle r consciousness of their
needs, and converting consciousness of needs into
hopes and expectations, and ultimately into
feelings of entitlement that can be transmitted
into demands among the p o litic a l system, including
the original leadership. (Burns 1984, pp. 102-103)
Transformational leadership, as defined by Burns, was morally purposeful and personally elevating for leaders and followers (Burns, 1978). It was real change that directed people's lives to some determined, but morally useful, end. Burns (1978) also argued that the federal government (the necessary changes having been made) provided the best opportunity for transformational leadership to flourish to the benefit of many.
This brief review of leadership study literatu re placed the evidence for a study of leadership styles of the Department of Education Secretaries in the appropriate context. It was now possible to address questions such as; Were the leadership styles of the secretaries transactional in nature? If yes, had they chosen that style out of necessity, or u tility ? Were they transformational in nature, and if so, what major, epoch-making changes could be pointed to, to substantiate the claim of transformational leadership?
This left one last piece of evidence to be put into place for this study: the philosophies of education. At f ir s t sight it may seem that philosophies of education were extraneous to this study. But upon reflection, it should be seen that animating a leadership style was a philosophy of life (in this case, education) that, in effect, predetermined leadership style. This study denied that leadership can take place in a vacuum apart from all other considerations that make up the fabric of life . It was important to this study to see what animated leadership style. Were philosophies important and how? What were they, and did they figure largely into policy-identification and implementation? In order to answer these questions, it was necessary to lay the proper foundation for such questions to be answered. It was to those foundations that this study now turned.
Philosophy of Education
Within the last two decades, the view of the philosophy of education has taken a dramatic turn.
Before the 1960s, educational philosophies, though repeatedly called for by Dewey (1966) and Brubacher
(1939, 1944), and, it must be admitted, by others such as Rousseau and M ill much e a rlie r, were relegated to academic circles alone. Even though it was generally agreed that everyone possessed one, articulation of them was reserved to arm-chair deliberations. This was not always so. In Plato fRepub 1 ic l . the state was to be ordered through education, the state its e lf governed by a philosopher-king, a kind of super-educator. In
Brubacher, it was more than a synonym for a theory of education. Dewey found the strongest link between a philosophy of education and the goals of education,t
Although it was found that the term "philosophy of education" had come to mean "practically anything from a wel1-a rtic u 1ated metaphysics of knowledge to the vaguest expression of attitudes toward, say, the public school system . , . " i t was not taken to mean that in this study (Scheffler, 1973, p. 9). Rather, a philosophy of education was taken to mean the manner in which education was conceived, the animating w ill behind It, the theory of knowledge suffusing it, the meaning of the life of the mind in human society, and how the values and knowledge it held important were passed on to others.
The place of a philosophy of education continued to
'. Dewey made this link most formidable. His hand was most prominent in the Humanist Manifesto (1933) He has, in fact, been charged with nearly full authorship. No other document has influenced public education more than has this document. Its fiercely anti-religious sentiment has led some scholars (Neuhaus, 1984) to mark it as being largely responsible for making possible the "naked public square" in education. be of great importance. Educators were encouraged at every turn to form one (Pulliam, 1987; Ozmon & Craver,
1986; Rippa, 1988), or to marshall their intellectual resources together to name what they own.
Unfortunately, not a ll educators were aware of the problem, or for the need to resolve one's own (Heslep,
1981). It nevertheless resided in the subconscious, guiding and directing, with or without the permission of the individual will. The fact of the matter was that a philosophy of education, while not always genuinely philosophical, emerged from the educator in a rapid evolution and became intertwined with goals and aspirations, and also with designs for the future of education.
The reasons for this were not too hard to understand. As Churchill said,
[T]hose who are possessed of a d e fin ite body of
doctrine and of deeply rooted convictions . . .
w ill be in a much better position to deal with the
shifts and surprises of daily a ffa irs than those
who are merely taking short views and indulging
th eir natural impulses as they are evolved by what
they read from day to day. (Burns, 1965, p. 338)
Churchill understood what experience proved: that those who mull over in th eir minds those things that are of great moment tend to be much better at goal-attainment than those who are buffeted about by any wind of doctrine. The transactional leader may, in fact, be such a person who cannot, because of the nature of the leadership equation, be able to muster any more than day-to-day convictions. By contrast, the transformational leader may be the one who follows the philosophical beat of his internal drum.
Chesterton admitted that "There are some people-- and I am one of them--who think that the most practical and important thing about a man is still his
[philosophy] of the universe" (1950, p. 7), Although the way in which one views the universe has often led to categorization and pigeon-holing, it is nevertheless essential to understanding the man.
A philosophy of education "means an analytical treatment of education together with an attempt to relate i t in a certain way to metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology" (Price, 1962, p. 9). This most likely w ill not be always present to the conscious mind. But it w ill be present in the subconscious mind.
Individuals do not determine the courses of their lives entirely in a pell-mell fashion.
Philosophy was seen by Wahlquist (1942) as an attempt to make life intelligent, and therefore education could not escape from being a part of it .
Arnold saw it as an attempt to see lif e in a steady fashion, to take in the whole picture of life, not just
its individual strokes.
The development of a philosophy of education was
virtually ineluctable. Jones (1911) argued that
education was a process in which a person came to
realize the values of lif e (p. 1). This was simply
another way of saying that education was a means of
explaining to oneself a philosophy of living. It was
also a moral activity (Bantock, 1965; Kilpatrick, 1933).
The question of values, then, has always been primary.
But a philosophy of education, while not precisely
the same as a philosophy of lif e , animated how one
learned what one has learned (Brumbaugh & Lawrence,
1963), It was also a means of sorting out life's
mysteries: " If fundamental notions about man, thought,
nature, human nature, and so on, are strange to us, we
can only settle our differences by political force,
economic pressure, or irration al persuasion" (Brumbaugh
& Lawrence, 1963, p. 4). Educational philosophy
provided the vehicle for understanding the world as it
appeared, and for understanding ourselves in relation to
that world knowledge.
Educational philosophy, by its very nature, must
"examine the fundamental assumptions about the nature of man and society which underlie educational practice"
(Brumbaugh & Lawrence, 1963, p. 3). That philosophy then suffused all that we said or did, all that we determined to do. It was a lodestar for the essence that was the self.
The act of educating was also seen to embody the act of philosophizing. Bantock (1965) wrote;
When we educate, we inevitably work in terms of
certain assumptions about human p o ten tiality and
human good; behind the practices we approve or the
recommendations we make lie usually unexpressed
views on the nature and function of the mind, on
the vanity and the scope of human "need" in
development, on the re la tiv e value to be assigned
to differen t areas of knowledge. (p. 19)
Those "unexpressed views" were at once the force and the drive of the "system" of education, and the manner in which it was pursued. This had obvious ramifications for the Department of Education Secretaries. What drive animated th eir wills? How did they "see" education, and what "unexpressed views" determined the shape or the vehicle that eventually carried the federal educational w ill forward?
Whether these educational philosophies were always consciously present in the minds of the secretaries did not matter in this study. The fact of the matter was seen, as Kleinig (1982) pointed out, that philosophies of education did not exist in a vacuum. They added and subtracted from the milieu in which they were found.
What was more, they did have consequences on the
possessor, and in profoundly subtle, but devastating!y
vast ways:
[0]ne must take into account the deep psychic
anxiety, the extraordinary prevalence of neurosis,
which make our age unique. The typical modern has
the look of the hunted. He senses that we have
lost our grip on reality. This, in turn, produces
disintegration, and disintegration leaves
impossible that kind of reasonable prediction by
which men, in eras of sanity, are able to order
th eir lives. And the fear accompanying it unlooses
the great disorganizing force of hatred, so that
states are threatened and wars ensue. Few men
today feel certain that war w ill not wipe out their
children’s inheritance; and even if this evil is
held in abeyance, the individual does not rest
easy, for he knows that the Juggernaut technology
may twist or destroy the pattern of life he has
made for himself. A creature designed to look
before and after finds that to do the latter has
gone out of fashion and that to do the former is
becoming impossible. (Weaver, 1948, p. 16)
The manner in which we chose to educate ourselves and others often determined for us the fa c ilit y in which we would be able to deal with our inner fears, and the
fears which the world thrust upon us. Thus, a Marxist
looking at the world at large would minimize freedom; a
democrat would adulate over i t . The difference was
fundamental to the way life would be viewed, and the way
humans would have social and economic commerce with one
another.
Philosophies of education were, as Lipman and Sharp
(1978) pointed out, virtually purely individual matters.
They were not something that one could provide for
another. They were courses of action that were
acquired, from the bits and pieces of the fabric of the
intellectual world that were placed, at last, almost mosaic-like, into a pattern that one has firmly at
times, but more often vaguely in mind, often, a
philosophy of education was found to be made up of
intuitions of lif e , small inner voices that demand the mind's attention, and require the individual to bring
action into concert with mental behavior. It was thought that those intuitions were the material of one's philosophy of education.
Jeffreys (1971) argued this line of reasoning
exactly. Though separate, a philosophy of life and a philosophy of education were also similar because:
What we believe about education implicitly affects
our beliefs about everything else. The end and means of education must be seen in relation to the
ultimate problem of life .... Whereas, from our
point of view, education is a specialized study,
with its own technicians, and is the business of
experts, from another point of view, education is
everyone's business and involves everything that
living involves. (p. 3)
The issue of what affected the life of the mind could not have been more straight-forwardly stated for the sake of this study. Philosophy of education affected all of life because it was about life , it was about what living was about, at every level. Even children have shown remarkable adaptability in philosophy (Lipman &
Sharp, 1978).
A philosophy of education was found to be a specific branch of philosophy, but not in such a way that it could divorce its e lf from that which was the very lifeblood of philosophy; for example, ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, and the like (Strike & Egen,
1978). This may help to explain why one's view of the world, and one's philosophy of education intersected so frequently. Woods (1972) called a philosophy of education really a subset or branch of philosophy.
Peters (1973), in an attempt to clarify the matter, thought that there was a distinction between education as knowing and education as training. But both were still under the rubric of a philosophy of education.
Pratte (1971) saw the education of philosophy as describing "worthwhile education" (p. 13).
This was what Dewey (1966) attempted to do when he linked philosophy and a general theory of education.
Education was for Dewey a process, and that process naturally involved philosophy, the infrastructure upon which the education hung, or was held together. Though later lost on disciples, Dewey, either by accident or design, allowed his approach to become a methodology
(Lipman & Sharp, 1978). This led to unnatural conclusions, and forced a dry patina of confusion that f i t over the back of education theory.
"What is basically wrong with our public school education," wrote Chew (1970),
is its theoretical and philosophical basis, if any
It may be presumptuous to suppose there re a lly is
any philosophy of education among our schoolmen,
generally speaking. All of these people, however,
have been run through the m ill of a teacher
education college and have learned the system.
They have been subjugated to "method of education.'
(p. 20)
This proved an especially important point. It may be argued that this was a problem from another discussion, namely, the malaise of education. But it was eminently appropriate to consider it here. For it was this
"methods" approach that had cut off educational philosophy so that many have one, but do not know what form it takes, or how it shapes th eir own views.
Following Dewey's disciples, rather than Dewey himself in this case, many practitioners formed a method of education as wholly separate from a philosophy, but allowed it to masquerade as one (Chew, 1970). It was important to attempt to make that distinction in this study in order to see if method had supplanted philosophy.
McMurrin (1962) a former Commissioner of Education, contended that i t was "entirely obvious that what passes today as the philosophy of education is sheer nonsense"
(p. 629). He also saw the importance of removing from the educational foreground that nonsense. MacIntyre
(1981) was far more alarmist. He said that the ability to make moral judgments had been lost because the a b ility to distinguish issues philosophically had f ir s t been lost. The failure to philosophize may lead to muddle and incoherence, and even greater dangers
(MacIntyre, 1981; Wilson, 1979). Philosophy of education was not considered here to be a series of methods or approaches, or methodologies, but a panoply of thought which covered the whole of the process.
The point served to show that philosophies of education were not mere games people played. One did not blindly choose one philosophy over another, but chose A over B, because A appeared to him to be superior to B (Wilson, 1979). That served further to distinguish between those who casually reflected about meaning in human lif e , and those who genuinely engaged in defining it and coming to understand i t (Passmore, 1980).
Power (1982) pointed out:
It is the business of educational philosophy . . .
to set fundamentally human standards for education,
standards worthy of human nature, and to develop an
educational process confined by the s ta b ility and
dependable knowledge about a real material and
sp iritual world wherein these standards can be
realized .... Every educationat judgment [made]
is infused with and dominated by this
interpretation of human nature, (p.22)
This spiritualization of education harksback to the framers of the Constitution and th eir acceptance of a
Judaeo-Christian view of the world. Lipman said, "For the more men have been separated from the spiritual heritage which binds together, the more has education become egoist, careerist, specialist, and asocial"
(Maccoby, 1981, p. 36). If educational philosophies were predominately sp iritu al in nature, then what those philosophies did would be monumentally important, whether or not the "owner" considered them to be so. In a federal context, philosophies of education that were spiritual in nature and held by federal employees, could have enormous repercussions.
How so? Powers pointed out that the role of educational philosophies was "to discuss man's nature, capacities, and responsibilities" in an effort to find out "dependable intellectu al and moral knowledge" and finally "to map out the direction education should take"
(p. 10). Thus, any educational philosophy had profound influence. It was no longer a matter of, "This is my opinion," but a matter in which opinions, settled into fact, could change the course of the educational flux.
Dewey understood this perhaps better and certainly before anyone else did. Because he understood it so well, he was able to change the course of education in an entire nation and move it away from what had made education important, to a place where education could rule. A whole generation of individuals grew up betting that education would solve a host of world problems
(Neuhaus, 1984).
Dewey could not have stated his views on the matter more clearly than to say,
What philosophy has been unconsciously, without
knowing it , or intending i t , and, so to speak,
under cover, it must henceforth be openly and deliberately. When it is acknowledged that under
disguise of dealing with ultimate reality,
philosophy has been occupied with the precious
values embedded in social trad itio n, that it has
sprung from a clash of social ends and from a
conflict of inherited institutions, with
contemporary tendencies, it w ill be seen that the
task of future philosophies is to clarify men's
ideas as to the social and moral strifes of their
own day. (Dewey, 1957, p. 20)
Dewey led a movement that redefined the philosophy of
America. It was to exclude the religious and focus on the civic and academic (Neuhaus, 1984).
Philosophies of education were found to be settled into an agreed upon number. Most books which covered the philosophies of education followed roughly the same pattern in identification and number. Idealism,
Realism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, Zen,
Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Pragmatism, Essential ism
Reconstructionism, Behaviorism, Existentialism, Analytic philosophical education, and Marxism were found to be discussed most frequently in the literature (Ozmon &
Craver, 1986; Cole, 1972; Howick, 1971; Pratte, 1971;
Brameld, 1970; Cahn, 1970; Buford, 1969; Rosen, 1968;
Butler, 1966, 1951; Dupuis, 1966; McDonald, 1965; Wingo,
1965; Copelston, 1962; Weber, 1960; Wilds and Lottich, 167
1961; Lodge, 1947; Russell, 1945; and Brubacher, 1939).
Some were found to cover only a half dozen or more; others treated them all and a few that were tied to the epoch of the individual publication.
While this study considered any philosophy of education that might be espoused by a Department of
Education Secretary, it was clearly designed to portray those interstices with the more prominent philosophies, namely, realism, idealism, pragmatism, reconstruction ism, behaviorism, Marxism, Christianity, essentialism, and existentialism. Eclecticism was also looked for, since it appeared that the modern mind was often, owing to social and p o litical pressures, less likely to abide a discriminating selectivity of ideas than it would embrace a rechauffe or "casserole" of ideas that could be, with greater or lesser difficulty, melded into a mold of thought.
Philosophies of education were not strained beyond their most typical definitions in this study. An
Idealist, therefore, was taken to describe an educator who believed that ideas were the only true re a lity , and that ideas, in Richard Weaver's (1948) words, "have consequences." They were not mere tr ifle s by which mind games could be played in arm-chair comfort, but ideals worth fighting for, and, ultimately, values worth dying for. Idealism also included Christian idealism as defined and portrayed by Augustine. Id ealist educators sought to establish a firm understanding of knowledge but couched that understanding in the modality of everlasting value, such as spiritual truth, which will transform character.
Realism was taken to mean that body of educational thought which held that re a lity , along with knowledge and value, existed outside of, or was independent of the mind. The contrast between realism and idealism, i t was thought, could not be better depicted than in the famous painting of Raphael's titled "The Academy." In it we see Plato, the idealist, gesturing to the heavens, while
Aristotle, the realist, gestures to the earth below.
Realism also embodied for this study Christian realism and was therefore subsumed under the larger heading.
The realist educator believed in moral and character development, and thought the curricula for such a regime could be named.
Realism also included as one of its subcategories, essentialism, as embodied by the work of William Bagley.
Although, occasionally included as a separate philosophy, essentialists were forging basically realist notions in response to Dewey's progressivism (Ozmon &
Craver, 1986). In this study, essentialist-educators were seen to be those who favored tried and tested s k ills , facts, and knowledge inherited through the modern culture and traditions. Back-to-basic educators
and those who favored a core curriculum were seen to be
"pure” realists.
Pragmatism was held to be that body of thought
which originated in Charles Pierce, but had its roots in
the works of Bacon and Locke. Pragmatism can hardly be
distinguished from secular humanism in its fetish for
evolving a new way of looking at the world, a way that
will "fit" better with the revolution of ideas that was
caused by the Renaissance and, more completely, the
Enlightenment. Educators who were fundamentally
pragmatists were found to believe in education as the
arbiter elegantiae of lif e . Education was something of
a Savior. Experience played a major role in the
education of the child. John Dewey was the
quintessential pragmatist educator.
Reconstructionists such as Brameld and Counts, and
to a greater extent Dewey and Marx, signified for this
study the boundaries of reconstructionism. It sought to
define its e lf in the educational framework by seeking to
change lif e through education. Education was seen to be
a revolutionary vehicle and, in the hands of the right
"philosopher-kings" could be made to implement profound
social and political changes. Reconstructionist
educators were often found to be willing to overthrow the existing order to achieve real or imagined, but previously defined, social aims.
Behaviorist educators were defined as those who
shared the basic views of B. F. Skinner. Behaviorists
generally believed that the student could be conditioned
into performing as one desired the student to perform.
While behaviorism was seen to employ more psychological
notions than philosophical ones, it was also seen to be
one of the major tools of educators in forming how
knowledge was transmitted to others today.
Existentialism, with the death of Sartre in the
early 1980s, and the tragic death of Camus some decades
before, had lost much of its moral ground. With the
passing of the 1960s (a flower bed, lit e r a lly , of much
of the existential predispositions) and the realization
of existentialism's failure, mortal blows were struck
doubly hard to the in teg rity of this philosophical
system. Existential educators were seen by this study
to be more concerned with basic questions of life rather
than with some body of knowledge per se. Although weakened by the passing of two of its giants and a
decade which saw, for the most part, broken promises and
pinchbeck gains, existentialism still had perficient
qualities for it to be included in this study.
Although leas defensibly retained, also included in
this study were Marxism and Marxist educators. In an
age of glasnost and perestroika, two new Soviet trends which acknowledged a failed Marxist agenda, Marxism still had an inscrutable attraction for educators, especially academics and in tellectu als. Even though no
Marxist-cum-Leninist economy had proved successful
(Rydenfelt, 1984), the philosophy of Marxism still attracted educators who hope for a social utopia.
Education for the Marxist educator existed in a dialectical process to bring about the movement from feudalism to capitalism, to socialism, to communism.
The reason for attempting to descry these philosophies in the thought of the Department of
Education Secretaries was obvious. Because philosophy was concerned with wholeness (Wingo, 1965) and education was considered an ethical act (Maritain, 1943, 1962;
Cahn, 1970), that philosophy which animated the intellectual w ill of the secretaries could be said to direct and guide th eir policies. It was not considered impossible, but on the contrary, highly likely, that, for example, an id ealis t educator would not be likely to pursue a policy that stood inim ically opposed to idealist tendencies. Such policies, were they not jettisoned outright, would in fact be shaped and reforged until they could be brought forth in an educational framework more compatible with philosophical principles.
Brubacher (1939) held that educational philosophy had both function and process, and had epistemological
and metaphysical bases or foundations. These and
considerations by Ozmon & Craver (1986) seemed to
indicate that the philosophical educational bias of the
secretaries may have had as much influence upon them as
leadership and the history of the relationship between
education and the federal government. All three foci--
education and federal government, leadership, and
educational philosophies--appeared to be elements that were at once outvying the others for precedence. While
it cannot be argued that each person is subject to his
or her philosophy, it must be admitted that no one can
long exist without listening to some aspect of the
philosophical voice within (Ibsen, 1941; Kierkegaard
1959; Weaver, 1948; Schlossberg; 1983, Btamires, 1963;
Lewis, 1958).
Educational philosophy seemed also to guide
educational purpose (Cohen & Travers, 1970; Gutman,
1987; Adler, 1982). It became quite obvious that
perceived purpose in education was somehow manipulated
by whatever philosophy held sway in a given educator's mind. Philosophy of education could be subjugated to
educational purpose at times, but by and large it was
found that purpose, unless for strateg ically, p o litic a lly important reasons for a given policy, often
fe ll in line behind educational philosophy. Purpose was subsequent, or subservient, to educational philosophies.
This in no way was seen to undermine the importance of educational purpose. The debate about educational purpose had been bruited about for many years (Rippa,
1908; Gutman, 1987; Rubin, 1980; Dunwell & Wendell,
1976; Cohen & Travers, 1970; and Levine & Havighurst,
1971, to name only a few of many). It is unlikely that it w ill be resolved in the future. But educational purpose was guided by educational philosophy and that purpose was articulated, in American terms, in democracy and the continuation of this Republic (Cohen & Travers,
1970).
Nakosteen (1965) fashioned it in this way:
The historic performance of education, in contrast
to that of the nineteenth-century Europe elite and
aristocratic systems, spells out in a unique way
the faith and the meaning of democracy and the
realization of the American dream. (p. 684)
Nakosteen cautioned that reformers not forget how much a fabric of the educational purpose democracy is, and that reforms that seek to ruin that fabric should be excluded. Nakosteen also saw that in a democratic atmosphere, every philosophy of education was competing with each other to shape educational practice. This shed a bright light on the importance of these concerns of educational purpose and philosophy. Cohen and Travers (1970) saw educational purpose in
America as undergirding a society based on justice, not privilege, in which responsibility and freedom were shared by a ll. Counts (1969) held that "complete im partiality is u tterly impossible, that schools must shape attitu de, develop tastes, and even impose ideas"
(p. 19).
Gutman (1987) argued that democratic education was a political as well as an educational ideal. He further argued that education set the stage for democratic problems. It was not that solutions were already presented before problems were understood, but that resolution of them was "compatible with a commitment to democratic values" (p. 11).
Adler (1982) was more harsh. Educational purpose ought to be tied to the objectives of democracy, yet that we continually failed in that regard. He saw the schools as fa ilin g the public trust i f they fa iled in providing equal opportunity, and in achieving truly democratic purposes,
[T]he democratic promise of equal educational
opportunity half fulfilled, is worse than a promise
broken. It is an ideal betrayed. Equality of
educational opportunity is not, in fact, provided
if it means no more than taking all the children
into the public schools for the same number of hours, days, and years. If once there they are
divided into the sheep and the goats, into those
destined solely for toil and those destined for
economic and political leadership and for a quality
of lif e to which a ll should have access, then the
democratic purpose has been undermined by an
inadequate system of public schooling. (p. 5)
In other words, educational purpose that was not
closely allied to democracy and all that it entailed,
fa iled not only in purpose, but also in knowledge. How
well the Department of Education Secretaries understood
their educational philosophies and how they meshed their
educational philosophies into policies and action was an
important part of the investigation of this study. If
the purpose of education meant at the federal level
nothing more than funding programs, it might well be
considered to have dislodged the cornerstone of this
country's educational building.
Educational purpose and educational philosophies
combined to perform a task that unfolded in educational
practice and policy. In reviewing the policies and the
leadership of the Department of Education Secretaries,
it was imperative that the study touched on these
issues. How were they influenced by these things? Were they influenced at all? What prevented their influence at different junctures? Hullfish (1953), in this connection, pointed out:
Schools may not make the c ritic a l difference in the
immediate a ffa irs of man but they do in the long
run make a difference, for good or ill. They are
never re a lly neutral. They stand, in th eir freedom
or in their subservience, as a test of the health
of the culture as a whole. When they are on the
side of good— when they are aware of themselves as
institutions created by men who are free and who
wish to remain so— they stand, moreover, as a
symbol to remind those who may fa lte r. As they
serve these functions they also serve the young
person in his growth giving him the opportunity to
experience these ways of living he will be later
asked to represent in his citizenship. (p. 218)
Once again the argument is brought fu ll c ircle.
From the debate over education and relig io n , to
education and the state, to educational philosophy and
purpose. Nothing is more capable of more good, or of more evil, than this system of 3tate controlled,
federally supervised, education. From its beginning,
that system has had the power to change lives, to form opinions. Hard as it may be to do so, we would do well to remember Dale Owen's (Rippa, 1988) "excessive
statement" about education: how schools must direct not only the studies of children, but also th eir occupations and amusements. It was impossible to deny that power to the educational system in America. For how we think about education eventually affected not only how we learned, but also how we viewed the world in which we lived, and what we were w illin g to learn from i t .
No other single public system in the United States had the opportunity to touch the minds and hearts of nearly every American born. In spite, or perhaps because, illite ra c y was s t i l l prevalent in America, the
American education system continued to exercise its influence over Americans. It did not always teach them how to read, or write, but it never failed to pass on to them a philosophical ethos. How that philosophy was guided and directed at government's highest level, how it was conceived and mandated to perform, should be of the utmost importance to every citizen; its importance, second only to the country's physical safety and defense.
Summary of the Literature Review
This lengthy lite ra tu re review served to highlight the important aspects of education that this study undertook to examine. These were three: the link between education and the federal government; leadership styles; and philosophies of education.
It was shown that, from the beginning, our nation valued education. The Tenth Amendment of the B ill of Rights made certain that education would be a matter for the states to decide. The "Common Defense" and "General
Welfare" clauses of the Constitution (A rticle I, section
8) have come to be recognized as allowing for a ll, or nearly a ll of the federal involvement in education.
With the exception of Hamilton and Madison, it is clear that most of the framers of the Constitution did not understand these phrases as referring to federal powers to be exercised with respect to education.
Four reasons supplied answers why education was le ft out of the Constitution. These were, the idea of government as se lf-lim itin g , the power of government the states already had established for themselves, the nature of the debate between the Federalists and the
Anti-Federa1is ts , and the link between education and religion. Government was s e lf - 1imiting for the framers and therefore the Constitution served as a document to
1imit the powers of the federal government. The states had already established education as a right of the states and would not submit easily to losing that power to an untried system of government, a system that its proponents had argued would not be arrogating to its e lf previously acquired powers of the states.
The debate between the Federalists and the Anti-
Federalists was fierce and often physically brutal. The idea of a federalized republic was not an easy one to sell. In order to get it through, the Federalists were content to offer only those things they thought had every chance of being accepted. Education was simply not one of them. Finally, religion and education had always been tied together by Federalists and Anti-
Federalists because both taught about life . Since both groups were wary of any government interference with religion, they were equally wary about i t with education. The tension that exists today between religion and education was found to be a modern invention, brought about by the federal government's insistence to move in matters regarding education, yet not teach didactically about life .
This examination of federal matters also led to a review of the history of the Department of Education, from its inception in 1867, to its creation with
Cabinet-level status in 1979 by then President James
Carter. Along the way, important issues were brought out in high r e lie f. These included debates about the department, the rise of the Bureau of Education, commissioners of the Bureau, the creation of the Office of Education, commissioners of that o ffice , and, fin a lly , the creation of the Department of Education and a brief review of the work of the four secretaries.
Second, leadership styles studied were viewed from the vantage point of the taxonomy outlined by James McGregor Burns. Burns showed that p o litic a l leadership often fell into two categories (with numerous subcategories), transactional and transformational.
Because this study focused on the leadership of the
Department of Education by its secretaries (necessarily p o litic a l), the Burns taxonomy seemed especially appropr i ate.
Third and last, the literature survey reported the findings regarding philosophies of education held by educators and th eir importance. This included a definition of the phrase, "philosophy of education," the importance of what that phrase represented to educators and the educated, and a brief review of the major philosophies of education. CHAPTER 3
Methodology
Selection of the appropriate methodology for a
research project was crucial (Borg & Gall, 1983;
Krippendorff, 1980; Rosengren, 1981; and Lasswell,
Leites, & Associates, 1968). This research project was
no exception. The selection of an appropriate
methodology was c ritic a l to this project because of the
qualitative nature of the study.
In the case of qualitative studies, the research
fie ld remained open, not only to choice of methodology,
but also to controversy (Krippendorff, 1980). With the
broad division of content analysis, there were a number
of different types. Janis (Lasswell, Leites, &
Associates, 1968) id entified three major areas:
pragmatical content analysis, semantical content
analysis (with three further subdivisions), and sign-
vehicle analysis.
Pragmatical content analysis involved procedures which classified signs according to th eir probable effects. Semantical content analysis involved the classification of signs according to meanings. Sign- vehicle analysis classified content according to the psychophysical properties of the signs (Lasswell, Leites
& Associates, 1968, p. 57).
Under the second heading were distinguished designations (frequencies with which certain persons or
groups were referred to); attribution (frequencies with
which certain references were made that characterized a
certain group, person, or thing); and assertion (the
frequency with which certain objects were thematically
designated). This study was classified as a semantical
content study that employed assertion analysis.
The strain between qualitative (semantic, or
analytical) and quantitative content analyses was not
imaginary. Much of this stemmed from the Lasswell-
Lazarsfe1d-Berelson trad itio n (Rosengren, 1981). For
this study, qualitative content analysis was preferred
over quantitative content analysis. Qualitative content
analysis of the data was appealing for several reasons.
F irs t, the nature of the data, being collected on
nationally-known figures made unlikely any chance of
employing paper and pencil tests. Furthermore, it was
deemed that even if such tests were taken, the
disclosure of information might be jumbled amid a
thousand other duties. Another person might even be
assigned the task of f illin g out a given questionnaire.
The literature substantiates this point in trying to
find out about notables and the unlikelihood that they will, in fact, submit to paper tests (Krippendorff,
1980; Rosengren, 1981; and Adams & Schreibman, 1978).
Second, the nature of the data proved to be such that a content analysis seemed most appropriate. Since
the object of this study was to investigate leadership
styles and educational philosophies# and the crux of the
data revolved about printed speeches, annual reports,
and interviews, an approach that would allow the
examination of textually contrived meanings was
essential. Content analysis was found appealing because
i t achieved that hoped for scheme. Compared to other
analytical tools, content analysis was admittedly a
relatively new instrument. It had proven its
usefulness, however, in studies similar to this one.
Indeed, the use of content analysis as a term does
not appear until late in the language of research.
According to Krippendorff (1980), the term was not in
general use until about 1961, But i t was the
terminology that was found to be recent in the
lite ra tu re . The idea of approaching materials to assess
them qualitatively rather than quantitatively was found
to have been around for more than one hundred years.
The f ir s t such analysis was performed in the 1700s, when
the Church was out to protect its interests
(Krippendorff, 1980).
One of the important uses of content analysis had
been the generation of culture signs that pointed out or
described beliefs, values, ideologies, or culture
systems (Weber, 1985; Melischek, Rosengren, & Stappers, 1984) and Namenwirth & Lasswell, 1970). The point of departure for this study had these approaches uppermost in mind.
Analysis, as Chambers (OED, 1971) showed, was a most exacting way to truth, and a manner in which truth could be dissected. Content analysis followed closely on the heels of this definition. Berelson (1952) called it "a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication" (p. 18). Adams and Schreibman (1978) described it as a way of testing effects, processes, and impacts (pp. 26-35). Janis (Lasswell, Leites, &
Associates, 1968) described it as a:
technique a) for the classification of the sign-
vehicles. b) which re lie s solely upon the .judgments
of an analyst or group of analysts as to which
sign-vehides fall into which categories, c) on the
basis of explicit1v formulated rules. d) provided
that the analyst's judgments are regarded as
reports of a scientific observer. (p. 55)
Weber (1985) saw it as "a research methodology that u tilize d a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text" (p. 9). Krippendorff (1980) saw it in three ways: as a pursuit that was "fundamentally empirical," transcending "conventional notions of content as object of concern" and focused on the symbolic as well, and as a developing methodology in its own right (pp. 9-10).
More specifically, he called it "a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context" {p, 21). Because content analysis attempted to secure meaning through the context in which that meaning is secured (interviews, documents, papers, articles), it was further thought to be the most appropriate for this study.
This brought up another important point in content analysis: meanings did not have to be shared by all analyzers in order for the methodology to be acceptable, valid, and reliable (Krippendorff, 1980). Poems conveyed more than one meaning to a wide audience. Did this mean that only one meaning was valid, only one reliable? Of course not. There could be approaches to poems that were not meaningful, or that strayed too far from the w riter's intent. In the same way, there were approaches in content analysis that led one astray, but methodological approaches corrected for possible diversions from the beaten path.
Yet a third point arose about the definitions of content analysis. If content analysis was about anything, it was about communication. The trad itio nal
S-M-C-R communication model of sender, message, channel, and receiver illustrated the matter of content analysis e x p lic itly (Hanson, 1985). Communication barriers, filtering, officialese, and the like were all elements that entered into the communication process (Hanson,
1985; Qoldhaber, 1979; Rogers & Agarwala-Rogers, 1976) and became staple diets for the content analyst whose job it was to make sense out of the communications. A counting procedure would not prove much in the way of usable data, unless it was cast against another, more te llin g canvass of meaning.
Finally, a fourth point about content analysis was found to be most important. Content analysis focused on unstructured data. Data that were structured included questionnaires, laboratory conditions, pencil and paper tests, and the like (Krippendorff, 1980). Unstructured data included documents, editorials, reports, video- tapings, interviews, and the like from which must come information that will be structured to arrive at conclus ions.
This study followed the common understanding of information in the literature of content analysis studies. Krippendorff (1980) and Lasswell, Leites, and
Associates (1968) have both provided a design. That design followed the usual paths:
— selected symbol list or statements whose
occurrence was to be recorded;
--defined the lis t when necessary (see below)
--selected recording unit and the specified context --trained readers (or coders) i f necessary
— collected and processed data (Lasswell, Leites, &
Associates, 1968, pp. 113-114)
The literature on content analysis made plain that
content analysis must be about something exp licit
(Krippendorff, 1980). This study chose leadership
styles and educational philosophies of the Department of
Education Secretaries. Further, content analysis
required that certain procedures be performed.
Krippendorff (1980) outlined these as unitization,
sampling, recording, data reduction, inference, and
analysis (p. 54). Following that prescription, the
pages which follow indicated how this study patterned
its e lf after these recommendations.
Uniti zation
Although it had been argued that the unit of
examination can be anything the researcher chose it to
be about, it must also be about something that can be
analyzed (Krippendorff, 1980). Content analysis can
include enormous amounts of data. Landis and Burtt
(1924) used over 400 conversations for their study.
Foster (1938) studied more than 8,000 editorials in his
investigation of how education was treated in
newspapers. Krippendorff (1980) reported that Qerbner
and his associates examined more than 10,000 fictio nal characters on television. The unitizing of materials in content analysis was described by Krippendorff as taking on three appearances: sampling units, recording units, and context units. Sampling units were units drawn from the raw population data. For this study, they constituted the vast body of raw data about the secretaries: all the speeches, the a rtic le s , the books, the notes, in short, every possible piece of data that could be drawn upon. Sampling must take place from the sampling units
(Krippendorff, 1980, p. 58).
Recording units, as described by Krippendorff, may be thought of as parts of the whole. They were the separately, disambiguated, analyzable parts of the sampling units. They cannot be entirely disambiguated, however, from the sampling unit without inevitably resulting in incoherence. But they can be examined individually, in much the same way that a character in a play can be examined. The character cannot, however, be removed from the play and examined completely apart from the rest of the characters. Recording units used in this study referred to the individual theme of a book, a rtic le , or speech. Knowing how many times, for example, Secretary Bennett mentioned the word
"leadership" as compared to how many times Secretary
Cavazos did, would have thrown very l i t t l e light onto the issues under examination. But being able to categorize parts of each unit into categories, or themes, did prove critical to the analysis that followed. Weber (1985) pointed out that one of the chief values of content analysis was this a b ility to d is till many words of a communication (in this case, speeches, books, articles, and interviews) into a few well-ordered categories.
Context units described recording units, that is, context units were the medium in which the recording units occurred. In this study, that constituted the book, the a rtic le , or the speech its e lf. These differed from the sampling units in that a context unit was the actual book, speech, or a rtic le . A sampling unit was part of a larger whole.
Krippendorff also discussed the various ways of defining units: physical, syntactical, referential, propositional, and thematic. Physical units were books, articles, reports, letters, poems, and the like. They were so large as to be obvious, but too complex to remain in that manner. This study relied primarily on the physical units for meaning: each book, each a rtic le , each speech, each annual report. Krippendorff also pointed out that physical unitizing was the most reliable. But a further description was necessary in the unitization of the material. It was not always possible to approach each unit hoiistically. Syntactical unit description broke down written or spoken materials into words or phrases. This may be the safest way statistically (Krippendorff, 1980) to go, but as Andren (cited as Rosengren, 1981) pointed out, it can also be the least satisfying. Referential units were described as "particular objects, persons, acts, countries, or ideas to which expression refers"
(Krippendorff, 1980, p. G1). A referential approach ruled out any examination of the complexities of natural language and was thus discarded.
Thematic units recognized themes in the unit of description. Although there were inherent dangers in the approach (Krippendorff noted that even experts can be led astray in the identification of themes), the approach had the advantage of singling out common themes and points of intersection. None of the material produced by the secretaries and used in this study was thought to be lacking even one of the theme-categories identified below.
In the case of data collection for this study, it was determined that speeches by the four secretaries, their annual reports produced, government published materials that had nationwide circulation ( i. e ., A
Nation at Risk). authored books, and articles in popular magazines with a readership over 100,000) and scholarly magazines (for a limited and professional readership) would be possible sampling units of examination.
Articles about the secretaries were consulted, but only those which contained direct quotes, and pertained to the research questions, were examined for materials reported in Chapter 4. According to the Office of
Public Affairs, Secretary Hufstedler gave dozens of speeches. Secretaries Bell and Bennett gave even more.
It was reported by the same office that with less than half of 19B9 passed, Secretary Cavazos had delivered a dozen and a half speeches.
The length of the speeches also proved imposing.
Again, according to the Office of Public A ffairs, each of Secretary Hufstedler's speeches ran a little more than two-dozen pages. Each of Secretary Bennett's speeches were longer s t i l l . Secretaries Bell and
Cavazos also had speeches of a sim ilar length. Add to this the thousands of pages in a rtic le s , books, and interviews that covered the corpus of the written and spoken work of the secretaries, and the resulting body of information would have indeed been formidable. A sample of information was in order.
Sam p!ing
The "population of raw data," as Krippendorff
(1980, p. 65) called it, was the area of speeches, annual reports, books, and artic les described above.
The reasons for this necessity have already been described, Krippendorff concurred: "The practical need for sampling is to reduce a large volume of potential data to a manageable size" (p. GG). The amount of material was too large to be taken as a whole. Some aspects or component parts, however, were not.
In the case of annual reports, a ll were used.
Secretary Hufstedler produced only one annual report;
Secretary Bell, four; Secretary Bennett, three; and
Secretary Cavazos, one. All annual reports were examined. Only the larger body of work ( i.e . speeches, articles) were included in that material from which a random sample was taken.
This same reasoning was also applied to books published by the secretaries. Secretaries Bell and
Bennett have written one book apiece about th eir work in the department, The national reports, such as A Nation at Risk. were so few, as to also be included, j_n toto. in this part of the sample process.
The a rtic le s , however, were limited to those that could be found by a thorough search of the lite ra tu re of the articles by. the secretaries, and that pertained to th eir work in the Department of Education, or were concerned with education in general1* This naturally
*. This naturally limited or excluded a body of work by Secretary Hufstedler published in a number of law journals. Much of this work pertained to her life as an appeals court judge and were not deemed pertinent here. The same was true for Bennett. Some of his early limited the articles to those which were indexed in some popular or scholarly indexing service: Education Index.
ERIC and its accompanying indices, Pub!ic Affairs
Information Service. Social Science 1ndex. Reader' s
Qujde., Monthly Catalog., General Periodical 1 ndex. Dialog
Information Retrieval Services, and BRS were all examined or accessed. Although the research inctuded examinations of many articles about the secretaries, these were not included in the examination for
leadership styles and educational philosophies, except
in so far as they countered or substantiated a finding.
They were used, in other words, as background materials.
The speeches, however, proved another problem.
Since many of these were also printed in national magazines, it was thought that some would be covered through an a rtic le search. But many speeches were found to be overlooked by the journals, or were reported on rather than printed. Since reportage included its own pitfalls to which ideological bent was but one, for speeches and addresses it was decided that a cluster random sample should be taken from the lis t of all the speeches provided by the library in the Department of work appeared in publications either produced or indexed by the Modern Language Association. That which spoke to how English or American lite ra tu re should be taught was used; but others which discussed texts or argued for certain interpretations of literature were deemed unimportant for this study. This also held true for Cavazos who has published 75 articles on medical topics. Education,
The speeches were listed and numbered. Then, using a table of random numbers, 20% of the speeches were selected. This method provided 203S of those given by each of the four secretaries. The brought up the issue of whether such a sampling would be adequately large.
It was answered by Krippendorff (p. 69). How large must the sample be? "There is no set answer." He pointed out that Stempel (1952) had taken samples of 6, 12, 18,
24, and 48 issues in a content analysis of newspapers.
Increasing the sample size beyond 12 did not make for any more significant results than 18, 24, or 48.
Record i ng
The issue of recording within the units was also an important point to be addressed by Krippendorff and others. Recording of the units here followed the simulation of hypothesis testing. Identified were three major areas in which coders were asked to place information: leadership, educational philosophies, and the relations of the federal government to schooling.
Under leadership the p o ssib ilities were: tended to function under transactional leadership by exchanging what was wanted by the secretary with what was wanted by the other party. The other party was defined as any group or individual who was not associated with the
Department of Education in an employable capacity. Transformational leadership was seen as that style of leadership which "caught up" followers and led them to a level of higher attainment that produced long-lasting, observable change, and that left some easily identified event or program which reflected that change had, in fact, occurred.
Under educational philosophies, the following subheads were used:
I dealism--used ideas to convey concrete
messages. Focused on ideas as the preeminent
concern.
Realism--assumed that a basic attitude or a
basic body of knowledge needed to be taught, or
taught that there was a recognized culture that
should be preserved through the teaching of it .
Pragmat1sm--assumed that education was a
practical matter and focused on what worked, or
processes that were successful, whether or not they
portrayed any specific body of knowledge.
Reconstructionism--assumed education was a
change vehicle for social and p o litic a l processes.
Focused in using education to change society and
restructure it.
Behavior1sm--assumed that education was a
series of desirable or undesirable behaviors that
must be encouraged or rooted out. Relied on specialized experts or individuals, by virtue of
their training, to guide and direct the aims of
education.
Existentialism--assumed that education was a
matter of significant events within the "lived
experience of individuals" (Ozmon & Craver, 1986,
p. 194). How the individual perceived the events
was of utmost importance.
A secondary area of study also classified statements of the secretaries as evidencing an understanding of the historical role of the federal government in education.
This category was subsumed as:
Limited government--assumed that government
should be as limited as possible and that
federalized government was better when it
interfered in the lives of individuals in the least
way possible. Government was seen to provide
"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," but
no more. (Carey, 19B1; Livingston, 1981)
Unlimited government--assumed that government
can help with nearly any human problem and that the
more it helped individuals reach their potential,
the more likely these individuals were to be happy.
It was concerned with " life , liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness" also, but saw government and
its programs as the quickest way to achieve those ends. (Varey, 1981; Livingston, 1981)
There were three coders, including the author. The two outside coders examined the sample of materials and were asked to categorize them according to the headings id entified . Coders were asked to place those units in those areas where they f e lt the descriptions were applicable. If a given sample (an article or book chapter, for example) did not f i t any of the categories, they were asked not to force it into one. Since the degree of intensity within each category was not a matter of investigation, some coders placed the same speech in two or more categories.
The data language chosen for this content analysis was groupings. Groupings under leadership (with two values), under educational philosophies (with six values), and under government (again, with two values).
This was most like White's (1951) eight categories of personal values. The motivation for this was the same as Krippendorff's (1980): the need to consider unequal distances between values of a variable. The distance between transactional and transformational may or may not be the same as the distance between realism or limited government. Neither, it may be said, may the distance between two levels of the philosophy subheads be of equal distance from the others.
The variations on any of the themes did not d iffe r from the trad itional manner in which they were considered in the lite ra tu re . Questions were posed to the Department of Education Secretaries that would e li c it from them answers characteristic of one of the philosophies of education presented, views of government, and leadership styles. Thus, for example, a
Department of Education Secretary who responded to a question about what children should know with a very detailed description of a basic body of knowledge, and framed a very definite parameter of culture, would be said to be exhibiting the characteristics of a realist educator, and would thus be placed into that category.
The same procedure was applied for a ll other categories.
The major design for the study, however, was less like White and more like Briggs (1986). 8riggs used a simulation for hypothesis in which Indians in southwestern states were asked to respond to a number of questions. The idea was to gather an oral tradition and to get a living history. While this study used the traditional approach to data--relying on unstructured, non-reactive speeches and re p o rts --it was thought that the one hour interviews and the follow-up phone conversations, described below, would be most useful.
Interviews
Interviews were conducted with each of the secretaries or his proxy. All the interviews were based
on the same interview guide, with allowances made for
individual flexibility. Secretaries Bennett and Cavazos
would not agree to a fu ll interview. The questions they
agreed to answer were noted in Chapter 4. The same
protocol was used for each interview (Appendix 2) and
the same format was followed. A copy of the protocol
was sent to the secretaries ten days prior to the
interview itself. (t was pointed out, however, that the
questions would not be limited to the protocol alone.
The protocol acted as a guide for the discussions.
Should some side issue raised by a secretary become
evident during an interview, it would be pursued even if
it was not on the protocol.
The conversations were taped. These were
transcribed, proces verba 1. immediately after the
interview. All garbled or jumbled portions of the text
were set off by ellipsis (. . .) preceding a supplied
word or phrase in brackets [ ] , and followed again by
e llip s is (. . .) , if necessary. In most cases, these
notations were not needed.
Construct for Inference
The construct for inference for the study rested on
the established theory that what a person talked about most often was, in fact, of major concern to him. But more than that, this study sought to show that what was spoken about most often, was couched in terms of leadership and philosophies.
This led to the use of contextual experiences to help verify the inferences made from the texts chosen by the systematic sample. Krippendorff (1980) pointed out that such constructs for inference were, to a large degree, subjective in nature. This was argued against here. All s c ie n tific study fe ll victim to the subjectivity of the researcher at one point or another.
But this "victimization" of subjectivity did not cloud the issue entirely. Lewis (1981) pointed out, "The sciences bring to the "facts" the philosophy they claim to derive from them" (p. 59). Although it was recognized that subjectivity did enter into the inferences drawn, it was thought that the element only secured the results rather than invalidated them.
Reliabi1itv
Issues surrounding reliability were important to the content analyst. When absolute frequencies of words or phrases, semantical disambiguations, or parsing of ideas were used, standard s ta tis tic a l procedures were followed. But this study was not interested in arriving at a quantifiable approach at the data, but rather at inferences from given recording units.
Krippendorff argued that "If research results are to be valid, the data on which they are based, the individuals involved in their analysis, and the
processes that yield the results must be reliable" (p.
129). Berelson (1952) argued that reliability was
consensus and that when something was re lia b le , i t was
measuring what i t was meant to measure. Other standard
definitions of reliability constitute basically the same
approach to the task. Kaplan and Goldman (Laswell,
Leites, and Associates, 1968) talked about reliability
as "the constancy of its results as that variable
assumes different values" (p. 83), Holsti (1969) called
i t a measure whereby "repeated measures with the same
instrument on a given sample of data should yield
similar results" (p. 135).
This study achieved r e lia b ilit y by placing the
categories mentioned above before two individuals
trained in content analysis and asking them to assess
the categories chosen. This form of reliability matched most closely with what Krippendorff named under
r e lia b ilit y design as reproducibi1i t y .
"Reproducibility," wrote Krippendorff, "is the
degree to which a process can be recreated under varying
circumstances, at different locations, using different
coders" (Krippendorff, 1980, p. 131). While reproducibi1ity was not the strongest measure of reliability for Krippendorff, it was also seen by him not to be the weakest (Krippendorff, 1980, p. 131). This approach also aligned nicely with Andren’s view of r e lia b ilit y . Although Krippendorff and Andren did not always agree on this issue (Rosengren, 1981), the approach taken here appeared to combine the scientific objectivity sought by Krippendorff, and the open-endedness that allowed for individual interpretation by Andren.
V alid itv
Andren (Rosengren, 1981) pointed out, however, that v a lid ity measures per se, were unproductive when applied to q u alitative or semantic content analysis. Andren put the issue of v a lid ity in the domain of relevancv. the relevancy of the raw data. In attempting to secure validity for the results reported here, interest was focused on the semantical and pragmatical, or product- oriented validity as described by Krippendorff (1980).
What was being sought was an accurate re a lity .
Semantical v a lid ity was described as that form of v a lid ity which "assesses the degree to which a method is sensitive to the symbolic meanings that are relevant within a given context" (Krippendorff, 1980, p. 157).
Semantical v a lid ity can be achieved when the semantics of the data language, in this study the three areas with defined categories, corresponded to that of the source
(Krippendorff, 1980, p. 157). The constructs for this study (the leadership styles, the philosophies of education, and the approaches or views of government) have been designed to e lic it from the secretaries information on these views. All three constructs have been developed from existing literature on the subject matters covered and were common understandings of those areas.
Krippendorff said that pragmatical or product- oriented v a lid ity "assesses how well a method 'works' under a variety of circumstances .... The overall success of a content analysis was established by showing that its results correlate or agree with what they claim to represent" (Krippendorff, 1980, p. 157). Since the constructs were formed in light of existing, verifiable meanings, the product of the method employed naturally yielded the hoped for results.
Janis hinted at this same idea when he wrote,
This . . . is made on the basis of an assumption
derived from the procedures which are used in
determining meaning in everyday life : Unless the
signs have the signification assigned to them by
the content analyst, relationships between the
classifications . . . and the responses of the
sign-interpretations would not be found.
(Rosengren, 1981, p. 71)
Janis (Lasswell, Leites, & Associates, 1968) also made this distinction when he wrote about the difference between verifying categories and verifying meaning.
Because va lid ity and r e lia b ilit y issues revolved around the verification of categories, the methodology would be vali d.
Another reason for choosing this form of v a lid ity was that it provided for verifiable and reliable ways of assessing the data without eliminating the human process necessary in interpretation. Semantical and pragmatical or product-oriented validities used in this study brought together the need for achievement v a lid ity on a semantical basis, and the need to discover the validity of results in an analytically satisfying manner. CHAPTER 4
Findings
Findings of the data were established by content analysis, and relied heavily on the work of Krippendorff
(1980) and Andren (cited in Rosengren, 1981), This method involved selecting a symbol list, defining the list when necessary, establishing recording units, training readers, and collecting and processing the data
(Lasswell, Leites & Associates, 1968).
The selection of a symbol list was defined by the nature of the study itself: leadership styles and educational philosophies, A third issue, the views of government and its role in education as held by the secretaries, was also examined. The special meanings used in this study have been defined in Chapter 3. To summarize, the symbols sought were, under leadership styles, transactional and transformational leadership, constructs identified by Burns (1978). Educational philosophies identified conformed to the usual definitions of Idealism, Realism, Pragmatism,
Reconstructionism, Behaviorism, and Existentialism. One additional philosophy, or rather body of thought, was added: Eclecticism. Eclecticism was defined as a blending of two or more philosophies. This category was used only if one philosophy of education was not the
205 predominate one. Lastly, views of government were identified as either limited or unlimited. Limited government was best seen as that view of government which believes that government helps most when it governs least. Unlimited government was thought to be the opposite.
The selection of recording units, or unitization, established contextual units as speeches, articles by the secretaries, addresses, and interviews performed by others, and this researcher. Secondary sources in this case, i.e ., articles about the secretaries but not by the secretaries, were, for this chapter, used only when direct quotes from the secretaries were used. Annual reports by the secretaries were also used, but not as extensively as was originally planned. The annual reports, it was discovered, varied little, not only among the four secretaries, but throughout the more than
100 years a department or bureau of education has existed 1n the federal government.
Thematic units identified themes in the recording units, such as transactional and transformational leadership, educational philosophies (Idealism, Realism,
Pragmatism, e tc .), and limited or unlimited government.
In other words, the thematic units were the same as the symbols lis ts .
The "population of raw data," as Krippendorff (1980, p. 65) called i t , was comprised of the speeches,
addresses, articles by or about the secretaries,
interviews with the secretaries by other researchers,
the annual reports, and the four interviews conducted by
this researcher. Table 4 provided the actual
accounting of the materials. The categories differed in
the amount of available materials to examine becausethe
secretaries chose different avenues to deliver their
approaches to the department. Because the speeches were
largely rep etitive and not available through any one
source, resort was made through traditional research
procedures. Unpublished speeches were secured through
congressional offices. Length of tenure in the office
regulated the number of annual reports viewed.
A grid was devised to record the data. It included
the different thematic units, i.e., transactional and
transformational leadership, the educational
philosophies, and limited or unlimited views of
government. Several articles were piloted on this grid,
but i t was determined that notations on copies of the
documents worked just as well as the grid. One outside
reviewer used the grid, the other did not. The grid was
devised to ease the recording of the thematic units. It
served as a marking pad, not as an integral construct 1n
identifying thematic units. Its use or non-use did not affect validity or reliability issues. 208
Table 4
Sampling Units of the Secretaries of the Department of
Educat ion
Hufstedler Bell Bennett Cavazos Total
Articles 24 48 43 6 121
Monographs 0 7 0 0 7
Speeches 3 4 20 49 76
Interviews 5 10 4 3 22
Annual Rpts, 1 4 3 1 9
Other Rpts. 0 3 0 0 3
Totals 33 76 70 59 238 Notations on the actual documents were limited to themes identified in the documents, and quotations indicating a support or denial of the themes being researched. Since tabulations of themes, such as the number of times the word leadership was used in a given recording unit, were not being sought, tabulations were not used in the gathering of data. A notation was made on each of the recording units, however, of the preponderance of themes that were in evidence in each recording unit.
An interview guide was devised and advice was sought from experts regarding the questions. Some questions were altered as a result of their suggestions.
Two former commissioners of the education department in
Tennessee were asked to "pilot" the interview questions.
They were asked because of th eir fa m ilia rity with the issues, and the similarity of job roles. Since previous
Department of Education secretaries were not available it was not possible to get an exact pilot population.
Both commissioners participated in the interviews in a similar manner in which the actual interviews with the secretaries occurred. The commissioners responded to interviews and their answers were recorded on tape.
These interviews were conducted in the same manner as if the commissioners had served as secretaries of the
Department of Education instead of a state department. At the conclusion of the Interview, both commissioners agreed that the questions were legitimate questions, and believed that the questions would generate answers to the research questions for th is study.
R e lia b ility issues were addressed by using two outside examiners, both of whom were fam iliar with content analysis. The reviewers were sent a representative sample of the material viewed by this researcher: Hufstedler, 12*; Bell, 8*; Bennett, 9%; and
Cavazos, 10%. The percentages differed because the number of representative samples in each category of recording units differed dramatically. For example, because only Bell had monographs appropriate for this study, comparative samples of this material with the other secretaries could not be sent. Percentages represented an amount of the overall materials examined for this study, not a percentage of pages sent. Both reviewers found that all thematic units identified for this study were present in the sample. For each of the secretaries they found the themes of leadership (either transactional or transformational), educational philosophies, and views of government present. Based on the responses of the reviewers, both reviewers indicated content validity.
Reasonable levels of inter-scorer reliability were obtained. Both outside reviewers agreed that the themes sought in this study were present in the materials sent them, and present in sufficient quantity to pursue this study. In terms of content analysis, reliability reproducibility was found by both reviewers. Semantical v a lid ity was also found by both outside examiners.
The number of occurrences of themes found in the materials sent to each of the reviewers is exhibited in
Table 5. Since the reviewers were told that a ll or none of the themes could be present in each or none of the articles, they could mark any one recording unit with as many themes as they id entified . Table 5 showed sufficient reliability and validity of the study methodology.
A chi-square test for independence was performed between reviewers 1 and 3 (this researcher) and reviewers 2 and 3. The null hypothesis was retained for reviewers 1 and 3. The null hypothesis was rejected between reviewers 2 and 3 (please see Table 5). The differences between reviewer 2, and reviewers 1 and 3 on the calculated chi-square may be seen in the leadership occurrences, and may be explained by the admission of the second reviewer, a mathematician and statistician, that he was unfamiliar with Burns and the constructs.
He admitted that he had never heard of them before, and had not had the opportunity to work with them in any research context. Definitions and other materials were 212
Table 5
Occurrences of Thematic Units as Observed in Sample
Materials by Independent Reviewers
Reviewer Leadership Philosophy Government X2
A* B C D
13 22 31 12
2 .18ns
19 18 33 15
30 16
17.58**
19 18 33 15
30 16
. 28ns
33 15
*A=Transactional B=Transformationa1 C=Limited Government D=Unlimited Government
* * p> .05 sent to explain these differences, and he agreed that he understood them; however, he nevertheless Indicated a great reluctance in attributing those themes. Reviewer
1 and reviewer 3 were better acquainted with the Burns constructs (both having worked with them) and were far more fam iliar with leadership studies. Reviewer 1 admitted that studies were underway at his university that would incorporate not only leadership studies, but also the use of the content analysis methodology. The chi-square test indicated this familiarity.
The chi-square test of independence between reviewers 2 and 3, recalculated to include only philosophy and government, substantiated the earlier claim that reviewer 2 simply was unfamiliar with the
Burns leadership constructs. The chi-square value for this second test between reviewers 2 and 3 indicated the retention of the null at any level. This second chi- square further underscored the claims made for r e lia b i1i t y .
The interviews with the secretaries were carried out in the following manner. This researcher interviewed former Secretary Hufstedler face-to-face.
Former Secretary Bell was interviewed over the telephone, from his home in Salt Lake City. A face-to- face arrangement was trie d , but scheduling for the former secretary made this impossible. Former Secretary Bennett and current Secretary Cavazos would not agree to face-to-face interviews, thereby forcing a departure from the original plan outlined in Chapter 3. The same questions used with former Secretary Hufstedler and former Secretary Bell were sent to former Secretary
Bennett and Secretary Cavazos prior to th eir responses.
Former Secretary Bennett would agree to answer only eight questions from the interview guide (please see
Appendix 2). These were numbers 1, 5, and 7 under leadership; numbers 2, 9, and 13 under philosophy, and numbers 1 and 4 under government. Cavazos would answer only through his Deputy Under Secretary Charles E. M.
Kolb, and then the following questions; leadership: 1,
5, 7; philosophy: 2, 4, 7; and government: 1, 2, 4.
Since this interview was through a proxy, the answers were not used to substantiate any finding on Cavazos, but to corroborate, where applicable, reported findings.
Biographical sketches were placed in Appendix 1. The full interviews may be obtained from the researcher (see v i t a ) .
Findings on the Secretaries
Data were reported under each secretary, with each research question identified in bold type. Under leadership, issues such as vision, compromise, consensus, team-building, and the like were key concepts sought. Vision denoted a transformational inclination for Burns, if such a vision were articulated in detail.
Compromise, consensus, and team-building were a ll strong transactional concepts. Concepts such as the great books, back to basics, a core curriculum, and the like identified certain educational philosophies (I.e .,
Idealism, Realism, and etc.). No special designations were sought for, other than those that are common to the educational community. Such themes have been described by Ozmon and Craver (1986), Pulliam (1987), and others.
Only two key concepts under government were sought: whether there was present in the recording units any indication that the federal role was advisory, limited, constricted, or federalized by the Constitution, or not.
Shirlev Mount Hufsbedler
Leadership: Three research questions dealt with leadership style. The first treated identifiable leadership styles. The second examined whether that style was transactional or transformational. The third and last question about leadership dealt with which of the two constructs, transactional or transformational, was more useful or more necessary to the leader in goal- attainment.
Research Question 1: Were there id entifiable leadership styles evinced by the Secretaries of the
Department of Education?
Senator Claiborne Pell asked Hufstedler about her credentials to lead the department. Hufstedler replied,
. . . I am [not] a master of [leadership] s k ills .
. . . I am really . . . a student, my philosophy
overall is not a particularly extraordinary one.
It is that you find the very best people there are.
You give them significant responsibility. You take
responsibility for their mistakes as well as for
th eir successes. You give them confidence where
confidence is due. If they do not do their jobs,
they are asked to leave. (U.S. Congress, 1979, p.
38; quoted, Radin & Hawley, 1988, p. 158)
As noted here, leadership for the Secretary was one
in which individuals who appeared to be the best were those solicited for work. Once they were employed, they were given a job to do, delegated work in which they were to achieve some level of distinction and for which the Secretary would be given credit. If they misfired, the Secretary would also take credit, but, "If they do not do their jobs, they are asked to leave." The secretary equated leadership with management. That this was her approach was later confirmed in her own words
(Hufstedler, 1989):
Leadership was, in my view, not only in the
Department of Education but elsewhere, a
combination of talents. One, an a b ility to give
sense of direction and vision. And, two, the talent to inspire other people to follow that
vision. At the same time, ability to pick
individuals who w ill be able to carry forward
policy and be given the responsibility to do so,
plus an accountability for what they have
accomplished. And, at the same time, an a b ility to
cause some bottom up, instead of top down,
interchange in order to activate the talents that
have not been expressly used in any structure. If
you are able to do those things, then you have the
qualities of leadership, (p. 1)
What Hufstedler described and followed as a style
or approach to leadership involved the familiar notion
of vision (though she never defined i t ) . But i t also
involved issues that were more clearly identified with management.
Burns (1978) pointed out that in p o litic a l
leadership "linkage consists of an array of political motives applied to a structure of d o ! itical opportunity"
(p. 105, emphases in original). Hufstedler did not
indicate anywhere in the material examined that such
linkages could or would take place. Rather, linkage here consisted of getting excellent people (however
defined) and putting them to the task at hand, political motives and political opportunity notwith- standing.
Hufstedler's view of leadership also did not allow for individual recognition (a factor in Burns' transformational leadership), but one in which excellent people did jobs they were assigned (Hufstedler, 1989;
1981, January 11; Theroux, 1980, June 8).
In fact, her theme of managing the best people appeared as her only leadership scheme. For example, later in the same hearings, when asked what she would do for low morale of the employees in the Office of
Education following the b itte r debate over the creation of the ED, Hufstedler gave a very consistent answer:
The f ir s t order of business is to obtain the
names of people of outstanding quality representing
the diversity and pluralism of the entire
educational enterprise to be nominated for . . .
appointments ....
The second--which is proceeding right now— is
to bring together persons who have been known for
excellence in the existing Office of Education to
assist . . . to define and outline the tasks and to
suggest p rio ritie s for the attention of the
Secretary of Education.
The third is the commitment of the Secretary
of Education at the f ir s t moment possible after
confirmation to visit that Office of Education and
to being a personal contact with those who are
leaders . . . to fill the vacancies which now unfortunately exist. (U.S. Congress, 1979, p. 32;
quoted, Radin & Hawley, 1988, pp. 157-158; see
also, Hufstedler, 1980d, p. 7)
Hufstedler's approach to leadership was really an approach to management. Her style was to find quality people, many of whom would be suggesting leadership in itia tiv e s , and have them do th eir jobs.
Research Question 2; If there is an identifiable style, could it be characterized as either transactional or transformational?
After describing transactional and transformational leadership to her, Hufstedler was asked to indicate which best described her own leadership style. She responded, "I would say it would be neither, i f I was going to be worth a hoot as a leader. It is not done that way. Things are not divided neatly into those packages" (Hufstedler, 1909, p. 3).
The evidence suggested a contrary conclusion, namely that transactional leadership was, in fact, going on. The evidence for this assertion ran as follows.
First, Burns required the strong articulation of vision as a requirement for transformational leadership.
Hufstedler did not identify one. She came out early and strong for the following: a blanket approach to education (Hufstedler 1980b); understanding that there were competing demands on the federal budget and education must get into the fray on its own (Hufstedler,
1980a, c); red tape needing to be reduced dramatically
(Hufstedler, 1981, January 11; 1980d); the ED to be a catalyst to educational reform activity (Hufstedler,
1989; 1980e); for assistance to some institutions which were failing (Hufstedler, 1980a); the federal system in education to remain, but for some adjustments to be made
(Hufstedler, 1980e); and the ED to be a sounding board for educational concerns (Hufstedler, 1980d). All of these issues were important leadership in itia tiv e s .
Second, Hufstedler did not think of her leadership approach as "a particularly extraordinary one."
Extraordinary was just such a word used to describe transformational leadership—extraordinary was its very nature (Burns, 1978). Third, when asked if compromise
(a key ingredient in transactional leadership) was important to her, she responded, "Of course. If you don't understand the art of compromise you are not going to be able to manage at all. The question is not whether you w ill compromise, but about what. And that itself is an art" (Hufstedler, 1989, p. 2). Fourth,
Hufstedler f e lt that the department had to be run by consensus in order to get things done (Hufstedler,
1980d), Hufstedler, 1n the materials examined for this study, revealed a markedly transactional approach to leadership. Research Question 3: Was one style considered by the secretary to be either more useful or more necessary, given the department's present political configuration?
Hufstedler chose transactional leadership because she saw i t as the more necessary approach. For example, when asked to provide an example of her leadership, she responded:
At the time I became Secretary of the new
Department of Education, the Higher Education
Reauthorization Bill was completely bogged down.
It was not going to be enacted. I knew there were
a lot of things in that bill which were not what
they should be. I also knew that 1f the President
were re-elected, that the authorizing legislation
could be repaired. I also knew if Mr. Reagan were
going to be elected there wasn't going to be any
authorizing legislation. So what do you do? You
immediately figure out how much you've got to trade
o ff in order to accomplish the goal. What's the
goal? Without any authorizing legislation there
would have been thousands upon thousands of young
people who were not going to be able to attend the
universities and colleges of th eir choice~-because
you would not even worry about budgetary
considerations—there wasn't going to be any b ill. So what's the main thing? You decide you want to
get the b ili through (which I did) by accepting a
lot of provisions in the legislation which were not
wise or desirable. (Hufstedler, 1989, pp. 3-4)
In order to achieve the Higher Education
Reauthorization B ill, Hufstedler acted transactionally because she needed to, because she thought that style would get her to her goal. She assumed that transactional or compromise leadership was the only road open to her. Even though the style led to productions of an end product with additions that "were not wise or desirable," she s t i l l took the approach as the more necessary.
Hufstedler pointed out that the various constituencies devoted to a given interest also made leadership d ifficu lt and therefore compromise more necessary:
[These constituencies] don't destroy
leadership. [They] do make it more difficult to do
some things that you might like to do because in a
democratic system . . . there are a ll kinds of
constraints that hedge about anything that you are
going to do. The art of leadership in a democratic
system always involves elements of a rtis tic
compromise .... (Hufstedler, 1989, p. 2.)
Another issue of leadership for Hufstedler was the position the department would take on the preparation of teachers. Not only did she believe that the department could help prepare them, but one of her "top p rio ritie s " was "to go out on the stump across the country"
(Hufstedler, 1980a, p. 7) and elevate the consciousness of Americans about the good work classroom teachers did.
She strove to identify the "excellent teaching that is going on out there" (Hufstedler, 1980a, p. 7). Her approach produced no co n flict and aroused l i t t l e interest; it was predominately transactional
(Hufstedler, 1980a, b).
Other examples of Hufstedler's transactional leadership were found, Hufstedler, for example, felt that l i t t l e thought had been given to the new department and its budget. She was clearly suspicious of some of the counsel from the Office of Management and Budget
(0MB). Rather than using this co nflict to achieve a transformational goal, she placed buffers between herself and them (Radin 8< Hawley, 1988, citing original memoranda and le tte rs ). She was also amazed that l i t t l e had been done for the transition team, including finding an o ffice out of which the team could work. Moreover, a budget for the transition team had also not been put in place. Compromise, she felt, was imperative to resolve these issues (Radin & Hawley, 1988).
To sum up Hufstedler’ s approach to leadership, her type of leadership style, and the necessity for choosing it, Hufstedler's understanding of leadership may be said to have consisted of four things. First, her approach to leadership was indistinguishable from management.
Nevertheless, this did constitute an approach to leading people. Second, p rio ritie s were determined by the administration under which she was working with no clear mission or vision articulated. Third, compromise and consensus were extremely Important, and were In ready use whenever issues of decision-making were necessary.
The identified style of leadership was then said to be transactional. Fourth, because compromise was essential, Hufstedler chose transactional leadership as the more necessary leadership style. Owing to the political configuration of the department, the many constituencies, and the nature of the democratic system,
Hufstedler saw transactional leadership as the more necessary leadership style.
Philosophv of Education; The questions under philosophy dealt with the identification of the philosophy and whether the philosophy was important in setting or helping to set ED policies. The third question dealing with philosophy focused on whether the secretary made statements consistent with the identified philosophy.
Research Question 5: Was there an id en tifiab le philosophy of education by the Secretary?
Hufstedler's educational philosophy emerged throughout her writings and In the interview conducted for this study. Unlike the other secretaries,
Hufstedler resisted the effort to pinpoint her philosophy of education to a specific one. On the contrary, when asked to name her educational philosophy she replied, "I don't think in labels, I think in whole concepts. What are we trying to accomplish in education? [ I t ] is a lifelong concept" (Hufstedler,
1989, p. 20). Having stated that, 1t was clear that the secretary was guided by the concept of equality and equal opportunity for all in education, as well as elements of Pragmatism and Buddhist thought,
Hufstedler made many pronouncements about the pluralistic society in which we live and equal educational access for all (Hufstedler, 1980a, b, c, d,
19B1a, 1981b). This theme supplied the philosophical foundation for her educational philosophy. Hufstedler wrote, "I believe every word Earl Warren wrote about the ultimate dependence of our democratic system upon our public schools" (Hufstedler, 1980b, p. 7GS). She saw the decision as a "great moral landmark" and wanted to see that the ideal of equal education to a l1 children would occur (Hufstedler, 1980b, p. 7G). She added that she would work to see that this ideal was preserved. These data Indicated a predilection for Pragmatism, especially with its emphasis on education as a necessity of life (Ozmon & Craver, 1986). Other pronouncements by the secretary substantiate this. Hufstedler wrote, "I believe that we should use children's natural curiosity, logic, and sense of wonder to give them the best possible grounding in that most essential of a ll learning areas—the basic skills'* (Hufstedler, 1981, p.
12).
These "basic s k ills " included competencies in mathematics and language s k ills , the la tte r "basic to all learning" (Hufstedler, 1981, p. 12). To make certain that this philosophy was carried out, she intended "to concentrate Department of Education efforts
. , . to further the basic skills objective"
(Hufstedler, 1981, p. 12). This meant coordination of more than fifty programs and billions of dollars that would help schools, directly or in d irectly, improve the teaching of basic skills.
The improvement of basic s k ills was more or less, for Hufstedler, a way of adjusting the system. It did not take on a core curriculum, as such concerns did with
Realism. Teachers, she f e lt , were s t i l l just as dedicated as ever (Hufstedler, 1980e). She pointed out that simply because the evidence indicated that children today were receiving lower scores on standard tests than their parents, that did not mean the/ were being less well-educated (Hufstedler, 1980e).
When describing her approach to philosophical educational issues, Hufstedler said, "In Buddhist thought, time is circu lar. There is a concept of steadiness and change going together. If lightning strikes, I ' l l think about what I have to do" (Theroux,
19B0 June 6, p. 94). She also f e lt the need to encourage children about themselves, and about what they were feeling. "Children need time to look through the windows of their minds," 3he said, "and to let their insides speak" (Theroux, 1980 June 8, p. 98). While this cannot be said to be a pure Buddhist koan, it approached the Buddhist conceptualizations of life
(Ozmon & Craver, 1986). It also bore the marks of the
Pragmatist's flexibility of education, and the need for education to direct, control, and guide the personal and social experience.
While the examples were strong enough to indicate an Eastern philosophical orientation with pragmatic influences, Hufstedler (1989) did not embrace one system;
We are trying to give people the opportunity to
develop th eir own powers of thought. We are trying
to develop and not destroy the cre a tiv ity which is
born in varying degrees in a ll human beings. We want to have people value th eir Individual dignity
. . . and to value other people's .... After
a ll, education . . . is a lifelong process, (p .20)
While the evidence of an oriental influence was clear, there also appeared an even stronger trace of
Pragmatism.
Pragmatism became more apparent when Hufstedler admitted that Individual ideas or skills (reading, writing, and arithmetic) had to be learned, but for u tilita ria n reasons. The length of the answer deserves
Its full presentation here:
Well, there surely are a number of concepts that
should be conveyed in order to reach some degree of
coherence about some core values of the country . .
. . To be sure, fact-teaching helps to put things
into some kind of focus. You have to have a
vocabulary to talk, and to think abstractly , . . .
You do have to learn the fundamentals of basic
arithmetic because you need them. And these are
arbitrary in that some other symbols could do as
w ell, number systems b u ilt on 12, 15, 20 or 35. It
just happens we have ten digits to our system. But
even though they are arb itra ry , they are necessary
to function in a wide variety of ways. So yes.
Those things, those fa c ts . 1f you want to call them
that, have to be taught. (Hufstedler, 1989, p. 12) Evan in such an answer, however, the evidence of
Buddhist thought and the Zen idea that the names of things are simply arbitrarily assigned, was evident
(Coplestone, 1962). This statement was also 1n concert with her other statements about education, especially in connection with education for all, and the pluralism and diversity that was American education.
Research Question 6: Were these philosophies important in setting or helping to set department policies? That these ideas of Buddhist thought and
Pragmatism influenced Hufstedler's decision-making was clear. She did not make up her philosophy as soon as she came to the department. It had evolved over the years she was on the court:
I had been dealing with extremely difficult civil
rights issues, school integration issues, for many,
many years. In my role on the bench for almost
twenty years, I had those issues before me a ll the
time, in various forms. I thought about them a
great deal. I did not make [my philosophy] up as I
came along.
The evidence that this philosophy influenced her decision-making, apart from her own affirmations, was reflected in her insistence on civil rights themes, bilingual education, and human rights during her tenure as secretary. Clearly these were themes that were in harmony with her expressed educational philosophy.
Moreover, when asked if education should be limited to disciplines or extended beyond the classroom and into the social arena, Hufstedler replied:
If it does not extend to the social arena, you
haven't got anything! That is like simply laying
down rules and having memorization, or laying down
facts, and saying "Memorize this." It is a
question of whether or not i t is internalized, and
how it is internalized, that makes all the
difference. (Hufstedler, 1989, p. 22)
Her philosophy, she argued, encouraged children to ask probing questions about themselves and about the universe in which they live. This did not mean that an
American consciousness could or even should be taught
(Hufstedler, 1989, p. 23). Nor did it mean that values of any specific dogmatic nature could be inculcated beyond things like honesty or courtesy (Hufstedler,
1989, p. 18). Nevertheless, the teaching itself, taken as a whole concept, was to administer some direction, some guidance, and some value structure, but without sectarian implications.
Hufstedler used this philosophy to outline objectives for her tenure in the Department of
Education. "I want to build on that great record [of
American commitment to public education] while preserving the equally firm commitment to educational pluralism at the local level" (Hufstedler, 1980a, p.
6). She then went on to name her p rio ritie s : Youth Act of 1980; basic educational skills; vocational education and equal educational opportunity for all (Hufstedler,
1989; 1981; & 1980a, b, d ,).
For Hufstedler, then, education was a lifelong pursuit, one which should not be fragmented or overly concerned with facts, so much as it should be with a complete system of learning. Facts were important in
Hufstedler's philosophy, but they were not knowledge:
"You must learn how to read the menu," she said, "but i takes more education and knowledge to decide what's worth eating" (Hufstedler grasps helm of Education
Department, 1980, p. 445). In other words, facts were pragmatic concerns because they acted as legal tender for admission into the educational marketplace. But they d is tin c tly were not knowledge. Finally, and perhaps the most important philosophical underpinning,
Hufstedler believed passionately about the modern
American ideal of equal educational opportunity for a ll
Research Question 7: Were these philosophies of education in agreement with statements made about education by the Secretary?
The evidence for this question has already been supplied in large measure. From the evidence examined, Hufstedler did not say one thing about human rights and then do another, believe one thing about civil rights and argue another. For example, Hufstedler (1989) argued " . . . 1 have a firm conviction that if we cannot demonstrate to the American people that education can make a difference for the great pluralism of our society--if you can’t do it in education, you can’t do it" (p. 5). Or again,
I am deeply convinced that my experiences on the
bench, my experience in the department did not
change a bit, my conviction that it was absolutely
essential to make the promise come true for being
able to educate a ll of America's children,
irrespective of what color skin they had, what kind
of religion they had, or what th eir immigrant
status was, or anything else. (pp. 16—17)
At still another point, Hufstedler argued that her strategy was always to find ways of making certain everyone had equal access, that those at the bottom were not being le ft out because of the advantages possessed by those at the top (Hufstedler, 1989; 1981; & 1980, a, b, c).
Education and Government: Research Question 4;
Were leadership styles consistent with Constitutional demands of a limited federal involvement?
Given the strongly f e lt view that education must be for a l l , Hufstedler's view of government and education was equally compatible and not surprising. Government,
Hufstedler felt, had an obligation to steer education along the right lines (Hufstedler, 1980a, b, d, & f ) .
But this did not mean that the federal fist came down heavy on states' rights (Hufstedler, 1980d).
Rather, the right of the states to provide education for their citizens should come first. The federal Department of Education was to oversee this process and make certain that it was occurring
(Hufstedler, 1980d). But Hufstedler (1980e) was also concerned that various states in certain regions of the country would lag behind state leaders in education.
The purpose of the department was to stand ready to help, to assist, but not to supplant state prerogatives
(Hufstedler 1980e). But the power that the federal government had to exercise over states that were not doing a good job was unlimited (Hufstedler, 1989). The federal government could not usurp the state role
(Hufstedler, 1980e), but i t could offer assistance at every turn, and at every opportunity (Hufstedler,
1980e). Moreover, i t could also demand that states especially negligent in their educational roles improve
(Hufstedler, 1989; 1980e).
The department would not stand, metaphorically, with its hands in its pockets, waiting for the states to call. Hufstedler (Hufstedler Warns Against Dismantling
ED, 1981) was adamant that the federal government had a right to be Involved in education (Hufstedler Warns
Against Dismantling ED, 1982, p. 475). Hufstedler also believed that the administration of the nation's educational goals could not be managed any other way than through a large federal o ffic e . Hufstedler wrote,
National problems require national solutions. They
require an in s titu tio n — ED— and a person— [the
Secretary]—with responsibility for formulating a
coherent national policy .... The Federal
Government is obligated to insure equal educational
opportunity for disadvantaged youngsters ....
Equal access is not a local preference or a
personal convenience. It is a fundamental rig h t, a
truly national responsibility. (Hufstedler, 1981
January 11, p. 42)
Hufstedler disagreed with opponents who said that the federal educational role was nationalizing education:
[The federal involvement in education has] [n]ot in
the least [nationalized it]. It has nationalized
it only 1n this sense. When I was running the
department, the federal government supplied a
significant amount of the financial wherewithal for
one half of all the students in the United States who attended institutions of higher education.
. . . Now it nationalized it only in a sense that
the federal government provided money which would
otherwise not have existed to permit young persons
and their families Individual choice on where that
young person wanted to go to university or college,
or any post-secondary education ....
(Hufstedler, 1989, pp. 26-27)
Hufstedler was equally certain that the oblique reference to education in the Constitution—the Tenth
Amendment— also had not been overstepped by Congress or the judiciary:
Unless one is prepared to say that giving money to
poor children oversteps the federal role; I never
thought that was true. No one has thought that to
be overstepping the federal role. When it comes to
dealing with older Americans— for example, Social
Security revolutionized the opportunities of otder
Americans— but who has said that oversteps the
Constitutional grounds? Nobodyi (Hufstedler, 1989,
p. 28)
Hufstedler saw the historic commitment to education as one that was clear from the beginning of this country, and one that anticipated the growth of the federal government in education (Hufstedler, 1980a).
The Constitution notwithstanding, Hufstedler felt that it was inevitable that the federal government would take over more control because of the American ideal of equal access for all. In some ways, Hufstedler felt that the
Warren decision on Civil Rights either rewrote the Tenth
Amendment, or overrode its meaning in terms of l i t t l e or no federal control over education (Hufstedler, 1989;
1980b). The Warren decision placed the American educational system in a class by itself, for no other country attempted to imitate this industrious dream.
This ideal permeated not only views of government and education, but also leadership and philosophy.
Though this control of education by the federal government was bound to increase, i t was not to usurp or interfere unnecessarily. To what extent it interfered depended on how often state and local systems asked for help, or evidenced by th eir behaviors, that they needed help (Hufstedler, 1989). In the meanwhile, the federal role reacted when it was necessary, was a guide always, and encouraged educators and educational systems at every turn.
Research Question 8: How were leadership styles and educational philosophies converted into public action?
A main concern for Hufstedler during her tenure was keeping the ED a liv e . She indicated twice that the establishment of the ED was her primary goal and a chief accomplishment (Hufstedler, 1989; 1981). But survival alone was not her only concern:
It was very Important to me— a very, very high
p rio rity — that the Department of Education, and its
Presidential level appointment personnel, reflect
the diversity of the United States, while at the
same time, not taking one tiny nick on the quality
of people .... Secondly, it was extremely
d iffic u lt, but also v ita lly important that the
Department of Education, appropriately directed and
run, could be a significant benefit to all levels
of education in the United States, without being a
captive of any .... Third, I was able to put a
view of the Department in a way that meant there
would be no dominance of public education by the
department. (Hufstedler, 1989, p. 5)
Other goals for the department she declared could be summed up in two words, "equality and excellence"
(Hufstedler, 1980a, p.6), This was to be done through
"a firm commitment to educational pluralism at the local level" (p. 6). Hufstedler went on to add that her view
Included a role for the department to "encourage and reinforce community initiative and leadership in
improving our educational system" (p .6).
Hufstedler felt that the trouble with American education was "a lack of real commitment by state and local governments and in some respect the federal government to making quality education available to children" (N e ill, 1980b, p. 309). These, she went on to say, stemmed from inflationary pressures that struck parts of the country more than others. But the other part of i t was that, " [ l ] t has just been because a ll kinds of groups have been fighting over the children and not necessarily fighting for them in terms of educational opportunity" (Neill, 1980b, p. 310).
The Department of Education, under her leadership, could help a llevia te that problem because, "after a ll, the Department of Education is a great big bank”
(Hufstedler, 1989, p.6). She would see to it that the
DOE put into public policy the equal opportunity for all dreams. But there were more things the Department could do besides provide money and increase programs in international and vocational education. Hufstedler said that the department, under her leadership, could provide, besides the chief aim of money, the agenda of the country in education:
But in addition to [money] it should set, with the
assistance of the President, the agenda of American
p rio ritie s , the importance of education at a ll
levels, for a ll people. So i t serves as a bully
pulpit. Secondly, it can provide by the p rio ritie s
set in the Department (with which there must be
agreement in order to make it effective) the leadership on the H ill. You can’t do one without
the other. I believe we were able to accomplish
th at, at least in the time I was there. There was
a very, very large unfinished agenda, of course,
because the Administration changed before those
policies could be fu lly implemented. (Hufstedler,
1989, p. 6)
Hufstedler also felt that her leadership style and
educational philosophy had combined with the raw power
of politics in the executive level of government. She
fe lt the department accomplished its goals because 1t
had access to the power of the President of the United
States (Hufstedler, 1989, p. 7).
Policies influenced by leadership styles and
educational philosophies were impeded because,
Hufstedler complained, budgetary decisions had to be made in astonishingly short periods of time. In four months she had to comprehend $45 b illio n worth of
budgets and have it allocated appropriately within four months of her swearing in (Hufstedler, 1981 January 11,
p. 40). Aside from these important drawbacks, the
Department of Education was desperate for the leadership of a Cabinet-leve 1 secretary: ’’Without your leadership, the nation would see only the schools in trouble. With
[the secretary's help], the country will also see the everyday world of real teachers working with real students, who are actually learning!" (Hufstedler, 1981
January 11, p. 48).
Hufstedler affirmed these goals Immediately after her time with the department had ended. The survival o the department was tantamount to success (Hufstedler,
1981 January 11). Plurality and diversity were also very important to her. She was able to put minorities in 603S of the department's assistant secretary’s positions, "a record achieved without the slightest concession on quality" (Hufstedler, 1981, January 11, p
40).
Summary
Hufstedler displayed an Identifiable approach or style of leadership. Because this approach relied so heavily on compromise and consensus to achieved goals, the style of leadership was identified as transactional
Although Hufstedler resisted the notion of identifying her approach as transactional or transformational, transactional leadership emerged from the data.
Further, Hufstedler felt this approach the only one available to her, given the political configurations of the Department of Education.
An Identifiable philosophy of education also emerged. This philosophy was labeled as one that was
Oriental or Buddhist in nature, but also maintained strong leanings to Pragmatism. These findings were confirmed by the data, even though Hufstedler complained that she did not think in "labels but whole concepts"
(Hufstedler, 1989, p. 20). Her leadership style and educational philosophy Influenced policies and decision making and were especially important in determining the agenda at the DOE. Her views about c iv il rights and equal opportunity for a l l , for example, were issues she had dealt with while on the bench and were only reinforced by her experiences as secretary of the ED.
Hufstedler did not espouse one view and enact another. On the contrary, Hufstedler defied Congress and congressional vetoes on four sets of regulations which the Department of Education had prepared and that
Congress had overturned (Neill, 1980b). All four dealt with c iv il rights issues and equality of education.
Hufstedler matched words with deeds.
Both her leadership style and educational philosophy were consistent with the Constitution and the traditional role of the federal government in education.
While Hufstedler felt that the federal role had to bow to state precedence, she believed strongly in an active federal role, nevertheless.
Finally, her leadership style and educational philosophy converted itself into public action as displayed by her determination to see the ED survive.
The fact of its existence for the next secretary established her success, she f e lt (Hufstedler, 1989).
But mere survival was not all Hufstedler hoped to get out of the ED. She also strove to Increase the department's service to education through the states by her Insistence on c iv il rights, her b e lief 1n equal opportunity for all (not only In education but in the
fu ll panoply of American rights to a ll individuals), and by her determination to see quality established but never replace equality.
Terrel H. Bell
Leadership: The data regarding Terrel Bell was more diverse and plentiful than were the data for any of the other secretaries. His approach to problems, especially in regard to educational philosophies, was
found to have been more certain and more direct. Bell had already served as Commissioner under the old Office of Education during the Nixon Administration and brought to Washington a paper trail of formidable educational experience.
Research Question 1: Were there Id en tifiab le
leadership styles evinced by the Secretary of the
Department of Education?
During his long term In various education offices, whether as teacher, principal, superintendent, commissioner, or secretary of a Cabinet-level bureaucracy, Bell had spoken in a clear voice about leadership. Bell said that leadership at the ED had a good deal to do with "the person who was elected president .... My leadership had a heavy emphasis on building a perception of leadership .... [That meant] taking a stand on issues In a positive way" (B ell, 1989, p. 1).
Part of taking a stand meant clearly defining leadership Issues. For Bell, those issues were accountability and m erit. These two themes occurred- again and again, whenever Bell discussed the Issue of leadership (Bell, 1989; 1968; 1975c; 1974c). Leadership was also to be measured by effective, long-lasting, and tangible change: "The real proof of the value of our education comes from observing the lif e being lived by the individual who was educated" (B ell, 1974c, p. 33).
It was also to be measured by the leadership of the individual being able to exhibit "self-renewal" and being "receptive to feedback" in such a way that leadership would use the feedback to "correct the aim and focus of [the] execution . . ."(Bell, 1974c, p. 22).
Bell felt that the proof of leadership was to be found in long-lasting change.
The themes of accountability and excellence as leadership In itia tiv e s did not apply to the top position only, but for all educational positions. Bell believed that by approaching leadership in this manner, teaching could be Improved and schools made more effective. Bell outlined steps to accountability as follows:
[D]escr1be teaching competence as 1t Is
demonstrated in the classroom . . . explain a
method of objectively observing and gathering data
that are related to teaching competence as It is
demonstrated 1n the classroom, [and] discuss
methods and procedures necessary to ensure success
in basing salary payments to teachers upon the
principal of merit. (Bell, 1962a, p. 9)
These observations were hardly subjective ones: pupil response, classroom climate, element of competency, class leadership, and teacher assistance, to name but a few (B ell, 1962a, pp.19-31). Merit pay was not unheard of, of course, but its application to teachers must have been something of a novelty. Later, while working in the Office of Education, Bell enlarged upon this notion of "paying for what you get" by telling his gathered audience, "There Is l i t t l e to be gained by spending unless we spend in a way that w ill produce tangible results .... [T]hat way, children will learn" (Bell,
1970a, pp. 3-5; Bell, 1988).
Bell described leadership characteristics 1n transformational language:
The chief executive [of the school] must display
certain leadership qualities that relate to his In tellectu al power, w it, charm, magnetism, and
general strength of character. In brief, if he is
to become a truly exceptional executive, he must
have charisma . . . [T]he aggregate . . . quality
of the mind, personality, and character of the
executive must be such that he is recognized and
respected as a leader. (Bell, 1974c, p. 127-128)
The leader was also the "key to educational reform" in the country (Marland, 1982; Bell, 1975c, p. 13).
This reformationwould be through a number of steps in which the leader gave theschool back to the community, made the school more accountable to the parents whose children attended there, dejuveni1ized the schools, reduced age and culture barriers, provided a wide spectrum of educational experiences, and, above all, produced concrete action that could be measured (B ell,
1975c). Bell added that through the Influence of this person's personal powers he would attract respect and command performance. His power, authority, and leadership charisma led s ta ff, governing boards, the student body, and the public in general to follow the vision and the mission of this chief executive (Bell,
1988; 1974c).
Bell's approach to leadership meant defining issues and leading staff with a vision. The individual leader must be a strong, charismatic person, whose charm and personal mein made him an easy leader to follow.
Leadership for Bell meant accountability and merit, i.e., excellence. Leadership for Bell also meant producing results.
Research Question 2: If there is an identifiable style, could it be characterized as either transactional or transformational?
Bell's style was identified as transformational in intention, but transactional in outcome. F irs t, Bell saw elements of his approach to leadership as transformational: "With respect to managing the bureaucracy, and internal affairs, I was most certainly transformational" (B ell, 1989, p. 5). Second, however, he characterized his overall approach to leadership as transactional:
I guess if I had to say i t was more one than the
other— leadership tends to be more one thing than
another while not being 100* this or 100* th a t— I
would say that my leadership by virtue of
concession of the job would be transactional
leadership. (Bell, 1989, p. 5)
But Bell did not begin with the thought of compromise or consensus. Before taking the postion,
Bell said that the person in the secretary's chair needed to be "lean and hungry and mean as h e ll. We in education . . . need a new voice that is loud, clear, and cuttingly direct. In short, a fresh new breeze needs to blow through the federal education structure"
(N e ill, 1979). He did not change his assessment when he took the office himself (Bell, 1988; B ell, 1989).
Bell did, however, make the same mistake as
Hufstedler 1n equating management with leadership. "As
I see 1t," Bell wrote, "schools need a management system around which plans can be laid for solving problems and reaching higher levels of accomplishment in securing the need3 of students" (Bell, 1974a, p. 359). Later (Bell,
1989) again saw in leadership a tool for management.
B ell's understanding about leadership was forcible:
It was not dependent on others, but on a strong leader who convinced followers of what they must attain. There was nothing about the quality of those followers, but everything about the quality of that leader whose every capac1ty--wit, humor, Intelligence, power, personal influence, to wit, everything—must be marshalled to bring about effectiveness. "Leadership 1n education these days,” he wrote, "calls for a high level of social
Intelligence" (Bell, 1974d, p. 12). Bell later argued that this social Intelligence was a guiding vision that would direct the clear voice of the leader In the
Department of Education (B ell, 1989).
Bell underscored this view elsewhere when he called for "new partnerships" In education and work (Bell, 1975b). This was to bo a partnership in which
"Education [would] make sense and make money" (Bell,
1975b, p. 3) through much-needed and long lasting change, obvious transformational characteristics. The emphasis on partnership was on the leader of the partnership, not the partners (Bell, 1975b).
Two acts of transformational leadership occurred early in Bell’s tenure at ED. The first was the rules on bilingual education (Feds scrap rules on bilingual education, 1980). Bell, amid the opposition of the bilingual lobby In Washington (Bell, 1988), set the tone in a clear, direct voice: The rules were, he said,
"harsh, inflexible, burdensome, and incredibly costly"
(Feds scrap rules on bilingual education, 1980, p. 21).
The second transformational act occurred the following year. Bell (1981c) campaigned for the Omnibus Education and Labor Reconciliation Act of 1981, and later saw
Congress pass i t . This b ill sent education back to the states in the form of block grants, a form of funding he favored (B ell, 1983c, part II; McGrath, 1982). This time Bell opposed the strong NEA lobby and won (Bell,
1988). But he won by being forceful, direct, and setting the tone for followers. He caught them up 1n a vision that education was to make sense and make money, and his people followed him, even amid strong conflict.
In these two cases, Bell used conflict to achieve a sought for victory (Bell, 1988). But he did not always take this approach.
Bell felt his leadership wa3 inhibited by what he called "movement conservatives" (Bell, 1988, 1986a),
They prevented him from achieving all of his goals, owing to the constant pressure on him to compromise.
When asked what role compromise played in his leadership, Bell said, "You constantly had to
[compromise]. You had to compromise with the Office of
Management and Budget and Its leadership. You had to compromise with the White House s ta ff. Over certain initiatives you had to take 1t" (Bell, 1989, p. 2). It was important that Bell phrased the compromise in a
"had-to" proposition. Unlike Hufstedler, Bell felt forced to compromise. Bell documented his problems with movement conservatives at length (Bell, 1988). In rethinking his leadership approach, (B ell, 1989) Bell saw the approach as more transactional than transformational.
Research Question 3: A Was one style considered by the secretary to be either more useful or more necessary, given the department's present political configurations?
In B ell's case, the answer was clearly that he saw the use of transactional leadership as more necessary.
For example, like Hufstedler, Bell found the appointment of key members In the department a very d iffic u lt act to accomplish. Robert B illings came on as a Special
Assistant, having served as the Executive Director of the Moral Majority. Daniel Oliver served as General
Counsel to the Department, coming over from the opinion journal, National Review (Savage, 1981a). The p o litic a l gerrymandering and repositioning of personnel within the department and the end-runs around appropriate channels forced Bell into compromise, and le ft him disenchanted with the leadership process in the Reagan administration
(Bell 1988; 1986b).
Bell's own transformational vision and mission had been spelled out very clearly in a sixfold departmental statement;
F irs t, reduce federal spending in education;
Second, strengthen local and state control of education while dramatically reducing the federal responslbi1ity ;
Third, maintain a very limited federal role that would help the states do their job in education;
Fourth, increase parental choice 1n schools through the establishments of laws and rules;
Fifth, encourage substantial reduction of judicial influence in education, and
Sixth, abolish the Department of Education and replace i t with a new agency that would be "less powerful and prominent in the federal structure" (B ell,
1986b, p. 488; Mar land, 1982).
But these problems became secondary concerns because movement conservatives in the Reagan
Administration kept the pressure on him. As a result, he lost the support on the left-of-center side because he upheld certain initiatives of the new administration.
On the other hand, he lost the support of the right-of- center faction because he opposed certain other conservative initiatives. Thus, Bell found himself between two p o litic a l chairs; he also found the need for compromise and consensus (B ell, 1989; 198B).
When the need arose, however, Bell stood firm where he felt he must 3tand firm, calling on transformational leadership to do so. For example, on issues such as
C ivil Rights and the budget, Bel! stood his ground against a ll comers (B ell, 1988, 1981a). Those who argued against him, he rebutted by citing the
Constitution as his defense (B ell, 1988, 1981a).
Movement conservatives h it him hard on this issue (B ell,
1988), but he used the conflict, and the power of his office to overcome them.
Amid these concerns was yet another: the dismantlement of the department its e lf. In this case,
Bell supplied the conflict himself by first agreeing that the department should be dismantled, and then later reversing himself (Bell, 1968). He began his tenure in
the department (as evidenced by his sixth reform above)
by wanting to dismantle 1t. Bell said so categorically.
When asked 1f he was committed to making himself
unemployed, he said, "I surely am. My proposals are
now--been submitted to the president, and that was the
understanding that I had when I took this position. And
we're quite a long ways along on that project, by the
way" (MacNeiI-Lehrer, 1981 September 7, p. 6). Later he
said the exact opposite, namely that he worked to keep
the department (B ell, 1988). This led to co n flict both within and outside of the department which required him
to compromise, he f e lt (B ell, 1989).
For example, the phalanx of opposition forthe
dismantlement of the department emerged from the Reagan
administration itself. Ed Meese and others in the
Reagan administration opposed B ell's department
(Wellborn, 1981). Reflecting on his own position as
head of a department that administration o ffic ia ls
expected him to destroy, Bell said that there could
hardly be "any lower status than to be a Republican In
the Reagan administration in charge" of the Department of Education (Bell, 1988, p. 27).
When Bell changed his mind about the department and
determined to keep 1t, he began his plans in a transformational manner. He hoped to provide the necessary vision for Reagan to follow (B ell, 1988).
Later he wrote,
I was . . . arrogant enough to think I could teach
Ronald Reagan to use his considerable persuasive
powers to fig h t for the nation's schools and
colleges. I f e lt a ll I needed was a chance to get
on the inside, where I could preach the gospel of
education to the movers and the shakers of the new
administration. (Bell, 1988, p. 1)
Later, when he saw there was no budging the movement conservatives, he realized that he had to resort to the only tool of leadership the political configuration of the ED and the Reagan administration had given him: compromise, and therefore transactional
1eadership.
Further examples will suffice to show that his approach to leadership, while strongly favoring a transformational reform, was forced, by political reasons, to opt out for transactional means. These may be seen in the establishment of the Commission on
Excellence in Education (Bell 1988); his fight over the
NIE and the dismissal of undersecretary William Clohan
(B ell, 1988; 1986e; Connell, 1982); and the Commission on Excellence in Education's Report (Bell, 1989, 1988).
In the case of the appointing of the commission,
Bell wanted the president to do it, but had to compromise with White House o ffic ia ls and name 1t himself (B ell, 1989; 1988). NIE head Ed Curran went behind B e ll's back to have NIE abolished, a move that infuriated B ell. Bell wanted to fir e Curran and replace him with a man of his choosing. But he only got to fire
Curran (B ell, 1988). Clohan lost out to what Bell called "right-wingers'* in the Reagan administration
(Connell, 1982, p. 21). As much as Bell wanted Clohan to stay on, he had to compromise with movement conservatives (Bell, 1988; 1986e).
Lastly, compromise was the plan when the commission's report was fin a lly released (B ell, 1988).
Bell wanted 1t to focus exclusively on the findings, but had to settle for a mix of Reagan ideology and findings.
President Reagan discussed the report, but he also talked about merit pay for teachers and prayer in the schools, neither of which were in the commission's report (Bell, 1988, 1989). In order to get the report before the nation, Bell saw it as a necessary compromise
(B ell, 1988). Bell thought the compromising process would achieve the hoped-for end. He saw compromise as
"the essence of political effectiveness" (Bell, 1988, p.
31.) Even with a generous supply of transactional leadership occurring, the commission's report, A Nation at Risk, created conflict and established the potential for long-lasting change. In summary, B e ll’ s view of leadership contained a number of facets. He came to Washington as a professional educator with clear views about leadership and he exhibited a clear leadership style.
That leadership style had a transformational quality, but often expressed Its e lf in transactional ways. Bell provided steps to the implementation of his vision in the form of accountability, m erit, and management by objectives. Despite the fact that educational theory distinguished between leadership and management (Hoy & Miskel, 1986), Bell, like Hufstedler, took a managerial approach.
These data led to the finding that Bell exhibited some transformational qualities, but was predominately transactional. Bell felt that the political configuration of the department did not permit transformational leadership. Rather, he felt forced by circumstances, by movement conservatives, and by ideological warfare on the right and the left to resort to transactional leadership. The data revealed that
Bell favored transformational leadership as more powerful a construct of leadership. In practice, however, he f e lt he had no other choice but consensus and compromise, and therefore, transactional leadership
Philosophy of Education; Like his views on leadership, Bell's philosophy of education had a long gestation, but a quick maturation. Boll talked, wrote, and discussed his philosophy over a forty year period.
Research Question 5: Was there an id entifiab le philosophy of education exhibited by the secretary of the Department of Education?
Bell's philosophy of education was strongly
Realist, with undercurrents of Idealism and Pragmatism emergent throughout. Said B ell, "[My philosophy is] an amalgam, a mix of idealism and realism" (B ell, 19B9, p. 17). But the data substantiating this claim originated more than thirty years ago. In his fictionalized account of a pedagogue (Bell, 1955), Bell made clear what place philosophies of education occupied. They were not to be relegated to the back room, or to the armchair:
[W]e should place the greatest premium on training
in the fundamental processes . , . the tools of
learning. He must be able to read and write and to
express himself e ffic ie n tly . [W]e should then turn
to citizenship training and place emphasis on
teaching our students to be . . . patriots . . . in
our democracy. We should stress history and civics
and the specific knowledge and skills that will
produce good citizens. Current a ffa irs should be
taught on a ll levels of our school.
If we fa il to teach these young people here in our school to get along with each other and to
become adjusted socially, they will not be happy
and successful in lif e . (B ell, 1955, p. 124)
Bell added through his fic tio n al character that the child should be taught "how to care for his body and preserve his health" (p. 124) and should not concern himself with training students for specific skills such as carpentry, welders,*and mechanics (p. 125). The main role of the teacher was to "produce young people who have a good command of the fundamentals, a good attitude toward citizenship responsibilities, good health, good tastes in finer things and make them well adjusted socially," thus preparing them to go on to college or trade school for their life's career (p. 125).
Education was to be specific facts and learned subjects, both strong staples of Realism.
This philosophy did not change when he took over as secretary:
I think in education we are trying to teach, first
of all, skills that are essential for a person to
learn and to keep on learning throughout their
lives. The mastery of the language, to speak, to
use language in furthering the thought process of
logic. And we need a good command of mathematics.
Then certainly, it goes beyond behavior. Without
the mastery of the subject matter in history, economics, and the area we call the social studies,
an understanding of science and the scientific
method, a person is not going to be prepared to
function in our world. (B ell, 1989, p. 18}
Bell described the "perfect teacher" in this manner:
The type of man we are seeking in our society is
one who makes his intellectual power the supreme
force in his total make-up. Such a person, given
the proper knowledge, w ill abstain when complete
abstinence is necessary, and w ill practice
moderation in meeting the hunger urgings of a ll his
physical appetites. (Bell, 1962b, p. 28)
B ell, near the time he made his f ir s t tr ip to
Washington, echoed these concerns. Education was l i f e long, i t did not end with the diploma (B ell, 1976a;
1970b). The important things were language, science, economics, ecology, math, psychology, geography, history, and anthropology (B ell, 1976a; 1970b). In short, this was a core-curriculum developed straight from Realist-based concerns. Ideas were important, but were not foremost (B ell, 1988, 1989). Finally, education had to educate the whole man, and include experiences, evidences of Pragmatism.
Bell's philosophy of education, likewise, held that there were specific things which could be measured. Students who could not read or write effectively could not express themselves verbally, and those who maintained a disregard for the life of the mind or the health of their bodies, were not good students or good citizens (Bell 1962b; 1989). Said Bell, "Our teenagers are just not reaching the levels of accomplishments that, by measures that we have, that we had expected.
[S]coras have been declining now for 12 consecutive years. We simply have to do something about that"
(MacNei1-Lehrer, 1981, September 7, p. 1). Bell also believed that an educational system that did not teach students certain skills and a core of subjects, had failed in Its charge (B ell, 1988; 1982f; 1974a; 1971b;
1970a; 1962c).
Bell's philosophy of education spanned four decades of educational leadership. His statements about his philosophy of education in the 1950s showed his concern that certain things should be taught, such as reading, writing, and arithmetic (Bell, 1955). In the 1960s Bell called for educational funding to be targeted to programs that sought and achieved results in reading, w riting, and arithmetic (Bell 1962b). During the 1970s, as acting Commissioner of Education, Bell argued for measurable levels of achievement in subject areas, and argued that failure to achieve certain levels meant that teaching was substandard (B ell, 1974b). F inally, while serving as secretary In the 1980s, Bell believed that there were specific facts that everyone should be taught, and specific s k ills that everyone should learn
(B ell, 1988; 1989). Throughout those four decades,
B ell's philosophy remained Realist with nuances of
Idealism and Pragmatism.
Research Question 6; Was this philosophy of education important in setting or helping to set department po1ic 1es?
The data revealed that, without question, it was.
Most of what Bell attempted to do 1n the ED centered around his philosophy of education (Bell, 1989). He devised programs to get at what he thought was important in education which his educational philosophy supplied.
"My emphasis on almost everything we did," said
B ell, "was connected to [my philosophy] (B ell, 1989, p.
16). The accomplishment of outcomes, the ranking of the states, the emphasis of, or the testimony to Congress on various educational reforms were a ll connected to [my philosophy]" (Bell, 1989, p. 16-17).
So important was Bell's concern to see policies matched with philosophy that he said, M[l]f you were to ask me the number one purpose of education [ i t ] would be to prepare a person to be academically competent" (B ell,
1989, p. 18). Schools that were "knowledge-centered" helped students become good citizen s, and helped man "dominate his environment at the command of his w ill"
(Bell, 1962b, p. 21). "All education," he wrote,
"begins with knowledge and ends with knowledge.
Education runs into conflict when this simple statement is forgotten or ignored" (B ell, 1962b, p. 17). Without this strong knowledge base of teaching, teaching itself and the responsibility of the education system woutd f a i l . In reviewing the methods used by teachers in the
1960s, Bell found much to be desired. The then present methods resonated in incompetence and encouraged mediocrity (Bell, 1989; 1962a, pp. 14-15).
Bell held to education as a life-long process
(B ell, 1989; 1988). He also developed into a formidable proponent for continuing and vocational education (B ell,
1984a; 1976f). Yes, he said, the students did have lots of information, but how much of it would be useful to th eir work experience? A core must be present, but i t must not be merely the acquisition of dates and names only (Bell, 1971b). It had to be accountable to the student by helping him to become a useful citizen in a democratic society, and by teaching him basic skills
(B ell, 1973; 1971a). These s k ills were both academic and vocational (Bell, 1984g, h; 1983a).
Bell's philosophy of education was reflected in policies that touched a ll grade levels, beginning with children. The intellect and the life of the mind was not to be pushed down a child's throat. Nevertheless, skills had to be learned by every child, and parents could play a key role (Bell, 1972). Thus, Bell reaffirmed the connection between parents and schools
(Bell, 1976a; 1972).
In this way, home and school could become equal partners in a mutual concern (B ell, 1975a). The schools could not accomplish this huge task of teaching and a ll that it entailed by themselves. Teachers, principals, superintendents, and parents needed to understand that.
They had to work together if education in the United
States was to be successful (Bell, 1975a). At that juncture, in the mid-1970s, Bell was concerned that both sides were failing in their determination (Bell, 1975a;
1976b).
The Nation at Risk report, which sparked the reform movement in America and later became a nationwide policy of reform, grew out of Bell's concern in the
1970s for excellence in education, the educational mediocrity he saw, the lack of accountability in the schools, and poor teacher-preparation (Bell, 1989; 1988;
1984b, g). Reform must begin in the home and end in the school (B ell, 1976a, e). Reforming education through excellence and a fundamental core became the watchword in education during the 1980s because i t had been forgotten in the 1970s. The report, Bell felt, spoke directly to the need in American education: "The facts are there," he said, "and we have to face them, painful as it is to face them" (MacNei1-Lehrer Report, 1983,
April 26, p. 1).
This view of education was in such harmony with
Bell's leadership initiative of excellence that it was hard to separate the two. B ell's policies, 3uch as accountability 1n schools, merit pay, the ranking of states, and his whole program of educational reform, were linked to his philosophy of education (Bell, 1989;
1984 a, b, c, g; 1983a, b, c; 1982a, b, c, e; 1981a, b).
Research Question 7: Wa3 this philosophy of education in agreement with statements made by the secretary?
The data showed that i t would be harder to find agreement more closely a llie d . Bell argued for what amounted to a core curriculum, set policies that sought to so lid ify it in schools, and then set about applauding its utility.
Bell's core curriculum would provide a firm foundation for all generations to come (Bell, 1976f).
He contrasted the framers' education, being liberally classical in nature, with their ability to achieve greatness (B ell, 1984a, f ) . Today's students, he pointed out, have neither the benefit of a classical education, nor are they able to achieve anything of long-lasting value (B ell, 1984b, g; 1976e, f ) . The time had come for a return to, or concentration upon, the fundamentals of education.
Said Bell, "Graduates from our public schools should be able to read, write, use basic mathematics, and have a fundamental background necessary for a period of lifelong learning" (Bell, 1976a, p. 46; Bell, 1989, pp. 13-16). Bell's statements about block grants underscored his willingness to match word with deed: the local schools would use the money to achieve policies relating to basic s k ills and excellence (McGrath, 1982).
"We're . . . committed to block grants . . . because . .
. it makes it possible for states and local authorities to use federal money in a more effective way than the narrow categorical approach does," said Bell (MacNeil-
Lehrer, 1981, September 7, p. 3).
From Bell's early articulation of concern about values (Bell, 1955) to his confirmation as the nation's second Secretary of Education, moral values were important (Bell, 1989, 1988, 1976d). "I think values are very important. We should be deeolv concerned with values. We should be teaching them casually, but also passionately" (Bell, 1989, p. 16). Bell felt that if the schools did not help students understand the basic traditional values, something was wrong (B ell, 1989, p.
16; 1988, 1976d). He wanted values tied to a moral setting: "They should be connected to moral settings.
They should be connected to the Ideals that we value.
Schools, he f e lt , had an obligation to do th is, even If
1t did stop short of prayer in the schools (B ell, 1989;
1988; 1976d). Was America up to the task? Bell (1983a) thought so. Given the country's heritage, its understanding of values, Its keen awareness of what 1s important, and its history to fight for what was right,
Bell was convinced this could come about.
Bell's educational philosophy was most closely allied with the definitions of Realism and Idealism.
His philosophy was based on a clear understanding of what should be taught: reading, w riting, mathematics, science, and the like. He saw a ll the advantages of the
American p lu ra lis tic educational system, but he was also concerned that traditional values were being overlooked.
Bell wondered if we had not been given too much and therefore could not achieve more: "To reach the outer limits we must have fire in our bellies .... The passion to achieve may be more d iffic u lt to sustain in our privileged environment. How do we keep wide awake on a fu ll stomach?" (B ell, 1988, p .10).
Clearly B ell's philosophy was a mixture of Realism and Idealism. These two philosophical and intellectual miens conveyed themselves 1n the form of basic, fundamental truths which were not taught behaviorally, but in a straight-forward fashion (B ell, 1989). A core of subjects was the basis for the philosophy of education. But the academic beginning was not limited to the mind alone. The learning had to be practical, it had to have direction, and 1t had to be accountable to the student. In his philosophy, policy was not made
Irrespective of his views, but because of them.
Leadership guided his followers, and his philosophy guided him, down to the very policies he advocated: accountability, master-teachers, basic skills, and even how federal programs would be funded.
Views of Government: Again, the key views sought here were whether or not the secretary viewed government's involvement with public education as either limited or unlimited. Research Question 4 spoke directly to this concern. B e ll’ s views about the federal government and education were clear and abundantly supplied.
Research Question 4: Were the secretary's leadership style and educational philosophy consistent with constitutional demands of limited federal involvement?
The data reveal that Bell favored a limited, or federal 1st1c, view of government (Bell 1989; 1988;
1984a-h; 1983a-f; 1982d, e ,f,h ; 1981a-d). He f e lt that
Washington had overstepped its command from the Constitution in some ways, and was in danger of becoming
too federalized in its intentions regarding education
(Bell, 1989, p. 23; 1981d), The time had come with the
Reagan administration, he felt, to stop that flow from
Washington and to place 1t back with the states (Bell,
1982d; 1981d).
In an address to Michigan educators and professors
he said, "This may cause you to snort with disgust, but
the plain answer is that the state legislatures must
levy the taxes and appropriate the money" (Kurtz, 1983,
May 14, p. A3). Bell also pointed out, "[Y]ou see,
right now the responsibility belongs out there in the states" (MacNei1-Lehrer, 1981 September 7, p. 4).
Indeed, so strong were his feelings about a limited federal role, that Bell called it the legacy he hoped to
leave after him. He wanted to leave the Department of
Education in control of less, not more, influence:
I would hope that I might be successful in
reversing the relentless trend toward federal
control of American education. I fear that If we
continue down the road we have been traveling, we
might find ourselves with an assertive, a ll-
powerful federal ministry of education, i.e ., a
system somewhat like the European countries. The
strength of the United States and its education 1s
tied to the diversity and autonomy of the education enterprise. Anything I can do to further enhance
these two principles would, I believe, make a
significant contribution. Therefore I hope I can
do something about regulation and about
encroachment in these areas. Even if t help
produce a skinnier rule book—simplistic as that
sounds--I w ill have rendered a worthwhile service
to education. (Bell, 1981c, p. 7)
Bell also took this federalistic approach to how government programs should be funded. Block grants, by definition, were less restrictive, assumed that not every program would be funded, and required that the localities receiving them had to make choices. This was federalism in very nearly its purest form (Bell, 1982d),
"The flexibility," said Bell, "on the local level under the block grant program should make i t easier to harmonize state aid funds with federal dollars" (Bell,
1981b, p. 29). Bell added, "Block grants w ill restore a measure of autonomy to the states in matters pertaining to education. We have a strong belief that the Tenth
Amendment left the states the responsibility for education, and block grants allow the states broad latitude" (Bell, 1981b, p. 6).
The limited view was important to Bell because of the distance from Washington to the states. Influence from Washington should issue broad, general concerns, and the states and localities should concentrate on concrete* specific ideas. "[A] limited federal role in education 1s required*" Bell wrote* "because despite past progress and acceptable responsiveness* the states have not done well recently" (Bell* 1982d* p. 376). But i t was not the role of the federal government to
"command or direct* but through research to discern nationwide trends* call attention to weaknesses, and recognize excellence" (Bell, 1982d* p. 376). Bell also said, "I think the states have been doing a bum job, but
I don't think the answer 1s to start federalizing the operation" (Kurtz, 1983 May 14, p. A3).
For Bell* limited federalism also meant changing the federal structure. "The cabinet-level structure now in place," he said* "lends Its e lf to strengthening the federal government's intrusive role in education" (Bell,
1982b* p. 23). Bell wrote*
[The new structure] would eliminate unwarranted
control and Interference in American education.
This control is primarily a state and local
responsibility. By eliminating the total number of
federal education programs* a foundation would
require fewer political and civil service employees
at a considerable savings to the taxpayer. (Bell,
1982b* p. 23)
Bell affirmed this belief after he left the office of secretary (Bell, 1989, pp. 23-26).
The limited federalism that Bell held did not, however, include a measure to erase education from the federal budget. Bell had seen the need for federal government, was the product of federal programs, and had enough education experience to see what happened when states were not pushed to achieve their best for education (Bell, 1989; 1988). But the states and the lo calities had the right over the federal government when it came to decision making and policies (Bell,
1989; 1988; 1982a-f). When the states failed in certain areas, when those weaknesses were not addressed, then the federal government had a right to step in and te ll the states to get on with their work (Bell, 1989, p.
23).
Finally, in Bell's limited federalism, states and lo calities were to work together to achieve common concerns. This was what he hoped would happen with the
Nation at Risk report (Bell, 1989). He hoped that with the commission reporting on widely rumored weaknesses in the education framework, the states and localities would set about doing something constructive about it . In this way, an educational reform fir e begun by the federal government in Washington would be swept by the winds of discontent nationwide. In the end, reform would be completed with the federal government pointing the way, and the states and localities carrying out the mission.
Research Question 8: How were the secretary's leadership style and educational philosophy converted into public action?
The data to answer this question began with B ell's
Commission on Excellence in Education, and its report, A
Nation at Risk. The report, though nearly crippled by outside intrusions (Bell, 198B), stressed excellence, accountability, merit in education, basic s k ills , and reform. Through much wheeling and dealing, Bell was able to soften the impact of those intrusions, and the report became the nation's cornerstone of reform.
Bell also made other bold in itia tiv e s . He strove to combine the idea of excellence as a huge umbrella under which a ll of education would rest (B ell, 1982c;
Parnell, 1981-1982, quoting B ell). This excellence in education would not only mean elementary and secondary schools, and colleges and universities, but also community and junior colleges and vocational education
(Parnell, 1981-1982). Neither would this drive toward excellence mean an end to equal access for a ll (Parnell,
1981-1982, quoting B e ll). Bell also called on education to be sensible and make money (Parnell, 1981-1982, quoting B ell).
The Bell push for excellence, however, meant that leadership in education would not come from Washington, but from the states. All of this did not mean an end to federal programs In education, but It did mean an end to many Individual programs which Bell fe lt were too draconian (Bell, 1982g). He would seek to "streamline" the processes from the federal government to the states, while creating more flexibility (Bell, 1982g, pp. 19-
20; 1982e, g; 1981c).
Bell tried to reform teaching through the action of merit pay, and the career ladder (B ell, 1982e; Marland,
1982). He also called for education to be practical
(B ell, 1981b).
The character of Bell's descriptions in his early work led him to create programs while at the head of the
Department of Education. He feared for the nation and
Its schools (Be 11, 1983g). Bell called for updated standards and a desire for excellence (Bell, 1984a;
1983d; 1982c).
Public action in the form of the "wall chart" also typified how Bell linked leadership style and educational philosophies into a concrete reality (Bell,
1989, p. 8). The chart acted as a barometer for the achievement of the nation's schools. B ell's successor,
William Bennett, also kept it.
Reform called for in A Hation at Risk also culminated into public action, and grew out of Bell's leadership in itia tiv e s and educational philosophy. Bell later wrote.
To launch a campaign of the magnitude necessary to
transform American education early in [Reagan's]
f ir s t term, the new president should call a summit
conference at which he lays out to those present
and to the nation the goals that must be attained
and how this is to be brought about. (B ell, 1968,
p. 166)
The "how" of Bell's plan was converted into public actions such as accountability, career ladder, higher standards in all states, entry-level, competitive salaries for teachers, the extension of teacher preparation to fiv e years, master teacher programs, a national board of certification, probationary periods of
3-5 years for entry-level teachers, and a vigorous recruitment of teachers undertaken (B ell, 1988, p. 179-
181).
Bell talked about reform through this plan of excellence at every opportunity (Bell, 1988; 1984b;
1984d; 19B4e; 1984f; 1984g; H all, 1984; Marland, 1982).
Bell, even after he left office, continued to call for excellence, and even made comparisons with other countries, such as Japan (B ell, 1985). The commitment to excellence, the public actions of the school awards for excellence, and the establishment of career ladders about the country added further data to this question. Summary
B ell's leadership, philosophy, and view of government demonstrated that f ir s t , Bell saw leadership as coming from the top, from the leader, and guided by that leader's own charisma. These personal q u alities, armed with the tools of accountability, management by objectives, career ladders, master teacher programs, lengthened teacher preparation, and increased teacher salaries would combine with the goal of excellence to reform education. This leadership, while transformational in character, was forced into a transactional mode of operation because of the political matters in the department.
Bell's leadership style was most consistent with the federal role in education as outlined by the
Constitution. Bell’s philosophy of education was
Realist in nature with strands of Idealism and
Pragmatism evident throughout. His philosophy of education greatly influenced what went on in the department.
F inally, B ell's public action underscored the pervasive influence of his leadership style and his educational philosophy.
William John Bennett
Leadership; Bennett rarely separated his leadership view and philosophy of education. When he spoke of the one, he nearly always spoke of the other.
Given his academic training as a philosopher, this was not considered very unusual. Nevertheless, the two remained distin ct.
Research Question 1: Was there an id en tifiab le leadership style evinced by the secretary?
Bennett was not one to mince words on the subject of leadership. In an a rtic le to board members, Bennett used the example of principal Joe Clark to illustrate his view of leadership. After describing Clark as a
"take-charge" man who fired incompetents and expelled undisciplined students, Bennett urged school board members that Joe Clarks needed to be cloned throughout
America (Bennett, 1986c). This take-charge approach to leadership was confirmed in a later interview (Bennett,
1969). Bennett called his leadership offensive as opposed to a defensive one (Bennett, 1989, p. 1).
Bennett approached leadership as a leader who pointed the way, who coaxed and cajoled others to follow, and who used his office as a bully-pulpit for his leadership vision (Bennett 1989; 1988b; 1987a, h; 1986b).
Bennett gave evidence that this was his approach before coming to the secretary’s position. While serving 1n the National Endowment for the Humanities, f ir s t as a regional director, and then as its chairman,
Bennett approached leadership in a take-command attitude, aggressive, and in an offensive mode (Bennett,
1985b; M ille r, 1987, September 16).
Bennett's style of leadership was not, however, to explicate exact goals (Bennett, 1984). He wanted rather to discuss the overall idea, or vision, of how to get there. The practical matter of reaching the destination would be le ft to those closer than he to the front lines. This avoidance of presenting a "blueprint" to success, in the sense that every school would follow x, y, and z steps, probably grew out of his training as a lawyer (Bennett, 1984). As secretary, Bennett spelled out more clearly the characteristics of his leadership and vision by stressing excellence and accountability.
Through accountability, measurable and quantifiable goals were sought, yielding excellence (Bennett, 1987a, f» 9> 1; 1986d). The approach to leadership was, for
Bennett, mainly to articulate vision, to hammer home purpose, and to do both from the b u lly-p u lp it of his o ffic e as secretary (1986c; 1987c, k; 1988a).
Research Question 2: If an identifiable style could be found, could it be characterized as transactional or transformational?
The data quite explicitly showed a transformational style, Bennett himself agreed with this assessment.
When asked to characterize his leadership style he said,
"I believed in an offensive leadership style as opposed to defensive leadership. I believed In setting the terms of the national debate, so I see my leadership as transformational" (Bennett, 1989, p. 1).
His use of the secretary's position as a "bully pulpit" to achieve the goals of educational reform also pointed to a transformational 3tyle (Lewis, 1985).
Within a few months of taking over the office, Bennett set the terms of the national debate on education as excellence and accountability, cleaned house in the top positions of the ED, reorganized and redesigned the
O ffice of Educational Research and Improvement (OERI), and phased out the National In stitu te of Education
(Lewis, 1985).
Bennett's leadership bypassed the traditional educational leadership clientele and spoke directly to the people (Bennett, 1988b, e; 19871; 1985 September 21;
1985 October 3). He also spoke in a way that they could understand, a method he referred to as his three C's approach: Content, Character, and Choice (Bennett,
1985a; 1987a, c, g, i, k; Lewis, 1985). These three C's clearly outlined where his leadership would be taking
American public education.
Bennett created conflict to accentuate his transformational approach to leadership. For example, in one of his early and more controversial moves,
Bennett called for a cutback on financial aid to college students. Citing low return on dollars while students bought expensive stereo equipment, Bennett called on colleges and universities to transform this program Into one that would assist only the truly needy (Bennett,
1986 October 10; Engelgau, 1985 February 6). Bennett used this approach to underscore that changes had to be made (Bennett, 1986, March 4; 1985, October 28). Some called Bennett's views e l i t i s t (Power, 1987; Engelau,
1985); others, via the vehicle of editorials, viewed
Bennett's leadership in this area as confrontational
(Bernstein, Marchese & Newman, 1985). S till others, even those within his own department, viewed his remarks on education as seeking to "undermine" rather than encourage, the improvement of American education
("Education Leaders Issue Criticism of Bennett . , .,"
1986, p. 546). Bennett used this co nflict to bolster his efforts to achieve his goals.
He also used conflict as a key to establish and maintain transformational leadership to his advantage in pressing his ideas for public school improvement and reform. To implement Bennett's vision, he lectured schools on the necessity of the three C's approach
(Bennett, 1987a, h, j, k; Feistritzer, 1985). This vision was guided "by the America people" (F e is tritz e r,
1985, p. 8). Bennett claimed he was leading the nation's schools in the direction that the people of this country wanted to go, in the direction "that the
American people have in mind when they speak about what they want" (F e is tritz e r, 1985, p. 10). His school was
"A school where teachers teach children how to read and write correctly, help to develop re lia b le standards of righ t and wrong, [and] emphasize the teaching of math, science, English, and history" (Feistritzer, 1985, p.
10). Other identified curricular changes would occur in reading, w riting, mathematics, science, social studies, the arts, cultural literacy, foreign language, and physical education, according to the content of the three C's (Bennett, 1986a). All of these things should be taught by every school. How they were to be taught,
Bennett did not say. That they should be taught, he was adamant.
That Bennett sought the improvement of American education through transformational leadership cannot be denied. As previously pointed out, Bennett (1989) himself called his leadership transformational. Bennett followed through on his claim by, in Burns' (1978) language, catching up his followers in a vision of what education should be. That is, he described a vision that made sense to his followers and then urged them to help him achieve its goals (Bennett, 1988d; 1987f; 1985,
November 8). Bennett succeeded in amassing a large following (Charen, 1989, March 22, 1989 & May 31; Evans, 1989, February 4; Laugenberg, 1989, January 21; Beck &
Namath, 19B8; Brookes, 1988, July 23; Hart, 1988,
Oecember 31; Hawkins, 1988, June 11; K ilpatrick, 1988,
September 21; and Ravitch & Finn, 1988), though he did
not garner as much support from the educational
establishment.
Tradition was also Important to Bennett's view of
leadership because we a ll "share something in common— In
common principles, common memories, and a common
language In which to discuss our common a ffa irs ....
We entrust this task . . . to our schools" (Bennett,
1985, September 26). Bennett used this message of
tradition again to call followers up to his vision, and
provide them with a way to follow (Bennett, 1985,
September 26).
Bennett's transformational approach to leadership
used conflict as a means for achieving goals, the bully
pu lpit as a means of defining the parameters of debate,
his three C’s approach as a mission to achieve vision,
and tradition as a vehicle to attract followers.
Research Question 3; Was one leadership style
considered by the secretary to be either more useful or more necessary, given the department's political
configuration?
Bennett never addressed th is question d ire c tly , but
he indicated that transformational leadership was the style he wanted to follow (Bennett, 1989). He did not talk about compromise, nor did he mention consensus in his speeches, Interviews, or artic les . He did not ignore the opportunities for compromise, but he did not readily seek them. Nevertheless, his approach to conflict, his use of the secretary's office as a bully- pulpit, and his calls for reform gave a distinct impression that transformational leadership was followed because It was needed.
For example, Bennett's calls for reform couched in tradition often resulted in conflict from others
(LeBlanc, 1988; Manning, 1988; Ohanian, 1988— a ll quoting Bennett and opposing him). Bennett met his opposition without backing down (Bennett, 1988a, b;
1986, October 6). He attempted to m ollify this conflict, not with compromise, but by claiming his place as an educational insider; "When I speak as a c r it ic - - as, I trust, a constructive critic— I speak as a member of the family. I am a product of the academy. I found intellectual nourishment there. I taught there"
(Bennett, 1985, October 28, p. 2).
When his attempt to defuse the criticism fa ile d , he again did not compromise, he preached from his pulpit:
The rhetoric of contemporary American higher
education, the terms In which practitioners and
advocates speak of It , is often exceedingly pious . . . . But try, as I have tried, to criticize
American higher education by the one yardstick that
matters—namely, the relative success or failure of
our colleges and universities at discharging the
educational responsibilities that they bear. From
the reaction, you would think I had hurled a rock
through the stained-glass window of a cathedral.
(Bennett, 1986, October 10, pp. 3-4)
Since he approached leadership in an offensive mode
rather than a defensive one, Bennett often used the
criticisms that others had for American education to
p a llia te or validate his own views. For example, the
reports from various committees, including 8e1l*s
Commission on Excellence in Education, had pointed to
the low level of educational excellence found in
American schools. Bennett often referred to those
reports as confirmation of his own criticisms that
education was in need of the transformational reform he
advocated (Bennett 1988b; 1987f, h).
Bennett felt transformational leadership necessary,
but he did not always find i t as easy as a more
compromising leadership might have been. For example,
Bennett himself noted that the transformational change he was seeking in education had not come about as quickly as he thought 1t would (Bennett, 1988a). He attributed the lethargy to his opponents in the educational establishment (Bennett, 1988a; Anson, 1988;
Jung & K1rst, 1986). Bennett did convince many that educational reform was needed. Vet he also cited reports and studies that proved that reform was not taking place fast enough, or completely enough to change the course of education as rapidly as he thought 1t needed changing (Bennett, 1988a; 1987h).
The sum of Bennett's leadership style, then, was one of combativeness 1n which he saw as necessary the use of the secretary's chair as a bully pulpit to disseminate Ideas that were supported by facts and v e rifie d by research methods. Bennett approached his leadership opportunity with Ideas translated Into a vision for American education. He used the conflict he generated to move American education along the road to reform. Transforming American education called for a transformational style of leadership (Meyerson, 1988).
Philosophv of Education; Research Question 5: Was there an identifiable philosophy of education exhibited by the secretary?
The data revealed that there was a strong Idealist- based philosophy. This philosophy was pandemic 1n his three C's formula, a formulation that became the earmark of the Bennett-run ED. Those three C's were: content, character, and commitment (Bennett, 1987a, c, g, i, k;
1985a; Lewis, 1985a). The evidence that indicated that Bennett held a true Idealist view in education was revealed in the supremacy of place that Bennett gave to Ideas. This did not remove from hi3 philosophy traces of Realism ( i . e . , that there was in fact a certain body of knowledge that must be learned), but his insistence that ideas hold a position of primacy remained firm throughout his discourses, both at NEH and later in the ED (Bennett,
1987f, k; 1985b; 1986b, c; 1984).
Much of the evidence for this may be traced to
Bennett's own education, to Ideas, but not to place.
"If my experience told me that such an effect could only occur at a place like Williams, then I'd say, ’Well, everybody needs to go to a school like th a t'" (Bennett,
1984, p. 6). The reliance, then, was less on place, and more on ideas. His insistence throughout his career as secretary (and throughout his chairmanship of the NEH) underscored his reliance on ideas, especially classical ones (Bennett, 1984; Bennett, 1986a, b; 1988e).
But i t was not enough to have a table of contents or, simply, a "menu" of ideas. Bennett thought the nation needed a meal of ideas, and for that, there was going to have be preparation, preparation in the classics and the humanities (Bennett, 1986, October 10, p. 7). This was clearly an Idealist approach to education. His philosophy of education embraced the study of the humanities because i t was a "case for the study of what's worth knowing" (Bennett, 1988a, b; Bennett Makes
Case for the Humanities, 1984, p. 21). Bennett further argued that "some of the most important things a student should study in college [are the humanities]. If not, why have college? IBM could do i t better than a university" (Bennett, 1985, December 11). The humanities were rich in ideas, and therefore, where
Bennett's frame of mind was naturally attracted.
Bennett's insistence on ideas often expressed its e lf in a stark and even headstrong fashion:
I think every college student—no matter what his
career ambitions—should discover some of the great
works that te ll us how men and women of our own and
other civilizations have grappled with life's
relentless questions: What should be loved? What
deserves to be defended? What is noble and what is
base? As Montainge wrote, a student should have
the chance to learn "what valor, temperance, and
justice are; the difference between ambition and
greed, loyalty and servitude, liberty and license,
and the marks of true solid contentment. (Bennett,
1985, December 11, p. 5)
The earmark of Idealism was clear here. As Ozmon and
Craver (1986) pointed out, Today, Idealists lean more toward the study of
ideas through the use of classical works or
writings and art that express great ideas. The
Great Books of the Western World, a program that
began at the University of Chicago in the 1950s,
achieved wide attention and is advocated by many
Id ealist educators as a vehicle for encouraging
students toward learning of a more conceptual
nature. (pp. 18-19)
Bennett's comment above, along with many others referenced here, were directly within this tradition.
This philosophy was very much in harmony with
Bennett's second C: character. Ideas drawn from the
Great Books, whether in a series or separately, contained much that made up the fabric of the Western trad itio n . Bennett thought passionately about values, not to the extent of usurping the teaching roles of parents, but to the point of helping them in that endeavor, "[T]he schools must help. They too must teach what I would call virtues, at the risk of sounding behind the times. We cannot forget that the teaching of intellectual acumen and moral virtue should be seen as
Inseparable" (Bennett, 1985, September 21, p. 3).
Bennett's Idealist philosophy of education followed textbook descriptions of it . It focused on Ideas, called for the teaching of values, and endorsed the Great Books approach to education (Bennett, 1989; 1987h,
j , 1; 1986, January 13; 1985a-b; 1985, December 6; 1984,
September 21).
Research Question 6: Was his philosophy of
education important in setting or helping to set
departmental policies?
The question, on the basis of the data studied,
required an affirm ative response. His philosophy of
education was one based solidly on ideas that had
practical value. The practical value of these ideas
emerged in public policy.
For example, his concern about moral character,
sound character, or reliable standards of right and
wrong, took a more intense focus on drugs and alcohol
abuse 1n the nation's schools. Part of the problem,
Bennett was convinced, had to do with the loss of values
In the 1960s and 1970s (Bennett, 1988c; Bennett, 1986,
October 6). "For two decades," he wrote, "the 60*s and
70's, our schools did not do as good a job as they
should have" (Bennett, 1986, October 6, pp. 1-2).
Bennett's drug policy was an example of how philosophy
determined policy (Bennett, 1987d; 1986, October 6).
Bennett's philosophy of education called for a
restructuring of education. In terms of policies, it meant better teacher education and more course content
in that education (Bennett, 1987e, f, i, 1; 1986a, b; 1985a, b). He reasoned that education had trie d a number of very difficult and hardly empirically valid
Innovations; why not now take on this one that was not only not new, but had the d istin ct advantage of having been trie d and found successful (Bennett 1985b)?
Bennett advocated policies that touched on choice in schools, school prayer, merit pay, accountability, master-teachers, and more (Bennett, 1986, January 13,
14, & 21; October 6 & 10; Bennett, 1985, October 3 & 23;
November 8; December 6). He furthered these policies by arguing what subjects, in fact, should be taught:
"There is considerable agreement," he said to the
College Board National Forum audience, "that baccalaureate study ought to include two years of coherent and rigorous general education in the disciplines of literature, mathematics, history, the sciences, philosophy, foreign language, and the fine arts" (Bennett, 1985, October 23, p. 4).
The Influence of his philosophy of education extended into policy-setting beyond the classroom, to adult literacy (Bennett, 1985, December 10). Even in his concern for vocational education, Bennett s t i l l insisted on tangible reforms that included the three C'3
(Bennett, 1986e). Here were tangible goals set to policy with measurable objectives: higher standards for students and teachers, the wall chart, and making the schools turn out better test scores by insisting on basic skills (Bennett, 1988b, c; 1987a, f, h, kj 1985,
March 27; October 3; November 8; November 21). These objectives became the policy initiatives for the
Department of Education under Bennett.
All of these concerns— content, character, and choice--reflected Bennett's concern that education be a science that produced results and helped to move the nation to educational reform, not impede its progress to hoped-for goals. Bennett followed up these policy- setting concerns for choice, master teachers, merit pay, and the like by asking Office of Educational Research and Improvement assistant secretary Chester Finn to produce a book that would demystify education research and prove his policies the correct ones to follow,
Finn's result, the What Works series, attempted to do that (Bennett, 1986, March 4). The series, Bennett went on to say, confirmed common sense, something that had taken abuse from those in the education fie ld in recent years (Bennett, 1986 March 4).
Bennett hoped to develop into a groundswell the grass roots support for the findings in the What Work3 series. He also hoped that support would eventually work its way behind his other policy in itia tiv e s , mentioned above (Bennett, 1987k; Uhlig, 1987; Bennett,
1986, March 10). Neither teachers nor schools were le ft untouched by the zeal his policy-setting reforms took. Bennett
lectured teachers on what they needed to accomplish, as well as talking about which schools were working, and which were not (Bennett March 13, 1986). He focused more on polls of teachers to undergird support for his
ideas. These ideas did not exclude higher pay for teachers, but they focused more on higher pay going to the better-skilled teachers (Bennett, 1986, March 13).
He saw no reason for allowing bad teachers to be rewarded for poor performance. They would be accountable to the system as the system was accountable to the nation, and the nation to the people. Bennett understood that there may be problems with making a distinction (Bennett, 1987f, k). But he felt that there were greater problems by not making any distinctions at al 1.
Research Question 7: Was his philosophy of education in agreement with statements made about education by him? The answer to this question was also affirmative. Bennett articulated his educational philosophy about content, character and choice and then followed i t up with deeds. Whether Bennett was addressing educators, university presidents, or even elementary school teachers and principals (Bennett,
1986b), or whether he was talking about policy or about philosophy, his message was uniform: American education had slipped from Its pedestal and needed reform
(Bennett, 1987h, k). Reform could be accomplished by focusing on the three C's, which in turn could be further protracted into other tangible ideas of policy implementation.
For example, when Bennett spoke about Japanese education, these same elements came up in the course of the conversation, address, lecture, or article (Bennett,
1987e, g). Later Bennett revealed himself 1n language too clear to be mistaken: "CUn transmitting the ideals and the story of our people we cannot do that without reference to religion, to religious beliefs and believers of our religious tradition. This tradition is the wellspring of many of our beliefs" (Bennett, 1985,
November 8, p. 8). That trad itio n coincided, Bennett reminded his audience, with what parents want from their schools—reading and writing, and reliable standards of righ t and wrong. In the message, as well as in his policies, Bennett emphasized content, choice, and character.
Bennett often spoke in a way that did not mask his language in jargon:
Nothing seems to me to be more sensible; nothing
seems to me to make a charge to the charter of the
Secretary of Education; we want to strengthen and try to put [Ideas about choice, values, merit
teachers] in broader circulation. Part of the
understanding of right and wrong has to do with the
understanding of one's place in society and place
of one's society in the world .... Our
education must bear that in mind. (Bennett, 1985,
November 8, p. 12)
The context for Bennett's philosophy was then d e a r: Ideas were the central core, the content of his curriculum, so to speak. Those ideas could best be taught in going back to basics, the basics of reading, w riting, and the sciences. Preeminent in this educational philosophy was the need for the centrality of the humanities—the bearer, It may be said, of
Western culture's ideas. At the heart of the humanities was the importance, even primacy, of the teaching of character (Bennett, 1988c). He also knew that the children in public schools needed to be taught basic skills and basic values, or, in Bennett's words, content and character.
Bennett's philosophy was Idealist, with shades or overtones of Realism. His philosophy of education was lik e Bennett himself: combative, adamant, self-assured, and above a ll, grounded in the trad itio n that Americans have come to think of as th eir own. Bennett spoke openly about his educational philosophy. When he spoke, he was careful to match word with deed. Policies were determined by this philosophy which expressed its e lf most frequently 1n a triumvirate: content, choice, and character.
Views of Government; Research Question 4: Was the leadership style consistent with the constitutional demands of limited federal government?
Liberty was a mainstay for Bennett's view of leadership and government and the relation of both to education. So Important was liberty that Bennett made certain that students learned it. In teaching it to them, Bennett argued for limited government: "Our students should know our nation's ideals and aspirations," he wrote. "What are they? Well, we, we the people, all of us, believe in liberty., and equal itv . we believe in 1imited government and the betterment of the human condition" (Bennett, 1985a, p. 4, emphases 1n the original).
In a later speech (Bennett, 1985, December 6),
Bennett made this theme even more pronounced:
Let me start with first principles. We are, in
Lincoln's words, a nation dedicated to the
proposition that all men are created equal. I
think we would all readily agree that equality is
the principle most fundamental to the constitution
of our democracy and to the organization of our society. What does this mean, to be equal? Well,
according to our Declaration of Independence, it
means to be endowed with certain inalienable
rights, among them life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness .... A diverse people, for although
we are equal, we are not all the same. (p. 2)
Bennett*3 themes of lib erty and limited government came, no doubt, from his reliance on the Federalist
Papers. In his speeches and his a rtic le s , 8ennett makes reference to the Federalist Papers either directly or by allusion (Bennett 1988b, 19871; 1985a, b; Bennett, 1985,
September 21 & 26; Bennett, 1984; Meyerson, 1988, for example). When the Federalist Papers were not the direct source, Bennett would resort to unassailable constitutional figures such as Thomas Jefferson or
Benjamin Franklin (Bennett, 1985, September 21, p. 15).
But he also went further; he referenced his views about the leadership of hi3 office in language that was reminiscent of the Constitution and to the founding fathers: "The work [of the ED] is principally the
American people's work, not the federal government's.
We, in Washington, can talk about these matters, comment on them, provide intellectual resources, and, when appropriate, limited fiscal resources, but the responsibility is the people's" (Bennett, 1985, March
27; also quoted, Jung & K irst, 1986, p. 95). One of Bennett's C's in his three C's approach to the transformational reform of education was choice.
His insistence on choice as a fundamental right of parents also epitomized his constitutional view of the federal role in education. That parents could choose where they would send th e ir children to school was of fundamental importance to Bennett because, "Not all teachers are parents but all parents are teachers, the indispensable teachers. And as teachers, parents always have the first and largest responsibility for educating their children" (Bennett, 1985a, p. 5).
Bennett firm ly believed that government could not solve a ll human problems. In fact, it could only f i l l in the gaps where the states and localities failed, he thought (Bennett, 1984). Even pressing problems of major concern to us were not necessarily the province of government:
A national need should not always be translated
into a federal solution. We may have a national
need for responsible parenthood, but that doesn't
mean we should have a Department of Parenting. We
have a national need for relig ion; God knows we
shouldn't necessarily have a federal Department of
Religion. National problems don't necessarily call
for federal solutions. (Bennett, 1984, p. 9)
This included some education problems, and served as a soapbox from which Bennett defended budget cuts while he
was secretary. Money was not the solution to every
problem, and that certainly applied to federal problems
(Bennett, 1989). The Constitution was a document that
outtined the limited powers of a federalized nation.
Bennett's leadership style was dedicated to a limited
federal bureaucracy.
Government was not entirely bad, Bennett thought;
it just had to be kept in tow;
So, how do you deal with government? In some
cases, simply by damage control, by trying to lim it
the harm that government does. We must insist that
government do no harm to those institutions that
really make a difference in the lives of
individuals--institutions like the family, good
schools, and community organizations. But in many
cases, i would urge conservatives to view the
existence of government programs as an opportunity
to make things better. Harness government programs
to serve conservative ends. Harness government
programs to ends that work, ends that re fle c t the
basic views and values of American people.
(Meyerson, 1988, p. 2)
Bennett also felt that this represented not only
responsible government, but the expressed desires of the people. He went on to say that limited government should never relieve people from th eir responsibilities, especially in the case of welfare programs.
Limited government for Bennett meant government helping where 1t could help. It could help in education, so long as education was not bedeviled by what he called "educrats," individuals with professional careers in education, and therefore a stake, or so he thought, to see funding for education increase year a fter year (Meyerson, 1988). The idea of limited government did not mean that there would be no help from
Washington. It meant an end to Interference from
Washington, however. "Let me be clear," he said in an address to the Association for a Better New York,
We do not intend to prescribe one method for
another .... Our movement away from exclusive
reliance on one method, and our endorsement of
local fle x ib ilit y , should not be mistaken for a
return to the old days of sink or swim .... But
we believe that local flexibility will serve the
needs of these students far more effectively than
Intrusive federal regulation. (Bennett, 1985,
September 26, p. 13)
Bennett's transformational leadership approach, then, held s tric tly to the view of a limited federal government as defined by the Constitution. Government was to stress those themes that were basic to the Declaration of Independence: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Government was not e v il, but it must be checked in order to be certain that i t did not obtrude its e lf upon the people. Government programs would be organized and implemented, not to do good so much as to do what they set out to achieve— i.e ., do what their goals said they were trying to do.
When these goals fa ile d , or when certain programs did not succeed, the money was to be placed elsewhere, and other programs trie d until success could be found.
All of this took place in a political context that had to be taken account of, had to be understood in the proper political milieu. But the desires of the founding fathers were to be the overriding concern.
Research Question 8: Were leadership styles and philosophies of education converted into public action?
The data yielded a strong positive affirmation.
Bennett never deviated from his three C's. Toward the close of his tenure at the ED, however, he chose to phrase them in more id en tifiab le reform or policy goals.
These became six in number: accountability, assessments, choice, alternative c e rtific a tio n , effective (school) leadership, and hire the best people
(Bennett, 1987h). It can be easily seen that these do not differ substantially from content, character, and choice. Alternative certification was added, but this fit easily under the umbrella of accountability.
Bennett wanted autonomy for the schools, a clear public action. Having certification procedures, for example, which made many Ph.D.’s in this country ineligible to teach in the public schools, seemed ridiculous to him
(Bennett, 1987a). So, he called for a relaxation of certification requirements that would enable successful
"teachers" from the private sector to be put to use in the schools (Bennett, 1987a).
Educational reform, then, would come through the federal Department of Education administering programs fairly, disseminating reliable, useful information, and using the office of secretary as a bully pulpit from which to speak out, as a family member, to educational concerns (Bennett, 1986d), These major forms would then f i l t e r out into making schools more accessible to parents, tightening teachei—preparation, trying to establish merit pay for teachers, making sure the school system was designed to let teachers teach, making sure state resources were adequate to the task, recruiting teachers and principals from wide geographical areas to insure educational leadership, and assessing performance
(Bennett, 1986d).
These plans also extended to school board members
(Bennett, 1986c). School board members were to be concerned about their own leadership and the leadership of their superintendents and principals. Drugs were a major concern and school boards should be doing something about them, Bennett said. They should also have made the school more accessible to parents, made
3ure th eir schools had good teachers, and examined the curriculum to be sure that certain disciplines were being taught.
Bennett stressed the overall policy of accountability. He drew on this public action—the very public action of making promises about education measure up to an agreed-upon standard— a major theme during his term as secretary:
Another conservative principle is accountability in
government, the idea that federal monies ought to
be spent in ways that reach the object they are
intended to reach .... For example, the
Department of Education during my tenure did not
launch an ideological assault on Chapter 1, the $4
b illio n compensatory education program, or even the
$140 million program for bilingual education . . .
. The $4 b illio n in Chapter 1 should go to actual,
demonstrable gains in achievement by poor children,
or we should do something else with the money.
(Meyerson, 1988, pp. 2-3)
The transformational character of Bennett's leadership pushed for reform. Reform met with conflict which Bennett hoped to turned Into epoch-making change.
His philosophy of Ideas were converted Into public
actions.
Summary.
Bennett exhibited an identifiable leadership style,
one that was designated as transformational. Bennett
thought that approach necessary, given the need for
reform in education. That need he felt had been granted
by reports such as £. Nation at Risk. and by anecdotal
information he had gained while serving as chairman of
the National Endowment for the Humanities.
The p o litic a l configurations of the department led
Bennett to assert his transformational leadership. That
assertion 1n turn led to heated exchanges between
Bennett and those he said were of the education
establishment.
His philosophy of education focused on ideas, with
Influences of Realism also present. Bennett believed 1n
the Great Books approach to education and the
inculcation of moral values in the schools, two clear
symptoms of Idealism.
His Idealism influenced public policy in a number of in itia tiv e s , chief among them being Content, Choice, and Character. His spoken statements and his public policies agreed with one another.
Bennett's leadership style and educational philosophy were held in check by his unswerving devotion to the Constitution of the United States. Bennett sided with the founding fathers, and often quoted the
Federal 1st Papers as a chief source to verify his actions within the Department of Education. Bennett rarely spoke about the federal role in government without also calling up the names of those responsible for the Constitution.
Lastly, Bennett's leadership style and education philosophy converted itself into public action by calling first for Content, choice, and Character, and later for accountability, assessments, choice, alternative certification, effective (school) leadership, master-teachers, higher standards for teachers and students, and the teaching of values. He talked most frequently about his three C's—Content,
Choice and Character. At times he expanded the three to six, Including with the choice, accountability, assessments of student work, alternative certification, effective leadership, and the hiring of the best people.
Whichever formulation was used, however, pointed to the same public actions. All of Bennett's public actions were measured against the goals of what a given public action should achieve.
Lauro Fred Cavazos Jr.
Leadership: Research Question 1: Was there an Id entifiab le leadership style evidenced by the secretary?
To make any more than preliminary findings on the leadership style of Lauro Cavazos while he remained 1n the department would be premature and unjust. Cavazos s t i l l held the Department of Education Secretary's seat at the close of this study. While the answer to the f ir s t question was affirm ative, Cavazos' style appeared to come more by virtue of the problems presented, rather than from any conscious e ffo rt on the part of the secretary to direct events himself, by initializing a leadership approach or style.
One day after his swearing in, Cavazos outlined his leadership approach. When asked how his style would differ from that of former Secretary Bennett, Cavazos replied,
I think everybody has d ifferen t kinds of styles and
different goals that they try to achieve. I have
always prided myself first of all as being a person
that listens, 1 put a lot of stock in listening,
which I think is the first place to start ....
The second place that I'll start . . . 1s trying to
. . . build a consensus .... [S]o therefore
what I Intend to do is to try to work with
everybody, to the best of my a b ility .... Now I
want you to know that I didn't commit to . . . agree but I bet we'll agree more times than we will
disagree. (Cavazos, 1988, September 21, p. 8)
Cavazos added, "I've got my own [leadeshlp style]. 1 think we should just go about doing things 1n our own way that are really the best for what we are trying to do" (Cavazos, 1988, September 21, p. 8). He did not go on to define what his style of leadership was.
The closet Cavazos came to elaborating on his style was to talk repeatedly about one of the biggest problems in education: "we do not educate every person" (p. 9).
His own education as a person of a minority group led
Cavazos through a number of experiences in which he witnessed the failu re of the system to achieve this goal. This became his most repeated mission:
As Secretary of Education, I have made it clear to
every employee of the Department of Education, on
my "watch," our efforts--our talents, energies, and
resources--wi11 be devoted to one mission: to
educate every American to his or her fu lles t
potential. (Cavazos, 1989 February 14, p. 1; again
February 2; February 6; March 21, to cite only a
few).
He later refined this to, "The approach of this
Administration is founded on three v ital elements: expectations, access and accountability" (Cavazos, April
20, 1989, p.5). While there was nothing inherently wrong with such an approach, Cavazos never defined how his leadership would deal with these issues other than to address them frequently (Cavazos, 1989, April 3} May
3; June 22, to c ite but three occasions. The themes repeat in more than 75% of a ll of Cavazos' speeches).
Cavazos was a man committed to consensus, to leadership of all opinions. He also wanted to highlight the problems in American public education. His approach to leadership was to indicate his willingness to listen, to encourage agreement wherever he could, and to build a consensus. His approach was through consensus and team building.
Research Question 2: If an identifiable style was found, could i t be characterized as either transactional or transformational?
Cavazos' strong emphasis on agreement, and his further underscoring of consensus, indicated a transactional approach. Consensus was rarely b u ilt without compromise and often led more to headship than leadership (Burns, 1978). The issue of consensus of opinion, and Cavazos' desire to listen to a ll sides of an issue, placed him in the transactional mode of leadership. In fact, he often couched the articulation of problems in consensus. When speaking before the
Third Annual Conference on Drug-Free Schools, Cavazos said, "The consensus is that we must have a system that expects every person in America to be educated to his or her fu lle s t potential" (Cavazos, 1989, April 3. p. 1).
He spelled out the role the Department of Education would play in transactional terms: "We try to showcase successful innovations and improvements in education so that educators at the local level can tailor them to th eir needs .... We have assumed this leadership position . . . (Cavazos, 1989, May 25, p. 1).
Cavazos also took leadership to mean partnership, another evidence of transactional leadership. After recalling the story of Columbus to an audience, he said,
"The actions of great leaders are propelled by a dream and guided by knowledge. But seldom do great leaders act alone" (Cavazos, 1988, October 14, p. 6). Shortly after he became Secretary, Cavazos called at once for consensus of opinion (Wilson, 1988, November 30). But his partnership equals leadership equation placed the emphasis on the partners, not on the leadership
(Cavazos, 1989, April 3, for example).
Cavazos underscored his focus on consensus and partnership some days later 1n an address to the
National Distinguished Principals:
You recognize that the success of your enterprise
hinges on the efforts of others— the efforts of
students, teachers, parents, counselors,
custodians, cooks, nurses, and bus drivers. And school boards. (Not necessarily in that order.)
So you be!leve in these people. Not because you
have to. but because you believe in education. And
to be!ieve in education is to be!ieve in people.
(Cavazos, 1988, October 18, p. 3, emphases in the
o rig in a l)
Cavazos identified two major themes: leadership as partnership, and education as In need of reform. His first theme related directly to consensus, and therefore to transactional leadership. But even his second theme called on transactional leadership to carry it through to its goal.
For example, Cavazos used studies (such as Finn,
1989) to point out that students, while achieving at lower levels than students in nearly a ll other industrial countries, had a high regard for their p o ten tia l. Self-image stood high, but simple competency, embarrassingly low. "We recognize," said
Cavazos, "that a serious. concerted. long-term program of improvement must be focused on education. We cannot and must not go on with business as usual, or a ll students will continue to suffer" (Cavazos, 1989, April
20, p. 5). This message was a strong articulation of the problem. Cavazos inferred a transformational approach. But when it came time to apply an approach, he chose consensus, team-building, and the establishment of partnerships (Cavazos, 1989, April 20; 1988, November
18).
Burns (1978) argued that the resolution of conflict
often led leaders Into the arena of moral leadership,
i.e., transformational leadership, via crisis and
c o n flict. Cavazos turned from c o n flict. When asked
about his budget and how i t contradicted his emphasis on
reform, Cavazos did not challenge the description.
Rather he replied:
I ’m pleased with this budget. It's a direction.
What we had to do, of course, is to make some
decisions about some programs and reallocate,
[Rjecall that I did say that I would do the best
that I could under the circumstances and with what
was available, and this is what we have done at
this time. (Cavazos, 1989, January 9, p. 14; see
also Cox & O'Brien, 1989)
Cavazos did not defend his budget. The serious
objection raised he did not meet. His answer was that the budget was a direction, and that was a ll that mattered. Cavazos did not use the opportunity to explain what the direction was, or where it would take
his department.
Cavazos spelled out a number of leadership
in itia tiv e s , but he left it to the partnership to carry them out (Cavazos, 1989 January 18). The need for excellence was stressed; Cavazos* leadership would guide schools in that direction through partnership or reliance on others to get the job done. Of course, all leadership must rely on others. Cavazos was content, however, to let others take his charge without a transforming vision that would, in Burns' words, catch up his followers.
Research Question 3: Was one style considered by the secretary to be either more useful or more necessary, given the political configuration of the department?
The data provided an answer to this question, though it was not as direct and straightforward as with the other secretaries. tt was clear that Cavazos felt the pressure of the Bennett years of criticism and the need to create a less combative Department of Education
(Cavazos, 1989, January 9; Cunlberti, 1988, October 11).
Consequently, Cavazos stressed that the department would be working toward agreement, from the very beginning of his administration. Said Cavazos, "I want you to know that t didn't commit to agree but I bet w e'll agree more times than w e'll disagree (Cavazos, 1988, September 21,
P. 8).
Cavazos' leadership themes were not Inadequate, but they lacked ways to achieve Implementation, other than through partners who would see them and Immediately undertake them (Cavazos 1989, March 9; April 3; 1988,
November 18). This Indicated that Cavazos may not have
thought the transactional approach useful so much as he
found i t necessary. Transformational leadership often
created conflict, according to Burns, in order to
achieve goals. Cavazos saw the conflict outside the
Department of Education too significant to rebut. He hoped to defuse it. When asked what he would do about
the department, in light of hl3 predecessor's
"outspokenness" and his willingness to "take on the
education establishment" Cavazos replied, " I ' l l start trying to work with people and to build a consensus . .
. . I think we should go about doing things in our own way that are really the best for what we are trying to do" (Cavazos, 1988, September 21, p. 8).
Cavazos' own personality may have moved him toward the transactional approach as the more necessary approach. Cavazos had said of himself that "I'm too quiet" ("Lauro Fred Cavazos," 1988). His leadership
in itia tiv e s worked at a volume set too low. There was direction, but without a clear vision of what was to be achieved.
On January 18, 1989, at an address before the U.S.
Department of Education forum, Cavazos outlined further the direction of his leadership. The address pointed to three themes (mentioned above) for the Cavazos administration: expectation, access, and accountability
(Cavazos, 1989, January 18). These three themes would be considered again and again, with several other nuances offered later (Cavazos, 1989, January 27;
February 14 & 23; March 21 & 31; April 20; June 22).
The three themes were, however, 1n keeping with consensual approach. Educational leaders ( i . e . , others) were to expect more from students and one another; everyone would be provided with the access to education; and the system would be accountable in a manner agreed upon by a ll.
Cavazos f e lt that former Secretary Bennett had alienated his listeners, so he tried hard to administer negative education news in an upbeat manner, stressing the positives of what "partners" could do by working together (Cavazos, 1989, February 6; 19B8, April 18).
When he spoke before the Senate on President Bush's
1990 education budget, the same themes of expectation, accountability, and access were applied (Cavazos, 1989,
February 23; Cavazos, 1989). Partners working together and building consensus would achieve them (Cavazos,
1989, January 9; May 11; May 19; June 19). Although
Cavazos said that his approach meant nothing less than a total restructuring of elementary and secondary education, it would s t i l l be achieved through consensus and partnerships (Cavazos, 1989, June 13). Finally, because Cavazos called upon others to pick up these themes without showing them how, without catching them up 1n a moral vision, his leadership style was thought to be transactional in approach.
Cavazos was a mild-mannered man who wished to transform education in America without conflict, and without disagreement. His vision focused on achieving consensus; his mission was partnership to achieve reform. Cavazos exhibited a style of leadership that was predominately transactional. Cavazos Indicated the necessity for his transactional leadership as based on the combativeness of his predecessor, William Bennett, and the need to direct more attention to education and less on the o ffice of secretary. This approach, however, led to some d iffic u ltie s , those being identified as mainly a low-key or self-effacing manner that made Cavazos' leadership often appear as headship.
Philosophv of Education: Research Question 5: Was there an identifiable philosophy of education exhibited by the secretary of the department?
Again, Cavazos did not indicate that his philosophy of education followed a given school of thought. But the data revealed that an educational philosophy was id en tifiab le. The data revealed a strong tendency for
Pragmatism with a mix of Realism, especially as it touched on what should be taught in the schools. In v irtu a lly every speech given since January 1989, the themes of expectation, access, and accountability were aired, regardless of the group Cavazos happened to be addressing. Tucked away within the discussion of these themes were traces of Cavazos* philosophy of education.
For example, in talks about access, evidences of his Realism may be seen. When Cavazos discussed m inorities, he often discussed the dropout rate in the nation's schools as well. He said, "The high school dropout problem is one of the gravest d iffic u ltie s we face" (Cavazos, 1988a, October 11, p. 3), The prescription was a core-based curriculum (Cavazos,
1989, March 4; 1988b, October 11). The core was for a ll students, but especially for minorities (Cavazos, 1989,
October 11).
His concern for m inorities and the dropout rate appeared to be a pragmatic concern, too, characteristic of Realist thinkers, rather than out of a fundamental concern to restructure society, or to transform the approach to education. Moreover, Cavazos believed in
"lib eral arts education" (Cavazos, 1988b, October 11;
1989, March 4). This did not mean that he opposed specialization. Rather he favored students coming to grips with the "big picture." The quote which follows veritably summed up Cavazos' philosophy of education:
We a ll recognize that the knowledge and work of our society has become Increasingly specialized and
w ill continue doing so. But specialized knowledge
is more useful i f it is seen in the broader
context, in the "Big Picture." I urge you to seek
to establish a broad foundation of knowledge on
which to build your major, whatever that may be.
Enroll in courses from a range of important
d iscip lines--in mathematics, and the natural
sciences, history, geography, anthropology, and
other social sciences; literature and foreign
languages; philosophy and composition; music and
the visual arts. Savor the Intellectual delights
that c iv iliz a tio n has accumulated over the
millennia .... You w ill gain wisdom, which is
superior to knowledge. (Cavazos, 1988b, October
11. PP. 4-5)
Cavazos encouraged freshmen and sophomores to take more than the minimum requirements 1n the five basics: math, natural science, social studies, languages, the arts, and lite ra tu re (p. 5). This admonition reflected
Realism, a traditional approach to subjects studied.
Cavazos espoused this philosophy of education more frequently, and to many differen t groups (Cavazos, 1989,
January 13, for example). Cavazos spelled out to a group of engineers why following a Realist philosophy based on a core curriculum was necessary (Cavazos, 1988, October 19). F irs t, it helped them be better scientists by giving them the context of their knowledge as it fit the "big picture" (p. 7). Second, such knowledge, even after post-graduate work, would better help them understand, communicate, and work with other people (p.
8 ). And third, by studying a broad base of subjects, they would come in contact with the wisdom of the world and with a wisdom they might not see again. "For a liberal arts background," said Cavazos, "is perhaps the best preparation for life " (Cavazos, 1988, October 19, pp. 8-9).
Evidences of Idealism may also be seen, but the overriding concern was on what was most practical, what was most needed: hence, Realism. Cavazos took these broad outlines of a liberal arts education and extended them as a standard of what made schools excellent
(Cavazos, 1988b, October 11). A school which placed "a clear emphasis on academics," where students could get
"a full dose" of science and reading, and where the library promoted reading in the school community and the community at large, was a school that achieved excellence (p. 3).
Also in keeping with the identified Realism was
Cavazos' concern for values. Values for him usually meant pragmatic talks stemming the tide of drugs in the schools and preventing unwanted teen-aged pregnancies (Cavazos, 1988, October 13; 1989, March 9), Values were also important for what they taught the student.
"I put a lot of stock in virtue," said Cavazos. "By virtue I mean doing what is right .... As educators,
I know that we must do what is right. Let us impart that to a ll the citizens of this land, but let us impart it especially to our students" (Cavazos, 1988, November
18, p .13).
Research Question 6: Was this philosophy of education important in setting or helping to set department policies?
Cavazos' philosophy was more strongly aligned with policy-setting than any of the other secretaries. For example, his concern for values led to his department's strong program in the nation's schools to put an end to the use of drugs:
Today the U.S. Department of Education introduces a
powerful new force in the Nation's continuing
efforts to get drugs out of our schools. Free
video cassettes for classroom use. Today we
continue saying "No," but now we go beyond that
point. In these videos we w ill te ll students why
they should reject drugs and show them how to do
it . (Cavazos, 1988, October 13, p. 2)
Cavazos also spoke about these concerns elsewhere
(Cavazos, 1989, March 10; April 3; June 19 & 21). The values held by Cavazos had roots In the "classical" virtues, Mortimer Adler's concepts, and the Golden Rule
(Cavazos, 1988, October 13; November 3; November 18).
His philosophy of education eventuated in a policy for the reform of all grades, including higher standards for a ll high schools in the country, and a core that every high school student should know (Cavazos, 1988
November 3). He also called on educators to strengthen the curricula in the nation's high schools. Further, he argued for greater state autonomy, stronger character development, and more stringent teacher recruitment
(Cavazos, 1988 October 13; November 3),
The Realist themes in Cavazos' philosophy--the pragmatic concerns of i t — helped to set Cavazos' choice policy. Standards meant agreeing on a set of s k ills and teaching them to all students. Stronger curricula meant setting up units of teaching, such as four years of
English, three years of math, science, and social studies each, and two years of foreign language
(Cavazos, 1988, November 3, p. 7). Autonomy meant getting the national education associations up and running because "improvements can only occur if they are devised and developed by the people who must implement them" (p. 9). Values meant that knowledge without virtue was empty (p. 10). Teacher recruitment meant the use of a ll citizens who were capable of teaching to join In the process via alternative certification (p. 11).
These ideas were not new to the Cavazos framework.
Hi3 leadership impetus had already made use of them.
But they were driven by a philosophy of education that believed in certain important things that all children should know. Ozmon and Craver (1986) pointed out:
Realism as an educational philosophy has long been
with us in one way or another, but tends to assert
its e lf most in times of turmoil. It is almost as
if we have other educational philosophies when we
can afford them, but Realism i3 a necessity. The
claim is that we w ill always have some need for
basic factual data and subjects like reading,
writing, and arithmetic. (Ozmon & Craver, 1986, p.
44)
Cavazos was not a pure Realist, for he maintained other notions that are not endemic to Realist philosophy, such as his concern for access. How his philosophy influenced policy-setting concerns in the department may also be related to his emphasis on partnership. Cavazos said that everyone must be enlisted to gather support for these ideas (Cavazos,
1989, November 3 & 18). It was his idea that with everyone working on the same tasks, the nation would be able to reach its goal of providing a suitable education for every child more quickly. " It 's really the business of everybody in this nation, because unless this nation educates its e lf, i t w ill never achieve the greatness that a ll of us envision for America" (Cavazos, 1988,
November 18, p. 2).
Research Question 7: Was this philosophy of education in agreement with statements about education made by the secretary?
Cavazos* philosophy of education was so strongly felt that he rarely spoke about education without reference to it. First, for example, was his concern for a practical education focused on choice. Second, a traditional reliance on the Realist approach to education, pointing to a body of knowledge and saying
"Learn this" figured largely Into Cavazos' writings. He spelled out what needed to be learned: a broad liberal arts background made up of English, science, social studies, history, art, and literature, linking word with deed (Cavazos, 1989, March 4; 1988b; October 11).
Schools which did not teach these subjects were not good schools (Cavazos, 1988, November 3). Third, Cavazos wanted to see schools begin to make a difference in themselves by improving teaching, strengthening curriculum, and drawing on a larger body of teachers for recruitment purposes by not relying exclusively on products from teachei—education schools (Cavazos, 1988,
November 18). Views of Government: Research Question 4: Were the secretary's leadership style and educational philosophy consistent with the constitutional demands of limited federal government?
The data revealed a strong belief in a limited federal government. Cavazos, when asked about the role of the ED said, "The federal Department of Education does not have a centralized control over the country's education system, so our function is primarily to suggest and advise, rather than mandate" (Cavazos, 1989,
May 25, p. 1). It was Cavazos' understanding that hi3 federal office would have a limited role. Further, his view about access, which eventually began to be spoken of as choice, was based in his belief that choice was a fundamental part of our democracy ("Debate rages at choice conference," 1990).
Cavazos' views of government drew the lines of state control over education in a bold manner. Cavazos said about the federal role in education:
I think [the federal government] has a very
significant role. Certainly, from the financial
side of i t , it doesn't have a big impact, when you
think of a ll the dollars spent on education
nationwide, and compare our budget to what's
happening out there. So, we don't make a big
splash, in terms of dollars. Most of our impact, really, will be--and would be viewed to be--to make
access for a ll students. (Cavazos, 1988, December,
2 2 , p. 1)
Cavazos also added that this meant making sure C ivil
Rights were enforced, and that students had every opportunity to fu lfill their quest of a good education.
Cavazos held a view of the federal role, a view of government and education, that maintained itself well within the bounds of Constitutional demands. He highlighted this belief in his call for choice in education (Cavazos, 1989, January 10 & 18j May 12 & 19;
June 20). Choice epitomized what the federal role 1n education could do. “Choice is the cornerstone of our efforts to improve the nation's schools," said Cavazos
("Debate rages at choice conference," 1990, p. 8). And again, "Armed with the power of choice," he said,
"parents can force In ferio r schools to upgrade or close"
(Cavazos, 1989, June 20, p. 5).
Choice also had an even greater Impact. It worked in harmony with the idea of a limited government:
"Choice would have the greatest impact on those schools that are in most need of change. Choice reforms have been and will continue to be fostered at the state and local levels" (Cavazos, 1989, June 26, p. 5).
Later he accentuated the theme of choice by linking it to quality of education, something else the government could provide;
How much choice do parents have on the school that
th eir children w ill attend? This issue, t submit,
is related to the question of quality of education.
Further, it becomes a key factor in what our school
systems will look like in the future. tt is clear
that if we are to address the ills of education and
to enhance the fine programs that exist in our
elementary and secondary schools, America must
restructure the school system. Choice is one of
the strategies that addresses restructuring.
(Cavazos, 1989, January 10, p. 3)
M inorities especially, he said, should have the freedom of school choice (Cavazos, 1989, January 10). Indeed, a ll parents were the vanguard of education. They should have the say, not the state or the government, over where th eir children would attend school (Cavazos, 1989,
January 10). "A free and productive society thrives on the empowerment of the people," Cavazos said. "The
American economy and our democracy are products of empowerment, and [choice] can re v ita liz e schools around the country" (Cavazos, 1989, May 19, p. 4).
Government could do some things with Its money. It could make programs accountable, and it could close down programs that were not (Cavazos, 1989, January 18;
February 6 & 23; March 31; April 20). Government needed to be there when people could not help themselves, but it should not be pushing hard to be at the center of the stage when no reason for its presence existed.
Cavazos' idea of government envisioned an entity that brought its vast resources to bear on a problem that needed its attention, calling in a ll those who might help contribute to the solution. Education was one such problem. The problem was not that the curricula across the nation were too varied or too many, he thought. They were simply not strong enough. The system was also too tig h tly configured. Consequently, government should pave the way to help a llevia te these problems by empowering states to solve them at the local level (Cavazos, 1989, June 1).
For Cavazos, government served the people where i t could d irec tly . When that proved too problematic, then it could provide opportunities in the form of concrete ideas that the nation could peruse (Cavazos, 1989,
October 8). Government pointed out weaknesses, but people working in lo c a litie s would be the ones to correct those weaknesses (Cavazos, 1989, October 8).
This was thought to be firm ly in the trad itio n of a limited federal role outlined in the Constitution.
The element of choice Cavazos did not articulate in the same manner as Bennett, as a fundamental right of the Declaration of Independence. But i t was no less Important to him. Cavazos saw i t as a more pragmatic, practical matter. Schools had failed in some significant ways and government could help that problem by removing obstacles and encouraging choice.
Research Question 8: How were leadership styles and educational philosophies converted into public action?
Early in his administration of the ED, Cavazos shed light on how his leadership and educational philosophy would be converted into public action. At a press conference, Cavazos emphasized the idea of partnership, of listening to constituents, of literacy, and of minorities (Cavazos, 1989, January 9). He also stressed programs for children who had limited English proficiencies. He favored TRIO projects (projects that used tutors to help less academically gifted students), developmental grants for Black colleges and universities, adult education, grants to the disabled, student aid, drug-free schools, and vocational education
(Cavazos, 1989, January 9). Leadership for Cavazos meant action-based policies.
Leadership meant partnership. Cavazos offered
In itia tiv e s with which almost no one disagreed, and which almost everyone wanted to see achieved. He also offered E A C: expectation, access, and accountability
(Cavazos, 1989, January 18, p. 5). Cavazos' expectation theme became a policy for the dropout problem, the fa ilu re rate of m inorities, and the achievement of success by all students. "It is our expectation,"
Cavazos said, "that every person in America be educated to his or her fu lle s t potential. That w ill result only when all students stay in school, and this year's first graders go on to graduate in the year 2000. It is our expectation that the term dropout w ill become obsolete"
(Cavazos, 1989, January 18, p. 6).
A further expectation was that the nation must become lite ra te , and that it reduce the knowledge deficit of 27 million functionally illiterate Americans
(Cavazos, 1989, January 18). Finally, it was the expectation of the Cavazos leadership that academic programs be geared to excellence, not hopes or dreams of such. Expectation led back to partnership:
We should expect that academic programs be of
excellence. In order to achieve this, we must have
the participation of every citizen in the debate
about quality education — parents, teachers,
federal and state officials, school administrators,
and others must enter the discussions and find ways
of strengthening education in America. Education
and its quality should seek a national consensus.
(Cavazos, 1989, January 18, p. 7)
Public action resulted from the interplay of leadership and philosophical concerns.
Access for Cavazos meant that "Every student should
have access to a quality education" (Cavazos, 1989,
January 18, p. 7). This did not mean just for the
gifted , but "for those living In poverty, the a t-risk
students and the handicapped" (p. 7). Access also meant
choice, the choice of the school made by parents for
th eir children. Choice would be used in a way to
"restructure" American education ("Debate rages at
choice conference," 1990; Cavazos, 1989, January 18).
Lastly, accountability became a major pot icy Issue
for Cavazos, "All of us must be accountable to our
nation relative to the quality of education we provide,"
he said (Cavazos, 1989, January 18, p. 9). Everything
from the education itself, to teacher preparation, to
teacher certification, to parents, and to the students
themselves would be held accountable to the nation.
Theoretical models did not interest Cavazos (Cavazos,
1989, January 27, p. 9), The nation had too many of
them, he argued. Cavazos called for models of success,
actual schools that did a good job, merit schools that
achieved excellence. This he sought for and hoped to
achieve through the ED (Cavazos, January 18, p. 10).
Accountability would result in merit schools,
Cavazos argued (Cavazos, 1989, January 27, p. 9).
Studies would show schools that "produce[dj results. We don't need another theoretical model to tell us which schools are doing a good job; we just have to look at what they are actually producing" (Cavazos, 1989,
January 27, p. 9). Accountability meant measuring quantifiable goals and outcomes. It meant testing teachers, and finding out which ones did a good job. It also meant getting competent teachers with or without the "proper" credentials, into the classroom.
Accountability also meant making use of the "Wall
Chart," that measurement of educational achievement by the states that Bell began. Cavazos revealed that accountability definitely meant that this would continue, although in perhaps a less strident manner than his predecessor (Cavazos, 1989, January 27, p. 11).
Cavazos wanted to "get the word out" to the nation about America's schools (Cavazos, 1989, January 27). He wanted the nation to know that the schools were in trouble, that education as a public venture had failed the nation, and that the knowledge d e fic it was as serious as any other d e fic it (Cavazos, 1989, January 27;
February 6; March 4; May 25; Sharpe, 1989). "What we are suffering from is an education deficit that is concentrated 1n our elementary and secondary schools.
This deficit is just as real as the trade and budget d eficits" (Cavazos, 1988, November 3; 1989, June 5, p.
1; see also 1989, June 13, p. 2; 1989, August 2). His public actions, propelled by his approach to leadership and his educational philosophy, touched all grade levels. For example, secondary schools needed to be more concerned about the default rate on student loans, Cavazos admitted (Cavazos, 1989, February 6, p.
5; Cavazos, 1989). This was Cavazos' way of bringing home the accountability issues to colleges. Access occupied a major issue, consumed by concerns for the handicapped (p. 2). But expectation held center stage:
We should expect that a ll students w ill pay back their loans; we should expect that a ll students excel; we should expect access for a ll. Partnership received some of the limelight as well. Banks, Cavazo3 said, should help out, as should loan departments, parents, and even professors (Cavazos, 1989, February 6).
Cavazos* leadership styles and educational philosophy were converted into performance-based outcomes that could be assessed, or, in his own words, held accountable. His three themes of expectation, access, and accountability would be translated into merit schools, magnet schools of excellence, foci for experiments and data collection for educational achievement, Presidential awards for excellent teachers, national science scholar programs, alternative certification for teachers and principals, drug-free schools, grants to black colleges, and education of the homeless (Cavazos, 1989, February 23, pp. 4-6; 1989,
June 13, pp. 3-6). Not all of these Initiatives were new. But Cavazos had linked his leadership and educational philosophy with objective outcomes. Here he
Indicated how his program of expectation, access, and accountability would be put into play in the federal budget, and in the nation.
Later (Cavazos, 1989, March 21 & June 22) would expand these notions to include the more specific themes of accountability for results, simplification, and flexibility for federal programs, program guidelines improvement, and vocational education improvement.
For example, literacy became a concern, both adult literacy and the literacy of the nation's youth.
Workplace litera cy , library literacy, and English literacy were a ll concerns that would again be treated by the tr in ity of themes that Cavazos had been naming
(Cavazos, 1989, May 4). Cavazos' leadership style became a recurring cry for the reform of education "to v irtu a lly reshape America’ s educational system, focusing on academic excellence, parental involvement and choice, so that young people may successfully compete in the global marketplace" ("A Vision for America," 1989, p.
1). As recently as June 13, 1989, Cavazos reminded his audience about the education d e fic its and called on his listeners to help him achieve his policy of strong educational reform:
I've emphasized that this nation has three
deficits. We're all aware of our trade and budget
deficits, but this nation also has an education
deficit. All three of these deficits are linked,
and they w ill not be solved until we solve the
education deficit. I can promise you that.
(Cavazos, 1989, June 13, p .2; see also Cavazos,
1989, August 2, p. 2)
Cavazos linked his practice and policy, his leadership and his philosophy to initiatives that could be objectively observed.
Summary
Cavazos' leadership style was identified by the data as transactional. Owing to the secretary's concern for everyone in the debate reaching consensus, his insistence on partnerships, and the combativeness of his predecessor, the transactional or compromising mode lent its e lf to him as more necessary than the more d iffic u lt transformational approach of resolution through conf1i c t .
His leadership style sought for partnerships and consensus. It also sought to minimize co nflict and disagreement. Cavazos may be said to dislike controversy. His leadership stretched itself to include a number of themes, the chief ones being expectation, access, and accountability.
Cavazos' Realist-Pragmatist philosophy served him well. He exhibited the Realist penchant for values, a core curriculum, and a basic set of skills (3uch as reading and writing). His interest in minority students, drop out rates, and what he called the
"education d e fic it" served to show off the pragmatic side of his education, as well as the more practical side of his Realism.
It was also shown that his philosophy helped to set
Department of Education policies. Access, a major theme of the Cavazos-run ED, indicated how strongly philosophy and policy were matched. Choice also Indicated this connection. Cavazos, though he did at times garble his message by stating it 1n a convoluted manner, he nevertheless revealed that his actions and his words were very closely allied.
Cavazos also showed how his views about the limited role government should play in the lives of its citizens carried over into the role of a bureaucratic office of education. He outlined that role as one of aiding and abetting states' roles, not replacing or supplanting them. He saw the department as clearly supplementary and advising, not policy-setting.
Finally, Cavazos converted his leadership style and educational philosophy into a number of objective publi actions. Some of these included choice, magnet schools accountability programs in schools at a ll levels, TRIO projects, developmental grants to Black colleges, handicapped in itia tiv e s , and literacy programs. CHAPTER 5
Summary! Conclusions, and Recommendations
This chapter commences with a discussion comparing the four secretaries and their work. It summaries the findings and research that has been the focus of this study. Following the summary are the conclusions for this study. Two sections on recommendations conclude this research project. The first outlines recommendations that follow from the conclusions. The second deals with recommendations for future studies.
Summary
The first research question drew attention to leadership styles. Were identifiable leadership styles evinced by the Secretaries of the Department of
Education? All four secretaries exhibited a leadership style. All of the secretaries knew leadership in its fine nuances, and a ll stood eager to defend th eir individual style. Moreover, given th eir comments, a ll exhibited a strong sense of the need for leadership in this o ffice . Although the approaches to leadership were not very formal or self-acknowledging ( i . e . , no secretary approached the office with the idea in mind that such and so "will be my leadership style"), the secretaries exhibited an ability to describe an emerging style, however unrefined, utilized for various problems
333 and sundry goals.
Hufstedler did not like to think in labels and refused to apply one to her own approach, though she did acknowledge an approach. Bell, Bennett, and Cavazos all affirmed a label being applied to their leadership styles. All the secretaries approached leadership with a comprehensive understanding of what i t entailed. The differences that were revealed in this study may be linked to their various experiences as judge, professional educator, and academician.
The second research question was about the exhibited leadership style with reference to Burns' taxonomy of transactional and transformational styles.
What exhibitions of leadership emerged in this connection? This question was less easy to answer, but, given the data, the styles may be summed up as follows;
Shirley Hufstedlei— Transactional
Terrel Bell—Transformational in intention, transactional in implementation
William Bennett—Transformational in intention, near-transformational in implementation
Lauro Cavazos—Transactional
Hufstedler willingly began her leadership with compromise in mind. She knew that she would have to compromise, so she came to the leadership position ready to bargain for what she hoped to get. Unfortunately, she learned too late that sheer In te lle c t was no match for politics. She was playing political games with professional practitioners. Her inexperience showed most clearly on the Reauthorization Act, where she admitted to preparing a b ill with unwise and undesirable features, in order to get the b ill at a ll (Hufstedler,
1989). She eagerly provided the context for compromise, coming as she did to leadership decisions with more than one alternative ready.
Attenuating these conclusions was the formidable task of reorganization and transition. Radin and Hawley
(1988) argued that Hufstedler, since she had only thirteen months in office, could not have done more than focus on reorganization and transition of the bureau to a Cabinet-1evel department. Moreover, it could be further argued that she would have been able to construct a more solid leadership foundation had she been given more time. Yet Hufstedler herself did not believe that any more time was needed to establish her record (Hufstedler, 1989). She also Indicated that the single most important goal she strove to achieve was the survival of the Department of Education (Hufstedler,
1989: 1981, January 11).
Bell had a vision for education and for his leadership role in that vision. He sought reforms through strongly stated beliefs, but he also fe lt the need to compromise (B ell, 1989). It could be argued that leadership without compromise 1s hard-headed and designed for disaster. But the Burns' taxonomy established compromise as a willingness to agree that the vision may not be as good a vision as It could be
( I . e . , the leader lacked confidence himself in its expression), hence the need for correction through compromise (Burns, 1978).
B ell's tendency to want to compromise also showed his fa ilu re to harness the power of co nflict to achieve desired goals. Conflict regarding the condition of education in the early 1980s was surely one of the most talked-about educational Issues. Bell galvanized that conflict with the publication of A Nation at Risk. But
Bell did not follow up on the power released In that report, a fa ilu re even he acknowledged (B ell, 1989). He allowed internal problems, problems he must have known were in store for him before he took the job, to overshadow a good portion of the other work that needed doing (B ell, 1988).
Bennett alone eagerly fought for transformational leadership, a view he took of his own style (Bennett,
1989). He wanted to reform education as much as Bell, and he w illin g ly argued for his ideas about reform by setting the tone of the debate. He used his position as secretary and his office as a bully pulpit to reform (Jung & Kirst, 1986). More than any other secretary, he focused national attention on education so that it shared a position of priority nearly equal to the d e fic it.
But he spurned the role of professional educators in the implementation stage of his reform. More than once he said that the Secretary of the Department of
Education did not work for the National Education
Association, but for the American people ("Bennett,
William J(ohn), 1985). This uncompromising attitude set the stage for what could have been transformational leadership at its best, if conflicts were turned into progress.
This data clearly showed that Bennett failed to gather up to a higher plane that area of moral argument that would have caused his followers to implement his reforms. But even transformational leaders fail to gather up all followers. Yet Burns (1978) showed that the best and most formidable transformational leaders were able either to defuse the opposition, or make it
Inconsequential. There can be no doubt that his opposition was fierce and worked from a position of strength (Ohanian, 1988). His alienation of many professional educators filled the literature. That he fa ile d to convince them of his reforms continued to be apparent even after his term as secretary. Bennett understood the nature of co nflict and the power it unleased to carry out reform. The data revealed that he was not able to convert his opposition Into a negligible force. No one can doubt that reform continued, even at the close of this study, in schools where reform had not reached before Bennett took o ffice . Finn (1989) showed
Incontestably that reform, In its truest sense, had been slowed by professional educators and opponents of the
Bennett-led ED. Bennett's record of reform, if it may be called that, has only been in place for five years.
Finn's (1989) work showed that he did not, to use Burns* phrase, catch up a ll of his followers. He cannot then be said to have fully achieved transformational leadership. Bennett's leadership approach, however, was never transactional.
Cavazos, whose leadership style continued in the making at the close of this study, tried to please everyone through consensus-building. From his f ir s t press conference to the last speech examined for this study (Cavazos, 1989, October 8), Cavazos took pains to include everyone in the education equation. He was six months into his tenure before he came up with clearly identifiable leadership initiatives. These were in turn condensed, rig h tly or wrongly, by the press and others to one: choice (Lauro's themes, 1989, June 10).
Although Cavazos f e lt strongly about his leadership style, he never put forth enough energy to give that style clear definition.
The issue raised by the third research question concerned the usefulness of one leadership style over another. Was one style or another more useful or more necessary, given the department's political configuration? For staying power and ability to rivet attention to problems, transformational leadership was far more useful than transactional leadership. This may be shown by drawing attention to the two secretaries who evinced some measure of transformational leadership,
Bell and Bennett, and contrasting them with the two secretaries who exhibited far more transactional leadership, Hufstedler and Cavazos. Of the two predominately transactional leaders, Hufstedler and
Cavazos, neither appeared to galvanize the o ffice by their leadership. Unfortunately, so little has come out of the Department of Education under Cavazos, that even his proponents have complained ( T if f t , 1989, May 29, p.
76).
In the case of Bennett and Bell, where transformational leadership was at least attempted, the nation was made aware of educational deficiencies and even moved to do something about i t . In the end, however, neither man was capable of bringing to pass any strongly felt transformational reforms. Bell changed the way Americans thought about education through the
Commission on Educational Excellence, A. Nation at R isk
(1983), Bennett continued the debate by highlighting the nation’s concerns with publications like First
Lessons (1986), and the What Works (1986) series.
Bennett also gained nationwide recognition for education by his insistence on schools returning to the teaching of traditional values and the need for choice.
These initiatives were clearly the result of transformational leadership and, in their own way, transformed the way the nation's citizens thought about education— these in itia tiv e s have changed the approach to the subject. But in B ell's case, two things occurred. The necessity of transactional leadership grew out of his experience with trying to deal with what he called "movement conservatives." Second, he fe lt he lacked the fire-in-the-bel1y drive to make certain that long-lasting change would occur. Bennett failed to circumvent his opponents, or at least neutralize them by the presence of others on his side.
Views of government, with regard to the
Constitution, comprised the fourth research question.
Were these leadership styles consistent with the
Constitutional demands of limited federal government? In the cases of Bell, Bennett, and Cavazos, the idea of limited federal government maintained a clear, consistent, and persistent shape. Bell and Bennett spoke out strongly, often, and favorably for a lessening of federal impact and federal involvement in what they viewed, by way of the Constitution, as a state right.
In Bennett’s case, his repeated use of the Federalist papers only underscored what must have been a h e a rt-fe lt conviction.
Hufstedler differed from the other three secretaries on the issue of limited government in only one significant way. she held that the department was a big bank (Hufstedler, 1989) and that its role was to dole out to the states what they needed when those states obtained specific federal goals. Hufstedler held to a limited view of her federal o ffic e , but an office that had unlimited freedom to reform and influence the states. Hufstedler felt no constitutional compunction for allowing and even encouraging the federal government to step in at every opportunity and correct the states' bad or lethargic behavior (Hufstedler, 1989). Neither
B ell, Bennett, nor Cavazos expressed any such view. The limited federal role the government played in education was just that--limited, Further, Cavazos maintained a limited federalist view by virtue of his insistence that the DOE was only an advising department for the states.
He stepped over this line of distinction once when he argued for more funding even though his department had just released a study indicating no strong correlation between funding and educational improvement.
The f if t h question had to do with whether philosophies of education were evident or not. The data revealed a yes in every case. An Eastern-type of philosophical orientation with Pragmatism acting as a base was Hufstedler's chosen philosophic orientation.
Realism in some form was held to by Bell and Cavazos.
B ell's was the much more strongly expressed Realism of the two, his philosophy often sounding as if it had been developed straight out of the textbooks. Idealism was
Bennett's chosen philosophical predilection.
The three men and one woman who have served the nation in this capacity seemed to have been overwhelmingly held captive to th eir educational philosophies, according to the findings with reference to the sixth research question. Hufstedler was taken by the notion of equal access for all; Bell by the need for a ll students learning a set item of things; Bennett by ideas as the chief end of education; and Cavazos by a basic s k ills ' approach. Policies from Bennett's three
C's (content, character and choice) to Cavazos' expectation, access, and accountability seem to have been the predominate guiding forces for the secretaries in th eir decisions about what they would do with the leadership of the department. The secretaries pursued goals and desires for the department that were in keeping with th eir philosophies, a concern raised by the seventh research question. In case after case, the secretaries' spoken goals agreed with their expressed philosophies. In no case was there found to be a spoken goal or outcome that was in direct contrast to a philosophical orientation.
How leadership styles and educational philosophies were converted into public action was the province of the eight research question. In the cases of Bell and
Bennett, leadership styles and philosophies served as springboards for action. Bell took his transformational characteristic to the nation and carved out a niche in the educational framework. Bennett chose to use his combativeness to fight against professional educationism. In both cases, public action resulted in a nationwide concern for education.
Hufstedler and Cavazos approached the matter in a d ifferen t way. Hufstedler took o ffice amid debates about whether the department should even be in existence. The climate on Capitol Hill was hardly conducive to getting strong reforms started since the
Department of Education had passed by so narrow a margin
(Hufstedler, 1989; Richards, 1979, December 11),
Hufstedler did not have any reforms in mind. She merely wanted to adjust the system, not change it . Cavazos wanted to make some changes, most notably to add choice to the discussion of educational reform (a matter already vouchsafed through Bennett's work, but he sought to do this without making any enemies. Toward the close of this study, Cavazos' commitment to choice was strengthened, and became the centerpiece for the
Bush Administration's reform efforts (Debate rages over choice conference, 1990).
Conclusions
1. Leadership styles were important to the secretaries, and their styles often influenced what goals they undertook to accomplish while at ED.
Leadership styles often dictated what approaches the secretaries would take to certain problems, and even what recourse to resolution those approaches would have.
2. The political configuration of the Department of Education often dictated the approach to leadership a secretary could take.
It may be that the presidents who nominated the secretaries got what they wanted: Carter looked for and found a transactional leadership to make certain the
Department's transition from a bureau to a Cabinet-level o ffice . Reagan looked for and found two transactional leaders and one transformational leader to do the work he, Reagan, saw was important at the time. In terms of the styles used, Hufstedler began with a compromising approach to goal-attainment. It often did not work very well. Yet she was able to achieve what she felt to be one of her most important goals: the survival of a
Cabinet-level Department for Education. It was unclear, however, whether this goal was the result of her conscious leadership, or the result of Washington politics. Cabinet-level offices in Washington are not typ ically created and then removed. In fact, the history of Cabinet-level offices has been very secure.
The former Navy and War Departments were consolidated into the Department of Defense in 1947, while Health,
Education, and Welfare became the Department of Heath and Human Services in 1979. Only the Post Office
Department le ft Cabinet rank (in 1971), but it3 funding continues (Livingston, 1981, p. 115),
Cavazos pursued his goals transactional1y through consensus-building, an approach he thought was needed because of the controversies created by his predecessor,
William Bennett. His effectiveness was diminished by the constant inferences that he would be replaced.
Cavazos said in a recent interview, "I wish to hell we could put this to bed. I w ill stay with the president until he asks me to leave" (Cavazos says he's staying,
1989, p. 15).
B ell's approach also appeared dictated by the office. He felt that movement conservatives (i.e., Right-wing conservatives) had forced him to bargain his way to the attainment of goals. Bell was successful in attaining some of these goals in this manner; in others he was not. Perhaps his most dramatic failure occurred when he captivated the nation with his Commission's report, A Nation at Risk, but failed to carry out its findings. Bell pointed this out as one of his failures, attributing it to a lack of feistiness (Bell, 1989, p.
13). Only Bennett approached the job with transformational leadership in mind. But his effectiveness was diminished by the constant antagonism he encountered from the education establishment.
Bennett pounded his themes by using the secretary's position as a bully-pulpit. Education enjoyed a primary place in the nation's p o litic al discussions while he was secretary.
3. Transactional leadership was found in use more often than transformational leadership.
This was not too surprising given that Burns (1978) argued that transformational leadership was much harder to obtain. But it appeared from the data that the
Department of Education is p o litic a lly structured in such a way as to dictate transactional leadership.
4. Transformational leadership, on the other hand, appeared to have the far greater impact.
Bell used i t to present his Commission's report, A. Nation At Risk, even though the establishment of the
Commission was arranged transactionally. Bennett used transformational leadership to keep the nation's attention focused on educational concerns. Both were largely successful in those in itia tiv e s . Hufstedler and
Cavazos, using transactional leadership, were not able to achieve much more than status quo concerns. Neither achieved the level of conscious-raising about education that Sell and Bennett achieved. This did not mean that transformational leadership was more effective that transactional leadership. It did indicate that in terms of defining the parameters of the Department's concerns, transformational leadership was better at galvanizing the debate on those terms.
5. Educational philosophies proved to be very important and very influential in policy-setting and policy creation.
Whether the educational philosophy was Pragmatism,
Idealism, or Realism, it influenced the thoughts of the secretary, and ultimately the direction of the
Department of Education. Accompanying the educational philosophy was a companion view of values. In a ll four cases, values proved to be very in flu e n tia l, especially in regard to how the secretary set policies and what public actions were eventually carried out. Future secretaries of education should be examined in this regard, since i t appeared from the data presented that educational philosophy, and policies later coming out of the Department of Education, were closely a llie d .
6. A good barometer of what to expect from future
Department of Education nominees might well be his or her educational philosophy.
So predictive of the behavioral policies of the secretaries were their philosophies of education, that philosophies of education appeared to work as lodestars for the secretaries. Likewise, to what extent the secretaries espoused their philosophies, and in what manner, appeared from this study largely to be the direct influence of a given secretary's leadership approach. Both of these issues should prove useful in assessing potential Department of Education nominees.
7. Educational philosophies espoused by the secretaries matched the policies they pursued.
The secretaries were, in other words, not saying one thing and then doing another. Their philosophies exercised substantial control over public pronouncements and non-public actions. Educational philosophies were also instrumental in converting ideology into public action. Although correlations of secretaries' philosophies of education and their public actions was not examined in this study per se, the data revealed a strong alliance between philosophies espoused and action later taken.
8. Although not constituted for reform, the
Department of Education, under secretaries using either transactional or transformational leadership styles, could not achieve even short-term reform.
The issue of educational reform underscored nearly everything Bell, Bennett, and Cavazos did. Although
Hufstedler only referred to reform on four occasions
(Hufstedler, 1981; 1981, January 11; 1980f ; Hufstedler,
1989), it was, nevertheless, an important leadership issue for her administration. From Hufstedler’s fin e- tuning approach, to Cavazos* restructuring through choice, all the secretaries displayed concern about education reform. The data on reform, however, were very disheartening,
Finn (1989) and Cavazos (1989) both reported, along with others (B ell, 1988; Ohanian, 1988; Jung & K irst,
1986), that no reform of any great significance had occurred since 1980. The only notable long-lasting change was the awareness that the problems in public education remained multitudinous. In terms of leadership styles, the data indicated that transformational leadership may be necessary to articulate the concerns of reform. Bennett's transformational leadership of the secretary's office, employing the bu lly-pulpit to a rtic u la te his concerns, drew greater attention to the nation's educational problems than did the transactional use of the office.
The only other secretary who generated nearly as much nationwide concern was Bell.
9. In the case of the federal role in education, all of the secretaries exhibited a limited view of the government in education. The level of limitations, however, differed between Hufstedler and the rest of the secretaries. Hufstedler held a pragmatic view of limited government. The federal government was not going to usurp the states' role in education, but it could exercise great latitude in instructing the states of th eir proper educational roles.
Bell and Bennett, on the other hand, held to a much s tric te r role for the federal government. Government could help, they thought, but that help should be in the form of verifiable results. From Bennett's view came the idea that there were very few conditions under which the federal government could interfere with the states' educational roles. Cavazos, too, held to this notion, but he also expressed his concern over the problems that the states were not addressing, and insinuated that the federal government should press harder on those concerns.
10. The Burns taxonomy provided useful constructs for examining p o litic a l leadership. While transformational leadership appeared to be the most powerful, transactional leadership, at least in the manner in which Bell used it , was not useless.
Burns' (1986) argument that a new structure for our government is needed to allow for more transformational leadership, appeared too hasty in this context. Many formidable obstacles to transformational leadership existed in the Department of Education bureaucracy, not the least of which were outside influences. Some of these outside influences, such as the NEA and movement conservatives exerted a direct obstacle to the
Department of Education, if a given in itia tiv e was found to be disagreeable. Nevertheless, 3ome leaders in other political contexts (e.g., Churchill, Roosevelt) have surmounted sim ilar d iffic u ltie s and achieved sought for goals using a transformational approach in a democratic arrangement.
11. Given the clien tele of the Department of
Education and its myriad of concerns, the organizational structure may dictate something other than a bureaucratic arrangement for solving problems.
The work of Woodward and Thompson (cited in
Jelinek, Litterer & Miles, 1986) Indicated that d ifferen t environments required d ifferen t organizational approaches. A new organizational approach may be in order for the Department of Education. Granting th is, i t appeared nevertheless unwise to argue, as did Burns, that a ll of our Madisonian government needed to be discarded.
Recommendations
1. The organizational structure of the Department of Education be reconfigured to lessen the impact of group influence.
Not explored in this study was the impact of the
National Educational Association (NEA). Nevertheless, given the data revealed in this study, its presence is still very strong, and it still exercises a significant influence over the Department. Its presence in the formation of the Department of Education was outlined in
Chapter 2, and Secretaries Hufstedler, Bell, and Bennett referred to the organization during their tenures.
Bennett was the most outspoken about the NEA. He attributed some of the failures of reform to that organization (Bennett, 1988a, d, e; 1986 October 10).
The influence of the NEA is an important matter because i t is an advocate for a small portion of the
Department's clientele. Studies of the NEA and other special interest groups' impact on this and other federal departments would be usefut.
2. The organizational climate of the Department of
Education be restructured to be more amenable to transformational leadership. The failure of transactional or transformational leadership to achieve even short-term change should not result in automatically rejecting either style as useful. A combination of faulty organizational structure and untoward external influence on the
Department appeared to be the two main reasons why both styles failed to affect reform. Nevertheless, the failure of transactional and transformational leadership to accomplish the reform of education on a short-term basis should give every educator pause.
3. Educators should reexamine the Department of
Education as an en tity that might meet the reform needs of the American public educational system.
Is a federal Department of Education the most effective design for educators to achieve the reformation of American public education? Cavazos raised a most te llin g point: We have spent over $330 b illio n on education in 1989 (Cavazos, 1989, April 20) and s t i l l have had, largely, only negative impacts to report. How much more must be spent to turn public education around?
This study made clear another important fact. As i t is presently constituted, the Department of Education was unable, for whatever reasons, with either transactional or transformational leaders, to effect even short-term reform of public education. Although the ED was not created to enact nationwide reform, reform was a chief concern of all four secretaries.
The secretaries donot constitute the entire Department of Education, but they acted as spokespersons for the
Department and represented to the President of the
United States the nation’ s educational concerns. Yet reform, even on a small scale was not forthcoming.
Researchers w ill want to examine more closely whether educational reform is an appropriate concern for the federal office,
4. The importance of educational philosophies has been substantiated in a clear and impressive fashion.
Confirmed once again was the primacy of educational philosophies in the mind of the educator. The philosophies of education espoused by the four secretaries figured largely into the Department of
Education's creation of policies. For the secretaries of the Department of Education, educational philosophies were sine qua non in determining the direction of this large federal bureaucracy. It is unlikely that the importance of educational philosophies w ill lessen, regardless of how small or unimportant the level of educational leadership might be.
5. Transformational leadership should be taught more vigorously to educational leaders, especially how to obtain it. The Burns (1978) study made clear that transformational leadership was certainly more vigorous.
Bass (1985) Indicated that transformational leadership was decidedly the better style when compared with transactional leadership. Data from this study indicated that transformational leadership may be better at galvanizing the focus of an audience on educational problems than transactional leadership. This can only be beneficial to the solution of those problems.
Recommendations for Future Studies
1. A study examining the effectiveness of
Department of Education programs and goals achieved would be in order. The studies should examine actual working programs and not p ilo t programs. Several smaller studies could be undertaken by numerous scholars on Individual programs of the Department of Education.
2. The nature of educational reform, in political contexts, should be studied further. These studies should focus on where reform has worked well and where it has not, what leadership style was present, and how reform was enacted. The study should also grapple with the obstacles to the reform of education.
3. The issue of p o litic a l power should also be examined in this context of change. The power brokers, who they are and how they wield power, and how change took place in the federal p o litic a l context should also be examined. Such a study might augment those by Hunter
(1953), Dahl (1961), and Presthus (1964).
4. Examining the federal system of government with particular focus on the intent implicit and explicit in the Constitution, would describe the parameters of another study. Burns (1986; 1984) argued that our system of government was impervious to transformational
leadership, and urged its dismantlement for one that would be more amenable to transformational leadership.
The data from this study indicated that Burns was right and wrong. He was rig h t, at least in the case of the
Department of Education, that transformational leadership was not possible in a bureacuracy. He was wrong to call for the dismantlement of the federal structure. The data in this study revealed, rather, that the organizational structure of one department in the federal configuration may need to be restructured in order to make either transactional or transformational leadership more effective.
Outside Influences and obstacles to the Department of Education and its in itia tiv e s may s t i l l account for the lack of effectiveness in the two styles of leadership than the entire federal structure. It is simply too hasty a conclusion to draw on the basis on one department's difficulties, that the whole should be discarded. With the advent of governmental reforms in
Eastern Europe and Central America that mimic more our form of democratic government than any other form, quite the opposite of Burns' recommendation is indicated.
Even so, some organizational restructuring, because of the varied clientele served by education, requires that the Department's organizational structure be examined more closely.
5, One last question that deserves future study concerns whether, for example, the Constitution was ever meant to contain a bureaucracy as large as the one our nation currently supports. In Federalist paper number
84, Hamilton argued that the B ill of Rights simply could not contain a l 1 of the freedoms that were guaranteed the people, nor that it was intended to. But naming some while excluding others, for space or convenience, would, he felt, give later politicians the "colorable pretext to claim more than [was] granted" (Cooke, 1961, p. 579).
The historical study that needs to be conducted is one that would shed light on whether we have already weighted down our Constitution with far more that it was ever intended to support.
Studies such as these would help c la rify issues that this one only raised. What this study sought to do, however, was focus attention on two areas, leadership and educational philosophies of the secretaries of the Department of Education. As the
Department grows, as surely i t w ill, i t is incumbent
upon researchers to analyze the Department, its programs, and its leaders. In doing so, researchers help to extend the knowledge base, provide data for decision-makers on the future of the Department, help to chart the Department’s course, and assist government in answering the demands of the people it serves. BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Cavazos, L. (1988 September 21). Press conference. U. S. Department of Education, Washington, 1- 19. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1988a, October 11). Convocation at the Texas A & I University, Kingsville, TX, 1-8. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1988b, October 11). Los Encinos Special Emphasis School, Corpus Christi Independent School D is tric t, 1-10. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515,]
Cavazos, L. (1988, October 13). Education department unveils drug prevention videos. U.S. Department of Education, Washington, 1-14. [Obtained from Congressman James Q uillen's O ffice, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1988, October 14). Inter-American defense board. U.S. Department of Education, Washington, 1-8. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's O ffice, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1988, October 18). Remarks at the National Distinguished Principals Awards banquet, J, W. M arriott Hotel, Washington, 1-8. [Obtained from Congressman James Q uillen's O ffice, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1988, October 19). Mexican Engineering Society. U.S. Department of Education, Washington, 1-32, [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's O ffice, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1988, October 29). Speech before the 17th annual Texas Association for Bilingual Education conference. Dallas, TX, 1-6. [Obtained from Congressman James Q u ille n 's O ffic e , 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1988, November 3). Speech at Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, 1-14. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House O ffice Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1988, November 18). Press conference on partnerships in education. U.S. Department of Education, Washington, 1-20, [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1988, December 6). Address before the Council of S cie n tific Society Presidents. American Chemical Society Building, Washington, 1-7. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1988, December 19). Interview. U.S. Department of Education, Washington, Dai 1v Education News. Thursday, 1-7,
Cavazos, L. (1989, January 9). Press conference: Fiscal year 1990 budget request. U.S. Department of Education, Washington, 1-32. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, January 10). Speech at the White House workshop on choice in education. Old Executive Office Building, Washington, 1-16. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's O ffice, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, January 13). Remarks prepared for delivery before the Martin Luther King, Jr. "Teach-in program'* and community meeting, Atlanta, QA, 1-14. [Obtained from Congressman James Q u illen’ s Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, January 16). Speech at the third annual conference on the recruitment and retention of minority students in teach [sic] education. University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, 1-36. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's O ffice, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, January 18). Education: The future begins today. Remarks prepared for delivery before the U.S. Department of Education forum. National Museum of Women In the Arts, Washington, 1-16. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, January 27). Statement before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Relations. U. S Department of Education, 1-14, [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, February 2). Remarks prepared for delivery before the annual meeting of the National Association of Independent Colleges and universities Hyatt Regency Hotel-Capitol H ill, Washington, 1-6. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, February 6). Remarks prepared for the sixth annual Washington conference National Association of Trade and Technical Schools. The Westin Hotel, Washington, 1-13. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, February 14). Testimony before the House Education and Labor Subcommittee on elementary secondary, and vocational education. Oversight hearing on implementation of the Hawkins-Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Improvement Amendments of 1988. U.S. Department of Education, Washington, 1-5. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515,]
Cavazos, L. (1989, February 23). Department of Education, fiscal year 1990 budget request for the Department of Education. Witnesses appearing before the House Subcommittee on Labor-HHS-Education Appropriations. U.S. Department of Education, Washington, 1-11. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, March 1). Speech at Manhattanvi11e College, Purchase, NY, 1-13. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, March 4). Remarks prepared for delivery before the National Education Association annual conference. San Diego, CA., 1-8, [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515,]
Cavazos, L. (1989, March 9). Leadership and the American family: Remarks prepared for delivery before the National Institute of Hispanic leadership. Long Island University, Brooklyn, NY, 1-5. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House O ffice Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, March 10). Remarks prepared for delivery before the city college/New York state legislative forum. The City University of New York, New York, NY, 1-7. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, March 21). Statement of Lauro F. Cavazos, Secretary of Education before the subcommittee on elementary, secondary, and vocational education. House Committee on Education and Labor. U.S. Department of Education, Washington, 1-5. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, March 31) Speech at the University of Alabama, Birmingham, AL., 1-13. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's O ffice, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, April 3). Partnerships in prevention: Remarks prepared for delivery before the third annual conference on drug-free schools, Radisson Lord Baltimore Hotel, Baltimore, MD, 1-7. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, April 20). Remarks prepared for delivery before the National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education's (NAFEO) fourteenth national conference on blacks in higher education. The Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington, 1-12. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L, (1989, May 3). Remarks prepared for delivery at press conference on 1989 state education performance chart. Horace Mann Learning Center, Washington, 1-10. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.] Cavazos, L. (1989, May 4). Statement of Lauro F. Cavazos, Secretary of Education, before the Subcommittee on Education, Arts and Humanities, United States Senate. U. S. Department of Education, 1-8. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, May 11). The education's president's man in charge. U.S. Department of Education, Daily Education News. Thursday, 1-4.
Cavazos, L. (1989, May 12). Greetings to the attendees of the National Association of Bilingual Education conference. Hyatt Regency, downtown, Miami, 1-5, [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515,]
Cavazos, L. (1989, May 19). Restructuring American education through choice. Education Press Association, National Press Club, Washington, 1-7. [Obtained from Congressman James Q uillen’s Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, May 25). Speech at Voice of America International Training Center workshop, Washington, 1-9. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, June 1). Remarks prepared for delivery by Secretary Lauro F. Cavazos for student loan default reduction initiatives announcement. U.S. Department of Education, Washington, 1-8. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, June 5). Remarks prepared for delivery to the Business Roundtable, M arriott, Washington, D. C., 1-8. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, June 13). Statement of Lauro F. Cavazos, Secretary of Education, before the subcommittee on Education, Arts, and the Humanities, Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Washington, 1-10. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.] Cavazos, L. (1989, June 19). Speech at the drug-free schools awards luncheon. The National Museum of Women in the Arts, Washington, 1-3. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, June 20). Remarks to the Carnegie Corporation conference. Turning points: Education in the twenty fir s t century. School restructuring: Choice 1n education. The Westin Hotel, Washington, 1-9. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, June 21). Statement of Lauro F. Cavazos, Secretary of Education, before the subcommittee on Education, Arts, and the Humanities, Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Washington, 1-8. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Wash i ngton, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, June 22). Testimony before the senate committee on governmental a ffa irs . The Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, 1-10. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
Cavazos, L. (1989, June 26). Remarks prepared for delivery before the Americans for Generational Equity national education forum. The Quality Inn Hotel, Washington, 1-12, [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
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Cavazos, L. (1989, July 15). Remarks prepared for delivery before the Education Commission of the States. The Hyatt Regency, Chicago, 1L, 1-10. [Obtained from Congressman Jame3 Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.] Cavazos, L. (1989, August 2). Statement of Lauro F. Cavazos, Secretary of Education, before the Subcommittee on Elementary, Secondary and Vocational Education House Committee on Education and Labor. U.S. Department of Education, 1-10. [Obtained from Congressman James Quillen's Office, 102 Canon House Office Building, Washington, 20515.]
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES
404 Shirley M. Hufstedler
Shirley Ann Mount Hufstedler was appointed by
President James Carter to serve as the Department of
Education's first secretary. She was confirmed as in that position on November 30, 1979, by a vote of 81-2
(Theroux, 1980, June 8). On December 6 of the same year she was sworn in as the nation's f ir s t Department of
Education secretary.
Shirley Hufstedler was born Shirley Ann Mount to parents of German descent 1n Denver, Colorado
("Hufstedler, Shirley [Ann] M[ount]," 1980). She credits her mother who ran the house like a "drill sergeant" (Hufstedler, Shirley [Ann] M[ount]," 1980, p.
160) to her In tellectu al development. Her other s k ills she credited to an eighth grade English ("Hufstedler,
Shirley [Ann] M[ount]," 1980).
Hufstedler attended Stanford University as a law student and served on the Stanford Law Review. She graduated tenth in her class, later marrying Seth
Hufstedler, who graduated first in the class
("Hufstedler, Shirley [Ann] M[ount]," 1980).
As a judge, Hufstedler acquired the reputation as a minority activist with the spirit of a civil libertarian. Her written opinions were dissents to prevailing conservative opinions ("Hufstedler, Shirley
[Ann] M[ount]," 1980),
405 Her appointment took educational pundits by surprise (Radin & Hawley, 1988; Hufstedler, 1981,
January 11; Wynn, 1980). Hufstedler took the job after having served as a distinguished appellate federal judge
1n California (“Hufstedler, Shirley [Ann] M[ount]",
1980). Until Carter's defeat in the 1980 presidential elections, p o litic a l pundits regarded her as likely to be the nation's f ir s t female United States Supreme Count
Justice. The New York Times rated Hufstedler as a liberal activist (Neill, 1980b, p. 310), Theroux (1980,
June 8) called her "something of a barracuda" (p. 43),
Hufstedler's own assessment of herself did not contradict other f ir s t impressions: "I am a den mother gone w ild," she told a reporter (Theroux, 1980 June 8, p. 93).
Hufstedler herself was surprised by the nomination.
She wrote,
[W]hen 1 was tapped, £ny. surprise was complete.
I didn't have any inkling until Vice-President
Mondale called and asked me to come to Washington.
. . .A friend told me that if I had any sense, I
would take the next plane back to the Himalayas.
I reached the White House , . . only to
discover I was the list. I felt like a girl who
had been invited to meet her finance's family only
to find herself walking down the aisle. (H u fs te d le r, 1981 January 11, p. 38)
With her tie s to the bench, her strong and, at times, strident views on civil rights, Carter felt that her appointment would, at the very least, deflect attention away from the National Education Association, and to the matter of educational reform (Radln & Hawley,
1988; "Carter's Choice," 1979 November 11).
Though the Washington Post had taken a b ristlin g opposition to the new Department, Hufstedler*s nomination was greeted with applause. The ed ito rial that appeared after her nomination said that she was not a "part or a product" of the "hustling bureaucracy whose perspective influence was one of the better reasons for opposing the department in the f ir s t place" ("The
Hufstedler Nomination," 1979, p. A20; quoted, Radln &
Hawley, 1988, p. 155). Secretary Hufstedler began her only year in the Department's top seat with a $14.2 b illio n dollar budget and 17,239 employees ("Hufstedler,
Shirley [Ann] M[ount]," 1980). Secretary Hufstedler served in the chief capacity less that eighteen months.
The f ir s t six months of that time was spent in working with a transition team from HEW and, later, a reorganization team she put together (Radin & Hawley,
1988). Both of these activities created multitudinous difficulties for her and for the work she hoped to accomplish while secretary. Some educators were happy with the Hufstedler announcement, Howe (1980) pointed out that the judge had an "incisive mind" (p. 466) and the capacity to master new subject and disambiguate complex educational considerations. Her service on the bench would stand her in good stead in the Department. Howe further pointed out that the new Secretary must understand quickly that she had a responsibility to lead.
Other educators were less optim istic. Wynn (1980) pointed out that here was another case of a non-educator being appointed to an educator's post. To Wynn, only a
"real" educator could handle the department's problems.
C ertainly, some f e lt that way (Radin & Hawley, 1988).
She maintained a candid coolness in the face of criticism and portrayed a sense of overwhelming confidence amid b itte r debate (Hufstedler, 1981 January
11). Appointed by President Lyndon Johnson to the Ninth
C ircuit Court of Appeals, Hufstedler, at the time of her appointment, was the highest ranking female ju ris t in the U.S. (Radin & Hawley, 1988). Terrel Howard Bell
Terrel Bell was born November 11, 1921 in Lava Hot
Springs, in southeastern Idaho. He was one of five sons and four daughter of William Dewain B ell, a farmer, and
Alta (Martin) Bell. Alta Bell raised her nine children during the depression after Bell's father was killed in an accident in 1929 (Bell, 1988). Bell grew up 1n a four-room house with no plumbing. The nine children shared two bedrooms.
Bell knew the hard lif e from his beginnings. His chores were grueling and had to be done before his education could occur. He would rise up before daybreak and stoke fire s and milk cows and do other chores, putting in nearly a full day's work before his schoolwork began (B ell, 1988). But he worked hard, and the hard work paid off. It also influenced his views of education ("Bell, T[errel] H[oward]," 1976). When he graduated at the top of his class and gave the valedictory, he stood proudly before his classmates, not realizing that he was wearing an outfit that had been purchased by donations from his teachers (Bell, 1988).
Bell attended Albion State Normal School for his college work.
His college days were not any easier than his elementary and high school education (Bell, 1988). He worked part-time jobs, scraped enough of his money
409 together to pay his tuition, and stayed up late at night to get his studies in. He used to walk the library at night, hoping to find a textbook he could "borrow" while his classmates worked on other assignments. B ell's own financial plight was so bad he never could afford the purchase of textbooks while in school (B ell, 1988).
In this context Bell ascended to the top of his profession, working as a principal in Utah, later as a superintendent, and s till later, as the Commissioner of
Education in Utah. In 1970 he joined the United States
Office of Education as an associate commissioner for regional office coordination, under then Commissioner of
Education, James Allen. When Allen, President Nixon first education appointee, was relased by the administration for his criticism of the Vietnam War,
Bell was named acting commissioner. Bell le ft this position to head the Granite schoot district in Salt
Lake C ity, Utah. Three years later he was back in
Washington as Nixon's Commisioner of Education, succeeding John R. Ottina. Bell lives in Salt Lake City with his wife Betty Ruth Fitzgerald. The Bell's have four sons.
Bell's schooling had come courtesy of President
Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal and the Congress of the
United States (Bell, 1988j "Bell, T[errel] H[oward],"
1976.). Roosevelt had provided the schools in a rural 411 town, and the Congress had enacted laws to provide Bell with a part-time job through the National Youth
Administration (NYA) program (B ell, 1988, p. 9). If anything, Bell saw that government could do something for the people, and, given his circumstances, was not
lik e ly to forget i t . Moreover, he went into teaching because of his "enjoyment of lif e as a student" and because of his "respect for teachers and teaching and
learning as a youth" ("Bell, T[errel] H[oward]," 1976, p. 21
With President Ronald Reagan's victory over the incumbent Jimmy Carter, Washington took on a new
Republican look. Reagan had campaigned on a platform of getting government off the backs of the nation's citizens and he vowed to do that by making government
less obtrusive in th e ir lives. One of his f ir s t promises was to dismantle the Department of Education
(B ell, 1988). Although Hufstedler*3 choice had been a surprise to everyone, Bell's choice was hardly surprising to anyone. He had been in the Republican camp for many years and his face and diminutive statue was known to everyone. What did surprise was that
Republican candidate for President, who had campaigned as a candidate 1n the Qotdwater mold, had tapped an educational helmsman who resembled that mold very
1it t le . Indeed, long before Bell came to Washington on his f ir s t go-round (as Nixon's Commissioner of the Office of
Education 1n the mid-seventies), he said, "I look for government to more and more, provide federal assistance and suggestions . . ."(B e ll, 1974b, p. 31). This was hardly going to be a match made in heaven between
Reagan, a conservative Republican, and B ell, a moderate one.
When he was tapped by President Reagan, he and his wife picked up their belongings and loaded them into a
U-Haul and headed back to th eir Washington for th eir second s tin t (B ell, 1988). Never had one individual seen the Protestant work ethic perform as admirably as it had in B ell's case. Here was a man who had been dirt-poor, worked hard, got a good education, and made it to the top of his profession. He was an interesting choice for Secretary of the Department of Education for a conservative President to make.
Bell came into Washington amid the debate about the
Department of Education (National Education Association,
1982; Savage, 1981b). Reagan had promised to close the
Department down. Because the Department had won so narrow a victory in its creation, and because the debates regarding Secretary Hufstedler's slow movement during her thirteen month tenure, even proponents, with the exception of the education establishment, were 413 beginning to have second thoughts about the newly created Department of Education (B ell, 1988). Bell came to Washington ready to abolish the Department 1n favor of a foundation of education. He left Washington committed to seeing the Department not only survive, but flourish. William John Bennett
When Terrel Bell resigned the post of Secretary of the Department of Education in 1984, William John
Bennett took over the helm. Bennett's leadership, philosophy of education, and views of government sprang full grown in the eighties, Bennett was a controversial figure, first as head of the National Endowment of the
Humanities, in the early eighties, and later as the
Department's head man. What made him controversial had much to do with his leadership and his philosophy
(indeed, one can hardly be disambiguated from the other), both of which he never hesitated from sharing with his audiences, be they congressional figures, the nation at large, or gatherings of teachers.
Sworn in on February 6, 1985, Bennett described himself as a "disaffected Democrat sympathetic to neoconservative causes" ("Bennett, William J[ohn],"
1985, p. 30). He strongly advocated President Ronald
Reagan's supply-side economics and Reagan's educational policies which were strongly federalistic. While his predecessor's much publicized difficulties with in-house conservatives contributed to his resignation in November of 1984, Bennett's out-spoken views on education caused him many d iffic u ltie s with an opposite group, those within the educational establishment, In equally well- publicized press accounts ("Bennett, William J[ohn],"
414 1985).
Bennett was born on July 31, 1949 to a middle-class
Catholic family in Brooklyn, New York. He made his educational way through public and Jesuit schools as a
"streetwise" youth ("Bennett, William J[ohn]," 1985, p.
30). He later moved with his family to Washington, graduating from Qonzaga High School. Bennett later obtained his BA degree from Williams College in
Massachusetts. He pursued and obtained his PhD degree from the University of Texas. He also received a JD degree from Harvard University. In 1981, President
Reagan tapped Bennett to be chairman of the replacing Carter appointee, Joseph Duffey, Bennett turned around the funding of NEH, which he said had grown p o litic a lly lib eral, while also trimming its budget. His most celebrated NEH document, To Reclaim a
Legacy (1984), to be discussed later, focused on the reform movement sparked by the publication of A Nation at Risk (1983), by Bennett's DOE predecessor.
Bennett assumed fu ll command in 1985 and did not waste anytime in letting the nation know the course which the DOE would assume. Almost immediately he was embroiled in controversies surrounding the funding of higher education through student loans, educational content taught, bilingual education, and the teaching of moral values in the classroom. Lauro Fred Cavazos Jr.
The fourth person to serve as Secretary of the
Department of Education is Hispanic-born, Lauro F.
Cavazos. Cavazos was originally nominated by President
Reagan for the post on August 9, 1988. He was unanimously approved by the Senate on September 20,
1988. Cavazos was asked later by the incoming Bush
Administration to stay on as Department of Education
Secretary. Cavazos later became the Education
President's man (U.S. Department of Education, 1989,
Release, July 1).
A sixth generation Texan, Cavazos was born in 1927, on January 4. He father was foreman of the vast and famous King Ranch in South Texas. His father, Don
Lauro, always stressed education. He also emphasized the importance of his children learning English (Hays,
1989). Cavazos was greatly influenced by his father's views.
Cavazos earned his BA and MA degree in Zoology at
Texas Technological University. He holds a doctoral degree in Physiology from Iowa State University. He has received various honorary degrees from many institutions in the United States, Cavazos has served in a number of professional positions. He taught at the Medical
College of Virginia and a Tufts University School of
Medicine, in Boston. He also served as Dean at Tufts
416 for five years. He returned to Texas Tech in 1980 to become that university's tenth president, the first
Hispanic and fir s t graduate to hold that office.
Cavazos found himself in the middle of the limelight immediately, not only because he was the f ir s t
Hispanic to be named to a Cabinet-level post, but also because of his beleaguered presidency at Texas Tech.
His faculty had just taken a vote of confidence in him, one that did not turn out favorably (Hays, 1989). Prior to the vote of confidence, and something that played no l i t t l e part in its outcome certainly, Cavazos had encouraged his board of trustees to change faculty tenure to something other than tenure for life--a kind of five-year tenure that was renewable, but not without qualifications (Hays, 1989), Cavazos did not go into the question blindly. He warned his board that the faculty could come back with repercussions over the new tenure plan.
Those repercussions came quickly. In the vote of confidence nearly 8056 of his colleagues turned him down
(Hays, 1989), Some were hostile. Said one member,
"[He] stopped making decisions three or four years ago.
He runs from any kind of confrontation" (Hays, 1989, p.
25). The writing was on the wall. Cavazos had to step down. But just as he did, Reagan stepped in, and, for the second time, offered him the job of Secretary of the Department of Education. He came to the Department with no experience in elementary or secondary education
(Hays, 1989).
Cavazos' appointment, like Hufstedler's and B ell's before him, was something of a mystery. Here was a man who had served as a faculty member, chairman of a university department, and president of a Institution,
Texas Tech. His more than seventy a rtic le s were on physiology and sim ilar medical concerns.
It was amid this climate that Cavazos took over as secretary. Already his predecessor had le ft the climate at the DOE electric with charges of foul from the so- called education establishment (Ohanian, 1988). Now with his own personal distresses upon him, Cavazos took up the reign of a huge bureaucracy, not unlike the large, private one he had just left behind. Appendix B
INTERVIEW QUIDE
419 Interview Quide
Questions Pertaining to Leadership
1. A lot has been w ritten and said about leadership over the last decade. How would you describe your own leadership while you were in the Department of Education (ED)?
2. Do you feel that the structure of the ED was amenable to your view of leadership?
3. A large part of leadership in the legislative or p o litic a l arena deals, it strikes me, with restraints from one source or another— the leg islative restraints, the judicial restraints, congressional restraints, and restraints from special interest groups. Do you feel any of these restraints (or others) curtailed dynamic leadership while you were at the ED?
4. Was compromise important to you in accomplishing your goals?
5. If you had to name your type of leadership while at the ED, and I were to give you only two choices, transactional (leadership which achieves goals through compromise), or transformational (leadership which achieves goals through change and vision) which would best describe your own?
6 . . Do you feel you had enough time in the ED to give a fa ir assessment of your leadership a b ilitie s ? [Asked to Hufstedler only.]
7. What could you point to, or name as the sort of thing(s) that you would like to be remembered for in the ED, Think especially of those areas you feel achieved long lasting change.
8 . Education reform has been mentioned frequetly during this decade. What role do you see the ED should play in educational reform? What kind of leadership it provide for educational reform? Is educational reform possible through a federal office?
9. What part did power play in terms of getting things accomplished in ED. How did you use power?
10. Is it appropriate to talk about moral leadership in connection with a federal office?
420 11. The ED was not very popular with the public when the b ill creating It was passed. Moreover, i t passed very narrowly in Congress. If we assume that leadership involves needs fu lfillm en t going on between leader and follower, what do you see were the needs being fu lfille d on the part of followers by the ED?
12. Do you feel you were largely successful in fu lfillin g those needs?
13. Historically, the role between the federal government and education has been an ambivalent one-one that runs hot and cold. Did your understanding of this history, often one of a debate between how proper that role was, and to what lengths 1t should extend, influence your leadership style?
14. If you had it to do all over again, would you change anything about your approach to the ED?
Questions Pertaining to Philosophy of Education
1. Do you believe that there are specific facts that everyone should be taught, or do you have another view of education?
2. Do you perceive a difference in the way we are going about education now and the way we went about It , say, 30 to 50 years ago? Are we doing the same things basically, and the change 1n students academically represents just an increase in the sheer number of students being educated?
3. Researchers te ll us that there has been a significant decline in SAT and ACT scores over the past two decades. What could account for this decline?
4. What role did you own world view, your way of looking at life and education, play in influencing your leadership? Did you think about it in connection with decision making, or was it unimportant for the job you were doing?
5. Were values important 1n education, and was it the bailiwick of a public office to teach those values?
6 . As you see it , is process more important than facts?
7. If you had to, what descriptive name would yougive to your philosophy of education. It may be a traditional term, or you may want to invent one that is more descriptive. 422
8 . Is the main goal of education a process whereby teachers teach students to exchange one set of behaviors that may be unacceptable for another set that are acceptable?
9. From your point of view, should education be the chief tool for reforming our culture?
10. Should education begin and end with disciplines, or should it extend into the social arena?
11. Should we be concerned with providing students with a consciousness, say, with passing on to each generation, an American consciousness?
12. Should public education attempt to help students to answer, such questions as "Who am I?" "What am I doing?" and "Where am I going?" along with, or in place of, course content?
13. What recommendations do you have for educators about the way they now go about passing knowledge on to students? If you had the a b ility to change anything about education in the United States, what would it be?
Questions Pertaining to Government
1. Has federal involvement in education essentially nationalized it?
2. In light of the oblique reference to education in the Tenth Amendment, do you feel Congress has ever overstepped the boundaries of the Constitution in regard to education?
3. Education in the United States was once the envy of the world. Now we read in popular and scholarly presses that American education has declined, especially at the elementary and secondary levels. Do you think federal involvement in education has had anything to do with this decline?
4. The link between public education and religion has been at times a strong one, at times a weak one. Has continued federal involvement in education helped to a) distance religion from education; b) place that relationship in sharper focus; or, c) simply blur the distinctions.
5. How would you characterize the relationship between government and education. Why do you characterize i t in this manner? 424
VITA
MARK Y. HERRING
Personal Data: Date of Birth: October 10, 1952 Place of Birth: Dothan, Alabama
Education: George Peabody College for Teachers, Nashville, Tennessee; English/ Philosophy, B.A., 1974 George Peabody College of Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee; Library Science, MLS, 1979 East Tennessee State University, Johnson City, Tennessee, Ed.D., 1990
Professional Department of Highways, State of Experience: Tennessee, Nashville, Tennessee, Highway Assessor, 1974 Comptroller of Tennessee, State of Tennessee, Nashville, Tennessee, Tax Examiner, 1974-1976 Motivational Institute of Natural Dynamics, Executive Director, 1976 Private Tutor, Nashville, Tennessee, 1976 Vanderbilt University, Reserve Reading Room, Library Assistant, 1978-1979 Metropolitan Nashville Public Library, Circulation Librarian, Genealogy, Summer, 1979 King College, Inc., E.W. King Library, Director, 1979-1987
Publications: Controversial Issues in Librarianship. Garland, 1987 Ethics and the Professor. Garland, 1988 Friends of the Librarv Programs. Neal- Schuman, 1990