The Rise of the Commercial Threat

Microwave/Electro-Optic electronics engineer at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division, prepares alignment of various optical components using eye-safe visible lasers, Norco, California, April 19, 2011 (U.S. Navy/Greg Vojtko) Angela Merkel while she delivered a The Rise of the campaign speech.1 In January of 2015, an sUAS defied restricted airspace and landed, initially undetected, on the White House lawn.2 And more Commercial Threat recently, in August of 2016, at least five sUASs disrupted wildfire fighting Countering the Small efforts near Los Angeles, grounding helicopters for fear of mid-air colli- sions.3 Likewise, sUAS altercations Unmanned Aircraft System with law enforcement are increasing, as the Federal Aviation Administration By Anthony Tingle and David Tyree now receives over 100 adverse UAS reports per month.4 These examples emphasize the intrusive, undetectable, and potentially lethal nature of this he Small Unmanned Aircraft the parameters of the capabilities emerging technology. System (sUAS) is a disruptive regarding military use have yet to be The sUAS epitomizes the difficulties commercial technology that fully discovered, recent events high- T with rapidly advancing commercial tech- poses a unique and currently unde- light the potential danger. In Septem- nology.5 The sUAS is as prolific as it is fined threat to U.S. national security. ber 2013, an unarmed sUAS hovered disruptive, and it will challenge our joint Although, as with any new technology, near the face of German Chancellor air-defense procedures and doctrine and redefine our perspective on the military uses of commercial technology. In this Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Tingle, USA, is a Strategic Initiatives Analyst at the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command. Second Lieutenant David Tyree, USAF, is a Flight Student Pilot at Vance Air article, we examine the characteristics Force Base, Oklahoma. and capabilities of the sUAS, report on 30 Forum / Countering the Small Unmanned Aircraft System JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 current counter-UAS initiatives within technologies may be necessary to defend lightweight power sources and materials the Department of Defense (DOD), against the growing sUAS threat. such as carbon nanotubes (and corre- and present policy ideas to mitigate the It is hard to understate the current sponding manufacturing processes such future threat from militarized commercial complexity and importance of positively as adaptive printing) will enable smaller technology. identifying sUASs. As sUASs continue to and faster sUASs with longer loiter and be used for a variety of commercial and pri- greater operating distances. Characteristics and Capabilities vate purposes (including package delivery While the size and maneuverability The rapid rate of commercial technol- and photography), the sUAS operator’s are defining characteristics of the sUAS, ogy’s advance has directly contributed intent becomes difficult to discern. Unlike advances in automation algorithms are to the rise of sUASs. Improvements in traditional aircraft, which require runways a necessary component of the swarming communication equipment, cryptog- and thus provide longer lead times for tactic. Simultaneous command and con- raphy, and lightweight materials have tracking, the average sUAS is able to trol of a large number of small objects led to the current state of the multiple become airborne quickly and close on its necessitates autonomy technology that rotary-wing UASs, often referred to target. Additionally, positive identification will undoubtedly be available in the as “quadcopters,” and extremely small is a necessary component of engagement near future.12 In fact, a number of UASs fixed-wing UASs. For this article, we authority, especially when considering currently deployed or in development op- define aircraft that fall into the DOD deployment of sUAS countermeasures erate with varying degrees of autonomy.13 UAS Category 1 (weighing less than on U.S. soil, including interdiction by law It is quite feasible that attacking sUAS 20 pounds) as an sUAS6 because the enforcement and the possibility of civilian swarms will be able to automatically interdiction of larger than Category 1 casualties. To effectively counter sUASs, sense and communicate weaknesses in aircraft quickly approaches traditional it will be necessary to refine and practice the opposing defense, thus adapting their defensive counterair operations.7 procedures and doctrine, while developing swarming tactics accordingly. As technology advances, the sUAS the capability to effectively detect, track, The development of sUAS swarm will increase in lethality. If Moore’s law and positively identify the threat. tactics and techniques in many ways continues to hold, we will see an increase Future advances in material and com- mirrors the introduction of Multiple in sUAS command and control distances, putational science will enable the sUAS Independently Targetable Reentry electro-optical sensor resolution, GPS to perform autonomously, increasing Vehicle (MIRV) technology in the early guidance accuracy, and battlefield auton- their efficacy as an offensive weapon. One 1970s. The MIRV concept included the omy. With advances in material science, of the characteristics of the sUAS is that use of multiple nuclear warheads included especially considering adaptive (“3D”) it uniquely lends itself to advanced aerial in a single ballistic missile, greatly increas- printing techniques and carbon nano- tactics. As battlefield automation pro- ing the probability of successfully striking tubes, sUASs will become smaller, faster, gresses, militaries are advancing toward the enemy with nuclear missiles.14 Similar and lighter, and will loiter longer and the use of multitudes of sUASs in coordi- to the inability of the Soviets to counter carry heavier payloads. nated formations known as “swarming.” a larger number of potential inbound The basic physical structure of the This swarming tactic could make defense nuclear warheads, the sUAS overwhelms sUAS (including the use of advanced difficult, especially for large objects or those on the defense with possible multi- materials) hinders radar technologies, fixed facilities. The use of swarm tactics ple aggressors. Although similar in terms the primary component of modern air increases the destructive power of the of using mass, sUAS differs from MIRV defense. Radar works by bouncing energy sUAS and presents adversaries with a in terms of maneuverability and the abil- off airborne objects and interpreting defensive dilemma.10 In this regard, mili- ity to land and wait for more opportune the return reflections. Although the taries may have to reconsider the concept times to attack. Not all the sUASs in the carbon fiber and plastic components (of of mass on the battlefield. offensive swarm need to be deadly, as the which the majority of most sUASs are Currently, the practical use of sUAS parallels with MIRVs extend beyond a comprised) naturally reduce radar return, swarms suffers from a confluence of simple numerical advantage. Offensive size appears to contribute most to the technological shortcomings seemingly sUAS tactics could co-opt the idea of shortcomings in sUAS radar identifica- resolved by relatively minor advances in decoys from MIRV technology. With the tion and tracking.8 While modern radar technology. The lift capacity, speed, and advent of MIRV decoys, or warheads that technology has the capability to engage agility of the sUAS is directly dependent had the same physical characteristics as smaller objects. Additionally, concerning on the amount of weight carried by the their nuclear counterparts, the economic radar, sUASs are often indistinguishable vehicle. Reductions in the weight of efficiency of MIRV technology enabled from other airborne objects (specifically communications equipment, sensors, asymmetric advantages.15 Similarly, the birds).9 While additional methods such as onboard processors, and kinetic payload use of decoys may reduce the overall cost acoustic-phased arrays and electro-optical (for example, “energetics”)11 will increase of simultaneously attacking with large cameras show promise, a combination the range and maneuverability of these numbers of sUASs, presenting adversaries of these tracking and identification systems. Likewise, advances in small, with multiple deadly dilemmas. JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 Tingle and Tyree 31 Current Counter-UAS Initiatives these relatively cheap miniature guided recalls memories of the now defunct The U.S. military currently has a mul- munitions may hold the answer to coun- Airborne Laser System, the mission titude of ways to effectively destroy tering swarms of sUASs. Another method and domain of the Air Force forces the UASs. Starting in 2002, the military to counter sUASs may be with the use of Service to pursue small, lightweight laser exercise Black Dart focused on coun- other sUASs. systems that can be mounted on aircraft. tering the UAS threat. The exercise One method to counteract swarms Perhaps the most promising di- has tested a number of kinetic and of attacking sUASs may be to use sUASs rected-energy technology in terms of nonkinetic methods ranging from 0.50- as “hunter-drones.” Currently, there is defeating multiple sUASs is the use of caliber guns to Hellfire missiles.16 The a “drone war” occurring over the skies high-powered microwaves. These micro- ability to defend against this threat is, of Tokyo as the Japanese Yakuza (an wave devices have the capability to render at its core,

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