Microwave/Electro-Optic electronics engineer at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division, prepares alignment of various optical components using eye-safe visible lasers, Norco, California, April 19, 2011 (U.S. Navy/Greg Vojtko)
Angela Merkel while she delivered a The Rise of the campaign speech.1 In January of 2015, an sUAS defied restricted airspace and landed, initially undetected, on the White House lawn.2 And more Commercial Threat recently, in August of 2016, at least five sUASs disrupted wildfire fighting Countering the Small efforts near Los Angeles, grounding helicopters for fear of mid-air colli- sions.3 Likewise, sUAS altercations Unmanned Aircraft System with law enforcement are increasing, as the Federal Aviation Administration By Anthony Tingle and David Tyree now receives over 100 adverse UAS reports per month.4 These examples emphasize the intrusive, undetectable, and potentially lethal nature of this he Small Unmanned Aircraft the parameters of the capabilities emerging technology. System (sUAS) is a disruptive regarding military use have yet to be The sUAS epitomizes the difficulties commercial technology that fully discovered, recent events high- T with rapidly advancing commercial tech- poses a unique and currently unde- light the potential danger. In Septem- nology.5 The sUAS is as prolific as it is fined threat to U.S. national security. ber 2013, an unarmed sUAS hovered disruptive, and it will challenge our joint Although, as with any new technology, near the face of German Chancellor air-defense procedures and doctrine and redefine our perspective on the military uses of commercial technology. In this Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Tingle, USA, is a Strategic Initiatives Analyst at the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command. Second Lieutenant David Tyree, USAF, is a Flight Student Pilot at Vance Air article, we examine the characteristics Force Base, Oklahoma. and capabilities of the sUAS, report on
30 Forum / Countering the Small Unmanned Aircraft System JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 current counter-UAS initiatives within technologies may be necessary to defend lightweight power sources and materials the Department of Defense (DOD), against the growing sUAS threat. such as carbon nanotubes (and corre- and present policy ideas to mitigate the It is hard to understate the current sponding manufacturing processes such future threat from militarized commercial complexity and importance of positively as adaptive printing) will enable smaller technology. identifying sUASs. As sUASs continue to and faster sUASs with longer loiter and be used for a variety of commercial and pri- greater operating distances. Characteristics and Capabilities vate purposes (including package delivery While the size and maneuverability The rapid rate of commercial technol- and photography), the sUAS operator’s are defining characteristics of the sUAS, ogy’s advance has directly contributed intent becomes difficult to discern. Unlike advances in automation algorithms are to the rise of sUASs. Improvements in traditional aircraft, which require runways a necessary component of the swarming communication equipment, cryptog- and thus provide longer lead times for tactic. Simultaneous command and con- raphy, and lightweight materials have tracking, the average sUAS is able to trol of a large number of small objects led to the current state of the multiple become airborne quickly and close on its necessitates autonomy technology that rotary-wing UASs, often referred to target. Additionally, positive identification will undoubtedly be available in the as “quadcopters,” and extremely small is a necessary component of engagement near future.12 In fact, a number of UASs fixed-wing UASs. For this article, we authority, especially when considering currently deployed or in development op- define aircraft that fall into the DOD deployment of sUAS countermeasures erate with varying degrees of autonomy.13 UAS Category 1 (weighing less than on U.S. soil, including interdiction by law It is quite feasible that attacking sUAS 20 pounds) as an sUAS6 because the enforcement and the possibility of civilian swarms will be able to automatically interdiction of larger than Category 1 casualties. To effectively counter sUASs, sense and communicate weaknesses in aircraft quickly approaches traditional it will be necessary to refine and practice the opposing defense, thus adapting their defensive counterair operations.7 procedures and doctrine, while developing swarming tactics accordingly. As technology advances, the sUAS the capability to effectively detect, track, The development of sUAS swarm will increase in lethality. If Moore’s law and positively identify the threat. tactics and techniques in many ways continues to hold, we will see an increase Future advances in material and com- mirrors the introduction of Multiple in sUAS command and control distances, putational science will enable the sUAS Independently Targetable Reentry electro-optical sensor resolution, GPS to perform autonomously, increasing Vehicle (MIRV) technology in the early guidance accuracy, and battlefield auton- their efficacy as an offensive weapon. One 1970s. The MIRV concept included the omy. With advances in material science, of the characteristics of the sUAS is that use of multiple nuclear warheads included especially considering adaptive (“3D”) it uniquely lends itself to advanced aerial in a single ballistic missile, greatly increas- printing techniques and carbon nano- tactics. As battlefield automation pro- ing the probability of successfully striking tubes, sUASs will become smaller, faster, gresses, militaries are advancing toward the enemy with nuclear missiles.14 Similar and lighter, and will loiter longer and the use of multitudes of sUASs in coordi- to the inability of the Soviets to counter carry heavier payloads. nated formations known as “swarming.” a larger number of potential inbound The basic physical structure of the This swarming tactic could make defense nuclear warheads, the sUAS overwhelms sUAS (including the use of advanced difficult, especially for large objects or those on the defense with possible multi- materials) hinders radar technologies, fixed facilities. The use of swarm tactics ple aggressors. Although similar in terms the primary component of modern air increases the destructive power of the of using mass, sUAS differs from MIRV defense. Radar works by bouncing energy sUAS and presents adversaries with a in terms of maneuverability and the abil- off airborne objects and interpreting defensive dilemma.10 In this regard, mili- ity to land and wait for more opportune the return reflections. Although the taries may have to reconsider the concept times to attack. Not all the sUASs in the carbon fiber and plastic components (of of mass on the battlefield. offensive swarm need to be deadly, as the which the majority of most sUASs are Currently, the practical use of sUAS parallels with MIRVs extend beyond a comprised) naturally reduce radar return, swarms suffers from a confluence of simple numerical advantage. Offensive size appears to contribute most to the technological shortcomings seemingly sUAS tactics could co-opt the idea of shortcomings in sUAS radar identifica- resolved by relatively minor advances in decoys from MIRV technology. With the tion and tracking.8 While modern radar technology. The lift capacity, speed, and advent of MIRV decoys, or warheads that technology has the capability to engage agility of the sUAS is directly dependent had the same physical characteristics as smaller objects. Additionally, concerning on the amount of weight carried by the their nuclear counterparts, the economic radar, sUASs are often indistinguishable vehicle. Reductions in the weight of efficiency of MIRV technology enabled from other airborne objects (specifically communications equipment, sensors, asymmetric advantages.15 Similarly, the birds).9 While additional methods such as onboard processors, and kinetic payload use of decoys may reduce the overall cost acoustic-phased arrays and electro-optical (for example, “energetics”)11 will increase of simultaneously attacking with large cameras show promise, a combination the range and maneuverability of these numbers of sUASs, presenting adversaries of these tracking and identification systems. Likewise, advances in small, with multiple deadly dilemmas.
JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 Tingle and Tyree 31 Current Counter-UAS Initiatives these relatively cheap miniature guided recalls memories of the now defunct The U.S. military currently has a mul- munitions may hold the answer to coun- Airborne Laser System, the mission titude of ways to effectively destroy tering swarms of sUASs. Another method and domain of the Air Force forces the UASs. Starting in 2002, the military to counter sUASs may be with the use of Service to pursue small, lightweight laser exercise Black Dart focused on coun- other sUASs. systems that can be mounted on aircraft. tering the UAS threat. The exercise One method to counteract swarms Perhaps the most promising di- has tested a number of kinetic and of attacking sUASs may be to use sUASs rected-energy technology in terms of nonkinetic methods ranging from 0.50- as “hunter-drones.” Currently, there is defeating multiple sUASs is the use of caliber guns to Hellfire missiles.16 The a “drone war” occurring over the skies high-powered microwaves. These micro- ability to defend against this threat is, of Tokyo as the Japanese Yakuza (an wave devices have the capability to render at its core, a problem of asymmetry and organized crime syndicate) frequently use the electronic components of an sUAS efficiency. How do we defeat swarms of sUASs to courier drugs across the city. useless, much like an electromagnetic $1,500 drones in a practical, cost-effi- When the Tokyo police use sUASs with pulse (EMP).28 Although there may be cient manner? The following sections nets to capture these drones, the Yakuza practical considerations in the use of EMP detail existing counter-UAS methods, retaliate by attacking the police drones.20 devices in urban environments or on the including traditional kinetic and Increases in battlefield automation might battlefield (that is, necessitating controlled directed energy means, and examine allow “hunting parties” of sUASs to de- use of these weapons), microwave weap- their applicability to defending against grade or destroy enemy sUASs with nets ons are under development and, in the sUASs.17 or other kinetic methods. Additionally, future, could be used simultaneously to Traditional Kinetic Methods. man-portable air-defense systems like destroy large numbers of sUASs.29 Traditional kinetic means of air defense, anti-UAS weapons may prove effective while ostensibly effective in a single against sUASs.21 In the near term, Addressing the Threat: intruder scenario, are cost inefficient though, solutions may lie in more natural Commercial Adaptive R&D versus relatively cheap sUASs. Factoring means of sUAS interdiction. Since the early 2000s, DOD has in the possibility of multiple small, low, There has been research into the use acknowledged the necessity to increase and fast targets, existing kinetic means of of birds of prey for countering the sUAS the integration of commercial technol- defense are tactically inadequate. Current threat.22 The U.S. Air Force Academy has ogy into military systems and procure- kinetic defense systems lack the coverage, recently conducted a year-long study in- ment. But it is a recent phenomenon range, and accuracy to counter future volving gyr-saker falcons. Tests reveal the that commercial technology represents sUAS swarms.18 It is unlikely that these falcons were able to “detect, positively complete capabilities that circumvent weapons systems could create a necessary identify, track, and engage a specific sUAS the long lead times of traditional gov- “dome of steel” around stationary posi- already in flight.”23 Compared to soaring ernment research and development tions. Although reducing the caliber of birds like hawks and eagles, falcons must (R&D) and procurement. In other these defensive weapons may ostensibly actively flap their wings while in flight, words, in many sectors commercial increase the rate of fire, one would ex- limiting loiter time to around 20 min- products are no longer simply contrib- pect a corresponding decrease in range. utes. Additionally, the training time per uting to military capabilities; they are Disregarding possible Gaussian-type falcon is approximately 4 to 5 months.24 the capabilities.30 weapons (for example, railguns) currently While this study did not address the use While DOD has adapted to the com- under development, the most viable di- of falcons to interdict different types mercial influence in defense procurement, rect-fire kinetic defense from sUASs may of sUASs, the study lead, Lieutenant it has failed to recognize the increasing be small-caliber precision-guided rounds. Colonel Donald Rhymer, believes that it rate of impact of technology on national The miniaturization of preci- is possible to “train falcons to generalize security. The rising capabilities of com- sion-guided munitions may provide the to different types of UASs.”25 mercial technologies, such as the sUAS, capability to interdict a large number of Directed Energy. If Army direct- presage even greater future commercial sUASs at standoff distances. According ed-energy systems are disadvantaged threats. Similar to the impact of civilian to Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert in terms of size and weight (compared malware across the spectrum of cyber Work, “We’re not too far away from with the Navy’s), then Air Force sys- operations (on both civilian and military guided 0.50-caliber rounds. We’re not tems are even more so. The Air Force is concerns), future unforeseen commercial too far away from a sensor-fused weapon constrained by attempting to develop di- technologies will readily lend themselves that instead of going after tanks will go rected-energy systems carried by aircraft. to military applications, unnerving those after the biometric signatures of human The Air Force scientific advisory board is most concerned with maintaining na- beings.”19 In the absence of a viable currently assessing the requirements for tional security. “brute force” or “shotgun” method these missions on the modified AC-130H The challenge is to address this new of area defense (for example, massive model,26 with a projected demonstration and fast-moving commercial threat amounts of “dumb” kinetic projectiles), date of 2020.27 While this lofty endeavor under the shadow of an antiquated and
32 Forum / Countering the Small Unmanned Aircraft System JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 Cadet-in-charge for Academy falconry team pulls lure as Ace, a black gyr-saker falcon, makes pass at it, September 10, 2010 (U.S. Air Force/Bennie J. Davis III)
inadequate defense procurement process. using the results of commercial R&D discovery of additional uses for their The existing DOD procurement para- in the form of COTS, under the CARD technology. The dual-use nature of digm relies on establishing requirements concept, DOD would seek to conduct technology is rarely immediately appar- that are fulfilled, in part, by commer- research on technology at different stages ent, especially if the government is not cial-off-the-shelf (COTS) systems and of development. This pre-market R&D exposed to or knowledgeable of that components. Regarding DOD R&D, this has a number of advantages for both technology.32 By working closely with requirements-based procurement happens DOD and the firm. large firms, DOD is able to discover new either directly (from the national labs, First, DOD gains knowledge on national defense applications for com- for example) or indirectly through using market-shaping technology that will mercial technology, helping both the firm COTS. As emerging COTS capabilities inevitably find its way into the hands of and the government. surpass the capacity of the government our adversaries. With commercial tech- Third, DOD can revive the chances R&D establishment, the United States nologies’ rising level of capabilities, state for possibly useful technologies that must develop policies to maintain its tech- and nonstate actors increasingly threaten have fallen “below the cut line”—or, in nical advantage over its adversaries. U.S. ability to maintain technological other words, are deemed by the firm as In terms of contribution to national overmatch. By conducting CARD, DOD not commercially viable. By signaling defense, the United States currently fails gains vital knowledge on the possible its interest in these technologies, DOD to take full advantage of its indigenous uses of new technologies, and possible provides an opportunity for a “second private industry. We recommend that counters to these technologies, before life” to the firm’s technology, resulting in DOD should work closer with private our adversaries. Much like the develop- possible commercialization. industry prior to the release of com- ment of the Defense Advanced Research Lastly, the CARD construct reduces mercial technology, a policy that we call Projects Agency after the launch of government R&D risk. The government Commercial Adaptive R&D, or CARD.31 Sputnik in 1957, the use of the CARD no longer directly vets new technology The CARD concept promotes the use strategy will help prevent the United as the industry bears the brunt of matu- of DOD partnerships and relationships States from being surprised by significant ration of the innovation. Utilizing these with commercial firms to enhance DOD commercial technology. market-shaping firms in partnership roles visibility of impending commercial tech- Second, for both the firms and DOD, with government R&D is dispropor- nological release. In contrast with simply there exists a possible benefit from the tionately low given the amount of R&D
JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 Tingle and Tyree 33 Sailors assigned to USS Jason Dunham, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadets, and engineers from Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab test unmanned aerial systems aboard rigid hull inflatable boat during exercise Black Dart, September 20, 2016, Gulf of Mexico (U.S. Navy/Maddelin Angebrand) that is conducted (for example, the Intel nentially more deadly. The asymmetric both offensive and defensive sUAS tech- Corporation R&D budget for 2013 was nature of the sUAS, especially when nologies. Additionally, this is inherently roughly $10.6 billion).33 A majority of considering swarm tactics, makes the a joint fight, with the technology and the risk is placed on the commercial firm, technology difficult to defend against. techniques developed by each Service whereas DOD begins to conduct R&D An sUAS is relatively inexpensive and synergistically contributing to the de- on the product in mid-to-late stream. ubiquitous (it is estimated that there velopment of anti-sUAS doctrine. Now By adopting new policies toward gov- are over one million sUASs in the may be the time to establish a joint orga- ernment defense procurement and the United States alone).34 Conversely, nization specifically to address the sUAS degree to which they conduct research most defense systems are—at least at threat, similar to the Joint Improvised- with private industry before the commer- this stage of development—restrictively Threat Defense Organization (formerly cial release of COTS products, DOD will expensive. It may be fiscally restrictive known as the Joint Improvised Explosive develop early defenses against threatening and grossly inefficient to attempt to Device Defeat Organization), originally technologies, help shape the develop- counter this commercial threat with established to counter improvised explo- ment of defense-related technologies, large military programs. Additionally, sive devices. and prevent technological surprise. The as technologically state-of-the-art as Additionally, since the early 2000s, greater integration of DOD into private current commercial sUASs appear, small it has been widely accepted that DOD R&D, or CARD, will help better ensure advances in supporting technologies needs to integrate COTS requirements national defense in a period of increasing will yield huge leaps in sUAS capa- solutions. In this “linear model” of commercial threats. bilities, further compounding defen- innovation, private industry conducts sive problems such as detection and R&D to develop the COTS product, Conclusion identification. and the government applies COTS to Although current state-of-the-art sUAS To protect against this threat, the existing requirements. Most important, capabilities are sufficiently threatening, United States must develop doctrines DOD needs to conduct R&D on the we are on the cusp of technological both for sUAS attack and defense. It is pre-COTS product to discover new advances that will make the sUAS expo- necessary to improve our capabilities in requirements based on new capabilities.
34 Forum / Countering the Small Unmanned Aircraft System JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 20 This form of R&D should supersede the System Airspace Integration Plan (Washington, James Vincent, “Tokyo Police Unveil DC: Department of Defense, March 2011), Net-wielding Interceptor Drone,” TheVerge. old model of simply fulfilling government available at
JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 Tingle and Tyree 35