View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE

provided by SPIRE - Sciences Po Institutional REpository Journal of Business Ethics DOI 10.1007/s10551-015-2879-7

Contextualizing Corporate Political Responsibilities: Neoliberal CSR in Historical Perspective

1 1 Marie-Laure Djelic • Helen Etchanchu

Abstract This article provides a historical contextual- Keywords Political CSR Á Neoliberalism Á Paternalism Á ization of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and its Trusteeship Á Globalization Á Stakeholder democracy political role. CSR, we propose, is one form of business– society interactions reflecting a unique ideological framing. To make that argument, we compare contemporary CSR Introduction with two historical ideal-types. We explore in turn pater- nalism in nineteenth century Europe and managerial The debate on where the responsibility of business ends trusteeship in early twentieth century US. We outline how and that of government starts is an old one. We can at least the political responsibilities of business were constructed, trace it back to the 18th century opposition between Mer- negotiated, and practiced in both cases. This historical cantilism and Liberalism (Screpanti and Zamagni 2005). In contextualization shows that the frontier between economy its contemporary version, this debate has been shaped by and polity has always been blurry and shifting and that Milton Friedman’s provocative claim that the only firms have played a political role for a very long time. It responsibility of the corporate executive is to his employ- also allows us to show how the nature, extent, and impact ers—the shareholders (Friedman 1970). This proposition of that political role changed through history and co- suggests an axiomatic and even natural separation between evolved in particular with shifts in dominant ideologies. business and state responsibilities. Arguably, it remains to Globalization, in that context, is not the driver of the this day a structuring ‘‘null hypothesis’’—from, against or political role of the firm but a moderating phenomenon in relation to which most contemporary discussions on contributing significantly to the dynamics of this shift. The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) inscribe themselves comparison between paternalism, trusteeship, and con- (Kinderman 2012; Marens 2008). temporary CSR points to what can be seen as functional This ‘‘null hypothesis,’’ however, is not neutral in any equivalents—alternative patterns of business–society way but ideologically framed. Friedman’s (1970) article interactions that each correspond, historically, to unique revealed, expressed, and formalized a specific and conse- and distinct ideological frames. We conclude by drawing quential ideological frame. Ideological frames are the implications for future theorizing on (political) CSR and cognitive and value lenses that constitute our mental maps, stakeholder democracy. the background worldviews through which individual and collective actors approach, read, and act upon the world (Cheal 1979; Davies and McGoey 2012; Padelford and White 2009; Schmid 1981). With respect to the interplay & Marie-Laure Djelic between business and government, this specific ideological [email protected] frame put forward by Friedman had five main dimen- Helen Etchanchu sions—individual wealth maximization is the source of [email protected] collective welfare; corporations belong to (and should 1 ESSEC Business School, Avenue B. Hirsch, BP 90405, serve) their owners—shareholders; business and politics Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, France have different logics; that should be kept as separate as possible; and the political sphere should have only a sup- This is, precisely, the step we propose to take in this portive and minimal role. The principled separation of article. To move beyond the economic and instrumental business and state responsibilities hence cannot be appre- perspective on CSR, we contextualize CSR historically as hended without reference to the framing role of a powerful one form of business–society interactions that reflects a background worldview or ideology (Davies and McGoey unique ideological framing. The comparison of CSR with 2012; Padelford and White 2009; Van Dijk 1998). We will alternative patterns of business–society interactions in refer to that specific ideological frame, as ‘‘shareholder history and their associated background ideologies allows value maximization.’’ It is often discussed, in the literature, for a critique of the ‘‘null hypothesis’’ that is more radical, under the broader label of ‘‘neoliberalism’’ (e.g., Djelic we suggest, than that of political CSR. This historical 2006; Harvey 2005; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). contextualization shows that the frontier between economy Within the corpus of CSR research, the ‘‘instrumental and polity has always been blurry and shifting and that CSR’’ paradigm has long been dominant (Garriga and Mele´ firms have played for a very long time a political role. It 2004; Margolis and Walsh 2003; Vogel 2005). This para- also allows us to show how the nature, extent, and impact digm clearly inscribed itself in continuity with the ideo- of that political role changed through history and co- logical frame expressed by Friedman’s ‘‘null hypothesis’’— evolved with shifts in dominant ideologies. CSR being legitimate only if it contributed to the maxi- We explore this empirically through a historical analysis mization of profits and value for shareholders (Mackey et al. of the political role of firms in two distinct periods—in the 2007; McWilliams and Siegel 2001). In contrast, the recent context of nineteenth century paternalism in Europe and in political turn in CSR research has come to question and the context of corporate/managerial trusteeship in the critique this separation and some of the ideological 1920s in the United States. We outline how the political assumptions it reveals (Matten and Crane 2005a; Scherer responsibilities of business were constructed, negotiated, and Palazzo 2007, 2011; Scherer et al. 2009). A key argu- and practiced in both cases. The comparison between ment in this stream of research is that, in the context of paternalism, trusteeship, and current notions of CSR points globalization, the boundaries between economic and polit- to what can be seen as functional equivalents—alternative ical spheres are getting increasingly blurred. Globalization patterns of business–society interactions that each corre- entails the weakening role and power of nation states and spond, historically, to unique ideological frames. While fosters in parallel a ‘‘new political role’’ for private business contemporary CSR corresponds to a ‘‘shareholder value (Scherer and Palazzo 2011). As corporations increase in maximization’’ ideology, we connect paternalism to an size and operate in multiple countries, they come to ‘‘as- ideological frame that we label ‘‘authoritarian-owner sume enlarged responsibilities in their globally expanded benevolence’’ and trusteeship to an ideology that we business environments—responsibilities once regarded as characterize as ‘‘techno-managerial efficiency.’’ The his- genuine governmental responsibilities’’ (Scherer and torical cases, furthermore, point to a number of past Palazzo 2007, p. 1109, emphasis authors). With political shortcomings, such as managerial discretion, infantilizing CSR, we share the project of moving CSR scholarship forms of control, or the privatization of politics, which help beyond the economic and instrumental perspective (Scherer us make sense, through a mirror effect, of some of the and Palazzo 2011, p. 904). We also agree that globalization limits of contemporary CSR. changes the nature of the interplay between business and The remainder of this article is organized as follows. We politics. We argue, however, that political responsibilities start with a short review of the debates around political have not always been in any absolute or natural sense CSR. We then discuss our methods—a comparison of two ‘‘genuine governmental responsibilities’’. historical ideal-types. In the following two sections, we Current theorizing on CSR in general and political CSR present in turn the two historical ideal-types that constitute in particular is largely a-historical. Most studies tracing the the empirical base for this article. In the discussion section, origins of CSR go back at most to the 1950s and the work we contextualize contemporary CSR through a systematic of Howard R. Bowen (Acquier et al. 2011; Carroll 2008, comparison with those historical cases and explore the for an exception see Marens 2012, 2013). The focus is moderating role played in recent years by neoliberal mostly on the structuration of a CSR preoccupation and globalization. Using systematic ideal-type comparison as a field in the period since the late 1970s—in parallel to the conceptualizing device (Glaser 2002), we are able to deployment of neoliberal globalization (e.g., Kaplan 2015; identify four main dimensions along which the political Kinderman 2012). This limits, we propose, our capacity to role and responsibility of firms has varied over time and in compare and contrast CSR as a particular form of busi- parallel to shifting background ideologies. A first dimen- ness–society interactions inscribed in a singular worldview sion is territory—or the range of action and responsibility. with alternatives that would be set in different ideological Second, we find a striking evolution in the nature of ‘‘ac- grounds (Matten and Moon 2008). tors’’ at the core of this responsibility. Third, targets have evolved—reflecting a transformation of those intentions be the prerogative of governments, even if only to provide that motivate the exercise of responsibility. Finally, the public goods necessary to their proper functioning, they modes through which responsibility has been exercised take on a political role (Matten and Crane 2005a; Scherer have also changed in significant ways. We conclude by and Palazzo 2007, 2011). When corporations provide drawing implications for future theorizing on (political) public goods through their CSR programs—clean water, CSR and stakeholder democracy. health, or education—then CSR indeed has a political dimension (Ite 2004). When corporations seek to address ethical issues in their global supply chains, CSR again is A Changing Global Landscape: A New Political about politics (Rotter et al. 2014). Finally, when corpora- Turn of CSR? tions get involved in multi-stakeholder rule making, CSR once more becomes politics (Mena and Palazzo 2012). Even today, most studies theorizing in economics and In contrast to the idea of corporate responsibility and management start from the assumption that the business of citizenship as means to compensate for government failure business is (only) business (and profits) and that maxi- stand critics who decry CSR as nothing more than an mizing shareholder wealth amounts to maximizing societal instrument used to further private interests (Fooks et al. wealth. This economic and political paradigm was proba- 2013) and to sustain new forms of imperialism, colonial- bly most clearly expressed by Milton Friedman in his well- ism, and inequality (Banerjee 2007). Both representations known 1970 New York Times Magazine article, entitled of CSR point to its political nature but the meaning of the ‘‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its term ‘‘political’’ is different in each case. We find a con- Profits.’’ According to Friedman, because managers are tinuum of meanings for ‘‘political’’ between ‘‘serving the understood to be the agents of owners-shareholders (prin- common good’’—often valued positively—and ‘‘at the cipals), their responsibility is to those shareholders only service of particularistic interests to the detriment of other and to the maximization of their profits (Friedman 1970). groups’’—perceived more negatively. Critics of contem- Because managers are neither elected nor politically rep- porary CSR highlight the fact that corporations only focus resentative, they do not have the legitimacy, on the other on a selection of issues and stakeholders they deem hand, to deal with societal and common good issues important for their own activities and interests (Banerjee (Friedman 1970). Hence, Friedman argues, business cannot 2011; Devinney 2009; Scherer and Palazzo 2007, 2011). and should not take on social or political responsibilities. Taken for granted or even celebrated in stakeholder and The logic is that of a neat separation between business and CSR research, managerial discretion is called upon by society/politics and of a clear division of labor between critics who argue that ‘‘it is dangerous to assume that private business actors—who should only be involved in managers know what is best for society’’ (Buchholz and economic activities and profit maximization—and other Rosenthal 2004, p. 145). Managerial discretion is prob- actors, including the state, who can and should take on lematic because of a lack of legitimacy and accountability political and social roles. With the progress of globaliza- to stakeholders (Buchholz and Rosenthal 2004) and to tion, however, a number of scholars point to blurry society at large (Matten and Crane 2005a; Scherer and boundaries between business and government (Crane et al. Palazzo 2011). The problem is the non-democratic nature 2004; Marens 2012; Matten and Crane 2005a; Matten et al. of valuation and moral judgment in the assessment of 2003; Scherer and Palazzo 2011). The increasing power of stakeholder interests and their priorities—and this problem large, often multinational, corporations makes their politi- begs the question of the legitimacy of the corporate cal role and responsibility unavoidable. Globalization also stakeholder model. appears to imply an erosion of state sovereignty and a Strangely enough, while the normative assessment of weakening of state capacities, which may foster even more CSR as political activity varies significantly, from essen- the political role of business (Matten et al. 2003; Prakash tially positive and progressive (Scherer and Palazzo 2007) and Griffin 2012; Scherer and Palazzo 2011). In fact, some to negative and even possibly destructive (Banerjee 2007; scholars assert that ‘‘globalization has changed the social Fleming and Jones 2012; Fooks et al. 2013), the causal contract between business and society’’ (Mark-Ungericht narrative is broadly similar. Across the literature on polit- and Weiskopf 2007, p. 286). Others even talk of a para- ical CSR, contemporary globalization is presented as the digm shift (Palazzo and Scherer 2008). main driver of both CSR and its political role (Banerjee In that context, a lively debate explores the political 2007; Matten et al. 2003; Prakash and Griffin 2012; dimension of CSR, corporate citizenship, and business Scherer and Palazzo 2011). The progress of globalization, ethics (Heath et al. 2010; Matten et al. 2003; Scherer and it is argued, comes together with a ‘‘deterritorialization of Palazzo 2007). The core argument is that as corporations social, political and economic interactions’’ that ultimately increasingly take on activities conventionally understood to generates what Matten and Crane call a significant ‘‘dis- empowerment of states’’ (Matten and Crane 2005a, p. 171). framed by, distinct background ideologies. Such a histori- This frames the context in which corporations ‘‘take over cal contextualization of contemporary CSR and of its many of the roles and actions previously associated with associated ideological frame shows that firms are and have government’’ and become increasingly involved in always been political actors. Furthermore, it can contribute, administering ‘‘citizenship rights’’ (Matten and Crane we suggest, to a deeper understanding of how this political 2005a, pp. 170–171). role has been and is motivated, exerted, legitimated, or Ma¨kinen and colleagues (2012, 2014) highlight the fact even contested through time. In the process, we can learn that contemporary conceptions of political CSR are pro- from questions raised and actions (un)taken in the past to foundly embedded within the modern liberal political further our understanding of the contemporary political system. The critique of the ‘‘a-political role of the corpo- role and responsibility of firms and their consequences. ration’’ (Palazzo and Scherer 2006, p. 72) or even the development of the notion of ‘‘corporate citizenship’’ (Matten and Crane 2005a) inscribe themselves within Epistemological Assumptions and Methods classical liberal political theory (Ma¨kinen and Kourula 2012). While questioning purely ‘‘economic’’ or ‘‘instru- Our project in this article is grounded in the epistemolog- mental’’ CSR, political CSR scholars still paradoxically ical conviction that human activity is contextual, socially further the liberal assumption that once upon a time eco- constructed, and ideologically framed. Activity, language, nomic and political spheres were stable and separate and institutions, politics, and practices are historically co-con- that political responsibilities were traditionally the pre- stituted and co-evolve with values and ideologies. Hence, rogative of states and governments. Even critiques of words and concepts are not mere labels put on the ‘‘essence political CSR and corporate citizenship are in fact likely to of things’’ but ‘‘historical and cultural objects,’’ ‘‘symbolic take the liberal paradigm of a clear separation of business systems with their own histories and logics’’—symbolic and politics as a starting point (Jones and Haigh 2007; Van systems that reflect particular ideological frames and are at Oosterhout 2005; Willke and Willke 2008). Jones and the same time ‘‘modalities of power and authority’’ Haigh (2007), for example, base their strong critique of the (Somers 1995b, p. 232). This kind of epistemological deployment of corporate citizenship on game theoretic conviction generates a responsibility for the social scien- approaches that take for granted the rational corporation, tist—that of uncovering ideological frames behind taken- along with its profit-seeking motive and economic incen- for-granted concepts and practices (Somers 1995a). As tive structures. In a rebuttal to this violent critique, Crane Max Weber put it, the social scientist should aim at deep, and Matten underscore that Jones and Haigh engage, in embedded understanding (verstehen)—an understanding of reality, ‘‘in a nostalgic retreat to a Keynesian postwar the worldviews or ideologies that constitute or inform world where the lines between business, government and activities, concepts, or interactions, an understanding in civil society were sure and certain’’ (Crane and Matten other words ‘‘of the cultural significance of concrete his- 2008, p. 23). torical events and patterns’’ (Weber 1949 [1904], p. 111). Ma¨kinen and colleagues take what we see as an In order to really ‘‘understand how we think and why we important step to distance themselves from the powerful seem obliged to think in certain ways’’ (Hacking 1990, assumptions associated with the ‘‘null hypothesis’’ (Ma¨ki- p. 362), we need to analyze concepts as being ‘‘words in nen and Kasanen 2014;Ma¨kinen and Kourula 2012). They their sites’’ (Somers 1995a, p. 113) and as such embedded argue that the separation between business and society, both historically and ideologically. economy and politics, or public and private that we take for We believe that scholarship on corporate social granted today may reflect a particular (and hence contex- responsibility (CSR) has tended to neglect this essential tual) socio-political system. Ma¨kinen and Kourula revive, dimension of social scientific analysis. An important in the process, an older sociological and anthropological frontier for scholarship on CSR in general—and on tradition that conceives of society as a more complex, political CSR in particular—should be to explore the integrated if not ‘‘total’’ phenomenon where the economic, institutional, political, and ideological dimensions that co- the social, and the political are all deeply interlocked evolve with contemporary notions and practices of CSR. (Hirschman 1981; Mauss 1967 [1925]; Polanyi 1944). We argue here that a historical contextualization of con- In line with Ma¨kinen and colleagues and with this older temporary CSR is an important step in that direction. CSR intellectual tradition, we draw attention to the plurality of needs to be understood as a particular and contextual form forms of business–society interactions. We do so by pro- of business–society interactions that reflects and reveals viding a historical contextualization of contemporary CSR. certain institutional and cultural conditions, particular We propose that alternative patterns of business–society relations of power and a given ideological and value interactions in different periods of time reflect, and are grounding. A Methodological Program: Ideal-Type and specific background ideologies. On the other hand, we Construction and Comparison expected to identify similarities, or functional equivalence, but also striking differences and specificities across these To move in that direction, we engage in the construction of patterns through time. An easier methodological alternative ideal-types for two historical patterns of business–society would have been to do an in-depth historical case-study of interactions that pre-date contemporary CSR. The first CSR, exploring both its origins and its development in time ideal-type, ‘‘paternalism,’’ emerged and developed during (Skocpol 1984; Yin 2014). We would have then also been the first and second industrialization and was particularly able to uncover the worldview framing contemporary prevalent in nineteenth century Europe. We label the sec- CSR—and possibly its evolution through time. But the ond ideal-type ‘‘trusteeship.’’ It emerged alongside corpo- systematic comparison with different patterns of business– rate and managerial capitalism—hence during the first part society interactions and their background ideologies allows of the twentieth century in the United States. Ideal-type us to point to key differences and surprising similarities construction is a methodological program pioneered by that help us identify the strengths and weaknesses of con- Max Weber and allowing for both an in-depth historical temporary CSR. and contextual understanding (verstehen) as well as for The paternalism and trusteeship periods provide us with conceptualization and theory building through comparison two ideal-types of business–society interactions, which we (Weber 1949; Watkins 1952; Doty and Glick 1994; Glaser can compare and contrast with contemporary CSR. We 2002). An ideal-type is a construct that serves to clarify a could have considered, constructed, and used a number of particular logic of action or structure of organization by other ideal-types. For example, we could have identified extracting from the thickness of empirical situations not guilds as an alternative pattern of business–society interac- only a pattern of action or structure but also the meaning tions (Kieser 1989). We chose to focus on paternalism and system in which those are embedded and ‘‘make sense’’ trusteeship first of all because they correspond to periods of (Weber 1978 [1922], p. 20). The ideal-type is ‘‘constructed (relatively) advanced modernity and articulate with forms of by abstracting the outstanding features from some histori- social and economic organization that are close enough to cal complex and by organizing these into a coherent world- our own. Furthermore, both periods are particularly inter- picture’’ (Watkins 1952, p. 23). Hence, ideal-types are esting as they are both characterized, like our contemporary heuristic devices that are neither a faithful image of the real CSR period, by a strong political implication of business. By world nor the projection of an idealized utopia. They are thus reducing differences between our three periods and ‘‘mental constructs’’ and in that sense they ‘‘cannot be ideal-types, we can hope to capture more easily the simi- found empirically anywhere in reality’’ (Weber 1949 larities and differences with respect to how business exer- [1904], pp. 91–92). Neither can they be treated as norma- cised political responsibility in each case. tive, best practice-like projections. Their ‘‘ideality’’ only lies in the associated ‘‘simplification and aloofness from Data Collection and Analysis detail’’ (Watkins 1952, p. 23). A research-design based on ideal-type construction and Our data sources are mainly secondary material—essen- comparison is not easy to operationalize but it has many tially the work of historians who contributed in-depth advantages. It allows the researcher to combine in-depth explorations and descriptions of the social and political understanding of complex and unique historical ‘‘wholes’’ roles of business during each period. On nineteenth century with their reduction and simplification into heuristic con- European paternalism, we reviewed a wide-ranging set of structs that then become tools for comparison and con- company histories on well-known paternalist firms. We ceptualization. The researcher can compare different ideal- further built upon an unpublished doctoral dissertation, types with each other as well as a particular empirical which so far represents the most advanced historical con- situation with a given ideal-type. The complexity of tribution on the practices of nineteenth century paternalism deploying a research-design based on comparative ideal- in France (De Bry 1980). We also had a 2-h long interview types explains that it is still rarely used, but as a powerful with the historian, author of that dissertation. For the tool for theory building and conceptualization, it is likely to trusteeship era, we had access to secondary material but we elicit growing interest in the coming years (Baden-Fuller also explored some primary archives—open letters or lec- and Morgan 2010; Hernes 2005; Horsfall 2013; Soliva tures of key managers and opinion leaders in that period. 2007). This preliminary phase of historical exploration provided This methodological program appeared well suited, in us with the empirical material necessary to construct the any case, to our two-dimensional project. We wanted to two ideal-types. uncover, on the one hand, the complex associations We constructed the two ideal-types through ‘‘synthesis between different patterns of business–society interactions of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present features’’ (Weber 1949 [1904], p. 90). The richness of the business–society interactions varied over time—territory, data was managed and simplified thanks to a structure that actors, targets, and modes of political responsibility. we followed in both cases: (1) the historical context, (2) the ‘‘Territory’’ refers to the geographical reach and scope of ideological frame, (3) the main political roles and respon- political responsibility. ‘‘Actors’’ point to the main carriers sibilities of business at the time, and 4) the political of political responsibility. ‘‘Targets’’ are the ‘‘objects’’ at struggles and frictions encountered towards the end of each the receiving end of (and hence reveal the intentions of) period. It is important to understand that the ideal-type political responsibility. And ‘‘modes’’ reflect the different itself is not—and cannot be—a faithful historical depiction ways in which political responsibility is exercised (e.g., (Weber 1949 [1904]). An ideal-type is a unified construct, Young 2004). a concept but one that cannot be ‘‘objective’’ as it is always In summary, the construction and comparison of ideal- constructed from a ‘‘point of view,’’ a ‘‘perspective,’’ or a types allows us to both historicize and de-naturalize con- ‘‘set of presuppositions’’ (Weber 1949 [1904], pp. 91–92). temporary CSR by confronting it to alternative patterns of For the purpose of this study, our perspective and our business–society interactions and suggesting both func- presuppositions were guided by Matten and Crane’s tional equivalence and striking differences. This con- (2005a, b) extended view of corporate citizenship that frontation makes it possible to think of bundles and investigates corporate involvement in the administration of configurations—connecting a form of business–society social, civil, and political rights. According to Matten and interactions with certain institutional, cultural, political, Crane (2005a, p. 170) social rights ‘‘consist of those rights and ideological traits. that provide the individual with the freedom to participate in society, such as the right to education, health care, or various aspects of welfare.’’ Civil rights consist of those Nineteenth Century Paternalist Business and its rights that ‘‘provide freedom from abuses and interference Political Role by third parties (most notably governments), among the most important of which are the rights to own property, As a pattern of business–society interactions, paternalism exercise freedom of speech, and engage in ‘‘free’’ mar- emerged and developed in close articulation with a par- kets.’’ Political rights include ‘‘the right to vote or the right ticular form of capitalism. The heyday of paternalism was to hold office and, generally speaking, entitle the individual the mid-to-late 19th century, with a particularly strong to take part in the process of collective will formation in inscription in Europe (Hobsbawm 1996; Noiriel 1988; Reid the public sphere.’’ We explored our data with these dif- 1985). ferent roles in mind and used this framing as a red thread connecting the various ideal-types beyond their differences Historical Context: Industrialization and Personal and specificities. Capitalism Once constructed, historical ideal-types become methodological tools or measuring rods allowing us to As the European continent was going through its early understand and characterize concrete periods, events, and phases of industrialization, from the late eighteenth century situations by confronting them with a particular ideal-type. throughout the nineteenth century, an early step was the But it is also interesting to compare different ideal-types development of the putting-out system (Nussbaum 2002 between themselves to underscore, beyond the variability [1933]). Intermediaries organized, contracted out to, and of contexts, similarity through functional equivalence as pooled production from individuals and households who well as remaining and consequential differences (Hall worked from their homes (Sabel and Zeitlin 1985). Pro- 2007). This is what we do in this article by confronting our gressively, the idea of bringing producers together in the two historical ideal-types with contemporary CSR (that same physical space—with a view to increasing produc- becomes a third ideal-type in the process)—and showing tivity and control but also to exploiting technological how we have in each case alignment between particular developments—imposed itself. And the factory system patterns of business–society interactions and specific ide- came to replace almost everywhere the putting-out system ological frames. Using the different forms of firm (Hounshell 1984; Nussbaum 2002 [1933]; Pollard 1965). involvement defined by Matten and Crane (2005a) as a red The emergence of the modern factory system was a pro- thread, we have tried to systematically draw out similarities found revolution with major economic but also social and and differences, between and across ideal-types, with potentially political consequences. respect to how business took on political responsibility The development of the factory system in Europe took (i.e., catered to political, social, and civil rights) in each place within the frame of personal capitalism (Colli et al. case. This systematic comparison allowed us to identify 2003). Factories belonged to firms that were under the four principal dimensions along which patterns of strong control and oversight of individuals or small groups of owners. Legal structures became more sophisticated by underscored the urgent necessity to reconcile the intense the end of the nineteenth century. On the whole, though, development of capitalism with respect for human beings the joint stock corporate form remained rare. Rather, per- as divine creatures. For example, Le´on Harmel, owner of sonal legal forms, partnerships, or hybrid structures where textile mills in the North of France (today in Belgium), saw strong owners/decision makers opened their capital to his company as a ‘‘Christian corporation.’’ He targeted the passive investors were more widespread. creation of a physical and spiritual community that looked As Europe went through its first and second industrial to ‘‘the well-being of the workers’’ and the ‘‘prosperity of revolutions, economic transformations and their substantial the enterprise’’ (Coffey 2003; Harmel 1889, p. 37). A third and often dramatic societal consequences triggered reac- strand of paternalism was anchored in the intellectual tra- tions. The socialist critique in particular denounced pro- dition pioneered by Charles Fourier or Robert Owen. Jean- found social disruptions. The break-up of families and rural Baptiste Godin, who founded the stove company bearing communities associated with mass migration towards the his name, constructed, for example, the structures for a industrial centers where factories were located, child labor, community—the Familiste`re de Guise—with the objective alcohol consumption and violence, out-of-wedlock preg- of reconciling economic production and social progress nancies, poor hygiene, exhaustion from overwork but also (Lallement 2009). work-related accidents and sicknesses with no protection or Those distinct intellectual influences all provided strong compensation pointed to the dark side of increased pro- motives for paternalist-type intervention. The ideological ductivity and control (Engels 1987 [1844]). The increasing driver, however, was often combined with more pragmatic intensity of that critique combined with a genuine preoc- motives, reflecting the fact that firms needed certain cupation for profoundly disrupting social trends to foster resources, including healthy and mobilized workers, quiet action and organization within parts of the European and thriving communities, which they could not, in that business classes. Paternalism flourished in that context period, take for granted. On the ground, those different (Magnusson 2000; Nielsen 1994). strands of paternalism translated into relatively similar practices. The logic was that the authority of the The Paternalist Reaction and Its Ideological Frame: owner/father implied a certain form of responsibility to the Authoritarian-Owner Benevolence members/employees/children of the firm that went well beyond the provision of a salary. In some of the most The common logic behind the paternalist reaction reflected extreme variants of the paternalist experience, the firm a deeply ingrained ideological frame that we label here became fused with the geographical community in which it ‘‘authoritarian-owner benevolence.’’ The firm—and the was embedded. Brede Klaedefabrik north of Copenhagen, factory—was understood to be an extension of the owners Denmark, the Stumm family in the Saar region, Germany, and their families. Ownership was a source of uncontested Philips in Eindhoven, Netherlands, Schneider in Le Creu- power—just like fatherhood at the time. Workers were like sot, France, the tire manufacturer, Michelin in the city of children who needed the authority but also at times the Clermont-Ferrand, France, and Gustaf Adolf Serlachius guidance and benevolence of the owner/father. Power and Company in Ma¨ntta¨, Finland are all typical examples of wealth implied responsibility with regard to the employees/ how paternal employers across Europe took on social and children. The space in and around the firm should be pro- political responsibilities towards the local community by tected, as much as possible, from external political creating sometimes entire factory towns (De Bry 1980; encroachments of different kinds. And as a consequence, Gueslin 1993; Kalb 1997;Ma¨kinen and Kasanen 2014; owners should proactively engage in any political and Ma¨kinen and Kourula 2012; Nielsen 1994; Van Du¨lmen social activity that would keep external scrutiny and pres- 1989). sure at bay. Within this broad background ideology, there were Political Roles and Responsibilities variants that reflected distinct but compatible influences. We identify essentially three. First, some expressions of The political roles and responsibilities of nineteenth cen- paternalism had clear elective affinities with the ‘‘civiliz- tury paternalist firms were broad. They included the pro- ing, white man’s burden’’ associated, for example, with the duction of public goods and services, the defense of colonial enterprise or with progressive benevolence of a citizenship rights, and, at times, initiatives to foster the Benthamian type (Quinn 1997). The paternalist project democratic empowerment of employees. They also trans- reflected, in that context, the sense of responsibility that lated into rule making and monitoring, within firms but should come with a (perceived) sense of (racial/class) also beyond. As we have just underscored, the ideology in superiority (Gillet 1976). A second strand of paternalism which paternalism was inscribed explains that nineteenth was connected to a Christian form of humanism that century employers considered this political role a personal (and firm) duty and often even a moral obligation (De Bry company maintained the phone network until 1954. 1980, p. 303). The company put efforts into building roads and railways. It owned ships, brought the first car to Administering Social Rights Through the Production Ma¨ntta¨ in 1913 and maintained the municipality’s of Public Goods roads and streets up to 1948. The inhabitants bought their groceries in the company store and paid them Most paternalist employers provided public goods of a with ‘Serlachius money’. (Palkkatyo¨la¨inen magazine social welfare nature—typically health care, retirement cited in Ma¨kinen and Kourula 2013, p. 226) provisions, child-care, and family-connected purchasing power (e.g., De Bry 1980; Nielsen 1994; Reid 1985; From the Provision of Moral Goods to the Defense of Civil Roberts 1958). For example, Le´on Harmel understood his Rights obligations to the worker who lived on site to include caring for the family in case of illness, accident, or death of The production of public goods was often tightly connected a family member. He also made sure that the worker, his with the provision of moral goods. On an everyday basis, wife, and children performed tasks according to their paternal employers sought to moralize employees, and ability and that they would have sufficient time left to material privileges were often seen as a compensation for fulfill their duties to their family and to the Church (Coffey the ‘‘moral’’ worker. For example, employers built chur- 2003). Faced with high levels of childbirth mortality, ches or chapels on company grounds and encouraged the paternalist employers provided financial assistance, reading of ‘‘good’’ newspapers—‘‘good’’ being defined by reduced working hours, and organized health and dietary their own appreciation. They built schools for the children workshops for pregnant women (De Bry 1980). Paternalist of their employees and kept tight ideological and moral employers often granted their workers child or family control over those schools. For example, the schools allowances to encourage larger-size families. Companies financed by paternalist Christian employers were operated also built or financially contributed to the building of col- by nuns—which ensured a strong moral and religious lective institutions, such as hospitals, old-age homes, or influence on the education of children (De Bry 1980). schools. An observer of the Brede factory community in Paternalist employers would make sure that children Denmark described it this way: actually attended these schools, including through coercive pressure on the family, which could take the form of All the salaried staff and workers live in houses conditional social welfare benefits (De Bry 1980; Nielsen belonging to the firm and on land belonging to the 1994). The protection of civil rights was thus rather con- firm, and for their needs and comfort the firm has set strained and conditional upon the alignment of workers up a library, savings bank, a canteen, a bath house, a with employers’ values. school for the children (about 150), a kindergarten for However, later in the nineteenth century and in reaction the infants (aged 2-7) and a nursery for the tots (up to to the increasing socialist critique that was bound to influ- the age of 2). (cited in Nielsen 1994, p. 70). ence their workers, a number of paternalist leaders became Similarly, within the Godin familiste`re, workers enjoyed active in promoting a certain empowerment of workers. good housing, hygiene, health, education, quality food, clean Le´on Harmel, for example, played an active role in the water, and air, tranquility, etc. (Lallement 2009). For Jean- creation of Christian trade unionism in France and estab- Baptiste Godin, these public goods were the ‘‘equivalents of lished himself as a social reformer (Coffey 2003). Jean- wealth’’ and they should be deployed to deal with the ‘‘social Baptiste Godin was among the most progressive industri- predicaments of industrialization’’ (Guiol 2000). alists of his generation (Godin 1881). He went so far as to Paternal employers, furthermore, tried to reduce the risk create a ‘‘work and capital association,’’ through which he of work accidents. They offered pension plans, unem- turned the property of the means of production over to ployment benefits, health insurance, and corporate saving workers and advocated that everybody should receive schemes (De Bry 1980). They organized or fostered the according to their needs. This was a step to enfranchise creation of food and staples’ cooperatives to reduce the workers and free them from the yoke of paternalist costs of first necessity products. Some paternal employers employers. In England, the Tory social reformer, Lord even created their own currency and operated their own Ashley, called upon the government to take over the defi- police force, as the Serlachius Company in Finland nition and enforcement of employee protection. The idea illustrates: was to disconnect civil rights and social benefits from direct dependence to a paternalist employer (Roberts 1958). But in The factory owners of Ma¨ntta¨ have hired the first the 1840s, Lord Ashley’s plea went unheeded. police officers and built the first fire department. The Rule Making, Monitoring, and Control of Political Rights illegitimate forms of control and abuses of power from paternalist employers (Joyce 1980; Roberts 1958). Pater- Paternalist owners being the ‘‘providence’’ of their nalism was criticized as a masquerade and the expression employees set the rules single-handedly within their firms. of manipulation, leading to the structural infantilization of They also often had an impact at the local community or workers. It was denounced as a dangerous scam—where even at the national level as they exercised political man- the class struggle was being diluted in ‘‘heated housing dates. Euge`ne Schneider, for example, was mayor of the programs’’ and ‘‘sports facilities.’’ In parallel, large parts of city where his firm was located, member of the National the working classes and certain strands of socialism Assembly between 1845 and 1848 and even Minister for mobilized in favor of an alternative—the welfare state. agriculture and commerce in 1851 (De Bry 1980, p. 400). Throughout Europe, political actors, particularly at the Paternalist owners, hence, could be directly involved in national level, questioned the legitimacy of business con- local and national rule making. trol over local community affairs. They looked for ways to Paternalist strategies often had a strong control dimen- constrain the authority of paternalist employers (Reid 1985, sion. Even though Jean-Baptiste Godin was very progres- p. 598). Increasingly, intrusive governments forced them- sive, his ‘‘social palace’’ (Palais Social) at the heart of the selves into what had until then been (private) company familiste`re was an architectural expression of how pater- territories. Paternalist employers fought to keep their nalist employers monitored and controlled employees. It authority and control by complying proactively with soci- evoked the Panopticon, which Jeremy Bentham had etal demands for better working conditions and greater developed for the purpose of complete surveillance in respect of workers’ political and civic rights. For example, hospitals, mad houses, or prisons (Bentham 1995). the mining company of Blanzy created a workers associ- According to Godin, detailed planning of duties according ation in 1909, which at least in appearance was run by to one’s abilities combined with tight control would bring workers (De Bry 1980, p. 304). order and coherence and eliminate conflicts (Lallement But this was not enough and the welfare state progres- 2009). As said before, paternal employers who controlled sively imposed itself in Europe as an alternative to the factory towns had the strongest leverage, monitoring strong political engagement hitherto characteristic of pri- employees well into their private lives. They restricted the vate firms (Beck 1995). In the social democratic view of journals employees could read, made them go to church, the welfare state, citizens (and not workers) are granted and their children to school. They even organized leisure rights—from education, health, social security, unem- time by structuring, sponsoring, and even imposing par- ployment, and even pension rights. The state becomes in ticipation into certain activities (sports, cooking, etc.). that context responsible for eradicating unemployment and Some imposed strict rules for house cleaning that were poverty but also wage-dependency (Esping-Andersen controlled through regular visits (Noiriel 1988). Others 1990; Quadagno 1987): even used their own private police forces to control Laws and regulations of the late nineteenth century – workers. When violent strikes erupted at the mines of mainly based on liberal or social conservative ideas – Blanzy in France in 1882, the director delegated the formed a public sector which became an alternative recruiting process to his private police to ensure that new to private responsibility for workers (De Geer et al. hires did not ‘‘infiltrate’’ socialist ideology but instead 2009, p. 274). shared the employer’s values (De Bry 1980). Only with the crisis of paternalism did employers come to accept a National governments introduced labor reforms and set widening of their employees’ political rights, through the themselves the task to control social problems at the national development, for example, of non-company trade unions. level. These measures were motivated in part by the willingness to decrease the potential abuse of power and Towards a Crisis of Paternalism and the Rise control of paternalist employers and came together with a of the Welfare State partial withdrawal of business from the social and political sphere—a political de-responsabilization of business. At the turn of the twentieth century, paternalism was in crisis. The increasing influence of the socialist critique that translated into a worldwide organization of the labor American Corporate Capitalism and Managerial movement was an important driver for the questioning of Trusteeship paternalism as a pattern of business–society interactions (Katznelson and Zolberg 1996). There were many violent Another pattern of business–society interactions where strikes and brutal riots in that period (Debouzy 1988; business played a significant role was managerial trustee- Noiriel 1988; Tone 1997). Employees actively denounced ship. Trusteeship emerged and co-evolved together with corporate and managerial capitalism, during the first half of Contradictory notions had to be reconciled—‘‘bigness’’ on the twentieth century in the United States. the one hand with an axiomatic belief in competition on the other but also the disappearance of owners (replaced by Historical Context: The Emergence of Corporate invisible, dispersed, and un-involved shareholders) with a and Managerial Capitalism sense of corporate responsibility. The process took time and was conflictual but a social At the turn of the twentieth century, the American capitalist compromise finally emerged. This social compromise was landscape went through a ‘‘great transformation’’ associ- the background ideology that framed trusteeship as an ated with corporatization and rapid ‘‘managerialization’’ emerging pattern of business–society interactions. We label (Berle and Means 1932; Chandler 1977; Roy 1997; Sklar it ‘‘techno-managerial efficiency.’’ ‘‘Efficiency’’ was the 1980). This ‘‘great transformation’’ had no equivalent central notion in that social compromise, allowing for the anywhere else in the world and the form of capitalist reconciliation of ‘‘bigness’’ with ‘‘free competition.’’ Effi- organization that emerged then was peculiar to the United ciency was perceived to create a positive dynamic for the States. This emergent form of capitalism had a number of consumer that largely compensated for the reduction in defining features (Djelic and Amdam 2007). competition. Since ownership had essentially dissolved The large-size and capital-intensive firm was one of its into the holding of pieces of paper, managers inherited key markers (Chandler 1977, 1990) and it was associated power. This power, particularly because of the large size of with an oligopolistic understanding of competition policed firms, had to be coupled with significant responsibility. by antitrust regulation (McCraw 1997). The constitution of And this responsibility extended well beyond the bound- large firms co-evolved with a change in legal status: the joint aries of the firm. It was conceived as a ‘‘quasi-public stock corporation with dispersed ownership imposed itself responsibility’’ and, as a consequence, corporations (Roy 1997; Sklar 1980). Those corporations were listed on (through their managers) should become major political stock exchanges where they found the capital they required actors both on the national and even further on the inter- (Navin and Sears 1953). Professional managers—without national scene. This political role was understood in ownership legitimacy—increasingly imposed themselves as managerial-technocratic terms, the idea being to tackle key decision makers (Berle and Means 1932). This separa- broad political issues also through managerial ‘‘efficiency’’ tion between ownership and control was a major revolution. and professionalization. It triggered the emergence of a profession—management— As the size and number of corporations increased and the structuring of an organizational field around it rapidly in the first decades of the twentieth century, their (McKenna 2006; Sutton et al. 1956). social significance became clearer (Heald 1970, p. 61). In The consequence of this revolution was a profound re- an article written in 1932 and titled ‘‘For Whom are Cor- invention of the dominant form of capitalism in the United porate Managers Trustees,’’ Edwin Merrick Dodd, a Har- States (Djelic and Amdam 2007; Sklar 1980). Well until vard Law School Professor put it clearly: the second half of the nineteenth century, American capi- Modern large-scale industry has given to the man- talism had been of the proprietary-competitive type and agers of our principal corporations enormous power hence quite similar to European forms of capitalism. Most over the welfare of wage earners and consumers, industries were structured around small or medium-sized particularly the former. Power over the lives of others firms. Personal and family ownership combined with a tends to create on the part of those most worthy to discourse championing free competition that was, however, exercise it a sense of responsibility (Dodd 1932, mitigated by the reality of cartel-like strategies that p. 1157). attempted to curb competition and its problematic conse- quences (Djelic 1998). In just a few decades, American As management developed, in parallel, into a quasi- capitalism came to be re-invented around very large-size profession, this new position of powerful mediator had to firms, oligopolistic competition, corporate ownership, and be defined along with associated responsibilities. The the managerialization of decision making. The transfor- Harvard Business Review (HBR), first published in 1922, mation was striking indeed and highly consequential (Berle and the American Management Association (AMA), and Means 1932; Sklar 1980). established in 1923, played a key role in that respect. A 1923 article of the AMA journal, the Management Review, Trusteeship and Its Ideological Frame: Techno- stated the following: ‘‘We are beginning to regard those Managerial Efficiency who occupy executive positions as having something in the nature of quasi-public responsibility’’ (Heald 1970, p. 64). While this form of capitalism was being institutionalized, The 1929 crisis only reinforced the urgency of discussions discussions were intense as to its consequences. on and around the responsibility of corporations and their leaders, the new ‘‘managers.’’ The concentration of Similarly, Leverett Lyon, an official of the Chicago power—economic, financial, but also political—in the Association of Industry and Commerce, suggested that hands of a small number of firms became all the more business education had ‘‘to make crystal clear…that busi- striking and problematic as conditions were worsening for ness does not exist for itself but is a device which society many across the country. uses and modifies for the accomplishment of social pur- This period of American capitalism has sometimes been poses’’ (Lyon 1922, cited in Heald 1970, p. 79). referred to as the ‘trusteeship management’ era (Hay and Calls for a particular kind of corporate ‘citizenship’ Gray 1974) and we take over that label. Elbert H. Gary, were made as early as in the 1920s and in fact well before President and Chairman of the Board of the US Steel the Great Depression (Eberstadt 1973, p. 22). Owen D. Company argued in 1921 that managers occupied a ‘‘po- Young, who was then Chairman of General Electric and sition of balance’’ and were in fact ‘‘trustees for investors, representative of a generation of public minded business- employees, employers, consumers, or customers, com- men and managers put it this way: petitors, and all others who may be interested in or affected Customers have a right to demand that a concern so by, the actions or attitudes of the managers’’ (cited in Heald large shall not only do its business honestly and 1970, p. 100). The manager had a ‘‘fiduciary duty’’ in other properly, but, further, that it shall meet its public words towards many different groups and in fact towards obligations and perform its public duties—in a word, society broadly understood. In striking contrast to what vast as it is, that it should be a good citizen (Young Friedman would claim in 1970, professional managers 1929). seemed perfectly legitimate in that period to make deci- sions not only on behalf of their companies but also on A concrete form in which this corporate responsibility behalf of multiple stakeholder groups. manifested itself was through the community chest move- ment (Heald 1970). As the individual philanthropy of the Political Roles and Responsibilities great American Robber Barons (Carnegie or Rockefeller) gave way to corporate philanthropy, corporate managers In that context, corporations—through their managers— increasingly became involved in the development of were hence called upon to take on political roles and community fund drives designed to support social responsibilities of different kinds but all of significance. As needs—e.g., health or education (Zunz 2011). For example, they inscribed themselves in the peculiar ideological frame ‘‘massive fundraising campaigns were organized between we have just described, those roles and responsibilities 1921 and 1925 to endow universities’’ (Hoffman 2007, became justified and legitimate. p. 67). In addition, corporations also offered their workers pension plans, consumer credit, unemployment insurance, Social Rights: Serving the Public Interest through or profit sharing schemes and they ‘‘engaged in public Community Chests works and philanthropic projects such as community health and welfare, the arts and education’’ (Hoffman 2007, As the management profession was being institutionalized, p. 66). By the end of the 1920s, (corporate) business, the idea that corporations—through their managers—had through its professional managers, had become in the the duty to serve the public interest came to be clearly United States a ‘‘key social institution’’ for the well-being articulated. The Harvard Business School that became in of the community (Heald 1970, p. 198). the 1920s a leading ‘‘producer’’ of professional managers played a key role in that respect (Khurana 2010). Wallace Defending a Form of Civilization and Its Associated Civil B. Donham, Dean of the School, was adamant that the key Rights challenge of the times was to create the conditions for the emergence of a socially responsible managerial class that The unprecedented power and size of American corpora- would know how to mobilize corporate capitalism to serve tions made salient, already in the 1910s and 1920s, their the public interest broadly understood: political nature and role (Dodd 1932; Donham 1927). This political role was sometimes connected to the increasing Unless more of our business leaders learn to exercise power of the United States on the world scene—and to the their powers and responsibilities with a definitely responsibility this entailed in the face of ever increasing increased sense of responsibility toward other groups risks and threats (Spector 2008; Yogev 2001). From a in the community, unless without great lapse of time geopolitical perspective, the political and social involve- there is through the initiative of such men an important ment of American corporations hence could have a stabi- socializing of business, our civilization may well head lizing aim. It could help save ‘‘American liberalism’’ from for one of its periods of decline (Donham 1927). the threats and challenges it was facing and this would be the side of corporations and their leaders, one of the done through reactions to re-establish public legitimacy was to take on a greater share of responsibility in a situation of immense …socialization of industry from within on a higher social distress. ethical plane, not socialism or communism, not With a view to improve public relations, Ford’s ‘‘gospel government operation or the exercise of political of production’’ turned into the ‘‘gospel of service.’’ Henry power, but rather the development from within of Gantt, an early management consultant, defined ‘‘service’’ effective social control (Donham 1927, p. 407). as a way to ensure ‘‘more democratic principles in busi- In his 1927 HBR article, ‘‘The Social Significance of ness’’ (Hoffman 2007, p. 62). This new gospel of service Business,’’ Donham acknowledged the urgency of facing was quite demanding on managers: up to this upcoming ‘‘threat to civilization’’: The gospel of service was clearly more ambitious The discontent with the existing condition of things is than the gospel of production. It demanded of its perhaps more widespread than ever before in history. apostles both a sense of trusteeship and a desire to put There is a close analogy between the position of the one’s will and work at the service of others (Fortune governing class in the earlier, simple societies editors 1949, p. 156). [France and Russia at the time of their revolutions] The gospel of service was picked up by emerging public and that of the business group in our present complex relations firms and advertising agencies who saw the broad social organization (Donham 1927, p. 406). public as their constituency. They committed to determin- Donham went on, making it clear that it was the ing the wants of this constituency and ensuring that responsibility of corporate managers to protect ‘‘the manufacturers would satisfy them: continuance of our economic order and its sane evolution’’ Just as citizens had representatives in Congress (Donham 1927, p. 407). Starting with the First World War, looking out for their needs and interests, so con- an important political responsibility of American business sumers had a representative in the highest councils of was seen to be, nationally and internationally, the cham- business, demanding that their desires be satisfied pioning of an American way of life—as defined through (Marchand 1985, p. 30). mass-production and mass-consumption in a (corporate) market society. American business had, in other words, the Greater involvement in the Community Chest movement responsibility to defend a particular kind of civilization in was another path to demonstrating ‘‘service’’ (Elwood the face of mounting threats. Henry Ford proposed his own 1932; Heald 1970;Zunz2011). To palliate resentment, but interpretation of this responsibility, first strongly contested also to keep government at bay, large corporations rushed then widely supported and defended. He asserted that into ‘‘responsible’’ corporate philanthropy. In 1932, Louis progress (economic, social, and moral) was fueled by mass- E. Kirstein, President of the Associated Jewish Philan- consumption and that the responsibility of business was thropies of Boston, candidly expressed the rationale: thus to offer quality products at low prices. From that Either we must give generously and voluntarily to our perspective, ‘‘the logic of mass production thus reconciled social agencies or we must stop whining when gov- the private interest of the manufacturer with the well-being ernment is forced to impose the added taxes required of the consumer, and, ultimately, with society at large’’ for succor until jobs appear (Kirstein 1932). (Heald 1970,p.89). Corporate spending increased from $2,539,819 by 2652 Political Rights: Ministering to the Needs and Desires firms in 13 cities in 1920 to $12,954,769 by 33,977 firms in of a Broad Constituency 129 cities in 1929 (Heald 1970, p. 18). By then, business contributions had become a key element in the chests’ The projection of management as having the capacity and funding movement not only in the form of monetary the duty to serve the public interest and hence to be a donations but also in the form of strong personal involve- ‘‘trustee’’ for the interests of multiple parties was signifi- ment leading to the creation of broad networks that cantly challenged by the onset of the 1929 crisis. The early connected local chests into a nationally organized charity. years following the crisis were years of bitter disappoint- However, philanthropy did not prove sufficient to deal ment as it became plain that corporate managers had not with mass unemployment after 1929. Starting in the early adequately served and protected the public interest—quite 1930s, the New Deal marked an assertive attempt, on the to the contrary. The Great Depression revived anti-big part of governmental authorities, to impose themselves on business sentiment in the United States—within civil the territory of social welfare. A bitter struggle opposed the society but also among politicians (Roosevelt 1936). On government to business and community chests in the 1930s on the question of tax deductions for corporate donations. of political duty to a new level. An exemplary illustration The stake was the continued capacity of business to of that evolution is the Committee for Economic Devel- maintain its vast community spending and community opment (CED) (Collins 1981). The CED was created in organizing. The New Deal government was not in favor of 1942 by a group of progressive businessmen together with tax deduction schemes as it sought to constrain corporate the American Secretary of Commerce, Jesse Jones. Paul influence in social and political matters and to expand Hoffman, Chairman of the Studebaker Corporation, Wil- instead the role and responsibilities of government. Even- liam Benton from the advertising firm of Benton and tually, after years of lobbying from business and commu- Bowles, and Marion Folsom, treasurer of the Eastman nity chests, the Five Per Cent Amendment was voted in Kodak Company, were all, among others, founding mem- 1935. This allowed companies to deduct payments to bers. The agenda of the CED was to involve the American charitable organizations for up to 5 % of their taxable business community in national planning for the postwar income. This legitimated the use of corporate funds for period and to determine the conditions necessary to pre- social purposes but also appeased critics of corporate giv- serve employment. The group of progressive businessmen ing within and around firms—corporate philanthropy who made up the CED had come to terms with the New became ‘‘good for business’’ as it reduced the overall tax Deal. They accepted a degree of government intervention bill (Hoffman 2007, p. 67). in the economy and recognized that the state should lead the way when it came to social welfare and the adminis- Questioning Trusteeship and the Assertion tration of social, civil, and political rights (Collins 1981). of Government The 1929 crisis and its partial de-legitimation of cor- porate managers’ claims to trusteeship opened the way to During the 1910s and 1920s, trade associations played an an increasingly assertive federal government. This evolu- important role—along with the new business schools—as a tion contributed to the delineation of a sharp boundary ‘‘professionalizing force’’ (Heald 1970, p. 92). They were between what came to be defined as the responsibility of at the forefront in pushing the notion of (corporate) man- business (serving the interests of the firm and later on of agers as legitimate professional trustees for the public shareholders in particular) and what pertained of a politi- interest. They set industry standards and were active in cal/social sphere. Even if corporations and their managers establishing ethical codes of conduct. They also justified could be called upon to take on parts of those political and business self-regulation as the most (cost-)effective pattern social responsibilities, the idea that they should be doing of regulation—hence serving the common and public this as surrogates of the state emerged during that period interest. Already in the 1920s, though, a number of critics and came to progressively impose itself. were questioning this. The economist J.M. Clark, for example, called in 1926 for ‘‘social accounting’’—arguing that the current situation where the private sector was in Discussion: Contextualizing Contemporary charge of its own control could not protect the interests of Political CSR the public at large. After 1929, the federal government became increasingly Our ideal–typical exploration of two distinct historical assertive—with the large corporations being one of its patterns of business–society interactions shows that firms main targets. As FD Roosevelt is believed to have said then had played significant social and political roles well before in private corridors ‘‘we have to save capitalism from the contemporary period of neoliberal globalization. We itself’’ (Schlesinger 1958). A number of business leaders propose the idea of contextual and functionally equivalent tried to fight back—attempting to protect private business patterns that inscribe themselves in distinct ideological and its self-defined political roles and responsibilities from frames. encroachments by the New Deal government, particularly as the latter was deploying an ambitious regulatory pro- Learning from Two Historical Ideal-Types gram (Katznelson 2014). Shortly before the 1936 elections, of Business–Society Interactions Colby M. Chester of General Mills called business to do all it could to ‘‘win public approbation’’ (Heald 1970, p. 194). In nineteenth century Europe, paternalist employers created Other business leaders chose a different path. By the end and sustained public goods and institutions, provided of the 1930s, some of the most emblematic managers of material and welfare benefits of various kinds, attending to large American corporations came to re-invent what was the needs of workers and their families from ‘‘cradle to meant by the political involvement of managers. The New grave.’’ They imposed moral and ideological ‘‘guidance,’’ Deal and its ambitious project of national flexible planning shaping the context in which workers and their families created opportunities for those managers to take their sense could enjoy civil rights. They also set rules for entire communities within and around their factories, closely political role of business (Whelan 2012). Nevertheless, as controlling and monitoring employees not only at work but the embodiment of neoliberal ideology, contemporary also well into their private lives. By the turn of the twen- globalization shifts the ways in which business engages in tieth century, an organized labor movement influenced in various political but also social roles. part by the socialist critique and increasingly assertive national governments came to scrutinize and question the Neoliberal Globalization and Its Significant legitimacy of the strong political engagement of private Moderating Role business. Key arguments were that paternalism led to the structural infantilization of workers and that it gave ‘‘Globalization’’ is an oft-debated concept that has been employers too much (illegitimate) power and discretion. associated with diverse definitions. We connect it here to In the first decades of the twentieth century, as Ameri- two main trends. First, the globalization we are talking can capitalism went through its great transformation, the about is ‘‘neoliberal’’ (Campbell and Pedersen 2001). The social and political responsibility of corporations was onset of this contemporary wave of globalization parallels source of intense discussions. The size and power of those the global spread of the neoliberal agenda that became, in corporations implied, it was argued, great social signifi- the same period, integrated with corporate capitalism cance—and, as a consequence, carried responsibilities. (Djelic 2006; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). Neoliberal Since ownership had essentially dissolved into the holding globalization has been characterized by a powerful trend of pieces of paper, the emerging group of professional towards the maximization of shareholder value, as we managers took over this power and associated responsi- argued above, and towards marketization. The term bilities. Those professional managers were supposed to be ‘‘marketization’’ refers both to market ideologies and ‘‘trustees’’ of the public interest, with a responsibility to market-oriented reforms. Contemporary market ideology balance the interests of multiple groups. They were also reflects the belief that markets are of superior efficiency for expected to contribute to the defense, both nationally and the allocation of goods and resources. Market-oriented internationally, of a particular form of civilization. reforms are those policies fostering the emergence and Through the active coordination of a nation-wide philan- development of markets and weakening, in parallel, alter- thropy movement, they furthermore indirectly framed the native institutional arrangements (Djelic 2006; Simmons context for collective and civic action on a large scale. The and Elkins 2004). A second defining feature of contem- 1929 crisis and the ensuing de-legitimation of corporate porary globalization is the associated density of regulatory managers’ claims to trusteeship opened the way for an and governance activities with a transnational scope and increasingly assertive federal government. FD Roosevelt’s reach (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Levi-Faur and New Deal project had in part the objective to affirm the Jordana 2005). Many different actors are involved in these pre-eminence of the state on social and political territories. activities—states but also multinational corporations, It could be seen, from that perspective, as an attempt to international organizations, and non-governmental organi- assert government’s responsibility for the common good zations. An important role for those multi-stakeholder and to contain the pretensions of business on that front. platforms is to codify, frame, and standardize practices, in The empirical exploration showed that business particular by negotiating and issuing rules, norms, or assumed, in both periods, strong social and political standards. responsibilities. The ‘‘null hypothesis’’ that business and Contemporary CSR has clear American roots (e.g., government, economics and politics were (by nature)—or Sheehy 2014). But CSR as we know it today has also should be—clearly separated could be argued to emerge, in become embedded and inscribed through time in the pro- fact, at the end of each period, during the rise to promi- gress of corporate capitalism and its transformation under nence of the welfare state in Europe and during the con- neoliberal globalization (Scherer et al. 2009; Segerlund frontation, in the 1930s, between the New Deal 2010). The global trend towards explicit CSR identified by government and American business. The historical con- Matten and Moon (2008) illustrates this co-evolution. textualization of contemporary CSR and its political role Along with the diffusion of explicit CSR as a set of prac- presented above allows us to put into perspective the taken- tices has come the spread of a neoliberal understanding that for-granted separation of private and public spheres that CSR was something unnaturally tied to business and could serves as a benchmark for current theorizing on the polit- be at most a voluntary engagement (Ho¨llerer 2013). As ical role of CSR. We propose an alternative ‘‘null Richter points out: hypothesis’’—business and state responsibilities are tightly interconnected, often blurred and always being negotiated. The CSR debate relies on a strict separation of the Firms play today as they did in the past important political public and private domain derived from the liberal roles. Hence, globalization is not per se the driver of the model. The liberal assumption of a minimalist state guaranteeing the free exercise of private interests and differentiate between the levels at which they occur. At the avoiding government coercion is translated into the local or national level, there might be no significant dif- voluntary character of CSR in the CSR debate ference in nature or even in intensity with the political roles (Richter 2010, p. 634). exerted (well) before globalization. At the global level, however, an entirely new space has been created for the Hence, contemporary globalization has neoliberal under- political activity and involvement of business. pinnings and contemporary CSR practices remain anchored within this paradigm. This neoliberal inscription has a New Actors: Towards a Virtualization of Actorhood number of consequences for the ways in which business– society interactions play out on the ground within contem- Under paternalism, the actors that became strongly porary CSR. This becomes all the more obvious when we engaged in political and social activities were essentially systematically compare and contrast neoliberal CSR with family or personal firms with strong anchoring in a regional our two historical ideal-types. (and hence national) territory. During the trusteeship era, the main actors were the new mostly nationally based joint Differences and Similarities: Comparing stock corporations of a re-invented American capitalism. Contemporary CSR with Paternalism After 1929, those national corporations joined forces and Trusteeship through philanthropy networks—and those networks then became important relays of the social and political The systematic comparison between contemporary CSR engagement of individual corporations. and our two historical ideal-types allows us to identify four As a consequence of its global diffusion, CSR has today principal dimensions along which the political role of firms become structured as a broad and fluid transnational field, has varied over time and in parallel to shifting ideological with a multiplicity of nodes in relations of co-opetition frames—territory, main actors, targets, and modes of with each other (Levy and Kaplan 2008). The constellation responsibility. of actors is characterized by the fact that transnational actors such as MNCs and multinational non-governmental Territory: From Local to Global organizations (NGOs) play a major role compared to most local actors or even to nation states. It is no surprise then, The evolution, all the way from paternalism to contem- that national governments across the world establish their porary corporate social responsibility, has come with a own transnational champions by controlling MNCs and broadening of the range of action and of target territories— creating GONGOs, ‘‘governmental non-governmental hence with a certain form of geographic universalization. organizations’’ as a means to regain influence at the global When we compare contemporary CSR to paternalism or level (Cumming 2010). trusteeship, we realize that the temporal move also corre- sponds to an extension of territory, as it were, of the Targets and Intentions: From Concrete to Elusive common good. Paternalism localized political responsibil- ity; the firm was in charge of a narrow geographical Under paternalism, the targets of the social responsibility community. In the 1920–1930s, the trusteeship era and political activity of firms were real and intentions were expanded the horizon of the political role of firms/corpo- concrete—workers, their families and their welfare, and a rations to the national territory. Contemporary CSR has the well-delineated local community and its prosperity. During world as its territory, at least potentially. the trusteeship era, the targets were a dematerialized but Political CSR scholars note that within this global ter- still identifiable national ‘‘citizen’’ and a physical national ritory, multinational corporations (MNCs) fill institutional territory. Intentions were structured around the defense of a and governmental voids particularly in developing coun- particular form of civilization (with a national base). In the tries. That business takes on political responsibilities vis-a`- context of contemporary CSR, targets are the ‘‘global cit- vis weak national governments is not in itself a new izen’’ or the ‘‘global environment’’ and intentions are development, as nineteenth century paternalism shows. articulated around the elusive notion of the ‘‘global com- What differs, though, is the nature of the firms (MNCs) that mon good’’—a notion that is highly dematerialized and take on a political role in local communities and their quite difficult to grasp. global reach and power. The new political turn of CSR acknowledges the great More specific perhaps to our contemporary era is the power of MNCs at the global level—mirroring the local strong involvement of firms as political and rule-making power of the paternal firm and the national power of the actors in the international/transnational context. When American corporation. What Clark called in 1926 the role talking of corporate political activities, one needs to of ‘‘social accounting’’ (Clark 1926)—the potential of civil society to influence and control public matters—has and evaluations. This move towards a ‘‘measurability’’ of translated today into the role of a dense ecology of medi- responsibility is hailed as an important step leading to ators (consultants, NGOs, the media, ranking and accredi- transparency and efficiency. But the measurability and tation bodies,…) that hold business accountable on a global ‘‘quantification’’ of responsibility are also creating the scale. In the process, the ultimate targets are being dis- opportunity and the possibility for its commodification— placed to quite an extent—from the subjects and objects what is more, on a global scale. Arguably, this process of towards which the corporation engages its responsibility commodification of responsibility could emerge as the (even in their elusive and disembodied form) towards, at driver of collective irresponsibility (Mitchell 2002). least in part, this dense ecology of mediators and In Table 1, we bring together and summarize those three watchdogs. different forms: As we have shown above, the common good was in New Modes: The De-Materialization of Responsibility private hands before it came to be, historically, ‘‘nation- alized.’’ The rise of the welfare state in Europe and the The expansion of territories and the ‘‘virtualization’’ of tar- deployment of the American New Deal were reactions, in gets have come together with the progressive de-material- part, to the strong discretionary power of private business ization of responsibility. Early paternalist owners could that had ruled until then. The project was to move towards clearly be identified as ‘‘real’’ individuals or families—and an at least partial nationalization of social responsibilities they directly bore the responsibility for the social and with a view to marginalizing the power of private firms. political engagement of their firms. The early American We agree with Matten et al. (2003, p. 116) and Beck (1995, corporation acting in the public interest was already a p. 98) that the ‘‘equation of politics and the state’’ is ‘‘a somewhat more dematerialized actor. However, in the con- modernist category error.’’ We hope to have provided text of weak and dispersed ownership, professional man- evidence that the privatization of the common good is not a agers came to embody corporate responsibility. Today, consequence of globalization. We can, however, come to pointing to the locus of responsibility(ies) in the context of re-interpret the contemporary CSR movement as a case of CSR is highly challenging if not outright impossible. Cor- partial re-privatization of the common good, a partial porations are understood to ‘‘belong to their shareholders’’ ‘‘return to the past’’ but under different conditions. (Friedman 1970) and hence the responsibility should lie The re-privatization of the common good that comes there. What does it mean though to have an assembly of together with contemporary CSR means that private eco- dispersed and fluid shareholders as ultimate responsibility nomic actors enjoy (again) a fair degree of discretionary bearers for CSR? If anything, it makes it difficult to apply a power. This principle of discretionary power is ‘‘liability model of responsibility’’ where ‘‘one assigns stable across the background ideologies presented above. responsibility to particular agents whose actions can be The ideological frames of authoritarian benevolence, shown as causally connected to the circumstances for which managerial efficiency, and shareholder wealth maximiza- responsibility is sought’’ (Young 2004, p. 368). tion all take for granted that private actors voluntarily have Furthermore, the more we move away from paternalism the legitimacy to engage in political roles and responsi- and closer to contemporary CSR, the more we see the bilities. Those private actors, and in particular the large strong role of discourse over actions in the management of corporations, have a relative free hand in the targeting of social and political responsibility. Naturally, the paternalist certain constituencies over others, in the selection of cer- owner or manager did build discursive strategies around his tain issues and priorities over others, of certain tools over actions (Coffey 2003) but those actions took center stage others, as long as they remain within a general framework and they could be concretely, physically identified and that is so broad as to really constrain nothing (e.g., the experienced (e.g., the utopian familiste`re of Godin or Global Compact). This is reminiscent, indeed, of the housing developments for workers around paternalist fac- greater degree of discretionary power traditionally associ- tories). A key issue with contemporary CSR is that of the ated with paternalism and managerial trusteeship, a dis- decoupling between increasingly dense discursive products cretionary power against which the (welfare) state and the and actions that are becoming difficult to follow, experi- American New Deal had both attempted to fight. ence, and monitor. This generates many outcries of ‘‘green’’ or ‘‘ethical’’ washing (Tokar 1997). The tools Implications for Future Research: Overcoming mobilized to monitor social engagement and corporate the Democracy Gap social responsibility are those of the ‘‘audit society’’ (Power 1997). Audits and measurements are used to pro- Hence, we can and should learn from the historical short- duce multiple systems of ‘‘naming and shaming’’ (Boli comings of paternalism and trusteeship and reflect upon 2006)—(positive and negative) rankings, accreditations, contemporary (political) CSR and its own limitations. Table 1 Political responsibility in historical perspective Paternalism Trusteeship CSR

Ideological Authoritarian-owner Techno-managerial efficiency Shareholder value maximization frame benevolence Territory Local National Global Actors Family or personal firms National corporations and philanthropy networks Transnational, multi-actor constellations (MNCs, NGOs…) Targets Workers, families, Local communities, national citizens, and national The global citizen, the global environment, communities public interest global common good Modes Employers (direct) Managers (per delegation) Corporations and multi-actor platforms (diffuse and partly indirect)

The discretionary, and as a consequence limited and obtain a right to participate in decision-making processes, partial, nature of paternalism, and trusteeship generated to sit at the table (Crane et al. 2005, p. 72). negative reactions. Those features indeed came, through At one extreme, some scholars have argued against time, to be identified as problematic. Neither paternalism stakeholder democracy as it undermines the legitimacy of nor trusteeship could be seen as fully legitimate in their corporate and managerial authority (Van Oosterhout claims of serving ‘‘the common good,’’ nor even of han- 2007). At the other extreme, the claim is that this does not dling ‘‘the social question.’’ The ultimately private nature go far enough given the fundamental question of who is to of firms and the conflicts this generated, their limited and be included or excluded for the debate to be really highly discretionary reach and scope meant that political democratic (Parker 2002). The argument is that deliber- engagement on their part could always be shown to be ative democratic processes may in fact be de-politicizing wanting and to lack legitimacy. The development of the rather than re-politicizing. Even if there is agreement on welfare state in Europe and the deployment of the New who should sit at the table, significant power differences Deal in the United States were attempts, in part, to over- de facto imply the silencing of marginalized or dissonant come the limits of a system that strongly relied on private voices (Edward and Willmott 2012). This is reminiscent actors by granting national governments a significant role. of the evolution from controlling worker morality to Governments had, by nature, a ‘‘universal’’ national reach, defending civil rights by paternalist firms. Because only scope, and responsibility and were, at least formally, certain kinds of employee representation were allowed, legitimate over a given national territory. this development was still taming the political debate These historical debates and criticisms appear to lend rather than opening it. empirical support to current critical readings of political Our critique of CSR is more radical, we propose, than CSR and they specifically raise questions about the limits the one set out by political CSR scholars. Indeed, the and legitimacy of corporate discretionary political choices political CSR literature tends to champion corporate and (Banerjee 2007; Buchholz and Rosenthal 2004). In part as a managerial voluntarism in the context of transnational reaction to those issues, democratization mechanisms deliberative and participatory platforms as a possible path aiming at stakeholder participation and empowerment are towards a defense of the ‘‘common good.’’ But owner or increasingly identified as necessary conditions for the managerial discretion was precisely the main factor that legitimacy of corporate political involvement (Dallmayr prevented, historically, both paternalism and trusteeship 2003; Matten and Crane 2005b; Palazzo and Scherer 2008; from ‘‘serving the common good.’’ Hence, based on our Renouard and Lado 2012). Scherer and Palazzo turn to historical analysis, we argue that corporate and managerial Habermas and propose deliberative democracy as a legit- discretion and voluntarism at the transnational level are not imizing process for corporate political involvement likely to be the solutions to social, environmental, and (Palazzo and Scherer 2006; Scherer and Palazzo 2007). political ills nor are they likely to be the best path to Others develop the notion of ‘‘stakeholder democracy’’ ‘‘serving the common (global) good.’’ On the basis of this (Crane et al. 2005; Harrison and Freeman 2004; Matten and analysis, and in line with certain critics, we therefore call Crane 2005b; Thompson and Driver 2005). Stakeholder for a more radical approach to stakeholder democracy in democracy can be understood as ‘‘firm–stakeholder rela- global governance (Edward and Willmott 2008, 2012; tions based on self-governing and voluntarism’’ (Matten Whelan 2012). Whelan, for example, proposes that politi- and Crane 2005b, p. 10) and implies that stakeholders cal CSR needs to be associated with a ‘political’ model of corporate state responsibilities, far from describing a natural state of governance that provides communities, citizenries, things, reflects in reality a singular and limiting perspec- and/or civil society, with similar voting rights to tive—deeply anchored in neoliberal ideology. Furthermore, those that shareholders enjoy within shareholder we suggest that this powerful ideological frame and its corporate governance models (Whelan 2012, p. 719). associated ‘‘null hypothesis’’ have been the source of and have fueled the taken-for-grantedness of the principle of Based on our historical contextualization of CSR and its voluntarism in the (political) CSR literature. redefinition as one form of business–society interactions In light of our reading of the two historical ideal-types, we reflecting a unique ideological frame, we encourage future may question whether a voluntary and deliberative demo- research on the ‘‘democracy gap and (how to) make cratic platform is sufficient to address the externalities and corporate decisions more accountable’’ (Scherer and welfare issues associated with globalized business and to Palazzo 2011, p. 921). As we argue here, in line with legitimize the strong political involvement of business. Ma¨kinen and Kourula (2012), the political responsibilities While we are sympathetic to the idea of a possible democ- of business can take different forms—and those forms ratization of corporate processes (Scherer and Palazzo reflect in part underlying ideologies. Contemporary CSR is 2007), we agree with Ma¨kinen and colleagues (2012, 2014) and remains deeply inscribed within a neoliberal frame. or Whelan (2012) that Habermas’ political theory may not be And a multi-stakeholder re-interpretation of global political sufficient to bring along the democratization needed in the CSR does little as yet to challenge this deep inscription. If context of contemporary challenges. If we started from an we are to overcome some of the problematic shortcomings alternative, historically informed, null hypothesis, that of contemporary (political) CSR, we will need to dis- business and state responsibilities are tightly interconnected, embed it from its associated neoliberal ideological frame— often blurred, difficult to disentangle, and always being and attempt to connect it with an alternative worldview. negotiated, we could develop a more radical view of stake- One way in which to start doing this is to think about the holder democracy for the proper governance of business implications today, at the transnational level, of the solutions activities—one that goes well beyond the power and dis- devised historically to deal with the shortcomings of private cretion of private corporate actors. This, we hope, opens new political engagement. The European welfare state and the perspectives and research avenues with a view to refine our American New Deal both made two common claims—for- understanding of contemporary CSR and its political mal legitimacy and universalism. The question for us today is dimension. what could be the contemporary functional equivalent, at the transnational level, of these kinds of solutions. Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and the Editors of the Special Issue for very useful com- ments and suggestions throughout the revision process. Conclusion

By exploring and comparing paternalism in nineteenth References century Europe, managerial trusteeship in early twentieth century US, and contemporary CSR, we underscored Acquier, A., Gond, J. P., & Pasquero, J. (2011). Rediscovering Howard R. Bowen’s legacy: The unachieved agenda and important differences as well as striking similarities. All continuing relevance of social responsibilities of the business- periods are characterized by business taking on strong man. Business & Society, 50, 607–646. political roles and responsibilities, with high managerial Baden-Fuller, C., & Morgan, M. (2010). Business models as models. discretion. These roles and responsibilities nevertheless Long Range Planning, 43(2–3), 156–171. Banerjee, S. B. (2007). Corporate social responsibility. Cheltenham: differed in expanding the territory from local to global Edward Elgar. reach. Actors evolved from family firms to transnational Banerjee, S. B. (2011). Voices of the governed: Towards a theory of multi-actor constellations, and went from targeting local the translocal. Organization, 18(3), 323–344. communities to global stakeholders. Finally, responsibility Beck, H. (1995). Origins of the authoritarian welfare state in Prussia, 1815-1870. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. was progressively dematerialized—from the original con- Bentham, J. (1995). The panopticon writings. Ed. and intro. crete and direct responsibility of the paternal employer to M. Bozovic. London: Verso. diffuse and more indirect forms of corporate responsibility. Berle, A., & Means, G. (1932). Modern corporation and private This historical contextualization shows that the frontier property. London and New York: Macmillan. Boli, J. (2006). The rationalization of virtue and virtuosity in world between economy and polity has always been blurry and society. In M. L. Djelic & K. Sahlin-Andersson (Eds.), shifting. Hence, we propose that Friedman’s ‘‘null Transnational governance (pp. 95–118). Cambridge: Cambridge hypothesis’’ of a clear separation between business and University Press. Buchholz, R., & Rosenthal, S. (2004). Stakeholder theory and public Dodd, E. (1932). For whom are corporate managers trustees? (pp. policy: How governments matter. Journal of Business Ethics, 1145–1163). XLV: Harvard Law Review. 51(1), 143–153. Donham, W. B. (1927). The social significance of business. Harvard Campbell, J., & Pedersen, O. (Eds.). (2001). The rise of neoliberalism Business Review, II, 401–419. and institutional analysis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Doty, H., & Glick, W. (1994). Typologies as a unique form of theory Press. building: Toward improved understanding and modeling. Carroll, A. (2008). A history of corporate social responsibility: Academy of Management Review, 19(2), 230–251. Concepts and practices. In A. Crane, D. Matten, A. McWilliams, Eberstadt, N. (1973). What history tells us about corporate respon- J. Moon, & D. Siegel (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of corporate sibilities. Business and Society Review, 7, 76–81. social responsibility (pp. 19–46). Oxford: Oxford University Editors, Fortune. (1949). The moral history of U.S. business. Fortune, Press. XL(6), 143–158. Chandler, A. (1977). The visible hand. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Edward, P., & Willmott, H. (2008). Corporate citizenship: Rise or Press. demise of a myth? Academy of Management Review, 33(3), Chandler, A. (1990). Scale and scope. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 771–773. University Press. Edward, P., & Willmott, H. (2012). Discourse and normative business Cheal, D. J. (1979). Hegemony, ideology and contradictory con- ethics. In C. Lu¨tge (Ed.), Handbook of the philosophical sciousness. The Sociological Quarterly, 20(1), 109–117. foundations of business ethics (pp. 549–580). Dordrecht: Clark, J. M. (1926). Social control of business. Chicago: University of Springer. Chicago Press. Elwood, S. (1932). Discussion of some sociological principles Coffey, J. (2003). Le´on Harmel. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre underlying the community chest movement. Social Forces, Dame Press. 10(4), 494. Colli, A., Perez, P., & Rose, M. (2003). National determinants of Engels, F. (1987 [1844]). The condition of the working class in family firm development. Enterprise and Society, 4(1), 28–64. England. London: Penguin Books. Collins, R. (1981). The business response to Keynes, 1929-1964. New Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. York: Columbia University Press. Princeton University Press. Crane, A., Driver, C., Kaler, J., Parker, M., & Parkinson, J. (2005). Fleming, P., & Jones, M. (2012). The end of corporate social Stakeholder democracy: Towards a multi-disciplinary view. responsibility. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Business Ethics: A European Review, 14(1), 67–75. Fooks, G., Gilmore, A., Collin, J., Holden, C., & Lee, K. (2013). The Crane, A., & Matten, D. (2008). Fear and loathing in the JCC: limits of corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Unleashing the monster of ‘New Corporate Citizenship Theory’ Ethics, 112(2), 283–299. to confront category crisis. Journal of Corporate Citizenship, Friedman, M. (1970). The social responsibility of business is to 29(March), 21–24. increase its profits. New York Times Magazine, September 13. Crane, A., Matten, M., & Moon, J. (2004). Stakeholders as citizens? Last retrieved January 2014 from http://www.colorado.edu/ Rethinking rights, participation, and democracy. Journal of studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business. Business Ethics, 53(1–2), 107–122. html. Cumming, L. (2010). GONGOs. In H. K. Anheier & S. Toepler Garriga, E., & Mele´, D. (2004). Corporate social responsibility (Eds.), International encyclopedia of civil society (pp. 779–783). theories: Mapping the territory. Journal of Business Ethics, 53(1/ New York: Springer. 2), 51–71. Dallmayr, F. (2003). Cosmopolitanism moral and political. Political Gillet, M. (1976). La gre`ve d’Anzin de 1884 et Germinal. Cahiers Theory, 31(3), 421–442. Naturalistes, XXII(50), 59–66. Davies, W., & McGoey, L. (2012). Rationalities of ignorance: On Glaser, B. (2002). Conceptualization: On theory and theorizing using financial crises and the ambivalence of neo-liberal epistemology. grounded theory. International Journal of Qualitative Methods, Economy and Society, 41(1), 64–83. 1(2), 23–38. Debouzy, M. (1988). Permanence du paternalisme? Le Mouvement Godin, J. B. (1881). Comment s’accomplit le progre`s social ? Le Social, 3–16. Devoir, February 27, 129–130. De Bry, F. (1980). Le paternalisme dans l’opinion des industriels Gueslin, A., & Jones, M. (1993). Michelin, les hommes du pneu. franc¸ais au XIXe`me sie`cle. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Paris: Ed. ouvrie`res. Universite´ de Paris-I. Guiol, P. (2000). L’expe´rience Godin ou les ‘e´quivalents de la De Geer, H., Borglund, T., & Frostenson, M. (2009). Reconciling richesse’. Panoramiques, 46(2), 94–104. CSR with the role of the corporation in Welfare States: The Hacking, I. (1990). Two kinds of ‘New Historicism’ for philosophers. problematic Swedish example. Journal of Business Ethics, 89(3), New Literary History, 21(3), 343–364. 269–283. Hall, J. (2007). Historicity and sociohistorical research. In W. Devinney, T. M. (2009). Is the socially responsible corporation a Outhwaite & S. Turner (Eds.), The Sage handbook of social myth? The good, the bad, and the ugly of corporate social science methodology (pp. 82–99). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. responsibility. Academy of Management Perspectives, 23(2), Harmel, L. (1889). Cate´chisme du patron. Paris: Aux bureaux du 44–56. journal la corporation. Djelic, M. L. (1998). Exporting the American model. Oxford: Oxford Harrison, J. S., & Freeman, R. E. (2004). Special topic: Democracy in University Press. and around organizations. Academy of Management Executive, Djelic, M. L. (2006). Marketization: From intellectual agenda to 18(3), 49–53. global policy making. In M. L. Djelic & K. Sahlin-Andersson Harvey, D. (2005). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford (Eds.), Transnational governance (pp. 53–73). Cambridge: University Press. Cambridge University Press. Hay, R., & Gray, E. (1974). Social responsibilities of business Djelic, M. L., & Amdam, R. P. (2007). Americanization in managers. Academy of Management Journal, 17(1), 135–143. comparative perspective: The managerial revolution in France Heald, M. 2005 [1970]. The social responsibilities of business. New and Norway, 1940-1990. Business History, 49(4), 483–505. Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Heath, J., Moriarty, J., & Norman, W. (2010). Business ethics and (or Ma¨kinen, J., & Kasanen, E. (2014). Boundaries between business and as) political philosophy. Business Ethics Quarterly, 20(3), politics: A study on the division of moral labor. Journal of 427–452. Business Ethics. doi:10.1007/s10551-014-2419-x. Hernes, T. (2005). Four ideal-type organizational responses to New Ma¨kinen, J., & Kourula, A. (2012). Pluralism in political corporate Public Management reforms and some consequences. Interna- social responsibility. Business Ethics Quarterly, 22(4), 649–678. tional Review of Administrative Sciences, 71(1), 5–17. Ma¨kinen, J., & Kourula, A. (2013). Globalization, national politics Hirschman, A. (1981). Essays in trespassing. Cambridge: Cambridge and corporate social responsibility. In R. Tainio, S. Merilainen, University Press. J. Ma¨kinen, & M. Laihonen (Eds.), Limits of globalization (pp. Hobsbawm, E. (1996[1962]). The age of revolution: 1789-1848. 219–235). Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press. Vintage: First Vintage Books Edition. Marchand, R. (1985). Advertising the American dream. Berkeley: Hoffman, R. (2007). Corporate social responsibility in the 1920s: An University of California Press. institutional perspective. Journal of Management History, 13(1), Marens, R. (2008). Recovering the past: Reviving the legacy of the 55–73. early scholars of corporate social responsibility. Journal of Ho¨llerer, M. A. (2013). From taken-for-granted to explicit commit- Management History, 14(1), 55–72. ment: The rise of CSR in a corporatist country. Journal of Marens, R. (2012). Generous in victory? American managerial Management Studies, 50(4), 573–606. autonomy, labour relations and the invention of corporate social Horsfall, D. (2013). A fuzzy set ideal-type approach to measuring the responsibility. Socio-Economic Review, 10(1), 59–84. competition state. Policy and Society, 32(4), 345–356. Marens, R. (2013). What comes around: The early 20th century Hounshell, D. (1984). From the American system to mass production: American roots of legitimating corporate social responsibility. 1800–1932. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Organization, 20(3), 454–476. Ite, U. (2004). Multinationals and CSR in developing countries: A Margolis, J. D., & Walsh, J. P. (2003). Misery loves companies: case study of Nigeria. Corporate Social Responsibility and Rethinking social initiatives by business. Administrative Science Environmental Management, 11(1), 1–11. Quarterly, 48, 268–305. Jones, M. T., & Haigh, M. (2007). The transnational corporation and Mark-Ungericht, B., & Weiskopf, R. (2007). Filling the empty shell. new corporate citizenship Theory. Journal of Corporate Citi- Journal of Business Ethics, 70(3), 285–297. zenship, 27, 51–69. Matten, D., & Crane, A. (2005a). Corporate citizenship: Toward an Joyce, P. (1980). Work, society and politics: The culture of the factory extended theoretical conceptualization. Academy of Management in later Victorian England. Oxford: Taylor & Francis. Review, 30(1), 166–179. Kalb, D. (1997). Expanding class: Power and everyday politics in Matten, D., & Crane, A. (2005b). What is stakeholder democracy? industrial communities, The Netherlands 1850-1950. Durham, Perspectives and issues. Business Ethics, 14(1), 6–13. NC: Duke University Press. Matten, D., Crane, A., & Chapple, W. (2003). Behind the mask: Kaplan, R. (2015). Who has been regulating whom, business or Revealing the true face of corporate citizenship. Journal of society? The mid-20th-century institutionalization of ‘‘corporate Business Ethics, 45(1–2), 109–120. responsibility’’ in the USA. Socio-Economic Review, 13(1), Matten, D., & Moon, J. (2008). Implicit’’ and ‘‘explicit’’ CSR. 125–155. Academy of Management Review, 33(2), 404–424. Katznelson, I. (2014). Fear itself: The New Deal and the origins of Mauss, M. (1967[1925]). The Gift. Norton, MA: Norton Library. our time. New York: Liveright. McCraw, T. (Ed.). (1997). Creating modern capitalism. Cambridge, Katznelson, I., & Zolberg, A. R. (Eds.). (1996). Working-class MA: Harvard University Press. formation. Nineteenth century patterns in Western Europe and McKenna, C. D. (2006). The world’s newest profession: Management the United States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. consulting in the twentieth century. Cambridge University Press. Khurana, R. (2010). From higher aims to hired hands. Princeton, NJ: McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (2001). Corporate social responsibility: Princeton University Press. A theory of the firm perspective. Academy of Management Kieser, A. (1989). Organizational, institutional and societal evolution: Review, 26(1), 117–127. Medieval craft guilds and the genesis of formal organization. Mena, S., & Palazzo, G. (2012). Input and output legitimacy of multi- Administrative Science Quarterly, 34(4), 540–564. stakeholder initiatives. Business Ethics Quarterly, 22(3), Kinderman, D. (2012). ‘Free us up so we can be responsible!’ The co- 527–556. evolution of CSR and neo-liberalism in the UK, 1977-2010. Mirowski, P., & Plehwe, D. (Eds.). (2009). The road from Mont Socio-Economic Review, 10(1), 29–57. Pe`lerin. Boston: Harvard University Press. Kirstein, L. E. (1932). The challenge to businessmen. The Survey, Mitchell, L. (2002). Corporate irresponsibility. New Haven, NJ: Yale October 15, 501-503. University Press. Lallement, M. (2009). Le travail de l’utopie. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Navin, T., & Sears, M. (1953). The Rise of a market for industrial Levi-Faur, D., & Jordana, J. (Eds.) (2005). The rise of regulatory securities, 1887-1902. Business History Review, 29(2), 105–123. capitalism. In The annals of the American academy of political Nielsen, N. J. (1994). Lifelong care and control paternalism in and social science, Vol. 598. London: Sage. nineteenth-century factory communities. Ethnologia Scandinav- Levy, D., & Kaplan, R. (2008). CSR and theories of global governance: ica, 24, 70–89. Strategic contestation in global issue arenas. In Crane, A., Noiriel, G. (1988). Du ‘‘patronage’’ au ‘‘paternalisme’’. Le Mouve- McWilliams, A., Matten, D., Moon, J., & Siegel, D. (Eds.), The ment Social, 144, 17–35. Oxford Handbook of CSR. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nussbaum, F. (2002[1933]). An early history of the economic Lyon, L. (1922). Education for business. Chicago: University of institutions of Europe. Washington, DC: Beard Books. Chicago Press. Padelford, W., & White, D. W. (2009). The shaping of a society’s Mackey, A., Mackey, T., & Barney, J. (2007). Corporate social economic ethos: A longitudinal study of individuals’ morality of responsibility and firm performance: Investor preferences and profit-making worldview. Journal of Business Ethics, 85(1), corporate strategies. The Academy of Management Review, 67–75. 32(3), 817–835. Palazzo, G., & Scherer, A. G. (2006). Corporate legitimacy as Magnusson, L. (2000). An economic history of Sweden. London: deliberation: A communicative framework. Journal of Business Routledge. Ethics, 66(1), 71–88. Palazzo, G., & Scherer, A. (2008). Corporate social responsibility, Sklar, M. (1980). Corporate reconstruction of American capitalism, democracy, and the politicization of the corporation. Academy of 1890–1916. New York: Cambridge University Press. Management Review, 33(3), 773–775. Skocpol, T. (Ed.). (1984). Vision and method in historical sociology. Parker, C. (2002). The open corporation. Cambridge: Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press. University Press. Soliva, R. (2007). Landscape Stories: Using ideal type narratives as a Polanyi, K. (1944). The great transformation. Boston: Beacon Press. heuristic device in rural studies. Journal of Rural Studies, 23(1), Pollard, S. (1965). The genesis of modern management. London: 62–74. Penguin. Somers, M. (1995a). What’s political or cultural about political Power, M. (1997). The audit society. Oxford: Oxford University culture and the public sphere? Towards an historical sociology of Press. concept formation. Sociological Theory, 13(2), 113–144. Prakash, A., & Griffin, J. (2012). Corporate responsibility, multina- Somers, M. (1995b). Narrating and naturalizing civil society and tional corporations, and nation states: An introduction. Business citizenship theory: The place of political culture and the public and Politics, 14(3), 1–10. sphere. Sociological Theory, 13(3), 229–274. Quadagno, J. (1987). Theories of the welfare state. Annual Review of Spector, B. (2008). Business responsibilities in a divided world. Sociology, 1, 109–128. Enterprise & Society, 9(2), 314–336. Quinn, M. (1997). The fallacy of non-interference: The poor Sutton, F., Harris, S., Kaysen, C., & Tobin, J. (1956). The American panopticon and equality of opportunity. Journal of Bentham business creed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Studies, 1, 1–18. Thompson, G., & Driver, C. (2005). Stakeholder champions: How to Reid, D. (1985). Industrial paternalism. Comparative Studies in internationalize the corporate social responsibility agenda. Society and History, 27(4), 579–607. Business Ethics, 14(1), 56–66. Renouard, C., & Lado, H. (2012). RSE et justice sociale: Le cas des Tokar, B. (1997). Earth for sale. Boston: South End Press. multinationales pe´trolie`res dans le Delta du Niger. Afrique et Tone, A. (1997). The business of benevolence: Industrial paternalism De´veloppement, 37(2), 167–194. in corporate America. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Richter, U. (2010). Liberal thought in reasoning on CSR. Journal of Van Dijk, T. A. (1998). Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach. Business Ethics, 97(4), 625–649. London: Sage. Roberts, D. (1958). Tory paternalism and social reform in early Van Du¨lmen, R. (1989). Industriekultur an der Saar: Leben und Victorian England. The American Historical Review, 63(2), Arbeit in einer Industrieregion 1840-1914. Munich: Beck. 323–337. Van Oosterhout, H. (2005). Corporate citizenship: An idea whose Roosevelt, F.D. (1936). A rendezvous with destiny. Speech before the time has not yet come. The Academy of Management Review, 1936 National Democratic Convention, Philadelphia, June 27. 30(4), 677–681. Retrieved 20 October 2014 from http://www.austincc.edu/ Van Oosterhout, H. (2007). Authority and democracy in corporate lpatrick/his2341/fdr36acceptancespeech.htm. governance? Journal of Business Ethics, 71(4), 359–370. Rotter, J. P., Airike, P.-E., & Mark-Herbert, C. (2014). Exploring Vogel, D. J. (2005). Is there a market for virtue? The business case for political corporate social responsibility in global supply chains. corporate social responsibility. California Management Review, Journal of Business Ethics, 125(4), 581–599. 47(4). Roy, W. (1997). Socializing capital. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Watkins, J. (1952). Ideal types and historical explanation. The British University Press. Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 3(9), 22–43. Sabel, C., & Zeitlin, J. (1985). Historical alternatives to mass Weber, M. (1949[1904]). ‘Objectivity’ in social science and social production: Politics, markets, and technology in nineteenth- policy. In Shils, E. & Finch, H. (Eds.), Max Weber: The century industrialization. Past and Present, 108, 133–176. methodology of the social sciences. Glencoe: The Free Press. Scherer, A. G., & Palazzo, G. (2007). Toward a political conception Weber, M. (1978[1922]). Economy and society. Berkeley: University of corporate social responsibility. Academy of Management of California. Review, 32(4), 1096–1120. Whelan, G. (2012). The political perspective of corporate social Scherer, A. G., & Palazzo, G. (2011). The new political role of responsibility: A critical research agenda. Business Ethics business in a globalized world. Journal of Management Studies, Quarterly, 22(4), 709–737. 48(4), 899–931. Willke, H., & Willke, G. (2008). Corporate moral legitimacy and the Scherer, A. G., Palazzo, G., & Matten, D. (2009). Introduction to the legitimacy of morals: A critique of Palazzo/Scherer’s commu- special issue: Globalization as a challenge for business respon- nicative framework. Journal of Business Ethics, 81(1), 27–38. sibilities. Business Ethics Quarterly, 19(3), 327–347. Yin, R. (2014). Case-study research: Design and methods. Thousand Schlesinger, A. (1958). The coming of the New Deal—The age of Oaks, CA: Sage. Roosevelt (Vol. 2). Boston: Hougthon Mifflin. Yogev, E. (2001). Corporate hand in academic glove—The case of Schmid, H. (1981). On the origin of ideology. Acta Sociologica, the Harvard group in the 1920’s. American Studies International, 24(1–2), 57–73. 39(1), 52–71. Screpanti, E., & Zamagni, S. (2005). An outline of the history of Young, O. (1929). Address of Owen D. Young, January 1929. In J. economic thought (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sears (Ed.), The new place of the stockholder (p. 209). New Segerlund, L. (2010). Making CSR a global concern. Farnham: York: Harper & Brothers. Ashgate Publishing. Young, I. M. (2004). Responsibility and global labor justice. The Sheehy, B. (2014). Defining CSR: Problems and solutions. Journal of Journal of Political Philosophy, 12(4), 365–388. Business Ethics. doi:10.1007/s10551-014-2281-x. Zunz, O. (2011). Philanthropy in America: A history. Princeton, NJ: Simmons, B., & Elkins, Z. (2004). The globalization of liberalization. Princeton University Press. American Political Science Review, 98(1), 171–189.