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Emmanual Wallerstein's World-Systems Theory Summary

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/ Emmanual Wallerstein's World-systems Theory Summary From: https:llwww.boundless.com/sociology/textbookslboundless-sociology-textbooklglobal-stratification-and- inegual ity-8/soci 0 logical-theories-and -global- inequaJ ity- 72/world-systems-theory-429- 5371 World Systems Theory, like dependency theory, suggests that wealthy countries benefit from other countries and ex-ploit those countries' citizens. In contrast to dependency theory. however, this model recognizes the minimal benefits that are enjoyed by low status countries in the world system. The theory originated with sociologist Immanuel \'\'allerstein, who suggests that the way a country is integrated into the capitalist world system determines how economic development takes place in that country. According to Wallerstein, the world economic system is divided into a hierarchy of three types of countries: core, semiperipheral, and peripheral. Core countries (e.g., U.S., Japan, Germany) are dominant, capitalist countries characterized by high levels of industrialization and urbanization. Core countries are capital intensive, have high wages and high technology production patterns and lower amounts oflabor ex-ploitation and coercion. Peripheral countries (e.g., most African countries and low income countries in South America) are dependent on core countries for capital and are less industrialized and urbanized. Peripheral countries are usually agrarian, have low literacy rates and lack consistent Internet access. Semiperipheral countries (e.g., South Korea, Taiwan, Mexico, Brazil, India, Nigeria, South Africa) are less developed than core nations but more developed than peripheral nations. They are the weaker members of "advanced" regions or the leading members of former colonial ones. Core countries own most of the world's capital and technology and have great control oyer world trade and economic agreements. They are also the cultural centers which attract artists and intellecutals. Peripheral countries generally provide labor and materials to core countries. Semiperipheral countries exploit peripheral countries, just as core countries exploit both semiperipheral and peripheral countries. Core countries extract raw materials with little cost. They can also set the prices for the agricultural products that peripheral countries export regardless of market prices, forcing small farmers to abandon their fields because they can't afford to pay for labor and fertilizer. The wealthy in peripheral countries benefit from the labor of poor workers and from their own economic relations with core country capitalists. Characteristics of Core/Periphery Areas: As core and periphery areas develop it is possible to recognise distinct characteristics. These characteristics may include: Characteristics of Core Characteristics of Periphery -- .- - .- ._.---- _ ..- ---_ _._ .._- • High foreign direct investment (FOI) • Disinvestment • High employment and high wages • Net migration loss • High levels of communications and technology e.g. internet and mobile network • Unemployment • High literacy and skills rates • Low levels of literacy and small skills base • Net migration gain • Large primary sector economy· maybe a large number of subsistence farmers: • Larger secondary and tertiary economy • Water and electricity shortages - possible reliance on fuelwood • Good electricity. water and gas supplies • Poor levels of communications • Good quality housing • poor housing - often informal settlements • Wide variety of entertainment e.g. cinemas, museums, etc .. • Traditionallifestyle!culture (lack of cultural mix) • Cultural diversity (sport, music, religion, language, food, dress. etc.) • little international cultural or sporting facilities Large racial mix Core and periphery regions develop because of a combination of human and physical factors. Below is a summary of some of the main reasons. Core Area Periphery Area Physical • Coastline • landlocked (no coastline) e.g. Rwanda and Uganda Factors • Available resources e.g. coal in Australia • Mountainous e.q. Bolivia and Nepal • Close to other developed countries e.q. Europe and North America • Very hot (arid desert environment) e.g. Mali • Stable climate (not to hot or to cold) e.g. Western Europe • Very cold (penmafrost) Areas of flat land that make construction easy e.q. East coast of US and SE of England Infertile land e.g. The Sahel • No resources • Regular suffer from devastating natural disasters e.q. Bangladesh and floodi~g orfamine in E~st Africa _ _ .._ .. _..... Human • Good transport links e.q. International airport (london Heathrow) • Poor education system often resulting in high levels of illiteracy. Factors • Good education system. Renowned academic and research universities e.g. Cambridge • Poor healthcare leading to high death rates and low life expectancy. and Oxford in the UK and the Ivy league universities in the US Possibly high rates of diseases like HIV and malaria. • Good medical care so that there are low death rates and high life expectancy- free from • Lack of democracy and kleptocratic government. No accountability for major diseases government officials • Good international relations e.g. member ofintemational organisations like NATO and • large levels of debt OECO • Frequent conflicts e.g..Somalia • Stable democracy free from conflict • Possible exploitation from previous colonial power • Government policy e.g the development on enterprise zones or export processing zones that encourage FDI i ,..". .:; . / ~ \.
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