View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Research Papers in Economics How Experts Decide : Identifying Preferences versus Signals from Policy Decisions Stephen Hansen and Michael McMahon No 963 WARWICK ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS How Experts Decide: Identifying Preferences versus Signals from Policy Decisions∗ Stephen Hansen Michael McMahon Universitat Pompeu Fabra University of Warwick Barcelona GSE CEP, LSE
[email protected] [email protected] May 11, 2011 Abstract A large theoretical literature assumes that experts differ in terms of preferences and the distribution of their private signals, but the empirical literature to date has not separately identified them. This paper proposes a novel way of doing so by relating the probability a member chooses a particular policy decision to the prior belief that it is correct. We then apply this methodology to study differences between internal and external members on the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee. Using a variety of proxies for the prior, we provide evidence that they differ significantly on both dimensions. Keywords: Bayesian decision making, Committees, Monetary policy JEL Codes: D81, D82, E52 ∗This paper extends part of the research previously circulated under the title \What Do Outside Experts Bring To A Committee? Evidence From The Bank of England". We would like to thank Tim Besley, Pablo Casas, Fabio Canova, Francesco Caselli, Antonio Ciccone, Greg Crawford, Thomas Cunningham, Nathan Foley-Fisher, Francesco Giavazzi, Charles Goodhart, Clare Leaver, Gilat Levy, Massimo Motta, Andrew Oswald, Morten Ravn, Karl Schlag, Kevin Sheedy, J´onSteinsson, and Thijs van Rens for insightful comments.