DOCSLIB.ORG

Standard of Care in Negligent Design Product Liability Cases, Existence

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Standard of Care in Negligent Design Product Liability Cases, Existence Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel Springfield, Illinois | www.iadtc.org | 800-232-0169 IDC Quarterly | Volume 20, Number 2 (20.2.28) Product Liability By: James W. Ozog and Staci A. Williamson* Wiedner & McAuliffe, Ltd. Standard of Care in Negligent Design Product Liability Cases, Existence of a Post-Sale Duty to Warn, the Admissibility of Post-Sale Product Improvements and Due-Process Analysis of Punitive Damage Verdicts: Jablonski v. Ford Motor Company The Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District, unanimously affirmed a $43 million judgment in a passenger vehicle defect case against Ford Motor Company. The court addressed several complex issues significantly affecting manufacturers, including the standard of care in negligent product design cases, a manufacturer’s continuous duty to warn, the admissibility of a manufacturer’s pre-injury/post-sale improvements and appeal from punitive damage verdicts. Factual Background In Jablonski v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5-05-0723, 2010 Ill. App. LEXIS 65 (5th Dist. Feb. 1, 2010), while stopped on a highway, another vehicle rear-ended the plaintiff and her husband’s 1993 Lincoln Town Car. Jablonski, 2010 Ill. App. Lexis 65 at *3. Experts estimated that impact occurred at 55-65 miles per hour. The collision crushed the fuel tank of the Lincoln Town Car and a pipe wrench located in its trunk also pierced the fuel tank. A fire immediately started which severely burned the plaintiff and killed her husband. Consequently, the plaintiffs sued Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) alleging strict product liability and negligence in the design of the Lincoln Town Car. Strategically, prior to trial, plaintiffs dropped their strict liability claim and proceeded to try the case against Ford for negligence and willful and wanton conduct only. The plaintiffs’ negligence claims attacked the design of the vehicle’s fuel tank system. At trial, the evidence established that the plaintiffs’ Lincoln Town Car and other Ford-made vehicles, including the Ford Crown Victoria Police Interceptor (“Police Interceptor”), were all members of Ford’s Panther platform vehicle line. Ford introduced the Panther platform (“the platform”) in 1979 and featured “a body-on frame construction” and an aft-of-axle fuel tank (which was located in front of the vehicle’s trunk, behind its rear axle and between its rear wheels). Jablonski, 2010 Ill. App. Lexis 65 at *5. All subsequent platforms had fuel tanks forward of the axle. Plaintiffs’ Defect Theory The plaintiffs argued that the Lincoln Town Car was defective in that the fuel tank was located in the crush zone in a rear-end collision and was therefore susceptible to being punctured by items in the trunk. One of the Page 1 of 6 plaintiffs’ experts opined that at the time the plaintiffs’ vehicle was manufactured, a safer and more practical location for the fuel tank would have been forward of the axle. The plaintiffs’ expert also opined that if Ford did not change the location of the fuel tank, it should have provided shields that protected the fuel tank from being punctured, as well as a guard for vehicle owners to use to align items in the trunk so they would be less likely to puncture the tank. Additionally, Ford should have warned the vehicle owners of the danger of objects in the trunk puncturing the fuel tank. Trial Proceedings At trial, the plaintiffs introduced records and testimony from several Ford employees which showed that Ford had been aware of the potential hazards associated with the aft-of-axle fuel tank design, including the danger of objects in the trunk puncturing the fuel tank in a rear end collision, since the late 1960s. According to the evidence, in response to concerns regarding the high number of police officers being injured or killed in post-crash fires following high-speed rear-end collisions involving Police Interceptors, Ford produced an Upgrade Kit and Trunk Pack Recommendations. Id. at *19. The Upgrade Kit included shields designed to protect the fuel tank from being punctured by component parts, and the Trunk Pack Recommendations advised police officers on the placement of items in the trunk to reduce the potential for fuel tank ruptures. Ford’s experts “opined that there was no defect in the [Panther platform’s] fuel system, that a change in the location of the fuel tank would reduce the effectiveness of other desirable attributes of the Panther platform vehicles, and that, considering the [platform’s overall design] ..., the fuel tank [was] in the best location.” Id. at *21. Additionally, Ford presented evidence showing that its Panther platform “met and exceeded all United States government safety standards for its fuel containment system.” Id. At the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury to rule on four claims of negligence: (1) Equipping the 1993 Lincoln Town Car with a vertical-behind-the-axle fuel tank without adding shields or guards; or (2) Failing to locate the fuel tank above the axle or forward the rear axle; or (3) Failing to warn of the risk of trunk contents puncturing the fuel tank; or (4) Failing to inform of the existence of the Trunk Pack Recommendations. Id. at *37. The jury returned a general verdict exceeding $43 million, including $15 million in punitive damages against Ford. The court denied Ford’s post-trial motions and Ford appealed. The Fifth District’s Analysis and Opinion The Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District recognized that product liability cases for negligence, as opposed to strict liability, are rare. With respect to the current state of negligence law in product liability cases, the court summarized: To establish a product liability action asserting a claim based upon negligent product design, the plaintiff must establish ... “the existence of a duty of care owed by the defendant, a breach of that duty, an injury that was proximately caused by that breach, and damages.” Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 247, 270, 864 N.E.2d 249, 263 (2007). “The key distinction between a negligence claim and a strict liability claim lies in the concept of fault.” Calles, 864 N.E.2d at 263. A strict liability claim is concerned only with the condition of the product, while “in a negligence claim, a defendant’s fault is at issue in addition to the condition of the product.” Calles, 864 N.E.2d at 263-64. Thus, in both types of cases alleging a product-design claim, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a defective condition in the product at the time it left the manufacturer’s control. Carrizales v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 226 Ill. App. 3d 20, 36, 589 N.E.2d 569, 580, 168 Ill. Dec. 169 (1991). In a Page 2 of 6 negligent-product-design-claim, the plaintiff must also provide evidence of “a standard of care by which to measure a defendant’s design and establish a deviation from that standard of care.” Blue, 215 Ill. 2d at 96, 828 N.E.2d at 1141. Jablonski, 2010 Ill. App. at *34-35. The court further observed that “a manufacturer is held to the degree of knowledge and skill of experts” and that an automobile manufacturer has a duty to “use reasonable care in the design and manufacture of its product, bearing in mind that the intended and actual use of automobile results in collisions.” Id. at *35, quoting Anderson v. Hyster Co., 74 Ill. 2d 364, 368, 385 N.E.2d 690, 692 (1979); Mack v. Ford Motor Co., 283 Ill. App. 3d 52, 56, 669 N.E.2d 608, 612 (1996). Accordingly, “[t]he crucial question in a negligent-design case is whether the manufacturer exercised reasonable care in the design of the product.” Id., quoting Calles, 864 N.E.2d at 264. To determine whether a manufacturer’s conduct was reasonable, it must be determined whether “in the exercise of ordinary care the manufacturer should have foreseen that the design would be hazardous to someone.’” Id. at *36, quoting Calles, 864 N.E.2d at 264. Finally, the court stated that “[t]o show that the manufacturer acted unreasonably based on the foreseeability of the harm, the plaintiff must show the manufacturer knew or should have known of the risk posed by the product design at the time of manufacturer.” Id., quoting Calles, 864 N.E.2d at 264. Standard of Care Ford argued that the plaintiffs failed to prove a standard of care and a deviation from that standard. With respect to the proof of the standard of care, the court looked at the test asserted by both plaintiffs’ and Ford’s experts. Both parties’ experts agreed on the standard of care in the design of a complex product: Once a design engineer identifies a potential hazard in a product, he is obligated to attempt to design the hazard out of the product. If he is unable to do so, he should design a shield or guard to eliminate the hazard. If that is impossible he should warn the consumer about the hazard. Id. The court found that the plaintiffs had established that Ford deviated from the applicable standard of care in its design of the Lincoln Town Car. Continuous Duty to Warn The plaintiffs also claimed that Ford was negligent for failing to inform civilian owners of the existence of Trunk Pack Recommendations (which had been distributed to law enforcement owners). Ford argued that there is no post-sale duty to warn in Illinois and that the Trunk Pack Recommendations did not exist until after the 1993 Lincoln Town Car was manufactured. The appellate court agreed with Ford that there is no post-sale duty to warn, but ruled that “if a manufacturer knew or should have known of the hazard at the time of manufacture, so that a duty to warn existed when the product left its control, that duty to warn is continuous.” Id.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Attention Food & Beverage Industry: False Advertising, Product Liability, and Defamation Litigation Is Making an Impact
    Attention Food & Beverage Industry: False Advertising, Product Liability, and Defamation Litigation is Making an Impact Presented by: Erik Connolly, Amanda Groves, Neil Murphy, and Ron Rothstein Today’s eLunch Presenters Erik Connolly Amanda Groves Neil Murphy Ron Rothstein Partner Partner Partner Partner Chicago Charlotte/San Francisco Chicago Chicago [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] +1 (312) 558-6339 +1 (704) 350-7755 +1 (312) 558-7538 +1 (312) 558-7464 2 Overview 1. The Broadening Scope of Labeling and Safety Issue Targeted by the Plaintiffs’ Bar 2. Got HFCS? A Report from the Front Lines of Product Liability and False Advertising Litigation Involving High Fructose Corn Syrup 3. Food Defamation: Protecting Your Brand 3 The Broadening Scope of Labeling and Safety Issues Targeted by the Plaintiffs’ Bar Presented by: Amanda Groves Ron Rothstein 4 Overview • What’s under attack in consumer class actions? • Pet Food – Propylene Glycol • Homeopathic Medicines • Health Claims – Kind Bar • Chocolate – Antioxidants • Slack Fill 5 Where Do These Lawsuits Come From? Hire FDA State Consultant - FDA Warning Investigative FTC Consent NAD Rulings Attorneys Find Technical Journalism Judgments Letters Violation of General Regulations or Invent Theory Lawsuits 6 Who is Behind the Litigation? Law Offices of Law Offices of Janet Howard W. Lindner Spielberg Rubinstein, P.A. Reese Richman LLP Braun Law Carella, Byrne, Cecchi, Olstein, Brody & Agnello, P.C. 7 Who is Behind the Litigation? • Many of the
    [Show full text]
  • Products Liability: User Misconduct Defenses David G
    University of South Carolina Scholar Commons Faculty Publications Law School Fall 2000 Products Liability: User Misconduct Defenses David G. Owen University of South Carolina - Columbia, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub Part of the Torts Commons Recommended Citation David G. Owen, Products Liability: User Misconduct Defenses, 52 S.C.L.Rev. 1 (2000). This Article is brought to you by the Law School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. PRODUCTS LIABILITY: USER MISCONDUCT DEFENSES DAVID G. OwEN* I. TRADITIONAL USER MISCONDUCT DEFENSES: AN OVERVIEW ....... 3 A. Common Law ......................................... 3 B. Reform Legislation ..................................... 5 II. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ................................ 9 A. In General ........................................... 9 B. Warnings Cases ...................................... 15 C. Children ............................................ 15 D. Employees ........................................... 16 E. ContributoryNegligence as a Defense to Strict Liability in Tort Claims ........................................ 17 F. Contributory Negligence as the Sole Proximate Cause of an Accident ........................................ 21 III. ASSUMPTION OF RISK ..................................... 23 A. In General .......................................... 23 B.
    [Show full text]
  • An Introduction to Product Liability Law
    AN INTRODUCTION TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW When a person is injured by a defective product that is unreasonably dangerous or unsafe, the injured person may have a claim or cause of action against the company that designed, manufactured, sold, distributed, leased, or furnished the product. In other words, the company may be liable to the person for his injuries and, as a result, may be required to pay for his damages. That, in short, is product liability; and, not surprisingly, the law that governs this kind of liability is referred to as product liability law. This article is intended to serve as a brief introduction to product liability law, especially as it relates to food. However, before we embark on our introductory tour of this subject, a few words of warning are necessary. First, you should keep in mind that whole books have been written about product liability law and that this article is, by necessity, an oversimplification of a complex subject. Second, for every general rule described below, you should assume that there exists innumerable exceptions. That is the way the law is, and, if it were otherwise, there would be a lot of lawyers out of work. Finally, you should remember that, as a rule, the law is different from state to state, and product liability law is no exception to this rule. A BRIEF HISTORY OF STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AN INJURY WITH NO REMEDY AT LAW It is exceedingly rare, in the law, when one can point to a general rule that is both well established and uniformly followed.
    [Show full text]
  • Tort Liability That May Attach to Intellectual Property Licensing, 13 J
    UIC Law Review Volume 13 Issue 1 Article 4 Fall 1979 Tort Liability That May Attach to Intellectual Property Licensing, 13 J. Marshall L. Rev. 105 (1979) W. R. Norris Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Torts Commons Recommended Citation W.R. Norris, Tort Liability That May Attach to Intellectual Property Licensing, 13 J. Marshall L. Rev. 105 (1979) https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. TORT LIABILITY THAT MAY ATTACH TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING W. R. NORRIS* INTRODUCTION Due to the wide applicability of the functions of tort law, there has emerged an interface between the field of intellectual property licensing and tort law which by definition applies to le- gal responsibilities outside the scope of the licensing contract. However, there appears to be a dearth of case law and compan- ion writings on tort liability in the fields of know-how and patent licensing even though tort liability has become well established in the field of trademark licensing over the past few years. The reasons for the development of this dichotomy are not clear. Between the licensor and licensee of technology and/or patents, one can speculate that the agreement has generally been sufficient in outlining performances and remedies required by the parties, even though some theories support extracontrac- tual remedies in tort.' Lacking privity with the technology licen- sor, a third party customer of the licensee is likely to target his recourse against the licensee-manufacturer.
    [Show full text]
  • Product Liability and Protection of EU Consumers: Is It Time for a Serious Reassessment?
    Journal of Private International Law ISSN: 1744-1048 (Print) 1757-8418 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpil20 Product liability and protection of EU consumers: is it time for a serious reassessment? Giorgio Risso To cite this article: Giorgio Risso (2019) Product liability and protection of EU consumers: is it time for a serious reassessment?, Journal of Private International Law, 15:1, 210-233, DOI: 10.1080/17441048.2019.1579994 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/17441048.2019.1579994 Published online: 06 Jun 2019. Submit your article to this journal View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rpil20 Journal of Private International Law, 2019 Vol. 15, No. 1, 210–233, https://doi.org/10.1080/17441048.2019.1579994 Product liability and protection of EU consumers: is it time for a serious reassessment? Giorgio Risso* The European Union (EU) has not enacted a coherent and fully-fledged product liability regime. At the substantive level, the Product Liability Directive – adopted in 1985 – is the only piece of legislation harmonising the laws of the Member States. At the private international law level, the special choice-of-laws provision in the Rome II Regulation coexists with the general rules in the Brussels I-bis Regulation. Cross-border product liability cases are therefore subject to different pieces of legislation containing either “general” or “specific” provisions. In turn, such general and specific provisions do have their own rationales which, simplistically, can be inspired by “pro-consumer”, “pro-producer”, or more “balanced” considerations, or can be completely “indifferent” to consumer protection.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 7 Tort Law and Product Liability Chapter Outline 1
    Chapter 7 Tort Law and Product Liability Chapter Outline 1. Introduction 2. The Basis of Tort Law 3. Intentional Torts 4. Negligence 5. Cyber Torts: Defamation Online 6. Strict Liability 7. Product Liability 8. Defenses to Product Liability 9. Tort Law and the Paralegal Chapter Objectives After completing this chapter, you will know: • What a tort is, the purpose of tort law, and the three basic categories of torts. • The four elements of negligence. • What is meant by strict liability and under what circumstances strict liability is applied. • The meaning of strict product liability and the underlying policy for imposing strict product liability. • What defenses can be raised in product liability actions. Chapter 7 Tort Law and Product Liability Chapter Outline I. INTRODUCTION A. Torts are wrongful actions. B. The word tort is French for “wrong.” II. THE BASIS OF TORT LAW A. Two notions serve as the basis of all torts. i. Wrongs ii. Compensation B. In a tort action, one person or group brings a personal-injury suit against another person or group to obtain compensation or other relief for the harm suffered. C. Tort suits involve “private” wrongs, distinguishable from criminal actions that involve “public” wrongs. D. The purpose of tort law is to provide remedies for the invasion of various interests. E. There are three broad classifications of torts. i. Intentional Torts ii. Negligence iii. Strict Liability F. The classification of a particular tort depends largely on how the tort occurs (intentionally or unintentionally) and the surrounding circumstances. Intentional Intentions An intentional tort requires only that the tortfeasor, the actor/wrongdoer, intended, or knew with substantial certainty, that certain consequences would result from the action.
    [Show full text]
  • Investigating and Defending Products Liability and Toxic Tort Claims
    INVESTIGATING AND DEFENDING PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND TOXIC TORT CLAIMS Presented at the Twin Cities Claims Association Winter Seminar December 4, 2006 Lawrence M. Rocheford [email protected] 8519 Eagle Point Boulevard, Suite 100 Lake Elmo, Minnesota 55042-8624 (651) 290-6500 Copyright © 2006 by Jardine, Logan & O'Brien, P.L.L.P. INDEX _______________________________________________________________________________ I. COMMON PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS.................................................................1 A. Negligence Claims.........................................................................................................1 1. Design.................................................................................................................2 2. Manufacture .....................................................................................................5 3. Entrustment ......................................................................................................7 4. Bailments...........................................................................................................8 B. Strict Liability Claims..................................................................................................9 1. Defective Design .............................................................................................10 2. Defective Manufacture ..................................................................................13 3. Entrustment ....................................................................................................14
    [Show full text]
  • Civil Nature of Suit Code Descriptions (Rev
    Civil Nature of Suit Code Descriptions (Rev. 04/21) Contract Code Title Description 110 Insurance Action alleging breach of insurance contract, tort claim, or other cause related to an insurance contract, except for maritime insurance contracts. 120 Marine Action (Admiralty or Maritime) based on service, employment, insurance or other contracts relating to maritime vessels and other maritime contractual matters. 130 Miller Act Action based on performance and payment bonds agreed to by contractors on federal construction projects as required under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 3131-3134. 140 Negotiable Instrument Action relating to an agreement to pay a specific amount of money, including promissory notes, loan agreements and checks. 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement Action to recover debt owed to the United States, including Judgment enforcement of judgments, based on overpayments and restitution agreements involving matters other than Medicare benefits, student loans and veterans’ benefits. 151 Medicare Action relating to Medicare payments, including actions for payments of benefits, to recover overpayments, and for judicial review of administrative decisions. 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans Action to recover debt owed to the United States from defaulted (Excludes Veterans) student loan. 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veterans' Action relating to payments of veterans’ benefits, primarily including Benefits actions to recover overpayments. 160 Stockholders' Suits Action brought by stockholder(s) of a corporation (including
    [Show full text]
  • Is There Really No Liability Without Fault?: a Critique of Goldberg & Zipursky
    IS THERE REALLY NO LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT?: A CRITIQUE OF GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY Gregory C. Keating* INTRODUCTION In their influential writings over the past twenty years and most recently in their article “The Strict Liability in Fault and the Fault in Strict Liability,” Professors Goldberg and Zipursky embrace the thesis that torts are conduct-based wrongs.1 A conduct-based wrong is one where an agent violates the right of another by failing to conform her conduct to the standard required by the law.2 As a description of negligence liability, the characterization of torts as conduct-based wrongs is both correct and illuminating. Negligence involves a failure to conduct oneself as a reasonable person would. It is fault in the deed, not fault in the doer. At least since Vaughan v. Menlove,3 it has been clear that a blameless injurer can conduct himself negligently and so be held liable.4 Someone who fails to conform to the standard of conduct expected of the average reasonable person and physically harms someone else through such failure is prima * William T. Dalessi Professor of Law and Philosophy, USC Gould School of Law. I am grateful to John Goldberg and Ben Zipursky both for providing a stimulating paper and for feedback on this Article. Daniel Gherardi provided valuable research assistance. 1. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Strict Liability in Fault and the Fault in Strict Liability, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 745 (2016) (“[F]ault-based liability is . liability predicated on some sort of wrongdoing. [L]iability rests on the defendant having been ‘at fault,’ i.e., having failed to act as required.”).
    [Show full text]
  • Product Liability Litigation and the Concept of Defective Goods: Reasonableness Revisited Vincent S
    Journal of Air Law and Commerce Volume 44 | Issue 4 Article 2 1979 Product Liability Litigation and the Concept of Defective Goods: Reasonableness Revisited Vincent S. Walkowiak Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc Recommended Citation Vincent S. Walkowiak, Product Liability Litigation and the Concept of Defective Goods: Reasonableness Revisited, 44 J. Air L. & Com. 705 (1979) https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol44/iss4/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu. PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION AND THE CONCEPT OF DEFECTIVE GOODS: "REASONABLENESS" REVISITED? VINCENT S. WALKOWIAK* It must be understood that the words "unreasonably dangerous" have no independent significance and merely represent a label to be used where it is determined that the risk of loss should be placed upon the supplier.' W HEN THE NEW YORK Court of Appeals in MacPherson v Buick Motor Co.' eliminated the requirement that a plaintiff establish privity of contract with a manufacturer before bringing a negligence suit for personal injuries caused by a defec- tive product, they ushered in the modem era of products liability. The variety of devices available to the plaintiff to establish the fault, and therefore liability, of a manufacturer for manufacturing flaws steadily increased.! Initial satisfaction with the efficiency of such procedural devices as res ipsa loquitur to shift the costs of com- pensating for injuries, however, slowly wore off and pro-plaintiff jurists gradually began questioning even substantive rules of lia- bility.
    [Show full text]
  • Post-Sale Duty to Warn” in This Enunciation of Products Liability Law
    Post-Sale Duties THE MOST EXPANSIVE THEORY IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY Kenneth Ross and Professor J. David Prince † I. INTRODUCTION Manufacturing, designing, and selling safe products does not totally satisfy a product manufacturer’s legal duties. A few U.S. courts, starting in 1959, held that manufacturers have a duty to warn product users when they learn of risks in their product after sale even if the product was not defective when sold.1 A number of courts, on the other hand, held that there was no such duty.2 In the 1990s, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) considered the status of products liability law in the United States. This culminated in the publication of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (“Restatement (Third)”).3 The Institute had to decide whether enough precedent existed to support a section on the “post-sale duty to warn” in this enunciation of products liability law. The law professors who served as the drafters of the Restatement (Third) (“Reporters”), considered all of the cases through 1997, and despite a split of authority, felt there was sufficient support in case law and common sense to support a “post-sale duty to warn in the † Kenneth Ross is Of Counsel to Bowman and Brooke LLP and has been an adjunct professor at both William Mitchell College of Law in St. Paul, Minnesota and the University of Minnesota Law School. J. David Prince is a Professor of Law at William Mitchell College of Law and is Of Counsel to Larson King, LLP in St. Paul, Minnesota. Versions of Parts I through IX of this Article appeared in Kenneth Ross, Post-Sale Duty to Warn: A Critical Cause of Action, 26 N.
    [Show full text]
  • The Expansion of Fraud, Negligence, and Strict Tort Liability
    Michigan Law Review Volume 64 Issue 7 1966 Products Liability--The Expansion of Fraud, Negligence, and Strict Tort Liability John A. Sebert Jr. University of Michigan Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons, and the Torts Commons Recommended Citation John A. Sebert Jr., Products Liability--The Expansion of Fraud, Negligence, and Strict Tort Liability, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1350 (1966). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol64/iss7/10 This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. COMMENTS Products Liability-The Expansion of Fraud, Negligence, and Strict Tort Liability The advances in recent years in the field of products liability have probably outshone, in both number a~d significance, the prog­ ress during the same period in most other areas of the law. These rapid developments in the law of consumer protection have been marked by a consistent tendency to expand the liability· of manu­ facturers, retailers, and other members of the distributive chain for physical and economic harm caused by defective merchandise made available to the public. Some of the most notable progress has been made in the law of tort liability. A number of courts have adopted the principle that a manufacturer, retailer, or other seller1 of goods is answerable in tort to any user of his product who suffers injuries attributable to a defect in the merchandise, despite the seller's exer­ cise of reasonable care in dealing with the product and irrespective of the fact that no contractual relationship has ever existed between the seller and the victim.2 This doctrine of strict tort liability, orig­ inally enunciated by the California Supreme Court in Greenman v.
    [Show full text]