The Silk Road, Bitcoins and the Global Prohibition Regime on the International Trade in Illicit Drugs: Can This Storm Be Weathered?

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Silk Road, Bitcoins and the Global Prohibition Regime on the International Trade in Illicit Drugs: Can This Storm Be Weathered? The Silk Road, Bitcoins and the Global Prohibition Regime on the International Trade in Illicit Drugs: Can this Storm Be Weathered? Reza Raeesi Abstract: This paper examines the effects of the Silk Road on the global prohibition regime on the international trade in illicit drugs. Situating the FBI’s effort in shutting down the online illicit drugs black market, it is argued that The Silk Road represents a fundamental challenge to this global prohibition regime. The paper will look at how this challenge is shaped through the technological difficulties the complexities of The Silk Road has dealt law enforcement agencies and legislative bodies looking to regulate and expand this prohibition regime in the virtual world. It is also argued that the approach taken by law enforcement efforts in this regard is problematic and doomed to fail. Lastly, this paper looks at controlled samples of social media reactions to gage public response to this phenomenon in order to explain the lack of clear moral opprobrium against this type of criminal activity. Résumé : Cet essai examine les effets de la plateforme Silk Road sur le régime de prohibition globale du commerce international de drogues illicites. Localisant les efforts du FBI visant à fermer le marché noir en ligne de drogues, on reconnaît que Silk Road représente un défi fondamental au régime de prohibition globale. Cet essai explore ensuite les manières dont la technologie a façonné les tactiques et stratégies utilisées par les organismes d’application de la loi et les organes législatifs cherchant à réguler et à combattre ce monde illicite virtuel. Plus spécifiquement, on illustre la problématique de l’approche transparaissant des efforts d’application de la loi à cet égard, argumentant ainsi qu’elle soit vouée à l’échec. Enfin, cet essai analyse des échantillons contrôlés des réactions sur les médias sociaux afin de mesurer la réponse du public à ce phénomène et d’expliquer le manque d’opprobre moral clair contre ce type d’activité criminelle. 2 The global prohibition regime on the international trade in illicit drugs is a relatively recent phenomenon. This regime finds its origins in the early twentieth century and is a part of the broader system of international norms and regulations arising from American hegemony and is historically without precedent. Conversely, the historical Silk Road traversed much of the ancient known world and connected civilizations through trade for centuries. Merchants from across the world travelled safely, for the most part, on this road and took part in a vibrant globalized trade. Centuries later, a new Silk Road was allegedly created by 29 year-old Mr. Ross William Ulbricht, the self-styled Dread Pirate Roberts.1 The Silk Road relevant to this discussion is a web page that cannot be accessed through routine means. This black market trading in illicit drugs is placed within the Dark Web, in a deeper layer of the Internet than the one accessed through regular URLs used by majority of the websites. During its two-and- a-half year run, the “E-bay of illicit drugs”2 facilitated more than $1 billion in transactions, according to the FBI.3 Utilizing the crypto-currency Bitcoin, it protected all financial transactions from the watchful eye of the anti-money laundering checks and balances. It also utilized Tor, an Internet browser ironically created by the US government, which can grant access to the Dark Web. I set out to analyse how such technological advances challenge law enforcement. To do so I will answer the ‘why’ and ‘how’; Firstly why there is a potential within such technology to present a challenge and secondly, how is law enforcement confronted and responding. Since this response to the drug trade is the centerpiece of the global prohibition regime on the international trade in illicit drugs, any attempt to analyze the law enforcement’s responses to such phenomenon must include a critique of this regime as well. 1 Alex Konrad, "Feds Say They've Arrested 'Dread Pirate Roberts,' Shut Down His Black Market 'The Silk Road'," Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexkonrad/2013/10/02/feds-shut-down-silk-road-owner-known-as- dread-pirate-roberts-arrested/. 2 Joshua Kopstein, "How Ebay of Illegal Drugs Came Undone," http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/elements/2013/10/fbi-silk-road-ross-ulbricht-allegations-arrest.html. 3 Konrad, "Feds Say They've Arrested 'Dread Pirate Roberts,' Shut Down His Black Market 'The Silk Road'". 3 I will argue that the modern Silk Road and similar apparatus have placed unrivalled pressure on the regime’s underpinnings. I will attempt this analysis in two steps. Firstly, I will develop the context and background of the subject and a review of the literature. Secondly, I will present relevant conceptual tools such as anti-sovereignty4 in Dark Web, nomadic capitalism and criminal business5, the uniqueness of The Silk Road in limiting possible demand focused law enforcement efforts, and the global regime of prohibition of international trade in illicit drugs.6 I will also survey Twitter in an attempt to gauge cultural trends in responses to The Silk Road and another similar case and consequently analyse the findings. Relying on these, I will attempt to build a case outlining the ways in which technologically intricate tools such as The Silk Road and Bitcoin present tremendous challenges to the enforcement arms of this global regime. Background The Silk Road, Tor and Dark Web The simplest way to explain The Silk Road to the uninitiated would be to say that it is the e- Bay of illicit drugs. To understand The Silk Road, however, one must look to the technological platforms it utilizes. The Silk Road is inaccessible to anyone not using the Tor browser and relying on conventional software. Tor was created by the Swedish and American governments in a US Naval research laboratory and eventually released in 2001.7 It was created primarily for privacy of communication and leaves no trace of virtual activity. It has important legitimate uses such as inter-governmental and classified communication as well as providing safe communication channels to non-governmental organizations and their staff in 4 Ronen Palan, "Crime and the global political economy," ed. H Richard Friman (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 35-62. 5 R. Palan, The Offshore World: Sovereign Markets, Virtual Places, and Nomad Millionaires (Cornell University Press, 2006). 133. 6 Frank Madsen, Transnational organized crime, vol. 34 (Taylor & Francis, 2009). 12-36. 7 Tor Project, "Uses for Tor," Tor Project, https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en. 4 high-risk situations.8 Tor differs from conventional browsers in its transmission methods. Every Tor user becomes a “node” in the network and traffic is bounced through at least three such nodes before reaching its destination. When the browser of a prospective buyer attempts to contact The Silk Road server, these nodes set up a virtual meeting point within the Tor network so that the two parties can communicate while keeping IP addresses and digital footprints hidden from third parties as well as anyone involved. The Silk Road is only one of such websites being used to perpetuate illicit activity. This part of the internet is commonly known as the Dark Web, a phrase that refers to content that is not accessible or indexed by search engines like Google.9 An important part of the Dark Web is the “Hidden Wiki”, a Wikipedia type webpage that has a collection of links to the websites active in the Dark Web. The Silk Road is only one of the vendors in this market; links on the “Hidden Wiki” include avenues for child pornography, murder for hire, counterfeit money and other illicit websites.10 The Dark Web is indeed a dark place. Though in all fairness, The Silk Road’s seller’s guide clearly mentions: “Do not list anything who's purpose is to harm or defraud, such as stolen items or info, stolen credit cards, counterfeit currency, personal info, assassinations, and weapons of any kind. Do not list anything related to pedophilia.” The guide also outlines a detailed description of an expectation of a high standard in customer service.11 Although Tor and the Dark Web have been subject to NSA, FBI and United States Secret Service enforcement efforts and heavy monitoring12, Tor has continually provided 8 Ibid. 9 Alex Wright, "Exploring a 'deep Web' that Google can't grasp," New York Times 23 (2009). 10 This has drawn reactions from the “hacktivist” group Anonymous. In 2011, they took down the objectionable website as part of Anonymous’ Operation Dark net, an anti-child-pornography effort aimed at thwarting child pornographers operating on the Tor network. http://arstechnica.com/business/2011/10/anonymous-takes-down- darknet-child-porn-site-on-tor-network/ 11 Andy Greenberg, "Collected Quotations Of The Dread Pirate Roberts, Founder Of Underground Drug Site Silk Road And Radical Libertarian," Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/04/29/collected- quotations-of-the-dread-pirate-roberts-founder-of-the-drug-site-silk-road-and-radical-libertarian/3/. 12 Committe on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and Promises of Virtual Currencies, 18th November 2013 2013. 5 exceptional anonymity . “More brazen than anything else by light-years” is how U.S. Senator Charles Schumer characterized The Silk Road when it first hit the US legislators’ radar.13 This sense of security has been key for The Silk Road users who, assured by these intricate tools, were part of a thriving illicit market until the FBI succeeded in shutting down the website for one month14 following the arrest of the man behind it all.
Recommended publications
  • Privacy in Atlantis*
    Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Volume 18, Number 1 Fall 2004 PRIVACY IN ATLANTIS* Jerry Kang & Benedikt Buchner** TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION.................................................................................230 SCENE I: PRIVACY’S FORM...............................................................231 A. Market-Talk..............................................................................231 B. Dignity-Talk .............................................................................234 SCENE II: PRIVACY’S SUBSTANCE....................................................236 A. The Core Similarities ...............................................................237 1. Dignity’s Consent (or the Market’s Initial Allocation) .........237 2. Data Protection Regulations (or Intangible Property Regulations) ....................................................................240 B. Too Little Control.....................................................................244 1. The Problem: Hard Choices ..................................................244 2. The Response: Fortifying the Individual...............................246 C. Too Much Control....................................................................251 1. The Problem: Societal Overrides ..........................................251 2. The Response: Interest Balancing .........................................252 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................255 APPENDIX .........................................................................................257
    [Show full text]
  • Is Bitcoin Really Untethered?
    THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE • VOL. LXXV, NO. 4 • AUGUST 2020 Is Bitcoin Really Untethered? JOHN M. GRIFFIN and AMIN SHAMS∗ ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether Tether, a digital currency pegged to the U.S. dollar, influenced Bitcoin and other cryptocurrency prices during the 2017 boom. Using al- gorithms to analyze blockchain data, we find that purchases with Tether are timed following market downturns and result in sizable increases in Bitcoin prices. The flow is attributable to one entity, clusters below round prices, induces asymmetric auto- correlations in Bitcoin, and suggests insufficient Tether reserves before month-ends. Rather than demand from cash investors, these patterns are most consistent with the supply-based hypothesis of unbacked digital money inflating cryptocurrency prices. INNOVATION, EXCESSIVE SPECULATION, AND DUBIOUS behavior are often closely linked. Periods of extreme price increases followed by implosion, commonly known as “bubbles,” are often associated with legitimate inventions, technolo- gies, or opportunities. However, they can be carried to excess. In particu- lar, financial bubbles often coincide with the belief that a rapid gain can be ∗John M. Griffin is at the McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin. Amin Shams is at the Fisher College of Business, Ohio State University. Helpful comments were received from Stefan Nagel (the editor); an associate editor; two anonymous referees; Cesare Fracassi; Sam Kruger; Shaun MaGruder; Gregor Matvos; Nikolai Roussanov; Clemens Sialm; and seminar and conference
    [Show full text]
  • Cryptocurrency: the Economics of Money and Selected Policy Issues
    Cryptocurrency: The Economics of Money and Selected Policy Issues Updated April 9, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R45427 SUMMARY R45427 Cryptocurrency: The Economics of Money and April 9, 2020 Selected Policy Issues David W. Perkins Cryptocurrencies are digital money in electronic payment systems that generally do not require Specialist in government backing or the involvement of an intermediary, such as a bank. Instead, users of the Macroeconomic Policy system validate payments using certain protocols. Since the 2008 invention of the first cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, cryptocurrencies have proliferated. In recent years, they experienced a rapid increase and subsequent decrease in value. One estimate found that, as of March 2020, there were more than 5,100 different cryptocurrencies worth about $231 billion. Given this rapid growth and volatility, cryptocurrencies have drawn the attention of the public and policymakers. A particularly notable feature of cryptocurrencies is their potential to act as an alternative form of money. Historically, money has either had intrinsic value or derived value from government decree. Using money electronically generally has involved using the private ledgers and systems of at least one trusted intermediary. Cryptocurrencies, by contrast, generally employ user agreement, a network of users, and cryptographic protocols to achieve valid transfers of value. Cryptocurrency users typically use a pseudonymous address to identify each other and a passcode or private key to make changes to a public ledger in order to transfer value between accounts. Other computers in the network validate these transfers. Through this use of blockchain technology, cryptocurrency systems protect their public ledgers of accounts against manipulation, so that users can only send cryptocurrency to which they have access, thus allowing users to make valid transfers without a centralized, trusted intermediary.
    [Show full text]
  • Cryptocurrency and the Blockchain: Technical Overview and Potential Impact on Commercial Child Sexual Exploitation
    Cryptocurrency and the BlockChain: Technical Overview and Potential Impact on Commercial Child Sexual Exploitation Prepared for the Financial Coalition Against Child Pornography (FCACP) and the International Centre for Missing & Exploited Children (ICMEC) by Eric Olson and Jonathan Tomek, May 2017 Foreword The International Centre for Missing & Exploited Children (ICMEC) advocates, trains and collaborates to eradicate child abduction, sexual abuse and exploitation around the globe. Collaboration – one of the pillars of our work – is uniquely demonstrated by the Financial Coalition Against Child Pornography (FCACP), which was launched in 2006 by ICMEC and the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children. The FCACP was created when it became evident that people were using their credit cards to buy images of children being sexually abused online. Working alongside law enforcement, the FCACP followed the money to disrupt the economics of the child pornography business, resulting in the virtual elimination of the use of credit cards in the United States for the purchase of child sexual abuse content online. And while that is a stunning accomplishment, ICMEC and the FCACP are mindful of the need to stay vigilant and continue to fight those who seek to profit from the sexual exploitation of children. It is with this in mind that we sought to research cryptocurrencies and the role they play in commercial sexual exploitation of children. This paper examines several cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, and the Blockchain architecture that supports them. It provides a summary of the underground and illicit uses of the currencies, as well as the ramifications for law enforcement and industry. ICMEC is extremely grateful to the authors of this paper – Eric Olson and Jonathan Tomek of LookingGlass Cyber Solutions.
    [Show full text]
  • Cybersecurity-The Silk Road Market
    City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works Open Educational Resources Hostos Community College 2020 Cybersecurity-The Silk Road Market Amy J. Ramson CUNY Hostos Community College How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/ho_oers/7 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] CYBERSECURITY: SILK ROAD MARKET These slides describe an account of how the Department of JusEce through the FBI and DEA successfully brought the mastermind, Ross Ulbricht, behind the DARK WEB drug bazaar, SILK ROAD, to jusEce Silk Road Professor Amy Ramson, Esq. This OER material was produced as a result of the PIT-UN network Challenge Grant – New America Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License Ulbricht-head of the Silk Road market Ø Ross Ulbricht was born on March 27, 1984 Ø Ulbricht created the Silk Road website in 2011 Ø Ulbricht earned millions of dollars in profits from the commissions collected on purchases Ø Around January 2012, he adopted the username Dread Pirate Roberts referring to the pirate in the popular novel and film The Princess Bride that is passed to whom ever was wearing the mask Ø In order to assure users that posts from by DPR were his own, DPR authenEcated his posts using an electronic signature known as a PGP key. Ø See explanaon of PGP key signature authenEcaon on next slide PGP electronic signature authenEcaon Ø When sending digital signatures, PGP uses an algorithm that generates a hash (a mathemacal summary) which is encrypted with the sender's private key Ø The receiver uses the sender's public key to decrypt the hash code.
    [Show full text]
  • How Bitcoin Functions As Property Law Eric D
    College of William & Mary Law School William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans 2019 How Bitcoin Functions As Property Law Eric D. Chason William & Mary Law School, [email protected] Repository Citation Chason, Eric D., "How Bitcoin Functions As Property Law" (2019). Faculty Publications. 1896. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1896 Copyright c 2019 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs How Bitcoin Functions As Property Law Eric D. Chason* Bitcoin replicates many of the formal aspects of real estate transactions. Bitcoin transactions have features that closely resemble grantor names, grantee names, legal descriptions, and signatures found in real property deeds. While these “Bitcoin deeds” may be interesting, they are not profound. Bitcoin goes beyond creating simple digital deeds, however, and replicates important institutional aspects of real estate transactions, in particular recordation and title assurance. Deeds to real property are recorded in a central repository (e.g., the public records office), which the parties (and the public) can search to determine title. When one grantor executes more than one deed covering the same property, recordation acts (race, notice, and race-notice) determine which grantee wins. The Bitcoin blockchain replicates the public records office, giving anyone with a computer the ability to see any Bitcoin transaction. Bitcoin mining replicates the recording of deeds, a process by which formally valid transactions between two parties become essentially a public record. When one grantor executes more than one transaction covering the same Bitcoin, a miner determines which grantee wins simply by moving one transaction to the blockchain before the others.
    [Show full text]
  • The Legal Status and Regulation of Bitcoin in Australia
    The University of Notre Dame Australia ResearchOnline@ND Theses 2017 Future digital money: The legal status and regulation of bitcoin in Australia Chinelle van der Westhuizen Follow this and additional works at: https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/theses Part of the Law Commons COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Copyright Regulations 1969 WARNING The material in this communication may be subject to copyright under the Act. Any further copying or communication of this material by you may be the subject of copyright protection under the Act. Do not remove this notice. Publication Details van der Westhuizen, C. (2017). Future digital money: The legal status and regulation of bitcoin in Australia (Master of Laws (Thesis)). University of Notre Dame Australia. https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/theses/160 This dissertation/thesis is brought to you by ResearchOnline@ND. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses by an authorized administrator of ResearchOnline@ND. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The University of Notre Dame Australia School of Law FUTURE DIGITAL MONEY: THE LEGAL STATUS AND REGULATION OF BITCOIN IN AUSTRALIA Chinelle van der Westhuizen LLB, LLM (University of Pretoria) This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of Master of Laws by Research 2017 DECLARATION This thesis does not, to the best of my knowledge, contain previously published or written material by another person except where due reference is made in the text, or any material previously submitted for a degree in any higher degree institution. _________________________________ Chinelle van der Westhuizen _________________________________ Date i ACKNOWLDEGEMENTS First and foremost, I thank God for his abundant love and goodness throughout this research period and for Blessing me with the talents to endure such a challenging research project.
    [Show full text]
  • How Do Non-Poaching Agreements Distort Competition? the Rise of The
    Advancing economics in business April 2020 TheHow rise do non-poachingof the cryptoexchange giants: whatagreements next for distort trading competition? cryptocurrencies? The rise of the cryptoexchange giants: what next for trading cryptocurrencies? Contact How cryptocurrencies work Helen Ralston Partner Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are permissionless forms of blockchain technology that rely on a ‘proof of work’ concept to verify transactions. In such a system, transactions are verified by third parties (commonly referred to as ‘miners’) racing to be the first to solve a unique, complex mathematical problem that is specific to each transaction and the history of preceding transactions. The first miner to solve the problem records the answer in the decentralised blockchain along with Since the inception of Bitcoin over its private key, thereby lengthening the chain. If the network confirms that this is the a decade ago, trading in crypto- correct answer—by other miners also identifying the same solution—the first miner is currencies has exploded. There are rewarded with coins in the system. now thousands of cryptocurrencies and hundreds of cryptoexchanges to Three features of the system make it robust to fraud: first, transactions are verified on a consensus basis (i.e. the majority of the network must agree that the transaction is trade on, of which Binance is by far the correct). Second, the verification (mining) process is time- and energy-intensive and largest. What is the secret of the few intentionally difficult to solve. Third, all transactions are linked, such that if someone big cryptoexchanges, and is the high wanted to change an earlier transaction they would need to redo all the subsequent number of smaller cryptoexchanges mining and do so before the rest of the network approved the next block.
    [Show full text]
  • Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code Jeanne L
    University of Miami Law School Institutional Repository University of Miami Business Law Review 6-1-2016 Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code Jeanne L. Schroeder Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Commercial Law Commons Recommended Citation Jeanne L. Schroeder, Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 1 (2016) Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr/vol24/iss3/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Business Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code Jeanne L. Schroeder* Much of the discussion of bitcoin in the popular press has concentrated on its status as a currency. Putting aside a vocal minority of radical libertarians and anarchists, however, many bitcoin enthusiasts are concentrating on how its underlying technology – the blockchain – can be put to use for wide variety of uses. For example, economists at the Fed and other central banks have suggested that they should encourage the evolution of bitcoin’s blockchain protocol which might allow financial transactions to clear much efficiently than under our current systems. As such, it also holds out the possibility of becoming that holy grail of commerce – a payment system that would eliminate or minimize the roles of third party intermediaries. In addition, the NASDAQ and a number of issuers are experimenting with using the blockchain to record the issuing and trading of investments securities.
    [Show full text]
  • United States District Court Southern District of Florida
    Case 9:18-cv-80176-BB Document 277 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/27/2019 Page 1 of 29 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CASE NO. 18-CIV-80176-Bloom/Reinhart IRA KLEIMAN, as personal representative of the estate of David Kleiman, and W&K INFO DEFENSE RESEARCH, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. CRAIG WRIGHT, Defendant. ___________________________________/ ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL [DE 210]1 This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, DE 210, and the Court’s Order dated June 14, 2019. DE 217. The Court has considered the totality of the docketed filings, including all pleadings referenced herein and transcripts of all cited court proceedings. As the judicial officer who presided at the relevant proceedings, I retain a current and independent recollection of the events discussed below. I have reviewed all of the exhibits introduced into the record at the evidentiary hearing, including the deposition excerpts filed in the record. See DE 270. Finally, I have carefully considered the arguments of counsel. The Court is fully advised and this matter is ripe for decision. The Court announced its ruling from the bench on August 26, 1 Magistrate judges may issue an order on any “pretrial matter not dispositive of a party's claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). “Thus, magistrate judges have jurisdiction to enter sanctions orders for discovery failures which do not strike claims, completely preclude defenses or generate litigation-ending consequences.” Wandner v. Am. Airlines, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1295 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (J.
    [Show full text]
  • Deepweb and Cybercrime It’S Not All About TOR
    A Trend Micro Research Paper Deepweb and Cybercrime It’s Not All About TOR Vincenzo Ciancaglini, Marco Balduzzi, Max Goncharov, and Robert McArdle Forward-Looking Threat Research Team Trend Micro | Deepweb and Cybercrime Contents Abstract ..................................................................................................................................................3 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................3 Overview of Existing Deepweb Networks ......................................................................................5 TOR ............................................................................................................................................5 I2P ...............................................................................................................................................6 Freenet .......................................................................................................................................7 Alternative Domain Roots ......................................................................................................7 Cybercrime in the TOR Network .......................................................................................................9 TOR Marketplace Overview ..................................................................................................9 TOR Private Offerings ..........................................................................................................14
    [Show full text]
  • How Did Dread Pirate Roberts Acquire and Protect His Bitcoin Wealth?
    How Did Dread Pirate Roberts Acquire and Protect His Bitcoin Wealth? Dorit Ron and Adi Shamir Department of Computer Science and Applied Mathematics, The Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel {dorit.ron,adi.shamir}@weizmann.ac.il Abstract. The Bitcoin scheme is one of the most popular and talked about alternative payment schemes. It was conceived in 2008 by the mysterious Satoshi Nakamoto, whose real identity remains unknown even though his bitcoin holdings are believed to be worth several hundred million dollars. One of the most active parts of the Bitcoin ecosystem was the Silk Road marketplace, in which highly illegal substances and services were traded. It was run by another mysterious person who called himself Dread Pirate Roberts (DPR), whose bitcoin holdings are also estimated to be worth hundreds of millions of dollars at today's exchange rate. On October 1-st 2013, the FBI arrested a 29 year old person named Ross William Ulbricht, claiming that he is DPR, and seizing a small fraction of his bitcoin wealth. In this paper we use the publicly available record to trace the evolution of his holdings in order to find how he acquired and how he tried to hide them from the authorities. For example, we show that all his income from the months of May, June and September 2013, along with numerous other amounts, were not seized by the FBI. One of the most surprising discoveries we made during our analysis was the existence of a recent substantial transfer (which was worth more than 60,000 dollars when made on March 20-th 2013, and close to a million dollars at today's exchange rate) which may link these two mysterious figures.
    [Show full text]