Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center
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UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED T Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center HSTC Intelligence Note Tenancingo Bulletin #7: Building Trust to Diminish Trafficking HSTC 2011010013 January 10, 2011 UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED 1 UNCLASSIFIED (CONTEXT STATEMENT: The information in this report was provided by the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC) in collaboration with the participating agencies of the HSTC. The HSTC is an interagency fusion center and information clearinghouse, composed of representatives from various governmental agencies, and focused on matters of human smuggling, human trafficking, and the facilitation of terrorist travel. The HSTC provides the U.S. Government with a mechanism to achieve greater integration and overall effectiveness in its efforts to eliminate these activities. The HSTC is unique among U.S. organizations and centers in that it concentrates on illicit worldwide travel and provides guidance to U.S. Government policymakers.) Scope Note: This is the seventh in a series of bulletins at the unclassified level based solely on open source reporting intended to inform federal, state, and local law enforcement about the Tlaxcala, Mexico-based sex trafficking network with ties to the U.S. (U) Building Trust to Diminish Trafficking (U) Tlaxcala state, Mexico is known for high levels of official corruption and low government accountability. The inability to provide effective law enforcement in response to a documented trafficking problem has decimated Tlaxcalan citizens’ trust in government. Until Tlaxcalan authorities provide effective prosecution for these crimes, the state will remain a trafficking hub. In spite of Tlaxcalan authorities’ longstanding abuses, the state could benefit from concrete short and long-term measures to increase trust and accountability, setting up a virtuous cycle that bolsters the effective government provision of security. (U) Authorities’ Complicity Keeps Traffickers in Business (U) Tlaxcala is the third-most corrupt state in Mexico, according to Transparency Mexico's 2007 survey, with nearby Puebla, a major Tlaxcalan trafficking recruitment ground, just one place behind.1 Tlaxcalan government kick-backs are institutionalized in the local language, with officials skimming a standard 10 percent fee, known as a diezmo, for basic transactions, and the level of government abuse and misuse is recognized and condemned by the Catholic dioceses of Tlaxcala.2, 3 Mexican media sources highlighted corruption within the state environment ministry, agriculture ministry, and health services, just during the month of October.4,5,6 (U) According to Tlaxcala-focused non-profit Centro Fray Julián Garcés, numerous Tlaxcalan organizations have denounced trafficking crimes since 2005, without any improvement in trafficking or prosecution trends.7 Complicity between pimps and law enforcement authorities explains how such a well know sex trafficking enterprise remains unchecked, according to a Mexican anthropologist expert on Tlaxcala trafficking.8 (U) Crimes go Unreported and Curb Much-Needed Opportunity (U) Fear of retaliation from authorities who are aware of crimes, but do not act in accordance with Mexican law, makes citizens less likely to report and crimes less likely to be prosecuted. Tlaxcala and several southern states evidence societal stresses that UNCLASSIFIED 2 UNCLASSIFIED make them more vulnerable to corruption, including a higher presence of poverty, minority ethnic groups, and economic inequality. When officials’ efforts to investigate, detect, and respond to trafficking crimes do not effectively enforce Mexican law, a fragile situation of limited public trust and spiraling government ineptitude results.9 (U) This culturally and historically imbedded corruption reproduces inequalities of wealth and privilege and perpetuates opportunities and incentives for further abuses. 10 Corruption discourages investors, thereby reducing growth and economic opportunity, and assuring that Tlaxcala remains a state of poor, uneducated potential victims and poor, easily enticed prospective traffickers. 11 (U) Opportunity Analysis: Where to Grow Trust and Rule of Law (U) Tlaxcalans can build trust through the provision of basic services -- in this case, the rule of law -- in credible and demonstrable ways that gradually rebalance the stresses on and capabilities of the state, thereby changing citizens’ expectations of government, improving law enforcement institutions, and raising citizen participation. Tlaxcala must boost its capability to deliver and be seen publically delivering law enforcement in these notorious trafficking crimes.12 (U) In the short-term, Tlaxcala might build public expectations and strengthen the links between citizens and the state through effective public messaging, evaluations of the provision of government security services, and incentives when law enforcement objectives are achieved. Concrete tactics could include: - (U) Framing corruption control in terms of fighting poverty and improving quality of life, thereby emphasizing the connection between reform and citizens’ interests; - (U) Conducting and publishing regular performance reviews that make non- governmental and citizen input central; - (U) Publically citing and rewarding officials responsible for improved performance and requiring those who do not deliver to account for their results; - (U) Allocating resources to reward agencies and jurisdictions. Since trafficking crimes are not equally acute nor responses equally strong throughout Mexico, authorities might design measures of law enforcement anti-trafficking efforts to be regionally specific. The U.S. non-profit Polaris Project provides one model which rates U.S. states according to trafficking, asset forfeiture laws, officer training, victim assistance, among other anti-trafficking law enforcement indicators.13 The federal government might implement a race to the top of Mexican states toughest on trafficking; UNCLASSIFIED 3 UNCLASSIFIED (U) To dislodge a deeply imbedded culture of government incompetence and malfeasance, Tlaxcala might continue officials’ and citizens’ transparency training. This could include the establishment and/or amplification of: - (U) Law enforcement officer and judiciary training to enhance professionalism, independence, and credibility; and - (U) Transparency curriculums in schools and workplaces. The Tlaxcala University created some foundations with its, "Don't keep quiet. Speak out," campaign encouraging whistleblowers and its business sector and teacher transparency training initiatives.14,15,16 (U) The implementation and publically visible results of any number of these steps would provide real evidence to government officials that reform is underway – convincing them that “the train has left the station” –dis-incentivising a return to shady practices and beginning a virtuous cycle of gradually increasing trust and transparency. (U) To the contrary, without reliable enforcement of Mexican trafficking laws in Tlaxcala, citizen mistrust in government will serve only to exacerbate the state’s security woes. Absent concerted plans to grow Tlaxcalan public trust and government anti-trafficking accountability, the root ills of economic inequality and lack of opportunity will persist. Sustained corruption reduction requires “bringing state and society closer together, fostering trust, … persuading citizens that they can act effectively and showing leaders that citizens are ready and able to do so,” according to a leading global anti-corruption scholar. 17 Growing such state - society links of accountability and trust will be a prerequisite to any program that curbs the trafficking impunity in Tlaxcala. 1(U) Transparency Mexico, "Índice Nacional de Corrupción y Buen Gobierno 2007," http://www.transparenciamexicana.org.mx/documentos/INCBG/2007/INCBGporEntidad2007.pdf, accessed 5 November 2010. 2(U) e consulta, "La corrupción en el gobierno," 28 November 2008, http://www.e- consulta.com/tlaxcala/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7426&Itemid=77, accessed 5 November 2010. 3(U) Diocesis de Tlaxcala, "Corrupción, todos responsables," http://www.diocesisdetlaxcala.org.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=958&Itemid=990 , accessed 5 November 2010. 4(U) Pulso, "Acusan a titular de CGE de fomentar nepotismo y corrupción, durante comparecencia," 28 October 2010, http://www.pulso.ws/periodico/index.php/elecciones-2010/9390-cge, accessed 5 November 2010. 5(U) E Consulta, "Hay corrupción en Tlaxcala por falta de planeación en el sector salud: PRD", 25 October 2010, http://www.econsulta.com/tlaxcala/index.php?Itemid=126&id=19932&option=com_content&task=view, accessed 5 November 2010. 6(U) El Universal, “Corrupción florece en los invernaderos," 25 October 2010, http://www.inforural.com.mx/noticias.php?&id_rubrique=339&id_article=65992, accessed 5 November 2010. 7(U) CIMAC, “En cada rincón de la República se comete el delito de trata,” 23 September 2010, UNCLASSIFIED 4 UNCLASSIFIED http://www.cimacnoticias.com/site/index.php?id=44344&print=1&no_cache=1, accessed 5 November 2010. 8(U) Inmujeres, “Trata de Personas: Padrotes, iniciacion, y modus operandi,” July 2009, http://cedoc.inmujeres.gob.mx/documentos_download/101080.pdf, accessed 29 October 2010. 9(U) World Bank, World Development Report, Johnston, Michael, “First, Do No Harm – Then, Build Trust: Anti-Corruption Strategies in Fragile Situations,” September 2010. 10(U) Asian Institute of Management, Johnston, Michael, “Political and Social Foundations for Reform: Anti-Corruption