The Bosnian Refugee Crisis A Comparative Study of German and Austrian Reactions and Responses Joelle Hageboutros Often labeled as the most deadly cri- European country at 320,000, while Aus- sis in Europe since WWII, the Yugoslav tria admitted the second highest amongst Wars (1991-2002) were a series of ethnic all non-Yugoslavian European countries conflicts that facilitated the collapse of the at 86,500.(Valenta, 2011, 4)The Yugoslav fragile Yugoslav federation created under wars, and especially the Bosnian conflict, the Soviet model in 1946. One of these forced European states confronted with the conflicts, the Bosnian War (1992-1995), largest refugee crisis since WWII, to revise was described by US assistant Secretary of their asylum policies, specify their vague State Richard Holbroke as, \The greatest regulations on refugees, and attempt to de- failure of the West since the 1930s."(Lamb, velop a unified policy in response to the 2005) During the conflict in which Bosnian pressing issue. Serbs waged an aggressive campaign of eth- nic cleansing targeting Muslim (Bosniak) A study of the response of the two and Croat populations, many of the es- aforementioned host countries strongly af- timated 1.4 million Bosnian refugees fled fected by the Bosnian crisis will help to ex- to other former Yugoslav republics, where plain integration prospects and realities of they were subsequently subjected to more the Bosnian refugee communities in both ethnic conflict and violence.(Ministry of In- countries. On a larger scale, it will illu- terior of the Republic of Slovenia, 2007) minate the policy decisions of Germany, An estimated 650,000 refugees were able to Austria, and the EU as a whole regard- reach European countries beyond the for- ing the current Syrian refugee crisis. This mer Yugoslavia and became the first group case will also serve as a means of under- to acquire \temporary protection" in EU standing the responsibility liberal demo- states as well as in states preparing to cratic states have vis-`a-visrefugees and the join the EU, such as Austria which ac- means by which states are able to balance ceded in 1995.(Valenta, 2011, 2)Germany the needs and expectations of its citizens accepted the most refugees out of any and refugees.(Gibney, 1999, 175) Explaining the Case Studies While Germany and Austria took in the ning of the Bosnian crisis, diverged by the most refugees in proportion to their popu- end. lations, they both initially had fierce anti- This study analyzes Germany and Aus- immigration policies and no intention to tria because they are historically and lin- provide immediate permanent residency or guistically linked and share similar cultur- resettlement programs. However, Ger- ally conservative values on the topic of im- many was able to repatriate around 75% migration. They also both have compa- of Bosnian refugees by 2005, while Austria rable waves of post-war migration, espe- only repatriated less than 10%.(Valenta, cially with regards to the large Turkish 2011, 4) This study thus seeks to explain migrant communities and smaller Bosnian why the migration policies of Germany and economic migrant groups initially permit- Austria, which were initially aligned in ted to enter as \guest workers" until the their anti-immigration goals at the begin- mid-1970s.(Kraler, 2011, 21-22) At the 51 Joelle Hageboutros time of the crisis, both German and Aus- stigma of the Nazi-era politics. This adds trian citizenship were based heavily on another layer of intrigue to the puzzle, as jus sanguinis, which negatively impacted Austria would be expected to have imple- access to citizenship for Bosnian migrant mented more anti-immigration legislation populations.(Brubaker, 1992, 52) While with such a right-wing force in Parliament. both countries witnessed a large growth While these two states are generally com- in foreign-born populations in the post- parable, it is also important to note sev- war era and an increase in asylum appli- eral distinctions that could assist in un- cations in the late 1980s and early 1990s, derstanding policy divergences. Germany they were reluctant to label their respective is a much larger and more densely pop- countries as immigration states.(Jandl & ulated country than Austria (at the time Kraler, 2003) These similarities only serve of the crisis, Germany's population aver- to further highlight the paradoxical gaps aged around 80 million, while Austria's was between both countries' policy intentions slightly under 8 million). It also wields a and realities. greater political and economic clout on the continent, which influenced the degree of Germany and Austria are both feder- autonomy it had with respect to its pol- alist republics comprised of sixteen and icy development and implementation. An- nine states (l¨ander), respectively and other distinction from Austria is that in the share similar Parliamentary political sys- 1990s, Germany was struggling with the so- tems. Additionally, Austria traditionally cial, political, and economic effects of re- has right-wing populist-party representa- unification in addition to the mass influx tion in Parliament (The Freedom Party of Yugoslavian refugees. The compounded or FPO),¨ whereas the German equivalent effects of these challenges in Germany will (pro-Deutschland) has never been able to be further analyzed in relation to the de- enter the German parliament due to the velopment of Bosnian refugee policies. Methodology On a theoretical level, this study aims vergence and divergence in Germany and to understand the initial large influxes Austria. Particular attention is paid to of refugees in both countries by us- international press coverage of the crisis, ing three theoretical models (impartial- namely from the New York Times, the Los ist, partialist, humanitarianist) to ex- Angeles Times, and Radio Free Europe. plain these states' responses to Bosnian The following analysis first situates refugees.(Singer, 1972; Walzer, 1983; Gib- Germany and Austria's specific policies in ney, 1999) The study also examines the in- the general European context of refugee fluence of far-right parties and pro-migrant policy development during the post-war interest groups in determining state policy years leading up to the Yugoslavian cri- towards refugees and citizenship in order sis in 1991. Then, the stated objectives to explain the divergence in German and and policy implementations of Germany Austrian policies. On an empirical level, and Austria's \temporary protection" pro- UNHCR data will provide a background on grams for Bosnians are analyzed in the the refugee statistics in both countries and context of both countries' decision making their demographic concentrations through- bodies and relevant interest groups that af- out the two countries. This study also fected the course of domestic politics. Fi- employs academic sources on the histori- nally, broader implications of Germany and cal development of asylum policies in Ger- Austria's policies are highlighted in order many and Austria and analyzes news cov- to illuminate Europe's current approach erage and political debates in order to trace towards the Syrian crisis. the path of asylum and refugee policy con- The Bosnian Refugee Crisis 52 Historical Development of Post-War Europe Refugee Policies Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of trated by private groups would not con- Human Rights, adopted by the United Na- stitute asylum.(Franz, 2010, 33-34) By the tions in 1948, states that \everyone has the time of the Bosnian crisis, Germany, Aus- right to seek and enjoy in other countries tria, and their Western European neigh- asylum from persecution."(United Nations, bors had come to narrowly define what con- 1948) While this was the first international stituted a refugee and tightened their asy- recognition of asylum as a human right, the lum laws. This was due to unprecedented duty of states granting asylum remained increases in asylum applications from indi- ambiguous. The 1951 Geneva Convention viduals and groups arriving from outside Relating to the Status of Refugees devel- of Europe starting in the 1980s. Many oped an official definition of a refugee and cases of fraudulent asylum were widely re- outlined, albeit in vague terms, state obli- ported regarding individuals using asylum gations to refugees. The subsequent 1967 as a means of fleeing North-South economic Protocol increased the scope of the 1951 disparities.(Koser & Black, 1999, 525) In convention (initially designed to protect relative terms, during the 1970s, asylum post-war European refugees) by universal- applications averaged at 30,000 per year, izing its applicability. The agreed upon while in the 1980s, they increased tenfold message was that states are legally obliged to 300,000 per year and more than dou- to offer asylum to those who have a \well- bled to 680,000 by 1992.(United Nations founded fear of being persecuted for rea- High Commissioner for Refugees, 1993, sons of race, religion, nationality, member- 3) Germany bore the majority of appli- ship of a particular social group or politi- cations as the amount of asylum claims cal opinion."(United Nations, 2010) States spiked from 121,000 in 1989 to 438,000 in are thus still under no duty to grant asy- 1992.(United Nations High Commissioner lum, but are obligated to admit refugees as for Refugees, 1993, 4) Additionally, follow- temporary residents.(Koser & Black, 1999, ing the collapse of the Soviet Union and 524) While there are no clearly delineated German reunification in 1990, what was obligations