An Analysis of Quota Conflicts in the Fishing Industry of the Western Cape – the Plight of the Small Scale Fisher Sector from 1994 to the Present Day.
By
M. A. GREEN
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Magister Philosophiae in Conflict Transformation and Management at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University.
March 2017
Supervisor: Prof Gavin Bradshaw
ABSTRACT
This treatise tracks the sequence of events that took place within the South African Fishing Industry post 1994, and focuses specifically on the plight of the small scale artisanal fisher sector, which operates in the in-shore and near-shore coastal waters of the Western and Southern Cape. In exploring this area of conflict, it focuses on the attempts of this sector to gain official recognition, sanction and inclusion in the country’s statutory framework. It is an intensive investigation into the activities of the various role players, being this fisher sector, various fishing bodies, the government and business, and through personal interactions with these stakeholders, a diverse set of perceptions and perspectives is detailed. Through the use of Participlan methodology, utilised in one-on-one interactions as well as focus group workshops, issues relating to the past, present and future are surfaced, leading to what the different entities believe to be a collective way forward. The dissertation concludes that there is a need for the three entities as defined, to communicate on a formalised basis in order to progress issues relating to the management, protection and sustainability of the in-shore and near-shore fish resources. It shows further that there is a desire and willingness across all these sectors to share ideas and thoughts in a structured environment to establish a common ground and to create a solution to resolve this conflict scenario. Specifically, the study illustrates that the small-scale artisanal fisher sector is a justifiable participant in the fishing industry, warranting recognition and inclusion as a distinct entity in the country’s Marine Living Resources Act.
2 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION: RATIONALE AND MOTIVATION 5
1.1 Area of focus 5 1.2 Definitions 6 1.3 Motivation for this study 8 1.4 Contextual background 9 1.5 Aims and objectives 43
Chapter 2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 45
2.1 Statement of the problem 45 2.2 Literature review 46 2.2.1 Local scenario 46 2.2.2 International scenario 50 2.2.3 Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) 56 2.2.4 Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQ) and Common Property Resources (CPR) 65 2.3 Literature study 69
Chapter 3 PERCEPTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF ROLE PLAYERS 70
Chapter 4 RESEARCH DESIGN 81
4.1 Demarcation and delimitation of research 81 4.2 Research methodology 82 4.2.1 Type of research 82 4.2.2 Research methods and techniques 82 4.3 Population frame 85 4.4 Reliability and validity 85
3 4.5 Type of sample 87 4.5.1 Sample size and selection 87 4.6 Data collection 88 4.7 Data analysis 88 4.8 Ethical and political considerations 89
Chapter 5 OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS 91
Chapter 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 113
LIST OF SOURCES 122
APPENDIX ONE: Participlan™ Process 138
APPENDIX TWO: Participlan™ Questions 144
4 Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION: RATIONALE AND MOTIVATION
This section covers the underlying principles and reasons for undertaking the research, and includes the background and therefore build-up to the discordant situation of today. It also deals with the aims and objectives of the project, as well as the research hypothesis.
1.1 Area of focus
The field of this research is limited to the harvesting of natural resources obtainable from the seas of South Africa, and more specifically those species prevalent within an area known as in-shore or near-shore, in the coastal waters of the Western and Southern Cape. This procurement process is controlled in the main through government enforced quotas based on Total Allowable Catches (TAC) per fish or marine specie. There is one fish specie however (the Cape Snoek) that is not restricted by an industry TAC; the rationale for its exclusion will be covered later in the text.
The specific area of focus of the research is on the equity of resource allocation amongst the various role players in the industry within the confines of quota allocation, and the methods put in place by government organs to effect due process. It further covers the issue of man’s inalienable right to harvest what is considered a freely available resource, and the resultant conflict that ensues when ‘free access’ is denied.
In particular, the key focus is specifically on the situation or rather plight of the artisanal fishers of the Western and Southern Cape coasts. Prior to the introduction of the Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA) of 1998, this community was part of a collective which post 1994 enjoyed what was known as a Community Quota. It was the classifications entrenched in the MRLA that were cause for the predicament of the artisanal fishers – they were a category of fishers that were not accommodated.
5 Previous research into the field of the in-shore fishing communities, has addressed areas such as the empowering of regional fishing communities through a proposed share-holding scheme (Isaacs 1999), and the conflict surrounding these communities and the South African Fishing Industry. A further study undertaken by Witbooi (2002) explored the issue of legitimising subsistence fishing in South Africa, and specifically addressed the balance between the sustainability of the resource and the economic and social rights of the community. A specific study of the artisanal fisher community operating along the Western and Southern Cape coast is a more concentrated approach to a dynamic situation, currently unfolding on our shores.
1.2 Definitions
An aspect that has been the source of confusion over the last number of years, is the definitions of the various role players in the in-shore fishing sector. For example, the definition of subsistence fishers in the MLRA, whilst recognising this sector for the first time, distinctly categorises these fishers as those who do NOT sell their catch, in whole or part. This subsequently was changed through the involvement of the Subsistence Fisheries Task Group (SFTG), a body set up by the government in December 1998, their purpose being to ‘provide recommendations with regard to systems for managing subsistence fisheries’ (Government Gazette 2006). The SFTG included in the definition the words ‘or sell their harvest to end users locally to meet their basic needs’.
In a class action in the Equality Court and High Court (SCA Case no: 437/2005 Equality Court no: EC1/2005f), an independent non-governmental agency known as Masifundise, used the following as descriptors for the various sectors within this community. Founded in 2001, the organisation works with small scale and traditional fishing and coastal communities on the West and South coast of the Western Cape.
6 Their definitions read as follows:
TRADITIONAL FISHERS – These are long established by specific communities that have developed customary patterns of rules and operations. Reflect cultural traits and influenced by religious practices or social customs. Knowledge is transmitted between generations by word of mouth. They are usually small-scale and/or artisanal.
SUBSISTENCE FISHERS – This is a category in which the catch shared directly by the families rather than selling to intermediaries, as defined in Section 1 of the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998.
SMALL-SCALE FISHERS – This is a labour-intensive group using relatively small crafts and limited capital. Family-owned, and may be commercial or for subsistence and are often equated with artisanal fishers.
ARTISANAL FISHERS – These are fisher households with small capital, small fishing vessels operating close to shore, and mainly for local consumption. They can be subsistence or commercial fishers, and sometimes referred to as small-scale fisheries. In general, though by no means always, they employ relatively low level technology. Traditional artisanal fishers differ from subsistence fishers in that they regard themselves as skilled tradesmen who fish for a living.
With the confusion in terminology, and with the SFTG having recognised that the definitions excluded a group of fishers, it has been accepted over the last while that the artisanal fisher community and the small-scale fisher community should be one and the same. The small-scale fisher sector can be distinguished from broader commercial operations firstly by the comparatively small size of their operations, as well as by the day-to-day involvement of the owner of the venture, including their active involvement in the catch effort or processing.
7 1.3 Motivation for this study
Interest in this specific field of research came about as a result of both a previous personal involvement in and an exposure to, the South African fishing industry. The latter through a parent who was managing director of the largest fishing company in the country through the 60’s and 70’s, and through him some knowledge of the industry as well as some of the role players themselves was gained. Own experience was limited to a couple of year’s exposure, but on two different sides of the industry’s business spectrum. On the one hand working for a large corporation and on the other for a smaller, family run enterprise. More recently and currently, exposure is being gained through being contracted to undertake a specific project within the industry, on a semi-permanent project management basis. The area of focus and involvement is in the pelagic fish sector, but requires a broader interaction with players from other sectors of the fishing community.
Initially, the intention was to research the quota system in the local fishing industry, across all sectors and all species. However, on investigation and initial probing, and through first hand interventions with the likes of Andy Johnston, the founder of the Artisanal Fishers Association in particular, the plight of the in-shore fisher community was surfaced. Progressing this further, and being witness to film footage of incidents in local communities, the predicament of the so-called artisanal fishers was highlighted.
This dissertation will highlight how the ‘errors’ of the past and the ensuing conflicts could have to a large degree been avoided through the right processes and approaches being adopted. Further, the conflict that is currently being waged in this particular sector can be managed through constructive dialogue and a structured methodology embracing all parties, as well as by those involved dealing with the issues with a mind frame of creative give and take.
8 1.4 Contextual Background
The South African Fishing Industry has historically been the domain of a select few large corporate entities, and where the governance of the industry was limited to the employment of industry imposed restrictions based on the specific marine resources, known as the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) or Total Allowable Effort (TAE).
Prior to 1994, when the new dispensation took over the governing of the country, the industry had been prone to a variety of different conflicts, most of which were related to the availability of a limited resource, and a situation of denied access of some sectors to those available resources. Whilst significant changes have been made since 1994, the industry itself would never seem to be out of the conflict limelight, as the ensuing content of this essay will illustrate.
One of the early issues to surface was that of the Fishing Community Trusts, a controversial system that had been put in place in an attempt to relieve poverty in some fishing communities. The modus operandi was for money to be paid into these community trusts, the moneys being derived as part of that community’s hake quota. The estimated value that was envisaged that would be put through to these communities at the time was R8 million (Marais 1994). This practice had led, according to the then Minister of Environment Dr Dawie de Villliers, to ‘bitter conflict’ and the ‘possible misappropriation of funds’ (Gosling 1995). In some instances, violence and mass action were the direct results of this scheme, where people from the community attempted to relieve the appointed trustees of the cash payouts. Such an incident had occurred earlier in April, when a group of 300 members of Cape Town Harbour Fishing Community Trust, held the then Chief Director of Fisheries, Louis Botha as well as an administrative assistant, hostage for 36 hours (Le May 1995).
9 A further report covering this episode, included a comment made by the Western Cape Marine Conservation Society, who argued that it was not reasonable to expect local fishermen to make a living through issuing them with hake or community quotas, as since the establishment of the community trusts, the majority of small-scale fishers had been selling their quotas to commercial operators; these operators having the technical resources to harvest these quotas from the deep. The outcome was that employment opportunities were not being created, nor subsistence for their own communities (Rossouw 1995).
Dr De Villiers’ recommendation made at that time was that the chairpersons of each registered Fishing Community Trust would be represented on what was to be known as the Mother Trust. This entity would receive a community quota from the quota board, and would then reallocate this to the 33 trusts. It was decided that all monies payable would go to the Mother Trust, and would only be apportioned to the Community Trusts on receipt of a specific project proposal i.e. no funds would be paid out for cash handouts.
Further disgruntlement with the system of the 33 community quotas was illustrated through the behaviour of some 600 fishermen along the Western and Southern coasts, who had refused to deliver on their quotas, the reported comment once again being that the system was a failure, and that the people responsible for the management of the quotas had pocketed the money themselves (Marais 1995).
Trust fund issues were again in the media when it was reported that a substantial amount of money, almost R1 million, had ‘gone missing’ over a six month period (Le May 1995). According to the article, the system ‘had failed, bedevilled by corruption and growing tension’, these anxieties a result of the relationship between the ‘traditional coloured fishermen of the Cape and the more recent black recruits to the industry’.
10 Historic allocations of quota were spotlighted by a Johnny Issel, a member of the Western Cape Legislature, where he was quoted in the Financial Mail (‘Angling for more Equity’, p. 28. February 17, 1995.) as saying that the ‘apartheid-blackened quota method of doling out fishing rights’ would need to be torn down. His argument was that the SA fishery was a ‘common property’ that fell under the guardianship of the State, and it was therefore their responsibity to allocate the resource with fairness, a practice which he believed was not happening at the time.
In the West Coast Rock Lobster and Abalone (Perlemoen) sectors, strong reactions met the actions of the Quota Board in their allocating quotas to new entrants to the industry. According to Joelle Row, chairperson of the Western Cape Fishing Forum, it was not the issue of new entrants that riled their members, it was the fact that some of these had received ‘much larger ‘quotas than those held by the Forum’s members. These allocations being made from what was termed ‘resources under pressure’ (Le may 1995).
Towards the end of 1995, Andy Johnston, then chairman of the Informal Fishing Communities, wrote a letter to President Nelson Mandela voicing their dismay that the plight of this particular sector, being the informal fishing community, had in his opinion not been addressed after a new government had been elected, contrary to their expectations. In an interview with The Argus (‘Complaints about “fishy” business in quota system’. November 24, 1995. P. 23), Johnston made comments re the Quota Board’s ‘unilateral’ allocation of fishing rights to the ‘privileged, greedy few’. He is quoted as saying there were instances where allocations had been made to ‘fronts representing businessmen who are not even citizens of this country’. He added further that some of the beneficiaries ‘represent prominent South African politicians’.
In an article published in early 1996, the plight of West Coast’s fishermen was again highlighted. This time in the form of an Ismael Slarmie, a local ‘coloured’ fisherman and self declared poacher, who according to the
11 commentary had reached breaking point, making accusations that he would ‘beat up‘ fishing inspectors as well as policemen. The root cause of his disgruntlement was that his livelihood had been taken away from him due to his ‘skin colour’, the consequence being his loss of right to live off the sea.
Andy Johnston was again quoted in the same piece, stating that there was much poverty and unemployment in the sector, and much anger was being directed at the quota board. His action group threatened to abort the protection measures currently in place in the lobster and perlemoen industry, and to ‘strip the sea bare’ of the resource…purely to ‘make a point’.
This thought process was carried forward by a newly formed body, representing some 2 000 fishers and calling themselves the Fishermen’s Action Group, and who’s modus operandi they described as being a ‘scorched sea policy’ (Friedman 1996). The thrust of the Group’s motivation for their defiance was that according to the meeting’s chairperson, Andy Johnston, these ‘impoverished’ fishers had exhausted ‘every available channel’ open to them in their efforts to get the authorities to ‘grant them a legal slice of the lucrative pie’. The essence of their argument was that the Quota Board, through its allocation of quotas in November 1995, had neglected to take the reconstruction and development programme into consideration. Once again Johnston made reference to newly acquired quota holders, categorising them as ‘foreign individuals, rich business people, teachers and other non- fishermen’.
The plight of subsistence fishermen was also picked up on by a group called the Western Province Underwater Union, who vowed to ‘catch as much crayfish (lobster) as they can’, in a meeting held on February 22 . As reported in The Argus (‘Fishermen threaten war over crayfish’. February 23, 2006, p. 5), the major issue surrounding subsistence fishermen was that they had to operate with recreational diving permits…and with such a permit it was illegal to sell one’s catch. They were therefore forced to operate against the law.
12 Around this time, and in response to the accusations and suspicion surrounding the activities of the Quota Board, Dr De Villiers made a call for any evidence of ‘any direct or indirect interest members of the Quota Board might have in the fishing industry’, as was reported in The Argus (‘Call for evidence of interest’. February 23, 2006, p. 5).
A new body, the Fishing Development Unit (FDU) that was formed in March 1996, was an entity described by Andy Johnston, in his capacity as chairperson of the Association of Informal Fishermen, as ‘part of a grouping that is muscling in’ (Gosling 1996). The makeup of the FDU included ‘prominent ANC figures in the Western Cape’, amongst others Mustaq Brey, head of a city accounting firm and later to become a director of Oceana, and then member of the Western Cape legislature Johnny Issel (Le May 1999). Johnston re-iterated his Association’s standpoint that being the right of every ‘bona fide’ fisher to catch fish within the confines of the TAC. Once the total allowable catch had been reached, all activity would cease, adding that ‘skill will determine’ who makes money and who doesn’t, and this process would separate the ‘fishermen from the crooks’.
Unrest was again an issue when a group of 100 fishermen attended a quota board hearing to hear of new perlemoen quotas (Cohen 1996). After chaos erupted, resulting in one of their number being stabbed, representatives of the fishers took charge, and in the process collected all weapons from the group – which included knives and a stick of dynamite. The deputy chairman of the Quota Board, Gerhard Krone, was quoted as saying that the task of allocating the quota to all parties involved was a difficult one, as they had to work within the confines of a Total Allowable Catch. Whatever portion of the quota allocated to the fishers would impact on the producers.
Quota issues continued to cause disgruntlement and dissent, the catalyst this time being the reduction in the hake fishing quotas of the larger corporates by 4%. The issue as expressed by the Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU) was the concern that fishing employees would be made redundant due to this action (Pretorius 1997). In a joint statement issued by FAWU, the
13 Informal Fishing Communities (IFC) and smaller unions within the industry, a call was made to disband the Quota Board, as the Board was ‘unable to appreciate our dissatisfaction’ (Friedman 1997). A threat was also made to blockade Cape Town’s Harbour with fishing boats, as well as to cause disruption to the opening of parliament, scheduled for February 7. Andy Johnston, in his capacity of chairperson of the IFC, was quoted as condemning the threats of violence perpetrated by certain sections of the industry.
This was followed a few weeks later by an ultimatum by the West Coast Informal Fishing Association, published in The Citizen (‘Fishermen warn Min of drastic action’. January 31, 1997, p. 9 ) who threatened to take ‘drastic action’ if their demands for quotas were not met. Their representative, Len Davids followed this with the accusation that there was unfairness in quotas allocations, with fishermen who depend on quota ‘for their livelihood’ not being allocated any, whilst there are ‘millionaires in Gauteng sitting with quotas’. At the same time, in a deal brokered by the office of the attorney-general, members of the Informal Fishing Communities (IFC) organisation handed in their weapons, based on a plea made by the IFC leadership for a cessation of violence in the informal community. The weapons surrendered included hand grenades, a shotgun and an AK47 assault rifle (Smith 1997).
Further mass action was witnessed when a group representing the IFC and FAWU, supported by the Trawler and Line Fishermen’s Union (TLFU), marched on parliament. In a newspaper article (Le May 1997), it was stated that whilst FAWU and the TLFU supported the campaign against the Quota Board, they were also in support of the quota applications made by the major fishing corporates, as a loss of quota translated directly into a loss of jobs. It was further asserted that the informal sector’s main complaint was that through its actions, the Quota Board was ‘whittling away’ the rights of inshore fishers. It was therefore the wish of the informal sector to have the Board abolished and quotas done away with.
14 In order to redress the social inequalities and discriminations of the past, the government introduced in 1998 the Marine Living Resource Act (MLRA) (Government Gazette 1998) (www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1998), a specific requirement of which was for the state to ‘restructure the fishing industry to address historical imbalances and to achieve equity within all branches of the fishing industry’.
The consequence of this programme was the revision of fishing rights allocations, where the fishing quotas were restructured away from the larger, predominantly white, organisations to smaller new, and mostly black, entrants to the industry.
Prior to the introduction of the MLRA, the government had received requests from different bodies requesting that consideration be given to their individual situations. One of these was a memorandum that was received by the then minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Dr Pallo Jordan, which prompted a media statement from the ministry (Jordan 1997). The statement makes mention of a White Paper on Fisheries, that had input from ‘all stakeholders in the fishing industry’ including ‘representatives of the informal fishermen, and it therefore takes into account the concerns raised by the different sectors’. There was though, one sector of the community that was not recognised in the MLRA published a few months later, being the small- scale artisanal sector.
The Marine Living Resources Act did however recognise subsistence fishers as a formal sector for the first time, and was deemed a significant development for fishers whose livelihoods, in the form of food and security, were dependent on marine living resources. The definition of a subsistence fisher according to the act (Government Gazette No 18930. May 27, 1998) was… ‘a natural person who regularly catches fish for personal consumption or for the consumption of his or her dependents, including one who engages from time to time in the local sale or barter of excess catch,
15 but does not include a person who engages on a substantial scale in the sale of fish on a commercial basis’.
September 1998 saw the abolishing of the Quota Board, as well as the Sea Fisheries Act, having been replaced by the MLRA. The new legislature empowered the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Pallo Jordan to allocate fishing quotas. Early 1999 saw a collective called the South African Commercial Fishing Cooperative (Soal 1999) being granted a legal right to harvest crayfish (lobster) for the first time.
This quota was to be allocated amongst 27 groups along the West and South Cape coasts, and the method employed to do so involved assessing whether these groups had other fishing interests, and what level of poverty their community was subjected to. According to Andy Johnston, chairperson of this Cooperative, it was a successful process with no disputes amongst the members. However, a week later the Cape High Court judge, Wilfred Thring, ordered these community groups to halt their fishing effort. The ruling was based on an application made by a collective of fishermen and fishing companies who had enjoyed a quota under the previous Quota Board set-up, but who under the new dispensation had been denied a quota. All fishing was therefore to be suspended until this application had been heard. Johnston’s attitude was that the fishermen would never give up, and responded to the legal suspension, and also in reference to those bringing about the application, as ‘even if they win the court case we know we will get there in the end’. He stated further that it was only those who ‘benefited from the past system who are opposed to the change’ (Soal 1999).
The application was heard on January 22 in Cape Town’s High Court, the applicants being Langklip Sea Products and 66 others (Arends 1999). Interestingly, it appeared that the applicants had not understood that a new set of guidelines had been put in place in the determining of quotas, or as Judge Willem Louw put it ‘they ran the race and only when they got to the finishing line were they told that they were supposed to run in the opposite direction’ (Mokwena 1999).
16 The upshot of the case was that Judge Louw ordered that the kreef (lobster) quotas need to be reviewed, a decision which elicited a response from Andy Johnston that ‘transformation cannot take place within the corrupt nature of the kreef industry’ (Bonthuys 1999).
Accusations were then directed by the New National Party at Minister Jordan, in as much as he was causing disruption to the ‘daily bread’ and livelihood of the West coast fishing communities. This in the light of allegations that these communities had not received any form of income since August of the previous year, due to issues surrounding the granting of quotas and the legal ramifications that these had had (Van der Westhuizen 1999). The Democratic Party also voiced their dissatisfaction at the delays being incurred in the issuing of quotas, and called for a response from the minister (Van der Westhuizen 1999). The Western Cape Premier was also quoted in an article in Die Burger (‘Visbedryf “moet provinsiale bevoegdheid word”’. February 20, 1999, p. 9), as saying that fishing quotas had been allocated to ‘people and organisations that have no knowledge of the fishing industry’.
The end result of the High Court case was that judges Jeanette Traverso and Dennis Davis ruled in favour of the plaintiffs (Rippenaar 1999), in that minister Jordan had errantly issued the new quotas to new entrants, as the MLRA stated that the old criteria in place prior to the inception of the MLRA had to be upheld for the first 6 months of the new Act. This meant that the quotas given to the new entrants were taken away (Louwrens 1999).
March saw the first senior government official exposed as having financial interests in the fishing industry, where allegations were made that the then Transport MEC for Western Cape, Piet Meyer, had shares in two fishing firms and that he had used his position to manipulate fishing rights in favour of both of these entities. ANC MP Noel Williams is on parliamentary record as saying that Meyer’s involvements were an ‘absolute hypocrisy’ (Schroeder 1999). IFC chairperson Andy Johnston was quoted as saying that the uncovering of the MEC’s involvement was only ‘the tip of the iceberg. The corruption goes through all political groups’.
17 Accusations were also made that Meyer had fishing quotas, as printed in Die Burger (‘Minister ontken hy het kwota’. March 5, 1999, p. 9), but these allegations were denied. What was revealed in the same article however was that Meyer was a shareholder of Brimstone, a black empowerment group that held a 50% shareholding in Sea Harvest, as well as having shares in Old Mutual, who in turn had shares in Oceana.
In a move to alleviate the plight of some 3 000 fishers, the provincial ministry of the Western Cape, through the minister Peter Marais, made a one time payment of R400 to each of them. The rationale driving the decision was the situation that had come about as a result of the ‘fishing quota chaos’ (Van der Westhuizen 1999).
The effect of the delays in the granting of quotas was not restricted to the Western and Southern Cape coasts - emerging fishing companies in the Eastern Cape were experiencing similar issues, with some of the smaller entities having to face potential bankruptcy (Richardson 1999). According to a spokesperson for the Small Quota Holders Association, Redah de Maine, some of the larger companies were in fact fishing, and where quotas had been granted, these had either been given to these established large entities, or to ‘people not connected to the fishing industry’. He added that the result was that these recipients were getting ‘paper quotas at the expense of those who are investing in the industry and creating jobs’.
In October of 1999 an initiative between big business, in the form of Oceana Fishing and a local entity entitled the SA Commercial Fishermen’s Corporation, saw the establishing of a unique entity named Ikamva Lethu. The uniqueness is derived from the fact that the formed company’s members and employees were all former poachers and subsistence fishers, who had joined forces and secured a commercial crayfish quota (Du Plessis 1999). The minister of the DEAT, Valli Moosa stated that the initiative ‘marked the completion of the government’s vision’, and that was the restructuring of the fishing industry.
18 What was pertinent also was the statement made by the spokesperson of the company, Lulamile Kati Kati who stated that in their opinion the solution to the ‘future needs’ of the informal fishing sector ‘lay in the creation of companies that functioned on market principles, but showed responsibility to their constituencies’.
Further rallying of disgruntled fishers took place in February 2000, when a group marched to parliament spearheaded by FAWU. FAWU spokesperson Williams Thomas was quoted as saying that they were mobilising fishers in order to voice to President Mbeki their concerns, and in particular for the President to ‘intervene and investigate corruption and fishing quotas fiasco’ (Dlakavu 2000). He was quoted further as saying that the DEAT was allocating quotas to ‘foreign groups while local fishermen languish in poverty’.
It was reported in The Citizen (‘Fishing catch quotas rethink’. August 29, 2000, p. 8) that in an attempt to bring some form of stability to the commercial fishing industry, the Environment Minster Valli Moosa announced at a media briefing in Cape Town that catch quotas for 2000 would be extended for the 2001 catch period as well. ‘All current rights holders’ would be allowed to harvest their quotas in the new year without having to reapply. Moosa was further quoted as saying that these measures were intended to ‘create a high degree of stability’ and to allow the department to ‘get off the treadmill’. Marine Coastal Management were inundated with quota applications for the 2000 catch period – of the more than 11 000 applications submitted, only approximately 2 000 were granted, according to the minister. MCM deputy director-general was quoted as saying that hake long-line applications had turned into a lottery, but the ‘returns were better’ i.e. for an application cost of R100, if awarded, the quota could sell for ‘half a million rand’.
Subsequent to the Marine Living Resources Act being accepted, the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) and specifically the Marine and Coastal Management (MCM) department, through the office of the Chief Director, appointed a 17-member Subsistence Fisheries Task Group (SFTG) whose role it was to make recommendations with regard to systems
19 for managing subsistence fisheries. In their attempts to gain an understanding of what subsistence fishing and artisanal fishing actually entailed, the SFTG drew on the experiences of other countries whom they believed were comparable to the local situation.
One such country where subsistence fishing had been identified was Alaska. A subsistence law had been in place (at the time of the commencement of their activities) for over 22 years. However, subsistence use of the resource in this country is focussed primarily on customary and traditional practices, where there is a degree of bartering, but where this is largely confined for the purposes of meeting basic needs (Fall 1990). The SFTG recognised that the term artisanal referred to a sector of small-scale fishers who involved themselves in a diverse spread of activities (Hauck 2000).
The SFTG was commissioned to commence its functioning in February 2001. According to Marine and Coastal Management, a body incorporated in the DEAT, the conclusions of the enquiry was that it was ‘not sustainable to maintain subsistence fisheries in high value fisheries, which are not subsisted on’. They continued by stating in their media release that as subsistence fishers are ‘not ordinarily allowed to sell their fish, many subsistence fishers sell illegally as they do not subsist off abalone or lobster’. The element of ‘illegal’ stems from the basic premise of the MLRA that states that no fishing whatsoever is allowed without a permit. Licensing is required for ‘commercial fishing by subsistence and recreational fishers and mariculture entrepreneurs’ (Besseling 2004, p. 160) and commercial fishing is regulated and controlled and subject to quotas.
One of the jobs given the Subsistence Fisheries Task Group was to define the subsistence and informal fishing sector more specifically, the definition as gazetted above being considered far too vague. At the end of 2001 the SFTG’s report was accepted, and one of the pertinent findings documented was that based on their scientific findings, a category distinct from any other group had emerged, this being that of artisanal fishers.
20 At the time of finalising their report, the SFTG had condensed the categories of fishers to three, being subsistence fishers, limited commercial fishers and large-scale commercial fishers. Artisanal fishers fell somewhere between subsistence and limited commercial fishers, as it was evident that there was a distinction between fishers in this group – being those whose basic needs were nutritional security, and those who aspired to and had the ability to become commercial fishers. There was further, a lack of accord amongst members of the Task team as the ‘categorisation’ of the artisanal fishers was not acceptable to all, and some members physically withdrew from the group, one such entity being the Artisanal Fishers Association (A. Johnston 2008, pers. comm., September 8).
What was happening at this time also was that subsistence fishers were illegally selling part of their catch, subsistence fishers not being allowed to sell, but only to use their harvest for food security. To counter this, in 2001 the DEAT issued limited lobster and abalone fishing rights to fishers who traditionally had made a living from selling fish off a subsistence permit. Subsistence fishers in the West Coast lobster sector operated from the shore or from small fishing boats, and were allowed a daily catch of 4 lobsters per permit holder, with the catch being sold off to restaurants, local hotels, private individuals and to processing plants. At the start of the 2001 season, some 1 700 subsistence permits were issued, accounting for an estimated 230 ton of fish, representing 11% of the Lobster TAC.
In a media statement issued by the Ministry of Environmental Affairs and Tourism on February 22, 2001 (Ministry of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2001), the then Deputy Director-General Horst Kleinschmidt was quoted as saying that a total of 3 431 applications were received for a subsistence fishing permit for West Coast lobster, adding that ‘government will spare no effort to make sure the honest and genuine subsistence fishers are granted fishing rights’. His commentary concluded with the affirmation that the ‘involvement of communities is crucial in the allocation of fishing rights’.
21 In an article relating to the allocation of fishing rights written by an external consultant of the name Karaki (2001), who had been commissioned by the DEAT to ‘sort out/restructure the process of allocating fishing quotas’, in the concluding comments he stated that through the initiatives currently being undertaken, the South African fishing sector is ‘taking a giant leap forward’ in an attempt to realise an industry of ‘first world status’. The principle of ‘user pays’ warranted careful scrutiny however, this in the light of the methodologies adopted such as quotas and the concept of ITQ’s (Individual Transferable Quotas). A balance was therefore required between these and the priority that needed to be given to transformation and social development essentials, if the industry was to reach its political, social and economic goals.
In an article published in The Star around the same time (‘Sorry tale of reluctant poachers’. February 13, 2001, p. 2), the plight of the subsistence fishers along the West coast was highlighted. The incidence of poaching had over recent times increased dramatically, this in the main due to the issuing or rather non-issuing of quotas. According to the writer, when quotas and employment were easily available in their areas, many of the fishers opted to sell their quotas to the large companies. However, with ‘corruption and gross inefficiency in quota allocation’, these large enterprises took on bigger quotas, the result of which was a situation where ‘people sitting in Johannesburg and Pretoria with no connection to the sea getting quotas and then selling them for vast profits’. Al Karaki is quoted in this article as saying that many of these poachers would opt rather to not be poachers, and it was the system to blame. As an alternative to licences, he advocated that these poachers should be brought into the system, and a policy of self-policing instituted, adding that ‘poachers make the best gamekeepers’.
Another contentious issue affecting the livelihoods in the traditional fishing communities was government’s intention to include snoek, seasonal fish specie and the staple diet of communities particularly on the West coast, in traditional linefish quotas. The fear of job losses as well as the ‘incentive’ to poach would be the end result of such a move, as was reported in the leader
22 article of the Cape Argus (‘Moosa must cut snoek out of linefish quotas’. September 6, 2001, p. 23).
Mass action was again used as a resort in December 2001, when an estimated 500 protesters descended on the office of the MCM, wanting to hand over a memorandum listing their grievances, to Horst Kleinschmidt. The crowd was made up of communities from across the Peninsula, their common grievance being the allocation of perlemoen quotas. The group’s spokesperson, Michael Mboniso, was quoted as saying that they had registered as a group, paid R6 000 for their form, and then raised R43 000 for 86 permits…of which only 3 were granted. The monies paid were not refundable (Magazi 2001).
The allocation of quotas for the 2002 fishing season reflected, according to Minister of the DEAT Valli Moosa, significant transformation of the industry (Xako 2002). In a media briefing in which details of black empowerment across all sectors of the fishing industry were released, Horst Kleinschmidt was quoted as saying that it was ‘unwise for politicians to hold interest in the fishing industry’. In the same article however, mention is made of the perceived conflict of interest of deputy Minister for Trade and Industry, Lindiwe Hendricks. Hendricks, according to the report held shares in her husband’s company, Phambili Fisheries, an entity which two weeks before was in the media voicing its unhappiness re its allocation of hake (Watson 2002). The company was one of 55 applicants to have received a four-year fishing right by the MCM for hake trawling.
As a consequence of these expressed problems and challenges with which the DEAT had to contend, the department established a task team under the leadership of Rhodes University. The result of this was the production of an Economic and Sectoral Study (ESS) of the South African Fishing Industry in 2003.
23 In the ESS report, the editors position the South African Fishing Industry (Mather, Britz, Hecht and Sauer 2003), as a complex system that is made up of different elements, being a biological system, an economic system, a system of legal measures and a social system. The focus historically of state fisheries management in our local context has been on the biological facets, where particular emphasis has been on harvest limitations or production which have been characterised by restrictions, specifically the Total Allowable Catch or Total Allowable Effort (TAE). Mather et al proposed that the industry be viewed as a microeconomic system, which is linked to the economy of the country and which is limited by a structure of legal measures, and which further impacts on the economic welfare of particular citizens of populace.
Whilst the recommendations of the ESS have contributed to the reduction of anomalies and imbalances in the implementation of the Marine Living Resource Act and hence transformation, there are still areas where the allocations of quota, and in some instances of non-allocation of quotas, have resulted in distress and disgruntlement. When in 2001 the MCM first opened up the application process for quotas and thus fishing rights, and compounded by the fact that the application fees involved were minimal, they were inundated with requests for such permits.
To counter what was termed by some as a ‘lottery’, the MCM opted to introduce a higher fee to discourage ‘opportunistic applications’ (Mather et al 2003, p. 149). In the EES report, Mather et al cautioned that this practice could well lead to a ‘variety of issues’, as the application fees were regressive and non-refundable if the application was unsuccessful. This has in fact been born out by the impact it had on some of the local fishing communities, Kalk Bay being just one, where fishers in the community were in some instances, in order to apply for permits to pursue their livelihood, compelled to take out loans…from whatever source. This factual drama is best illustrated by a documentary produced on this very issue, by a local film academy, using real life players to enact the scenario with which they were faced (Elsie’s kwota 2007). A copy of this film, in DVD format, is attached.
24 A further element highlighted by Mather et al (2003 p. 149) was that of the issue of rights allocations – it was proposed that rational new entrants to the industry having received allocations within the Total Allowable Catch parameters, would opt to lease out these rights, even if it was their initial intention to participate actively in this industry. The standpoint of established fishing companies by contrast, was that faced with a reduction in their quotas, opted instead to operate on a lease-in basis. This situation would give rise to the trading of rights of what was termed Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ’s), or as has become known, a market for ‘paper permits’. In order to counteract this, the MCM mooted a system of Minimum Viable Quotas (MVQ’s), a system whereby vessels would be granted sufficient quota to cover the basic variable costs of that vessel, coupled to a return for the vessel owner. It was argued that this system would exacerbate further the situation where quota rights would be traded back to the original rights holder or vessel owner.
In 2001 an independent non-governmental organisation was formed. Named the Masifundise Development Trust, the focus was the small scale and traditional fishing communities along the western and southern Cape coasts. During 2003, in an effort to document what they considered to be the negative impact of fishing policy on traditional small-scale fishers, and further to present a platform for traditional fishing communities to voice their concerns, Masifundise and the SA Artisanal Fisher Association hosted Fisher People’s Human Rights Hearings in the Western Cape. The intention was to collect information concerning the plight of traditional small-scale fishers, and to use this to position a case for an appropriate and, in their opinion, just policy. At the time the artisanal fishers were faced with having to apply for a permit to fish for specific fish specie…at a cost of R2 000 per application, and thereafter separate licence fees would be payable dependent on the specie. The application forms were challenging – the majority of the fishers were unable to complete the forms required personally, a combination of illiteracy and the fact that the forms were seriously complicated. If the application for the permits were unsuccessful, the application fee was not refundable.
25 According to Masifundise (www.masifundise.org.za.), since 1994 considerable changes have been made to the policies and legislation that govern fishers’ use of and access to the country’s marine resources.
They contend further that the policy and fishing rights allocation system is biased in favour of commercial fishing enterprises, with the result that the small-scale sectors are again marginalised and excluded.
Marine Coastal Management was again in the news in November 2002 (West 2002), when it was reported that an entity, the South Coast Hake Hand-line Industrial Association (SCHHIA), was intent on mobilising some ‘40 000’ of its members to invade the beaches of the Garden Route over the coming Christmas period, the story also being picked up and reported in the Eastern Province Herald (Bulger 2002). The planned action was due to the decision taken to dramatically reduce the rights allocations for fishing vessels from 380 to 69. Horst Kleinschmidt, head of the MCM, was quoted as saying that the reductions in rights allocations had been executed based on ‘handing rights to people who were genuinely dependent on hake fishing’. A charge was also levelled at DEAT minister Valli Moosa, by the angered hake fishermen, in that he is so ‘taken by SA’s tourism boom that he is prepared to sacrifice the interests of the local fishermen’ (Bulger 2002).
Communities along the Cape’s South coast were angered by Kleinschmidt's comments (West 2002), the spokesperson for the SCHHIA calling them ‘both arrogant and incorrect’, and accusing the MCM of having no knowledge or understanding’ of their fishing activities. An out of court settlement was reached with the SCHHIA which allowed them to continue their catch activities until such time as the licence allocation process had been reviewed (SAPA 2002). The MCM’s Kleinschmidt stated that he ‘hoped the parties will have reached an amicable solution by January 24’.
During 2003, a tide of disgruntlement rose against the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, as reported in the Cape’s daily The Cape Argus, due to the department’s issuing of linefish rights and quotas to the
26 various entities whom they believed warranted these (24 July, 2003, p. 1). Organised labour, in the form of the Fishing and Allied Workers Union, the Weskus Werkers Unie and the Trawler and Line Fishermen’s Union, issued a joint statement critical of the level of transparency and what they considered a lack of consultation with ‘key role players’ in the decisions made by government. It was reported that the small fishing villages along the South and West coasts would be hardest hit, examples given being those of Struisbaai and Arniston, as these communities did not have access to other fishing activities, other than line fishing. Examples of licence issuing were given, where the article claimed that in Struisbaai ‘only five of between 20 and 30 boats were allocated licence to fish’, the situation at Hout Bay being reported as ‘only two of 100 ski boats’ being allocated rights.
An additional criticism levelled by role players at the decisions taken by the DEAT was the ‘department’s assessment of stocks’. Union spokesperson Envor Barros was quoted as saying that ‘organised labour believes traditional fishers should have reasonable access to the resource and have a right to be party to any research or action’.
Defying the MCM, a group of line fishermen from a cross-section of fishing communities along the South coast, took a decision to fish regardless (Maposa & Du Plessis 2003). The provincial social services MEC Marius Fransman had called for an ‘urgent review’ of the permit and quota allocation policy implemented by MCM. Whilst it was acknowledged that control was exercised to control the over exploitation of linefish resources, Fransman was of the opinion that the allocations had ‘exacerbated the already tense and volatile relationship between subsistence and commercial fishing operations, and between subsistence fisher folk and the department of environmental affairs’. He is quoted further as saying that the subsistence rights of ‘our bona fide fisher folk along our coasts should not be ignored.’ As an alternative measure to not receiving a commercial licence, the department was believed to have told fishers that they should apply for a recreational licence, which would allow them 10 fish each per day. The downside here however, is that it was illegal for fishers to sell their fish caught off a recreational licence. This
27 prompted seasoned and local boat owner, Kenny Coleman, to comment: ‘How are we supposed to pay for our fuel and maintenance with fish we can only eat ourselves?’
This theme was picked up also by the Provincial Minister of Agriculture, Environmental Affairs and Development Johan Gelderblom, who was quoted as saying that the government could not be seen on the one hand to be creating employment, whilst on the other promoting poverty amongst people whose sole income is derived from fish (Louw 2003).
Partially in response to this, an opportunity was afforded those line-fish fishers who ‘felt aggrieved’ (Du Plessis 2003) at not receiving positive acceptance of their permit applications, by the then minister of the DEAT, Valli Moosa. Where historically disadvantaged fishing communities had been excluded due to what Moosa termed ‘unintended’ consequences of the allocation process, the minister was prepared to consider further exemptions. Additionally, in the case of communities who had no other ways of making a livelihood, exemptions would be considered and further, these communities would receive what Moosa and Western Cape Welfare MEC Marius Fransman termed ‘emergency relief measures on a temporary basis’.
2004 saw the appointment of a new minister to the DEAT, Marthinus van Schalkwyk. One of his first initiatives was to host a meeting in the Western Cape to which a cross section of representatives of the fishing industry were invited. At this meeting, he stressed that an open system was envisaged for the industry where information regarding the process and the points system would be made clear to all, further undertaking to ensure that the quota system was ‘operated by honest people who had the community’s interest at heart’ (Daniels 2004). The response by Andy Johnston, chairperson of the Artisanal Fishers Association, was that the country did not have a policy for the fishing industry, and that the government was purely exercising damage control (Philander 2004).
28 Further coverage of the meeting was reported in another Cape daily, one of the issues not covered in other reports being that of the application forms that fishers were require to complete. According to Van Schalkwyk ‘one needs to have a university degree to know what is going on in these forms’ (Kruser 2004). Further criticism of the application process was made by Van Schalkwyk at a meeting or fishing imbizo held in Mossel Bay, where he was quoted as saying that the application forms would not only be simplified so that one didn’t require a ‘legal background’ to be able to understand them, but also would be made available in ‘Xhosa or in any other language that the applicant desires’ (Taljaard 2004).
The question mark against quotas and the issuing thereof was once again brought front of mind by a television programme called In Focus on Sunday aired on SABC 2 at 19:30 on October 3, 2004. Hosted by John Bailey, the programme was entitled ‘Fishing: Who’s benefiting from fishing quotas?’
At the opening of a community centre in the West coast town of Doringbaai, the then Premier of the Western Cape Ebrahim Rasool told the community that he believed that a balance needed to be reached amongst the different role players in the industry, as well as the available resource. He added further that one should retain ones perspective, in that the fishing industry was not about poverty alleviation, but was an economic industry in its own right (Van Dyk 2004).
The Cape based Cape Argus newspaper published an article on December 2 (Khoisan 2004) in which individuals whose line fish quotas had been revoked, were quoted as voicing their unhappiness at this action taken by Marine and Coastal Management (MCM). Accusations of ‘double standards’ and using one of those affected as a ‘political football’. All of this in the wake of the MCM’s action in revoking 10 commercial line fish quota-holders’ rights, based on what they considered to be the providing of misleading information when the applications for quotas were made. Amongst this grouping were a police officer, a public official, a navy officer….and an individual who had recently emigrated to New Zealand. In a related article published a day earlier (Khoisan 2004), the notice informing one of the errant rights holders makes
29 mention of the fact that the individual had ‘fallen foul of the criteria adopted for the traditional linefish sector’, the criteria having been put in place to ‘benefit those people who earn a living, or derive a substantial part of their income, from fishing.’
In April 2005, the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism hosted a public meeting, the purpose of which was to get public input on the draft Traditional Line Fish Policy, the intention of which was to allocate long term fishing rights to traditional line fish fishermen (Chief Directorate Communications 2005). The draft policy set out the overall objectives as considered appropriate by the DEAT, the purpose being to ensure participation, affirm fair labour practice, protection of the resource and to ensure higher levels of compliance by fishers.
The issue of application fees and the disproportionate amounts that various fishers in the different fishing sectors had to pay, was addressed by the minister Van Schalkwyk, at a report–back session facilitated at the Woodstock Town Hall in early April. The main thrust of Van Schalkwyk’s action, which had already been gazetted, was the recommendation that ‘fees be restructured so that they relate directly to the value of the fishing rights allocated’. The impact of the application fee restructuring would, according to Van Schalkwyk, impact on all fishing sectors, and most significantly, the impact on small-scale fishers would be a reduction of up to 83% in the upfront allocation fees (Morris 2005).
A march by some 800 people from the fishing community, brought Cape Town ‘to a standstill’ on May 18 (Swart 2005), their intention being to demand a moratorium on the new proposed fishing rights policy, in that they believed an impact assessment should be done, as well as that the roles of labour and the community should be recognised in the formulation of the policy. Tony Ehrenreich, provincial secretary of COSATU, was quoted as saying that the ‘pain in our stomachs and hearts is as a result of the government’s economic policy’. He added that COSATU would attempt to have the minister, Van Schalkwyk, ousted from the ANC if he did not give audience to the groups’ spokespersons.
30 This action was followed by a group made up from the fishing communities, COSATU and workers from the fishing industry, who gathered outside parliament in Cape Town, some of them chaining themselves to the railings, all in protest at the minister of the DEAT’S concept policy on long-term fishing rights. The group was wanting a moratorium placed on the policy until impact assessments had been undertaken of the consequences of the policy implementation (Swart 2005). The protest was spearheaded by FAWU, the Fishing and Allied Workers Union.
Subsequent to the DEAT’s public meetings and according to Johnson of the Artisanal Fishers Association and Jaffer of Masifundise as reported in the Cape Times (June 1, 2005, p. 7), the minister of DEAT announced the long term fishing rights policy without what they considered to be satisfactory consultation with role players. Johnston was quoted as saying that the claims made by the department as to the number of people consulted was in excess of 6 000, whilst their own survey showed there to be an ‘estimated 3 500 fishermen’. He continued by saying that the action taken by the minister was ‘dictatorial’, adding that ‘we feel we have been betrayed’. Jaffer commented that his organisation’s legal challenge to the government, at that time pending, was an attempt to get the department to ‘acknowledge traditional artisanal fishers according to the Marine Living Resources Act’.
The plight of the fisherfolk and the issues with which they had to contend in government’s allocation of quotas and fishing rights, was also picked up by members of the public. In a letter that appeared in the Cape Argus (‘Fisherfolk should get quotas’. June 27, 2005, p. 13) a Kenny Bergsma, proposed that ‘nobody who does not go to sea to catch fish should be granted a quota’. He also put forward his thoughts on how the industry should be structured, and the process of qualification each fisher should undergo in order to reach a level of competence.
At the World Pelagic Conference held in Cape Town in October 2005, Horst Kleinschmidt, now of Feike, a marine regulatory-law and environment- management firm, raised the issue of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ’s).
31 Kleinschmidt was quoted as saying that after the process of long term rights had been completed, the industry in South Africa would need to look at a system of ITQ’s, as was the case ‘elsewhere in the world’ (Van Gass 2005). He explained further that ITQ’s involved the selling of a quota to the highest bidder, which then allowed those individuals to retain or sell their rights of their own volition.
In November of 2005, the Northern Cape coastal fishing community of Hondeklipbaai heard that of their 20 applications for crayfish fishing licences submitted, none had been granted. This meant that none of the fishermen in the community were able to legally participate in harvesting what they considered to be an area of ‘huge potential’ (Kwon Hoo 2005). The MEC for Local Tourism and Conservation, P. W. Saaiman, was quoted as saying that assistance would be given the community in their appeal to the MCM, to include the community’s fishers in the allocations process.
In an article released by SAPA (February 2006) the minister for the DEAT was quoted as saying that a policy for subsistence fishing would be released ‘within the coming months’. He is quoted further as saying that a way to address poverty fishing communities would be through a ‘framework of subsistence fishing’, which would allow families in these communities to eat, as well as to operate within the confines of the law. On the issue of not all applicants having received a quota, he stated that this was not possible due to the limitations of the resources and fish stocks, and added that the allocations of fish quotas alone was insufficient to uplift local coastal communities, and the government was committed to addressing this issue.
In protest action by some 300 community fishers from the Western Cape, who had converged on Kalk Bay to voice their grievances of not having received crayfish (lobster) fishing rights for 2006, it was reported that of some 4 000 fishers that had applied, only 700 had been granted rights. Naseegh Jaffer, of Masifundise, as was reported in Die Burger ('Vissers betoog oor vang-regte’. February 11, 2006, p. 6), was quoted as saying that the new rights did not ‘meet the needs of the community’, and if more efficient consultation had been undertaken with these fishers, they would not have
32 ‘ended up in this mess’. This action elicited a response from a spokesperson of the DEAT, a Ms Carol Moses, who was quoted as saying that due to resource constraints, and the department’s principle of protecting and conserving these limited resources, ‘not everyone was going to get something’.
‘Paper quota holders’ were again the focus of criticism in May, when a successful businesswoman from the Eastern Cape, Bulelwa Qupe, was interviewed as a result of the success she had achieved in developing successful businesses in the Port Elizabeth area (Who said fishing is for men only? 2006, p. 37). Giving insight as to how someone from outside of the fishing sector was eventually successful in being granted a fishing quota, she made reference to the ‘paper quota holders’, describing them as individuals who are ‘not interested in the industry but get quotas, anyway’. She continues by adding that the quotas are awarded to these people ‘based on the fact that they have capital’, and that they then sell these rights on at ‘exorbitant prices’ to those who were unsuccessful in their own quota applications.
In a media statement in May 2006, the Deputy Director-General of the DEAT, Dr Monde Mayekiso addressed the issue of the limitations of Total Allowable Catch and Total Allowable Effort (Mayekiso 2006), as a direct result of resource constraints, and the impact this had on the number of rights holders that could be accommodated, and still allow these rights to be economically viable. In particular, the West Coast Rock Lobster (WCRL) sector was highlighted, quoting a TAC of 2854 tons for that year, of which 572 tons was allocated for near-shore harvesting, where near-shore or in-shore is categorised as being at a water depth of no more than 40 meters. A figure of over 4 000 applications was quoted by Dr Mayekiso, and compounded by the community appealing for an increase in individual quantum in order to make their effort economically viable, put even more pressure on the number of rights that could be allocated.
33 The issuing of quotas and the predicament of those whose applications were turned down, motivated a class of the South African School of Motion Picture Medium and Live Performance, AFDA, to produce a documentary film on the subject. Depicting a real life situation, the movie tracks the story of a traditional fisherman who is forced to apply for a quota in order to pursue his livelihood. The manner in which money needs to be raised is dramatically captured, as are the consequences of the application’s failure (Elsie’s Kwota 2007). A copy of this production is appended to this essay.
During the course of 2006, an organisation representing small boat fishermen and small quota holders, formed under the banner of the South African United Fishing Front, made representation to the department of Sea Fisheries based on their dissatisfaction with their lot. The basic cause of unhappiness was, according to their coordinator Pedro Garcia, that the allocations as given them were ‘too small for people to make a living from and many bona fide fisherman sit on the beach while people who have never been fishermen go out and catch’ (Du Plessis 2006). Marine and Coastal Management’s response at the time through their spokesperson Carol Moses, was that with the dwindling marine resources it was ‘impossible to allocate rights to all’ and that they were exploring alternative means of employment for these communities thus effected. The affairs of the MCM were also brought to the fore at this stage, with a report in the Cape Times (Gosling 2006) highlighting the financial plight of the organisation. It was reported that from a healthy financial situation as at end March the year before, the Marine Living Resources Fund, being the operational budget of the DEAT’S MCM, had fallen to a debt situation of R45 million.
Interestingly, the ‘whistle blowers’ in this regard according to the article, where the ex Head of MCM Horst Kleinschmidt and former MCM chief director Shaheen Moolla, who had published these issues in FEIKE, a newsletter of Marine Regulatory Law and Environmental Management Advisors. Kleinschmidt and Moolla had both resigned from the MCM in January 2005, but were then retained by the department as consultants for a further period of 12 months from March 2005, their services being limited to 180 hours per
34 month each. In May of that year they both assumed directorships and a shareholding in Feike (Pty) Ltd (Feike News 2006).
According to Ponte and van Sittert both Kleinschmidt and Moolla (2007, p. 459) two of the key figures involved in the quota allocation process, resigned from the MCM due to their having been accused of ‘racism and lack of transformation’ at a formal briefing of the portfolio committee on environment and tourism.
In November 2006, the government published in their official medium a refined definition for subsistence fishers (Government Gazette 2006), which read…
“people who personally harvest marine resources as a source of food or sell their harvest to end users locally to meet their basic needs; they operate near to shore or in estuaries, live in close proximity to the resource, use low technology gear [often as part of a long-standing community-based or cultural practice], and the kinds of resources they harvest generate only sufficient returns to meet basic needs or food security”.
During 2004, an organisation known as Masifundise, a registered non profit trust organisation, together with seven other applicants, instituted a class action litigation against the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (Jaffer et al. 2004). This action stemmed from a process which Masifundise had instituted to identify and establish the reasons for the difficulties to which the fishing communities along the West and Southern coats were exposed. The process itself incorporated the hosting of the Fisher Peoples Human Rights hearings, held in August 2003. Five commissioners were chosen to receive submissions from the different communities affected, and after having processed all of these, the commission drew up a host of findings. Masifundise then embarked on a campaign to gain an audience with the relevant government departments, being Marine Coastal Management and its parent the Department for Environment and Tourism.
35
Having failed to gain adequate attention, the litigation was instituted, and was heard by the Equality Court in 2005. On May 5, 2007 Judge Nathan Erasmus issued an order to the respondent in the case, being the MCM and DEAT (Erasmus 2007).
It was on the basis of this court order that the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism announced on May 3, 2007 the Interim Relief Measure (Van Schalkwyk 2007) to accommodate fishers located along the western and southern Cape coasts, whose situation had remained virtually unchanged since the introduction of the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998. This agreement was then realised with Masifundise, the essence of which was that a limited number of 1000 bona fide traditional artisanal fishers would be identified, dependent on a set of criteria jointly arrived at with Masifundise, and that these fishers would be allowed to legally fish and sell a basket of sea produce until April 15, 2008. This breakthrough for artisanal fishers was even more significant as it was a deviation from the norm, which was to ‘licence’ a particular category to a specific fish specie or resource. The rider to this however was the prerequisite that the identified fishers must have applied for and be in the possession of, a valid recreational fishing permit.
The minister’s action was met with favourable response from Masifundise as well as Feike, who’s spokesperson Shaheen Moolla was reported as saying that the ‘affected fishing communities must be acknowledged for providing a solution that was immediately workable and credible’, and that a challenge facing the government was that this process ‘was not hijacked by opportunists’ (Morris 2007). According to Jaffer of Masifundise and as reported in the same article, the fisher’s catch would be limited and as they would need to launch and land from specific sites, details of their ‘movements and harvest’ would be recorded by monitors.
36 An equally significant event happened at this time. With the initiating of a new process of developing a fishing policy for the traditional ‘small-scale fishing sector’, this process was given a boost through the signing of a court order, which declared that those groups involved would engage in preparing a new policy and legislative process that would include all traditional fishers in South Africa. Inherent in this court order was the acknowledgment that these fishers had to date been excluded from the rights allocation process.
A rider to this development was the definition once again of what were the characteristics of subsistence versus artisanal versus traditional small-scale fishers. According to Pedersen and Sunde (2007 p. 2) the ‘overlapping and shifting nature’ of these fisheries made it difficult to arrive at any one definition. Because of this, international practice has adopted the term small- scale fishers to include all of these. Such practice has also been adopted by the local communities and organisations, where at a panel discussion hosted by an organisation known as PLAAS (the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies) on November 13, 2008 the director of Masifundise (Naseegh Jaffer) personally stated that for the sake of discussion and understanding going forward, that the terms artisanal, traditional and small- scale fishers encompassed the same group of people.
In December 2007, the DEAT made available a Draft Policy for the Transfer of Commercial Fishing Rights. Clearly stated in this document was that the transfer of ‘subsistence and small-scale commercial fishing rights’ did not form part of this proposal (Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2007).
The disgruntlement and disillusionment of the small-scale fishers of the West and South Cape coasts continued, and the response of the Witsands fisher community to their plight was captured in a film, in which violent and aggressive behaviour was promulgated. The intentions of this group were made abundantly clear, and the effect it has on the viewer is a sobering reality check (This gun makes me a man 2008). A copy of this film is appended to this essay.
37 However, it was reported in February that the public participation in the meetings arranged by the DEAT and hosted in the Garden Route area, was limited, with only a few fishers registering their input (Van Zyl 2007). The purpose of the meetings according to MCM, was to allow fishers to discuss the proposed new draft subsistence and small-scale commercial fishery policy. According to Errol Sargint, treasurer for Buffalo City Fishers, an entity representing 72 subsistence fishers in the region, most of the fishers did not attend because ‘previous attempts to allocate long-term fishing rights were fruitless’, adding that over the last three years and as a result of not having permits, they had been forced to ‘barter for other necessities’.
At the beginning of April 2008, the West Coast Rock Lobster Association instituted legal proceedings in the Cape Town High Court against the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and the 1242 small scale subsistence fishers, who had been enjoying the relief measure implemented the previous year. In a statement issued on March 17, 2008 (www.environment .gov.za. 17032008.doc), the minister of the DEAT stated that the department was in the process of developing fishing policies in order to accommodate the bona fide traditional and subsistence fishers along the western and southern Cape coasts. He acknowledged further that the government was working alongside both Masifundise and Coastal Links, a community based network of fishing coastal communities in the Western Cape [established in 2004 with the assistance of Masifundise], adding that the allocation of fishing rights to the poorest fishers was a priority, and that he had hoped for the support of the West Coast Rock Lobster industry, which was obviously not forthcoming (Van Schalkwyk 2008).
In an interview held with Andy Johnston of the Artisanal Fishers Association (Atwood 2008, p. 54-55), his standpoint was reported as one where through the actions of the West Coast Rock Lobster Association taking the fishers to court, a situation had developed where it was a case of ‘them versus us’. Johnston added that the ‘gloves were off’ and it was no longer an issue of technicalities, but one of politics.
38 Whilst the ANC always had a fishing desk, it was this incident that sparked COSATU into encouraging all organisations involved in fishing activities along the Western and Southern Cape coasts particularly, to act together through the desk. On Cosatu’s involvement, Johnston’s response was that they had been involved with the formulation of the new fishing policy, and also have in recent times recognised the fact that there were social problems being experienced amongst the fisher communities. The fisheries policy will have to be changed he added, a specific issue quoted by Johnston being the fact that ‘one person actually had 40 quotas’, a situation that came about through the Individual Transferable Quota system (ITQ), where those who had the financial resources were able to secure the quotas. The ANC fishing desk will play an active role in the formulation of the policy for subsistence and artisanal fishers, said Johnston.
The policy format of individual rights needs to be done away with, and a new way of structuring the industry needs to be adopted, being one based on ‘cooperatives or associations’. Johnston’s organisation has developed an acronym CREAD, which stands for Control, Regulate, Equitable, Access, Distribute as well as the concept TURF, the Territorial User Right in Fisheries.
During October 2008, the Cape High Court dismissed this application by the West Coast Rock Lobster Association to stop Minister Van Schalkwyk from issuing crayfish catching rights to these traditional fishers, a court ruling that was obviously welcomed by the traditional fishers organisations who had supported the Minister’s actions. Naseegh Jaffer, Director of Masifundise Development Organisation, was quoted as saying ‘this is a great victory in the struggle of poor fishers to put food on the table’ (Jaffer 2008). The interim relief measure was officially extended to April 15, 2009 by the State Attorney (Manuel 2008, p. 1), with a rider included that if the policy on ‘small-scale and subsistence fishers’ was not finalised by that time, then the status of the resource would need to be reassessed, with the view to possibly extending the special consideration into the new season.
39 Whilst the above issue was unfolding, at a meeting held in Port Elizabeth in November 2007, branded the Small-scale Fisheries National Summit, a National Joint Task Team (NJTT) was elected. The responsibility given the NJTT was to develop and formulate a small-scale fisheries policy, through the collective input of all identified role players. These included national and provincial government, representatives from fishing communities, Artisanal Fishers Association, Masifundise and Coastal Links.
Pedersen et al (2008) in their document on the new Small-scale Fisheries Policy highlighted a number of principles that would need to be included there-in. These included the principles of firstly, Community Based Fishing Rights (Pedersen et al 2008 p. 8), where according to the authors it was apparent that fishers wanted to have a decisive say regarding who should and who shouldn’t qualify for fishing rights, and by so doing take on the power to decide at community level. What is envisaged is that the community would be allocated a specific Total Allowable Catch or Total Allowable Effort, and it would be up to the co-management committees put in place, to distribute these rights to those qualified to participate as small-scale fishers. This effectively, they propose, would lead to individuals gaining individual fishing rights. A second principle was that of TURF, a Territorial User Rights system where fishers were operating in an area earmarked exclusively for that particular sector. That is, other stake holders not identified as traditional fishers would not be allowed to operate in that zone. Once again it would be up to the co-management committees to regulate and manage what Pedersen et al term ‘inputs and outputs’, where the former relates to issues such as days at sea, or number of vessels, and the latter being regulations such as the TAC, closed season and bag limits. A further principle proposed was that of the basket system, where fishers are entitled to harvest different species at different times of the year i.e. they are not restricted to one particular specie to harvest for their livelihood.
Further issues were the management of the fishery or rather the co- management thereof, and the inclusion of fisher’s knowledge in the compilation of scientific data.
40
The NJTT had set themselves a deadline of March 2008 for getting a draft copy of their intentions gazetted by the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.
Masifundise (2008), as stated on their website identify some of these as a combination of aspects of the TURF system, as an ALTERNATIVE to the current policy. These are the implementation of an Exclusive Zone that is ONLY for the use of artisanal fishers, being 1-8 or 10 nautical miles, as well as the implementation of the basket rights concept which would give the fishers the right to catch any species of marine life, provided that there is no specific restriction in place due to a particular specie being under threat. Effort controls would also be implemented, thus controlling the amount of effort per species, through size and number restraints, and finally a register would need to be put in place, serving as a record of who has qualified to participate. This proposed system would need to be managed, and it is envisaged that a co-management structure be put in place, representative of Marine Coastal Management and the register of fishers as well as local government. Rules, regulations and agreements would be formulated collectively, and ongoing liaison is envisaged to allow the system to work effectively.
In order for this ‘alternative’ system to be successful, Masifundise proposes that three initiatives need to be put in place, the first being that in their opinion MCM will need to change their stance in order to allow for an increased opportunity for fishers to participate in decision making. Secondly, MCM scientists would need to tap into and integrate the indigenous knowledge of these fishers into their research and findings and thirdly, that the fishing community themselves will need to accept that they also will need to modify their actions in order to work cooperatively with the MCM as well as their fellow fishers.
41
2008 saw an increase in union awareness of the activities of the fishing industry as a whole. Using as a launch point the Tiger Brands Competitions Act transgressions of the previous year, the local provincial secretary for the Western Cape of COSATU, Tony Ehrenreich was quoted in the Business Times (Jordan 2008). In addressing the issue of quotas holdings in the hake industry, Ehrenreich was quoted as saying that it’s a ‘food security issue for South Africa’, and continued by adding that the BEE ‘guys are not necessarily advancing the sustainability of the resource and benefits to the communities’.
The area of focus of this research will therefore be the conflict that surrounds the small-scale artisanal fisher community, the fishers themselves as well as the organisations that lend them support, such as the Artisanal Fishers Association of South Africa, Masifundise and Coastal Link. Based on occurrences over the last few months, a further ‘ally’ would seem to be Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism themselves.
However, only part of the problem is addressed here – a further and more threatening issue is that of the actual quotas awarded the various sectors of the in-shore fishing industry, the process of attaining these and the issue of cost. The other role players in this conflict are the individual fishing sectors that are impacted by the redistribution of limited resources, such as in the incidence above, the West Coast Rock Lobster Association.
The issue of status and recognition of the artisanal fisher community therefore cannot be seen in isolation…it starts with limitations placed on the harvesting of limited and fluctuating resources within the fishing industry, and cascades downwards through all levels of participation and involvement.
42 1.5 Aims and objectives
The AIMS of this research project are…
…to gain recognition for the Small-Scale Artisanal Fisher Sector as a role player in the fishing sector, from the other participants involved in this industry.
…to provide motivation for this sector to be included in Government’s classification and categorisation as an acknowledged and recognised entity, and therefore to be included in the Marine Living Resources Act.
...to create an atmosphere of understanding and acceptance of all role players, by all role players involved in the current dispute.
…to develop a climate whereby a possible alternative method of fishing rights allocation, monitoring and management for the Small-Scale Artisanal Fishers may be considered.
The OBJECTIVES are…
…to undertake a thorough investigation of the positioning of all role players in the dispute, being the Government through the DEAT, the small scale artisanal fishers and the various corporate entities who currently share the same resource. This would be across all fish categories and species that are impacted in the area of focus.
…through a process of consultation with key players, either through one-on- one interventions or through facilitated group sessions, to gain full understanding of the viewpoints of all entities involved.
…to create an environment which would allow key role players the opportunities to put across to others their perspectives, positions and beliefs.
43 The HYPOTHESIS is…
This research study will demonstrate that the small-scale artisanal fishing sector…
…is a recognised sector of the in-shore and near-shore fishing community that rightfully deserves the granting of fish quotas, and that this quota allocated is not specie specific, but of a cross specie variety.
…has a right of free access to the sea, and is therefore able to harvest the quota allotments unfettered by onerous licensing fees.
…is willing and competent to self-regulate their harvesting activity, and are therefore accountable for their actions.
44 Chapter 2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Specifics here are the statement of the problem itself, as well as a literature review and literature study that includes relevant references to the research problem.
2.1 Statement of the Problem
The purpose of this study is to address the conflicts that have come about through the changes to the quota allocation system, as a result of the introduction of The Marine Living Resources Act of 1998, and the impact that this had on all participants in the industry, specifically the small-scale artisanal fisher community.
In particular
… to evaluate how differently the allocation of limited resources could be spread equitably across the full spectrum of participants. …to address also the ethical ramifications of ‘paper quotas’ and the process whereby recipients of quotas were identified. …to consider what alternatives exist in the granting of quotas to small-scale artisanal fishers, other than having to pay for them. … to contemplate alternative methods of catch data compilation, through self- governance and management.
And through transparent, open and honest communications and interactions, to consider the establishment of a self-governing oversight body within the small-scale artisanal fisher sector which would allow for a situation of equitable opportunity, based on free access in a controlled environment.
45
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Local scenario
The small-scale artisanal fisher community has for decades been the victim of non-inclusion in the state determined structures within the fishing industry of this country. Prior to 1994, this sector was forced to operate on an illegal footing in order to survive, being to a large extent ‘excluded from accessing marine resources in their own right’ (www.masifundise.org.za./about). And this in a climate where the capital intensive and export-orientated industry flourished. Since 1994, even though radical changes have been made to legislation and policies controlling the population’s access to the nation’s marine resources, it would seem that the fishing rights allocation system is still biased against small-scale fishers, and continues to favour large-scale commercial fishing entities. These communities continue to be aggrieved at their marginalised and excluded status.
According to Fig (1996 p. 3) in the apartheid years the local coastal communities lost their independent access to marine resources, whilst the larger enterprises dominated the quotas. He adds that whatever policy was implemented by government would need to be monitored very closely to ensure that ‘equity prevails’. If this does not happen, the risk is that many of these communities’ livelihoods will remain only seasonal, and would be ‘dependent on the whims of larger marine corporations’. In the same article, Fig (1996 p. 2) sounds a warning with regard to environmental conflicts, where he argues that without proper mechanisms in place for the resolving of such issues, the outcomes of these would be 'random and unpredictable’. Protracted disputes are more likely to occur under these situations, which in itself would exacerbate ‘insecurities of local communities, decision makers and potential investors’.
46 From research undertaken to date, there have been dissertations published relevant to the plight of the in-shore fisher communities, albeit in a slightly different context to that of this research.
Most specifically, a report undertaken by Isaacs (1999) highlights the conflicts confronting the South African Fishing industry and a cross section of the fishing communities of the Western Cape, including those of Hout Bay and Kalk Bay. This account addresses the issue of managing the marine resources whilst simultaneously empowering the local fishing communities through a proposed share-holding scheme. A similar but less specific report was presented by Killian (1997), who approaches the issue of conflict within the fishing community through addressing the uprooting of these communities through the development of the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront. Killian documents further the resultant negative impact on their ability to work and live in the dockland area, together with the disruption of their sense of place, and social and cultural identities.
Mathee (2002) in his dissertation looks at fishing quotas allocated to the small scale, traditional fisher folk of Hawston on the East coast, and the problems and prospects that are related to this. A further study undertaken by Witbooi (2002), addresses the issue of legitimising subsistence fishing in South Africa, and specifically addressing the balance between the sustainability of the resource and the economic and social rights of the community.
Bronn (1980) focussed research effort into the owner-skipper segment of the fishing industry at that time, and addressed specifically the disposal of their catches, a situation where the fishermen were forced to sell their fish to the large fishing companies. Again a situation of having to restrict the quantity of fish harvested by this sector, but at the same time, looking after the interests and the welfare of private boat owners. Bronn proposed that to best serve the joint need, a cooperative be established for private boat owners, where some form of guarantee be put in place to allow these fishers to market their catch equitably.
47
In a study of the Berg River Mouth Fishing Community, Cadle (1983) focuses on the plight of this West Coast community whose lifestyles and existence were affected by the development and introduction by pelagic industry of sophisticated technology. A question of diminishing catches and increased legislation had impacted on the community’s growth rate, the socio-economic impact of which was a shifting away from fishing as a livelihood, Cadle’s contention being the lack of representation of the fishing community at a Fisheries Management level.
In an article ‘Food Security in South Africa: The Case of Subsistence Fishers’ (Schmidt 2005), that appeared on the website of the Alternative Information and Development Centre (AIDC), reference is made to a case study and research undertaken in the communities of the West and Southern Cape coasts. Through a host of different questions posed to a cross section of fishers, information was gained relating to their lifestyles and livelihoods. In essence, Schmidt concludes that the study highlights the ‘intersection between state policy which promotes export led growth, and the interests of the domestic elites anxious to maximise their profits’. She continues by stating that in the name of ‘conservation, market efficiency and investment, traditional fishers have been marginalised and impoverished’. She alludes further to new entrants in the industry who even though they have ‘no knowledge’ of fishing, and in fact are not solely reliant on this as a form of livelihood, have gained access to the detriment and exclusion of some fisher communities.
Lamberth, in his dissertation on commercial beach-seine fishing along the Southern and Western Cape shorelines, explores the relationships between this fishing community and so-called recreational anglers, as well as commercial line fisheries (1994, p. 2). The main thrust of this study however, was to explore allegations made at that time that the commercial beach-seine fishery in False Bay was jeopardising and having a detrimental effect on the ecology of the Bay. In the course of his investigation, it was reported by Lamberth that the number of beach-seine licences had been reduced over a
48 15 year period from 102 to a total of 7 in 1990. Thereafter, these licence holders had been subjected to a variety of restrictions ranging from what fishing gear they were allowed to use, what methods were permitted, when they could fish, and specific to this essay, where they could fish. These restrictions were resisted by the seine net fishers, their claim being that their catches were not significantly detrimental to either recreational or commercial line catches, nor was it having a significant impact on the ecology.
Furthermore, they considered these restrictions to be both an infringement on their traditional rights, and also that these would have a detrimental impact on the financial viability and sustainability of their businesses.
The upshot of this research was that the majority of perceptions relating to beach-seine fishing were false. These included the position that beach-seine fisheries were targeting ‘angling’ species where their traditional catch was that of harders, stock depletions were a direct result of beach-seine activity, and that the type of net used and methods employed caused damage to the sea bed, resulted in mortalities of non-target organisms as well as in cartilaginous species. Lamberth asserts therefore that the real issue that caused the conflict between recreational angles and the beach-seine fisheries was that of too many fishermen competing for a limited and diminishing resource (1994, p. 105).
The rights of access by both sectors was undeniable, he continues, adding that a study should be undertaken to evaluate the relative value of each type of activity in terms of socio-economic criteria, so as to be able to ‘allot proportions of catch and effort’ to either, or both. Almost 15 years on, the plight of some of these beach-seine fishers would seem to be unchanged. Areas such as Klein Vishoek along the coastline, a traditional beach-seine fishing area, have been closed to this activity, thus depriving the community that survived off this practice for generations, their means of livelihood.
According to Sulaiman Achmat (S. Achmat 2008, pers. comm. December 3), this area of operation or trek as it is more colloquially known, in the
49 Simon’s Town vicinity, had been in operation since the 1800’s, the first reported fisher being a Safar Jaffa who plied his trade originally in an area that became known as Jaffa Beach. With the expansion of the SA Naval Dockyard in 1969, Jaffa and his trek-net activity was relocated to Klein Vishoek Beach. Through the implementation of the Group Areas Act the exercise became logistically impractical, as the fishers were not able to reach the fishing area timeously, transport and other issues playing a significant part. Achmat was then handed the rights to fish the beach by Jaffa, with the undertaking that he would look after Jaffa's family and provide some 30 breadwinners with work. In 2002, Achmat’s permit to beach-seine fish this stretch of coastline was withdrawn, and according to him, a number of issues still require answers, ranging from lack of consultation with fishers themselves, no prior warning being given, other trek net operations were sanctioned in the areas not traditionally beach-seine fishing areas, and to individuals who had no previous involvement in the industry, to name but a few.
This situation is captured in an interview and workshop session hosted with this community as reported later in this study.
2.2.2 International scenario
Looking further abroad, a related issue is currently being experienced in New Zealand where in an effort by the government to protect the marine biodiversity, legislative processes have been put in place to protect the environment (Bess and Rallapudi 2007). Resultant conflicts due to these legislations have involved the fishers themselves, in this instance Maori, the country’s indigenous people, and those pursuing the sustaining of fish stocks and the protection of the marine environment. In other words they are looking for a balance between the use of the fisheries resources and the protection of the environment. Bess and Rallapudi’s conclusion was that through inconsistent legislative obligations and the contrasting processes that each have resulted in, spatial conflicts have been brought about, as well as a race
50 for the allocation of space. They propose further that in order to engender and sustain a balance between the use of the available fisheries resources and the protection of the marine environment, ‘specific legislative obligations need to be integrated’.
Gartrell (1997, p. 14) in his writings on the management of the natural resources in Cambodia, accuses that government of not having a coherent strategy for the managing of its resources, and in this instance, the fisheries sector. He contends that the primary initiative in developing and implementing a more sustainable resource use is the achievement of food self-sufficiency, adding that at the time of writing, no long term strategy was in place. The comparison between the Philippine example and that of the West and South coast artisanal predicament exists in that the approach adopted by their Ministry of Agriculture to the management of resources, is not unlike that of our own government. A top down, regulated and control oriented strategy is how Gartrell describes it, where the belief is that it is the responsibility of government to manage resources judiciously. The riders however are that weak enforcement and limited compliance are the realities, where the government constantly points the finger at the villagers blaming them for the decline in the resources, and by so doing end up in situations of conflict. Gartrell argues that by recognising the potential for villagers’ input into ‘sustainable, community based models’, the potential conflict issues could be diminished.
Attempts have been made by the Cambodian government to control and improve the development of their fisheries, through the implementation of Fisheries laws; these laws using control and enforcement as a means of managing the situation. Three levels of fishing have been identified, being family subsistence, middle scale artisanal and large scale industrial fishing. Two seasons are operative, a Closed season and an Open season, where only subsistence fishing is allowed throughout the year. The system operates on a ‘holding’ system, where the holdings are auctioned off and leased to fishing entities for periods of two years at a time. This lease and licence fee for commercial fishing is one which is susceptible to manipulation (Gartrell
51 1997, p. 27), as lease holders underestimate their yields, as the costs of their leases are directly proportionate to their catches. The critical issue however, is the role played by the Department of Fisheries, who operate according to Gartrell as a form of private business, in that they sell off community resources as industrial leases, a situation he adds that demonstrates little commitment to the welfare of fishing communities. Control in this sector is exercised by wealthy folk and their agents, with the bidding for fishing lots occurring among a select grouping of individuals.
The Cambodian government have come to realise that a top down strategy of enforcement does not work (Gartrell 1997, p. 38). As is the case locally, non government and independent organisations have been active in directing the focus to community organisation and participation, where the aim of government policy should be directed towards resource user groups.
Comparative examples of similar fisher community issues can be drawn from Peru and Chile. In the Peru example the Lake Titicaca fisher community of Peru are classified as one of artisanal, with a low level of capitalisation, using simple fishing gear and small fishing craft (Levieil and Orlove 1990, pp. 362- 382). Approximately two thirds of the catch is sold by the fishers for cash, with the balance of one sixth being consumed by the fishermen’s households or relatives and neighbours whom they supply freely, and a sixth used for bartering purposes.
With the in-shore fisher community of Peru, through government intervention, an exclusive zone for small-scale fishers was established. The government bought out the existing rights holders at that time, and instituted the policy for the recognition of this sector.
The Peruvian fisher communities manage their aquatic resources through a system of ‘communal fishing territories’ (Levieil et al, p. 367), with each of these rectangle shaped territories relating to a specific lake shore community, and where community members have informal exclusive rights to that area.
52 Monitoring of each other’s activities is a relatively simple task, the communities being of such a size that it is not a burdensome pursuit, with the communities being aware at all times of the conduct of their own and other’s members. Whilst the Peruvian government do deploy a coast guard system, the local communities in the main ignore the regulations as stipulated by them. Disputes between the fishing communities therefore, are settled outside of a court room, and it is seldom that someone would decide to go the legal route in pursuance of a grievance.
Although the fishing territories are communally held, the individual members of the community are willing to bear the costs of enforcement, a necessary practice in order to stave off trespassers, as they are committed to preserving the spatial integrity of the community, compounded by a concern that individual access would be diminished if outsiders were to be allowed to operate within these areas.
However in August 2004 (O’Riordan 2007, p. 43) the Peruvian Ministry of Production called in the country’s navy to establish control measures on the activities of what were called vikingos chicos (little Vikings) and bolichitos (mini-purse-seines). An issue and behaviour that O’Riordan describes as ‘fierce conflict’ between artisanal fishermen and aquaculture endeavours over the issue of access rights in the coastal fishing communities.
Local organisations formed to address the plight of the traditional fishing sector, and in particular the Artisanal Fishers Association, have over the past years aligned themselves with the Philippines fishing sector. According to Bernardino (2005), the Philippines has what he classifies as a ‘small-scale underdeveloped’ fishing industry, that employs a labour force of some 1,6 million, of which the majority are classified as artisanal fishers. This translates to a household populace of some 6 million who are dependent on fishing for their livelihoods. Coupled with this is the realty that the incidence of poverty in this sector stands at 53%, way ahead of the national average of 30%.
53 Bernardino’s presentation centred around trade liberalisation policies, and whilst he believes tariff reduction measures are essential for the good of the environment, the protection of small-scale fishers and the management and conservation of the resource should be the priority.
According to an article entitled ‘Growing demand and Local Communities: The Socio-economics of Capture Fisheries’ (Williams 2007), with small-scale fishers being set alongside commercial operations, compounded by a growing number of participants active in the industry and with individual fish catches declining, individual net earnings were on the decline. Simultaneously, according to the author, small-scale fishers and their families are being ‘priced out’ of an essential source of protein. In the Philippines, fish ‘provides more than half of the population’s animal protein’, and with a growing population demanding more fish, the Philippines did not address the problem by focussing on the fishing sector alone. An integrated approach was adopted which addressed the realities of a rapid population growth and a decline in the fish reserves, by providing the communities with ‘reproductive health and coastal resource management training’.
The threat to small-scale fishers in the Philippines is much as it is in other developing counties, where the fishers are ‘threatened’ by commercial fishing, where the commercial effort is slowly encroaching on the domain of the small- scale fishers by moving closer to shore. As a competitive defence method, the Philippine fishers adopted a dynamite technique, and soon derived the dubious moniker of ‘dynamite fishing capital of the world’. In efforts to address the decline in their fish resources, the mayors from 800 to 850 coastal communities shared the problems and challenges, and discovered that much of these problems were the same. What they did realise was that they needed to have in place as a basic service, a coastal management system, to be known as Coastal Resource Management (CRM). The bottom line was that the local governments needed to start appreciating and understanding their potential loss by not managing their fisheries and coastal environment.
54 According to the same article by Williams, the small-scale fishing sector cannot be fixed by addressing its problems in isolation – what was needed was government, on both a local and international scale, to focus also on commercial fishing and poaching.
More recently, the government of the Philippines have instituted an exclusive zone reserved for small-scale fishers extending 15 nautical miles out (Masifundise 2008).
An interesting perspective on small-scale fisheries was that of the amount of fuel consumed by small-scale fishers in their catch effort, compared to that of the average large-scale industrial fisheries (Small-scale fisheries more sustainabe 2008). According to Jennifer Jacquet, a University of British Columbia PhD candidate, the small-scale sector employs some 12 million people world-wide, compared to that of 500 000 in the industrial sector. A comparison of the fuel subsidies received when calculated on a per capita basis for both sectors, revealed that there was a 200 fold disparity in what the industrial sector received compared to the small-scale fishers. Further, according to Jacquet, small-scale fisheries use less fuel to harvest their fish. The type of fishing gear utilised by small-scale fishers resulted in far less destruction to deep sea environments, and that as this gear was selective, the result was very little discarding of unwanted fish, with almost all of their catch being used for human consumption.
In research undertaken by Ruttenburg (2001, pp. 1691- 1699) the effects of artisanal fishing was determined in the communities of the Galapagos Islands; the result of which showed that the direct effects of their endeavours were limited to the primary targeted specie. What Ruttenburg did conclude however (2001, p. 1698) was that it was essential that the fishers themselves as well as the local communities, developed an improved understanding of ecological interactions, as well as instituting an increased ecological and fishery monitoring behaviour. Further, that it was vital that effective precautionary management was needed to ensure that the effects of human interaction and participation, were kept to a minimum.
55
According to Acheson and Knight (2000, pp. 209-238) one of the success stories of an industry which has successfully developed a conservation ethic, is that of the Maine Lobster Industry of the United States. What is significant is their contention that this development has been connected in an important way to changing ways of thinking with regard to the rate at which ‘future benefits are discounted’. Where the conditions are in place where people are aware of the fact that the resource will continue into the future, coupled with a strong enforcement of rules adopted by the authorities and other fishers, it was contended that people did not deviate from the rules. The converse also applies, where the discount rate is high and law enforcement less certain, people compete as hard as possible to gain as much of the available resource as they can, which could lead to the ‘tragedy of the commons’. Acheson et al postulate that the vital question and challenge facing resource management is how to engender and develop a sense of stewardship amongst the users of the natural resource, which inevitably will result in changes in attitudes and values (Acheson et al 2000. p. 234)
2.2.3 Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ)
The concept of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) is one that has drawn much debate, with those both for and against drawn into argument on both a local and international basis. Grafton (2005, pp. 375-379), of the Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government, Australian National University, in a refute to an essay published by a Peter Orebech, argues that the ITQ system has assisted in helping maintain access to the industry by fishers, through ‘ensuring both a sustainable and profitable fishery’. He positions the ITQ system further, as one where holders may voluntarily chose to sell or lease their quota to someone else, and that there is no obligation for anyone holding an ITQ, to either sell their quota or exit the fishery. Grafton maintains further that in order for fishers to take into consideration the cost of their actions on others, a solution he believes necessary to counter over exploitation, incentives would need to be in place either on an individual or collective basis.
56 He adds that successful community-based rights and/or a properly managed ITQ system would realise that solution.
According to Townsend (1992, p. 185) the economic theory of fisheries management can be categorised into either of two distinct programmes, the first being that of limited entry, which he contends has never been able to reduce the total fishing effort significantly, as it invariably has been implemented after a fishing activity has been considered excessive, and the individual transferable quota system (ITQ). His description of the ITQ system is one where ‘stock certificates’ are issued to individuals whereby the holder is entitled to harvest either a specified amount of fish, or a specified percentage of the total annual quota of that particular fish specie. These quota share ‘certificates’ can be freely exchanged, and ‘both economic theory and practical experience support the benefits of free transfer’. Townsend cites examples where the implementation of ITQ’s have borne good results, examples of these being in Australia and the southern blue-fin tuna industry, the freshwater fisheries of Ontario, the east coast surf clam industry and the demersal ITQ programme in Iceland.
However, he contends that the ITQ programme does have a major drawback, and that is in the implementation of enforcement. Industries that have suffered due to this particular problem were Canada’s purse seine fishery for herring, and the mackerel fishery of south west England. A possible solution to the problems of enforcement is through the implementation of some form of ‘choke point’, where all landings need to be channelled. These can either be on board the ship itself, at the dockside or at the processing plant. The difficulty in enforcement is exacerbated when dealing with harvesting activities where there is more than one specie of fish being harvested at any one time.
Townsend asserts further that there is an alternative form of limited entry available, and that is the issuing of ‘fractional licences’. A practice whereby the issuing authorities give out only part of a licence as opposed to full licences to the qualifying fishers. What is interesting is that Townsend asserts that this form of licensing is an attractive option open to fisheries who are
57 needing to contend with two specific issues, firstly where difficulties of enforcement render an ITQ unattractive, and secondly, where political forces result in the ‘issuance of too many licences under traditional limited entry’.
Copes defines the ITQ system as one where a fixed share of the catch is allocated in advance to individual operators (1986, p. 279). One of the advantages put forward by Copes, is that in theory, the system allows for those holding an ITQ, within the confines of a TAC system being in place, to harvest their catch in their own time and thereby spreading their catch effort over the entire season, a practice where economies of equipment usage and manpower are optimised. ITQ managed fisheries, according to Gibbs (2006, p. 112), have been able to reduce the impact of one of the key management issues in global fisheries, that of ‘gross over-capitalisation and effort’. Copes in his article, also raises the stumbling block of enforcement, and its corollary ‘quota busting’, the practice of catching a larger quantity of fish than one’s quota allows.
A further issue of ITQ management is that of ‘data fouling’…where fishers are required to report on their catches, but are also prone to ‘quota busting’, the information given over will invariable be less as the fisher will undoubtedly under report his or her catch, in order to evade the consequences. Copes states further that in some industry where there are limited, open window periods to harvest specific fish specie, resulting in a ‘race for fish’, the ethics of quota compliance can be ignored. Multi-specie fisheries where an ITQ programmes are in place, are according to Cope extremely difficult to manage. An example would be where a directed effort towards one specie inevitably results in the by-catch of another specie.
Seasonal variations also have an impact on the effectiveness of an ITQ programme, with the resultant ‘race for fish’ again being an issue. This results in ‘capital stuffing’ which Copes (1986, p. 280) defines as ‘excessive capacity build-up under limited entry licensing commonly marked by technological advances involving higher capital inputs’. The setting of the Total Allowable Catch is hampered by a system of ITQ, specifically in the instance where
58 quotas are not filled, and the holders have not had sufficient time to transfer unused portions to others. The situation where the ITQ’s have not been fully realised will result in the TAC, which is set to mark the optimum catch for a specie, not being reached. According to Copes, the TAC setting authorities therefore have the dilemma of where to peg the next seasons catch.
The transitional gains trap is a practical reality which has befallen some governments in their attempts to solve problems of income deficiency, through the rationalisation of fisheries (Copes, p. 287). An example cited is that of the British Columbia salmon rationalisation programme, where limited entry licences were made transferable. The initial reduction in capacity through buy-back, combined with a situation where fish prices rose dramatically, resulted in some ‘rents and future rents’. This value was capitalised in the price charged for the licence on transfer, with the result that many fishermen who had bought these licences, found themselves in severe financial difficulties, the upshot being the seizure of their vessels.
Copes summarises his composition (1986, p. 290) by stating that the problems that can be experienced through the implementation of an ITQ programme, should be sufficient to caution those considering putting such a plan in place. He suggests that in the choice of management system to be deployed, an array of fisheries management devices should be considered, the end ‘product’ being a combination that is ‘most beneficial and least deficient in any particular set of circumstances.’ His final comment is one to be noted: ‘we must reconcile ourselves to the fact that the best possible solutions will still be flawed’.
In a presentation made in June, Copes addressed what he believed to be the negative impacts that came about as a result of the implementation of ITQ’s (2003, p. 1). Quoting ‘significant environmental losses’ and adverse social impacts, he ascribed these to ‘detrimental fisheries management requirements’ and ‘harmful, system-induced fishing practices’. These translated into high-level capitalisation of fishing access rights, which caused adverse social impacts due to broadening income disparities.
59 He contended further that local access rights had suffered as well as the viability of coastal communities who were dependent on small-scale fishing endeavours, at the same time ‘favouring’ the values of ‘financial rent seekers’ over the values of investors in fishing life styles and skills, as well as community attachments.
Copes (2007, p. 7) contends further that ITQ’s do not give ‘property rights’ to the fish stocks, but only ‘privileged access rights’ to a quantum of fish that quota holders continue to ‘exploit in common’.
A system similar to that of the ITQ was introduced in the State of Florida, USA, in the highly lucrative spiny lobster industry. In an attempt to stabilise the industry through the reduction of the total number of traps that fishers may use, the Florida legislature in 1991 passed the spiny Lobster Trap and Certificate program (LTC). The LTC allowed for fishers to transfer trap certificates in a market-based system (Shivlani & Milon. 2000, p. 139-140).
The system found favour with those fishers categorised as large in that they owned more than 2 000 certificates, whilst further down the line, the small fishers, owning less than 1000 certificates, were against the programme. The majority of these small fishers believed, according to Shivlani and Milon, that the LTC system was created to benefit the large fishers.
In their paper, their conclusion was that fishery management ‘needs to be viewed in the broader perspective of integrated coastal management (ICM) because of its many nonfishery effects’. Any changes in fishery management can also have a direct impact on social strata and community identity – whilst the LTC programme had reduced trap and participant totals, the socio-cultural identity of the communities in the area had been affected. Some of these saw no replacement fishers filling the shoes of older fishers when they exited the industry, and the situation where smaller fishers were forced to sell or lease out the ‘majority’ of their certificates in order to remain in the industry. An integrated management strategy is therefore, according to the writers, an essential pre-requisite of the LTC programme.
60 New Zealand implemented a system of ITQ’s in 1986 for the majority of its fishing ventures (Dewees. 1998, p. 133), the system encompassing a number of basic tenets, some of these being that the ITQ was based on previous catch history, ten fishery management areas (FMA) were identified and set up and TAC’s determined for species within these FMA’s, and that the government would enter the market to ‘buy back’ or ‘auction off’ quotas to adjust the annual TAC’s. During the period 1987 to 1995, personal interviews were conducted with fishing entrepreneurs and owners, and a further research exercise was undertaken between 1993-1994. Two of the results from the combined research exercise showed that 1] there was an end to the ‘race for fish’ phenomenon, and 2] there was a situation where industry participants maximised their returns from quota holdings.
In a further research exercise conducted by Newell and Sanchirico (2004, pp. 437-462), the focus was on the economic issues in an industry where ITQ’s had been in place for an extended period of time, in this instance, the New Zealand fishing industry which at the time of their research, had ITQ’s in place for over 17 years. Whilst they position the New Zealand ITQ system as being a dynamic institution that has been subjected to many refinements since its inception, the basic tenet of the system has remained unchanged, that being the setting of an industry Total Allowable Catch and leaving the market to ‘determine the most profitable allocation of fishing effort’.
Craig et al (2000, pp. 61-78) talk of the TACC or the Commercial Component of the Total Allowable Catch, which is allocated to each of the IT Quota holders proportionately, as a fully transferable property right. Newell et al conclude that irrespective of the resource problem being addressed, in order to maintain efficiency gains the ability of firms to buy and sell quotas in a properly structured market is an essential. The results showed a greater increase in quota prices for fish stocks that were facing reductions, consistent with an increase in profitability as a result of rationalisation, which led them to deduce that a system of ITQ’s can be effective instruments for the efficient management of fisheries.
61 In a study undertaken by a group of Finnish researchers entitled ‘Individual Transferable Quotas in the Baltic Sea Herring Fishery: A Socio-bioeconomic Analysis’ (Kulmala et al. 2006, p. 368), the social effects of individual transferable quotas (ITQ’s) for the Finnish herring industry were analysed. The results show that the ITQ system, in that particular environment, was a viable alternative to the total allowable catch based management system that was in place at the time. The results of the interviews undertaken by the researchers led them to conclude that an ITQ system would likely be supported by the fishermen in that industry.
In an article published in the Economist (‘A Rising Tide’. September 18, 2008, p. 1), the idea that the privatising of commercial fisheries through ‘catch shares’ or ITQ’S would prevent a catastrophe where the world’s commercial fisheries would have collapsed by 2048, is an argument that was submitted, quoting economists Costello and Lynham, and biologist Gaines. One of the biggest pluses of the system, according to the article, was that it would do away with the concept of ‘race to fish’, in that the fishermen would be able to regulate their catch effort, and would also engender in them an interest in ‘good management and conservation’, because they would have a vested interest in the fishery. Examples quoted of the successful application of the system were the Alaskan halibut and king crab fisheries, as well as the Atlantic lobster fishery. In the latter example, a property based system had also emerged, where families had laid ownership to ‘parcels of sea’, and by so doing were able to keep outsiders out.
That small-scale fishers would be disadvantaged relative to the larger users in the fishing industry through the implementation of an ITQ system, was the subject of an article written by Brandt (2005, p. 15-30). According to her, there was at the time constant debate around the distribution of gains from increased efficiency and losses from restructuring that the implementation of an ITQ system would bring about. Or more simply put: ‘are the economic gains from ITQ’s unfairly distributed from one group to another?’
62 The industry of focus for this research was the surf-clam industry of the United States, and the evidence that Brandt sourced refuted the claim that ITQ’s invariably harm small-scale fishers through forcing them out of the industry to the benefit of the larger operators.
Defining the term conservation will, according to Fujita et al (1998, pp. S139- S150), result in a number of different definitions being thrown up, where fishermen, fishing managers and environmentalists will all have a different perspective and hence give different weightings to what they consider the key aspects. A combination of these definitions is given by Fujita et al, and reads that the aim of achieving conservation is ‘to ensure that fishery yields are sustainable on a long-term basis whilst simultaneously protecting ecological health’.
One of the measures advocated here is the system of the ITQ, which Fujita et al claim alleviates over-capitalisation and the ‘race for fish’, as well as the pressure for unsustainable catches. Citing examples of the success of ITQ’s, they mention the abalone industry of Australia, the British Columbia sablefish industry and the Canadian Great Lake Fisheries. Two other aspects are addressed by Fujita et al, these being the social implications, and the conservation performance of fisheries where a system of ITQ’s is in place. Focussing on the social issues, two principle fears are noted by the authors (Fujita et al. 1998, p. S146), firstly the fear that some fishers may ‘lose out’ in the initial allocation of quotas, and secondly that ITQ’s will result in extreme ‘consolidation or corporization’ of fishing fleets, and thereby resulting in changing fishing communities ‘in undesirable ways’.
Fujita et al conclude that ITQ’s are therefore no ‘panacea’, and adding that it is essential before embarking on the implementation of an ITQ system, to capture the widest feasible range of concerns and values that would address all the issues relevant to the potential outcomes of the practice.
63 A different scenario is however sketched by Eythorsson (1196, p. 281), where after analysing the practice of transferring of fishing quotas in Iceland, in part only from 1984 but freely and in full from 1991, the conclusions drawn were that the whole exercise of ITQ’s was an ‘irreversible social experiment’. The most significant consequence of this, according to Eythorsson was a ‘massive distribution of wealth and income’. He argues further that the big winners were the big quota holders…the losers being the fishermen or the fishing crews. Losers also are the local fishing communities, who lose their quota shares, the end result being the loss also of their opportunity to derive an income from fishing. Which leads Eythorsson to conclude that there was good reason to be sceptical of the ‘visions and predictions’ of the promoters of the ITQ system in that country.
In a further article published by Eythorsson (2007, p. 4) on the Icelandic fishing industry, he reasons that he will not ‘argue that there are no economic benefits from ITQ’s’, but poses the question differently by asking who in fact enjoys these benefits, and at ‘what cost to whom’.
He concludes by stating that he believes there is little doubt that the implementation of ITQ systems have had a major impact on the distribution of ‘income, wealth and power’.
During 2008 a Global Conference was hosted in Bangkok (Global Conference on Small-Scale Fisheries 4SSF. 2008, pp. 1-4), at which time a statement was presented by a group representing 36 countries, entitled Civil Society Preparatory Workshop. The statement represented a call by this group representing small-scale fishing communities and indigenous communities dependent on fisheries for life and livelihood, on the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), and listed 36 points which they wanted considered. One of these was to ‘reverse and prevent the privatisation of fisheries resources, as through individual transferable quotas (ITQ) and similar systems that promote property rights’. By inference, the international fisher communities as represented at the conference believed that the ITQ system was not in the best interest of their communities.
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ITQ’s would only be appropriate and efficient, according to Mather et al (p7), in a system of rights when the right was of ‘a form that allows the institution of a TAC’ and that these rights must be proportional to a TAC, that these rights must be unattached, tradable and divisible so as to allow for transferability, and that these rights should be of a long term nature.
2.2.4 Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQ) and Common Property Resources (CPR)
Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQ) was a quota based system whereby each individual commercial fisherman or firm, was allowed to harvest a percentage of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for that particular fishing sector. The system was operating in the United States during the 1990’s, until a moratorium was put in place by their congress in 1996, to be effective until October 2000. On reaching that quota, the IFQ, the fisherman or firm was excluded from fishing for that specific specie until the commencement of the ensuing season.
According to Baker (1999, p. 180) the allocation of IFQ’S led to greater efficiency in the fishing effort, when compared to other methods deployed such as limiting the fishing season or the types of equipment and gear that the fishers were able to utilise. In a study by the National Academy of Science’s National Research Council (NRC), it was found that without IFQ’S, a ‘derby mentality’ took over, where the pressures that the fishers experienced in the harvesting of their catches led to fierce competition. This competition saw greater investment in more sophisticated gear and vessels, resulting in the industry being financially inefficient, at the same time ‘burdening already- strapped’ local fishing communities’.
65 Pitfalls of the programme were also raised by the NRC, and of significance the concern over fair allocation. Who qualifies to be part of the system, who gets what and how much, and whether these IFQ’s were transferable were recorded as ‘key to winning support from local communities’. The major concern here would be the threat of large organisations buying up the quotas of smaller operatives, thereby aggravating unemployment in the local fishing communities.
The NRC in their conclusions, stressed that the benefits of IFQ’s should be assessed for each specific fishing sector independently, and that any decision to implement such a program should be left to each sector’s management council.
Further criticism of an IFQ program is that because of the difficulties experienced in matching quota holdings with catches, many argue that this program is not appropriate for multispecies fisheries (Sanchirico et al 2006). This position is contested by Sanchirico et al, who argue that it is possible to implement IFQ programmes for multi-species fisheries, and that the practice can be both profitable and sustainable.
Common Property Resources (CPR) are defined as those to which no individual has exclusive rights (Macfadyen and Corcoran 2002), and include an expansive range of natural environments including inter-tidal zones and marine waters. Fisheries by the definition put forward by Macfayden et al, fit squarely into the concept of ‘the tragedy of the commons’. They identify three characteristics that define this theory, being…
1} that an individual’s self-interest will prevail over the best interests of the community as a whole, 2} that the environment must be limited and 3} that the resource must be collectively owned and freely open to any user.
66 They contend further by stating that the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is a paradigm relevant in the small-scale fishers sector, where they have been more vulnerable due to a variety of different factors. Two of which are of relevance to the issue of the West and South coast fishing communities, these being where there has been a loss of community control over the resource, and where a situation of commercialisation and over-development has come about.
The resources of the ocean are sometimes referred to as the ‘common heritage of mankind’ (Clark 1981), but so often these common properties are abused. The benefits of exploitation accrue in their entirety to the individual or fisher who first takes or taps into the resource. Conversely, the long term costs of over exploitation in both the resource depletion and lack of productivity are born by all the exploiters. In his essay Clark introduced a theory of what he called the ‘fishermen’s dilemma’ – based on the games theory of the ‘prisoners dilemma’, and where he adopted just two standpoints, being either conserve or deplete. Where any exploiter acting as an individual is, according to Clark, motivated to deplete the resource, even though a lose- lose scenario is the end result. In real life situations, resources may eventually be driven to extinction by competitive exploitation (1981, p. 232).
In a paper centred on a case study of the Argentinean city of Mar Del Plata (Allen. 2001, pp. 152-173), a schematic was formulated to illustrate the writer’s thinking on the issue of sustainability of urban development. A ‘three ringed circus’ is how Allen described the diagram, with the three rings representing social, environmental and economic goals.
Sustainable development therefore, according to Allen, is the intersection of these three goals (2001, p. 154).
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Sustainable stability would therefore be arrived at when the three elements are in sync, and the three components of equity, liveability and efficiency are targeted attributes which are the result of the interactions between two of the three elements as illustrated.
68 2.3 Literature Study
In conducting a search into and around the issue of the predicament of the artisanal fisher community and the conflict they face with the fishing community as a whole, as well as the government through the Department of Environmental Affairs and Marine Coastal Management, the majority of information was obtained from publications as compiled by different organs. These included the following local websites…
Dept. of Environmental Affairs and Tourism www.environment.gov.za. Marine Coastal Management www.mcm-deat.gov. Masifundise www.masifundise.org.za. FEIKE www.feike.co.za.
Three Search Engines accessed were EBSCOHOST, JSTOR and SCIENCEDIRECT.
Library searches were also undertaken at the University of Nelson Mandela Metropolitan and the University of Cape Town.
Another source of information was newspaper articles through SA Media.
Canvassing information from organisations and their representatives specifically Masifundise, Coastal Link, Artisanal Fishers Association and the Industrial Development Corporation.
A comprehensive literature study of books, electronic data bases, the internet and journals, so as to present a conceptual framework for this research.
69 Chapter 3 PERCEPTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF ROLE PLAYERS
An overview of the beliefs, attitudes, sensitivities and viewpoints of the role players in the dilemma, being the Government and the relevant government departments, the fishing industry and the participating large corporates and medium size entities, and the in-shore fishing community, specifically the small-scale artisanal fishers.
Artisanal Fishers Association of South Africa
This association has taken on as one of its tenets, the adage of Community policing, Community responsibility and Community accountability. Their chairman is Andy Johnston, and in a discussion held with him earlier in the year, Johnston (2008, pers. comm., September 8) sketched a picture of the fishing communities along the West and South coasts, along the lines that they derive a livelihood from the sea and whilst meeting their own needs through their endeavours, are still capable of feeding sections of the poorer communities. These poor communities, he contends, are marginalised and ‘continue to struggle for survival because of the pursuit of profits by uncaring capitalists’. He continued by adding that the ITQ system was creating a ‘dysfunctional society’, and it needed to be changed if one wanted to achieve a better social order.
At a panel discussion hosted by PLAAS on November 13, 2008 Andy Johnston, representing the Artisanal Fishers Association, re-enforced his opposition to an ITQ system commenting that ‘the ITQ system is the curse of the poor’.
In a presentation delivered at the Global Conference on Small-Scale Fishers in Bangkok during October (Johnston 2008), Johnston was again critical of the ITQ system of management, calling it the ‘privatisation of the sea’ and an ‘assault on the traditional common property rights of the vulnerable fishery dependent fisher folk’.
70 Contrary to its claimed intentions, the ITQ system has become a method of denying traditional/artisanal fishing communities access to the sea, the end result being a destruction of their livelihood and ‘way of life’.
At the conference, Johnston highlighted what he considered to be the advantages of small-scale/artisanal fisheries, which included their having a lower ecological impact, generating higher employment opportunities in their communities, having high versatility and utilising less expensive technology. In the same presentation, he raises the issue of displacement, where in South Africa in particular, access to the ocean is being impeded through ‘irresponsible’ housing developments, and the expansion of recreational areas, namely golf courses.
Johnston, at the same PLAAS panel discussion (November 13, 2008), was also critical of the Quota Board and its activities, stating that of the original 20 members appointed on the board, 12 currently have interests in the industry in some way. His comments were substantiated to a degree by an article published in the Business Times of the Sunday Times in a report by Heather Formby (Formby 1997), in which she makes mention of the ‘controversy’ whereby allegations had been made that the board had given quotas to ‘smaller players in which members of the board have an interest’. She reported further that the Food and Allied Workers Union had names and were investigating.
In a recent article in which Johnson was interviewed (Attwood. 2008, p. 55), he outlined what he believed to be the most appropriate and rightful manner in dealing with what he refers to as in-shore resources. Through the inclusion of CREAD and TURF in his argument, he states that the community will be defined in an area, with the area differing from community to community due to the catch reach (some fishing near-shore, others further out to sea) of the fishers of that particular area. A Total Allowable Catch (TAC) or Maximum Sustainable Yield system would be in place for the inshore area, where the community gets the quota.
71 Under this system, the fisher would retain the profits of his endeavours, even though the community owns the quota. A further deviation to what is currently the case, is the concept of a ‘basket’ or multi-specie right to catch.
Management of the area, Johnston continues, will be through each of the fishers being registered, and being allowed to catch in that area until the TAC has been reached, where after all activity will cease. Further, there will also be ‘effort limitation’, where boat size, net size and fish size will be stipulated, measured, weighed and managed. A critical issue is that it is envisaged that the community will take ownership of the area, and will therefore look after their own resources. Through the system of TURF, the fishing communities of that area will automatically ‘police’ it, the corollary being that if ownership is given, responsibility will be assumed. In order to achieve this, there will need to be some form of training and education process in place, a field of expertise which could well be handled by NGO’s.
The West Coast Rock Lobster as a resource was being over harvested, according to Johnston, and the only way that the resource could be sustained would be when all ‘stakeholders really got together’.
An issue that will need to be addressed is that of the fishers who under the current system have a 10 year right to participate in the industry. In order to handle this, says Johnston, both systems would need to run concurrently until such time as the tenure has expired, a situation that will need to be managed, through the help of MCM as it will inevitably lead to conflict.
MCM is, according to Johnston as reported in the Attwood article, well on side with the efforts to gain recognition for the small-scale or artisanal fisher communities. Their participation could be perceived as being accelerated through the Equity Court‘s ruling in 2007, where an order was made to government to provide the interim relief measure for these fishers.
72 In an interview held with Johnston in November (A. Johnston 2008, pers. comm., November 26), he related issues that had been discussed the previous day with Marine Coastal Management (MCM). In his opinion, the Interim Measures that were currently in place, and which had given rise to the High Court action against the fishers, had resulted in a situation of ‘chaos and a circus’. The main issues that contributed to this, were according to Johnston, the increase in the number of licences or permits given to fishers by some individuals within the MCM. The initial relief granted was for a group size of 1 000…at the time of interview, close on 2 000 licences or permits had been issued. Whilst he was of the opinion that this was erroneous action on the part of MCM in allowing for additional permits to be issued, he believed that because the lobster catch period was limited, when this was over it would reveal who the ‘real’ fishermen were, in that they would need to resort to catching line fish, a pursuit that many of the new permit holders would not be able to successfully manage.
A further issue contributing to Johnston’s concern over the measures was the issue of management, where he believed that there were insufficient monitors in place to record the catch rate of the participants. The situation was worsened by the fact that the fishing inspectors believed that as the community had deployed the monitors, their involvement was no longer required, and in Johnston’s words, they ‘were standing back’. An issue of concern to Johnston was the fact that the original intentions of the scheme, being a policy of subsistence, had evolved into an ‘incentive to generate megabucks’. Johnson contends that a large quantity of the crayfish (lobster) currently being harvested by those with permits, is being exported, and the returns here are substantially greater than what income would have been derived had the fish been sold locally. Whilst this does create revenue for the holders, it also serves as an incentive to poach…by those with or without permits.
One of the ‘self criticisms’ that Johnston made (A. Johnston 2008, pers. comm., November 26) was that the whole interim measure exercise lacked leadership. The exercise was due to have been managed and led by
73 Johnston and other role players, and he believes that as a result of money being ‘on the table’, there are some who have ‘become wobbly’. Instead of focussing on the intentions of the interim measures, the accusation was made that some had concerned themselves to a greater degree with the sales and marketing of the fish.
The interim relief measure would continue, according to Johnston, until such time as the government has gazetted the new small-scale artisanal fishing policy. This new policy he believes, according to information given to him by MCM, will be ready by February 9, 2009 where after the process of gazetting gets under way.
According to Johnston, countries where the artisanal small-scale fisher communities have gained recognition, and who are operating in a manner similar to what he advocates, are the countries of Philippines and Vietnam. In these areas he contends, there is a clear focus on the ‘equitable distribution' of fishing licences, having taken into consideration factors such as livelihood dependency in addressing the social and economic problems being experienced by the fisher communities.
Ownership of the sea lies within the community, is Johnston’s contention. He does add a rider however in that he believes that there should not be open access to the sea, but that it should be regulated.
Masifundise
According to Naseegh Jaffer (PLAAS Panel Discussion November 13, 2008) there are three defined terms for groups of fishers, who are in fact all one and the same. These are artisanal fishers (a term not used by the local communities of Kalk Bay and Hout Bay), traditional fishers and small-scale fishers. What they are NOT though are subsistence fishers! What has been lost over the last 10 years, is the spirit of community. Fisher tradition saw the boats returning with their catch, the fishermen taking home some fish for their own consumption, and the balance sold…after an amount is taken, commonly
74 known as the ‘fry’, which is given to those who did NOT catch anything that day, or who were unable to fish themselves.
Jaffer also is of the opinion that the MLRA as of today, still do not make provision for the small-scale fisher sector, and in fact comments that the ‘artisanal fishers were disenfranchised’ through the implementation of this Act.
A disgruntlement voiced by Jaffer is that in the determination of the allowable catch of specific specie, the fishing policy only takes advice from the scientists only – his opinion is that an ‘integrated’ approach is not adopted, where issues such as poverty, impoverishment, and social set-up are considered. This viewpoint is endorsed by Hauck (2000, p. 2) who positions traditional knowledge as an ‘important management tool that requires close cooperation between scientists, managers and local resource users’.
Jaffer stated that whilst commitments have been given by the government, and in particular the current minister Marthinus van Schalkwyk, as to a new policy to take into account the small-scale artisanal fisher sector, as of mid November nothing had been forthcoming with regard to the implementation thereof.
Masifundise’s standpoint on the ‘near shore’ fishing area is controversial, and will result in fierce resistance in some quarters. Expressed by Jaffer, the 'near shore’ fishing area is anywhere up to 8 nautical miles out to sea. It is his contention that this area should be reserved for the exclusive use of the artisanal/small scale fisher community, and that the commercial entities should be barred from participating in this area. Whilst this would not affect most of the resources harvested off the Western and Southern Cape coasts, it would have a dramatic effect on the West Coast Rock Lobster industry, as a large proportion of their harvest is gleaned from this area. He contends further that as an option, the government should be involved in the 'buying back’ of the rights to harvest from the commercial holders, and these returned to the communities for their fishing initiatives.
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PLAAS
‘It’s about managing the people, not the resource’ Dr Moeniba Isaacs (PLAAS Panel Discussion November 13, 2008). Isaacs added a new element to the argument surrounding the plight of the artisanal fisher community, and that is the philosophy of the past, where ‘handouts’ were used to keep the fisher communities happy. It is her opinion that one of the challenges is to move away from a food parcel, interim methodology and form a subsistence mindset. She argues that a balance should be arrived at where three elements are in sync, being sustainable livelihoods, sustainable management practices, and sustainable development practices.
Dr Isaacs contends further that the plight of the interim relief measure fishers, who were the ‘recipients’ of the special dispensation granted by the government during 2007, at the behest of the Equality Court, is exacerbated by the fact that they are forced to fish for what she refers to as ‘left-overs’, as the majority of the resource had already been harvested by the licensed rights holders. Compounding this is the effect that lay-offs from two of the larger corporates operating in these areas, being Oceana and Premier, would have on the number of fishers seeking interim relief. A limited available resource to harvest, with an increased number of participants makes for inevitable conflict.
As also voiced by Jaffer of Masifundise, Isaacs endorsed the fact that the minister of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism made a commitment to implement a policy focussed on addressing the lot of the small-scale artisanal fishers. This was made in Port Elizabeth during the November 2007 Small-scale Fisheries National Summit, and as yet nothing has been forthcoming.
76 Jaffer is of the opinion that the new policy should include the following elements…
A human rights approach. A multi-specie allocation. A green ecological practice. An approach that takes into account the role of women in post harvest activities.
One of the potential controversies of the desires of the artisanal fisher community, as voiced by Jaffer as well as Andy Johnston among others, is the issue of self-governance. Jaffer contends further that within the communities, there would need to be a separation of those who are fishers…and those who are not.
Concern has also been expressed that the localised fish resources along the Southern and Western Cape Coast lines may suffer a similar fate to that of the abalone industry. During the mid 1990’s poaching along the eastern sea board, in particular the areas of Hawston and Hermanus, was rife. Initially these activities were located in areas where law enforcement had difficulty accessing but later the illegal practices expanded outwards, due in the main to the denuding of the resource through excessive harvesting. The point of interest though was the reason for this activity in the first place – according to Mather et al (2003 p. 34) the area was home to a community who have strong ties with traditional abalone or perlemoen fisheries. With a new government and dispensation established in 1994, the constitutional rights of individuals were highlighted, which in turn led to an expectation amongst the residents of these previously disadvantaged communities, who desired formalised access to the resource which had in the past been denied them.
It is Mather et al’s contention that the pace of transformation in the country’s fishing sectors was too slow – with the resultant boom in abalone poaching. It is the contention of some that this illegal activity could well have been
77 curtailed over the last 14 years, but that it has been politically expedient to allow it to continue. Similar ‘disaster’ scenarios have been envisaged with the West Coast Rock lobster resource, and the governments slow response to the plight and formal recognition of the fishers in this sector may fuel similar illegal activity.
Within 3-5 years, if left unhalted and unabated, the West Coast Rock Lobster as an industry will be wiped out, due to the indiscriminate harvesting of the resource, couple with a ‘ blind eye’ approach adopted by the authorities, according to Richard Ball (R. Ball 2008. Pers. comm., October 21).
During a one-on–one interview with Donald Grant, chairperson of the West Coast Rock Lobster Association (WCRLA), on December 8, 2008, a different perspective was gained regarding the industry’s viewpoint on in particular the government’s interim relief measure, as well as the plight of the small-scale artisanal fisher sector. Grant believed that his association’s decision to appeal the recent ruling in favour of the continuance of the interim relief measures, as delivered by Judge Dennis Davis, was justifiable on two counts, these being for legal reasons, as well as on the grounds of bio-economic sustainability. The issue is currently on appeal with the Supreme Court in Bloemfontein.
According to Grant, the tragedy of the commons is the underlying tenet of not only the fishing industry in South Africa, but also the industry on a worldwide basis, where there was not enough fish to go around. Since 1995, the government through the then minister Pallo Jordan, and thereafter Valli Moosa assisted by Horst Kleinschmidt, had involved themselves in the issue of long-term rights allocations. As part of the process, workshops were held with communities on the West and South Cape coasts in order to gain input from these sectors in the formulation of policy. Through the process of issuing a draft policy, and thereafter through gaining further input from industry, policy was finalised and taken to cabinet for approval. Since the appointment of Marthinus van Schalkwyk as minister of the DEAT, Grant believes that a ‘fresh look at the industry’ was being taken. He contends
78 further that whilst the minister had purportedly stated that the fishing industry was 90% satisfactory, and even though the Grant and industry had requested what the ‘10% he was not happy with’ represented, they were never able to get an official response.
What then transpired was the issuing of long-term fishing rights, the purpose of which according to Grant was to improve transformation, improve job creation, and for growth. The process of long term rights allocations was one that was arrived at through the initial granting of interim rights, and thereafter medium term rights. The then small, medium rights holders were advised to apply for these new rights, and of the approximately 4 000 (Grant 2008) people that applied for the off-shore and near-shore sectors of the West coast, only 1 067 members were successful, an over subscription to the process being fourfold. Those that were not successful were, according to Grant, ‘discarded through competitive process’.
At the time of the interim measures being introduced, some 174 tons of crayfish were recorded as being taken out of the sea by the beneficiaries of these measures, according to Grant and which he stated reflected the scientific statistics and data as recorded by MCM. This took place over a period of three to four months. In the court action as recorded, the court had spoken of quantities of between 40 to 60 ton. One of the major contentions of the WCRLA regarding the relief measure, was that whilst it did give the government the right to extend the catch seasons and extend quotas as they considered necessary, it did not give them the right to ‘recognise a new collective of fishers’. Since the inception of long term rights allocations, the annual Total Allowable Catch and therefore quotas had been reduced. It was the opinion of the WCRLA therefore, that there should be a reduction of effort in the resource, and that there should not be the introduction of a new user group.
Grant contends further that in the original classifications and definitions of the different fishing sectors as outlined in the Marine Living Resources Act, the category ‘subsistence fishers’ was already included and therefore further
79 recognition of this same sector was unnecessary. The beneficiaries of the relief measure were operating under recreational permits, which were issued without costs – ‘no where does it say that the catch may be sold’ is the point that was made by Grant.
The industry workshop held in Port Elizabeth in late 2007, saw the WCRLA being invited, where the offer was made for two of their representatives to attend. They opted to send one only, being a lawyer from their firm of attorneys, being Webber Wentzel. The reason for this according to Grant, was for this individual to take note of the proceedings and to report back on that basis.
The current catch rates under the interim measures are, in the opinion of Grant, not being monitored. He raised the question further as to ‘where is this fish coming from’, as quotas had been set and allocated. A further issue that Grant alluded to was the halting of all fishing activity in the abalone industry. The shutting down of this industry has left the ‘fishers’ in these areas without a harvest, and there is a real concern that these individuals may be recruited into the lobster industry through their forming part of government’s relief measures.
The question of resource and catch rate monitoring is also one of major concern, according to Grant. Statistics quoted are that there are currently 138 inspectors in place, their task being to monitor 3 000 kms of coastline. In order to sustain the resource, far greater monitoring needs to take place, and as South Africa is a signatory of the Eco System Approach to Fisheries (EAF), the authorities need to be accountable to this also.
80 Chapter 4 RESEARCH DESIGN
Covered in this section is the type of research to be undertaken, the methods and techniques utilised as well as the specifics relating to size, number and type of individuals and institutions included in the study, as well as considerations addressed in order for the research to proceed effectively.
4.1 Demarcation and Delimitation of Research
This research was limited to focussing on the in-shore and near-shore fishing communities of the Western and Southern Cape coasts, where by definition the in-shore fishing sector covers an area from the coastline to approximately three kilometres off shore, or out to sea. Near-shore boundaries depend on the specific area and the fish specie being targeted, and obviously therefore differ from region to region. The participants in these areas therefore included the categories of Subsistence, Traditional, Small-Scale and Artisanal Fishers. It did not therefore research the large scale allocations of quota in the small and large pelagic sectors, nor the demersal hake sector. In particular, the research concentrated on the communities themselves as well as specific bodies that have evolved over time, and who operate for and on behalf of these fisher folk.
In order to maintain balance, it was necessary also to focus on specific corporate entities across the fishing sector, both large and small, to gain insight into their viewpoints.
These were restricted, though to specific entities that have a direct bearing on the issue at hand, being the non-recognition of, and non-allocation of quota to the small-scale artisanal community.
81 4.2 Research methodology
The research methodology that is adopted here is one of a critical social science, as it is an attempt to confront the perceived injustices which currently befall the Small-Scale Artisanal Fishers. Through this research attempts were made to transform the status and the standing of this sector, in an environment where the perception is that political and corporate muscle far outweigh that of this community.
4.2.1 Type of research
The type of research undertaken included a degree of exploratory study, necessary to gain a comprehensive knowledge of the various participants in the fishing industry, and an element of the descriptive to ensure full understanding of the legislation in place that governs the industry as a whole. Empirical research as well as a qualitative method of approach was adopted, where a general plan of enquiry was implemented, but without there being a particular sequence to the specific set of questions asked (Babbie 2004, p. 300).
4.2.2 Research methods and techniques
Methods and techniques utilised were confined to three specific areas, the first being one of content and textual analysis. This included a study of all printed information sourced from the different parties to the problem, as well as an intensive scrutiny of all media coverage relating to the issue. Further, there are DVD’s and video tapes available relating to the issue produced by one of the participants which clearly illustrate the problem to hand (as well as, unfortunately, the consequences of not addressing the issue).
82 The second technique was through a series of interviews. Due to the nature of the problem, there were individuals [as there were organisations] within specific sectors who were initially unwilling to entertain any form of dialogue. In order to counter this, these individuals were approached singularly, with the objective of conducting one-on-one interviews, in the least threatening manner possible. To assist, a structured interview was composed, though a strong degree of flexibility was allowed. An additional method was through attending forums where the issue was being discussed. One such opportunity was that of the meeting between representation of the in-shore fishing community Task Team and members of the DEAT [and obviously from MCM] held on May 5, 2008, and another being the PLAAS Seminar hosted at the Centre for the Book, Cape Town on November 13, 2008.
The third method was through the hosting of small groups in a structured workshop environment. The process that was originally intended to be used was that of Participlan™, and the sessions would have been facilitated by the writer. For a host of reasons, a combination of timing, literacy, availability and willingness, the full workshop format was not put into effect. Rather, open discussion sessions were held initially with representatives of the various fishing bodies, as well as with a cross-section of fishers themselves from the different communities of Kalk Bay, Hout Bay, Witsands and Ocean View, the objectives being to establish levels of accord, defining the ‘want’, and identifying areas of potential compromise.
The modus operandi that was used for the interview sessions in particular, could best be described as one of adopting a conversational facilitation technique.
The sequencing of questions asked of individuals and the groups followed the same format and structure. Three particular aspects were focussed on, the questions composed to extract comments and responses to these specifically. The first phased question concentrated on exploring issues relating to the past, or a ‘lessons learnt’ question, and asked the respondents to highlight the positives and negatives, or the good and the bad things that in their opinion
83 were pertinent to the issue to hand. The second question sought out responses that best described, in the view of the respondents, the future or ideal situation. In particular, how the in-shore fishing industry could be structured, so that all participants in this arena are working constructively, and the relationships are beneficial to all. The third phased question was that of composing the action going forward. In other words, what needs to be done by each and every role player, department and association, in order to become what was described in the ideal scenario.
The questions asked were specifically…
Lessons Learnt question - One
Looking back over the last 2-3 years what are the positives (good) and negatives (bad) things that happened in terms of fish rights for the small- scale/artisanal fishers sector?
Idealistic question - Two
Describe the relationship between government, industry and ourselves …where all our needs are heard, and the relationship is mutually beneficial…
What does this look like (how are we structured)…and what are we doing? (What are the activities we are involved in?)
{Question revised dependent on the audience being addressed.}
Action steps question - Three
What must we now do (collectively, including government, industry and small- scale artisanal fishers) to become what we described earlier? (What actions and/or decisions will you now implement?)
{Question revised dependent on the audience being addressed.}
It would further be the objective to host a session with representation from all three parties to the problem, once these initial interviews and sessions had flushed out the positions of those involved. This would be an exercise promoted and driven after the completion of this research exercise.
84
Details and an overview of the Participlan™ process are appended.
4.3 Population frame
All the elements in the population of this research, or the sampling frame, are as follows…
Fishers granted a ‘special dispensation’ through government as an interim relief measure in May, 2007. Initially this group size amounted to 1242 in total, but as mentioned in the copy, the size over the last 6 months grew to just less than 2 000. Through geography and difficulty in reach, the sample group would need to be determined through its regional representation, and purposive sampling. Fishing organisations that have aligned themselves with the Fishing Desk as set up by COSATU – currently 37, which would include the Artisanal Fishers Association. Once again, regional representation and purposive sampling would be the underlying criterion. Members of Musifundise. Members of Coastal Link. Management Employees of the DEAT, and specifically the MCM. West Coast Rock Lobster Association Representatives. Management of the business enterprises involved in the harvesting of the fish species in which the artisanal/small-scale fishers involve themselves.
4.4 Reliability and validity of the research
Being a qualitative approach, the research needed to be both dependable and consistent, and in order for these to be adhered to, the interviews conducted needed to be uniform and reliable.
85 Therefore the same set of questions needed to be carried through for each of the elements of the population frame, and the responses captured in the same format throughout. A challenge here was that the dynamics of the industry are such that the situations the respondents found themselves in differed from month to month e.g. a dramatic change to the availability of a natural resource, such as that which recently occurred in the pelagic fish industry. Absolute awareness of local and national situations is therefore critical to the collection of information. Consistency of approach by the researcher was necessary in order to be seen as impartial to those being interviewed, and control of emotions from both sides needed to be managed. The format of the questions posed is appended (Appendix Two).
With the Participlan™ process however, much of this potential unreliability is done away with, as the process allows for an absolute record of all opinions and comments raised to be captured, by providing photographic evidence of all that has transpired. The same questions also were put to the different groups, allowing for consistency of response. Much of the emotion was also diffused, leading to more meaningful and accurate data being assimilated.
The validity of this research, specifically in the interview stage, depended to a large degree on the ability of the researcher to focus in on issues that required surfacing. A degree of discernment and intuition was needed as a trait of the researcher, in order to cut through the peripheral issues so as to uncover the truth. This challenge was particularly necessary due to the nature of the industry in which the research was being conducted. The process used allowed little opportunity to mask issues, and in an unthreatening manner, the group were guided to reveal the truth, however uncomfortable or otherwise that was.
86 4.5 Type of sample
Two types of sample technique were utilised in this research. When determining who should be interviewed in the corporate sector, a form of snowball sampling (Neuman 2006, p. 223) was appropriate. In order to get in front of a new respondent it was necessary to ask of the person being interviewed to refer someone he or she was aware of, whom they believe would be valuable in their particular industry and who would be willing to give input. A sociogram of individuals within the fishing industry network was therefore created, a very closed sector where the likelihood of everyone knowing everyone else is high.
For the ‘workshop’ research however, it was necessary to deploy a purposive sampling technique, due to the fact that a number of the potential participants were spread across remote areas of the coastline of the Western and Southern Cape. For example, instead of having to sample from the original list of 1242 fishers who currently qualify for the government’s interim relief measure, it was more practical to utilise subjective information such as the local harbour, or other fishers in the area to identify a sample group that were included in the workshop rollout.
4.5.1 Sample size and selection
Sample size in this instance, specifically for the workshop scenario for the fisher group falling within the ‘interim relief’ measures’ would need to be around 300. However, this would obviously be an unmanageable number, which therefore necessitated the reduction in the group size to 50 as per the purposive sampling technique mentioned above. Approximately 5 members of the COSATU Fishing Desk were approached individually, as was the number of industry interviews conducted, being a representative cross section of the organisations involved. Government [DEAT] interviews as well as interviews with members of the organisational bodies were of a similar number.
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4.6 Data collection
This responsibility, in both sets of research process [being interviews and workshops] was undertaken by the writer. The interviews were secured through telephone conversations as well as direct referrals from people with whom there was a personal acquaintance – on both sides of the spectrum, being the fishing industry and the fisher organisations. The interviews were largely done ‘on site’ i.e. in and around the individual’s place of work. The workshops were hosted in community halls in the localities of the fisher folk, with more informal ‘workshop’ sessions being held on the beach, as well as in private homes, workshops and in garages in the fishers’ communities, the participants being representative of the key role players in each of the organisations.
4.7 Data analysis
With the interview process, all information gained from the particular sector interviewed was captured after each session, and thereafter categorised in order to arrive at some form of corporate consensus. The opinions expressed by the respondents from all organisations were then cross referenced, similarities noted, and areas of major difference flagged. In particular, the ‘wants’ of these entities were highlighted.
The questions posed to the ‘workshop’ groups were of a similar nature to those of the interview process. However the responses here were wherever possible categorised and prioritised, and rated as to level of importance and value, so that group thought and consensus was readily and easily available. The outcomes of the different sessions were then collated, and once again areas of similarity and dissimilarity were highlighted, as was the ‘want’.
As mentioned above, it was the intention to allow for a Participlan™ session to be run for a cross section of participants.
88 All the data obtained from these processes served as sufficient content for decisions to be made regarding the place, recognition and functioning of the Small-Scale/Artisanal Fisher community, as per the aims of this research.
4.8 Ethical and political considerations
Quite obviously, the allocation of quotas and the redefining of the recipients thereof is a politically sensitive issue. There are three sides to this…on one side there are organisational groups demonstrating their dissatisfaction with their lot, and vowing violence and retribution if their ‘demands’ are not met. Film evidence to hand will bear this out. Whilst this disgruntlement is simmering, their representative leaders are attempting to negotiate the way forward with one of the other sides, the government through the DEAT and MCM. The DEAT has, since the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998, been at loggerheads with not only the larger established fishing companies, but also the small medium-sized concerns. The hot potato of quota allocations and shaving of these in order to supplement new players in the industry has resulted in animosity, and also in some forms of what is considered by some to be suspect practice - the buying of paper quotas being just one of these. The fishing companies themselves are the third side, who as mentioned are not only struggling with government dictated quota reductions, but also in some instances facing major issues relating to the Total Allowable Catch for some fish species being drastically reduced due to changes in the marine source.
It was envisaged that there will be some dialogue of a sensitive and confidential nature. The challenge therefore was to allow the research process to proceed without being hamstrung by specific demands for non- disclosure.
89 The guarantee of confidentiality in a social research survey can, according to Babbie and Mouton (2001, pp. 523-524), be assured through a variety of techniques, some of which were obviously implemented. Trust was therefore a key criterion in the dealings with all participants, and a strong degree of integrity needed to be upheld. Caution was also exercised – in some instances the people with whom interactions took place are extremely volatile…and this holds for both sides.
90 Chapter 5 OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS
A comprehensive and progressive report of responses gained from all participants, from both types of research undertaken, detailing the areas of accord and dispute, as well as negotiables and non-negotiables.
As already documented, the research method and the structure of the interview process was based on a pre-set format, constructed in a manner to elicit input on three basic areas of focus. These were lessons of the past, the ideal situation into the future, and the actions that needed to be taken in order to reach this model.
In a formally structured interview with Andy Johnston (A. Johnston 2008, pers. comm. November 26) held on November 26, 2008, responses were given to the questions as outlined above. From the ‘lessons learnt’ question, Johnston submitted that had the rights of the artisanal fishers not been ‘ignored’ over the last number of years, he would not have been given the opportunity to appear on the international stage, attending conferences and workshops all over the world. The result is that it has allowed him to develop a policy for this fisher sector, something which he believes would not have been possible if it were not for the opportunity he has had in interacting with people across the globe, who had or are facing similar situations as those being played out on the coastlines of this country. Learning of a cooperative system that benefits the country as a whole, as opposed to the interest of the individual is a further positive perspective gained from his exposure.
He summarises and describes as a ‘tremendous learning curve’ all that he has got out of the state of affairs prevalent in these communities.
From a negative perspective, Johnston believes that whilst he had not heard of the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system, and would not have had he not been exposed to international exchanges, this system was possibly the worst thing to happen to the small-scale fisher communities, and he is therefore steadfastly against it. He continued by stating ‘unjust laws produces
91 a product of crime’, and he believes that it would not take much to ignite the disenchantment of the local fishers communities that would translate itself into serious civil disobedience. He adds that we are living in a revolutionary society, where the ‘problem is the product of society and where there is no respect for life or for each other’.
Johnson believes that ‘the essence of community’ is gone, much due to the implementation of the ITQ system, which was the cause of the ‘destruction of culture’. Under this system, fish became a commodity, where fish lost its ‘spiritual value’, being the myths, the legends, and the culture of harvesting. He describes the evolution of the ITQ system as follows…first there was the Paper Quota where you could sell the rights. This was followed by the Cardboard Quota, a practice which saw individuals putting up the money and finances, and tying in a group of fisher folk into a quota, and thereafter being the major beneficiary. Thirdly was the String Quota where a group of fishers were given money to apply for the quota, structure them into a formal Close Corporation, and thereafter ‘break the contract’. Johnston refers to this collective of individuals who promote such endeavours as ‘armchair fishers’.
ITQ’s he contends, led to a ‘tremendous amount’ of poaching, a disrespect for the sea, as well as excessive dumping of catch. The latter behaviour is exemplified by a situation of market demands – where the market demands smaller crayfish, the fishers would sort the catch on deck and discard overboard all the fish that didn’t fit into this size category. A habit of always trying to over catch was also endorsed.
A further negative is that all the role players currently view each other with mistrust, and there is a climate of misunderstanding that impinges on the activities and attitudes of all.
In summary, Johnston believes that the mindsets of the fisher communities has been changed, from one of sustainability to that of unsustainability, from respect to disrespect, from peaceful communities to conflict communities…and from one of ‘those who got, to those who didn’t get’.
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Looking ahead, Johnston describes his ideal situation as one where there was a committee in place, working on an economic development policy that would be focussed on sustainability. A situation where entities would sit around the table finding solutions, and displaying commitment and illustrating good faith, and where there was a common vision in place ‘as a collective’. He is not sure whether this scenario will unfold during his lifetime, due as a result he believes ‘of others’ mistakes’, but his want is for something ‘much better’ going forward. From a South African perspective, he believes that a merger between business and the community would be of benefit to all. Continuing on the ‘road of not talking to each other’ will, he adds, lead to conflict. Striving for a society that is not ‘dysfunctional’ is his ideal, and added that if we do not resolve the sustainability issue, we are ‘heading for major conflict in communities’. Johnson believes that it is an ‘ALL’ endeavour, and not about ‘politicians who make promises they can’t keep’.
In composing the action in order to reach this ideal, Johnston believes that all role players need to sit around the table, that they would need to get commitment from each other, and they would need to embark on a process of joint development. He adds that you can’t expect politicians to do this, as ‘they never will’.
In an interview held with Naseegh Jaffer of Masifundise Development Trust on November 25, he believed that from the past and from a positive perspective, what ‘stood out profoundly’ was the sense of community, belonging and ownership that were the small-scale fisher communities (N. Jaffer 2008, pers. comm. November 25). Folks had the character of being ‘rooted in’ these communities, and they were ‘in a sense’ part of this group of people.
Akin to this was the sense of culture and community, where the ties and relationships that the fishers had with one another particularly those fishing in boats, were ‘deep and strong’. These bonds between fishermen were based on their daily exposure to danger, and how they had to fend for each other if
93 disaster had to prevail whilst out at sea. These bonds overflowed into the communities - it was about life and doing things together…and sharing an income together, what Jaffer describes as ‘intrinsic positive values’.
From a negative aspect, Jaffer detailed the problem of what he termed the ‘commodification’ of fishing. Fish have become a commercial commodity, with the consequences of people trying to outdo others by producing more, through ‘jostling and competing’. The sense of ownership has switched from community ownership to economic ownership, and according to Jaffer not only ‘by white capital’, as a direct result of these entrepreneurs in the fishing sector. The relationship between boat owners and fishers became one of a power relationship, a relationship described by Jaffer as one of subjugation. Fishing having become a ‘commodity’, it is no longer culture and community…it’s now a job. Part of what’s driving this process, is the ‘norm’ by which the fishers are remunerated. Traditionally, one third of the catch goes to the boat, to cover expenses such as fuel, maintenance etc, the balance split 50/50 between the skipper and the fisher. However, fishers are now rewarded independently on their own catches, as there is no longer a collective assessment practice in place. So…he who catches the most fish wins, and if a fisher has a poor performance on the day, the chances of the skipper allowing him to go out with boat the next time around are slim.
The culture has therefore been eroded, and the relationship between the fishers has changed. According to Jaffer, where the MLRA policy went wrong was in turning fishing into wholely commercial entities. Compounded to this, and ‘what is worse’, is the fact that whether commercial or recreational, the quantum catch taken out is stipulated. The question that Jaffer asks, is where the minister of the DEAT is going to ‘find fish’ to service the near-shore sector. The policy has ignored community fishers, so how is it going to rectify this, is the question posed.
A further issue that Jaffer considers as a negative, is the ‘warped’ decision to give fishing rights to women. He qualifies this by saying that between the years 1994 and 1998 the government embarked on the campaign of
94 addressing the issues of Black Economic Empowerment and Gender. Women, he believes, have never been a part of the active fisher group, but with the new dispensation, rights have been allocated to them. These rights were then deployed to employ fishers, who previously were able to fish for themselves, who would then work and fish for these individuals in order to make a living.
When asked of what he considers to be an ideal future situation, Jaffer contended that it was not possible to go back to what fishing was like 30 to 40 years ago. Fishing culture has to be modified, but it does not mean ‘more speedboats’. A different approach is required, but a more ‘low technology one’. The situation would be characterised by greater harmony between and amongst people, the communities, the ocean and the marine life. A sense of mutual dependency should prevail where ‘we would look after the ocean’. The community itself Jaffer adds, should be protected from commercial life and commercial fishing. The community would need to play a role of regulating and managing the in-shore fishing activities. There needs to be explicit regulations in place, to protect the relationships between fishermen and the boat owners. These regulations should be ‘overt and explicit’, and the environment thus created would not be a ‘free for all’.
One of the challenges would be the issue of and problems with compliance – Jaffer believes the community would have to ‘buy-in’ on this basis, and only then will they comply. A situation of ‘don’t tell them…ask them’. A further point made by Jaffer was that the regulations must include the participation of government at a local level, so that they ‘can’t abdicate their responsibility’.
To realise this situation as outlined by Jaffer as above, the first step would be for government to change the law. The MLRA must change to legally include and provide for the small-scale fisher community as a recognised sector, and the DEAT would therefore need to develop regulations for the entire spectrum, inclusive of the small-scale sector. Jaffer believes that it is the minister of the DEAT who needs to take corrective measures as to some of the things ‘done and implemented’.
95 Administrative justice should also prevail according to Jaffer, meaning that respect must be given to the fact that there are those participants in the industry who have invested substantially in long term fishing rights, and these rights should not be put in jeopardy. The solution he contends, is for the government to buy back legally issued rights from the commercial sector, so that these entities do not lose materially. Jaffer believes that these rights should be discounted forward calculating what they would have earned for these 10 year rights, allowing for reasonable return to these entities, and pay outs should be made by the government on this basis. Once bought back, these rights must be re-allocated in a ‘fair and just’ manner to the in-shore sector.
Traditional fishing only should be allowed in the in-shore sector, which should be declared an exclusive zone, off-limits to all but themselves and the recreational fishing community. Further, there needs to be a locally ‘regulated regime’ – the minister must allow ‘devolution of management authority’ from national to a localised management regime, in order to incorporate measures to correct ‘anomalies’ of the past. A clear definition of the role of women in this sector needs to sought, by assessing what they were doing and empowering them to continue doing this – ‘not giving them fishing rights’, according to Jaffer. It would be the responsibility of the minister of the DEAT to facilitate the ‘building of capacity to self govern’.
A further methodology that Jaffer believes should be adopted, is what he calls the control of the ‘line of custody’. This ‘line’ runs from the time that hooks are prepared through the whole process of catch all the way through to the processing of the end product. This ‘line’ must be left to the fishers themselves, as would the decision as to what value they should add to the fish, as in smoking it for example. No third or external parties should have access to this ‘line’, as this would engender elements of commercialism. If these commercial bodies were allowed to participate it would, in Jaffer’s opinion, ‘break the harmony’ of the total effort, as elements of competition would occur. Fishers must be taught how to deal with the market, and ideally at a local level only. Jaffer adds that he ‘cannot say they must not’, but the
96 value in marketing the fish locally would be the bolstering of that area through restaurants and hotels being supplied with fresh, quality product. This in turn, he argues, would bring more trade into the area, and through this, greater employment opportunities which would lift the area as a whole.
Jaffer’s interpretation of the standpoint of the commercial sector, is that they believe that the artisanal fishers can’t be managed. The greater the catch of the small-scale fishers, the greater impact on the fish stocks that commercials are entitled to. He contends that their viewpoint is one where they say ‘give them (the artisanal) the right to harvest, and we will manage’. Jaffer’s response to this is that ‘you don’t have a right to a natural resource, and you cannot decide for others what should be done with the resource’. The issue of resource management is key, according to Jaffer, adding that whilst it is quick to change the law, ‘change doesn’t happen overnight’. New systems take time and people need to be acclimatised to this, and adding that whilst some may view the interim relief measures in place and the current harvesting activities as an example of what could happen with self and community regulation, he believes that it should be seen as a ‘pilot project’ to the implementation of a policy into the future.
In an interview with Richard Ball of Pioneer Fishing, in response to the question relating to the ‘lessons learnt from the past’ (R. Ball 2008, pers. comm. December 1), he considers that one of the negatives that have come about over the last period, is that the small-scale fisher sector have ‘suffered at the hands of the allocations procedures’. He describes the process as one where complicated input was required, and he believes that this sector of the fishing community did not have the ability to cope with these proceedings. A concern issued by Ball was that caution should be exercised when looking at the industry – he believes that a segmented perspective and view is required, as opposed to looking at the industry ‘holistically’. He contends that the lack of recognition of the small-scale fishers could be ‘to their benefit’. He sites the example of the abalone (perlemoen) industry where he asserts that in excess of 2 000 ton of gross weight product has been ‘harvested’ over the last few
97 years, by ‘poachers’. The shucked product then sold, generated substantial amounts of revenue, which all went into the ‘informal sector’.
The situation is characterised by a lack of what he calls compliance, where very few operators who have been caught in illegal activities, have received jail sentences, let alone spent time in jail. He believes that the authorities are ‘not really interested’ in responding to the climate of non-compliance, and that it is something that is ‘easy to stop’. Technology he adds, is already available, and through the use of infra-red cameras for example, any movement in and around Hout Bay would be able to be detected. Any movement therefore, both legal and otherwise, is easy to detect and pick up.
Ball considers the West Coast Rock Lobster situation as one heading towards that of the abalone industry, adding that some of the fishers who have been given the right to harvest lobster through the interim relief measures as granted in 2007, have been involved in ‘illegal activities’ also. With these measures, one of the rights granted some 2 000 fishers has been the right to harvest 20 lobster each per week. Based on these levels being reached, and not taking into account any ‘over catch’, this amounts to over 57 tons of crayfish (lobster) harvested per month, and an estimated 345 ton over the catching season. The industry quota or Total Allowable Catch (TAC) of this specie stands at 2 500 ton for 2008, and the catch allotment given to the small scale interim measure beneficiaries is therefore a substantial amount, considering further that this amount would be added to the TAC, not subtracted from it. If it were to be deducted from the TAC, there would be beneficiaries who had already been allocated quotas, who would have to curtail their catch effort. However, Ball considers this to be ‘just the tip of the iceberg’, as he is of the firm opinion that together with the legal catch effort, there is substantial amount being harvested that goes unreported, the reported catches therefore being ‘under estimated to a large degree’.
The fishing policy as implemented over the years has also resulted in the destruction of the fishing industry as ‘an employment area’. Ball adds that the reasons are good, but the ‘politicians ….. it anyway’. He does contend
98 however that the Marine Coastal Management entity has been a growth area, as they now employ over 800 individuals, but adds that they are not in his opinion, functioning anywhere near as well as they should be.
Looking at the positives, Ball envisages a ‘depoliticised’ fishing industry, where there is a system of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) in place, with effective fisheries management, and where there is a climate of compliance. He believes ‘people behave as badly as they are allowed to’, and that there is a ‘race to the bottom as to how badly they behave’. He draws an analogy to the current frightening phenomenon of motorists in South Africa running red lights – he believes that when approaching the lights, you also make the decision to run the light so as not to get rear-ended. The compliance aspect is where all players in the industry are obeying the Marine Living Resources Act. Ball adds a pragmatic note on this future ideal situation, by adding that sometimes there may not be a ‘place for individuals who currently have no role, to be included’.
And further, that ‘for the fishing industry to believe that the resource can solve the social problems of the various fishing communities is fiction – it’s not going to happen’. People will have to accept this, and understand further that ‘politicians trade in promises’, and they are very good at giving away other people’s money – ‘it’s what politicians do’. When asked directly how one can ensure that these small scale fishers are accommodated, Ball's answer was straight forward – ‘well actually, you can’t’.
An effective compliant, ITQ based fishing industry as the future ideal, can be realised through the improvement of fishing management generally, as well as the implementation of a structured well thought out ITQ system. However, Ball contends that an ITQ system is ‘unpalatable’ to political parties. He believes further that the protection of property at ‘all levels is at risk’, and that there is a strong ‘distribution component’ in all policy. Further, that to ‘alleviate poverty, you have to protect property’. The bias in South Africa is one where there is a ‘celebration of human rights, as opposed to a right to property’. He acknowledges that the current distribution policy is ‘wrong, but
99 setting it right makes everyone poorer in the end’. Ball states that ‘local resources, irrespective of area, are insufficient to allow that community to become self-sufficient’. An example he cites is that of Kalk Bay, where the current situation is one where there is insufficient money for boats, there is no abalone in the Bay area, and that the line fish resource is in a ‘shocking state’. The right therefore to the ‘bounty of the sea is fiction’, adding that if you’re born in Johannesburg, this does not give you a ‘pre-emptive right’ to go down a mine shaft and ‘go mining’. The ‘community in which you are born does not give you a pre-emptive right in that area’, is what he maintains, adding that politically though, this assumption would work.
Ball believes that a programme should be put in place whereby every year from now on in, the Total Allowable Catch and therefore fixed quota, should be reduced by 5%. This volume thus set apart, would be ‘put up for sale’. After 20 years, there would be no more quotas, and a system of ITQ’s in place.
A further solution Ball believes would be the instituting of a marine protected area, and anywhere outside of this would be free territory for small-scale artisanal fishers to operate in.
The big issue though, according to Ball, is that the government is in a lose- lose situation, in that they have too little to allocate to too many. Or as he puts it, it’s like a father of a household of seven going home with four presents only…someone is going to lose, and be unhappy to boot!
Gert du Plessis of Eyethu Fishing, part of Pioneer Fishing, a company part owned by the Suiderland Group, believes that one of the lessons learnt form the past was that of making decisions without having the necessary infrastructure and systems in place (G. Du Plessis 2008, pers. comm. December 1). Specifically, he also makes mention of the interim relief measures presently operative, and the lack of ‘monitoring’ of the catch effort. Using similar sums as those put forward by Ball, he contends that there are
100 currently tons of crayfish being harvested, both legally and illegally, over and above the already allocated and preset quota for 2008. He adds that it’s his opinion that the MCM inspectors have an ‘inability to control’ the situation, something which has been raised also by previous interviewees.
The first prize situation looking into the future, would be one where those participating in the catch effort are legally qualified to do so. Further, the fish harvested would be landed at specific landing points, and all catches would thus be recorded at these points. The TAC for fish species and in this instance lobster in particular, would be determined and allocated amongst all role players and participants. In order to reach or achieve this ideal, Du Plessis contends that a system needs to be put in place where the bona fides off all participants are established, and through this the ‘qualified’ would emerge. Landing points with qualified inspectorates need to be put in place, thereby keeping a record of all catches made in the inshore area, irrespective of the classification of the fisher i.e. semi-commercial, or small-scale artisanal etc.
In a workshop held on a southern coast beach of the name Klein Vishoek, the opinions, attitudes and perspectives of a collective group were gained, covering an historical perspective through to the situation in which this particular group of in-shore fishers find themselves today. The leader of this group was Sulaiman Achmat of the False Bay Treknet Fishermen’s Association, and the history of his involvement has been captured in an earlier section of this report. The ‘workshop’ was attended by Achmat and 7 of his trek-net fisher workforce. Also in attendance was Gary Simpson, currently of COSATU Fishing Desk, as well as Andy Johnston of the Artisanal Fishers Association.
Quite obviously the worst thing to have happened to this community over the last number of years, was the withdrawal of the 20 ton licence to catch fish off the Klein Vishoek Beach, depriving these fishers of what they consider their traditional right to harvest and sustain a livelihood. The resultant behaviour of
101 these unemployed folk translated itself into social problems, specifically alcohol and drug abuse. According to Achmat, these fishers have not earned an income since 2001, and it’s only through the philanthropic generosity of Achmat himself which has seen these families being supported over this period. Achmat has other fishing interests through which he is able to generate an income to be able to help these folk, including owning his own vessel operating out of Kalk Bay Harbour, as well as having a half share in another. Achmat contends that these fishers are a ‘proud and independent’ people, who would rather work than depend on handouts. They were born ‘treknet fishermen’ and know nothing else.
Through all the comments and disclosure made at this session, one thing stood out, and that was the distrust that Achmat and his fishers had for the authorities, particularly MCM and the scientific community, based on past episodes where they believed they were misled. A further allegation made by Achmat was the perceived preferential treatment some had enjoyed in being given rights to fish, where no such previous rights existed. The case of Smitswinkel Bay being just one.
Further, when long-term licences were reviewed, and these self same individuals had their licences revoked, the ‘new’ licences were issued to a relative, who according to Achmat was not a beach-seine fisher either.
Looking at a future ideal situation, the obvious is one where the beach-seine fishing activity was reinstated. The group believes that initially the effort should be contained, targeting Yellowtail only in the area. Thereafter, the catching of Steenbras should also be considered, both activities being subject to a catch monitoring system based on a return basis, with these returns being given to the Kalk Bay Harbour Master for ratification and collation. Interestingly, it was the issue of the targeting of Steenbras that brought pressure to bear on the authorities, and which swayed them to revoke all fishing licences in the area.
102 By so doing, the traditional fishers of the area believe their social issues would be rectified, and they would revert from the current situation where the authorities had ‘taken away their dignity’.
This potential ideal would be realised, according to this group, through representatives of their various bodies and affiliates, taking up the issue on their behalf with the ruling party, the African National Congress. They believe that by using these representatives, from COSATU, Artisanal Fishers Association, False Bay Trekkers Association to name but some, the ANC would use their ‘clout’ to get the licences for Achmat and his beach-seine fishing enterprise re-instated.
A further workshop was held in Ocean View, with a group of fishers who in January of this year, had been the real life players in a film made on their predicament, entitled This Gun Makes Me a Man (2008). Present in the meeting were 11 fishers from the community, as well as Andy Johnston, and the session was held in a garage/workshop in the heart of the community.
The fishing activities of the day having been blown out by a raging southeaster, the group had resorted to comforting themselves with liquid refreshment in the form of Carling Black Label. Whilst it has become apparent that the government’s interim relief measures have been extended to just under 2 000 recipients, as opposed to the intended 1 000, the group were of the understanding that this level of 1 000 had been adhered to. The initiative itself was described by the group as an ‘electioneering tactic’, and one where an attempt had been made to ‘force and alienate us out of the system’. According to the group, being able to catch all species of fish in the areas in which they operate makes them ‘fishermen’, and it’s the ability to catch linefish that sustains this community throughout the year.
The advent of what they termed ‘armchair’ fishermen was, they believe, one of the greatest negatives to have occurred over the last number of years. The problem in itself was created by ‘the government through the dictates of the
103 fishing industry’, meaning the large corporate businesses in this sector. ‘Big business’ should therefore be ‘kept out of policy making’ was the contention of the group.
The issuing of licences was another area of unhappiness, where the situation was created where a specific fish licence was issued to a boat, and if you were to be given a second licence for a different fish specie, a second boat would be required. Economic factors over the last few years resulted in the local fleet being reduced from just on 2 000 boats to around 470 at present for the near-shore industry, which the group believes was an orchestrated initiative to drive the ‘small man out of the industry’. The restricted ‘one licence per vessel’ policy also had the effect of removing a traditional practice of having secured their day’s quota of crayfish, they would catch some fish on the return for what they called the ‘fry’. Recipients of the licence themselves was also a negative issue with this group, where claims were made that a specific individual (who’s name and place of abode was mentioned) lived in the United Kingdom, and only returned over the holiday period to ‘harvest’ his licence allotment. Multi-specie fishing was okay for large companies, but not for the smaller fishers was the group’s further contention. The licence application process itself was one that the group was critical of, where their contention was that it was a means of ‘extorting money’ from the fishing community. Their belief was that the process put in place by the department, elicited ‘thousands of responses’ for quotas, each having to pay a non-refundable application fee of R300, where the department was aware that only ‘about 400’ licences would be approved.
The manner in which the health and therefore strengths (or weakness) of the fish specie was determined was a further negative. In their opinion, the scientists were ‘feeding out of the hand of MCM’. This feeling or perception was not unlike that of the Klein Vishoek group’s. That double standards were being practiced by the authorities, was the contention. The group believed there was ‘kreef for all’, and that these conflicts were therefore unnecessary.
104 One of the group described the current situation as one of ‘destroying a culture, destroying a people’, with community illness being the end result.
What was evident in this session was a huge degree of anger, which was freely vented, particularly when issues of government and scientific concerns were discussed.
The first-prize situation according to the Ocean View group, was for boats to be issued with multi-specie licences, and the credo of ‘catch if catch can’ should be paramount. A ‘basket system’ of catch, and a reverting to ‘traditional culture’, where fish are taken out by those who can. A Total Allowable Catch (TAC) should be instituted for all specie, with ‘effort controls’ being put in place, which would cover size limits, vessel sizes, catch controls, with specific seasons for different resources. ‘Same time’ fishing activities should be allowed, in other words being able to catch linefish at the same time as catching crayfish for example. This would reduce the cost structures currently applicable to the catch effort. Whoever catches the fish will survive, is the viewpoint of the group, this being of specific reference to those being given quotas, who themselves are not capable of catching the fish, or as put by one of the participants, to separate the ‘papslangers’ from the real fishermen.
Regarding the granting of licences to non-active participants, the group believed that all paper quota holders should have these withdrawn, and that these people should be removed from the industry. Granting licences to two individuals within the same family, for example to a husband and a wife, was also considered by the group to be a real issue. They believed that if this practice was to happen, there should be two distinct businesses in place, where both have applied independently. Interestingly, two of the group were husband and wife - both had licences, had separate businesses, and had separate SARS numbers and returns. The issue was raised as the group contended that people had falsified applications in order to secure additional licences. MCM had committed to screen all applicants as far back as 1992, with flawed applicants having been vetted by the auditing firm of DeLoitte and
105 Touche. According to the group, these fraudulent applications having been identified, were thereafter ignored.
The group believed that through the introduction of a processor/marketer on a joint venture basis with the fishers, a ‘sustainable and viable ideal’ would be realised.
How to achieve this ideal would, they believe, require initial steps along the lines of recalling the whole existing fisheries policy, and conducting an exercise where each licence holder would be vetted. Further, all advisory and consultancy bodies should be disbanded (their contention being that the two biggest fishing companies in the country serve on these boards). Due to what they considered to be over-capitalisation of the bigger role players in the industry, the near-shore fishing areas were being targeted by them. Marine Protected Areas need to be implemented, and these could only be effective in near-shore zones.
Double standards in the industry also need to be eliminated, a case in point being a particular fishing company who harvest multi-specie fish ongoing.
One of the issues the group believed to be essential in creating the ideal, was the need to include some form of financial education and money management, in any plan going forward. This aspect elicited strong argument from some, but the basic reality is that the fishers get paid large quantities of money at one time, and have two choices – spend it all immediately, or utilise it effectively to smooth cash availability until the next payment comes around.
There needs to be ‘restitution of traditional fishers’, something which is not happening, and which they believe should be. A further rectification would be that of correcting the situation of ‘exploitation through a system of rules’. An example cited was of ‘taking fish from me’ and then making me pay for the costs to offload this elsewhere’, a practice currently in place being their contention.
106 South Africa needs to look at lessons learnt and systems instituted in other countries which would assist in the producing of a policy equitable and fair to all, where the group cited nations such as the Philippines, Vietnam and Alaska, or as they expressed differently, to create ‘a hybrid’ for this country.
This hybrid as defined by the group would be characterised along the lines of the following…
Fishers first and foremost should be involved Should involve civil society There should be scientific input at a university and academic level Must include sociologists LAST would be the inclusion of the industrial sector, which the group termed ‘crooks’ And the government as ‘custodians’ must have decentralised power
Again MCM was criticised by the group, as being ‘completely industry influenced’. They quoted an example as follows: the interim relief measures as granted allocated a quantity of fish to be harvested, in this instance crayfish, and where MCM calculated the value of these catches based on Dollar or Euro currencies, and which they then used as substantiation that the monies thus generated by the fishers was more than sufficient.
They believed also that there should be a system in place of ‘performance based catch’, where if you don’t catch your quota by the end of the season (something which they contend is an ongoing reality with the larger quota holders), you should surrender it.
And the most explicitly described way forward was described by one of their number, Charles, as taking action to ‘open the can of worms, empty them out, disinfect – and take it forward!’
107 A workshop was hosted with representatives of the fishing community of Hout Bay, and was held in the Sea Fisheries museum in the harbour itself. The attendees included a senior representative from the local fishing industry, the head of the Hout Bay Business Owners Forum (HBBOF), and representatives from Imizamo Yethu (IY), the Hout Bay Artisanal Fishers Association (HBAFA), as well as the Department of Economic development and Tourism. Also in attendance was Andy Johnston of the Artisanal Fishers Association. The meeting was originally intended to be one where a proposed aquaculture project was to be discussed amongst the role players. However, it was possible to redirect the discussions in order to gain insight into the issues relevant to that community, as well as being able to witness first hand the dynamics between business, government and the local fisher communities.
One of the negatives that this community believed significant over the last few years, was the whole issue of the interim relief measure. What was evident from the group, was that there was little harmony amongst the fisher bodies present. The one side was composed of fishers who had received the right to harvest through the dictates of the government measure, being the Hout Bay Artisanal grouping, represented by a group of Rastafarians. Those who didn’t qualify were for the Black community, the representatives of Imizamo Yethu (IY).
Further discord was evident between the two business participants, where the representative of an actual business operating out of the harbour, and who has interests in hake, pelagic fish and crayfish, took issue with the head of the HBBOF, stating that that body was not representative of business in that area, and therefore did not have the authority to speak on their behalf. However on the interim relief measure issue, it was noted that the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism had stated that the group benefiting from the measure needed to be shrunk back to its original number of 1242. However, the dilemma was that according to this grouping, the number of recipients had increased to around 2 500. Therefore of this 1 500 ‘additionals’ only 50 would qualify, based on an expected fall-out of some of the current beneficiaries.
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An added negative expressed by the local business body, was the manner in which they were treated by government when requests were made for funding and collateral, the contention being ‘don’t treat us like a multi–million rand industry, because we are not’. She continued by stating that the policy for BEE businesses was ‘different’ to that of big corporates.
An unconstructive issue with which the local small-scale fisher community has had to contend, according to the chairman of the HBAFA, was that of the ‘stakeholders being asked for input’, and then a document is published which wanted the approval of the small-scale fishers. The IY representative contended also that MCM when making their decisions, consulted the ‘big role players’.
IY also believed that they had been overlooked in the past, and that it was a situation of there not being recognised as a bona fide fishing community. Further that they as a sector had been excluded from any and all policy making historically, and that their priority he added, was ‘catching fish’. Further conflict was evident in this meeting, that being between the Black folk, the Coloured folk and the Rasta folk.
Historically also and according to the business representative, one of the ‘bad things’ to have occurred over the last number of years in that community, was that in 1992 Pallo Jordan told the community to set up a community forum, and apply for a quota. The ‘scent of money’ was sufficient to disrupt this process, and splits and fighting were the end result. The mood of the meeting was inadvertently summed up by the business representative, when referring to issues at large, commented that ‘nobody trusts nobody’.
According to the chairman of the HBAFA, people ‘within organisations and structures are the cause of the failure of those entities’.
In order to create an ideal environment for all players to be in accord, according to the consensus of the group present, a development forum needs
109 to be put in place, which would be reprehensive of all, would be credible, which would be educated, and which would have a broad based representation. The benefits of initiatives such as the proposed aquaculture project for example, should not be spread across the full spectrum of the Hout Bay Community, currently totalling around 500 000. According to Andy Johnston, ‘not all can benefit, but there will be spin-off to others though’.
The group recognised that a further characteristic of an ideal set up would be one where there was no in-fighting amongst the role players. Collectively also and according to the HBAFA, all present have a ‘direct interest to protect our environment’.
In order to realise this ideal, the various entities involved, being those present and others, would need to look at ‘holistic development in the area’ and not focus on one aspect only, was the position articulated by the HAAFA. And further, that a ‘credible forum needs to be established to speak to government’, according to the government representative present. This would need to be representative of all players according to the business representative, something which ‘is not happening’ at the moment. The business delegate continued by adding that there was a strong ‘need for education – without education, we are not going to go forward’.
From an industry perspective, it was clear that the granting of the interim relief measures could be considered one of the negative issues that had arisen over the last few years. Coupled with this was the opinion that government had been guilty of giving ‘bad advice’ (D. Grant 2008, pers. comm., December 8) and through their actions had raised the expectation levels of this fishing sector. A further accusation made by Grant was that there was currently a lack of management at MCM, and that the government itself in the form of the minister, was not getting the ‘right advice’. As a result, they were being ‘irresponsible from a scientific perspective’.
110 A further negative that needed consideration was the fact that the catch per unit effort measure was, according to Grant, down, which raises the question…why? An added issue was that of role players wanting to exit the industry – according to Grant, there are, for example, a group of 5 quota holders with a combined quota of around 11 ton based in St Helena on the West coast, who want to sell their long-term rights holding. But they are unable to do so in that the government had not passed the ‘transfer of rights policy’, a necessary step before such actions could be sanctioned.
What should be done according to Grant is for MCM to conduct an evaluation of the performance of rights holders each year – something which they are supposed to do, but have not done for three years. A further issue that needs to be done is the quantification of poaching.
An additional negative that was raised by Grant, was that there are people in the industry, other than the small-scale fisher sector, who are suffering due to the reduction quotas and rights issues.
An example was cited of a fisherman based in Saldanha, who had been operating in the area for over thirty years and over that period acquired his own vessel, who could no longer operate due to the restrictions placed on his operation, a dilemma which saw him break down emotionally at a recent WCRLA meeting.
The bottom line, according to Grant, was that there was ‘not enough fish to go around’. The government should take a ‘long hard stand’ and communicate with all sectors on the basis of sharing the reality of the situation with them. The minister should be held accountable for this, he continues. The process of consultation needs dialogue and response. The solution would be to consolidate the industry, through a process whereby rights holders could sell their rights to those who have the means to afford them. This however would according to Grant not assist the ‘have-nots who do not have the means to participate in this process’. ‘There is no easy answer’ is how Grant positions the current predicament.
111
Grant believes that the minister of the DEAT has a moral obligation to protect the long term rights quotas. Buy backs are a ‘potential solution’, but not on a ‘subsidised basis’, and nor should it be with tax payers’ money.
What he does propose though is that all stakeholders should be brought into one room, and be told very clearly that ‘we have poverty, we need to consolidate and we need to protect our in-shore facilities’. The meeting should be in a facilitated environment, should be of an unstructured nature, and the minister should call the meeting himself, is how Grant sees this interaction. He does caution though, that the ‘guys that have the rights are not keen to sit around a table’, as he believes they will have the most to lose.
112 Chapter 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A summary and evaluation of all the findings of the research, as well as the recommended way forward, from both a practical and personal perspective.
Conflicts are about ill-defined goals, poor communications, personality clashes and poor or mismanagement. The above situation is epitomised by all of these elements, and as well as other attributes such as needs, values, interests, relationships, information and structures. Best described by Pretorius as structural conflict that comes about through a situation of ‘unequal control, ownership or distribution of resources or by environmental or time constraints’ (1993, p. 13). All social conflict is sparked when an individual or group desires something that the other refuses to relinquish or perform (Pruitt & Kim 2004, p. xiv). In this case study and on the one hand, the small-scale fisher sector desires the right to unfettered access to a natural resource, whilst on the other hand the greater fishing community is unwilling to relinquish its government allocated quota. The government, as the intermediate player, faces the dilemma of having to take from the one to give to the other, something which up until now has not been forthcoming, and the method of doing so not yet determined.
What is evident from the input received from different individuals and associations is that the desire of the small-scale fisher sector is to be recognised not only as a justifiable sector within the fishing community as a whole, but also as a community on its own. The community is identified by its culture, a learned behaviour characteristic of any given society which is passsed down from generation to generation. It is a way of life that includes everything a group of people thinks, does and makes, as well as determining their values, bias and prejudices. As described by Rogers and Steinfatt (1999, p. 81), culture is stored in individuals in the form of their beliefs, attitudes and values.
113 What is also apparent from the above interviews, especially those undertaken with members of the corporate fishing fraternity, is that there is a fair degree of stereotyping taking place, a natural result of any communication process, according to Gudykunst (2004, pp. 117-125). Typically, the pictures envisaged of fishers in a different social category, and in this instance specifically the images conjured up of the small-scale artisanal fishers, are ones of a group that are inherently dishonest and untrustworthy. This further leads to selective perception, which is what one chooses to focus one’s attention on, which in turn will determine the subject matter of the communication. In the above interactions, the emphasis is placed on the perceived negative attributes of the small-scale fisher communities (Berko, Rosenfeld & Samovar 1997, p. 67). The input gained, and comments made at some of the workshops held with the fisher folk, proved that one should not be deceived by looks and appearances and behaviours, and it was abundantly clear that in most instances, these participants knew what they were talking about, and to underestimate them would be at one’s own peril.
One of the issues that therefore would need to be addressed going forward, is that of these perceptions held by the other players in the negotiations and interactions with this particular fisher sector. Two components of these interventions would be the people - separating the ‘people from the problem’, and interests, where focus needs to be placed on these, and not on stances or positions taken by these folk. (Fisher & Ury 1983, pp. 11-22). Further, the three types of people problems that would also need to be taken into consideration would be: perceptions and being able to understand what the sides to the negotiations are thinking, emotions where there is recognition and understanding of these through all participants, and essentially communication, without which there would be no negotiation.
Individualism versus collectivism as a dimension of cross cultural variability is evident in the example of the needs and wants of the small-scale fisher community compared to those of corporate business in the fishing industry.
114 The small-scale fishers as a community display characteristics of a collectivistic culture, where the goals of the community are valued above those of the individual, and where all decisions are made with the group in mind. This is particularly so in their expressed want to be considered bastions of their coastal environment, and where the community will monitor and manage the natural resources in the best interests of all. This collectivistic solidarity (Rogers & Steinfatt 1999, p. 88) differs to that of the industry perspective, where the individual’s goals are valued above those of the collective.
The expectation that the policy for small-scale artisanal fishers will be released on February 9, 2009, and thereafter gazetted, has given rise to some scepticism in some quarters. The question has been asked as to the timing of this, specifically in the light of the general election planned by government to be held shortly thereafter. A co-incidence or a means of gaining the support from the communities in an attempt to garner votes for the ruling party, is what some are speculating.
What is evident though from the above, is that there is a real need for the three entities as defined, being the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Marine Coastal Management, members of the business community of the fishing industry, and the representatives of the various associations and bodies, to communicate on a formalised basis, in order to progress the issues as below.
Within the confines of the in-shore or near-shore regions, these would entail the issues of the sustainability, management and protection of the fish resources, per specific fish specie, to ensure that whatever plans or processes are implemented would secure resource availability into the future.
A further issue is that of the small-scale artisanal fishers themselves – for them to be officially and legal recognised as a fishing sector, and thereby enjoy the rights and benefits that this accepted status warrants.
115
The concern of the protection of the local fishing communities is vital where aspects such as traditional lifestyle and culture need to be respected and retained, as well as maintained. The spirit of community needs to be re- established, in order for these folk to live out their lives in a manner to which over centuries they have become accustomed.
The matter of the interests of business needs, their profitability and sustainability also needs to be formalised, where an equitable opportunity is extended to this sector in order to allow the wheels of commerce in the industry to continue rolling.
The marine resources themselves also need to be protected and monitored in a manner far more efficient than that currently in place. In order for all role players to participate in the different fish sectors, a combination of scientific fact and knowledge and experienced gained through years of exposure to the sea needs to be coordinated. If the resources are not properly managed, the end result would be a lose-lose situation for all. Industry would not be profitable, and the small-scale artisanal fishers would be deprived of their livelihood, factors leading to greater unemployment with a commensurate negative effect on the social climate in communities, leading to even greater hardships and social decline.
Overall, a spirit of cooperation and ‘working together’ needs to be engendered, and a moving away from the threats of violence (pending!), and threats (and actions!) of litigations and high court actions. It is unquestioned that threats have been forthcoming from both sides of the fray, but it would appear that the threat of violence and disruption as voiced by the small-scale fisher community has not been taken with the degree of seriousness that it warrants. It is however, undoubtedly what Deutsch describes as a credible threat (1973, p. 129) – one that has the perceived capability of being implemented at the acceptable level of cost to the people or persons issuing it (the small-scale artisanal fisher folk), as well as their commitment to executing it.
116
One of the attributes of this conflict, and the predicament that the small-scale fishers and communities find themselves in currently, is the phenomenon described as the Solomon Trap (Kennedy & Carpenter 1988, p. 22). Through the tracking of the sequences of events since the inception of the Marine Living Resources Act, the government through the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism has on an ongoing basis ‘heard’ of the plight and the pleas of this sector of fishers, and have responded by assuring the sector that their needs have been heard and addressed. However, when the Act was introduced, and subsequent changes advocated to this, the needs of these fishers were seen to have not been met in the manner that they had requested them and wanted them, and in some aspects not met at all. The overriding feeling therefore was one of betrayal, and that they had not been listened to.
A climate needs to be brought about where ‘greed’ is not the buzzword, and the realisation that with an equitable solution in place that will allow fair participation of all affected parties, a more harmonious environment is created that is constructive, and which will be mindful of the responsibility that we will all carry for the preservation of the fishing resources for future generations.
What is evident from the perspectives gained from the various role players, born out also through the examination of similar situations in other countries around the world, is that there are a number of different options available, some of which would work and find favour with all parties concerned, and some of which won’t. In particular the issue of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ’s) needs to be scrutinised with a view to assessing the practicability in a South African context. Also, the role of government in a proposed ‘rights buy- back’ scheme, and whether this in fact would assist the small-scale artisanal fisher sector, or would it exacerbate the issue through them not having their own resources to actively secure these rights for themselves?
117 A further issue of contention is the ability of the communities of the Western and Southern Cape coasts to take ‘ownership’ and control of the resources in their regions, and their ability to monitor the harvesting of the different fish species in their area. Some argue that this is a viable option, others that it would be the death knell of some species, and in particular the West Coast Lobster industry. The options as put forward by the various role players need to be addressed through means of open discussion, taking all aspects into consideration, being the protection and management of the natural marine resource, the participation of the small-scale artisanal fishers in the catch process, as well as the other fishing sector categories as defined, and the continued existence of the local fisher communities themselves.
In order to progress these, it is recommended that a series of industry workshops be planned, with a view to achieving consensus on all matters as outlined. The model proposed for use here would be that as constructed by Kennedy and Carpenter (1998, p. 93) where having defined the problem, external constraints would be identified, a conflict management goal would be established and a meeting structure selected. Contrary to past workshop practice, which has seen numerous efforts by different elements of the different role players attempting to progress issues, and in the main failing, these workshops would not be of a standard format of convened meetings, often disrupted by ‘offended’ parties taking umbrage and aborting proceedings through walkouts and non-participation.
The methodology of the Participlan™ process has been documented, and it is therefore proposed that a proficient and qualified outside entity, or individuals, be commissioned to facilitate this process. The process steps would be outlined and identified, where through using Participlan™ the method is such that it allows, in the opening phases, for all the hiccups, moans and groans, slights and injustices to be brought to the fore, in an unthreatening manner. By so doing, all the baggage of the past, and the present would be unloaded, which would allow the process to be progressed in the drive to determine a collective way forward, through participation by all and by gaining group
118 consensus as to the ‘best case’ scenario. Determining who should participate and their roles (in this process every participant has equal ‘weight’), as well as putting a time line to the process would be the final step in modelling the programme.
From a facilitation perspective, the role of this individual has best been described as one of an ‘intelligent ignoramus’ i.e. the ability to be astute, aware and intuitive is essential, but the need to be a specialised in the subject, topic or matter under discussion is not. Gersch and Gersch (2003, p. 173) provide an all encompassing definition of the characteristics required of an effective facilitator to a mediation process, this being that he or she should be…
A convenor, educator, communicator, counsellor, translator, questioner and clarifier, confidante, diplomat, manager of the process, reality-checker, creative genius, wordsmith and draftsperson!
Acting as an emotional sponge, by absorbing the emotion from the participants in the group and channelling these to the backing sheets on which all written responses are recorded, the facilitator is able to display empathy to the participants, best described as the ‘degree to which we can accurately infer another’s thoughts or feelings’ (Neuliep 2006, pp. 352-356). Empathy is an essential ingredient of cross cultural and culture sensitive communication, and entails the ability to paraphrase and reword, reflect feelings back to those with whom we are communicating, confirm meanings through restating what was heard, and summarising by restating the major issues that have been communicated. Furthermore, it is essential that the facilitators of the process are able to engender a strong level of trust from those participating in the interaction. Building this relationship of trust between themselves and the parties to the process is vital for the effective contribution and final outcomes (Cohen 1993, p. 77).
Following on from trust, is the essential that facilitators in this process need to maintain a balanced or neutral stance, where according to Kovach (1994, p.
119 99) ‘neutrality is the central concept of mediation’, the facilitator-mediator sometimes referred to as a ‘third party neutral’. Neutrality and impartiality according to Kruk (1998, p. 5), is being neither biased to any of the parties, nor ‘invested’ in any particular outcome.
The Participlan™ methodology that would be deployed in this instance, would be one where the lessons learnt from the past would be uncovered. Thereafter, the process would entail composing a future or ideal situation, and addressing issues such as the relationship between government, industry and the fisher communities, beneficial to all. The final sequence would see the composing of the action, that is, what would the group collectively need to do, how would it be structured, who would be doing what, and how it would be managed.
Participlan™ is a participatory process, as is all mediation, and it is essential therefore for the facilitators to clearly define their roles, and the expectations of those party to this methodology. As described by Kovach (1994, p. 29): ‘the parties are responsible for the content; the mediator is responsible for the process’. Nupen (1993, p. 42) frames this as explain the process, AND secure the parties commitment to it.
Participlan™, as mediation tool in conflict management, and therefore in this arena, is unrivalled in its potency, and its ability to deal with strata of individuals, associations and institutions, irrespective of race, creed, colour, education or background. It is able to cut through all of this simultaneously, where ministers can ‘talk’ to miners and chief executive officers to crayfish boat captains.
Essential to this process however would be the need for the parties to take responsibility for their own actions, negotiations, contractual arrangements and individual performance during the process as well as afterwards. The Participlan™ methodology, when used in such an application, would be considered a form of mediation, and the responsibilities as outlined would
120 require what is described by Leviton and Greenstone (1997, p. 7) as consensual resolution.
It is therefore vital that a getting together of all role players and representatives of industry, communities and government need to organised as a priority, as outlined in the process above. It is also evident from the above comments made by a cross section of representation that there is a willingness on the part of both community and their association representatives, as well as industry through their associations also, to share their ideas and thoughts, with a view to finding some common ground on which to reach some form of collective way forward.
It is also the general consensus that this initiative should be taken on by the government, and that the responsibility lies with them to get the process actioned.
From all of the above, this research study has illustrated that the small-scale artisanal fishing community is one that needs to be recognised as a justifiable participant in the in-shore and near-shore fishing industry, and as such should be included as a distinct category in the country’s Marine Living Resources Act. The continued participation of this sector, through whatever means determined, being either the allocation of quotas, or the right of access within the confines of an established Total Allowable Catch, needs to be worked through. It has also been demonstrated that this sector’s survival is further dependent on a multi-specie catch practice, allowing them to participate on a year round basis, taking into account the seasonality of different species. All of this though, will be tempered by the reality that the majority of species targeted form part of a limited resource, and effective management and compliance to stipulated quantities that can be harvested, is paramount.
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FEIKE www.feike.co.za. www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1998 www.environment .gov.za. 17032008.doc www.masifundise.org.za.
137 APPENDIX ONE…
Participlan™ … communicate collaborate perform
The Participlan™ process creates a positive environment for the free flow of ideas and constructive discussion ... to gather information, innovate, problem-solve or make decisions. Applied to group discussions, meetings or planning workshops, participants communicate and collaborate more effectively, producing an outcome that participants buy into because they have been totally involved. The Participlan™ process keeps everyone on track, creating the required output faster …
Participlan® process …
ideas clustered ideas rated or question all respond by on display prioritise posed writing sheets d
onideas cards
ideas unpacked to provide additional insight
actions decided and developed progress through sequence of questions
display sheets further Participlan® photo-reduced for follow up sessions evolve ...
138 the Participlan™process …
Clustering of ideas / opinions generated onto specially prepared display sheets, enables participants to focus their thinking through the visual stimulation this technique provides.
Questions are either formulated prior to a meeting, with participants as the first stage of their interaction … or simply as an issue arises.
The sequence and type of questions are determined by the objectives or “outputs” required from the session.
why the process works ...
Participlan™ enables everyone to focus their thinking and work effectively and efficiently towards the required outcome.
139 Here are the advantages …
• • simple to use by participants … successful results from first time users silent generation of ideas users … not influenced by others … original thinking responding on cards … not easy to hi-jack meeting simultaneous idea generation … keeps meeting on track … faster meetings write big and bold … no delay by verbose people one idea per card as many cards as you can avoid suitcase words less risk to participants … able to express in own language anonymous input … education / status not an issue … people express themselves openly - more honestly people distanced from their thoughts by using cards … reduces negative / emotional interplay
140 why the process works ...
visual display of ideas use any available wall space … people cross fertilise … environment best suited for … build on each others thinking the meeting (eg. factory floor) … people not away from … keeps meeting focused what are the typical problems in meetings? workplace too long
people cannot dominate … all ideas are heard ideas photo-reduced to A4 … people more open minded … no ideas lost … trust in the outcome … better recall of information visually reinforces progress … no need to produce minutes … constantly review ideas / decisions why the process works …
141 why the process works ...
eliminates heirarchy in meeting … people feel equal
… express genuine feelings what are the typical proper planning of meeting problems in meetings … unlock real potential … focus on right issue … have correct people … right framework to arrive at right conclusion focus on objective … arrive at decisions faster
facilitator understands decision making structure act as an emotional shock absorber … ensures decisions made … emotion doesn’t impact negatively on right parameters on process and content doesn’t allow “intimidation” manages process not content … remains objective / neutral … no manipulation
142 Participlan™ applications ...
vision
mission
policies (values)
enabling strategies strategic level
every day business tool planning
projects problem solving : conflict resolution innovation : scoping a project implementation decision making : information gathering
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APPENDIX TWO…
Format of questions for Participlan™ sessions….Artisanal Fishers, Industry, DEAT/MCM
Adopting a ‘conversational facilitation technique’
Lessons Learnt question…
Composes the Current Situation and Past Reality Scenario
Looking back over the last 2-3 years what are the positives (good) and negatives (bad) things that happened in terms of fish rights for small- scale/artisanal fishers sector?
VOTE: Which of these are most critical to you?
Idealistic question…
Composing the Future or Ideal Situation
Describe the relationship between government, industry and ourselves…where all our needs are heard, and the relationship is mutually beneficial…
What does this look like (how are we structured)…and what are we doing? (What are the activities we are involved in?)
(You are in the year 2010 [just before the opening ceremony of the World Cup] – describe your relationship and activities)
VOTE: Which of these are most important to you? (Individual thought question looking for individual response)
Action steps question…
Composing the Action
What must we now do (collectively, including government, industry and artisanal fishers) to become what we described earlier? (What actions and/or decisions will you now implement?)
Note: Question content to be changed dependent on the specific workshop audience.
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