Document of The World Bank

FOR OFFICLAL USE ONLY Public Disclosure Authorized Report No: 24323

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (IDA-27910; IDA-2791 1)

ONA

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 111.2 MILLION (US$152.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

Public Disclosure Authorized TO THE

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH

FOR A

RIVER BANK PROTECTION PROJECT

June 20, 2002 Public Disclosure Authorized

Rural Development Sector Unit South Asia Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Public Disclosure Authorized CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective) Currency Unit = Bangladesh Taka (Tk) At Appraisal (April 1995) Tk 1.00 = US$ 0.0248 US$ 1.00 = Tk 40.25

ICR (June 2002) US$1.00 = Tk 57.45

FISCAL YEAR

July 1 June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADP Annual Development Program (GOB) BBS Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics BRE Brahmaputra Right Embankment BWDB Bangladesh Water Development Board CEGIS Centre for Environmental and Geographic Information System CIDA Canadian International Development Agency DPHE Department of Public Health Engineering EIA Environmental Impact Assessment EMP Environmental Management Plan FAP Flood Action Plan FCDI Flood Control Drainage and Irrigation FDR Flood Damage Rehabilitation FIDIC Federation Internationale Des Ingenieurs-Conseils FPCO Flood Plan Coordination Organizaition GOB Government of Bangladesh GRC Grievance Redress Committee ICB International Competitive Bidding IDA International Development Association IPOE Independent Panel of Experts JMBA Jamuna Multi-Purpose Bridge Authority LGED Local Government Engineering Department MIS Management Information System MOWR Ministry of Water Resources NCB National Competitive Bidding NPV Net Present Value NWMP National Water Management Plan O&M Operation and Maintenance OED Operations Evaluation Department PEM Policy Entitlement Matrix PPAR Project Performance Audit Report PMRU Project Management and Resettlement Unit PSR Project Status Report QAG Quality Assurance Group RAC Regional Accounting Centre RAP Resettlement Action Plan FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

RBPP River Bank Protection Project SAR Staff Appraisal Report SCF Standard Conversion Factor SDR Special Drawing Right WARPO Water Resources Planning Organization WBS Work Breakdown structure WFP World Food Programme WMIP Water Management Improvement Project (Proposed) WPAG Water Policy Advisory Group

Vice President: , Mieko Nishimizu Country Manager/Director: Frederick Thomas Temple Sector Manager/lDirector: Constance A. Bernard Task Team Leader/Task Manager: , S.A.M. Rafiguzzaman and Ohn Myint

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not be otherwise disclosed without World Bank authorization. BANGLADESH River Bank Protection Project

CONTENTS

Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 8 6. Sustainability 9 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 10 8. Lessons Learned 12 9. Partner Comments 13 10. Additional Information 13 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 14 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 17 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 19 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 26 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 28 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Perfonnance 29 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 30 Annex 8. Borrowers Contribution to the ICR 31 Map: IBRD 31953: Bangladesh - River Bank Protection Project (Including Emergency Flood Recovery Area) ['rojectID: P009545 ProjectName: River Bank Protection 7'eam Leader: S. A. M. Rafiquzzaman TL Unit: SASRD IAR Type: Core ICR Report Date: June 19, 2002

1.. Project Data Name: River Bank Protection L/C/TFNumber: IDA-27910; IDA-27911 Country/Department: BANGLADESH Region: South Asia Regional Office Sector/subsector: MV - Pre-Investment / Portfolio Development; VM - Natural Resources Management

KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 04/27/1990 Effective: 06/20/1996 06/20/1996 Appraisal: 01/09/1995 MTR: Approval: 12/05/1995 Closing: 12/31/2000 12/31/2001

Borrower/lInplementingAgency: Government of Bangladesh (GOB)/Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) and Water Resources Planning Organization (WARPO) Other Partners:

STAFF Current At Appraisal >'ice President: Mieko Nishimizu D. Joseph Wood C'ountry Manager: Frederick Thomas Temple Paul Isenman Sector Manager: Constance A. Bernard Ridwan Ali 7Team Leader at ICR: S.A.M. Rafiquzzaman and Ohn Keith Pitman Myint ICR PrimaryAuthor: Christopher Konecki (FAO-TCIP)

2.. Principal Performance Ratings (FlS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactoiy, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Ualikely, HU=Highly Unsatis&ctory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: S Sustainability:L InstitutionalDevelopment Impact: M Bank Performance:S BorrowerPerformance: S

QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: S Project at Risk at Any Time: No 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 OriginalObjective: The principal project objective was to prevent the erosion of riparian land at two locations on the west bank of the Brahmaputra by the construction and maintenance of improved river-bank protection works that would: (a) protect Sirajganj town's built-up and semi-urban areas from major damage and cumulative destruction; and (b) prevent the merger of the Brahmaputra and Bangali Rivers in the vicinity of Sariakandi and consequential increased regional flooding. A further objective was to assist GOB in developing permanent institutions for improved water sector planning, preserving the institutional capacity developed under Flood Action Plan (FAP) and maling multidisciplinary planning part of Bangladesh's nornal water sector planning processes. A smnall component would assist Bangladesh Water Development Board's (BWDB) efforts to improve its accounting and management information systems.

The project objectives were consistent with both the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) objectives of land resource conservation and disaster mitigation, as reflected in the Five Year Development Plan and IDA's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) goals and sector priorities. To help Bangladesh achieve its overarching goal of a substantial reduction in poverty within a generation, IDA's CAS (December 2000) accords pnority to accelerating sustained rural development To this end, IDA's country assistance program includes support for essential rural infrastructure, including defensive infiastructure for disaster mitigation, and institutional reforms in the water sector to promote decentralized, participatory approaches to water resources management. The project objectives addressed the need to enhance the functionality of the existing Brahmnaputra Right Embanknent (BRE) flood management infrastructure to mitigate the environmental and economic impacts of flooding; and to address the associated institutional strengthening needs in implementing agencies under the Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR).

3.2 Revised Objective: Following the major floods in 1998, a Supplementary Credit was approved in April 1999, supporting a third project objective to: (a) facilitate resumption of agricultural and economic activities disrupted by the floods through repair and reconstruction of flood damaged water control, drainage and irrigation infrastructure, which were damaged by the floods; and (b) prepare a program to extend river bank protection works to other critical areas along Bangladesh's river system. The objective to improve the accounting information system was dropped from the project, when it was decided by GOB that this activity would be financed separately by CIDA, in a parallel operation to this project.

3.3 OriginalComponents: The project design incorporated the following components:

(a) Rehabilitation and construction of river-bank protection works at two sites on the Brahmnaputra River's west bank, including retirement and realignment of about 8 km of the Brahmaputra Right Embankment to link the river-bank protection works at Sariakandi and Mathurapara;

(b) Land acquisition and a program of resettlement for people displaced by project works;

(c) Technical assistance for implementation supervision and maintenance of works constructed under the project,

-2 - (d) Establishment and initial funding of a specialized O&M Unit in BWDB to maintain the riverbank protection works constructed under the project, and procurement of vehicles and equipment for the O&M Unit;

(e) Institution building technical assistance to Water Resources Planning Organization (WARPO) to integrate the FAP within the framework of national water planning, produce a national water management plan and a portfolio of investment projects for the medium and long-tern, and upgrade integrated water sector planning capability; and

(f) Institutional capacity building technical assistance to BWDB to improve the operation of the new regional accounting centers (which includes training), and provision of equipment and transport to improve supervision capability in the field and intemal communications.

The six components had two main thrusts: (i) construction and maintenance of river training works and associated institutional strengthening of BWDB; and (ii) development of a National Water Management Plan and associated institutional strengthening of WARPO. Both BWDB and WARPO were supported by appropriate internationally recruited technical assistance. The components, taken as a whole, were directly relevant to the achievement of project objectives. Project design drew heavily on the concepts developed through the Brahmaputra River Training Studies (BRTS) under the Flood Action Plan (FAP) study program; and the findings of the Project Perfornance Audit Report (PPAR) prepared by OED on the Drainage and Flood Control Project (Cr.864-BD), which closed in 1984.

3.4 Revised Components: An. additional component was added to address the objectives introduced under the 1999 Supplemental Credit, involving: (i) rehabilitating flood control, drainage irrigation and erosion control facilities at some 40 sites across the country (US$21 million); (ii) undertaking remedial measures for protection works at Sirajganj site which were damaged during the last high flow season (US$14.9 million); (iii) financing the gap due to depreciation of the US dollar against the SDR since Credit approval (US$7.1 nillion); and (iv) preparing a longer term plan for river bank protection and designing a follow-up river hbmk protection project to protect critical sites vulnerable to erosion (US$2 million) and to reduce damages which may be caused by floods in future.

3.5 Quality at Entry: Quality at entry of the overall project design is rated as satisfactory. The design addressed the need for linking investments in defensive infrastructure with institutional reforms and capacity building in the water sector. The project design took into account the special needs of a complex social-physical enlvironment, identified potential social and environmental impacts and risks, and incorporated specific rmitigating and enforcement mechanisms to ensure that the Bank's Resettlement and Environment safeguard policies were followed. Recommendations of the Flood Action Plan (FAP) were acknowledged in the design of project's institution building technical assistance for WARPO and BWDB. The preparation activities were well managed and comprehensive, relying on past Bangladesh project knowledge base, and the latest adlvances in river training technical analysis and design. In addition, advance procurement actions, prior to negotiation, for major civil works contracts including supervision consultancy were well managed, facilitating expedient implementation when the credit became effective.

The Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) and Environmental Inpact Assessment (EIA) were prepared irL accordance with the applicable World Bank safeguard policies. The project was justifiably placed in the enlvironmental screening category "B" with social and environmental impacts deternined to be site specific,

- 3- with few, if any, being irreversible.

The EIA proposed appropriate mitigating measures against potentially adverse construction impacts, and these were successfully implemented. Specific clauses were included in the civil works contracts to ensure EIA conditions were enforceable for timely scheduling of in-river works and material deposition activities. Civil works contracts included adequate provisions to ensure that affected water supply and sanitation services were repaired; drainage congestion was mininmized; and potential water borne infection from construction material borrow-pit areas was reduced by chemical treatment. Management of EIA mitigating measures deployment was assured through a comprehensive Environmental Monitoring and Action Plan developed for the project. The decision to further assesses the biodiversity (fisheries) impacts and mitigation needs resulted in the integration of a fish-pass within the six-kilometer link embankment near the Mathurapara "hard-point" (groyne).

The Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) was to be implemented by the project's Resettlement Unit and provision was made for compensation at current market prices and for the inclusion of persons without legal land titles who were nevertheless affected by the project (e.g. squatters, employees of displaced businesses, etc.). Accountability and transparency in RAP implementation were strengthened by good local level consultation, an effective information campaign and a grievance redress procedure, drawing on the earlier Jamuna Bridge project experience.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:

The achievement of development objectives is rated as satisfactory. The first objective was fully achieved. River bank protection works constructed under the project are now preventing land loss and settlements/property destruction with consequential reduction of regional flooding. Since the 1998 floods, these works have successfully provided flood protection for Sirajganj town and prevented the merger of Brahmaputra/Jamuna with the Bangali River at Sariakandi, protecting against expanded flooding in adjacent areas and associated property damage. The second development objective of improved water sector planning and water resources management was substantially achieved with the successful preparation of a National Water Management Plan (NWMP) and the associated institutional development and capacity building of WARPO. The first part of the third objective to facilitate resumption of agricultural and economic activity in 39 flood control, drainage and irrigation (FCDI) schemes, after repair of flood damaged water control infrastructure, was also achieved. Completion of the emergency repairs in those schemes has restored the functional infrastructure and facilitated the opportunity for affected communities to resume and maintain agricultural production and commercial activities in the adjacent lands and immediate hinterlands.

The second part of the third development objective--the preparation of a program to extend riverbank protection works to other critical areas along Bangladesh river system-was postponed by BWDB on the recommendation of the Bank. It was considered that more time was needed before this work could be undertaken, to ensure that future strategy and investment options take into account outcomes from the recently completed pilot project on River Bank Protection and River Training (FAP2 1/22 - kfw/Germany funded) and the recommendations of the NWMP which at that time was still being prepared. The FAP pilot examined options for erosion protection and river training works, while NWMP has set out a water sector investment program for the 2001- 2025 period, based on a development strategy approved by Government after a process involving extensive stakeholder participation. GOB is now following-up the recommendations of NWMP and FAP pilot in their proposed erosion protection programs; and

-4 - subsequently, the Bank proposes to undertake a study on the technical and social dimensions of river management during FY03, to have a better understanding of the problems and the issues involved.

Institutional development and strengthening was common to all components and proposed outcomes were largely achieved. This is evidenced by the fact that considerable momentum was established by MOWR, through BWDB and WARPO, in extending the water resources policy agenda in latter stages of the project. The National Water Management Development Strategy has been approved and the NWMP', which effectively operationalizes the National, Water Policy, is in the final stage of approval by the National Water Resources Council. Complementing these, the Bangladesh Water Act which will iacilitate implementation of the NWMP has been drafted. WARPO, equipped with national water resources database and some of the core-trained staff, is now better placed to carry out its mandated role.

An important complementary project outcome warrants mention, concerning the positive impact that project investments at Sirajganj is having on the Jamuna Bridge investment. The project river training infrastructure, when considered in conjunction with works at the Jamuna Bridge some 6 km downstream of Sirajganj, now provide a more secured integrated river training arrangement to mitigate river related impacts at the Bridge works (Section 6.1).

t Draft National Water Management Plan (NWMP) has been reviewed and cleared by the Executive Committee of National Water Resources Council on February 2, 2002. The draft is expected to be formally approved soon by the National Water Itesources Council.

4.2 Outputs by components: River Bank Protection Works. Construction of these protection works is rated as satisfactory, with the finished product being of superior technical quality. Activities at both sites were substantially complete by June 1998, when the major floods occurred. Portion of the works at Sirajganj were severely damaged during the floods, requiring remedial measures and rebuilding of a 320 meter failed section of the 2,500 meter revetment works. Construction was finally completed in June 1999, about a 12-month delay lrom the original schedule. Completion of the works at Sariakandi-Mathurapara where flood damage was inuch less, was delayed by three months, ana these were finalized by the end of September 1998. No damage has occurred to any project structure in the three floods subsequent to the major one in 1998. The mninor associated civil works procured under NCB, consisting of the BRE retirement link embankment and lish-pass (about 2% of total civil works cost), were completed satisfactorily and are operational. Factors which affected construction, moderately in ICB and more so in NCB contracts, included a short six month working season dictated by the monsoon flooding, and compounded by the need to complete all land acquisition and resettlement actions prior to start of work.

Land Acquisition and Resettlement. This socially and economically important aspect of project implementation was rated as satisfactory, achieving its objectives and outcomes despite difficulties at sttart-up. Implementation of all planned activities has been substantially completed, adhering to the comprehensive Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) and Environmental Management Plan (EMP) aspects and criteria. Land Acquisition totaled some 120 ha (vs. 96 ha in the $AR), relocating 421 homesteads (vs. 370 in the SAR), and involving 2,080 Project Affected Persons (vs. 1828 in the SAR). All land acquisition and resettlement activities have been substantially completed, except for 67 households at Sariakandi who have been relocated to resettlement plots, for which land ownership titles are yet to be transferred. This outstanding issue is yet to be resolved by the BWDB, but relates to unwillingness of the settlers to take the litle rather than fault on the part of BWDB.

-5 - Supervision reports and Quality Assurance Group (QAG) evaluations indicate that implementation of the RAP and EMP was largely successful. The project provided compensation to replace property and assets in line with the provisions of the policy entitlement matrix, complemented by support for local community organizations in developing alternative livelihood opportunities. Project Management and Resettlement Unit and Grievance Committees were established promptly and these ensured effective implementation of this aspect of the project. The RAP almost represented a full-fledged social development program in itself; and provided considerably enhanced benefits over and above the normal provisions of GOB policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R&R). The implementation of the RAP provided an excellent hands-on training opportunity for institutional development and capacity building in BWDB.

TechnicalAssistancefor Construction Supervision. Design of the protection works was funded under an earlier IDA project (Second Small Scale FCDI Project, Cr. 1870-BD) and the supervision contract was awarded on a single-source basis to a consortium of main firms involved in the design work. Notwithstanding the problems caused by the 1998 floods, the performance of construction supervision TA was Satisfactory, as it provided much-needed major project-management capacity strengthening and building at GOB/BWDB in hands-on, learning-by-doing setting for major construction management and O&M unit formation. The failed portion of the Sirajganj protection works involved major cost increases (about 30%/o or US$15.6 million), to finance repairs and additional supervision costs and assess liability. The matter was investigated by an Independent Panel of Experts (IPOE) appointed by BWDB. The panel concluded that the Consultants' design of river-bank protection works was deficient and, therefore, the Consultants were professionally liable. The consultants disagreed with the independent panel's conclusion and argued that the causes of failure were the extreme conditions beyond the agreed design parameters, caused by the magnitude of the one-in-one-hundred year floods. Based on the opinion of an intemal committee formed by BWDB, MOWR/BWDB later accepted the consultants' clarifications and absolved them from any fault related to the design, supervision and management of the construction. At the request of the Bank, MOWR has, however, now agreed to appoint a second independent panel to review the entire matter and reconcile the different conclusions of the independent panel and the subsequent BWDB internal committee, and complete the process during 2002.

Riverbank Protection Works O&M Unit. The project supported the establishment of a specialized O&M Unit in BWDB to monitor the conditions and performance of the riverbank protection works constructed under the project, and plan annual maintenance needs; organize routine and preventive maintenance work; and maintain a stockpile of repair materials (mainly concrete blocks and geo-textile bags). The specialized Unit was established in 1998 and although there were initial delays, by the end of the project it was properly staffed and equipment for monitoring and maintenance has been procured. The Unit is functioning satisfactorily and is carrying out survey and monitoring of the completed works throughout the year. As planned, BWDB has outsourced provision of necessary long-term technical support requirements by engaging two specialized agencies, the Centre for Environmental and Geographic Information System (CEGIS) for prediction of possible bank line movement in the particular river reaches relevant to the project works, and the Surface Water Modeling Centre (SWMC) for pre/post-monsoon assessment of morphological changes in the riverbed. Any maintenance work required will be tendered to national contractors. As this is specialized work for most contractors and timing is usually a crucial factor when substantive work needs to be done, BWDB is maintaining a stockpile of repair materials and will lease specialized equipment procured under the project (tugboat, work barges and crane) to facilitate a quick response by contractors. Strengthening and Institutional Capacity Building in WARPO and preparation of the National Water Management Plan (NWMP). This component included three main activities: institutional strengthening of WARPO; establishment of a national water resources database (NWRD);

- 6 - and, preparation of the NWMP. Overall implementation outputs for the most part is rated as satisfactory. The outputs from component activities were achieved. The combined activities strengthened the water management planning capacity within the country and have facilitated the steady transition to a more comprehensive and integrated approach to water sector development This new integrated approach was initiated under FAP and the 1995 Bangladesh Water and Flood Management Strategy continued it to some degree. But the major advances have been made under this project during both preparation and inplementation, culminating in the emergence of the National Water Policy in January 1999, the National Water Development Strategy in June 2001, and finally, in December 2001, the National Water Management Plan. A dral Bangladesh Water Act, an essential instrument for facilitating the imnplementation of the management plan, was also prepared in 2001.

Overall, the performance of TA is considered as generally satisfactory. Management of TA inputs would have benefited from optimization of work plans and more efficient and effective resources deployment An Independent Panel of Experts (IPOE) consisting of national and intemational consultants was appointed to advise WARPO on technical matters associated with the preparation of NWMP. The potential benefits of the panel's advice was limited by the fact that there was no clear leadership of the p:mel, leading to an unfocused approach in their interactions with WARPO.and the TA team helping prepare the NWMP. Also, the multiplicity of TA tearns (e.g. NWMP consultants, IPOEs and WPAG) pased a major challenge to WARPO in terms of coordination and reconciling the conflicting views.

Flood Rehabilitation Works. Despite the problem of misprocurement on a proportion of small value post-review contracts, the output from implementation of this component is still regarded as satisfactory. The works comprised rehabilitation, repair and re-construction of Flood Control Drainage anid Irrigation (FCDI) infrastructure in 39 BWDB schemes dispersed throughout the country. Rehabilitation and repairs were arranged through 321 separate and small contracts, of which 309 were in the range of US$2,000 to US$200,000, (with an average value of about US$67,000) and were therefore not subject to the Bank's prior review. Repairs undertaken under these contracts were of a generally s£1tisfactory quality, but a significantly unsatisfactory aspect of the implementation was the non-compliance by BWDB with the Bank's NCB guidelines, resulting in misprocurement being declared for 67 contracts of the 309 post-review contracts, and constituting around 13% of the total cost of the flood repair component. Limited technical capacity of field level BWDB staff to manage the NCB, and their lack of appreciation of Bank's stringent procurement guidelines led to inappropriate procurement practices including collusive bidding, unacceptable errors and inordinate delays. Under the Supplemental Credit, additional TA was arranged (financed by AUSAID during preparation, but IDA during implementation) to assist in the implementation of the emergency post flood repairs program. The supervision consultant's procurement guidance was not effective due to the number and dispersion of small contracts. It is worth mentioning here that this procurement exercise was BWDB's first experience with the Bank's standard bidding documents fcr NCB on contracts under Tkl 1.00 million. Neither BWDB staff, nor particularly the small contractors involved, found the new document fornats and increased procedural requirements easy to handle, and this no doubt contributed to the procurement problem that resulted.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:

The project economic analysis was done only on the riverbank protection works and was based on a hypothetical assumption regarding the year the benefits of the project commenced - these benefits being identified as the damage avoided by preventing riverbank erosion. Since the original earth embanlkment of the BRE was already in place and the project objective was to ensure that breaches would not occur in future, estimation of benefits depend on assumptions about when the breaches would be likely to occur and when the actual construction of the protection works would be advanced enough to begin providing

-7 - enhanced protection against this breaching. The SAR accordingly makes (in addition to the baseline analysis) three calculations of ERR depending on a hypothetical tuning of when the project benefits are likely to commence (a 1, 2 or 3-year delay). The ICR, in its analysis, assumes the project benefits as starting only when construction is completed, a situation equivalent to the SAR's two year's delay scenario. On this basis, the ICR estimate of ERR for the two sub-components together is about 16%, which is comparable to the SAR estimate.

4.4 Financialrate of return:

Not calculated.

4.5 Institutionaldevelopment impact:

The institutional development impact of the project at Credit Closing is rated as modest, although the impact is envisaged to evolve further over time. In case of river training works, BWDB has demonstrated their enhanced appreciation of the importance of proper O&M aspects and is now better organized for monitoring and maintenance activities. The BWDB's specialized O&M Unit is established with improved, equipment and operational capacity. Staff have been trained on the job, a draft O&M manual prepared to improve regular performance; and planning functions introduced to prepare annual programs and budgets. Where technical capacities are not available in-house, specialized aspects of monitoring functions have been outsourced to experts in the private sector. The impact with respect to WARPO has however been less, with only limited skills in integrated water management being transferred from the TA team preparing the NWMP to the core staff of WARPO. In its present form and with its present legal status, WARPO cannot provide sufficient incentives to attract staff of the needed technical calibre to perform its mandated function as an inter-ministerial water resource planning organization. It is recognized that this project did not adequately address this very difficult issue. Both the Netherlands and ADB are now actively considering projects to strengthen WARPO to enable it to carryout its mandated functions more effectively.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factorsoutside the control of government or implementing agency:

The extreme 1998 monsoon flooding was the most significant factor affecting the project implementation. This flood was of a 1/100 year magnitude which caused extensive damage to the river training works under construction, increasing civil works costs substantially and delaying completion.

5.2 Factorsgenerally subject to government control: The main issues related to (i) delayed sanctioning of employment of qualified staff by WARPO and BWDB's specialized O&M Unit in the early stages of the project; and (ii) delay in GOB approval of the draft NWMP largely due to inaction during the period immediately preceding and following the 2001 general elections. The NWMP was approved in February 2002 after the Credit closed.

5.3 Factorsgenerally subject to implementing agency control: BWDB made effective and expedient decisions to repairing damaged portions of FCDI schemes after the 1998 floods, but did not adequately control procurement processing of NCB contracts resulting in unacceptable bidding practices including collusion at some BWDB field offices and a significant number of cases of misprocurement. In WARPO, the slow provision of adequate office facilities and logistics for the TA team working on the NWMP caused significant implementation delays early in the project In

- 8 - addition, frequent movement of some senior personnel in WARPO early in the project period adversely affected management and planning effectiveness.

'.4 Costs andfinancing: The original total project cost was US$156.0 million equivalent and this was increased to U`S$192.0 million after the 1998 floods to finance emergency repairs through the Supplemental Credit. Final project costs are estimated at US$192.0 million, in line with the original combined project cost estimates.

Out of the combined credit amount of SDR 111.2 million, as of June 16, 2002, SDR 107.1 million had been disbursed; SDR 2.2 million cancelled due to misprocurement; the balance of SDR 1.9 million will be fully disbursed.

6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationalefor sustainabilityrating:

The long-term sustainability of the project is rated as ULkely. The civil works for the riverbank protection structures have been completed to a relatively high construction standard, and all structures at the two project sites, Sariakandi-Mathurapara and Sirajganj, have performed satisfactorily from a technical sustainability viewpoint, in the last three flood periods. During the devastating floods in 1998, the 2,500 m long Sirajganj "hard-point", was severely damaged over a -320 m section. Following extensive repairs, the works are stable and reportedly secure with a 50-year design life. The revetment work integrity is monitored regularly and remedial actions taken as needed by the special O&M Unit of BWDB. This Unit was formed in 1998 and is functioning with necessary core staff and equipment. The Unit carries out monitoring and maintenance activities in collaboration with private sector specialized agencies, the Surface WVlater Modeling Centre (SWMC) and Centre for Environmental and Geographic Information System (-EGIS). Sustainability of the river tramiing aspect of the project depends, however, only partially on the proper maintenance of the protection works at Sirajganj and Sariakandi-Mathurapara. These were two p)iority sites selected from more than 20 sites identified in the Brahmaputra River Training Study as being strategically important in the effort to limit the west-ward migration of the river. In designing the project, it was envisaged that protection works would be required at other sites in time, and that this should be done in a phased manner as and when needed, with due consideration of the economic, social and environmental issues involved. Sustainability therefore will depend on the ability of BWDB through its specialized O&M Unit with support from EGIS and SWMC, to monitor river movetnents, identify areas of the river at risk of substantive erosion, and take mitigation measures. It also depends on the availability of financing for fiuture necessary river training works and for this, GOB will be relying on donor support to supplement its own resources. In this regard, the Government intends to examine options for full or partial cost recovery. Siince the integrity of Jamuna Bridge is linked to that of Sirajganj protection works, the potential exists for sharing its maintenance cost with the Jarnuna Multipurpose Bridge Authority (JMBA), or for BWDB to hand over the maintenance responsibility to JMBA, which already performs regular river monitoring upstream of Sirajganj.

The repairs to the FCDI schemes affected by the 1998 flood were completed successfully by BWDB, but consistent O&M support for these schemes is needed if this investrnent is to be sustained. Based on past experience, GOB budget support is uncertain for this activity and alternate means are needed to supplement the O&M funding. GOB intends, through use of the "Guidelines for Participatory Water

-9- Management" approved in April 2001, to encourage community participation in management of FCDI schemes, including contribution to O&M costs. If properly implemented, this community-based approach could contribute effectively to longer-term operational sustainability of these schemes.

Likely sustainability of institutional strengthening outputs in water sector planning is signaled by GOB's adoption of key policy instruments, the NWMP and the proposed Bangladesh Water Act WARPO has prepared a 5-year work plan, which includes NWMP follow-up studies, screening of water sector investments, annual updating of National Water Resources Database (NWRDB), and the updating of the NWMP. But in its present form, WARPO is unlikely to be able to manage these functions without continuing external support

6.2 Transition arrangementto regularoperations: All project activities have been undertaken by BWDB and WARPO as part of their day-to-day functions, but with substantive TA support. Further TA support will be needed particularly with respect to the river protection O&M and water resource planning. GOB expects to secure this support through ongoing and future projects in the sector, including the twining arrangement with the Netherlands.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending: Bank's performance during the project preparation is considered satisfactory. The project was prepared comprehensively by an experienced team. It was consistent with GOB strategic priorities of the Five-Year Development Plan as well as with IDA's Country Assistance Strategy and sector priorities. Project preparation and appraisal responded to the complex social, environmental, technical, engineering, and economic viability issues associated with attempts at river trining and integrated water resource management Preparation efforts recognized the need for implementing agencies to have selective technical assistance when necessary; and insistence on advance procurement actions meant that civil works were completed on time and within budget.

7.2 Supervision:

Bank performance in project supervision is rated as satisfactory. The Bank's supervision team experience, skill mix and continuity were appropriate. The project review teams were responsive to client concerns and issues at critical points of physical works implementation. Financial management specialists were included later as the Bank added these staff positions. The supervision was cost effective considering total size and demands for conformance to the Bank's internal quality assurance guidelines and safeguards policies related to Environment, Land Acquisition and Resettlement The approach by Bank supervision teams of facilitating implementation rather than directing it made an important contribution to project outcomes by BWBD's and WARPO's taking full ownership of project activities.

7.3 Overall Bankperformance:

Based on the above, the Bank's overall performance is rated as satisfactory.

Borrower 7.4 Preparation: The Borrower's performance during project preparation is rated as satisfactory. The deferral of

-10- appraisal from late-1992 to mid-1995, during which time long-standing institutional issues at BWDB were addressed and arrangements were filized with CIDA for modernization of BWDB Accounting System, provided sufficient time for a higher level dialogue to secure GOB's commitment to the project The preparation ensured that the key elements required for physical works implementation - engineering design, land acquisition, procurement of contractors, and procurement of supervision consultants - were substantially completed before the Credit became effective.

7.5 Government implementation performance:

GOB's performance during implemnentation can be considered sah'sfactory. Project ownership was generally good and consistent. Matters pertaining to emergency repair response and resolution of contractual issues with major works construction, repair and re-design were handled reasonably expediently and effectively. Institutional development activities in BWDB and WARPO received less priority from the Government but gained considerable recognition during the course of the project. The GOB provided support and strong commitment to the development of water resources sector policy instruments such as the NWMP and draft Bangladesh Water Act.

7.6 Implementing Agency:

The performance of the implementing agencies was mostly satisfactory during implementation.

WARPO management of the NWMP consultants at the initial stages was not adequately focused on intended goals and objectives - with insufficient monitoring and TA resource management controls. However, management improved significantly over time, and particularly in the last 18 months of the project, when WARPO finally asserted full oJiership of the NWMP preparation.

BWDB's performance in implementing the river training component was satisfactory in terms of procurement management of the civil works contracts and the supervisory consultants. Decisive action was laken to initiate emergency repairs to the flood damaged Sirajgong protection works and to form an independent panel to investigate the failure. The subsequent overturning of this panel's conclusions by an intemal committee of BWDB, later endorsed by MOWR, was, however, somewhat questionable, and is still lo be resolved. However, BWDB's performance in managing the river training component, was overshadowed later by improper practices identified in contracting of small Flood Damage Repair works. The experience in this project confirms that BWDB's procurement management capacity needs strengthening, including procurement perfornance tracking on a regular basis. Instead of split of works into a large number of small packages, the contract packages should have been larger in size for ease of management and to ensure proper checks and balances are in place. In addition, provision for periodic and annual procurement audit may be built into any future project design.

The project's financial management performance was satisfactory, although for flood damages rehabilitation contracts, the payment and accounting procedure was apparently complicated by centralized processing for all the small contrats scattered over the entire country, rather than in the jurisdictions where these works were located. Having adequately trained staff at the RACs would also have helped to avoid the complications and delays with withdrawal applications for this component. Annual audits were carried out regularly by the Foreign Aided Project Audit Directorate (FAPAD) and Audit reports were submitted raostly on schedule. The observations of the auditors were responded to by the project authority timely and consistently, and resolved through tripartite meetings held among MOWR, FAPAD & BWDB. However, 918 audit observations still remain unresolved, although many of these are of a trivial nature, and the key audit findings on procurement indicate lack of understanding of procurement policy/procedures in large contracts on the auditor's part. The Ministry of Water Resources has agreed to pursue resolution of these observations following standard Government policies. The legal covenants under the Credit were generally in compliance.

7.7 Overall Borrowerperfiornance: Based on the above, the performance of the borrower overall is rated satisfactory.

8. Lessons Learned General Lessons

* Use of Independent Panels of Experts (IPOE) will be effective only when the implementing agencies (IAs) and the IPOE clearly understand the TORs and the lAs adequately manage the panel's outputs.

* To ensure cost-effectiveness, and maximize the benefit of technical assistance, it must be pro-actively managed by the contracting project agency, from day one of the consultants' assignment. Without good management, TA inputs inithe early stages of the assignmnent tend to be squandered, often resulting in reduced and delayed delivery of TA inputs.

* Whenever possible, payment terms of TA contracts should be linked in some way to measurable contract outputs, rather than relying solely on time-based payments (or through a judicious combination of both) to reduce potential cost overruns and the chance of delayed outputs.

* ICB and FIDIC procedures are highly advantageous when undertaking civil works in difficult physical situations (such as riverbank protection). The ability to react quickly and effectively to emergency situations, such as the 1998 floods, is greatly enhanced if the contract manager can operate in an independent professional manner, unconstrained by unnecessary outside interests.

BWDB Specific Lessons * Procurement management capacity of BWDB needs strengthening, including procurement performance tracking on a regular basis. Fragmentation of works into a large number of small packages must be avoided and a core group of professionals should be developed within the implementing agency to supervise all procurement matters. In addition, mandatory provision for periodic and annual procurement audit should be built into the future project designs.

* The institutional arrangements for financial management within the BWDB and the impact of ongoing CIDA-assisted TA project to strengthen financial management capacity should be assessed thoroughly in the context of BWDB's institutional reform program to ensure that adequate intemal controls are put in place and operated properly.

- 12 - 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementingagency:

GOB/BWDB/WARPO endorsed the conclusions of the ICR with the one exception of the flood damage rehabilitation misprocurement, where BWDB felt the Bank has been "rigid and focused on procedure rather than objective". BWDB argued that it was not the limited procurement management capacity of BWDB field staff that caused the problem, but rather it was a combination of "(i) contractors amd BWDB staff long held association with GOB procedures in processing tenders which is different from 'DA guidelines; (ii) lack of dissemination of knowledge about IDA guidelines (for NCB contracts under TIkl.0 million) through workshops and seminars for BWDB field offices and contractors; (iii) lack of confidence (and English skills) on the part of small contractors to complete tender documents in fear of being non-responsive, and consequently taking the help of others to do this; and, (vi) provision of dropping lenders in one place rather than a number of places, which encouraged collusive bidding and some other ladverse) social factors".

[A full project assessment by the Borrower is in Annex 8] cb) Cofinanciers: N4ot Applicable

l'c) Otherpartners (NGOs/private sector): N.ot Applicable

ILO. Additional Information The Borrower's assessment of project implementation is attached at Annex 8.

- 13 - Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

Outcome I Impact Indicators: ~~~~~~~~~I- ;- __5!_S_'j-j ,;Jts|1-2,:e^ -ndlc-atorlMatrx ProjectedInlast PSR ctal..as m.

DO 1: Target area protected from flood due Achieved -an evaluaton repon is prepared by to river erosion on a sustainable basis the Bonfower to qualifylquantify targets. (a) Erosion bosses prevented at Saroakand- (a) Erosion loss prevented through the (a)achieved-supported and quantified by Mathurapara and Sirajganj over an area of construction of lmpinoved river training works GOB evaluation report as issued In about 78,000 ha, benefiting a popubtion of at those locatons since Nov 1998/June December 2001. about 125,500 from 1999. 1999. (b)Regional flood damages behind the (b)Regcnal flood damages behind BRE has (b) achieved-physical works completed under Brahmaputra Right Embankment (BRE) In been minimLzed since 2000 through the project provide the planned protedion to Karotoa-BangaUl rivers system covering an preventing possible merger of the prevent the merger of the rivers, Brahmaputra area of about 300.000 ha, due to Ikely Brahmaputra and the Bangall. wih Bengal. merger of the Bangal and Brahmaputra rivers prevented from 1999.

D02: Govemment capacity built to update Achieved-WARPO Isfirmly founded. GOB multi- sectoral Natonal Water Management high-level support needed to re-organtze and Plan (NWMP) in a participatory manner on a formfalze its status for Inter-agency funcions. regular basis. (a) Government capacity progressively (a) substantially achieved iWroved GOB -WARPO updates the national water strengthened So far, 27 professional capaciy -WARPO made 5-YearWork Plan management plan periodically (possibly every poskion fiHed In against a total of 37. to coordinate, monitor and regulady update five years), beginning from 2002. the NWMP (bj The preparation of NWMP commenced (b) achieved NWMP approved by GOB with from March 15,1998. The Draft Final stakeholder inputs In February 2002. HR Development Stategy Report has been capacity was somewhat improved at issued in March 2001 and draft final NWMP WARPO. prepared by November 2001.

DO 3: Fadcitate reumption of agrculture and Agdcuture and econonic activities, disrupted Achieved-Protected lands, improved faclities economic actvites disrupted by the 1998 by 1998 floods, resumed in the affected in 39 schemes and established sense of floods areas of 39 BWDB scshemes. secudty Is promoting increased economic ac-1t.

-14- Output Indicators: Indicator/Matrix ProJected In last PSR ActuaVLaest Estimate D)O 1: Output IndIcator 1.1: Improved iver training SubstantUally completed by November 1998. Achieved-all physical works and assodated wvork completed at three locations FuDy completed induding repairs to damages safeguard programs fuDy Implemented as (Sadakandi, Mathurapara and SraiganD as at Sirajgarq by June 1999. planned. per design standards. DO I Link embankment completed. Fish pass Achieved-all aspects of the physical Output Indicator 1.2: LInk embankment completed and commissioned. improvements plans have been implemented between Kalitola and Mathurapam hnduding a acoording to project plans fish -pass constructed as per design standards by June 1999. DIO 1 Operational due to current arrangement with Achieved-BWDB spedal O&M Unit Output Indicator 1.3: BWDBs Spedaized a full time Executive Engineer since estabished and functioning weD under the Operation and Maintenance Unit established December 1999. The Unit is carrying out project. Continued routne budget support is at SiraJgarl with dear Temis of Reference routine surveys and montodring by Its own needed from GOB to provide successful CrOR). team, whie the annual surveys and analys sewvce delivery. through speciaRzed agences like EGIS and SWMC under annual contracts. The procurement of core maintenance equipment consists of two contract padkages -so far one of the contract has been awarded.

DO01 Substantially Achieved -the processing Cutput Indicator 1.4(a): 986 EntUled Persons 1.4 (a) Coompensaton and Rehabilitation of con6inues by GOB to resolve 3.5% ( EPs) compensated and 399 households EPs at Kaliftola, Saiakandi, Mathurapara and outstanding claims (67 total to provide rcdocated as per RAP Siraigonj: Intended PEM reparations under items (a). 0) 1843 (98.50%) EPs out of 1865 (b), (c) and (d)lIsted inthe adjacent column. compensated; and

(b)840 EPs compensated and 72 (idaD 351 HHs out of 353 have-been households relocated In link embankment area by March 31, 1999 (b) Compensaton and RehabUbtation of EPs for Kalitola -Mathurapara ink embankment () Total 2102 EPs. out of 2123 compensated; and (il) al 63 entMed HHs relocated (c) Compensation and Rehabitatn of (c) EPs for fish-pass site: () Total 434 EPs out of 461 compensated; and (ii) all 6 entiled HHs relocated (d)Compensaton and Rehablittion of EPs for marginal dyke site: 0)Total 273 EPs out of 279 compensated; and (ii) the one entitled HHs relocated DO 2: Achieved 4NWMP and National Water. Output Indicator 2.1: National Water Resources data base were delivered within Ma3nagement Plan ( NWMP) prepared reasonable timeRness of the indicatve integrating muRti-sectoral needs ina milestones/schiedues partcipatory manner by March 2001: I ea) Incepton report issued in June 1998; (a) Inception report by June 19998 (b) Report on 'Issues for the NWMP issued (bi Issues for the NVMP by March 1999; In May 1999;

- 15 - (c) Draft Final Development Strategy Report (c) Dev Strategy by March 2001: issued in March 2001. The report has been accepted In the Exeacive Committee of National Water Resoures Councl (ECNWRC). (d) Draft NWMP Issued in July2001 for (d) Draft NWMP issued In July2001 for review and comments; and review and comments.

(e) final NWMP issued by November 2001. (e) draft Final NWMP Issued by November 2001. DO 2 Water Resoures Plaming Orgarizabon Substanially Achleved Intended outputs. Output Indbator 2.2: Water Resouces (WARPO) re-organized and fuly staffed for Falow-on planned by GOB (with GoN) for Planning Organization (WARPO) oomprehensive water sector planning and more strengthening and capacity bulding to re-orgarized and fuly staffed for future updating, beginning from 2002. fully operabonarize WARPO and 5-Year Plan comprehensive water sedor planning and indudes NWMP updating as normal adivity. future updating, beginning from 2002. DO 3: The overall physical progress of repair/ Achieved Procurement irreguladties have Output Indicator 3.1: Flood control, drainage rehabiDltaon works in 39 subprojects is about been investgated and cancelation of about and tirgatbon infrastructure in 39 subprojects 95%. Repair works under 259 contracts are US$2.0 milion is proposed from the Credit repaired and rehabilitated by June 2001. fully complete, out of total 321. Most of the Misprocurement acoounted for about 2% of remaing works are expected to be total project Investment cost completed by November 30, 2001. End of project

- 16 - Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

lroject Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of Estimate Estimate Appraisal Project Cost By Component. US$ million US$ million 1. River Bank Protection 126.70 156.60 124 2.National Water Planning / Institutional Building and 7.90 9.40 119 Strengthening 3. 1998 Flood Emergency Rehabilitation Work 0.00 26.00 4. Preparation of RBPP II 0.00 rotal Baseline Cost 134.60 192.00 Physical Contingencies 16.20 0.00 0 Price Contingencies 5.20 0.00 Total Project Costs 156.00 192.00 Total Financing Required 156.00 192.00 Ref: MOP (March 22,1999), Schedule A, Page I of 2.

FProject Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) __._. Expenditure Category!ICB Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICB NCB Other2 N.B.F. Total Cost

11. Works 120.20 3.70 3.80 0.00 127.70 (99.80) (2.20) (0.80) (0.00) (102.80) 2. Goods 8.90 0.40 0.10 0.00 9.40 (3.90) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (4.00) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 13.60 0.00 13.60 (0.00) (0.00) (13.60) (0.00) (13.60) 41. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.20 Overseas Training (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.20) 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 5.10 0.00 5.10 - GOB Project Management (0.00) (0.00) (1.30) (0.00) (1.30) 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ______(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 129.10 4.10 22.80 0.00 156.00 _ (103.70) (2.30) (15.90) (0.00) (121.90) Ref: SAR (November 10, 1995), Page 29, Table 2.3

17 - Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equival nt) Procurement Method. Exenditure Category ICB NC Oth 2 N.B.F. Total Cost

1. Works 131.02 42.47 0.00 0.00 173.49 (124.85) (11.77) (0.00) (0.00) (136.62) 2. Goods 2.02 1.51 0.00 0.00 3.53 (1.17) (0.93) (0.00) (0.00) (2.10) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 14.98 0.00 14.98 (0.00) (0.00) (10.48) (0.00) (10.48) 4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Overseas Training (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - GOB Project Management (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 133.04 43.98 14.98 0.00 192.00

_ (126.02) (12.70) (10.48) (0.00) (149.20) Ref: SAP Procurement Summary Report and MOP (March 22,1999), Schedule B, Page I of 2.. IDA financing has been adjusted for about US$2.80 million, cancelled due to misprocurement (see Section 5.4). " Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the IDA Credit. All costs include contingencies. 2 Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local govemment units.

equivalent) Project Financing by Componentnnt (n(in US$USmillion n Percentage of Appraisal

Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate - . A WGovt CoF. Bank Giom CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. 1. Rlver Bank Protecdon 114.50 32.90 128.70 7.02 112.4 21.3 2.Natlonal Water Planning 7.40 1.20 7.80 1.60 105.4 133.3 / Institutdonal Building and Strengthening 3.1998 Flood Emergency 12.70 34.18 RehabDitation Work 4. Preparation of RBPP II 0.00 0.00 Total 121.90 34.10 149.20 42.80 122.4 125.5 Ref: MOP (March 22,1999), Schedule A, Page 2 of 2. The IDA Credit for RBPP increased to SDR 111.2 million (US$ 166.9 million in 1995 terms and US$ 152 million in 1999 terms). The conversion considered financial adjustment for the fluctuating SDRtUS$ exchange rates. Full amount of US$149.20 million, available balance after canceling about US$2.8 million due to misprocurement, is estimated to be disbursed (Section 5.4).

- 18 - Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits River Bank Protection Project Project ID: P009545 IDA Credit 27910/27911 Economic Evaluation

1. The ICR Mission re-evaluated the project economics on the basis of the latest project data at project completion and data available from the National Water Management Plan (NWM) economic ,tudies, an impact survey -carried out by EGIS in October-November 2001 and recent national economic :statistics. As in the SAR, separate analysis were undertaken for the two largest project activities in cost terms, the Sariakandi /Mathurapara and Sirajganj river bank protection works sub-projects. Other than the 3AR, the Tables 1-19 cited in Annex 3 are referenced as the ICR Mission Economic Analysis Tables in Annex 7. Together these account for about 78% of the total project costs. Based on Tables 1, 2 and 19 i'ound in the ICR Mission Economic Analysis Tables (ref. Annex 7), the results of the analysis are shown as follows (SAR values in brackets, 1996 taken as Year 1);

Proiect Portion EIRR NPV a, 12% (1998/99 prices) % (Tk million) (US$ million) Sariakandi/Mathurapara 15.2 504 10.4 (35) (1615) (21.6) Sirajganj 16.6 448 9.2 (45) (869) (40.6) Total 15.8 952 19.6 (39) (248) (62.2)

:!. As far as possible, the re-analysis followed the methodology and approach adopted in the SAR Xnalysis. There are, however, significant differences between the two analyses, as follows:

* The final cost of the Sirajganj sub-project is some 30% above appraisal estimates (US$86.4M as compared to the US$66.2M in SAR Annex 6), due mainly to the Tk. 755 million cost (Tk. 719M base cost plus, for economic analysis purposes, 5% for engineering and administration and miscellaneous costs; the dollar equivalent at the 1998/99 exchange rate is US$15.6M) of the works required to repair the damage to the Sirajganj hard point which occurred in the 1998 flood. * Costs and benefits have been updated to a 1998/99 constant price basis, using Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) national indices and the crop economic prices and net retums calculated in the NWMP detailed economic studies. The BBS 1998/99 Annual Statistical Yearbook is the latest one available. * Values of the land, property and infrastructure assets protected by the two sub-projects have been updated on the basis of the EGIS current asset price data collected from the two sub-project benefit areas in October-November 2001; these were then converted onto a 1998/99 price basis. * The areas of crop protected from flooding by the Sariakandi/Mathurapara sub-project have been changed from the SAR figures on the basis of estimates provided by the Department of Agricultural.Extension (DAE). * In converting values from financial to economnic prices the revised Standard Conversion

-19- Factor (SCF) and other input and output conversion factors developed in March 1998 for water resource projects by Q. Shahabuddin and I.A. Syed were applied, as for the NWMP studies. Differences between the 1998 factors and the factors applied in the SAR analysis are comparatively small. For both sub-projects the benefits have been assumed to start in project year 3, in comparison with the Year 1 start assumed in the SAR. With construction commencing in 1996, Year 3 was 1998, an exceptionally high flood year. By June 1998 both sub-projects were virtually complete, and provided valuable protection, and thus benefits, in the July to September 1998 flood period. Although the Sirajganj hard point suffered serious damage, it was still able to fulfil its protection function. Without it, erosion damage to Sirajganj could have been severe. In the 1996 and 1997 flood seasons, however, construction was insufficiently far advanced to provide effective protection.

3. Sub-project benefits comprise the avoidance of the losses (erosion) of land, property and infrastructure, crop production and employment, which would otherwise occur if the riverbank protection works had not been undertaken (i.e. in the 'without project' (WOP) situation). The basic aim is thus to preserve/protect the sub-project areas' existing physical asset base rather than to change it. In these circumstances benefit monitoring has little relevance; implementation of the works has prevented the damage and losses that would otherwise occur and would provide the only reliable basis for quantifjing benefits, using actual observations and measured data rather than predictions and hypotheses. Updating by the ICR of the SAR physical parameters on the basis of observed data from project impact monitoring in the implementation period is therefore not feasible. For the ICR re-analysis the SAR physical parameters have thus been used.

4. An important qualification to the ICR re-analysis is that, as in the SAR, account has not been taken of possible benefits of the RBPP to the Jamuna Multi-purpose Bridge (JMB). The Sirajganj hardpoint is only some 6km upstream of the western end of the bridge, and the JMB Authority is already maintaining the riverbank protection works from the bridge up to the downstream end of the Sirajganj hardpoint. Without the hardpoint, the Jamuna could possibly break through its right bank at Sirajganj and bypass the bridge. If so, the hardpoint had had to be constructed anyway, as part of the JMB Project, and its economic justification would be assured by the fact that it would be essential for the bridge's integrity.

5. Tables 1 and 2 in the economic analysis reference document (ref. Annex7-ICR Mission Economic Analysis Tables) summarize the economic analyses of the Sariakandi/Mathurapara and Sirajganj sub-projects and Table 3 to 18 show the supporting detailed calculations. For comparison purposes the sections below describe the re-analysis, following the same headings as the SAR as far as possible.

A. Proiect Benefits

6. As stated in SAR Annex 8: Economic Analysis, the project benefits are the damages and avoided by preventing riverbank erosion. These damages arise out of land loss to erosion and local and regional flooding as a result of breaches of the BRE (Brahmaputra Right Embankment) and of a merger of the Bangali and Brahmaputra rivers. Erosion losses include the agricultural production foregone from destruction of agricultural and urban land and the loss of private property and public infrastructure on flooded land. The flood damages consist of: (a) total loss of crops, livestock, property and infrastructure near a BRE breach at a given location; (b) partial damage to crops, property and infrastructure in the flooded area behind a BRE breach; (c) partial damage to crops, property and infrastructure in the incremental area of about l0O,OOOha of the Karatoa-Bangali-Ichimati river system floodplain, which would

- 20 - be subject to flooding hazards due to perennial augmentation of Bangali river flow when the Bangali river channel would become a distributary river of the Brahmaputra; and (d) savings in construction costs of local BRE retirements at locations where potential BRE breaches are prevented by the project.

7. In addition to possible JMB benefits, certain other benefits could not be quantified because of lack of data. The crop, property and infrastructure damage that might be caused by deeper flooding of the 200,000ha area of the Karatoa-Bangali-Ichimati rivers' floodplain, presently vulnerable to periodic flooding, was not quantified. The losses due to disruptions of road and rail traffic during flooding of the transportation network could not be calculated, nor could the losses attributable to disincentives to private investment in and around the flooded area. Benefits from the new fish pass in the BRE in the Sariakandi/Mathurapara sub-project and from the 25ha of new land created at Sirajganj would be too small to significantly affect overall benefit values.

8. Though non-quantifiable in economic terms, social benefits would be high. Bank erosion causes severe distress and social disruption, as dwellings, agricultural and urban land and other assets are swept away and the local inhabitants are forced to relocate. Avoidance of such adverse social impacts can be regarded as a major benefit of the project.

B. Erosion Prevention Benefits

9. Land Losses: Based on the SAR assumptions, in the WOP situation 50% of the urban land in Sirajganj would be lost in the first five years of benefits, together with the built-up area (Upazila HQ) of Sariakandi. Thereafter the land losses would be predominantly rural. The SAR benefit values have been adjusted on the basis of the EGIS field survey data and the conversion from 1994 prices (the presumed SAR price basis) to a 1998/99-price basis. Allowance has not been made for the value of the additional land accreted elsewhere as a result of the WOP crosion, because accreted land is worth so much less than eroded land, being completely undeveloped. Land values are based on market (financial) prices, adjusted by the SCF (Standard Conversion Factor).

10. Property and Infrastructure Losses: The property and infrastructure benefits given in Table 4 of SAR Annex 8, increased by 24.8% to take account of the rise in construction costs between 1994 and 1998/99, as reported in the BBS Construction Cost Index (Building), and adjusted by the slightly different economic conversion factors applied in this ICR. Following the SAR assumptions, losses would be highest in the first five benefit years (Years 3 to 7). Immediately thereafter they would be much lower, but would grow at a rate of 5% per annum (in real terms) until the end of the analysis period (Year 30). Since the early 1990s Bangladesh's economic growth rate has averaged around 5%, and expectations are that this will increase somewhat in the future. As the economy grows, so will the stock of property, infrastructure and other assets at risk from erosion and flooding. No such increase has been assumed for agricultural benefits. Comparison of crop returns per hectare between the SAR estimates, which date originally from the early 1990s, and the NWMP values applied in this ICR, show a 14% reduction in economic returns per hectare. This is presumably a result of worsening terms of trade for agriculture within the Bangladesh economy. Under these circumstances it would be imprudent to predict increasing net agricultural returns over time.

11. Employment Losses: Destruction of buildings through erosion would cause a temporary loss of employment. The ICR valuation of the benefits from preventing such employment losses has followed that of the SAR, but with a 26% increase to 1998/99 price levels, based on the change in the BBS Bangladesh Nominal Wage Index between 1994/95 and 1998/99, and the application of the revised SCF of 0.90.

- 21 - C. BRE Breach Losses Avoided

12. As described in the SAR, the benefits in the form of damage avoidance from BRE breaches consist of the damages near the breach caused by sudden flooding, and damages beyond the breach where there is deep and prolonged inundation. Near the breach damages consist of crops, livestock, property and infrastructure lost or destroyed when the breach occurs, and reduction of soil productivity for several years due to sand deposition as the flood recedes. Each damage near the breach was evaluated separately, as described in the SAR. Regional flood damage evaluation is described in Section D, together with the evaluation of regional flood damages caused by a merger of the Brahmaputra and Bangali rivers.

13. Without the project, it would be impossible to retire the BRE at Sariakandi/ Mathurapara following its imminent breach in the first benefit year. Any retirement would be subject to an immediate breach by ongoing erosion, as the Bangali River, in effect, acts as a physical boundary for any retirement Since resources would not be wasted on retirements, the BRE's hinterland would be subject to regular annual flooding from the open breach. This would continue for several years until the land between the Bangali and the Brahmaputra would be eroded and a merger occurs, resulting in exacerbated regional flooding in subsequent years. At Sirajganj, the BRE was assumed to be breached in the first benefit year, causing severe damage to the town. Since the BRE would have to be retired behind the town, the town would be exposed to regular annual flooding. For the agricultural areas of Sirajganj, it was assumed that breaches would occur at intervals in the 30-year analysis period.

14. These various assumptions have been adopted for the ICR, but with the values in Table 6 of SAR Annex 8 being increased by the 24.8% rise in the Construction Cost Index and the livestock values being increased on the basis of the EGIS survey data.

15. Crop Losses: In the severely affected areas near a breach, a total WOP loss of one year's crop was assumed in the SAR, with 320ha and lOOha being affected at Sariakandi/Mathurapara and Sirajganj respectively. Partial crop losses due to reduced output resulting from sand deposition near the breaches would occur. In the analysis the SAR values were applied, but with the SAR benefits (crop losses avoided) per hectare being reduced by 14%, the ratio between the recalculated crop net economic returns in and the equivalent figure in Table 10 of SAR Annex 8.

16. Livestock Losses: Significant losses of livestock normally occur in areas severely affected by a BRE breach. The livestock numbers applied are the SAR figures and the values per head are from the EGIS field survey, deflated to 1998/99 price levels.

17. Property and Infrastructure Losses: Property and infrastructure losses resulting from a BRE breach are the SAR values in Table 6 of SAR Annex 8, adjusted by the change in the Construction Cost Index.

18. Losses due to BRE Retirements at Sirajganj: In the SAR the project was assumed to save the costs of five BRE retirements at Sirajganj over a 30 year period, assuming that those retirements would occur without the project. About 2.5 km of embankment would be constructed each year for a period of three years following each breach. An area between 150 ha and 60 ha was expected to remain unprotected each year as a result of each retirement Flooding on the river side of the BRE would cause the average net economic return in this area to be substantially reduced, as the cropping pattern would shift to lower-value

- 22 - crops and cropping intensity would fall. The SAR benefit estimates have been revised on the same basis as the various benefits discussed above.

D. Reaional Flood Losses Prevented

19. Breaching of the BRE at Sariakandi/Mathurapara and Sirajganj causes augmentation of flooding in the Karatoa-Bangali-Ichimati river system. The maximum impact would be caused by breaches at Sariakandi, which result in deeper regional flooding in the above floodplain as well as incremental flooding of areas normally protected by the BRE. This impact was expected to be an annual occurrence, because the expected breach at Sariakandi would not be repaired. After about five years, when erosion has resulted in a merger of the Bangali and Brahmaputra rivers, deeper regional flooding and a larger incremental area inundated would result.

20. Crop Damage: In order to derive a probability distribution of the incremental area flooded, detailed mathematical modeling work was carried out in the Brahmaputra River Training Studies in the 1990s. The areas assumed to be flooded in different flood events and flood return periods are those shown in Table 8 of SAR Annex 8

21. Production Losses Caused by Cropping Pattern Changes: Another possible production loss is the effect of flooding on cropping systems. Most of the agricultural flood control benefits of the BRE result from expansion of HYV transplanted Aman paddy in the monsoon season, replacing flood-tolerant but low yielding broadcast Aman or a mixture of broadcast Aus and Aman. With continued flooding, farmers would revert to the lower-yielding cropping pattern. The ICR benefit calculations have been based on the crop areas provided by DAE and crop economic data from the NWMP economics studies.

22. Property and Infrastructure Damage Avoided: Floods of the magnitude of those of 1987 and 1988 can cause extensive damage to property and infrastructure, although the effects of flooding in most years are minimal. For the ICR analysis the SAR financial damage value of Tk226/ha was adjusted onto a 1998/99 price basis using the Construction Cost Index and was then converted to economic values by means of the SCF of 0.90.

E. Canital and O&M Costs

23. Capital Cost of Project Works: The final capital costs of the two sub-projects are based on the expenditures actually incurred, expressed in 1998/99 US dollars; these were converted to local currency values at the prevailing 1998/99 exchange rate of Tk 48.5/US$. Total costs at financial prices were US$55.5M (Tk.3,308M) for Sariakandi/Mathurapara and US$86.4M (Tk 4,190M) for Sirajganj, the total for the riverbank protection component as a whole thus being US$141.9M (Tk 7,498M) in 1998/99 prices. This compares with the total of US$146.8M (a base cost of US$126.7M plus 15.9% physical and price contingencies) or Tk 5,895M, which can be derived from SAR Table 2.1; the latter figures are at 1994/95 prices and exchange rates, so are not directly comparable. However, using the Bangladesh GDP Deflator to take account of Taka inflation since 1994/95, the 1998/99 equivalent of the SAR Taka cost of Tk 5,895M- would be Tk 7,123M. On this basis the final Taka capital cost of Tk 7,498M is only 5% above appraisal estimates. The Sariakandi/Mathurapara costs were incurred over three years whereas Sirajganj costs were incurred over four years, because the repairs were not completed until 1999. The above figures are at

- 23 - financial prices. They were converted to econonic prices using the conversion factors adopted in the NWMP.

24. O&M Costs: It is not possible to predict the precise level and timing of future O&M costs, because of uncertainties concerning possible future flood damage and the repairs that would be required. For analysis purposes the assumption made is that average O&M costs per annum are normally equivalent to 1% of capital costs but that in every tenth year (Years 10, 20 and 30) major repairs and other maintenance work will be required, total O&M costs in that year being equivalent to 50/oof the capital cost F. Economic Analysis

25. The analytical summary and detailed computations are presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3 to 18 of the ICR Economic Analysis Tables, referenced in Annex 7. The results of the ICR analysis summaized in paragraph 1 of this Annex.3 are discussed in the followirg paragraphs.

26. The re-estimated EIRRs of 17% for Sirajganj, 15% for Sariakandi/Mathurapara and 16% for the two sub-projects together are much lower than the respective SAR figures of 45%, 35% and 39%. The same is true of the re-estimated net present values (NPVs) of US$9M, US$lOM and US$20M in comparison with the considerably higher SAR NPVs of US$21.6M, US$40.6M and US$62.2M. The main reasons for the lower ICR returns are the assunption that benefits would start two years later, the cost increase at Sirajganj and the reduction in agricultural benefit values since appraisal. SAR crop prices and returns were based on values prevailing in thc early 1990s. Since that time the terms of trade have moved against the crop sector and, in particular, paddy prices have stagnated or fallen, as Bangladesh has reached and then maintained virtual self-sufficiency in rice. At present there appears to be little reason for this situation to change in the near future. The two-year delay assumed for benefits in this ICR analysis also has a very marked impact on economic performance. For example, taking the SAR cost and return figures, a two-year benefit delay reduces the overall SAR EIRR from 39%/o to 17%.

27. Nevertheless, both sub-projects are still economically viable, with EIRRs above the 12% Bangladesh opportunity cost of capital. One risk to their future performance is, however, that of maintenance costs being higher than predicted as a result of higher than expected erosion, scour and other damage to the bank protection works. In the three monsoon seasons since completion of the works in 1999 no major damage has occurre. If, however, it were to become a problem in the future, with the average annual O&M cost throughout the project life rising threefold, from the 'base case' average of TK 75 M at 1998/99 prices in most years to as much as 3% of capital costs, or Tk 225M (US$4.6M), per annum, the overall EIRR would still be a satisfactory 12.0%.

29. With the rapid urban and economic development now taking place in and around Sirajganj, due especially to the improved transport communications resulting from the opening of the Jamuna Bridge in 1998, and the high degree of vulnerability to erosion of this stretch of the river bank, the risk of Sirajganj benefits being much lower than assumed in the analysis is small. Apart from a certain amount of agricultural land loss, virtually all the Sirajganj benefits are non-agricultural. These are easier to predict with some confidence than are the likely losses from flooding in the 'without project' situation. Most of the Sariakandi/Mathurapara benefits, on the other hand, are agricultural, largely from the prevention of the damage from the increased regional flooding which is assumed to result if the sub-project were not built and a possible merger of the Brahmaputra and the Bangali rivers were not thereby prevented.

30. As explained in SAR Annex 8, estimation of the flood damage (and thus the benefits from avoiding

-24 - such damage) resulting from such a merger required detailing modeling work and a number of assumptions to be made concerning flood i equency, timing, depth and duration and the effects of flooding on crop yields and cropping patterns. -The resultant benefit estimate is thus unavoidably prone to uncertainty. In recognition of this problem, sensitivity tests were done with Sariakandi/Mathurapara regional flood damage avoidance benefits 20% and 40% below the base case level. The EIRRs would then fall to 12.5% and 9.5%.

31. An analysis was also made of what the Sirajganj EIRR would have been if the 1998 flood damage had not occurred and the subsequent major repairs had not been necessary. In this case the EIRR would have been some 5% higher, at 21%.

-25- Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating, (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation FY90 I IE FY91 4 WRS, IEs, SS FY92 7 WRS, lEs, EC, OP, SS, AG

Appraisal/Negotiation 07/92/ Appraisal 7 WRS, TEs, EC, OP, SS FY94/Appraisal 13 WRS, lEs, EC, OP, SS FY95/ Appraisal 13 WRS, EEs, EC, OP, SS, EV FY96/Appraisal 6 EC, lEs, OP, 08/95/ Negotiation 10 AGs, lEs, OP, SS Supervision 05/96/ PSR#I I IE (Initial Summary) S S 05/96/ PSR#2 I lE (Update) S S 09/96/ PSR#3 7 WRS, [Es, EC, SS, FMS S S 02/97/ PSR#4 3 IEs, SS. S S 06/97/ PSR#5 I IE ( Update only) S S 08/97/ PSR#6 4 IE, SS and FMSs. S S 04/98/ PSR#7 6 [Es, SS, PR, FMSs. S S 08/98/ PSR#8 5 [Es, SS, EC, FMS. S S 11/98/ PSR#9 4 LEs, EC, FA. S S 06/99/ PSR#10 I IE (Follow-up review) S S 01/2000/ PSR#I 1 6 [Es, SS, PR, FMSs. S S 06/2000/ PSR#12 9 WRS, EV, IES, SS, PR, FMSs, S S TA. 10/2000/ PSR#13 I E ( Update only) S S 12/2000/ PSR#14 8 AG, EC, IES, SS, PR, FMSs. S S 06/01/ PSR#15 1 E (Update only) S S 07/01/ PSR#16 6 AG, IE, SS, I PR, FMSs. S S ICR 11/2001 3 WRS, EC of FAO/CPO), IE S S (WB)

AG - Agriculturist, DB - Disbursement, EC - Economist, EO - Ecologist, EV -Environment, FA -Financial Analyst, FMS - Financial Management Specialist, IE - Irrigation Engineer, LC - Legal Counsel, OP - Operations, PR - Procurement, SS - Social Scientist, TA - Team Assistant, WRS - Water Resources Specialist

- 26 - (b) Staff:

Stage of Project Cycle ActualLataest Estimate

__No. Staff weeks US$ ('000) Identification/Preparation 63 178 Appraisal/Negotiation 178 463 Supervision 307 574 ICR 9 44 Total 557 1259 Staff Weeks and costs are as of May 31, 2602.

-27 - Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating O Macropolicies O H OSUOM O N O NA F Sector Policies OH *SUOM QN O NA O Physical O H *SUOM O N O NA O Financial O H OSU*M O N O NA O InstitutionalDevelopment 0 H O SUO M 0 N 0 NA OEnvironmental O H * SU O M O N O NA

Social FS Poverty Reduction O H OSUOM O N O NA OGender OH OSUOM ON *NA O Other (Please specify) OH *SUOM ON O NA Social impacts relatedto resettlement and RAP, EMP and PEM F Private sector development 0 H O SUO M 0 N 0 NA O Public sector management 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA OOther (Pleasespecify) O H OSUOM O N * NA

- 28 - Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HUU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance Rating

0 Lending OHSOS Ou OHU F Supervision OHS OS O u O HU Z Overall OHS OS OU OHU

6.2 Borrowerperformance Rating iZ Preparation OHS OS O u O HU I Government implementationperformance O HS 0 S 0 U 0 HU IZ Implementation agencyperformance O HS Os 0 U 0 HU 1 Overall OHS OS 0 u O HU

- 29 - Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

1. Supervision Reports, including Form 590 and PSR from 1996-2001 2. QAG Reports on Supervision Quality (1998, 2000) 3. Project Staff Appraisal Report dated November 10, 1995 4. Development Credit Agreement dated December 21, 1995 and subsequent amendments. 5. Memorandum of the President of IDA to the Executive Directors (November 13, 1995) 6. Memorandum of the President of IDA to the Executive Directors (March 22, 1999) 7. BWDB's Implementation Completion Report - Flood Damage Rehabilitation component (December 2001) 8. BWDB's Implementation Completion Report - River Training component (March 2002). 9. WARPO's Implementation Completion Report for NWMP component (March 2002) 10. ICR Mission Economic Analysis Tables 1-19.

- 30 - Additional Annex 8.Summary of Borrower's Contribution to the ICR (BWDB Works)

Background:

1. River bank erosion is a persistent hazard faced by the landowners, cultivators, and population living adjacent to rivers. Such erosion leads to collapse of the river bank over stretches of several hundred meters at a time. Along the Brahmaputra River, these erosion rates average about 100 meters each year, but sometimes increase to as high as 800 meters in a year of high floods. Such erosion has significant economic and social impacts. Fertile land is lost; and buildings, major bridges, embankments, ferry terminals for riverbank towns and other essential infrastructure are damaged, often resulting in landlessness and impoverishment for thousands of households.

2. The 1998 floods were of unprecedented magnitude and durationr, which inundated two thirds of the country, affected some 30 million people and caused over 1,100 deaths. They also severely damaged an estimated 15,000 kilometers of roads, 14,000 schools, hundreds of bridges and culverts and close to 500,000 homes. Damage of flood control, drainage and irrigation infrastructure as assessed by the Consultants is also enormous - about 2986 km of embankment, 1031 nos. water control structures, 186 km of erosion protection works. The floods had a substantiaUy adverse impact on economic growth in 1998/99.

Project Objective

3. The project's principal objective was to prevent the erosion of riparian land at two locations on the west bank of the Brahmaputra by the construction and maintenance of improved river-bank protection works which would: (a) protect Sirajganj town's built-up and semi-urban areas from major damage and cumulative destruction; and (b) prevent the merger of the Brahmaputra and Bangali Rivers in the vicinity of Sariakandi and consequential increased regional flooding.

4. Additional objectives being supported by the Supplementaiy Credit were to assist in: (a) resumption of agricultural and economic activities disrupted by the 1998 floods through repair and re-construction of flood damaged water control, drainage and irrigation infrastructure; and (b) preparation of a program to extend river bank protection works to other critical areas along Bangladesh's river system.

'Project Component with Costs

.5. Projects components and their costs are shown in the following Table under Original and Revised c.olumns. This includes NWMF Component:

Si. Components Amount in USs enuivalent No. Original Revised 1. River Traininig/Civil Works 133,100,000 143,900,000 2 River Training/Operation & Maintenance 12,300,000 9,200,000 3 River Training/Resettlement 2,100,000 1,500,000 National Water Plan/NWMP and WORPO Strengthening 8,500,000 9,400,000 5 Floods Rehab./Flood Damage Repairs 26,000,000 6 River Training/Consultants Services For Preparation Of Follow-Up ProjectVTA 2,000,000 Total (US$) 156,000,000 192,000,000

- 31 - Implementation Arrangements

6. River Training.Component: The responsibility for civil works construction and O&M activities was with BWDB's Additional Director General (former Member) Inplementation and Additional Director General (O&M) respectively. A project Director, with the rank of the Project Director/Additional Chief Engineer established a project Office at Bogra for the entire project period. Two Executive Engineers assigned to the construction sites at Sariakandi and Sirajganj assisted the Project Director/Chief Engineer. Executive responsibilities for establishment and subsequent operation of the O&M Unit for river bank protection works was with the Chief Engineer, North-Western Zone at Rajshahi. The supervision of O&M Unit was delegated to the Superintending Engineer at Bogra O&M Circle. The Unit's management was under the Executive Engineer BRE (Specialized) O&M Division located at Sirajganj. The Deputy Director (Resettlement) within the Project Management and Resettlement Unit (PMRU) was responsible for managing the resettlement and rehabilitation program. The cental PMRU was located at Bogra with two site offices at Sariakandi and Sirajganj. For RAP implementation, the implementation consultants and their associate NGO assisted the PMRU.

7. Flood Rehabilitation Component: For rehabilitation of schemes damaged by 1998 floods, the Director, PMU- Cluster Project, BWDB (former Superintending Engineer, Monitoring -1, BWDB) was responsible for monitoring and coordinating the activities under the overall guidance of the Additional Director General (former Member Operation and Maintenance) of BWDB. The Executive Engineers who have jurisdiction over the BWDB Divisions in which the schemes are located carried out the rehabilitation of schemes.

Implementation Experiences:

8. River Training Component: The implementation of the physical works under this component can be considered satisfactory. All of the physical components were substantially completed by June 1998. Compared to the contractually stipulated completion dates, this was about five months ahead of schedule. Considering that the Brahmaputra is a braided and turbulent river with very large seasonal fluctuations in water levels, it is remarkable that the construction of the revetment works could be completed in two construction seasons. The technical difficulty of executing the physical components of the project was further compounded by a very short working season (about 6 months) and by very tight contractual completion dates.

9. One of the key success factors in implementing the major civil works of the project was that the design, engineering, most of the land acquisition, procurement of contractors, and selection of supervision consultant had been substantially completed by Credit effectiveness. Furthermore, International Competitive Bidding (ICB) together with the application of strict pre-qualification (PQ) criteria succeeded in attracting highly qualified international contractors to the bidding process. This enabled GOB to procure internationally experienced contractors to execute the civil works contracts.

10. Although the construction schedule was tight, the overall construction quality of the two contracts is close to international standards and far superior to the usual standards achieved in Bangladesh. The riding quality of the dredge fill earthwork and concrete blocks is excellent. There were a number of construction-related issues that arose during implementation such as: (a) underwater subsoil problems which led to slope failures in the river training works; (c) redesign of Sirajganj protection works; (d) 1998 flood damage to the completed river training works at Sirajganj. All of the construction related issues were successfully resolved.

- 32 - 11. Resettlement Action and Environmental Management Plans. The implementation of the social and environmental components of the project can be deemed satisfactory despite few initial teething problems. To implement this component about 120 hectares of land were acquired, of which 37.70 hectares are government owned (khas). In total 3236 persons were affected to varying degrees in terms of loss of land and income by its implementation and 3209 of them (99.1%) has been fully compensated. In total 421 Homestead were affected and all of those have been relocated. It must also be stressed that it was the first time that BWDB has implemented the RAP for such a project. Therefore, the implementation of the RAP broke new ground and was a learning experience for all parties involved. This was largely successful, but that there have been significant implementations difficulties, concerns have also been raised related to governance issues.

12. To mitigate the environmental impacts of the project, an EMP was developed for implementation during the life of the project. Some of the social/environental mitigation measures identified in the EMAP and implemented under the project were: (a) reduction of construction related impacts; by using environmental friendly constructions materials (b) fisheries mitigation through a fish-pass in the 6 km link embankment at Mathurapara; (c) health and sanitation (d) establishment of a riverside park for recreational facilities along Sirajganj Hard Point's free space and (e) Tree planted along the river side over the earthen embankment of hard point and over the link B'tE.

13. Flood Rehabilitation Component: The project was originally scheduled to be implemented in two phases: (i) emergency works to be completed before 1999 monsoon; and (ii) rehabilitation of other works to its pre-1998 flood condition. But the phases were not taken into consideration during implementation, as all the works were felt necessary to be executed as early as possible. The supervision consultants commenced their services on March 15,1999. Overall 100% progress was achieved by December 31, 2001 and repairs completed in all 39 schemes.

Major factors affecting the Project Implementation

14. River Training Component: Implementation of the major civil works components was impeded due to the following main reasons:

1998 Flood: The works at Sariakandi & Mathurapara (Contract Bl) was completed by the Contractor by June 1998 and were handed over to BWDB in phases between July to September. The Hard Point at Sirajganj (Contract B2) scheduled to be completed by November 1998 were nearing completion when damage occurred to the revetment during the 1998 floods. However, the repairs were completed successfully by June 1999. Had there been no flood damage during 1998 flood, the work could be completed as scheduled.

15. Flood Rehabilitation Component: The project implementation was hampered initially in the tbendering process. Introduction of NCB documents by World Bank could not be followed properly by 'BWDB, which resulted in re-tendering and in some cases led to mis-procurement of some packages.

16. Very Small Size of Contracts: In most cases, the contract sizes were very small as is the practice with BWDB resulting in 321 nos. of contracts. The average contract value was only about Tk. 3.6 million (US$66,800) and more than 96% of the contract value was less than Tk.10.0 million (US $200,000). The contract administration of this huge number of contracts was a difficult task including their implementation and monitoring. Justification for small contracts may be that the BWDB projects are labor intensive and not located in a contiguous way.

- 33 - 17. Payment to the Contractor Although the works were scattered all over the country, the payments were made through a single pay office, located in one place at Bogra and that too not in a central location. Payment procedure was also very cumbersome. Bills prepared in the field were to be certified by BWDB and Consultant Then those were sent to Regional Accounting Centre (RAC) at Bogra for payment of GOB share and advising Bangladesh Bank for payment from Special Account Then, RAC prepared and sent the reimbursement application to Executive Engineer (EE) of the respective Divisions, EE to Consultants, Consultants to PD, RBPP and lastly, PD, RBPP to the World Bank. All these offices are located at different places.

Outcome of the Project:

18. River Training Component lhe construction of improved river training works at Sariakandi-Mathurapara and Sirajganj helped to prevent losses from river erosion since 1998, which was almost an regular phenomena in the past before these improved river-bank protection works were built The completion of the protective works in 1998 has prevented the merger of Bangali and Brahmaputra rivers in the vicinity of Sariakandi and regional flood damages behind the Brahmaputra Right Embankment (BRE) in the Karotoa-Bangali rivers system. Construction of fish-pass structure also served the purpose to mitigate declining flood plain fisheries behind the Brahmaputra Right Embankment (BRE) through seasonal fish migration. The project has produced positive impact on the area in term of growth in agricultural production, income and employment opportunity.

19. Flood Rehabilitation Component: From technical point of view, performances of the restoration works are found to be satisfactory except for a few locations, such as Chandpur, Kumarkhali, Bagerhat, and Manu. Bank protection works of Chandpur Irrigation Scheme (all 12 contract packages) including substantial emergency works have failed completely. Economic impact of the repair works has been assessed in 6 representative schemes out of total 39. The pre-project conditions have been restored in all the sub-projects. Flood protection goal of the concerned areas have been achieved. Homestead, crops and properties are safe and commercial activities have been restored.

Sustainability:

20. River Training Component. Under BWDB's river training component, the protection works at two locations (so called "hard points" at Sariakandi-Mathurapara and Sirajganj) have been fully completed to a high constructions standard by international contractors. All these works were substantially completed by June 1998. The exceptional 1998 floods tested the completed works, and all, excepting Sirajganj hard point, have performed well from a technical point of view. The completed revetment work at Sirajganj was severely damaged for a substantial length (about 320 m, 11 % of total length) during the monsoon floods in August and September 1998. The damages were repaired in 1999, and since then no failure has occurred. The integrity of the revetment work is regularly monitored and remedial actions are taken when needed. 21. The sustainability of a project of this type depends on the proper monitoring and maintenance of the infrastructures. BWDB's Specialized O&M Unit has been established in 1998 and is functional with necessary core equipment for monitoring and maintenance. During the project implementation period, the Unit satisfactorily carried out Monitoring & Maintenance (M&M) activities in collaboration with private sector specialized agencies like Surface Water Modeling Centre (SWMC) and Environmental and Geographic Information System (EGIS). BWDB has prepared an Operation Plan and decided to contract out monitoring of the changes in the river plan form and its morphology in the vicinity of "hard points" to suitable organization under annual frame contract. The Government is committed to provide necessary support and budget for monitoring & maintenance (M&M) for its sustainability.

-34 - 22. The improved river training works, completed under this project is sustainable in its present entity. But for it its long-term sustainability, stabilization of the entire stretch of Brahmaputra right bank (about 220 km from Chilmari to Hurasagar) needs to be taken up in phases. BWDB completed Brahmaputra River Training Study (BRTS, May 1993) under IDA Cr. 1870-BD and this project has implemented three priority locations, out of 27 identified sites. In addition, China-Bangladesh Joint Expert Study (1991) Study recommended total confinement of the river from the outset. Ongoing pilot project - Active Flood Plain Management (FAP21/22) has experimented on various approach including low cost ones. Therefore, in the light of Development Strategy under National Water Management Plan (June 2001), a long-term plan will have to be developed and implemented in phases.

23. Flood Rehabilitation Component: Under BWDB's flood rehabilitation component, the repairs were undertaken in 39 schemes, affected by 1998 flood and are expected to be fully completed by 'November 2001. The government provides fund from its revenue budget for their maintenance, which in most of the years cover 3040%/o of its actual needs. Given this budget situation, the Government/BWDB is irying to find alternate means of managing the schemes in a better way. Since 1999, the government with the assistance from World Food Program (WFP) is working towards better organizing the preventive maintenance in selected BWDB schemes with declining scarce resources under Rural Development Program. This program will continue till 2003. Meanwhile, the Govermnent has approved "the Guidelines ior Participatory Water Management (April 2001)" and BWDB intends to apply it for improved service dlelivery on the ground involving the User's representatives in operation and maintenance of the schemes. ]3WDB intends to pursue these aspects of operation and maintenance under the proposed Water MIanagement Improvement Project (WMIIP), currently under preparation.

EZ.valuation of Consultant's performances

24. River Training Component. The objectives of consultants' services were primarily to assist GOB end BWDB to implement the project as efficiently and effectively as possible. A team of Construction ',upervision Consultant (CSC) was designated as 'Engineer' was selected to supervise the two major civil works contracts including imnplementation of Resettlement Action Plan (RAP). The Consultants site supervision team consisted of international experts and local engineers & staff. One third of the local engineering personnel were seconded to the Consultant's supervision team from BWDB for training and supervision of works & quality assurance with 'Lien' from the GoB. The supervision consultant played a critical role in providing the necessary coordination in ensuring that the civil works were being executed to the appropriate specifications and within the stipulated contractual time frame. The consultant support to EtWDB in managing all contractual related matters and in implementing the RAP, and EMP were in general very satisfactory. Their timely role in diagnosing the causes of failure of 1998 flood damage to Sirajganj Revetment was very effective and the repair work done on the CSC furnished and BWDB approved design in a minimum possible time.

25. Flood Rehabilitation Componentr Consultant's overall performance is satisfactory. Their main n-sponsibilities and accomplishments are: (i) review of 1998 Flood Damage Assessment of Infrastructure Report; (ii) preparation of quality assurance and environmental management plans; (iii) review of the designs prepared by the BWDB Design Office and suggested modification wherever necessary; (iv) assisting BWDB in overall monitoring and quality assurance of the works through inspection and checks at a regular interval; (v) review and recommending proposal for variation of works wherever necessary; (vi) preparation of monthly progress reports on the basis of progress of individual event of a contract package irn a methodical way through computerized program; (vii) certification of contractor's invoices and withdrawal applications, and (viii) preparing draft Project Implementation Completion Report.

- 35 - Evaluation of Bank's Performance

26. River Training Component: The World Banks task team played a vital role in facilitating the implementation of the project successfully. The Bank's supervision of the project was adequate and appropriate. The Bank staff supervised all the components of the project regularly. The team, comprising staff from different discipline, visited and reviewed the progress of works. In the process, the team. pro-actively identified various implementation issues and assisted in resolving those. They advised the concerned officials of GoB and CSC to implement the work as per IDA standard procedures. The Bank staff periodically visited the project sites and discussed implementation with the BWDB officials, local administration and stakeholders, which helped in smooth execution of the works. Bank's Supervision Mission also visited the project sites regularly as per planned schedules.

27. In addition to the two large ICB contracts, rest of the contract packages was executed under National Competitive Bidding following IDA standard bidding document. As the IDA guidelines were different from GoB guidelines in some respects and both the BWDB officials and contractor were not well acquainted with those, the procurement activities could not progress as planned. As a consequence, some contract packages were declared mis-procurement on the ground of apprehend collusion and in some cases procedural deviation. A case in point is contract Packages 20/A and 21 for survey equipment, which were declared misprocurement simply for BWDB's disagreement for not awarding the contract with adjusted price for delay in award. IDA was requested to review the decisions on the misprocurement, but IDA was rigid and maintained their earlier position. The IDA approach was focused more on the process than the goal of the project, such as sustainable arrangement for Operation and Maintenance.

28. Disbursement: In general, the withdrawal applications as well as the direct payments were handled mostly in time. Response from the Bank regarding withdrawal application & other financial aspects was satisfactory. 29. Flood Rehabilitation Component. Bank's involvement in the initial stage was much intense as prevailing bidding procedure of BWDB was replaced by the introduction of National Competitive Bidding (NCB) by the Bank. This required a number of formal and informal meetings with BWDB and MOWR The Bank undertook prior review of twelve contracts above the threshold value of US$200,000 and ex-post review of the sample contracts for the remaining ones. A number of contract packages were found to consistent with IDA guidelines and those contracts were declared mis-procured. The Eight contracts were declared as misprocurement and the contract amount involved is Tk. 28,094,298 (US$497,244.0 equivalent). Based on further assessment by an independent audit team (Chartered Accountants Firm), engaged by the Bank, another 59 contracts for an amount of about Tk.133,106,654.0 have again been declared mis-procured.

Evaluation of Borrower's Performance

30. River Training Component: The government handled the project implementation efficiently. The contracts were finalized within reasonable time. The Construction Supervision Consultants (CSC) was also engaged within reasonable time. As per provision in the project (SAR, para 2.25), BWDB Engineers and other technical staff were seconded to the Construction Supervision Team. They were part of CSC's team and actively participating in supervision and quality assurance activities. The senior engineers acquired knowledge about contract administration under FIDIC which will be helpful in implementation of large construction contracts. The BWDB/MOWR responded very quickly to repair the damage of 1998 flood, where about 320m stretch of revetment in Sirajganj collapsed. GoB approached the IDA for financing and

- 36 - finalized the design with the help of committee and repaired the damage within shortest possible time.

.31. BWDB tried to make payment to the contractors timely so that work continued unhindered. In spite of constraint on GoB resources, counterpart funds were made available mostly on time. Besides, Govt. tired to resolve all issues related to implementation timely and complies with all the Credit covenants.

32. Flood Rehabilitation Component: BWDB started the work in right earnest at the beginning of the project. Tendering process for most of the packages was started before the Consultants were on board, but it faltered in the beginning due to the introduction of the World Bank's trial edition of Standard Bidding Document (SBD) for National Competitive Bidding (NCB). Since the requirements in this newly introduced SBD were far more stringent than the government bidding documents, both the BWDB officials and the bidders faced difficulties in working with these documents and that too in an emergency situation. All the repairs have been fully completed by December 31, 2001.

'13. The quality management aspects during execution of civil works have improved. Failure to make timely payment to the contractors, BWDB found it difficult to exercise their control over time related to construction administration and the imposition of liquidated damages in accordance to the contract clause clue to non completion of work in time. lKey Lessons Learned

34. River Training Component: Key lessons among others from this project component are the following:

Quality at entry. The RBPP is a clear example of a well-designed and very thoroughly prepared project, which was ready for implementation. Project planning and preparation were intensive and lengthy. The project preparation took about two years from 1991 to 1992 and the initial appraisal was made in 1992, vvhich was updated in 1995. This ensured that the project was at a very high state of implementation readiness once it became effective. For example, before IDA Board presentation, two major civil works bids and consultant services proposals had been received and evaluated, giving accurate cost estimates for the project. By effectiveness, all of the construction and consultant contracts for the project had been signed. This high state of procurement and engineering readiness was achieved despite the fact that because of the changing morphology of the Brahmaputra River, the final location of the "hard points" at tvo locations (Sariakandi and Mathurapara) had to be adjusted in late 1995.

Social & environmental components. The preparation and more importantly implementation of the social and environmental components of large civil works projects must be given the same attention as the preparation of the physical components. In the case of the RBPP the real needs, in terms of resources, to inplement the social and environmental components of the project was not appreciated until well into project implementation.

International Competitive Bidding (ICB). Because of ICB, GOB was able to procure, in a cost effective manner, intemationally experienced contractors to execute technically challenging civil works contracts. F.owever, ICB alone, without a strict PQ process, would not have resulted in the procurement of the suitably qualified contractor at the lowest possible price to execute the works. Thus the lesson learned firom implementing the RBPP is that a combination of ICB together with a very strict PQ process produces the best results.

Supervision consultant as the 'Engineer. In the case of the RBPP the role of the supervision consultant

- 37 - as the empowered Engineer worked well. The Engineer was given the necessary powers and independence to operate as the engineer and this reduced payment delays and potential problems with the contractors. Thus for a large complex project like the RBPP the role of the supervision consultant as the engineer can be effective if properly managed.

Transfer of Technology. For large project like RBPP, provision for secondment of staff from the implementing agency to the consultant's team should be continued as a part of technology transfer.

35. Flood Rehabilitation Component. Key lessons among others from this project component are the following:

Consultant'sRole. Review of design by Consultant leads to bmplacency for both Consultant and BWDB Design Office. Consultant's responsibility needs to be increased

Size of Contract Packages. Fragmentation of works into uuiall packages is to be avoided even if it is scattered, but situated within a reasonable distance. This will not necessarily affect the labor-intensive nature of the work very much. Contract administration, construction monitoring and supervision will improve considerably by this.

Summary of Borrower's Contribuffon to the ICR (WARPO - Strengthening of Water Sector Planning)

1. The 1964 EPWAPDA Water Master Plan proposed a major programme of investments to control Bangladesh's rivers and develop large-scale Flood Control and Drainage (FCD) and surface water irrigation projects. In contrast, the World Bank's 1972 Land and Water Resources sector study downplayed major FCD and surface water irrigation, instead recommending that emphasis be given to public investrnent in minor irrigation (low lift pumps and deep tube wells) and small scale FCD projects. From 1983 to 1991, UNDP-supported national water resources planning was done by Master Plan Organization (MPO). National Water Plan Phase-I was published in 1986 while Phase-IH was published in 1991. In 1992 MPO was transformed into Water Resources Planning Organization (WARPO) with the mandate of macro-level planning of water resources of the country.

2. After catastrophic flood of 1987 and 1988, the international community helped Bangladesh in preparing a comprehensive and coordinated action plan against flood. The resulting works is known as Flood Action Plan (FAP) and the organization responsible for implementing and administering the works is termed as Flood Plan Coordination Organization (FPCO). FAP comprises eleven major components (five regional planning studies; four studies focusing on specific programs - the Brahmaputra Right Bank Embankment, the Coastal Embankment, Dhaka Urban Protection, Secondary Cities Protection; two studies focusing on non-structural programs- flood forecasting and flood preparedness) and sixteen supporting studies and pilot activities. As a follow-up action of FAP, Government of Bangladesh (GoB) prepared Bangladesh Water and Flood Management Strategy (BWFMS) in September, 1995 which sets two immediate tasks - a National Water Policy and a National Water Management Plan.

3. The Govemment undertook the preparation of National Water Management Plan (NWMP) in mid-March, 1998 under a loan agreement between GoB and IDA (World Bank). National Water Policy was prepared and published by GoB in January, 1999. WARPO was the implementing agency of the task. The preparation of NWMP was completed in November 2001. The components of the National Water

- 38 - Management Plan Project (NWMPP) was (i) Preparation of NWMP, (ii) Strengthening of WARPO, and (iii) Establishment of a National Water Resources Database (NWRD).

4. Cost of NWMP: (a) 5.72 million SDR as per development credit agreement (DCA) (IDA contribution) (b) 0.30 million US$ from Canadian grant (c) 0.19 million US$ from the Netherlands and (d) Taka 131.74 lakh from GoB. The NWMP is being implemented under the direct supervision of Water Resources Planning Organization (WARPO). Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR), Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh (GoB) is responsible for top supervision of the job. Moreover, World Bank on behalf of IDA, is also advising on the implementation of the component as one of the member of the Tripatriate Team (the other two members are MoWR and the Consultants). From time to time IDA is also fielding peer reviewer and Review Mission to monitor the progress of the component.

5. A Consultants Team consisting of M/S Halcrow and Partners in association with Mott Mac Donald, DHI, Natural Resources Consulting Engineers Inc BETS, EPC, HCL, ECA, Proshika, ASOD with assistance and support from SWMC, EGIS and BIDS is responsible for implementation of the three tasks of the NWMPP. The Consultants team has subcontracted part of their job to Surface Water Modelling Centre (SWMC) and Environmental and Geographic Information System Support Project for Water Sector Planning (EGIS). Furthermore, MoWR has appointed International and National Water Policy Advisory Group (WPAG) and Independent Panel of Experts (IPoE) to -review the outputs of the component and to advice both the MoWR and WARPO on the formulation of NWMP. MoWR has also constituted a "Contact Group" taking experts members from the Government/Autonomous Agencies to advice WARPO on the NWMP formulation. A high power Steering Committed has been formed to guide the NWMPP taking members from different Ministries of the Government, head/representative of the Agencies/University/World Bank. This Committee is the highest body to decide on technical matter of NWMPP.

6. Supreme authority to take decision on NWMP is the Executive Committee of National Water Resources Council (ECNWRC) and National Water Resources Council (NWRC). ECNWRC is headed by the Ministry of Water Resources and NWRC is headed by the Prime Minister of the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.

7. The outputs of NWMPP are: The Inception Report, Issues for the NWMP Report, Topic Papers (Reports) - 15 Nos., Draft Development Strategy Reports (11 Volumes), Draft Development Strategy Reports (2 Volumes), Development Strategy of NWMP (Report), Draft National Water Management Plan. The draft NWMP was recommended by the Executive Committee of National Water Resources Council ,(ECNWRC) meeting on 2nd February, 2002. National Water Resources Council (NWRC) is the final authority to approve NWMP and hopefully, NWRC will approve it.

B. Institutional Strengthening of WARPO: 42 officials, from MoWR (10), Ministry of Planning (7), :[MED (2), JRC (I) and WARPO (22) received study tour/training on IWRM under the Projects. Besides, local training for WARPO officials was also arranged under the project Working atmosphere in WARPO lis now very good with improved computer facilities, office accommodation, library facilities and WARPO web-site. An updated EIA guideline has been prepared together with the guidelines for the participatory water management at national level. A Five Year Work Plan for WARPO has also been prepared. WARPO is also maintaining an excellent database for the water sector of the country.

19. Following Factors affected implementation of the NWMPP:

(a) Implementation arrangement of the Project: WARPO was responsible for overall

- 39 - implementation of the project under the guidance of Ministry of Water Resources. The project was monitored guided and advised by IPOE, WPAG, Steering Committee, Contract Group and Tripartite Team.

(b) Ganges Water Treaty: Based on the recommendations of the International Seminar held in March, 1998 in Dhaka and to hamess the available water secured by the Ganges Water Treaty signed between Bangladesh and India in December, 1996, the NWMP Project has to accommodate special studies on OGDA.

(c) Modification on the outputs of the Projects: In agreement with IPoEs, WPAGs, Tripatriate Team, the Outputs (Reports) have been changed as:

Inception Report - Unchanged

Option Report - Changed to : Issues of NWMP Topic Paper (TPs) Draft Development Strategy (DDS) Report Development Strategy Report

National Water Resources Plan - Unchanged

The changes in outputs affected both time and resources of the project.

10. The key element of sustainability of the project is continuation of the capacity of WARPO that has been achieved during NWMP project implementation phase. By this time, WARPO has adopted a five year work plan (2002-2006) that will help to uphold and further improve the capacity building of WARPO. This will also ensure and equip WARPO to take the responsibility of updating NWMP in future (considering physical, financial and institutional aspects). The main constraint WARPO cunrently faces is lack of permanent office. However, future prospects for WARPO are encouraging provided the above constraint overcomes.

11. Traditionally, the Consultants have worked independently (without interacting with WARPO professionals). WARPO and the Consultants jointly developed a mechanism to share views (among WARPO professional and Consultants) on different NWMP issues which was later dropped due to time and financial constraints. In absence of a mechanism to interact with the Consultants during plan formulation stage, divergence of opinion came on some issues between the Consultants and WARPO. Four international and five national IPoEs worked under the Project. Of them, one intemational IPoE was financed by CIDA while another by GoN. ToR of the jobs of the IPoEs were formulated in a very brief and general terms; specific way of providing inputs to the process by the IPoE members were not there. As a result, their services could not be utilized as per desired level.

12. Major part of the cost of NWMPP came from the loan agreement (IDA Credit No. 2791-BD) between IDA and GoB. Performance of the Bank (IDA/World Bank) was excellent in respect of release of fund and response of the Bank on amendment of Credit agreement from the Borrowers side. But the response of the Bank on management of the Project was, somehow, slow; clearance of the Bank on the proposed 2nd Amendment of Contract of Consultancy Services between WARPO and the consortium of Consultants took unusual lengthy time. Moreover, concept of involving IPoEs and WPAGs on planning process suggested by the Bank was proven not very effective.

-40 - 13. On behalf of GoB, WARPO was entrusted for the management of the Project. The Project started on 15th March, 1998 and completed on 30th November, 2001. During this period, Director General (DG) of the Organization has been changed twice; 1st time on 10-03-1999 and 2nd time on 17-09-2000. For project duration of forty four and half months, changing the top manager after twelve months of project's commencement and again repeating the same on 30th month of commencement did not create favorable environment for the project. A project manager from beginning to the end of the project could result better DUtpUt from the project. ToR of the project; though prepared by WARPO and vetted by World Bank and approved by the MoWR; did not provide the scope of interacting GoB personals (WARPO Professionals) with the Consultants on the issues of NWM. The process was initiated but the Consultants, after a few meetings, disagreed to continue it on the ground that this process is not allowing them to work independently with their professional standard and time and resources is also not enough for the process.

14. The following lessons, learnt from the experience of this project, will guide WARPO/GoB in future for similar projects: (i) ToR of the study should contain provision for interaction with GoB project ;oersonals and the Consultants on each important phase/issues of the project so that GoB's views are reflected in project documents; (ii) All professionals including top manager working in the project must not 'be transferred out of the project unless the Authority is compelled to do so; (iii) Concept of IPoE/WPAG's involvement in project should be reviewed seriously because of their general (not specific) level of performance; and (iv) Emphasis should be put to recruit as much as possible the national experts in state of internal experts.

- 41 - 89' 90° 91° 92' BANGLADESH

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IMAGING

Report No.: 24323 Type: ICR