Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association
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Sovereign Invulnerability: Sexual Politics and the Ontology of Rape
SSStttooonnnyyy BBBrrrooooookkk UUUnnniiivvveeerrrsssiiitttyyy The official electronic file of this thesis or dissertation is maintained by the University Libraries on behalf of The Graduate School at Stony Brook University. ©©© AAAllllll RRRiiiggghhhtttsss RRReeessseeerrrvvveeeddd bbbyyy AAAuuuttthhhooorrr... Sovereign Invulnerability: Sexual Politics and the Ontology of Rape A Dissertation Presented by Jane Clare Jones to The Graduate School in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Stony Brook University December 2016 Copyright by Jane Clare Jones 2016 ii Stony Brook University The Graduate School Jane Clare Jones We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy degree, hereby recommend acceptance of this dissertation. Dissertation Advisor – Dr. Edward S Casey Distinguished Professor, Department of Philosophy Chairperson of Defense – Dr. Megan Craig Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy Internal Reader – Dr. Eva Kittay Distinguished Professor, Department of Philosophy External Reader – Dr. Fiona Vera-Gray Durham Law School, Durham University, UK This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School Charles Taber Dean of the Graduate School iii Abstract of the Dissertation Sovereign Invulnerability: Sexual Politics and the Ontology of Rape by Jane Clare Jones Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Stony Brook University 2016 As Rebecca Whisnant has noted, notions of “national…and…bodily (especially sexual) sovereignty are routinely merged in -
Moral Autonomy, Civil Liberties, and Confucianism
MORAL AUTONOMY, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND CONFUCIANISM Joseph Chan Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Hong Kong One of the most challenging issues that must be faced today in any attempt to develop a contemporary Confucian ethical and political theory isthe question of individual autonomy. Since the May Fourth Movement, Confucianism has been criticized asfailing to recognize the dignity of the individual and the value of indi- vidual autonomy asunderstoodin the Western liberal traditionsof political thought. Some have gone further to contend that Confucianism not only fails to recognize, but even actively suppresses, individual autonomy. The most forceful critic in this regard wasChen Duxiu, who argued powerfully that Confucianismisunfit for modern life because its ethics seriously undermines individual autonomy and self- respect. This criticism is still influential today, but appears in a different form. Con- fucianism,it isnow claimed, isunfit in the context of human rightsand civil liberties because it does not respect the autonomy of the individual.1 Isit true that Confucianismdoesnot recognize individual autonomy? In the past, scholars often defended Confucianism against these charges. Their argument holds that there is, within Confucianism, a concept of moral autonomy that can support civil libertieswithout having to incorporate the liberal notion of individual auton- omy.2 This argument of moral autonomy is important. If sound, it can revise, if not reject, the dark and pessimistic picture of Confucianism powerfully painted by May Fourth thinkers. In this essay I seek to examine critically the Confucian conception of moral autonomy and explore itsimplicationsregarding civil liberties. The concept of moral autonomy is, unfortunately, vague and ambiguous, and the argumentsthat make useof thisidea do not help remove itsvaguenessorambi- guity. -
A Ground for Moral Standing
Jesper Söderstedt 19910410-1259 A Ground for Moral Standing: En grundläggning för moralisk status Umeå Universitet Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies Jesper Söderstedt Supervisor: Karsten Klint Jensen Bachelor thesis 15 hp Philosophy C 30 hp Spring Semester 2017 1 Jesper Söderstedt 19910410-1259 Abstract The concept of moral standing applies to those who are of a direct moral concern, i.e. we have a reason to directly include those with a moral standing in our moral deliberation- they matter for themselves. How one accounts for the concept in question is controversial and thus there are several different accounts that one can consult when pondering what content the concept ought to have. This paper investigates the plausibility of some of the most influential accounts of moral standing, concluding that they, as they stand alone, are insufficient. Instead an alternative account of moral standing with a kantian foundation is offered, an account which is heavily based on Christine Korsgaard’s notion of final goods, with moral standing understood as a comparative concept as its distinguishing component. 2 Jesper Söderstedt 19910410-1259 Table of Content Introduction p.5-7. §1. Singer, Sentience, Preference Utilitarianism and the Equal Consideration View p.7-9 §1.2. Considering Singer’s Equal Consideration View p.9-11. §1.3. Concluding Singer’s Account of Moral Standing p. 11. §2. Contractualism p.11-12. §2.1. Scanlon’s Contractualism p.12. §2.2. Carruthers, Contractualism and Rawls p12-14. §2.3. Critique of Contractualism p.14. §2.3.1. Scanlon, Non-rational Humans and Non-Human Animals p.14-16. -
Against 'Effective Altruism'
Against ‘Effective Altruism’ Alice Crary Effective Altruism (EA) is a programme for rationalising for the most part adopt the attitude that they have no charitable giving, positioning individuals to do the ‘most serious critics and that sceptics ought to be content with good’ per expenditure of money or time. It was first for- their ongoing attempts to fine-tune their practice. mulated – by two Oxford philosophers just over a decade It is a posture belied by the existence of formidable ago–as an application of the moral theory consequential- critical resources both inside and outside the philosoph- ism, and from the outset one of its distinctions within ical tradition in which EA originates. In light of the undis- the philanthropic world was expansion of the class of puted impact of EA, and its success in attracting idealistic charity-recipients to include non-human animals. EA young people, it is important to forcefully make the case has been the target of a fair bit of grumbling, and even that it owes its success primarily not to the – question- some mockery, from activists and critics on the left, who able – value of its moral theory but to its compatibility associate consequentialism with depoliticising tenden- with political and economic institutions responsible for cies of welfarism. But EA has mostly gotten a pass, with some of the very harms it addresses. The sincere ded- many detractors concluding that, however misguided, its ication of many individual adherents notwithstanding, efforts to get bankers, tech entrepreneurs and the like to reflection on EA reveals a straightforward example of give away their money cost-effectively does no serious moral corruption. -
Downloaded from 129.15.14.53 on Fri, 21 Mar 2014 15:06:24 PM All Use Subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol
International Phenomenological Society Obligation, Good Motives, and the Good Finite and Infinite Goods by Robert Merrihew Adams Review by: Linda Zagzebski Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Mar., 2002), pp. 453-458 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3071055 . Accessed: 21/03/2014 15:06 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. International Phenomenological Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 129.15.14.53 on Fri, 21 Mar 2014 15:06:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXIV, No. 2, March 2002 Obligation,Good Motives, and the Good LINDA ZAGZEBSKI University of Oklahoma In Finite and Infinite Goods, Robert Adams brings back a strongly Platonis- tic form of the metaphysics of value. I applaud most of the theory's main features: the primacy of the good; the idea that the excellent is more central than the desirable, the derivative status of well-being, the transcendence of the good, the idea that excellence is resemblance to God, the importance of such non-moral goods as beauty, the particularity of persons and their ways of imitating God, and the use of direct reference theory in understanding how "good" functions semantically. -
When the Kingdom of God Became the Kingdom of Ends: Altruism’S Development Into a Normative Ideal
When the Kingdom of God Became the Kingdom of Ends: Altruism’s Development into a Normative Ideal A Senior Honor Thesis Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with distinction in Political Science in the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences by Benjamin T. Jones The Ohio State University December 10, 2006 Project Advisors: John M. Parrish, Department of Political Science (Loyola Marymount University) Michael A. Neblo, Department of Political Science (The Ohio State University) Table of Contents Abstract ii Acknowledgements iii Introduction 1 The Paradox at the Heart of Altruism 4 Defining Altruism and Normativity 6 What Are We Looking For? 11 Roadmap of What’s to Come 14 Part I Towards a Problem: The Ancient Debate over Public Life 17 Eudaimonia and Ancient Ethics 18 Plato and Aristotle 24 Epicurus and the Stoics 40 A Solution from an Unlikely Source 47 Augustine’s Reconciliation of the Two Cities 55 Conclusion 63 Part II Self-Love’s Fall from Grace: How Normative Altruism Developed out of the Augustinian Tradition 65 Entangled in Self-love: Augustine’s Normative Argument 67 Augustine Goes Secular 75 Kant’s Problematic Solution 83 Reworking Kant—And Altruism 89 Conclusion 91 Part III The Problems with Normative Altruism 93 Two Conceptions of Altruism 93 Evidence for Altruism on a Descriptive Level 95 Motivational Barriers to Normative Altruism 113 Changing the Way We Talk About Altruism 121 Conclusion 126 Bibliography 131 i Abstract In contemporary moral philosophy, altruism holds a place of prominence. Although a complex idea, the term seeps into everyday discourse, by no means confined to the esoteric language of philosophers and psychologists. -
Eva-Feder-Kittay-CV-2014.Pdf
EVA FEDER KITTAY email: [email protected] [email protected] web: http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/philosophy/people/faculty_pages/kittay.html https://sbsuny.academia.edu/EvaKittay TEACHING POSITIONS Stony Brook University/SUNY, Department of Philosophy, 2009, Distinguished Professor Stony Brook University/SUNY, Department of Philosophy, 1993-2009, Professor. Senior Fellow, Center for Medical Humanities, Compassionate Care, and Bioethics, Stony Brook University/ SUNY, 2008-present. Policy Ethics and Life Sciences Research Centre, Newcastle University, New Castle, UK, Visiting Professor, Spring 2011, Spring 2012 Women’s Studies Associate, Stony Brook University/SUNY, 2000-present. Sarah Lawrence College, Department of Philosophy, Fall, 1993, Visiting Professor. SUNY at Stony Brook, Department of Philosophy, 1986-1993, Associate Professor. SUNY at Stony Brook, Department of Philosophy, 1979-86, Assistant Professor. University of Maryland, College Park, Department of Philosophy, 1978-79, Visiting Assistant Professor. Lehman College, CUNY, Department of Philosophy, Fall 1975, Fall 1974. Adjunct Lecturer. John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY, Department of Philosophy, Spring 1975. Adjunct Lecturer. Outreach program at precinct house. EDUCATION Sarah Lawrence College, Bronxville, New York, Philosophy, B.A. 1967. CUNY, Graduate School and University Center, New York, New York, Ph.D. 1978. Honors: Philosophy of Science. Dissertation: "The Cognitive Force of Metaphor." Dissertation Advisor: Peter Caws. HONORS, AWARDS AND GRANTS Guggenheim Fellowship (January, 2014-December 2014. NEH Fellowship (January 1, 2013-December 31, 2013) Lebowitz Prize Philosophical Achievement and Contribution awarded by the Phi Beta Kappa and American Philosophical Association, $28,000, 2013. Lifetime Achievement Award, Center for Discovery, Harris, New York, 2011. APA Grant for Philosophy in an Inclusive Key Summer Institute, an initiative of the Association of Feminist Ethics and Social Theory. -
The American Philosophical Association PACIFIC DIVISION EIGHTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM
The American Philosophical Association PACIFIC DIVISION EIGHTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM WESTIN BAYSHORE, VANCOUVER VANCOUVER, BRITISH COLUMBIA APRIL 1 – 4, 2015 new for spring COMPLICATED PRESENCE THE PHILOSOPHER-LOBBYIST Heidegger and the John Dewey and the People’s Postmetaphysical Unity of Being Lobby, 1928–1940 Jussi Backman Mordecai Lee AVAILABLE JUNE THE ORIGIN OF TIME TOWARDS A RELATIONAL Heidegger and Bergson ONTOLOGY Heath Massey Philosophy’s Other Possibility AVAILABLE APRIL Andrew Benjamin AVAILABLE JUNE WHOSE TRADITION? WHICH DAO? SPARKS WILL FLY Confucius and Wittgenstein Benjamin and Heidegger on Moral Learning and Reflection Andrew Benjamin and James F. Peterman Dimitris Vardoulakis, editors AVAILABLE APRIL Klee’s MIRROR John Sallis LEO STRAUSS ON THE BORDERS OF JUDAISM, NATURALIZING HEIDEGGER PHILOSOPHY, AND HISTORY His Confrontation with Nietzsche, Jeffrey A. Bernstein His Contributions to AVAILABLE JUNE Environmental Philosophy David E. Storey THE SOPHISTS IN PLATo’s DIALOGUES THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY David D. Corey OF FRANCIS BACON AVAILABLE JUNE On the Unity of Knowledge Tom van Malssen PHANTOMS OF THE OTHER Four Generations of WONDER Derrida’s Geschlecht A Grammar David Farrell Krell Sophia Vasalou AVAILABLE MAY IMPORTANT NOTICES FOR MEETING ATTENDEES SESSION LOCATIONS Please note: the locations of all individual sessions will be included in the paper program that you will receive when you pick up your registration materials at the meeting. To save on printing costs, the program will be available only online prior to the meeting; with the exception of plenary sessions, the online version does not include session locations. In addition, locations for sessions on the first morning (April 1) will be posted in the registration area. -
Caring for Philosophy: a Conference Celebrating the Work of Eva Feder Kittay
Caring for Philosophy: A Conference Celebrating the Work of Eva Feder Kittay Eva Feder Kittay. Photo credit: Joshua Brown April 21-22, 2017 Brooklyn College Sponsored by the Jay Newman Fund at Brooklyn College, the Brooklyn College Philosophy Department, and the Stony Brook University Philosophy Department Friday, April 21, 2017 All talks will be held in 2127 Ingersoll Hall.* 1:15 – 1:30 p.m. Welcoming Remarks Serene Khader (Brooklyn College and CUNY Graduate Center) Sarah Clark Miller (Penn State University) Mary C. Rawlinson (Stony Brook University) 1:30 – 3:30 p.m. Session 1: Bioethics Chair: Mary C. Rawlinson (Stony Brook University) Panelists: Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (Emory University), tba Bruce Jennings (Center for Humans and Nature), Solidarity and an Ethics of Place Chris Kaposy (Memorial University), Well-Being and Treatment for Down Syndrome Erik Parens (The Hastings Center), Should We Who Are Pro-Choice Stop Talking about Informed Consent in the ConteXt of Prenatal Testing? 3:30 – 3:45 p.m. Break Coffee and snacks will be provided. 3:45 – 5:15 p.m. Keynote Michael Bérubé (Penn State University) Who Cares About Surrogacy and Guardianship? 5:30 p.m. Shuttle from Bedford Gate (on campus) to Scottadito. 5:45 p.m. Dinner Scottadito Osteria Toscana, 788A Union Street, Brooklyn, NY 11215 Saturday, April 22, 2017 8:20 a.m. Shuttle from Hotel LeBleu to campus. 8:45 – 9:00 a.m. Light Breakfast 9:00 – 11:00 a.m. Session 2: Care Ethics Chair: Cara O’Connor (Borough of Manhattan Community College, CUNY) Panelists: Vrinda Dalmiya (University of Hawaii), Uncertain Care Virginia Held (The Graduate Center, CUNY), Downgrading the Social Contract Jean Keller (College of Saint Benedict/Saint John’s University), 35 Years of Care Ethics: A Care Ethic Autobiography Katie Wolfe (St. -
ANNUAL REPORT for 2020 Finalized May 2021
ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2020 Finalized May 2021 Hypatia Editors Bonnie Mann (January 2019 –) Erin McKenna (January 2019 –) Camisha Russell (January 2019 –) Rocío Zambrana (September 2018 –) Hypatia Reviews Online Editors Erin McKenna (January 2019 –) Clara Fischer (January 2020 –) Hypatia Managing Editors Sarah LaChance Adams (January 2019 –) Caroline Lundquist (March 2020 –) Hypatia Editorial Assistant Eli Portella (January 2019 – March 2020) Brooke Burns (March 2020 –) HRO Managing Editor Bjørn Kristensen (September 2019 – September 2020) Jane Nam (September 2020 –) OVERVIEW With this 2020 annual report, we resume the previous schedule in which the report is drafted after the full 2020 report from Cambridge University Press has been delivered to the editors (Feburary/March). In a new practice, it is to be presented to all interested parties within Hypatia’s tripartite governance structure during an Annual General Meeting (March 22, 2021). It covers the period from January 1 through December 31, 2020 (with some additional insights from the first months of 2021). It has been drafted by Camisha Russell, who took the position among the Co-Editors of Coordinating Co-Editor in September 2020. This year saw only minor, mostly planned changes in the Editorial teams. In January, Clara Fischer joined Erin McKenna as Co-Editor of Hypatia Reviews Online. In March, Caroline Lundquist joined Sarah LaChance Adams as Co-Managing Editor of Hypatia and Brooke Burns took over the Editorial Assistant position, which includes management of Hypatia’s social media. In September, Jane Nam took over the Managing Editor position for HRO. 1 Major accomplishments for 2020 include the following (further detailed below): (1) The reconstitution of the Board of Associate Editors in January (2) The creation of an International Advisory Board (not within official governance structure) in February (3) The online publication of curated article collections celebrating Juneteenth and in memory of María Lugones. -
Syllabus PHIL 607/CRN 26316 Dr. Bonnie Mann
Syllabus PHIL 607/CRN 26316 Dr. Bonnie Mann Feminist Philosophy: Proseminar 371 PLC: 346-5541 T/Th 2-3:50 pm Office Hrs: Tues 4:00-6:00 pm or by appt. 353 PLC [email protected] Purpose The purpose of this course is twofold: 1) to give students an opportunity to reflect on what it means to study and practice philosophy as a woman, i.e. from a position of alterity in relation to the dominant traditions in Western philosophy and 2) to introduce students to basic texts and basic topics in feminist philosophy. By the end of the term students should be able to speak competently about important themes in feminist philosophy, such as identity, the self-other relation, sexuality, gendered embodiment, agency and freedom; and about the contributions of a number of important thinkers in feminist philosophy. Students will gain exposure to feminist appropriations and criticisms of the Western philosophical tradition as well as debates within feminist thinking. Description Feminist philosophy is philosophical thought that emerges out of and in relation to social movements for women’s emancipation. It works toward the recuperation of women’s and feminist thought in the history of philosophy, an understanding of the human condition as it is lived by women, an articulation of women’s ways of knowing in relation to epistemologies that have implicitly or explicitly excluded women, and interrogating political and ethical practices from a feminist perspective. Though we commonly think of “feminist philosophy” as a recent development, scholars agree that philosophical work that exhibits a feminist sensibility has been a critical counter-voice to the mainstream Western tradition since its inception. -
Wni 1 Ichikawa Who Needs Intuitions?
Who Needs Intuitions? Two Experimentalist Critiques Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa 24 January 2013 To appear in Booth and Rowbottom, (eds.), Intuitions, Oxford University Press. Penultimate draft; please refer to published version Abstract. A number of philosophers have recently suggested that the role of intuitions in the epistemology of armchair philosophy has been exaggerated. This suggestion is rehearsed and endorsed. Many of these philosophers take this observation to undermine the experimentalist critiques of armchair philosophical methodology that have arisen in recent years. The dialectical situation here, I suggest, is more complex than it appears. I will argue that the so- called ‘experimentalist critique’ really comprises two very different kinds of challenges to armchair methodology. One, which I call the ‘defeater critique’, does not depend on any particular view about the philosophical significance of intuitions, even though its proponents often emphasize the language of intuition. The other, however, which I call the ‘arbitrariness critique’— prominent in earlier experimentalist work, especially that of Stephen Stich—does depend on a central role for intuitions. I survey some attempts to motivate this critique without reliance on assumptions about the centrality of intuitions, and find them unconvincing. So rejecting the centrality of intuitions is a sufficient response to the arbitrariness critique, even though it is orthogonal to the defeater critique. Here is a familiar situation: some philosophers are considering whether some philosophical theory X is true. One of them argues, by invoking a thought experiment, that it is not. “Here is an imaginary case S,” she says. “Intuitively, it is a case in which p. But according to theory X, S is a case in which not-p.