HEGEL'S DIALECTIC SOVIETICA

PUBLICATIONS AND MONOGRAPHS

OF THE INSTITUTE OF EAST-EUROPEAN STUDIES AT THE

UNIVERSITY OF FRIBOURG/SWITZERLAND

Edited by

PROF. DR J. M. BOCHENSKI

VOLUME 33 ANDRIES SARLEMIJN

HEGEL'S DIALECTIC

D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY

DORDRECHT-HOLLAND / BOSTON-U.S.A. HEGELSCHE DIALEKTIK First published in 1971 by Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/New York Translated from the German by Peter Kirschenmann

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 74-80522

ISBN-13: 978-94-010-1738-1 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-1736-7 001: 10.1007/978-94-010-1736-7

Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company P.O. Box 17, Dordrecht, Holland

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All Rights Reserved Copyright © 1975 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1975 No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION XI

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE XIII

INTRODUCTION 1 1 Subject Matter 1 2 Relevance 2 3 The Fate of Hegel Interpretations 3 3.1 Dialectical Materialists 3 3.2 Dialectical Idealism 4 3.3 Criticism by Formal Logicians 5 3.4 Old-Hegelians and Later Interpreters 5 4 Divisions 11

PART I / DIALECTIC

CHAPTER 1 / DIALECTIC OF THE REAL 15 1.1 Unity and Main Theme of the Dialectic 15 1.2 Negative Dialectic 17 1.3 The Presupposition of Dialectical Method: Idealist Individuation 22

CHAPTER 2 I POSITIVE DIALECTIC 27 2.1 Hegel's Dialectic and Its Origin 27 2.11 'Dialectic', 'Dialectician' 27 2.111 Heraclitus and the Eleatics 27 2.112 Plato and the Sophists 29 2.113 From Aristotle to Kant 33 2.12 Criticism, Sophistry, Dialectic 34 2.13 The Circle of Being, the Most Abstract Form of the Dialectic 42 2.131 Technical Description 42 2.132 Presuppositions 43 2.133 Interpretation 45 VI TABLE OF CONTENTS

2.14 Idealist 'Exposition' of the Absolute 47 2.2 From Subjective to Objective Idealism 50 2.21 Subject-K-F-H 50 2.22 Argumentation with Kant 51 2.221 The 'Impulse from Outside' and Immanence 51 2.222 The Method for Knowing the Unconditioned 53 2.2221 Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics 53 2.2222 Dialectical lliusion 54 2.2223 The Significance of Critical Philosophy 56 2.23 Argumentation with Fichte 58 2.231 Identity in the Science of Know/edge 58 2.232 Identity and Separation in Hegel's Dialectic 59 2.2321 Identity and Separation in the Subject-Side-H 59 2.2322 Identity and Separation in the Object-Side-H 60 2.3 Intro-Reflection as the Essence of Self-Movement 61 2.31 The Expressions 'Self-Movement' and 'Intro-Reflection' 61 2.32 Determinations of Reflection 61 2.33 Intro-Reflection as the Nature of the Absolute Essence and as the Essence of Dialectical Method 65

CHAPTER 3 / THE SUBJECT MATTER OF DIALECTICAL PHILOSOPHY 68 3.1 Dialectic and the Starting-Point of Philosophy 68 3.2 The 'Soul' of Dialectical Movement 69 3.21 Possibility of a Dialectical Logic 69 First Interpretation: Hegelian Contradictions are Objective 70 Second Interpretation: Modification of the Requirement of Non-Contradiction 75 Third Interpretation: No Restriction of the Principle of Non-Contradiction 76 3.22 Hegel's Theory of Contradiction 81 3.221 KpNp as Determinately Being 81 3.222 Sublation 83 3.2221 Logical Sublation 84 3.2222 Spatial and Temporal Sublation 86 3.2223 The Non-Contradictory Whole 87 3.223 Knowledge of the Understanding that Is Free from Contra- diction 88 T ABLE OF CONTENTS VII

3.2231 Human and Absolute Understanding 88 3.2232 Dialectic and Knowledge of Facts 90 3.2233 Dialectic and Natural Science 91 3.2234 Dialectic and Formal Logic: Truth and Correctness 91 3.2235 Dialectic and Its Justification 95 3.2236 Ex falso sequitur quodlibet 95 3.3 The Goal of Dialectical Method 96 3.31 The System 96 3.32 The Development of the Absolute and the Development of the System 97

PART III DIALECTIC AND METAPHYSICS

CHAPTER 1/ 'METAPHYSICS' - A PHILOSOPHICAL DISCIPLINE 103 1.1 'Metaphysics' 103 1.2 The Logic is a Metaphysics 105 1.21 The Metaphysical Content of the Logic 105 1.22 Why Does Hegel Call His Metaphysics 'Logic'? 106 1.221 Kant's Influence 106 1.222 'Logic' - 'Logos' 107 1.223 The Metaphysical is Logical 107 1.224 'Sublation' of Metaphysics of Being into Logic 107 1.225 The Demythologizing of Metaphysics 108 1.23 Does Dialectical Metaphysics Replace Formal Logic? 109 1.231 'Ordinary Logic' 109 1.232 'Formal Logic' 109 1.233 Hegel's Logic Is a Metaphysics of Being, and a Metaphysics of Knowledge Based Thereon 110 1.3 Hegel's Entire System Is a Metaphysics 110

CHAPTER 2 / METAPHYSICAL METHOD IN GENERAL 112 2.1 Positive Elements in the Method of Metaphysics of the Understanding 112 2.11 The 'View of the Understanding' 112 2.12 Epistemological Realism 113 2.13 The Idea In-and-for-itself 113 2.2 Criticism of the Method of Metaphysics of the Under- standing 113 VIII TABLE OF CONTENTS

2.21 'The Dead Product of Enlightenment' 114 2.22 Dependency on Imagination 115 2.23 Mathematical Metaphysics 115 2.24 Dogmatism 116 2.25 'Inferences of the Understanding' 118 2.26 Univocal Conception of Being 119 2.27 Multiplicity of Proofs 120

CHAPTER 3 I SPINOZA AND DOUBLE NEGA TION 121 3.1 Determinatio est negatio 121 3.2 Positio est negatio 121 3.3 Negation as Contradiction 123 3.4 Double Negation 123 3.5 Ambivalence of Spinoza's Position 124 3.6 Substance and Tnought 124

PART III / DIALECTICAL METAPHYSICS

CHAPTER 1 I INFINITY 127 1.1 The Finite and the Infinite 127 1.2 The 'Bad' Infinite 128 1.21 Infinity as Perennial Ought 128 1.22 Dualistic Infinity 129 1.23 The Bad and Untrue 130 1.3 True Infinity 131 1.31 The Finite Is Subia ted 131 CHAPTER 2 / ABSOLUTE NECESSITY 133 2.1 Accidentality and Necessity 133 2.2 Absolute Actuality 13S 2.3 Substantiality and Causality 138 2.31 'The Substance' 138 2.32 Causal Relationship 139 2.33 The Sublation of Metaphysics 141

CHAPTER 3/ BEING IS THOUGHT 143 3.1 The Sum Total of All Realities 143 3.11 The Subjective Concept 143 TABLE OF CONTENTS IX

3.12 The Metaphysical Concept 144 3.121 The Identity in the Metaphysics of the Understanding 144 3.122 The Critical Non-Identity 145 3.123 Dialectical Identity and Non-Identity 146 3.13 'The Derivation of the Real' 147 3.2 The Idea of Life 148 3.21 External Purposiveness 148 3.22 Internal Purposiveness 149 3.23 The Speculative Death 150 3.3 Teleology 151 3.31 Absolute Spirit 151 3.32 Absolute and Finite Spirit: Freedom 152 3.33 All of Hegel's Dialectic Is Teleological 153

SUMMARY ISS

EPILOGUE I HEGEL'S DIALECTIC AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 160 1 Analytic and Dialectic 160 2 The Sublation of Hegel's Dialectic 162 2.1 First Reversion 162 2.2 Second Reversion 164 2.3 Third Reversion 165 2.4 Fourth Reversion 166

CONCERNING NOTES AND ABBREVIA TIONS 168

NOTES 169

BIBLIOGRAPHY 183

INDEX OF NAMES 187 PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

This book was written in 1968, and defended as a doctoral dissertation before the Philosophical Faculty at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) in 1969. It treats of the systematic views of Hegel which led him to give to the princi• ple of non-contradiction, the principle of double negation, and the principle of excluded middle, meanings which are difficult to understand. The reader will look in vain for the philosophical position of the author. A few words about the intentions which motivated the author to study and clarify Hegel's thought are therefore not out of place. In the early sixties, when occupying myself with the history of Marxist philosophy, I discovered that the representatives of the logical-positivist tra• dition were not alone in employing a principle of demarcation; that those of the dialectical Marxist tradition were also using such a principle ('self-move• ment') as a foundation of a scientific philosophy and as a means to delimit unscientific ideas. I aimed at a clear conception of this principle in order to be able to judge whether, and to what extent, it accords with the foundations of the analytical method. In this endeavor I encountered two problems: (1) What is to be understood by 'analytical method' cannot be ascertained un• equivocally. (2) The representatives of the dialectical or Marxist tradition, on the one hand, do not sufficiently clarify what is meant by 'principle of self• movement' and by 'dialectical contradiction' in a Hegelian context and, on the other hand, presuppose the results of Hegel's Logic in the elucidation and logical justification of their position. I decided not to solve all of the problems pertinent to these issues, but to write instead an 'analytical' treatise on Hegel's Logic with the purpose of clarifying the issues. 'Analytical' is here taken to mean three things: (1) a discussion based on a precise interpretation of texts; (2) a particular consid• eration of theses which deviate from the analytical position (an analysis of what is given that is based on the principles of formal logic); (3) a renuncia• tion of 'modernizing' Hegel's dialectic (so as not to confront the reader with two philosophical systems - that of Hegel and that of the interpreter). Since con temporary discussions show how little is clarified when the Hegelian terms 'God' and 'the absolute' are replaced with 'matter' in Marxism-Leninism, or with 'the whole' in Neo-Marxism, I have not attempted to abstract from the XII PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

'metaphysical' aspects of Hegel's dialectic and Logic. On the other hand, I had to forgo any detailed treatment of the best-known critics of Hegelianism (Moore, Russell, Camap, Popper, Topitsch), as their criticisms rest on philo• sophical positions or on misunderstandings which can only be evaluated or corrected in a very extended discussion. My sincere thanks go to Prof. Dr J. Bochenski whose method for historical research I followed, Prof. Dr T. Blakeley who promoted the English edition, and Prof. Dr P. Kirschenmann who solved the difficult task of translating in an excellent manner. May the historical insights here communicated be useful to the reader for an objective and critical assessment of contemporary dialectic.

January 1974 TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

I have decided not to adopt the practice common in Hegel literature of using capitals for at least some of Hegel's categories and terms (Existence, Concept, Idea, the Ideal, the True and the Good, the Absolute, the Understanding, Reason, and the like). I have for the most part followed the author, who systematically employs his own means of emphasis. He uses quotation marks to indicate Hegel's terms and lengthier expressions (although not exclusively for that purpose). In text analyses that immediately follow quoted texts, terms and phrases taken from the text are in italics. (For further clarification of the author's means of emphasis, see his remarks Concerning Notes and Abbrevia• tions). Moreover, since Hegel's categories and the terms employed by him in an unusual sense are discussed in detail in the book, their technical meaning is hardly in danger of going unnoticed. I have deemed it helpful, however, to append the German original in parentheses to certain terms in a few places. In translating quoted texts, I have consulted and made use of the following translations: G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology ofMind, transl. by J. B. Baillie, Harper & Row, New York, 1967; Hegel: Texts and Commentary, trans!. anded. byW. Kaufmann, Doubleday, Garden City, 1966; Hegel's Science of Logic, trans!' by A. V. Miller, Allen & Unwin, London, 1969; The Logic of Hegel, transl. from The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences by W. Wallace, 2nd ed., Oxford, Clarendon, 1892; G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Together with a Work on the Proofs of the Existence of God, transl. by E. B. Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson, 3 vols. Humanities Press, New York, 1962; Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans!. by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson, 3 vols., Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1955;The DiIlloguesof Plato, trans!. by B. Jowett, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Chicago, 1952; I. Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, transl. by J. M. D. Meiklejohn, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1934; I. Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, trans!' by J. Ellington, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1970. I wish to thank my wife, Ann Kirschenmann, for valuable corrections, stylistic help, and for doing her share of the typing. PETER KIRSCHENMANN