AUTHENTIC CREATIVITY: INTENSIVELY CONSCIOUS INDlVlDUALS WHOLEHEARTEDLY PARTlClPATlNG IN RESPONSlVE AND RESPONSIBLE CONSTRUCTIONS OF MEIR (WORLD(S))

by

Bonita T. Whitety B.G.S.. Simon Fraser University. 1983 B.E.D.S., Technical University of Nova Scotia. 1987 B.A.E.D.. Nova Scotia Colkge of Art and Design. 1989

MISTHESIS IS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Facuity of Education

O Bonita T. Whiteiy 1999 SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY April, 1999

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The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fkom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. Representatives kmthe disciplines of psychobgy, phibsophy and education have agreed that regard& of the bngeviîy of creativw questions, unprecedenteâ interest in them has marked this century. Art educatois have paiocipated in the emergirg discourse and one has gone so far as to procbim art education creativity's "bastion". The conception of creativity that proponent, Viktor Lowenfeld, was proposing be protected was initiated by his predecessor, Herbeit &ad. And Read had bonowed it frorn an existential philosopher's address at a 1925 conference on creativity, where Martin Buber had claimed that: uniqueness, authentic diabgue and wholeheartedness were the rneans of realaing creative potential. That relatively "contemporary" trinity, however, is king chalienged in iight of its perceived shortcom ings, especialiy by representatbes of more "traditionai" conceptions of creativity, disturbed by its apparent lack of ernphasis on disciplines and their artifacts. This thesis acknowledges criicisms of the contemporary conceptions of creativity. But, rather than perpetuating clairns that it has been either "misleading" or "dangerousu, proposes that in spite of king both misunderstood and insutkknt, iî is sound enough to warrant transforming into a more integrated and integraüve paradigm. And iî goes so faas to suggest that the transformations proposed offer of a means of mligating the subject objectspll claimed by many to be the western world's nernesis. To explain this, the application of Abraham Mas bw's 196û suggestion of integrating aspects of existential thought into the humanistic paradigm in psychology, is one of his six proposak claimed to warrant appropriating into art education as hicalextensions of the BuMan precedent. Both R.K. EllioWs academic support of existential approaches to creativity and his daim that existentialists transfomi archetypal creativi understood as worid making into a much needed seculai rnyth are introduced. And the seven face6 of Rolb May's

iii existentialiy oriented "rede finition" of creativity : consciousness, receptivity, absorption, integration wlh the woriâ, ecstasy as the uniting of the Dionysian and Apobnian in "suprarationalim", and encounters that bring sorne new realiinto being, are posited as a potential nexus of the proposed transformation. As well as Bubeh exktential trinily, Kierkegaard's: "appropriation"; Sartre's 'respons bility"; Merleau-Ponty's "primacy of perception", Heidegger's "dwelling , "co- historicizing" and 'being-in-the-wor ld', Nietzsche's "ecstasy" and "self overcoming"; are intioduced and claimed to extend the prevailing paradgm's original emphasis on cunivaüng uniqueness and social consciousness, reciprocaliy . Maxine Greene's recentîy articulated extensions of aesthetic literacy and imagination, as well as her advocacy of a new paradigm empowering individuals to participate consciousty in worM reconstructions, are introduced and claimed to substantiate and extend Read's proposed reciprocity. And Greene's advocacy of cuitivating "awakeness" and "heightening consciousness" are claimed to substantiaie and extend both Car1 Jung's and Read's proposed augmentation of consciousness. How these proposats both can and have been reaiized in pedagogical situations are outlined. And one of Rafph Smith's hurnanist based proposafs is therefore, also noted, dong with heof Read's. Even Gablik's recent advocacy of a çocioecobgical paradigm in art education is claimed to be reaiizable by integrating a conternporized version of Read's proposal. And her advocacy of new myths is clairned to be addressed jointiy by the transformation of the creation myth into a secular one depicting individuals as limited divinKies and Saint Exupery's depictions of: uniqueness, responsibilii and imagination in The Lile Prince (1943). So together, an otherwise disparite collection of art educators, philosophers, and psychologists, are claimed to have engendered a paradgm worth perpetuating for: personal gratification, professional augmentation, and political efficacy - based on authentic creativity understood as: consciously responsive, responsible, wholeheaded participation in world (constructiin((s))). TaMe of Contents

ii ApQroval iii Abstract v Table of Contents vii Preface

Chapter 1. Introduction: "To Be, or Not to Be?" People, Processes, and Products in Conceptions of Creativity Inlorming Pedagogical Paradigms in Art Mucation

Chapter 2. A Contemporary Conception of Creabiiity and a Plausible Historical Precedent

Chapter 3. Seven Aspects of Rolb May's Conception of Creativity and Their Pedagogical Implications

Chapter 4. A Conception of Aesthetic Literacy Consistent With The Contemporary Conception of Creativity

Chapter 5. Awakeness: Making An lmplicit Aspect of Authentic Creativity Explicit Chapter 6. p.1 M. "Uniqueness" That Em bodies Gcistentiai Landscapes As Essential ta Contemporary Conceptions of Cteativity in Both The Prevailing and Praposed Paradgms

Chaptei 7. p.113. "Responsibility". "Geography", and the Possibiliiy of "Dweliing" As Aspects of Social Consciousness and Creativity

Chapter 8. p.125. Imagination (Glimmerings from Kant to Kent)

Chapter 9. p.145. Sa of Cari Rogers Contributions To The Contemporary Discourse On Creativity

Chapter 10. p.165. Six of Abraham Maslow's Contributions 10 Contemporary Theories Of Creativity

Chapter 11. p.182. Conclusion: "We're Wonderful One Times One" These thesis contains three linguistic idiosyncrasies. Where it can be done coherently, plural words suggesting plural visions have their multiple possbilitk reinforced by bacWi the 's', as in vision(s). The word "worid", however, is surrounded by an extra bracket when 1 is representing both the possbiiii of intersubjective woild(s) and world((s)) combining b brm a shared and common worîd, with the symbiotic relationship indicated by using the word (workf((s))). And, whenever possible to do so coherently, all pronouns that could be representing either gender, especiaiîy hase in oîder quotes, begin with a btacketed (sj, as in [slhe, to emphasize gender equity. When revising his text Introduction to Philoso~h~of Education (1982), one of the educator/philosophers referred to in this thesis, Robin Barrow, explains his rationale for making any adjustments comparable to the 1st one noted in the preceding paragraph, as his beiiif that using the masculine pronoun is an accepted linguistic convention. Since, however, I not only see language as an underutilired tooi, but ako share at least some of Marshall Mcluhan's conviction that 'the medium is the message'. I cannot, in good faith, participate in a convention I believe to unnecessarily and covertly perpetuate inequity. It is hoped that the three Iinguistic idiosyncrasies noted will not be perceived as distracting affectations, since they are, in fact, consistent with the thesis and both draw attention 10, and symbolize, three aspects of the conception of creativdy articulated in it, namely 1) pluralistic visions that emphasize 2) the uniqueness of individuaf(s) and their potentially 3) authentic integrations into shared and common (world((s))). And, since none of the concepts noted are ones I am cornfortable being passive about, 1 is hoped that the conscious manipulation of language does not unduiy distract the reader and apologies are extended brthe inconvenience, if they do. vii Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION

"10 Be, or Not to Be?" People, Processes, and Products in Conceptions of Creativity lnforming Paradigms in Art Education

Hausrnan and Rothenberg, the editors of The Creativiîv Question (1W6), reveal the bngevity of questions about the nature of creativity by opening their text with excerpts hom Plato's hypothesis on the topic, and subsequentty introducing ot her hypotheses that span from pre-Christiantimes until the third quarter of this century. And, William Fleming's daim, in && & ldeas(1980), that "one concem of the artist that has remained constant throughout the course of the arts is the nature of creativ'i" (p.5) not only substantiates the claimed bngevity, but also suggests creativity questions to be an integral aspects of aesthetic dimurse, as well. Regardless of the antiquatecl and perennial nature of creativity questions, however, interest in thern does appear to have been both erratic and limited to a relative Yewf prior to this century. By 1971, however, in The Furthest Reaches of Human Nature, Abraham Maslow had stated that 'almost everyone is now interested in creativity'. By 1991, R.K. Elliott, in "Venions of Creativity". had stated that "our modern feeling [ialics added] bs] t hat creativeness is a matter of highest importance" (p.66). And, by 1994, Sharon Bailin, in Achievina Gdra-ordinary Ends: An Essav on Creativrtv, had stated that creativity badbec~me [iialics added] nothing short of "a universal term of positive evaluation" (p.1). As well as changes in the degreeof current interest in creatiiity, however. these three aut hors, speaking from within three different disciplines (psychology, phibophy, and education, respectively) also al1 note changes in the natureof the conceptions of creativity. And, while the nature of the changes are perceived more rather than less consistently. the perceived value of these changes is sgnmcantty different. 60th Obtt and Masbw, for exampie, represent schoob of thought that wekome the current interest in creativity. And both are ako optimistic about the benetils that might be reaped Sy harvesting the apparent groundswell of contemporary interest in this phenomenon. Bailin, on the other hand, is quite pessimistic about the current interest. Two of her observations, krexample, both that %e are urged continualfy to be creative wlh respect to al1 our endeavors -- to be creative writers, creative cooks, creative teachers, creative thinkers, creative loversa (p.l), and that "ascribing creativity has become one of the principal means of appraising, approving, and commending" (pl), are actually lamentations, rather than simple statements of fact. And her perception, therefore, is antlhetical to the optimism others (such as: Elliott, Masbw, and rnyseff) wha support contemporary conceptions of cieativny resonant with the one that will be outlined in this thesis, continue to express. There is. however, at least agreement among the preceding three authon about the longevity of the contemporary conception of creativity being referred to. All three agree, for example, lhat I has taken hold since the branch of philosophy known as existentialism experienced a 'hey day' about the middle of this century, according to: William Barrett (Irrational Man, 1958, 1962), William Fleming (Arts and Ideas, 1955, 1980). Mary Warnock

(Existentialisrn, 1970) and R.K. Ellion ("Versions of Creativity", 1991). Oniy the tirne frarne, however, and not whether or not there is a relationship between existential thought and the conternporary conception of creativity, is consensually agreed upon. For his part, however, Elliott (1991) does daim such a relationship. He states, for example, that the existential philosopher "Nietzsche's understanding of creativeness as the overcoming of what our worid seeks to impose on us as necessity iç probabiy a contributory cause of the Promethean atmosphere which now surrounds the concept" (p.66). And, Oli also clairns that "our modem feeling that creativeness iç a matter of highest importance owes at least as much to the stress Nietzsche laid on setf creation (p.66). For his part, Masbw did not claim existential thought to have yet informed the contemporary conception of creativv, significantly. But, in Toward a Psvcholaav of Beinq (1968) he did claim that it not oniy couid, but ahshould begin to influence the evolving one. And, in 1971 he supported existential conceptions of it (intentionally or not) by deferring to Herbert Read's depiction of creativity in Educatina Throuah Art (1956), since Read had deferred to Martin Buber's existential depiction of creativity to explain the conception of it he (1956) proposed be integrated into contemporary art education. Bailin (1994), however, charts a different course for the new conception of creaiiiity's emergence. After observing that "attempts have been made in the last half century to deal with creativity in a new way" (p.2), she suggests that "new way", first, to be "scientifically" (p.2), and then, more specifically, to be "psychobgicaliy" (p.2)). She concludes that the new conception of creativity has ernerged as a direct resutt of the successful solicitation of more research into the nature of creativity by psychologiçts such as J.P. Guilford. And as such, Bailin credits psychology and psychologists, rather than philosophy and philosaphers, with the "very different way of viewing creativity from the previous one, bcussing not on extraiirdinary achievernent but rather on process" (p. 2),and she goes on to conclude that since creativity has corne to be seen as "a specific process or mode of thought ... that can be taught" )... these efforts have influenced not just the discipline of psychology, but also that of education" (p.2). She then daims that this shift away from an earlier focus on "great achievements and significant products" (p.1) [deerned] "great" or "significant" by representatives of disciplines' (p.4) is "radicalty defective" (p.4). And, even though the term "radicalty defective" leaves Iittle, if any, room for doubt about how she perceives this shift, any possible doubt is eliminated by the fact that she then goes from stating that: the way of ttiinking about creativity which is characteristic of contemporary psychobgical and ducational theory has been marked by a move away from an emphasis on aie production of valuable products and has stressed inçtead the creaüve process and alço

the creative person (pl), to the proposition that because: we have forgotten that creativity has to do with creating and that it is connected with great achievernents and quality productions ... most attempts to foster creativiîy in educational pracüce have kenmisleading at best, and dangerous at worst (p.1). 1 is, however, not only possible, but actually plausible, to propose, attematively, that rather than "misleading". the conception of creativity embodied in the prevailing pedagogical paradigm in art education has tended to be both more m&understOOdand misrepresented, than "misleading", and to have been insuîkknt at both its best and its worst, rather than "dangerous". And, it b even passible to consider it a dangerotis precedent to ignore, rather than to refine and continue to appropriate. Following the latter train of thought in Toward a Pwcholdav of Beinq (1968), Masbw listed fïfteen aspects of existential thought that he thought could, and should, be integrated into the humanistic branch of psychology he had been dubbed no less than the "father" of, to both give 1the philosophical foundation it lacked and mitgate its emerging insufficiencies, believing that it would then warrant king propelled into the Mure (pp. 9 -17). This thesis suggests making a comparable effort to integrate resonant aspects of existential thought with the prevailing paradigm in art educatiin, relative to the cultiiation of creativity, since there are not only aspects of existential thought that can substantiate the conception of creativity already embodied in the prevailing paradigm, but some that can transform it into a paradigm that is both more integrated and integrative !han the current one has succeeded in becoming. And, adding credence to this hypothesis, is the fact that the prevailing pedagogical paradigm in art education is based on the same humanistic precedents Masbw identifies as insufficient, but mitigatable, by such an integration. Two relatiiely respected authors, William Barrett (1962) and Mary Wmk(1 971 ), are acknowledged to have published books on exisîential thought prochiming it "dead" as a philosophic rnovement. This thesis, however, is suggesting that "dead" as existentiakm may (or may not) be as a philosophical rnovement, praparients of existentid thougM have engendered pedagogical implications that can not only substantiate the pcevailing paradigm Hi art education, but can tra~skrrnit into a more integrated and integrative paradigm. And, th& thesis is also claiming that such an integrated and integrative paradigm can, in turn, both effectiveiy and affectively addrefs both the goals of the ment past, and those adicuhted contemporariiy by: Bailin (1994), Gablik (1992) and Greene (l9ïï,1978,1989, 1991), in such a way as to collapse unnecessary and unconstructive poiarizations. So, in keeping with the preceding goak, like Maxine Greene (1977), 1 too "want to talk about a different kind of breathing in the reaiiiation tha? many of the songs we have Sung in the past have been to no avait" (1977, p.168). And, for me as for Greene. as well, th& goal not only "leads me to a preoccupation with ways of moving young people to self-refiectiveness and critical awareness" (p.169), but aîso to a concern with finding a mode of thinking, a mode of sense-making that '"is a painstaking as the works of Babac, Proust, Valery, or Cezanne -- by reason of the sarne kind of attentativeness and wonder, the same demand for awareness, the sarne will to seize the rneaning of the world or of history as that meaning cornes into being"" (p. 169). And, since predicably I ako share Greene's conclusion that "curriiulum ought to be a rneans of providing opportunities for the seizing of a range of meaning by pesons open to the worid" (p.169),the fact that I percebe such a curriiulum to have not only been initiated, but to have been in continual refinement throughout the fifty years Bailin dismisses, is the reason building on the est abiiished pedagogical foundation is proposeci to minirnize the risks of throwing

'babies out with bathwater', anaor 'wheat with chaff, that disrnissing it is feared to pose. Maxine Greene (1991) abquotes the phibsopher Mon6 Weitz twike, in such a way as to put the euphernisms just recited into more appropriateiy academic terms. She qwtes Weitz, for example, praposing that "there would seem to be value in consideration of aesthetic

theories, because they teach us what to look for and how to bok" (p.150). And she &O

quotes him proposing that: ?O understand the role of aesthetic theory is not to conceive 1 as definition, logicaliy doomed to failure, but to read iî as summaries of seriousiy made recomrnendations...." (p.150). And, in the spirit of their CO-propositions,al1 the proponents of contemporary conceptions of creativrty cited in th& thesis warrant consideration at aie ieast, since they are certainly "seriousiy made recommendations." Ako, ironic as it may be, in the spirit of these CO-propositions,as well, the proposed contemporary conceptions of creativrty can be understood to have been quite justifiabîy insuMent at both their best and their worst, since no one theory could be expected to accommodate such a muitifaceted phenornenon as creativity, any more than to explain art, as both Greene and Weitz emphasize. The point of this thesis, however, is stifl to dernonstrate that the integration of the recommendations of other sources can inspire a renewed paradigm that not onfy mlgates, but sometimes even eliminates, insufficiencies that have emerged in the prevailing paradigm whib giving form to the new pedagogical paradgm Maxine Greene (1978) claims to be needed to "enable students to understand how each of them reaches out from hk or her individual location ta participate in the construction of a common continent and ouf shared and common world" (p.59). And, even though Greene, herself, does not suggest her proposed paradgm to relate to any particular conception of creativity (and the words "creative" and "creativity" are, in fact, conspicuously rare in her work), mis thesis does posa that correlation, and supports il throughout the next nine chapters. To give brm to the integrations king proposed, both R.K. Elliottls rationale for accepting an existential conceptkm of creaüvity, and his rationale for believing that such a conception is a vital transformation of the archetypal creativity manifest as world creation that can, in effect, connect: ordinaty people, art and education, and our shared and common world, are introduced in Chapter Two, and claimed to offer both an infrastructure and a symbl that is appropriate for contemporary art educatian. Why this is understood îo be a contemporary, rathet than a traditional, conception of creativity is explained. And, resonant pedagogical precedents in the prevailing pdgmin art education that were initiated by Herbert Read's emphasis on education reciprocalîy cuitiiating uniqueness and social consciousness are ntroduced, abng with relevant depictions of what can constitute a "worId". In Chapter Three, the "redefinition" of creativity as: 'the encounter of the intensively conscious individuak with their (world(s)) that bring new realitiis into being' (p.%), proposeci by the existential psychobgist, Rollo May, in Couraae to Create (1W6), s posited as the potentiai nexus of a transformation of the prevailing paradigm into a more integrated and inkgrative one. The sgnÏfkance of May's deferences to both Plato's and Nietzsche's contributions to his 1976 depicton of creativity are explained. And the seven integral aspects of his conception of creativity (ubquity, absorption, integration, consciousness, suprarationalism. ecstasy and courage) are outlined in the belief that they offer existential extensions of the conception of creativity already embodied in the prevailing paradigm. The emphasis in Chapter Four is on the proposed perpetuation of aesthetic literacy as the essence of art education that Herbert Read proposed it as in Mucating Throuah Art (1943). Read's advocacy of it, however, is claimed to be both substantiated and augmented

by four of Maxine Greene's existentialiy oriented extensions of it (nameîy it: king broader based than the diçcipline, requiring perœptual enhancements, requiring imagination and requiring authentic integration to have meaning andlor maximize individual potential). And, both Read's and Greene's conceptions are claimed to be further augmented by the integration of Ralph Smith's proposed emphasis on appreciating masterpieces, since between the three proposais individual's hed world(s), the art world, and our shared and cornman (world(s)) are al1 attended to. In Chapter Fie, aulhentkty, awakeness, and artentan are suggested to be resonant with one another, as well as integrai to: consciousness, creativity, and Greene's depiction of aesthetic literacy. A brief history of such a proposa1 is offered and both their individuai and cumulative cultivation in ait classes is advocated. Two rneans of doing so are introduced and precedents advocating their cuftiiation in art education are traced back to Coliingwood (1939) and Nicolaides (1941 ), as weii as to Read (1943), and then linked to the ptesent A commonalty between such cuttivations and a meditation technique that has been cuttivated for thousands of years in the East is not only noted, but its continued cuttivation is advocated. 60th the hypotheses of Lawrence Le Shan and Cad Jung are claimed lo substantiate the goal of cutivating consciousness in art environs. And "Sense and ldea Journals" are posited as a potentially pivotal tool for the successful cuitbation of the intensifiecl consciousness attempting to ensconce itself in both the prevailing and propoçed paradigms. Having clarifieci that being awake is both necessary for authentic creativw to be manifest and unlikety to occur if not eâuced, in Chapter Fwe, Chapter Six introduces the existential augmentation of the existing paradigm that Buber's clear definitiin of unhueness provides - relative to Herbert Read's admonition that education rnust 'devebp, at the same time as the unqueness, the social consciousness of the individual' (1943, p.5). ft introduces and elabrates upon the existential conception of the subjectiveiy lNed worlds referred to as landscapes that is claimed to be integral to the propoçed paradigms of both Greene (1978) and Vandenberg (1971). And, More moving on to the next chapter introducing the~ecrgrhy claimed to be a necessary correlate of hndscape and representing the objective pole balancing the subjective one of landscape, two excerpts from Saint Exupery's Liiie Prince (1943) are introduced. and Saint Exupery is chimed to have written a contemporary myth that not onfy addresses the need for new myths embodying the socioecoiogical paradgm Gablik (1992) clairns to be necessary, but is ako claimed to have illustrated both the conceptions of uniqueness depicted in Chapter Six and the responsible and relational nature of creativity posited in Chapter Seven. Chapter Seven focuses on means of cultivating the social consciousness Read advocated and c hims that his concept can be enriched by recognizing ~eographyas a metaphor for the factual and relatively objective knowledge that needs to be integrated with subjective experience to extend student's otherwise self-timiting world(s). It abchims that Jean Paul Sartre's explanation of responsibiliry as the fiip side of freedom offers a concrete existential extension of the concept. And, it introduces Heidegger's existentialfy oriented advocacy of building 'âwelling thinking" to both substantiate Read's and Sartre's daims and to add a poetic element to the concept. Chapter Eght illustrates how Maxine Greene's depiction of imaghation as a conception that emphasizes: grounded and integrated "appreciation"; "futurizing"; and seeing, hearing, and feeling more: as well as transforrning the ordinary into the extraordinary by the powers of imagination) not only contemporizes the ambguous conception of imaginatbn in aie prevailing paradigm in a way that relates specificalty to the cuttiiation of creativity portrayed in this thesis, but does so in such a way as to aiso extend the conceptions of aesthetic literacy both Read and Smith advocate. The Curriculum Guide for Art Mucation (1993) published by the province of Manitoba is recognized for having incorporated a resonant conception of imagination into its guide and for having organized its curriculum in such a way as to facilitate the realization of a paradigm that resonates compatibiy with the one proposed in this thesis. And. both Dewey's identification of imagination's integral rob in creating cuiture and community and Saint Exupery's Little Prince are credited. In Saint Exupery's case, this tirne, with portraying a comparable conception of imagination to the one depicted in this thesis, as well as wieh advathg the cuitkation of imaginatbn, generaly. Chapter Nine acknowledges the fact that Herbert Read set a precedent Inr Yitegrating relevant aspecls of psychobgy hto art currkulums by defierring to both Cari Jung and the Gestalt psychobgists, himself. And. based on Read's precedent, six claims regarding the nature of creativity and how to cultivate ï made by the humanistic psychoiogfft, Cari Rogers,

are introduced and cbimed to be as vaSd Way they were haif a century ago when (Ist posiled- - as bng as one remembers the contexts for which and in which they were conceived, and makes appropriate adjustments. Rogers is credited with introducing bur preconditions or abilities he claims ta be precursorç to the likely reaiization of creativity, namely: openness, interna1 bcii of values, psychobgical safety and the ability to toy with ideas. And he is credited wiUi both aie triadic definition of creativity acknowledging :people. proesses, and produ& (in contexts), and its proposeci ubiquitous potential (that are both currently being chaltenged by Bailin and Barrow, as well as challenged lesç concretety by Raiph Smith.) Chapter Ten then extends threads introduced in Chapter Nine, by introducing sa contributions to the ernerging discourse on creaüvity that Rogers' peer Abraham Masbw introduced. Maslow is credited with clarifying what was meant by the seif realization, or actualizaüon, advacated in the branch of psychobgy both he and Rogers are associated with, as well as credited with boai introducing pnmary and secondary creativity and arücuhting the desirabilii of integrating them both when 'great productsaare aspired too. His identification of prirnary and secondary creativity is credited wlh opening a dootway that permits them to be seen as anabgous to the first and second natures G.H. Bantock posits in "Arts and Mucation' (1989). And this, in tum, 6 claimed to suggest that encouraging the ntegration of primary and secondary creativity akng with primary and secondary natures muid prornote the suprarational ecstasy May claims to be a resuit of authenticalty manifest creativity. Such authentically manifest creaüvii is then clairned to be resonant with eariier aspira!ions towarâs divinia grazzia andor sprenatura reinterpreted for secuhr society and its potential to encourage individual assumptions of divinity and associated powers of creatbn. And uitirnately, Masbw (1971) iç credited with augrnentirg the perceived roie of art in educatian by proclairning Read's paradigm (even though onty Read's paradgm) to be worth perpetuating . This thesis proposes folbwing Masbw's advice regarding both more rather than less perpetuating Reaô's paradgm and integrating rehted aspects of existenthl thought, even though these appropriations are qualii as needing to recognize the art worid as a worlâ wai its own unique entrees that can and stiould be addressed in art education (as R*h Smith is credited with pointing out). And, Chapter Ten both posiîs the possibility of Maslow's distinctions behveen primary and secondarycreativity king a means of augmenting Elliott's distinctions between tradfibnaland confemporary conceptions, and proposes that these distinctions not oniy explain an essential difference between the contemporary conceptions of creativity and those of traditionalists (such as Bailin, Barrow, and Smith), but that the proposed integrations can effectiveiy transcend and mitigate unnecessary and unconstructive polarizations.

In concluding, CU fiivating authenlk creafivlty by cuttivating consciousfy responsibk courage and cornmitment that enables students to integrate their encounters with their own world (s) is posited. The fact that th& paradigm not only encourages, but potentially ab empowers and enabies students to participate affective!y and effectiely in increasingiy: responsive, responsible and refiective constructions of both themsetve(s) and tfieir (worid(s)), in ways that are mutualiy se8 andworld enhancing, is reiterated. Teachers are posited as both Promethean and Janus-like when they prornote the cuttiiatbn of consciousness (as did Prometheus) and act as guardians of keys to gates, or portak, to the: past, present, and future (as did Janus). And, they are also Janus- like when they act as guardians of world making, since that role, too, was attributed to Janus, by Rothenberg, in The Creativrty Question,(1976). Creativity as worid rnaking is also the crux of this thesis - beginning with Elliott's depiction of archetypal creativity, as such, moving on to May's consistent redefiniüon of creativity. and then on to the compatible pedagogical paradigrn Greene proposes. And so it is to the beginning, and R.K. Elliott's hypotheses, that this thesis turns its attention. Chapter 2

A Contrmponry Conception of Creativity and a Pburibk Hirtodcal Precedent

The purpose of th6 chapter is threebld. 6y introducing three of the hypotheses that

R.K. Elliott positr in "Versions of Creativii (1991), it illustrates thd the cantemporary conception of creativ'ï can be connected to a recognaed hktoticalprecedent. R illustrates tha contrary to Baiin's surmision that signifiwnt achievement andlor quafii productions are

not significant in contemporary conceptions of creativity, quality 5 actually recognized on three different levels, but interpreted differently . And, il illustrates how the existentid conception of creativity can provide a rooted infrastructure for the prevailing pedagogical paradigm in art education. First, by introducing Elliott's distinction between contemporauy and badd&nai conceptions of creativity. Bis chapter illustrates how the sources cited in mis thesis can be better understood to be different (and usualîy broader) conceptions of what: can, could, andlor should constitute "quaiii productions and great achievements", than either ignorant of or disinterested in achieving "qualty" or extra-ordinary achievements. Antitheticaliy in fact, to Bailin's preceding chim, qua/@ as depicled by Bennett Reimer in "Achieving Quali in Music" (199l),meaning that at least one quarter of it is manifest as authenticity, is actualiy integral to the conception of creativity king depicted here because authenticify is integral to this thesis' conception. As well as quali, Chapter Four's elabration of the nature of the aesthetic Iiteracy advocated will ahreveal quaMathe aspects of perception to be similarîy integral to this conception of creativity, because they are not onty focal to the conception of aesthetic literacy advocated but clairned to be synonymous with Ihe conternporary conception of creatiiity, as well. And the essentialnature of the quality and/or extraordinary achievement integral to the contemporary conception of creativity being advocated is theiekre clarified, since 1 is not synonymous with those kund in traditionai conceptions of creativity. The threefold purpose of this chapter was mted. Wthin that triad, however, is another triad made up of the three hypotheses R.K. Eiliott articulates in "Versions of Creativity". And Mey are outiined as well because îhey combine with Greene's pedagogical proposal and May's redelnlion of creativity to inspire this thesis' hypothesis mat: the prevailing pedagogical paradgm in art education can rot oniy be substantiated by the integration of aspects of existentid thought, but transtormed by these integrations into a mw paradigm that is both more integrated (in and of itself) and potentialty more integrative of participating individuais, than iîs hurnanisticalty based predecesor has succeeded in being in spite of its comparable goal of integration.

Traditiinal and Contemporaty Conceptions of Creativity

Eflioît (1991) concluded that priir to this century most hypotheses about creativity made hnro assurnptions. The first assumption was that a cancrete product could and would be produced. And the second assumption was that the concrete objects produced, could and would receiue their assgnaüons of value from an externalty recognized body, or group of bodies, representing disciplines. Conceptions of creativity embodying these two points were #en labeled Iraditional". And conceptions of creativity that did not require concrete objects ( such as those that accepted human actions as potentialiy creacjve undertakings), and those that accepted individuai's assignation of value as suffkient to deem çomething creative, were labeled %ontemporaty. These designatiom were a signiricant contribution to the ernergirg discourse on creativity because prior to Elliott's identification of emphases on products that could be judged, and external judges to do the judging, king representatiue of traditional conceptions of creativity making 1 possibk to distinguish such conceptions from newer conceptions that did not require concrete objecîs or external verification, the distinctions made by the art educator, Howard Gardner, were the oniy criteria in the iield.

In Art. Mind and Bain (1982), krexample, Gardner had pmposed a hypotheticai spectrum of creative possibilii. On it, he had phced a naturalconception of creaüvity th& believed: creativity to be inheited (whether bidogicalty. or as a glof Gd).that could and would grow best free from active intemention, as representative of one end of the spectrurn. And he had contrasted the natural perspective with nu&nngconceptions that ranged from those that believed that even ifcreativity was inherii, education was still needed to give 1 bnn, to extremes that assumed people to be blank siates requiring total input to realue anything at ail. As such, the natural perspective occupied one end of the hypothetical spectrum of creativity, and nurîuring conceptions the rest of it. Ail of the latter conceptions, however, were linked by believing some degree of inteivention to be necessary. And, whiie these distinctions were helpful in disünguishing beîween conceptions of creativity that were similar, but not synonymous (such as those wilhin the prevailing pedagogical paradgm), Elliott's distinctions were more helpful in identifying bigger differences, since they locussed an content. Gardner's creativity spectrum does, however, help identify a misunderstandingcum- misrepresentation that appears to have plagued the prevailing paradgm from its inception up to the present. That rniçconception-cum-misrepresentationis attribuüng a bekf in there king no need for active teaching for creativity to be realized in the contemporary conception. And that misconception can, in part at least, Se attrbuted to careless readings and quotings of Viktor Lowenfeld's text, Creative and Mental Growth (1949) that more careful reading and represenîation can clarify . Viktor Lowenfetd

Vikr Lowenfeld is important to this thesis both because his text more rathet than less perpet uated Reaâ's proposais and because its readership rivaled Read's. It became, in fact, al1 but synonymous wlh the education of art teaches for decades. And, not only has it kenreprinted seven ümes (with later edàions CO-authoredby Lambert Biatain), but ib meib have been debated as recenüy as 1997, when two successive editions of WhColumbia's profesional art kachhg pumd aââressed the me& and shortcomings of his work. For Merandlor worse, Lowenfeld stated mat "every chiid is bom creativen (1975, p.71) and used 'the gardener and seed' anakgy Gardner (1982) subsequently used to illustrate the natural perspective. Since, however, Lowenkid onty warned against emphasizing knowledge and skill acquisition when it was at the expense of the shidents abiüaes to integrate them meaningfully, he actualty onty contemporized the warning that "Che supreme miskrtune 5 when theory oUlçbi peliOrrnancen expresed by Leonardo da Vnici five hundred years ago, and reilerated by Nicolaides in the introduction to The Natural Wav Io Draw (1941 ). And, since Lowenfeld abnot onty stated that students who did not acquire ait based skills when ready wouid find Vieir growth arrested, but posited such skik and knowkûge as the iiteral language of the discipline, he can onty be &wrae&accused of underestimating when Ihe acquislion of skilis and knowledge could and should be undedaken, since he propsed puberty as the appropriate starting point for such undertakings and even primary school children are now known to be capable of beginning such assimilations. These two claims, however, have inevtably aided hb misdesgnation as a representative of the natural end of the creaüvity spectrum, even though neither he nor the contemporized paradgm actually bebrig there, since Gardner (1982) ascrbes a bands off policy for teachers teaching tom within that perspective. Probably augmenting this misconception, however, is the contentbus distinction Lowenfeld (1976) made between art and art education as disciplines when he ciaimed art to have products as its emphasis, and art education people as its. This thesis is based on the ideas mat no such distinctions are necessary and that a vital conception of creaüvity acknowledges both people and products, as weil as processes. Such a trinity is the basis kr Kenneth BeWs claim, in Zen and the Art of Pottery (1992), that

"art ed ucators should know [that] personal ait and high ait are not the same, but the fornier is essential to the deeper meaning of the latîef (p21).) And, outlining anotfw triniîy in Growinq UD Creatïve (1989), Teresa habile, depids creaüvity as an inner circle that is engendered by the overlapping of three other circles represenüng: domain based skills and knowledge, creative thinking and working skilk, and personal passion or motivation (p.63). All three of which were proposed by Lowenfeld half a century aga The fact that lowenfeld acknowledged domain based skilis and knowledge as necessary and advocated their inclusion as part of art cumicula has been acknowledged. But, Lowenfeld afsd identified and advocated cuftiiating: otginality, iiexibilii, and fiuency, abng with the abilities to evaluate and elaborate, mat have since kenperpetuated to the point of becoming al1 but synonyrnous with creative processes in the work of sorne theorists, such as J.P. Guilford. And, abng with advocating tfte cuitivation of these four creative thinking and working skilis, Lowenfeld abadvocated cuîtivating the abiliües to: re-sotve, be resourceful, synthesize and attend, as four more skilk mat couM be cuîlivated as parts of a creative process. So. ahogether, he poçited no lesthan eight possible "creative working and skilk" (1989, p.35) that can still inform generic solicitations of such skilk, such as Arnabiie's. And, not only did Lowenfeld's proposed paiadgrn anticipate these two aspects of Amabile's triad, but it also anticipateci her third one. Anticipating Amabile's advocacy of the third component of her triad, namely intrinsic motivation, Lowenfeld (1975) stated that: the pupose in devebphg aesthetic growth is not to honour the work of past nor piesent arüsts. nor is it to teach the vocabulary of art, but raîher the purpose b b encourage and to devebp the aesthetic response of an individual to h6 (or her] pailicuiarworid (p.398). And. not only is h6hnguage amsistent with the wodd making metaphor behg posiled sa base for a meaninglul pedagopical conception of creahity in th6 thesis, but it is alw consistent with both the new pedagogical paradgm (1978) and the new conception of aesthetic literacy (199 1) Maxine Greene proposes and Chapter Four elabrates on. For hs part, however, Lowenkld, ebborated on his proposal by poçiüng the culüvation of "the chiid's processes - hs [or hm] thinking, his [or her] feelings, his [or her] perceiving, his [or het] reacüons to his [or her] enviionment '(1986. p.15). as the goal of educaüon. And. he brought his proposa1cbser to Read's emphasb on reciptocity by poing on to state that abng with 'the process of creatidn invotues incorporating the self into the activity, the very act of creation [alço] provides the understanding of the process that others go through in facing their own experiences" (p.15). Then, augmenting his resonance with Read's recipmity fuither, he wenî on to conclude that the uîtimate goal of educatian is % enabie student to lnre co-operativeîy as well-adjusted human beings and to contrbute creativety to such a srnietyu(p.15). Much of what was originaliy proposed in their paradigm has benrefined over time. Read, however, did provide the infrastructure tbr the prevailirg pedagogical paradgm. And, as well as perpetuate Read, Lowenfeld also anticipated the triad that Amabile claimed more recentîy to be the most likeiy means of cuhating creativity. it is Lowenfeld, however, who must be credited with entrenching the role of creativiîy in art education by prochirning art education its "bastion". And 1 was ais0 Lowenfeld who clairned that We have a sacred responsbility to unbld and devebp each individuals creative ability as dim as the spark may be and kindle it to whatever flame it may conceivab!y devebp" (1975, p.1975). So, from the perspective of this thesis, both his and Read's propos& fernain worthy of consideraüon at the least, and potentially selective appropriation and perpetuation, as well.

Kurt Rowland

ûther prominent ait educaton have since blbwed sua and phced similar emphasis on imperabLe reciprocity between rights and respombiiii in education. generally, as wel as in art education and the cuitivation of creativity, more particularly. Among them is Kuit Rowland and he not only substantiated but also extended both Reaâ's and Lowenfelb's proposais by more Merthan îess perpetuating them whiie also moving in an existential direction (however accidentally), in Viiual Education and Bevond (1976). He (1976) States, for exampie that: art education must fall into line with one of the most important aims of al1 education,

namely. to fit the individual to achieve his [or her] own potentid and to link him [or her] setf creativeiy with his [or her] environment (p.12).

And he goes on to clarify that he does nq! mean to propose "simply accepting [the] environment for better or worse but, [contributing] to it, if possible in his [or her] individual fashion, in ways consistent with his [or her] personalityn(p.12). As such, as well as being indicative of a contemporary conception of creativw that had been evohring in a prevailing paradigrn in art education since Read's time. Rowland's proposal is also comparable to (atthough presumably less antagonistic than) Nietzsche's advocacy of "over", or "super" men. And his proposal is also more optimistic and democratic than Nietzsche's comparable solicitation of integrated self-overcoming as the epitome of creativity since Rowland suggests self overcoming to be both ubiquitously possible and appropriateiy cuttivated in pubb school classrmms while Nietzsche proposed that such creativity could oniy be expected to be manifest by "a fed and allowed to trickie down through general society, as rippk benefi. Absignificantîy for both education, generally, and this thesis particulariy, Rowland (1976) claimed that: the diflicuity is one of bahnce to encourage as much expression of inner drives as the partkular situation demands lor inner equilibriim and growth, as weW as 16 deveiap a sensitive rehtionship to the environment, and most important of a#, to find a cornmon denominator between the îwo in Vie krm of educational activdy which wüi fuithar both processes at the same tirne (p.13). His emphasis not only suggests mat everyone can and should become an active paiocipant in both the construction of his or her own life and a contributor to the worlding of the world ab the same tirne but suggests it be creative to do so. And that is the conception of creativity being posited in this thesis.

June McFee

Rowland, like More Read him, was wriüng f'man wlhin an Englsh perspective that had begun taking art education seriously, earlier than North Arnerica. A burth art educator, however, June McFee, in her book Art, Culture and Environment (1977), provides a

rebtiveiy conternporary Ameriian conception of creativ'i that 6 consistent with theirs, even though it is not synonymous. She tempe6 Lowenkld's claim of inherent creatke potential by claiming t hat regardless of the degree of creativity people are, or are not, bom with, everyone can learn to be more creative than they are. And she resonates compatibty with Rowland's contemporizations of the initial paradgm by putting creativity in10 political and social contexts mat are as integral to it as personal ones, by stating that since "every one influences the quality of the stiated environrnent, and the ways people reiate to one another and to nature creates the paîterns within which they live" (p.15), .... Ihequality of the environrnent depends on people's abil- to use their design sensitivity, their socialesgamb~@[ialics added], and their embgicaIc9mems [ïics aWed]together to sobe enviionmental probiems" (p.10). And, significanüy for both education, generally, and art education in particular, McFee (197ï) concludes that Vhen this is done art is not an appendage, but an integral part of decision-making" (p.10). As such, McFee (19ïï) gives specific meaning to the social consciousness Read advocated cultivating. She also, however, claims that there are many ways to consider creativity that are context specific, and identifies the recognition and cultivation of the uniqueness of individuais as one of the three she identifies and chims to be worth addressirig in art education (19T7, p.353). And as such, she not only perpetuates Read's reciprocity and augments extensions of il that were introduced by Lowenfeld and Rowland, but her emphases on uniqueness also makes her paradigm compatible with the emphasis on it that is at the heart of existential thought, as well, (as Chapter Six clarifies). A more unique contribution, however, is her domain based emphasis on the responsibiMy that is integral to existential thought. She clarifies it by putting her proposais concretely into the context of art education, claiming first that "every person has a responsibility to iearn how to deal with his or her environment, [and then claiming mat] ... since design is a key elernent, it is important that everyone learn how design qualitiis relate to the function of things" (p.1 O). As such, she draws attention to the awareness of things as they are that needs to be cultivated prior to encouraging imaginative aitematives to them, andlor undertaking the communication and realitation of how things might be made better. And this links McFee, once again, with the three art educators already introduced, since they al1 encouraged people participating in the construction andlor reconstruction of their (worîd(s)) as part of art education, generally, and as part of creative expression, in patiiular. But, as well as resonating cornpatibly wit h her predecessors, McFee's social and political extensions ab Iink her with both Gablik's and Greene's more recent emphases on awareness and participation in world building, since she anticipated both of their subsequent advocacies of cultivating consciousness, as well as the socially and ecologically responsibie paradigm Gablik proposes for art education in The Re-enchantment of Art (1992). Her pedagogical approach (1977) aboutlined a skeietal map to the potential reatiiation of the world building both Greene (1978) and Gablik (1992) advocate emphasizing in education. Such a map, of course, is only one representative of the myriad that exist, but al1 such maps oflier: potential statfing points and pathways to the glimmerings of places one might wanf to go that can rnitigate the likelihood of unnecessary reinventions of the proverbialwheel, in favor of refining the one we have. Rowland (1976) lamented upon how short a distance art education seemed to have corne, relative to its goals of reciprocal balance. And, ignoring the past rather than learning from it and building on it could doom the past to either being laboriously repeated, or worse yet, lost indefiniteiy and possibfy precluding future re-arriva1 at even our lirnited degrees of success. Bailin's esc hewal of the prevailing pedagogical paradigm, therefore, not only strikes me as an ironic contradiction, since she advocates "developing and perpetuating traditions" (p.5) generally, but refutes doing so, specifically, in the contexts of both education and psychology, but her proposal abappears to advocate taking an unnecessary risk abng the lines just described. That said, however, R is now possible to shifî attention from highlighting the last half century's pedagogical refinements that have informed the contemporary conception of creativity resonantly wRh the existential depiction of creativity Elliott (1991) articulated and deknded, to his hypotheses, themsehres. f he Existential Connection, Backwards and Forwards

In "Versions of Creativity' (1991), R.K. Blioît ) introduced the idea that: the autonomous self [sJa val& oôject which is brought into king by deliberate endeavor, [and]there i5 no real reason why it shouid not be said to be created, or w hy the person who achieves autonomy should not be regarded as creative in mis respect (p.66). And, even though that üea did not originatte with EUM, ik inclusion in a book addressing aesthetics in art education was relativeiy unprecedented. His rekrence to people as "abjects" in the process of undertaking support of existential conceptions of creativity is unfortunateîy a literal contradiction in tem since people are never considered "objectsmin an existential paradgm, because t hey are understood to be the embodirnent of their "subjectivityn and actions. But, îwo very significant points are still been made in Eh6 essay. The fint king that contemporary conceptions of creativity that accept participating in the construction of one's own self and(worU(s)) as being creaüve can and strould be recognized as potentialîy vital contributions to pedagogical paradigrns. And the second being mat the abilito assign value that is credited to individuals in the contemporary conception of creativity can and shouM be cunivated in educational contexts, including art education. Significant as the preceding points were, however, in establishing resonance between existential conceptions of creativw that emphasize: freecbm, responsibiiii, and unqueness, and the prevailing pedagogical paradgm in art education outlined earlier in th& chapter, EllioWs essay a!so manages to do something none of the existentialists accomplished neariy as effectively, when he connected the rather esoteric existential conception of creativity to a ubiquitous Western source. He accomplshed this by suggesting "The Genesis Myth" bund in The Bible (a book that rnight be the most pervasive piece of Merature in the Western World) to have both depicted the oiigin of the most archetypai western] conception of creativity and be a plausible origin for existentid conceptions of #. And, together, these two hypotheses engender a bridge that can not only connect esoteric and exoteric domains but

dso engender a symbol for the transfer of the power ta create from God(s) @ people that 6 especialîy appropriate lor our increasingîy secuhr saciety . The resuîting sgnificance, furthemore, brthis thesis, is threefotd. First, Elliott's symbolic transkr of the power to create from Gods to anyone willing and ab te to take on the responsibiiity, connects creativity, archdypally, ta the creaüon of a world. This, in turn, establshes a bridge that connects a generic conception of creativty based on world creaüon with May's more specik, but nane the less resonant conception suggesting everyone to be manifesting creativity when they 'participate consciousiy in constructive encounters with aspects of their (worid(s)) that bring some new reali into being' (1976, p.56). And this redefinitiin has been clairned to have the potential to act as the nexus of a transfomation of a prevailing paradgm into a more integrateii and integrative one. Second, Elliott's hypothesis connects both art and to this conception of creativity, historical!y, because of both having been credited, anabgousiy, with the potential to be creative because of their tendencies to introduce objects to be viewed andor contemphted, that muid be likened to God's making of our shared and cornmon worid and people to inhabit it. And, not oniy does this connect art and artists to the metaphor of worid creation being the essence of creativily but, since that association continues into the contemporary transformation of the conception of creativity in which neither concrete objects nor externaî validation are necessary for something or somme to be considered creative, Elliott has established a threeway bridge that can connect: art, artists and relatively ordinary people by suggesting them al1 to have the potential to be creative by participating in the construction of some kind of world. The art world S just one of the many worlds people can contribute to the construction of, as part of contributing to the construction of both theu own lNed lies and world(s), and our shared and common world. And, most signifiant for thk thesis at this time, is the fact that. together. the three worlds represented (personal culhirai, and gW)consMute the three levels that were noted in the introduction to this chapter. Ail of which are claimed to warrant addressing in the context of art ducation, and al1 of which are cbirned to be able b beneîit from cuiüvating creativity as conscious participation in the cuiüvation of (woild(s)). The preceding emphasis on worid cieation resub from appropriating The Genesis Myth' in which god created oui shared and common world, ex nihib. This myth, however, has implications that transcend both relativeiy ordinary individual people creating their own selves and (worid(s)), and art& making and doing recognized work. As Elliott (1991) explains, existentid thought absuggests thal "the recreation of humanity S dependent on the recreation of the individual selr (0.96). And, to the extent that this postulate is accurate, it not onty implies that Bailin's goal of "devebping the traditions of loiowledge and cuiture" (1994. p.5) is most likety to be realaed by a paradigm that shares the contemporary one's inclusive emphases on: individuais, their processes, and their products, but its viabiiii also suggests the political risks to be considerable, if more exclusive paradigms are perpetuated instead. Three kvek of intersubjecüve connections have now been posited. They include: individuals within their own seives and liworid(s), individuais with their cultural and communal world(s) (of which the art world is one), and indivduab with the comrnoniy shared global world, oc planet. And, not onfy is participation in any level of world-making deemed to be a manifestation of creativity in the contemporary conception of creativity (as long as sorne new reality is brought into being in the process), but the act of participating in such constructions is accepted as being more signiiicant for both partkipating individuak and the world that receives their participation than the by-products of the process are. And as such, conscious participation 6,posited as quintessentially, as well as archetypally, creative acüvity. I stated previously that the conception of creativity king outlined in th& thesis has the potential to collapse existing pohrization between conceptions of creativity that ernphasize people and those that emp hasize products. This potential k based paitly on the fad that : people, processes, and products are al1 recognùed in the contemporary conception of creativity, even though extemal pioducts are usually considered secondary to peupie and theu setf actualization. The potential to collapse that pohnty, however. is ako based on the acceptance of a hierarchy of creative manifestations resonant with the one Elbit (1991) intimates. Al1 creativity in the conception king advocated in this thesis is understood to exist on the sarne continuum. The reason for this is the existenüal idea that everyone is ahvays demonstrating what hurnan beings are capabie of, throug h *it moment to moment actions (for better and lor wone). and everyone is thereby constantiy contributhg to the world's total picture of what it means to be human (whether by design or defauit). Works that are the result of cornmitment, and obviousty beneM more than one's own self and one's own irnmediak world, however, are still recognized Eor their augmented and augmentative reçonance or reverberations, because the archetypal ad of creativity was a world shared by everyone. And this 'sliding scale' of creative manifestations is depicted by Eiliott (1991) when he states that within our ordinary conception of creativeness: instances of creating are arranged in a hierarchy, from accidental production (as when a

school chiid rnakes something of his [or her] own choice ...) to production which invoives uniqueness or originality phatj k further classified as invention or ailistic cteation (p.63). Not everyone can accept the contemporary conception of creativity Eiliott articulates since it rneans accepting participation in the construction of any kind of worid as a potentially creative activity. But, his perspective is consistent with standard dictionaries' definitions of worlds since Wu exampies of what can be considered "a woW range from the mundane to the metaphysical. Funk and Wacanafs (1974) definibn, brexample, includes: definite clas[es] of people having certain interests or activities in cornmon [such as the art worîâ andloc chssrooms], ... spheres or domains, ... man regarded sociafly, ... puMc or sociai iife and intercourse... [as well as] a total of things pertaining to, or affecting an individual person (p.1548). And this thesis is proposing that such an inclusive conception of what can constitute a world is applicable to conceptions of creativity. The next chapter, for example, reiterates Rolb May's (1976), depiction of a "world" as Ihe pattern of meaningful relations in which a person exists and in the design of which he or she paiticipates... (mat has) objective reaMy. to be sure, but ... is not simply that. (p.51) And 1 also reiterates May's extended claim that: World is intenelated with the person at every moment. [It is] a continual dialectical process go[ing] on between world and self and self and worid; one impiyDngJthe other, and neither ... be(ing] understood if we omit the other" (p.51) . Expressing a similar conception of world from the erudite end of the spectrum of its depictions, Donald Vandenberg, in Bein~and Education (1971), begins his exposition claiming mat: authentic disclosure of world in landscape opens possibillks of genuine action such that the world that is ordinariiy discbsed is the future worîd, not the future that is two or three years hence but îhat which is two or three second or minutes ahead - the worid ordinariiy disclosed is the world one is futur~inginto (p.89). He then claims both that this is "the ontobgical presupposition of action ... [and that] there can be action, or action has future and is not "behaviour", because of the spatializing and temporalning movement to the world." (p.89) And he concludes quintessentialîy for this thesis and compatibîy with both Rollo May's and Nietzsche's depictions of creativity, that: "th6 continuous transcending of the given in the worlding of the world gives present existence ils significance" (p.89).

Vandenberg's hnguage does risk king obtuse, as well as eruôii, given as he 6 to using somewhat archaic existential terminokgy. But, his depictbn of world has been Kiduded here for three reasons. first, his observations from the further edges of existential îhougM (relaüve to worlds and woriding) can be brought from that esoteric realrn into the exoteric zone of public education when considered in conjunction with "Ihe Genesis Myth" and th& aiesis' appropriation of ElliotYs hypotheses. Second, while exphining his conception of world Vandenberg alluded to the conceptions of hndscape and transcendeme that Chapters: Sa, Eight, and Nine of this thesis address, and introducing them cursorily here, is hoped to facilitate understanding of them later, when they are elaborated upon. And third, since no 'le* of faith' is required to accept May's depiction of a world, but it still remains impassible br some (such as: Bailin (1994), Smith (1991), and Barrow (1988)) to accept anything short of the externalty validated "devebpments of the traditions of knowledge and culture" (p.3, recognized as such wlhin "the overall aims of a discipline, its overarching probkms and guiding methodology, and its general criteria br assessrnent" ( that Bailin (1994, pp. 34-35, identifies), the inclusion of Vandenberg's depiction of a world is posited, in spite of its obtuseness, as a serious proposal that not onty warrants consideration as such, but also warrants such consideration because it has, in fact, helped inform this aiesis. Moving on though, "The Genesis Wh" in which God made a world and the people to inhabit it is posited as a plausible origin for both traditional and contemporary conceptions of creativity by Bliott (1991). And conternporizing that myth for secular society means promoting the ideas that al1 people can karn to be god-like creators, even if their creations aie only on a humble scale that relates to their own kes. People are, however, still encouraged to aspire to be responsibly creative for both their own and the worid's sakes. And, in the conception of creaüw ity king advocated here, arbists s13 cm. and arguabiy should, aspire to be creative in the traditional sense of making concrete oôjects that can engender new reaiiifor others, as well as themseives. The emphasis on successful communication wlh others is, however, what determines people's assignation as arüsîs, and not nece&iy their king creative, because both communion and communication are credited with king able to bring new reaiiiinto king in the contemporary conception of creahiu'i. The art world is one worîd people can participate in as appreciators and/or concrete contributom. But, peopie's unique conscious human existence malters at ieast as much as the augmentation of any worîd that occurs when they are appreciated or contributed to. And, people's axiomatic participation in the shaping of humanity, ako matters. It is true that it in the contemporary conception of creativity 1 is no bnger necessary to contribute concreteiy & any of the many external worlds to be considered creative. The uitimate goal, however, is still to contribute as much as one unqueiy and authenticaiiy can, for both one's own gratification and the enhancement of the world. The exiçtential conception of authenticity requires that individuals be-present-to-both-themsehes-and-thewoi. And, not onfy is soch authenticity claimed to be compatiSie with Read's emphasis on reciprocity in his proposed paradigm, but integrating existential approaches to creativity is claimed to have the potential to finaljy begin realizing that paradgm, for the mutual beneM of everyone. In lrrational Man (1962) William Barre11 posls a remar kably similar scenario to the one flliott portrays in "Versions of Creativity" (1991) and both authors credit the exktential philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, wlh offering the world an alternative to the vacuum they klieve engendered by the continuing secuhrization of the world. That alternative is: people taking up the mantle once assurned to be the property of god(s) by assuming as much responsibility for the creation of themseives and their (world(s)) as they can. And for his part,

Elliott (199 1) credits Nietzsche's Zarathustra with nothing iess than calling upon individuals to recognize thd the concept of God is now &oiete, and to assume the role of creator of values ... [th w demythobgiting] the concept of creativeness without rejecting aie creation myth abçolutely [and managing. instead to transfomi] ... the idea of an actuaÿ accomplished creation of man and the world into that of a stiü-to-be-accomplished transformation of the moral and spiritual Iife-worid, and of man himseif, sinœ in becurning the oriii~torand su-ner of values man will surpas his previws rnere humanity (p.69. Ellioîfs summary provides an existential perspective on the nature of creativity, suggesüng as he does individuab partiiipating in seif and world creations to be the quintessential manifestations of creativity. And this perspective is made clear when Elliott

(199 1) goes from ciaiming that Nietzsche manages to retain "a notion of totality in the idea of creation, yet succeeds in adapting the idea to man conceived as creator" (p.65), to concluding that: "the recreation of [hu]man[iJ depends upon the recreation of the individual seîT (p.65). Not quite accurately, however, Eiliott not only portrays Nietzsche as having admonished people to be as "god-like"as they can be without assuming any potential for omnipotence, but he ako portrays him as crediting individuats with the potential to assume such respansibility for their own autonomy and communion. And the fact that Nietzsche was not, in actuality, very optimistic about how many people could andlor wouîd take up the challenge was already noted. The symbolic shifiing of power, however, even potentialty, from the hands of god(s) b relatively ordinary people, is such an incredibfy powerful symbl that as far as I am concerned it can transcend such rninor discrepancies.

The Democratic lmperative

To the extent that Rliott's conclusions should prove correct, they will be much more important than support for an hypothesis in an academk thesis such as th&. They will be sgnifkant breveryone, in fat, since they suggest that the Mure of humankind 6 intrinsicaiiy tied to our abiii to cultivate the creative potential of most, and ideally all, individuais. And it is quite fortunate, therefore, that thb â the direction the prevailing pedagogical paradgm in art education has been propelling itsetf and i!s students throughout the last haif century. Appropriations of Lowenfeld's pedagogy, for exarnpb, have refined the iniüal chim mat 'every child is born creative' (1975, pp.71), into the chirn that every child can leam to become more creative (McFee, 19T7). Read (1943,56), Lowenkld (1949,1975,1986), McFee(1977), and Rowland (1976) have consenuaiîy perpetuated the idea that creativity both cm and should be cilltivated in classrooms, especially ait classrooms, as ubiquitously as possible, for the mutual enhancement of the unique iived worids of individuak, and the comrnon worü we al1 share. And, as well as advocating the cultivation of creaüvity, each educator has introduced rneans of doing so, as well. Quantÿ, admittedly, does not necessarity engender qualiiy . And sornetimes quantity can even be a detriment to the emergence of quali. But, in spite of th& risk, Elliott's hypotheses still suggest cultiiating the maximum amount of creativity in the maximum number of people for at least two reasons. First, in his conception of creatbity creativity is understood to be intrinsicaliy grahfying. and in a democracy everyone is entitled to equal access to opportunitii for such gratification andlor se1fulblment. And second, since the cukivation of creativity king depicted advocates: consciousiy responsible and responsive peopie parücipating whokheartediy in both the constructions of their own world(s) and axiomatically our shared and cornmon wodd, as ends in themselves brparticipatirtg individuak and a means to a better world, idealty for everyone,there will be more cbnsciously responsibk people helping to carry üte bad of ensuring more peopies' inter&. Peopie who do not contribute by design, furthermore, are understood to participate by default (with a tendency for negative, rather than positive, reverberations.) And, since 1 is both possble and plausble to propose that it is oniy by engendering connections with the past and the Mure, as well as the present, that a majonty of people (includimg students) will hl they have a stake in, and responsbility br, a shared Mure, people are posited as lkenaMe to the guardian of new worids that Rothenberg (1976) atlibuted to the god Janus, and the syrnboliçm assockted with Janus' guardianshQ of keys and gateways that ïs faciütated by having eyes ta both the past and the future, is posited as an appropriable symôol Iw an existentially oriented and integrated pedagogical paradgm in art education. The task of attempting to tirst ascertain, and then cultivate quaMy, aiong with a quanilïy of creative manifestations, remains. But. since the approach to cuttivating creativity being advocated b based on both personal and social awareness and responsbility, awareness is expected to facilitate both ascertaining and cuitiiating quaiii in such a way as to encourage al1 work kingthe besî any individual can achieve at any given moment in time. By the conclusion of this thesis it will be apparent that nothing short of anyone's "best" constitutes authentic creaüvity and that nothing more than that needs to be expected, if it is an inforrned best. And the pedagogical precedent for this is Herbert &ad's proposal of uniqueness and social awareness being cultivated reciprocalty in ail education (1956, p.5). The simple fact that democratic ideak dominate the Western WoM we inhabit suggests cultiivating the creaüve potential of the greatest number of people for the greatest possible good since power in our democracy Ïs no bnger limited to the "few" that it was in Plato's time, everyone who can and will act as a "guardian" needs to be both encouraged and empowered to do so as responsbly as possible. Vandenberg (1971 ) proposes that teachers act as "guardians of being" (p.142). But, poetic as this image is for me personaliy, this thesis proposes that teachers, especially art teachers, can and should open doors to the kt that students can and should becorne guardians of both their own and the planet's weU being. Compatibty, in Landscam of Learninq (1978), Maxine Greene not only clairns that a new pedagogy is "obviously required... that will free persons to undentand the ways in whch each .. . reac hes out f'rom h is or her locations to constitute a common continent, a common warid" (p.70), but afso chims that such a pedagogy "might well be calied a democratic pedagogy, since, in several respects. the oôject is to empower persons to enact dernocracy" (p.70). And in this chapter: a phibophical umbrelh; a renewed, rather than new pedagogicai paradigrn; and a 'redefinitionn of creativity based upon wrId creabon being archetypai creahity, have been introâuced. The acceptance of the ideas that: our shared and common world ne& reconstnrcting, the recreation of hurnanity is dependent upon the recreabn of indïvidualç, and such recreatians are appropriatety addresseci in the contex! of art education, have been claimed to suggest a conception of creativity that encourages and attempts to emper al1 people to becorne as creative as they can be. These ideas have been claimed to be consistent with a prevailing paradgm in art education encouraging integraüwi of seives with the world that beg an with Herbert Read's proposed reciprocal culivat ion of uniqueness and social awareness in al1 education. and evohred by integrating refinements proposed by: Lowenkld, McFee, and Rowland (in particular), into a paradgm that can be augmented further by integrating proposak from: Vandenberg, May. Greene and Gablik arnong othen. The mention of: democracy. Phto and guardiam, however. presents the oppominily to shif! this thesis' bcus from Elliott's contributions and biblical sources to Mose of Rolb May since May. like Elliott, credits Nietzsche with aspects of his conception of creativity. but credits Plato's Svmaxium with informing other aspects of the existentially oriented conception of creativity he articulates and advocates in Couraae to Create (1976). And, since his depiction of creativity. like Elliott's, ako has potentiai to augment Me transformation of the existing paradgm nto a more integrated and integrative paradigm that S more likeîy to realize both Read's pedagogical goak and more generic democratic ideals. il is to May's conception of creativity, and its seven integrai aspects, that this thesis tums its attention. Chapter 3

Seven Aspects of Rolb May's Conception of Creativity and Their Pdagogicrl Implications

The previous chapter introduced R.K. Elliott's hypothesis that "The Genesis Wh" is a plausble origin for contempor;uy conceptions of creativity that accept individuak participating in shaping aiernseîves aWor îheir worid(s) as being creative. ît explained that existential conceptions accept this so completeiy as to suggest such participation, when conscious, to be the very essence of creativity. And, it chrified that the rationale for including that conception of creativity in educational paradigrns, is the assumption that Ihe recreation of [hujmanpy] depends upon the recreation of individual selves" (OlioQ 199 1, p.65). Bliott's hypotksis that: the existential conception of creativity is a transformation of the archetypal conception of creativity emphasizing worid creation embodied in the Bible's divine myth of creat ion, into a contemporariiy valid conception aûvocating individu& assume as much responsibili for the creation of their individual seîve(s) and (world(s)) as possible, was then posited as a symbol that could "draw together", or integrate, a collection of otherwise disparite conceptions of creativity for pedagogical purpaçes. And, in cancluding, th& thesis' proposal that: certain aspects of other concept ions of creativity , especialiy existential ones, can be integrated with the conception of creativity embodied in the prevailing paradigm in art education (that was initiated by Herûert Reaâ's proposal that "the purpose of education can ... only be to develop at the same time as the uniqueness, the social consciousness, or reciprocity, of the individual" (1943, p.l)),to transform that paradigm into a more vital, integrated and integrative one. The role of educaton within that framework was poçited as the empowennent of individuals to assume as much responsibility for paiticipating in the recartstruclian(s) of themselves and their (world(s)). as possible. And the specific role of art kachers was posited as the introduction of students to the unique oppxtunities the aRs provide kr enhancing and Kitegrating: student's lived worüs, the ad worlds, and the shared and cornmon woild, simultaneousiy. Rob May's redetinlion ofcreativitywaschimeâto havethepotential to act as a nexus of such a transformation. And this chapter eiaborates on the specilics of May's redefinition.

Fmn Pbto to the Present

Rollo May is an exiçtential psychobgist with many books to his credit. One of which is specifically about creativity. The one about creativity, Courase to Create (1976), posits a conception of creativity with seven aspects that not oniy gives brm to Eiliottk rehtiveiy abstract academic advocacy of including of existentid perspectives in the ernerging discourse on creativty, but is abconsistent with the paradigm Read proposed intioâucing into art education haif a century ago, and the ones Greene (1978) and Gablik (1992) still propose. And, since the integration of May's relativeiy obscure redefinition of creativity is cfairned here to have the potential to facilitate the reaiiiation of Read's paradigm, as well as those of Greene and Gablik, the seven facets of his redeffinition are outlined in this chapter, with those not addresseci etçewhere, receiving the most attention. Those facets include: appreciation as a creative activity; emphasis on authentic creativrty; ecstasy as bah integral to creaüvii and a means of ternporariiy resoiving the subject-object split; the necessary integration of the world as the objective pole with individuak subjective poks to achieve balance; suprarationalism as the mode of being consistent with the conception of creativity advocated, and courage as cornmitment to being al one can be. And each one s sgnikant. Two face, however, warrant noting bebre undertaking even cursory introductions. The first fact is that May (1976) credited Plaîo with heîping to inform his conception of creativity, as Herbert Read (1943, 1956, p.5) had simihriy credited Phto with inspiring his pedagogicai paradigm. And, abng with both authors crediüng Pîato with inspiring then conceptions of the "gooâ", both aiso acknowledged existential phibsophets wah inknning their conceptions, as weh. In Read's case, however, it was Martin Buber's 1925 proposal of education-asdialogueand emphasis on uniqueness constituting creativity, that was emphasized. Mile in May's case, A was Nietzsche's conception of creativity king a merger of the Dionysian and Wlbnian and self overmming that was emphasited. The signiiicance of their mutual delierences to both flatoand aspects of existential thought, however, is twofold. The first significance is t ha1 the "greatest good" not only deemed to be individuals contributing al1 they could to civic siiuations as well as to !kir own gratification and enlightenment in the Phtonic ideal exemplified in The Svmmium but that it still &the greatest good, according to sorne. Kaelin For exampie, in his daim that "aesthetic experience has both personal and social value" (Smiîh, 199 1, p. 14 1), proposes rec~rocalemphases resonant with t hose Read (1943) proposed. And the second sgniîïcance is the tendency towards a Zeitgeist of sorts that is irnplied by representatives of both psychological and educational domains proposing the inkgration of aspects of existenüai thought to cultivate creativ'i in spite of contemporary scepticism toward such a possbility. Also worth noting before introducing the seven integral aspects of his redefinition of creativity is that even though May's source of inspiration was not The Bible Eifitt deferred to, but Plato's Svmtmsium and Nietzsche's Birth of the Traaedv, May's deference to Plato's Symposium connects their conception of creativity with a second historii source. And this second hktoric connection further mligates Bailin's critickm of the conternporary conception's lack of awareness of orgins, since it can now chim two. Authentic Cieaüvii

Having noted both May's and Read's resonant deferences b Pbtok conception of "the greatest good", and noted the facl that May (1976) credits the Svmmium, speciblly, with inspiring his belief that 'any encounter that brings some new realii into being can be considered creative as bng as it is a canscious encounter of individual wlh his or her wwld' (p.56), it is naw passible to begin inlroâucing the specific aspects of his redefinition of creativi. To exphi his appropriation of Phto, May (1976) first clarilies that he is only interested in the authentic creatbity mat artists and phiksophers have struggieâ ail through the centuries to make clear" (p.57). And, since this thesis has already established its interest in the existential framework in which authenticity is understood to mean "being- present-to- booi4neself-and-the-world" and sharing its emphasis, May's limb are consistent with those informing th& thess. May (1976) also explains, however, that whiie he expects many if not rnost readers will be aware of Plato having demoted "poets and arüsts down îo the sixth circie of reali because ... Phey deaît] onty with appearances and not with reaiii itsetf " (p.57), he expects fewer readers will be aware of the fact that Plato was, at that point specificalty "referring to art as decoration, a way of making life prettier. a dealing with sernblances" (p.57). And this difference is significant because when flato, "in his bter, beautiful dialogue. Symposium, described what he called the trueartsts - narnely, those who give birth to some new reality' (p.57-58), he gave May (1976) reasan to believe Bat for Mato: These pets and other creative petsons are the ones who express kinglseli" (p.58). And this, in turn, ied May to conclude that since Yhese are the ones who enlarge human consciousness ...their creativity is the rnost basic manifestation of a man or woman fulfilling his or her own king in the world" (p.58). The significance of which, for th6 thesis, is that his hypothesis not only engenders an additional pathway to an existential conception of creativity that can substanüate and extenâ the prevail'i pedagogicai paradgm. but May's delierence b Phto abinboduces an additionai pathway io a hierarchy of creative achievement thal resonates compatibty wilh the one inûoduced in tkprevious chapter - in which ai such endeavon ex& on the same specbum, but those that have greater civic remance are recognired brtkir reverberative impacts. Oüott (1991 ) based his hierarchy on the creation of a worîd we al share being the epitome of creativity, and therefore products that muid be shared civicaliy were a greater good than those that had impact onfy for an individuai. And simlariy, May (1976) eqhins that a work of: an ait&, a poet an academic, etc. can be credied with being especialiy cteatke when theù work cm be likened ta progeny that are not oniy appropriated into the present, but also perpetuated into the future, since mis is how he interprets Plato's metaphorical exphnation of progeny in The Svmwsium. Even when usirig progeny' as a metaphor br great works that are inherited by the future, however, their makers, were SMcbimed to be as much like al1 the other relativefy "ordinary chitdren" that were absorbed into the eaios without any apparent cultural resonance, lhan they were believed to be diiferent from them. And mis point is important For this aiesis because of the dignity the contemporary conception of creativw accords al1 conscious efforts to partkpate authenücalîy in comtruction(s) of se)ve(s) and (wortd(s))based on the idea that: everyone participates is the construction of what we cal1 humanity al1 of the time. whether by design or by defaut and doing so by design not oniy takes: courage. cornmitment and consciousness, but 6 inherently honorable. These assurnptions are why May concludes that everyone realitiry their own potentiak and bringing something new into king by doing so is beiq creative. And they are ako why. given the democratic irnperative noted ai the end of the previous chapter, il s an appropriate conception of creativity to be perpetuated in contemporary eâucational currkulums. Of parücuhr significance krthis thesis, however, is the additional fact that these assumptiom cunnect the reciprocai emphases on Wiiduals as unque chic beings Rund in May's psychobgical depiction of creativity with those in R.K. Elliott's phibsophical conception of it, and both of these conceptions of creativity with the reciprocal emphasis posited in Herbert Reaâ's pedagogy, dready noted. All of which serve the function of perpetuating conceptions of creativity emphasiting authenticity requirïng presentnesç to both seîf and woild in: phibsophy, psycbbgy and educaüon.

Conscious Encouriters with the World

The tact that Rolb May redefines creativity as 'Itie encounten of intensiveîy conscious individuab with their (worid(s))' (1976, p.56 ) has aire* been noteû. (As has his requirement of conscious encountea being with the wodd in authentic creativily.) His explanation of what constitutes a worid. however, not only clarifies his conception of creativity but links it with Read's reciprocal paradgm, because of their mutual emphases on the integration of people,themseives, and wlh their (world(s)). And, May's chim that the world: has objective realiîy, to be sure, but it is more not simpiy that. World is interrelated with the person at every moment. A continual dialecti pmess goes on between worü and setf and setf and worid: one implies the other, and neither can be understood if we omit the othef @.SI, 1976), (introduced in the previous chapter) is ako relativeiy exoteric, even though i! rnght not appear so at first glance - as the sampling of dictionaries' depictions of the many domains the word 'world' can be used to frarne, made this clear in the previous chapter. Consciouo Encounten In W hich Appreciation is Considered Creative

A third inkgrative aspect of May's redefinlion of creativity with pedagogical implications is his inclusion of appreciation as a creative encounter. He (1976) begins his expianation of whaî he means by any creative encounter (1976) stating mat "aie first thing we notice about creativity is that 1is an encounter" (p.41). He goes on to provide examples of what he rneans by such encounters by staRing wiai paintes and suggesting that they encounterwhat they want to paint (whether the# acts of encaunter are with: tangole images, ideas, or the inner visions he assumes abstract painters to possess). And then, having started w ith art and artists as exampies, he chims that the idea of encounter being at the heart of creativity appliequally well to creativity manifest across domains and gives scientists confronting their experiments as an exampie of an encounter that can occur in aie realm of science. After which, antlheticaliy to the emphasis on "great praducts" that Bailin (1994) proposes, May (1976) ciaims that Wie paint, the canvas, and the other materials then becorne a secondary part of this encounter bcause] they are [simpty] the hnguage of it, the media" (p.49). and he describes a personal encounter with a Cezanne painting to make the essential point that appreciation can be considered a creative activity. He (1976) explain, brexample that: when we engage a painting ... authentically see it, we are experiencing some new moment of sensibility. Some new vision is triggered in us by our contact with the painting, something unique is born in us .... [and] this is why appreciation of music, or painting, or others wotks of the creaüve person is also a creative act on our part (pp.15- 16). And, while his explanation of the new (vision(s)) engendered by appreciatian king considered creative is his conternporization of Plato and not claimed to be new, especialty since it was irnplicl in the starting point of the contemporary conception of creativity Kepes proposed in The Mucation of Vision (1944) when he cbMthat even 70 percéive an image is to participate in a forming process... [and isj a creative act ' (p.15). as well as present in the conception's of creativity R.G. CoUingwood posited in Rincioles of Art (1939) and William Fieming summarùed in Arts and ldeas (1980) when he went hms?atKig that: al1 creative activity begins in the mind's eye or ear of the am, but a work of ait that does not comrnunicate is still barn, [to concluding that] art, then, is a two process invoiving the creator and the recreator. The activity of the recreator, to be sure, may be lesthan that of the arüst, but it is a dynamc activity nevertheiess (p.l8), May's proposal of appreciation king recognized as a creative undertaking bars hghlighting for two reasons. tt bearç highlighting because Ralph Smith, a prominent figure in art education who advocates emphasizng appreciation in art education in Excelience in Art (1987) as well as in other te*, does not appear to see any connection between creaüvity and the appreciation he so aggressively advocates instituthg into art education, and it bears pointing out that appreciation not only cari be considered creative, but in the contemporary conceptions of creativrty considered creative, so that that fact is not lost. And, it is ab bears highlighting here because, ironic as 1might be, when appreciation is considered creative, it adds another reason for enmuraging its inclusion in curricula, since il ceases to be only of a means of acqiiiring knowledge and becornes a means of: extending one's own worid, increasing the art worid's appreciators, and increasing the degree of existing consciousness in our shared and common world, as well.

The Qualdy of Engagement in Creative Encounters as W holehearted Integration

Worth pointing out as well is May's proposal that the quality of engagement detemines whether appreciation, or any other emunter, can beget the (integration(s)) booi he and Read aspire to. And, since by "quality of engagement" May means something that actualty integrates the individual with "the woriâ" he depicts, as wel as requires an 'intensive degree' of consciousness, his addiaonal quaüfication of such encounters requiririg

'a specific qualily of engagement" (p.40) br creativity to be deemed manw6 the buth integrai comwnent of his redefinition of creativiîy noted here. In his effort to clanfy the 'quahi of the engagement he is ptoposing May (1976) alludes to both "degrees of absorption" and "degrees of intensity" before going on to explain that "absorption ri]king caught up in, and /or wholly invoîved" (p.44). He could, however, have made his point iess okureiy by deferring to the %holeheartednessa, or Kavana, Friedman (1991) gives Buber credit for positing three quarters of a century ago as: intention, the mystery of the sou1 directeci to a goal.... the abili of a [hulman through the singieness and punty of his [or her] will to liberate the faiien spaiks of divinity that are imprisoned in the people and &je& araund him [or her] and to taie part in the redemption [or reconstruction] of the wo M... (p.48) in Encounter on the Nartow Ridae (1991). Since by such deference May could have connected hk own emphasis on encounters in w hich 'world making' is the essence of creativi with the precedent Buber set for 1 at "The Third International Pedagogical

Conference of the International Work Circle for the Renewal of Education ", in August 1925, when he spoke on the theme of "The Unfolding of Creative Forces in the Childa,and introduced the idea of ducation-as-âiakguethat inbrrned the 1-Thou teiaüonships Buber subsequentty became farnous krand Read (1W,I 956) delerreci to to define creativity. The blbkal tone of such words as "redemption" rnight, admittedîy, be 'over the top' lw secular audiences. But they can be interchanged with others, such as Dewey's "reconstructions", without any bss of rneaning, just as the 'experiencesw Dewey posited as art, can be subütuted for May's "encounters". And May's Kitentions would have been made clearer by such a deference since May was, in fact trying to include everything fiom recept iviiand comciousn8ss, to existential engagements by emp has~ingthe necessity of a specilic "qualii of engagement" and that quality can be both effectively and affectiveîy likened to Buberian Vhoieheartedness". Aiso wodh pointing out, however, are both the facts that the "quality" in these engagements implies much more than rnere waking consciousness and that the daim of it constitub'ng a mode of king labeled "suprarational" is unique to May, even though the Împrications are shared.

The Resonance of Intensive Consciousness with Contemporary Paradigms

May's attempts to explain the degree of intensity, or quali of engagement, he claims to be part of creative encounters bars directly on this thesis because "genuine creativity is characterked by an intensity of awareness, [or] a heghtened consciousness" (p.44). And, advocating such "heightened consciousness" mnnects May's conception of creativity to the pedagogies of at kast three contemporary art educators. For exampie, il connects May's conception of creativity wlh the heightened consciousness Ralph Smith advocates by quoting Harold Osborne's statement that: the full experience... of appreciation... lself is always accompanied by a feeling of heghtened vitality, we are more awake, more alert than usual, the facunies are working at greater pressure, mreeffectively, and with greater freedom than at other times, and the discovery of new insight is their constant guerdon (Excellence in Art Mucation (1987,p.l5). And to rationalize his own daim thal such heghtened consciousness can only be achieved through appreciation of the masterpieces that should account. therefore, for Mingiess than one (of oniy houndertakings) that should be addressed as part of ait education, Smâl(1987) chims both that: Yherein lies the peculiar exceknœ of art: üs capacity ... to energize experience in special, woithwhik ways (and that] such experiences have both aküve and cognitive strands; feelings intensify at the sarne tirne in sghts accrue" (1987, p.150). May's emphasis on intensified conxiousness aisconnects hi conception of creativity with Maxine Greene's conception of aesthetic literacy sirice Greene (1978) qwtes Aîfred Shuk' statement that Vide awakeness, " [cm ôe] defined as a plane of comciousness of highest tension orginating in an attitude of fun attention ta lii and lis requirements" (p. 169.), before going on. m her own words, to suggest that "the very asking of such questions, the very expbratbn of ways of fostenng such emunters, [hlics added) and indeed the investigation of what such encounters are, may well open up new perspectives on what it is to leam and what it is to see" (1978,p.169). And, such "seeuig" is as essential to Greene's conception of aesthetk literacy, as 1was Ipr the source of her daim that Io see, realty see, is everything', namely :Joseph Conrad. The intensive and integrative consciousness May's conception of creativity propases also anticipated the "change of consciousness" (p.8) Suzi Gablik still found 1 necessary to advocate introducing into art education as of 1992, in The Re-enchantment of Art . And in addition to still king necessary, this claim is compatible with the socioecobgicalperspective Gablik proposes and chims to be capable of "connect (ing] art 16 its integrative role in the larger whole and the web of relationships in which art exists and new emphasis falk on community and the environment rather than on individuai achievement and accomplishrnent" (p.8) that both Rowland and McFee aspired to encourage, since May clairns that everyone must contribute al1 they uniquely can to society in order to fuliy realize themsehres. Their mutuai emphases on consciousness, furltiennore, is linked yet again by the 'intenehtionship with the world' that May's conception of creativity has already kennoted ernphasizing, sine it anticipated the %orid mak'igmreferred to in GablilCs sylbgism clairning that: " if " world making" is the principal function of mind, then social reality âoes not just "happen" in the worlâ, but is constructeci tom the way our priiate beliee and intentions mer* with îbse of othersa(1992, pz). And together, these five author's resonance helps substantiate th6 mesis' emphasis on participation Li worü making king promoted as creaüve acüuity. As well as educaton. however, the ernphasis on consciousness also connects May's conception of creativity with the work of a theobgian, Mihael Novak, who places simihr emphasis on worid making in The Gmeriince of Nothinanes (1971 ) when he states Wh that he recognizes that he pub structure in his own worid, and that 'such recognition is a necessary condition of the experience of nothingness" because" aiere is no real world out there, given, intact, full of significance" (p.12). And, abng with this emphasis on paiticipating in construdion king a necessity, Novak ;ils0 clams both that "consciousness is constituted by randorn, virtualîy infinite barrages of exprime; [and that] these experience are indistinguishabty "inner" and "outef. The mad are aware of the buning confusion. The sane have put structure into it (p.12). NovaKs influence happens to be RD. Laing's PoRics of Bwrience(l967) but Novak couid have been paraphrasing Dewey, since Dewey (1934), too, emphasized experierice and refuted distinctions between inner and outer. For my part, however, 1 suspect that at lest some insane people manage to put structure into their worlds but lean towards structures that are inclined to be based on either their subjective world(s) or objectnre worb, oniy, rather than the integrations of them both that can inkgrate inner and outer. Wnile baiance is what is needed. And. since Rowiand (1976) was aheady noted advocating balance pedagogicaly and lamenting its lack of realizaüon, May's subsequent ciaim that consciousness can be cultivatecl in such a way as to engender an integrated balance so effectivety that fi temporarily undercuts the subjectobject spla thought by many to plague the western world, (GaMikJ991, p.12. amoung them), the bahnce May (1 976) bbek 'suprarational ecstasy" 6 the next -rai aspect of his redefinition of creativity b be addressed. Ecstasy as Supraiationalkm That Undercuts The Subject Object Split.

Bailin (1994) articulated the risk of 'sacrificing creativity precisely in the process of trying to MerP ... if we are ndclear about what is mant by creativity" (pl)and being clear about the various facets that comprise it is a bgical cornponent such chrity. The existentid ph~losopherMarün Heidegger had such serious reserv- about the word consciorSness king misunderstOOd, and inadvertently perpetuating the subw oôject oc Cartesian spiit (thought to be engendered by emphasïzing the intellect at the expense of its inkgration) that he made a point of not using it at ai. Just advocating "heightened consciausriess", therefore, can be assumed mto be specific enough, since the "heightened consciousness'

Rollo May advocates is the resutt of: intellect, emotion and volilion king integrated ço successfuiiy that the sublect.object (or Cartesian) split is temporarily resohred. The unity and resolution of which, May (1976)labels "suprarationalism" and clairns to be synonymouç with authentic "ecstasy". And so, in the interest of clarity, cult~atingauthentic ecstasy as a suprarational state that temporariiy resoives the subject-object (or Cartesian) split and integrates: intellect, emotion and volibn, is what is king advocated cuit ivating in educaionai settings for simuitaneous: individuai, professional, and communal enrichment in this thesis. Also in the interest of clarity, it bears pointing out mat May claimed suprarationalism to address the bnging '(or the pends of ""carnivar" such as they still have in the Mediterranean countries" (p.49), since such celebrations of lite are not only integral to his conception of ecstasy but are claimed to warrant addressing in art education as Yhe carnivalesque' both Maxine Greene (1991 ) and SuiGablik (1992) advocate. And, mie contemporarily even than Greene and Gablik, Conta Kent not onty advocates culüvaling th6 component in art curriculurns ri Learnina by Heat (1992) but provides step by step instructions on how to engender B. The fact that May's deference to Phto was shared by Read ako makes seehg ecstasy in the ligM of the Ancient Greek revels that were 'the carnivals' of their time. as May did, plausible for pedagogical contexts, even though May's appropriation of thse revek may be unique îo him. The fact that May (1976, p.47) credits Nietzsche with inspiring hs depiction of ecstasy also augments the connection his conception of creativity shares wiai ElJioWs defense of an existential approach to creativity. And, most signikantiy for this thesis, including thk existential approach to ecstasy as an integral aspect of creativity mitigates yet another of the insufficiencies in the prevailing paradigrn that fails b adequateîy address the ritual mentiai of integraüwi, as Feldman pointed out in Becornina Human Throwh Art (1975). Read did advocate the integration of seif and world chimed by May to beget the ecstasy that can temporariiy resotve the subject object split. But Read did not cal1 the experience "ecstasy". He (1956) simpiy calied 1 "integration". And Ithink 1 is important to cal1 ecstasy by its name because it can then make a connection with an earlier, more ritualistic time that in turn, cm create bridges to more primai and historic seives. R must, however, be acknowiedged that not even everyone who does advocate the cuitivation of ecstasy in education has May's conception of it in rnind, since May's portraya1of ecstasy is as an integration of botn Dionysian and Apolbnian aspects of human nature mat twether combine: 'intellect, emtbn, and voiiin' (p.49) and engender a supraraliional mode of being. And as such, the contemporary conception of creativ'ity is not advocating elher the" irrational" stae so oRen assaciated with exsential perspectives, nor is it advocating a purely Bacchic, or Dionysian. surrender. As a matter of fact, ecstasy, according to May . "invoive[s] the total person. with the subconscious and conscious acting in unity with the consciousm(p.49) (along the lines Jung (1971 ) posits as individuation.) And as such, the suprarationai state kingadvocated is quite dinerent from the exclusiveiy Dionysian sbte that David &pin depicts ecstasy emboûying in TheArts, Mucation and the Community" (1989). The dkrepancy between these two authors' depictions of the ecstasy they associate with Ancient Greek revek is important for ttis thesis because it is oniy the: res~onsive, responsible, and rektive form of ecstasy that May pasits that is cbimed to have the potentiai to heb tramkm the pievaiiing pedagogical paradgm into a more integrated and integrative one since Bacchic sunender is viewed as solipsSti and unconst~üve.And the hc k of an inkgrative approach to engendering the communion and communây synonymou~ with the ecstasy in May's conception of creativity is perceived to one of the prevailing paradigm's insufkiencies that can be mrtgafed by integratingthis existential conception of k Ecstasy 's proposed roie, however, also rests on the idea that the 'divine madness' (associable wifh May's conception of ecstasy because of his deference to flato) kingbth relativeiy accessibie and intentionally unitive in secular conte*, such as art educaüon. And, when Plato sîated that pœts (but meaning al1 art&) had to be "oui of their senses" in order to create, a contemporary interpretation is that whiie the transcendence of the senses 6 necessary for creaüvity to emerge, th6 transcendenœ simply rneans going beyorid the sense data to engender meaning, as one does continualty as one authenücalty encaunters the worfd. In The Svmbolic Order (1989), however, David Aspin alludes to an 'Athenian' paradigm that has stretched "from the time of Pericles 10 the present day" (p.254) and daims, first, that: according to this view of things, it is part of the greatness of man that he abne of al1 creatures can enrich his existence and the environment in which he iives by creating and furnishing it with works of Art, the constant exposure to and contemplation of which can evoke and be a vehicle Ibr the expression of the sublime in every man and can thus give to al1 a vision of beauty that can be a source of pieasure and joy for ever ... (1989, p254). And then, more signikantly brthis thesis, Aspin goes on to conclude that: this was sureiy the spirit of the creators of that paradigrnatic Gesamtkunsnvérk-the compkte artistii experience -- the Dionysiac festival in Athens. For Dionysius was determined to encourage each and every man to achieve an identification with 'the Divine' in stark contrast [ialics addedl to the injunction of Apalbline tradition that ordinary human beings must only 'think mortal tbughts' (1989, p.254). The significance of which lies in the fact that May (1976), aRer suggesting ecstasy to be synonymous with 'the degree of intensity" he ascribeâ to creative encountets, distanced himsetf from the pureiy Dionysian vision of ecstasy that Aspin depicts, by warning his readers that despite a recognized need for receptivity andlor absorption, he does not mean to imply simply a "Bacchic letüng go" (p.49). And, May elaborates on this point further by expbining that ecstasy can be understood to be the meraing of the Dionysian and the Apolbnian, and then proposing that aithough participants in the 'Dionysian revek" could be understood to have been participants in "magnificent summit[s] of creativity" (1976, p.48), what they had ac hieved was 'a union of form and passbn wlh order and v#al@f (1976, p.48). it is, therefore the union that May suggests to be the embodiment of his conception of ecstasy. And it is the cuhvation of that union that this thesis advocates culivating as a potentially integrative aspect of the proposed perpetuation of a transformed version of the prevailing paradigrn in art education. I have proposed a resonance between: ecstasy, 'divine madness', and Platonic moments of inspiration in which one is 'out of one's senses' and I have posited the possibility of transcending what can be ascertained through one's senses alone being "supran, rather than 'ira rational. That way of 'seeing' is resonant with: the 'aesthetic literacy" Greene (1991) depkts, the pedagogies of the majorii of art educators since Nicolaides (1941) time, and with both Nietzsche's philosophy, generally, and that espouseci in his Birth of the Tralaedy, more particularly. The latter of which is suggested by the fact that it is Nietzsche who May credits with informing h6 own chithat: the heghtened consciousness which we have identified as characteristic of the encounter, the state in which the dichotomy between subjective and objective ieality is overcome and symbok which reveal new meaning are born, is hktotically calied ecstasy (p.49). And May followed the previous staternent wlh both the additional claim that ecstasy is the "technical term for the process in which this union occurs" (pp.4849), and that 'ex-stask is a process in which a person literaiiy ""stands out from" and temporariiy undercuîs the subject object split that characterizes most of western life" (p.49). The accuracy of which, abne wouM make ecstasy worth cultivating. Ecstasy was the sixth integral aspect of May's conception of creativrty to be highiighted. And the deference May shared with &ad, regarding Piato's apparent belief that the greatest good was fuliy realized people both consciousiy enjoying their own lives and confributing civicaliy to their comrnunities, implies the cultivation of the authentk brm of creativity advocated by May in this thesis. This, in turn. implies the cultivation of the intensive conscbusness May labels suprarafbnal ecsfasy to be worth cuitivating as part of the quest to realize creative potential. And, such intensive consciousness is deerned so essential that i! is granted its own chapter and further elaboration, in Chapter Fwe. A seventh facet of May's conception of creativity, however, aiso warrants introduction before moving on and that is his emphasis on the need to cultiiate courage as commlment. And this facet is al1 the more sgnificant because of the rarity of its address, elsewhere. Courage as Cornmitment

May (1976) States mat h human beings courage is necessary to make belig and becoming possble" (p.4) and chims (1976) that an assertion of the self. a commament is essential if the self 6 to have any reality" (p.5). belore going on to propose th&: a man or woman becomes fuUy human onty by his or her choiiand his of her cornmitment to them. People attain woith and dignity by the multitude of decsions they make from day io day. These decisirequue courage (p.5). After which May acknowledges a third source for his conception of creativity, namety: Paul Tillich's Couraae to Be (1952), and claims that the courage Tillich describes " s essential to Our being" (p.5). The emphasis May places on cuttiiating courage is indicated by the fact Mat he refen to it in the titk of Couraae to Create (1976). But it still bean pointing out that May (1976) emphasued the fact that the word "courage" cornes tom French word "coeur", that translates as heart and stands for bve and compassion as well as passion, because the deference to Buber's whoieheartedness suggested previousiy would have connecteci May's emphasis on courage with Buber a second time and integrated the symbolic heart that couid make the concept more accessible to an exoteric public. And, since Buber's wholeheartedness included both the consciousness and the absorption May advocates cuîlivating as part of creativity, their resonance is still claimed to warrant consideration. May (1976). however. for better and for worse, went on to propose the existence of four different types of courage that muid create an unnecessary poti. He (1976) posited: physicalcoura@ as listening and thinking with the body; moral murage as standing up against injustices; and socialcourage as striving for meaningful intimacy with othen. But. he then claimed creative courage to be manifest by "those w ho present directiy and irnrnediately the new forms and symbols (p.15). And he goes on to depict creative courage as manifest most significantiy by: "the artists - the dramatists. the musicians, the painters. the dancers, the poets, and those poets of the religioüs sphere we cal1 saints .... [and posb those who] portray the new symbols in the form of images - poetic, aural, plastic, or dramatc, as the case may be ... [ta be amoung others who] live out their imaginations... and express symbok onty drearnt about by most human beings ... (p.15), even though he is hwnto have stated that when we engage a painting ... if we authenücaiiy to see 1, we are experiencing some new moment of sensibiiii. Some new vision is triggered in us by our contact with ...[w hat ever, or who ever. il k] and ximething unique is barn in us. This is why appreciation .... is aha creative act on oui part" (W.-5.16). The later of which s essential since it couples with May's exphnation of his own encounfer with a Cezanne painting to prevent the contradiction his depicth of creative courage wwld otherwise suggest, since only successful performers in variius disciplines were king recognized in it, and t hat has next to nothing to do with the ubquitousty applicable "redefinition" of creativity he was recognized b introducing, previousîy. The hierarchiai spectrum in which everyone consciousiy participating in enrichi4 encounters is undestood to be being creative (even if only minoriy), therebre. remains intact. And May's depiction of "creative" courage continues to relate to this thesis as "artistic courage". with the other kms of courage understood to not necesariîy be any les"creative" that the artStic brrns, since they too require: risk, absorption, consciousness, and cornmitment, to realize. For my part, I remain uncertah about why May made the distinctions he da, in IigM of his other depictions and "redefinition" of creativity, and I assume he was momentariîy confusing "aRistic" courage with %reativencourage. since 'creative" as he has defined 1 ekewhere applies equaiiy wel to all kur types of courage and cakng oniy the latter one "creative" seems to undemine the other three Rrms and risk undermining an otherwise remarkable contribution to the emerging discourse on creativity, as well. And this inconsistency, whik admittedîy confusing, is not terminal, since Howard Gardner went on îo propose seven types of creativity, Yi Creatina Minds (1993), that not oniy substantiate May's four types, but extend them. Be that as il may, however, May's clairn that courage is sornething that can and should be cuhated by those who aspires to culhate creaüvity on anything other than an accidental bas6 S ctairned to be another aspect of creativity that cm and should be cuttivated in ait classrmms. And hiç chims that we have "seize the courage necessary b preserve our sensitivify , awareness, and responsibility in the face of [the] radical change[sr

(1976,p.2) we are subject to, and "consciousiy participate, on hovuever small a scale, in the brming of the new society" (p2) ifwe are to be creative, are deemed essential. May (1976) kars, however, that few will be able to overcorne the fact that we are king 'called upon to do sotnethhg new, to confront a no man's land, to push into a forest where there are no welC worn paths and from which no one has returned to guide us Bhat] ... the existentialisls cal the anxiety of nothingness.... [because he believes that this means living] into the Mure, and ... leaplng] into the unknown. which requires a degree of courage for which there S no imrnediate precedents and whkh few people realize" (p2). And sol even though his identification of courage and its cultivation kingessential components of creativity constitutes the seventh facet of his conception of creativity king reiterated here, it is worth pointing that his claim resonates compatibly with the role of artist being to "ieap in to the worid and remake 1" that the B.C. pet. Robin Blazer, proposeci on a C.B.C. radio program - and that more optimistic existentialists than May claim that not just arosts. but everyone, can and shouid leap into the world and remake B. The new pedagogy Maxine Greene advocated in Landscapes of Leaming (1W8), br example, mat cm: "free perçons îo understand the ways in which each of them reaches out from his or her location to constaute a cornmon contnetit, a comrnon wrld" (p.70), 6 based on such optirnism. And even May (1976) aclarowledges that %hatever sphere we may be in, there is a prokund joy in the realization that we're helping to form the structure of the new world [and that] th6 6 creaüve courage, however minor. ..our creations might be (p .3). And as such, since May encourages both the celebratbn of life and the cultivation the heightened consciousness that can lead to integrative ecstasy as one encounters and integraîes aspects of the shared and cornmon world in the name of creativity, this thesis suggests considering his reciefinition of creativity the nexus of a mwh needed transformation of the prevailing pedagagicai paradigm.

Gyorgy Kepes and Subsequent Pedagogical Conmtions

A resonant conception, furthemore, was being advocated in pedagogical circks, at ieast two decades before May's conception of creativity was first published, in addiüon to the one proposed by Read. As already noted, the artkt and art educator, Gyorgy Kepes, in Lanauaae of Viion (1944), introduced a phusble orginative point for the contemporary conception of creativity by stating that even % perceive an image is to participate in a forming process [andl is a creative ad" (p.15). And Kepes ako anticipateci the connectedness to the world that both May's and EilioWs subsequent articulations advocated when he (1944) claimed that "inkgration, pianning and bm, are the key words of al1 progressive efforts, today and the goal is a new vital structure-order, a new form on a social plane, in which ail present knowledge and technobgicai possessions may function as a whde (p.12). Then, arücuiating an existential perspective from wÏthin hS own modernist framewoik, Kepes abclaimed that "a human being is more than his [or her] own body; [s]he impiies those actions which reach out and transbrm the environment" (p.29). And, not oniy did his ckim antkeate both the paradgm and praxis Greene (1978) advocated. aller contibuting to the discourse on creativity in his own rght, and adding resonance to the proposais introduced by Read in Mucatina Throw h Ait (194), but his emphasis on transfomative pownbeii pari of creaüvity iiiked both hirn and Read to Ihe subsequent pedagogies of the three internationaîiy recognPed art ed ucators KiWuced #i the previous chapter :Vii Lowenfeld (1947), Kurt Rowland (1976) and June McFee (1976). Which in tum fin& al them with Corita Kent, whose book Leamina bv Heart (1992), is not oniy resonant wati afl of thein, but is even more resonant with May3 conception of creativity than any of theirs, were simKent recognhes the need krboth comciousiy culovated awareness and courage as cornmitment more forrnalîy than any other precedents (except, perhaps, Kirnon Nicoiaides). Most signitkant for this thesis, however. is the fact that, together, the art educatois noted: engendered, refined, and perpetuated a paradigm dismssed by Bailin (1994) as "misleading at best and dangerous at worst" (p.1) that is suggested attematively here to have been "insufficient" at both its best and its worst, and to have provided a sound base fiom which to begin transbrrning an existing paradigm into one that is both more integrated and integrating. And in thk chapter. the seven integral aspects of Rolb May 's 1976 "redefinlion' of creaüvity as 'intensiveiy conscious individuals encountering sorne aspect of their (world(s)) and bringing some new reaiii into king as resuK have been outiined and posited as the potential nexus of such a transformation. Chapter 4

A Conception of Aesthetic Literacy Consistent With The Contemporary Conception

Chapter Two introduced both Oliott's ciairns that 'the recreation of hurnanity depends upon the recreation of the individual' and his daim that, by extrapolation, such "recreatians" can be consiôered creative because world creation 6 nothing less than archetypal cmtivily. And it introduced his additional claim that because artftts have traditionaliy made &je& to be contemphted they have usually been associated with creativity in the way that ordinary people, in today's more secuhr times, can be considered creaüve when they assume responsbiiity for creating aspects of themseive(s) and their (world(s)). Chapter Three introduced the redefinitin of creaüvity as: intensively conscious individuab encountering their (worid(s)) and bnnging some new reali into king as a result that was posled by the existential psychologist, Rolb May, in Couraae to Create (1976). And the fact that May credited both Plato and Nietzsche with inforrning hb conception of creativity was noted before the seven integral aspects of May's conception were introduced and his conception of creativity posited as a predominantly existential perspective that could be integrated into the prevailing paradigm paradgm's conception of creativity to help engender a more integrated and integrating paradigm than the existing one had yet managed to becorne. The fact that both Elliotrs and May's depictions of creativity were more rather than less resonant with those in the prevailing pedagogical paradigm, as weH as resonant wlh both the more recently proposed paradigms of Maxine Greene and Suzi Gablik, was noted to suppoit this clairn, based on their conceptions of creatkity having been demonstrateci to be resonant with those inspired by Herbert Read's proposition mat Ihe purpose of education can ... onty be to devebp, at the same time as the uniqueness, the social consciousness, or reciprocity, of the indkiduai" (1943,1958, p.5). And that proposition was the 6rst of îive Read pioposed in Mucatina Throua h Art (1943,1956) claimed to warrant renewed consideration, at the least, and potentialiy perpetuation in a contemporized form, as well. This chapter posits the quintessential foie attributed to cultivating aesthetii iaeracy in art education as the second of five aspects of Read's paradgm wananting reconsideration in light of the fact that the proposition can be substantiated, extended and transfprrned by integrating reiated aspects of existential îhought - especially those aioculated by Maxine Greene, in "Aesthetic Literacy" (1991). And, since a proposai made by a renowned proponent of discipline based art education, Rabh Smith, is no1 only compatible but can mitigate an additional shortcoming in the prevailing paradigm, it too R noted. It is as such, in this integrated fom, that the conception of aesthetic literacy Read proposed half a century ago is claimed to be as valid today ,as then. And both introducing the five facets of Read's original depiction of aesthetic literacy and the extensions made possible by integrating Greene's and Smith's conceptions of it are the focus of this chapter because those facets parallel contemporary proposals of how to cuttivate creat~ity.First, however, two facts must be noted.

The first fact is that even though Read (1956) posited aesthetic literacy as the essence of art education, and his successor, Viktor Lowenfeld, posited the real~ationof creative potential, as its essence, both authors actually aspired to much the same ends and can be best understood to have simply chosen different words to explain themsebes. And the second fact is that both of these art educator's paradigms are resonant with May's redefinition of creativity. Their resonance is part of the reason why it is claimed that by integrating aspects of the more recent pedagogical proposais of the existentially kaning educator, Maxine Greene, and the self-proclaimed humanist. Ralph Smith, these four author/educatorsl proposais, together, have the potential to mitigate not just one or two, but actually three of four insufficiencies that have emerged in the praxis (even if not the theory) of the prevailing paradgrn. And, not oniy is everyone ciaimed to have the potenüal to benefit from rtttharia and aesthetics being recognized as two sides of the same coin, or Janusian face, of both creativity and aesthetic literacy, but accepting thb dual nature iç ciaimed to minimite the likelihood of polarkation and reduce confusion about what: 6, has ben, couid be, and shouiâ be cuttivated as aesthetic literacy.

Read, Plato, and Their Dismissecl Aesthetic

Ralph Smith opens a text he edited with Simpson, Aesthetics and Art Education, stating that: as recently as "twenty years ago ...there was no Merature of aesthetic education, oniy scattered statements that had not kensystematicalty identifed or placed in some kind of coherent context" (1991, p.1). Many would argue, however, that Phto is one of several theorists who outlined conceptions of aesthetics that were not only coherent for the author's time but still relevant today. And Herbert Read is among them since he (1956) stated that he had "no other ambition than to translate [PIato's] view of the function of art in education" (p.1) into a contemporary framework. The fact that Herbert Read (1956) credited Plato with inspiring the paradgm he proped has kennoted but, neither the fact that his deference was so cornpiete that even the titie of his book, Educatinq Throuah Art, was taken from Plato's proposal that "we rnust make art the bask of al1 education" (1956, p283), nor the three points he clarified in keeping with this goal, were mentioned. The first of the three points was that: it must be understood from the beginning that what [he had] in mind [waq not mereiy 'art education' as such, which shouid more properiy be called visual or plastic education; the theory put Qrward embraced al1 modes of seif expression Iiterary and poek (verbal) no iess than musical aurai, and kms an integral approach to reaEty... (and meant ] aesaletlc educatbn - [as] the education of t hose senses upon w hich consciousness and uitimateîy the intellince and judgement of the individuai, are baseda (1956 p.7). The second point was that he believed: "education ... [was] the Wring of growth" (p.11). And the third point was that he considered growth to be the "complicated adjustment of the subjectbe feelings and emotions to the objective world [with] the quality of thought and understanding. and al the variations of peiçonality and character. dependpmlj to a large extent on the success ... of thk adjustment" (p.7). These three points are significant because Read's conception of "education" as "growlh" and May's "redefinitionWof creativity are resonant with one anoüter and their resonance subçtantiates th& thesis' proposal that May's "redefinition" of creativity can provide the nexus for contemporization of Read's proposed paradigm. And their shared ernphasis on consciousness is another point of resonance. Read's deference to Plato, however, does not appear to have eamed him any empathy from Ralph Smah since he (1991) opened his text as quoted, denying the existence of any coherent theory of aesthetics. And. even though it could be that Read simpty faiied to be either systernatic or coherent enough for Smith, it k more likeiy that Read's deference to the Greek ideal of the "greatest good* being fully realized individuals contributing civically to th& cornmunities was perceived to be promoting the "extra-aesthetics" SmiVi (1991) dismissed, stating that there is still "a need to move thinking about arts education beyond a tendency to construe the goals of iearning in the arts in principaliy extra-aesthetic terrns, [and explaining "extra-aesthetic" as meaning placing] the child's socialaatin or art's general therapeutic bene& above distinctivefy aesthetic understanding and appreciation" (pp. 1-2). For my part, even though I am not certain that Read actualiy placed extra aesthetics above the "distinctly aestheticw,1 do concede Read's portrayal of extra-aesthetics to suggest equali with disc~linebased ones. Unlike Smith, however, Isupport that stance as the oniy one inclusive enough for public education to perpetuate. And, since Smith (1991) does not articu late any aspirations to integrate "disünctiveiy aesthetic understanding and appreciation' with the prevailing paradgm's more inclusive emphases, but proposes instead the repiacement of the prevailing paradgm with one favonng sole emphases on masterpieces (deemed to be masterpieces by representatives of the discipline), their conceptions of aesthetc üteracy do have significant differences. Perhaps the rnost sgnificant of which is the fact that Read's conception of aesthetic literacy can accommodate Smith's, but Smith's can not accommodate Read's. So,in the interest of inclusiveness rather than exclusiveness, I propose a balanced paradigrn abng the lines of the one Kurt Rowland advocated to be an appropriate goal for art education since it accommodates both the extra-aesthetics Smith is refuting and the distinctiveiy aesthetic understanding and appreciation Smith is advocating. And, based on Read's (1956) chim that reciprocal emphases on individual unquenesses and social consciousness is the rnost likely means of achieving the goal of integration effkctivety and affectiveri, earlier aesthetic proposais emphasizing "extra-aestheticsnsuch as those of John Dewey in Art as Gmerience (1934) are also claimed to still be worthy of as much consideration and selective perpetuatiin as more recent proposats, such as Smith's. Reaâ's proposal, furthermore, in spite of Smith's intimation, is abnoteworthy for king relatively "coherent" and "systematic" - emphasizing as it does, three broad divisions, and breaking these divisions down into five smaller ones, al1 of which can al1 be addressed in art classes. The three broad divisions are: observation, appreciation, and expression. And, since Read (1958) qualified the statement that he had "no other ambition than to translate [Plato's] view of the function of art in education" (p.1) with the requirement that Plato's proposais be translated "into terms which are directiy applicable to our present needs and conditionsn(p.1) he made room for the subsequent: integrations, appropriations, and contemporizations of his proposab that did, in fact, occur. One such mntemporization was Lowenfeld's proposed addition of problem solving to the cunicuh in art education and another was Rowhnd's and McFee's common advocacies of the specik cuttivation of environmental awareness and socu environmental problem solving. And as such, ail three of these ait educators extendedthe reciprocity emp hasized in Read's original paradgm in directions unheard of in Read's time while still king more rather than less consistent with Read's original proposal emphasizing aest hetic literacy. His conception of aesthetic literacy, futthetmore. had been broken down into five components that included: (i)the presenration of the natural intensity of al1 modes of perception and sensation (ii)the co-ordination of the variius modes of perception and sensation with one another in relation to the environment (iii) the expression of feeling in communicable forrn; fiv) the expression in communicable fom of modes of mental experiince which would otherwise remain partialiy or wholiy unconscious; [and)

(v) the expression of thoug ht in required forrn (1956, pp.8-9) And not onty are these five points coherent, but are also resonant with May's depiction of creativity. The first point, for exarnple, ernphasizing perception and sensation, is resonant with May's emphasis on receptivity and sensitiiity. The second point emphasàing co- ordination with the environment, is resonant with May's emphasis on integrating oneseifwith the worîd (for the reciprocal ends of personal ecstasy and contrbuting al1 one can to the shctred and cornmon world). The third point emphasizing expression, is reçonant with May's dismissal of escapist creativity that faik to make the effort to communicate. Read's fourth point emphas~ingmaking the unconscious conscious is remnant with both May's emphasis on consciousness, generaliy, and wlh May's emphases on engendering a supraraüoml mode of being in which: thought, emotion and will are ntegrated. And Read's fiflh point prevents the need for thinking, in general, and refiection, in parücuiar, from king undervalued.

tt also bears pointing out, in light of emphases to corne in subsequent chapters, boîh that Read did recognize that "the basic mental processes invohred in art and education alike [are] perception and imagination rialics added ' (p.10). and that Greene (1991) makes a comparable point " when she states that: there b the whole matter of imaginative awareness, an awareness that is ako required if works of art are to be achieved.... .Perceking affects the patterns, the configurations of what we see, but imagination transforms what is perceived.... Without imagination, there could be no image creation on the part of the behoider, nor could there be the transformations that any art alows (p.156). But, since the topic of imagination S deemed too significant to undertake in anything less than a chapter, elaborating on Rs roks in the existing and proposed paradigm is deferred until Chapter Eight, even though the other four propositions about aesthetic Iiteracy Greene (1991) posits that augment Read's five are introduced after Smith's singular contribution.

Ralph Smith's Conception of Aesthetics

Ralph Smith is currentty championing an approach to art education known as discipline based art education (or D.B.A.E.) that promotes focussing on masterpieces. And even though he acknowkdges other approaches to both art education, generaliy, and creativrty, more specifically, in te* he edits, in his own writing, he does not. In them he prornotes the appreciation of masterpieces so exclusivety that his success puts the otkr developments of the last fi@ years in art education at risk. The problem, however, is not wiEh -what Smith advocates but wïth how he advocates iîs execution, and how exclusivek he advocates its execution. While the essence of what he advocates b actually so fundamental that is hard to imagine how the prevailing paradigm got so far from its inclusion in the first place. What Smith (1987) is advocating b simply that art teachen act as conduits to the discipline of ait and that students becorne aware and appreciative of masterpieces in the field. And, not only are there few pedagogical paradgms that We formal exception to this proposal, but nelher the prevailing paradigm nor its proposed extensions are among aie few that do. As a mater of fact, both the idea of addressing the 'art worid' in curriculum, and attempting to provide entrees for student into A b axiomatic in both of these paradigms since the art 'world' is one of multiple worîd(s) students both can and presumabiy should enter as both appreciators and practiners, in the reciprocal interests of enhancing their imrnediate iived worlds through such encounters expanding the realm of the art worki by including more individuais in 1as appreciators andlor makers. And for that matter, even our shared and common world can be expected to benefit from the mutual augmentation of individual's world(s) and the art world since the cultivation of the abilii to learn, at the least, is implied on the part of appreciators and such leaming to iearn impiies increased consciousness. Betty Redfern, a contributor to Smith's and Simpson's text, quite succinctly addresses the shortcoming Smith is attempting to counteract, by warning against Iimling student's exposure to 7heir own and their peers' artistic creations [since doing so denies] them acquaintance with great art [and IeavesJthem imprisoned wlhin the straight jacket of their own necessariiy Iimited experience (1991, p.11). But, even though Redfern's and

Sm iths' concern iç recogn~edas valid, the irnmediatety lived world(s) of students are also recognized as source material for the construction of personal "landscapes" and to only impîy "straightjacketsWwhen students do not reach out from them to seiectivety integrate experiences chosen from the infinite barrage of them they are subject to everyday. And this point has been made by both the psychologist, Carl Jung, when he ciaimed people to be W sum total of al1 they had met', and the existenthl phibsopher, Martin Buber, men he claimed 'ail real life to be meeting'. Smith's suggestion of limling Me bcus of art educatian exclusiveiy to masletpieces, or the "geography" of the field, threatens the emergence of a more balanced paradigm that includes both students own landscapes and the discipline's geography. And, to the extent that oniy the middie zone of the art worid and ifs artifacts are addressed in Smith's propoçal devoid of emphasis on encouraging the cultivatbn of either student's unquenesses or their social consciousness, his proposal is perceived to be one that sirnpiy moves from an overemphasis on individuak and their uniquenesses (al the expense of both social responsbility and the discipline), to an equaliy unbalanced emphasis on the discipline (at the expense of the cuftiiation of the student's uniqueneses and their social rights and responsibiliiies.) The first extreme undermines students' potential to discover who and what they might want to become and what they abne might contribute, and the latter undermines the likelihood of their effective and affective participation in communities and communion(s). And as such, the dialectkal swing Smith proposes not onty by-passes a balanced paradigrn that exists in-between the two extremes, but invites unnecessary and unconstructive polarization. as well. its extreme position, furthermore, abris& undermining oppominities that currently do exist in art cuniculums for encouraging Me setf determination and agency consistent with democratic environrnents because of i?semphasis on accepting externally determined values, rather than cuîtivating interna1 ones. And this, too, is antithetical to the reciprocal paradgm th& thesis b advocating be perpetuated in both the short and bng term interests of everyone. Smith (1991) argues that emphases on social integration is both "extra aestheüc" and iess important than emphasis on the appreciation of masterpieces in art education. But this thesis is suggesting, aîternatively, that Read's proposed emphasis on the recïprocai cuniI;dion of individual uniqueness and social consciousness is as valid a goal today as it was haif a century aga And, consistent wlh this conception of art education, is the idea of cultivating creativity as intensivety conscious individu& encountering their (world(s)) and bringing some new reaiii into kingthat May (1976) proposed. Because of Read's deference to the Phtonic ideai of integraîd citoenry in which "extra- aesthetics" and "aesthetics" are one in the same thing and "the greatest good" is the fulty cognizant and integrated, civicalîy contrbuting person, it would be possible to argue that an aesthetic stance has been taken. Smlh. however, could argue that this stance was axiological, rather that aesthetic and stifl, therefore, extra- aesthetic, at best. And, more to the point, this argument would not change the fact that Smith does not recogn~ethe aesthetic lieracy advocated throughout the last haîf century. For rny part, I cannot support either the exclusiveness with which Smith advocates his own proposais, nor the explicit exclusiveness of his proposal, itself, even though I do have to agree with his (1987) daim that we need to create awareness of great products within disciplines. because that awareness can enrich individual lives and achieving it through the discipline can open unique passageways to such enrichment. And, I also suspect both that such awareness enriches everyone's communal Me as a resun of the ripple effect and that t hat can augment petsonal seif actuakations. These acknowledgments, however, are made in conjunction with recognizing Lowenfeld's admonaion to emphasize individuai's process and integrations rather than the products and emphasis still remains, therefore. on authentic creat~ity. And Read's conception of aesthetics still resonates compatibty with those depicted in a variety of text books still in regular use. Herberhob and Aiexanders' devebping Artistic and Perce~tualAwareness, krexample. is a text wlh a resonant conception of aesîhetic literacy in its ffth edition (aller king first published in 1964). Read's depiction of aesthetic literacy abresonates compatibiy with Nicoiaides' proposed progression from sensoral expiences to informed communication in the 1941 publication of The Natural Wav to Draw still in circulation today . And the resonance between Read's and Nicobides' propos& are especially signikant for this thesis because of Nicolaides' statement that "an should be more concerned with lile than with art" (p. xiv), since th& thesis ciaims that art education should be at ieast concerned with life, especially student's lived lives, as it with art. Challenges to this ide& however, are occumng regardles of the potency of Read's proposed trinity of: observation, appreciation, and expression. And they are occurring in spite of the additional fact that his conception of asthetic literacy is not oniy still resonant with conceptions of it in the prevailing paradigm but with some of those advocated in recentty proposed paradgrns, as well. Even his supporter, Kurt Rowland (1976), lamented the paradigm's failure to engender the balance it aspired to. But, that balance has fortunatefy, if at long last, finalty begun to be realued. The Manitoba Curriculum Guide for Art Education (1993), for example, promotes the understanding of creativity and perception, as well as the language of art. And 1 organùes its curriculum to encourage students to integrate aspects of increasingly large worlds with their own iived ones by moving sequentially out from emphases on their uniqueîy lived worîd(s) to the integration of aspects of their irnmediate natural and man made environments, and from there to the inclusion of the art worid and other aspects of our shared an common world. But, this is admittediy, just one success story. And it must be adrnitted that the art worM and its educators do appear to have frequentiy gotten lost in efforts to cultivate unqueness andlor creativity that did not recognize the discipline as either an integral aspect of art education, or a means of cuitivating it. So, even though this oversight was not the aim of the originators of the prevailing paradgm, it fias happened anyway, and this indicates that, at the very least the prevailing paradigm has failed to adequately communicate its goals. Lowenteld, Rowland, and McFee were ail mted for updaüng Read's paradigm in the three decades lolbwing ils original pubiiition in1943 . And, for most of aie three decades since their extensions, Maxine Greene has been articulating an exstential perspective that is not only resdnant with the depiction of aesthetic litacy Re& paradigm emphasized, but capabie of extending it, as well. Greene's relatively bne voice, however, does not appear Eo be having much eWt on curriculum formation or impiernentaüon beyond The Curriculum Guide for Art Education published by the province of Manitoba in 1993. And meanwhile, the nisufficiencies that have emerged in the prevailng paradgm have generated a large emugh gap for Ralph Smith's proposed ernphasis on excelkllce to have gained a sgnificant foothold as a contender brthe new paradgm needed.

Maxine Greene

Maxine Greene is an educator with several books on aie education of bot h students and their teachea to her credit and the paradigm she proposes has already kenquoted. One of the many subjects she has addressed specificalty, however, is aesthetic literacy. And not only do four of her propositions on that topic substantiate and update ReadS, but two in particular have noteworthy potential to balance the imbalance that integrating SmithS exclusive proposal, abne, into the prevailing paradgm, would engender. Greene (1991) states, for example, that: "it is important, fiist of ali, to realize that the domain of aesthetics is more far-reaching than the world in which works of ait exists" (pp.152 -153). And with these words she illuminates one of the signiftcant shortcomings in Smith's proposed exclusive ernphasis on "masterpieces"in art cuniculums, namely, his exclusive frame of reference. Such breadth was implicit in Read's proposal, but Greene (1991) has made it explicit. And her dafican not only heip everjone interesteci in the topic avoid talking at cross purposes, but her additional clam that "everyone has some memoiy of sunsets, moon-liecked woods, snowy streets, chiidrens' hands, etc ... (p.153) ako provides concrete exampies of the breadth she envisions that not oniy clam her point further, but alço indicate that she, too, like the art educators initiaüng and perpetuating the prevailing paradgm, consider aesttiehic literacy to be ubiquitousiy achievable when entrees such as the preceding ones are recogneed br what they are and subsequentty expanded upon in educationai environments. This extension of the domain of aesthetic literacy into the "lived workis" of peopk is officially acknowledged wiM the ascription of "landscapes" (1978) and. not oniy 6 the concept given the credence of a name, but is abelaborated upon in chapter of the text using the term in its taie, Landsca~esof Leaming (1978). Acknowledging the domain of aesthetic iiieracy to be hrger aian art worlds is posited as Greene's first extension of Read. And her acknowledgment of the esentialness of integrating andfor transforming experiences into "landscapes" is poçited as her second. The recognition of such landscapes is another aspect of the prevailing paradigm that existential thought that can substantiate and extend since Greene (1991) not only refers to it herself, but defers to both the existential philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty's claim, in Pn'macv of Perce~tion(1964), that al1 meaningful learning is based on the successful integration of such personal landscapes, and to the psychobgist William James comparable claim that such landscapes are" the world of living realities [that constitute] the sense of our life which we at every moment possess [and is] the hook from which reg dangies, the absolute support" (p.153) . And. since their mutual ernphasis on landscape's role in aesthetic literacy is consistent with 00th Read's and May's propoçak, it is suggested here to be worthy of further consideration as a means of cultivating aesthetic liieracy and creativily simuitaneously. Greene's emphases on personal landscapes and the prirnacy of perception is extended further, however, in the direction of authenticity by her claim that "aesthetic perception is a mode of viewing that can only be pwsonally undertaken by an individual present to him or herseif" (1991, p.157). And her emphasis on presentness 6 not only part of the existential conception of authenticity already noted but it is ako resonant with May's emphasis on intensive consciousness being a par?of creativity. Thus both creativity and aesthetic literacy cmbe seen îo be king redefined aiong simiiar lines. And mis resonance is augrnented even further when Greene (1991 ) goes on to claim that "to be at the center of reality, "grasping ir" b to grasp what surrounds from ones' own center and in so grasping, to be conscious of one's own consciousms" (p.157). since this quote not only suggests the degree of conscioumess required for aesthetk literacy to be resonant with the degree required in May's conception of creativw, but atso resonates with his emphasis on responding hom one's center. it is not insigniticant, either, that such enhanced consciousness is consistent with Smith's depiction of aesthetic literacy. But it is the next chapter that will address such consciousness more fuliy. The resonance estabfished so far. however. does have another significance. Because of May's claim that "a chief characteristic of the courage (he advocates cuitiiating] is that it requires a centeredness within Our own being, without which we would fée1 ourseives to be a vacuum" (1976, p.3), his comparable emphasis on presentness andlor centeredness is evident. But, his advocacy of cuttiiating courage ako draws much needed attention to boîh the offen overboked facts thaf courage is needed to achieve the presentness necessaiy for authentic aesthetic literacy andlor creativity, and that courage not onfy needs to be cuiüvated but cultivated as cornmitment. And this point becornes especialîy important if May is correct about the successful cultivation of creativity king capable of undercutting both the prevaifing subject-object spb and their subsequent alienations, given the cunent cultural wide disposition towards them, noted previously. To Say that courage is needed in May's conception of creativi!y is somewhat of an understatement since for May, "courage is not a virtue or value among others .... R is the bundation that underlies and gives reality to al1 other virtues and values (p.4). And significanüy for th6 thesis' goal of encouraging the: responsive, responsibie, rellective empowerment of individuals in the narne of authentic creativity in art education and elsewtiere, May not only claims that courage is a necessary aspect of such creativw but proposes that an "emptiness" within corresponds to apathy without, and apathy in the bng run amounts to cowardice" (1976, p.3). The significance of whEh is that May has. in essence. suggested nothing short of aesthetic lieracy and creativii king antidotes to the apathy Gablik (1991) and others have witnessed and claimed to warrant rnitigation. The preceding antidote is one May's conception of creativity has already ken claimed to engender when May was already quoted claiming that creativity acüvity can engender suprarationai ecstasy that can resofve (however ternporarily) the subject-obpct dichotomy that both he (1976) and Gablik (1991) claim to be an unnecessarily prevalent nemesis of Western culture. And such ecstasy was claimed to be resonant with the integratbn Read (1956) advocated. as well as to anticipate the paradgm Greene has been advocating since 1978 (that encourages individuals to 'corne to understand how they can each reach out from their unque location to participate in the reconstructions of our shared and common (world(s)'). The fact that the authentic creativity aspired to in this thesis requires being present-to- (both) onesetf-and-the-worldhas aiso already been explained. And abng with keeping open the door to such authenticity by recogn~ingthe primacy of perception but requiring perceptions to be integrated with the objective world, Greene (19% ), like May, links art education with personal growth and therefore to education as Read defined both, as well. But, Greene abextends both her own proposal and her augmentation of Read even fuither by revealing Read (1956) to have been overly optimistic about what people corn equPped with. in terrns of sensory perception, sinœ he emphas~edpmerving perception, raaier than engendering afdor enhancing it, as she does. And this is important because even thoylh Greene's contention is that "no matter how the concept art is understood perception always has a central role to play (p.153), she also chims that "it is now known that perceking must be understood as an active mode of gnsping the structures of the wodd (emphasê added), of appearances, or what is otherwiçe called the "phenomenal worid" (p.154), and that "such perspectives do not open up spontaneousiy. The capacity to perceive, to attend, must be learned* (p.156) (emphasb added). The signaance of which riin the fact that Greene has made something eke that was only implicit in Reaâ's proposal, expiict, by making the point that 'sight is a faculty whiie seeing is an art' that must be ieamed. Read was not ignorant of this idea. He stated, for example, both that "obsewation is almost entireV an acquired skili" (p.209) and that "in most cases the eye (and the other organs of sensation) have to be trained, both in obsewation (directed perception) and in notation" (p2û9). But Greene contempoi~esthe emphasis on sensoral contacts with the world made by Read (as well as by both Kimon Nicolaides and Mana Montessori More him) and doing sol she reminds art educators of the need to cuitivate and enhance the sensoral awarenesses and perceptions posited as starting points of aesthetic literacy, by her, and of creativity. by me. And th&, in turn, suggests the specific enhancement of perceptual abiiiiies should be undertaken as part of art curriculums in the interest of enhancing both and the emphasis on enhancing perception is posited as Greene's fourth extension of Reaâ's conception of aesthetic literacy that can cuttiiate creative potential sirnuttaneousiy. Perhaps lesdirectiy, emphasis on sensoral contact also indicates that studio based art activitii warrant continued inclusion in art curricula despite a trend toward dismhing their resutts as 'child art', since they are a iiteral of means of enabling students to feel more. And, more subtfy yet perhaps, emphasis on enhancing sensoral experiences ako suggests

dis parite their conceptions are. And Greene's resonant claim that abng with heghtened conscbusness and perception lhere is ako the capacw to imagine [since] imagination transfomir pcepüon (p.154) (emphasis added) was noted when the fact that the exsting and proposed conceptions of imagination wouid be deferred to a later chapter was explained. So Greene's rehtiveiy unique conceptions of imagination as: futurking, making the ordinary extraordinary, and realiing "bndscape constructions" are defèned until then, even ttiough aie fact that she daims that 'imagination transforms perception" makes it integral to the reciprocaly conceptual and perceptuai approach to aesthetic literacy th6 aiesis is promtïng.

Aesthetic Literacy and Creativity as Enhanced and Applied Cansciousness that Embodies both Perceptual and Conceptual Consciousness

Even Smith advocateç cuiüvating the intense awareness that is integral to the contemporary conception of creativity. Supporters of the contemporary conception king prornoted, however, also promote the active cultivation and refinement of the sensory perception Smith (1987) downplays to the point of dbrnissing in favor of his exclusive

emphasis on masterpieces and thek appreciatbn. Kimon Nicolaides (1941 ), brexample, went so far in his advocacy of cunivating sense perception as to suggest that five years (pxiii) of conscious sensoral cuRRration to be necessary to enable students to learn how to "see"well enough to learn to draw. And, even though Smith (1991) includes excerpts such as Donald Crawford's, that point out that the word aesthetics cornes from the Greek root aesthetikos and translates as 'pertaining to sense perceptions" (p.18), Smith's hck of recognition that sense perception shouid be actively cuttivated in his own wriiing is a shortcoming in the initial paradigrn that can and should be rnlgated by acknowiedging Greene's extensions, especialty since this point is not suffkientty addresseci in Read's proposal, emphasizing as 1 did, the "preservation" ratfer than "cultivaüon" of enhanceci sensoral perception. Another contributor to Simpson and Smiths' bxt, Bennett Reimer (1991). pofits authenticity "among the most cunfused topics in the entire realm of aesthetics" (p.336). While for me, it is ascertainhg the parameters of the concepions of aesthetics difïerent authors are using to ftame their propositions that is moçt mnfusing. More significant aian such quantification, however, is the fact that such ambiguity is a shortcoming that can and should be overcome by acknowkdging inclusive conceptions of it so that the goals of the prevailing paradigm can tnally begin to be effectively realized. And along with kingclear, Maxine Greene's conception of aesthetic literacy contemporizes Read's, wahout undermining the possibil~of sekctive integratiom of Smith's, as well. A variety of dictionaries, furthermore, such as Funk and Waanal(1968), not only state that "aesthesia" has the same root as "aesthetics" and that that root translates as "sense" or "senses", but include "consciousness" as part of aesthesia More suggesting that aesthetics atso has to do wiai our understandings of what is "good" andlor "beautifuî" in art, nature, etc.. And as such, aie recognition of both the sense perception and consciousness Greene posits as integral to aesthetic literacy is not only warranted but essential, ifthe balanced paradgm aspired to since Read's tirne k finalty to be achieved. Paralieling an emerging emphasis on the role of perception, however, S an ernerging emphasis on role of consciousness that is more evident in iess entrenched sources such as: Betty Edwards, Frederick Franks and Corita Kent. And simply addresçing the differences in meaning, and advocating the cuitiiation of both aesthesia and aesthetics couid bring the new ernphasis on "consciousness" out of the closet which, abng with making the phenornenon lessuspect, could invile reconsideration of everyone tom Dewey and Collingwdod ta Smith, since they al1 refer to it. The next chapter, therefore, hksat a means of initiating the intensiveîy integrated conscious state claimed to be integral to authentic creativity, and at means of encouraging its perpetuation, based on existing precedents in art education. And it s to those means and to the idea: of awakeness, consciousness, cornmitment and authenticity, king integral to one another and to creativity, that this thesis now turns iîs attention. Chapter Five

Awakeness: Making An lmplicit Aspect of Authentic Creativity Explicit

The previous chapter proposed perpetuating Herbert Read's advocacy of aesthetic literacy as the essence of art education, but doing so in conjunctbn wlh aspects of both Maxine Greene's and Ralph Smith's more recent depictiom of 1. Not the ieast of which was Greene's claim that 'the idea of the quamative is focal to aesthetic literacy' (1991, p.153). The fact that consciousness and perception were recognized as aspects of "aesthesk", but not necessarily "aesthetics," was noted. And it was proposed that aesthesia both could and should be recognized as both an integral aspect of aesthetic literacy and constituting the other side of its Janusian face. The fact that consciousness has been at least a peripheral aspect of the prevailing paradigm in art education, since Dewey alluded to it in Art as Gmerience

(1934) was noted. And, abng with the fact consciousness has received an increasing degree of attention in sorne recent pedagogical proposais, the fact that the cultivation of consciousness is integral to both the cuttivation of aesthetic literacy as Read and Greene portray it, and to the cuttivation of creativity, as May depicts it, was ako noted. In spite of increasing references to it, however, and in spite of a perceived need to augment consciousness as well as perception, perception has been addressed more consistently in art education than consciousness has in the last half century and the need to augment consciousness appears to have been iess recognïzed and accepted than the need to augment perception. But, from the perspective of this thesis, not only can consciousness not afford to be under-recognized any longer. but there are at least five reasons to include its curvation as part of art education. The first of which is that without consciousness there can be no authenticity in the existential hamework informing this thesis, since one has to be consciously present-to-both-omN-and-the-world in order to be authentic. The second of w hic h is that Read (1956) not oniy advocated increasing consciousness, generally , as one of five aspects of îhe aesthetic literacy he claimed to be at the heart of art education, but he ab dekned specilicaliy to the psychobgist. Carl Jung, w ho cUrned it to be humankind's fairon d'etre and Read thereby opened the door to integrating aspecîs of psychokgy that relate to art education. The third reason is the fact that Jung, like the Gestan psychoiogists, not only ernphaseed the integraüon of peopie with themselves and thei (world(s)) that both Read and May emphas~ebut abposited a new myth that could propel the pioposed transliomation of

the existing paradigm into the more integrated and integrative one aspired ?O in th6 thesis, by replacing the divine creation myth's emphasis on a concrete and complete world's creation with an emphasis on the ubiquitous cuttivation of consciousness as communal or CO-operative creativity. The fourth reason is the fact that cultivating consciousness as part of ad education has not oniy continued to be proposed by peripheral contributors to the prevailing paradigm for haif a century, but has finaliy king recognized institutionally, as well --the success of which engenden a bridge between East and West that has been waZng t housands of years to be gben for m. And the fiRh reason is that Maxine Greene's daim of awakeness king integral to the increased consciousness that rnakes both appreciating art and responding responsibly possble suggests such awakeness andlor consciousness to be necessary brauthentic creativity, since "presentness" k required. And, not oniy does Read's deference to Jung (1956) put consciousness into a high a profile by association, since it is at the heart of Jung's vision, but such a profile iç claimed here to be both conducive to and resonant with the cultiiation of both authentic creativity and aesthetic literacy since the Jungian approach to consciousnes. together with the two keys introduced in Mis chapter. are capable of opening a door to the cuitivation of such consciousness in art classes in such a way as to be: personalty enriihing, prokssionalty justifiable, and poiiaically desirable. Jung's New Myth as The Renewal Of An O#er One

Jung's work was still evolving when Read first quoted him. But, by 1963, Jung's propals were being distilied and appropriated the world over and the reverberations of tib claim in Mernories. Dreams and Reffections of C.G. Junq (1962),that: humanity's ïask is to becorne conscious of the contents that press upward from the unconscious" (p.14) augmented Read's earlier proposal of expressing "in communicable form the modes of mental experience that would othenvSe remain whoify or partialiy unconsciousn (1956. p.9) beïng an integral aspect of aesaietic literacy. And. Jung's additional claim that people were evading t heir destiny to the extent that they remained unconscious not oniy substantiated but augmenteci both Read's and May's claims. since it brought Me Ancient Greek suggestion that the unexamined 'fe was not worth living forward. and that belief had informed both Read's and May's paradigms. The three additional facts that: Jung went on to state mat "as far as we can discern, the sole purpose of human existence is to kindle a Ight (iîalics added) in the darkness of rnere being (p.14); Buber included a reference to divine sparksin the conception of creativity Read subsequently deferred to; and Viktor Lowenfeld claimed the essence of art education to be the kriidling of sparks of creativity also al1 combine to augment the heart syrnbol of the transforrned and transformative paradigm proposeci, in which the sparks and or light ernbody the symboiii transkr of creative powen tom God(s) to peopie, and as such, augment the symbois attributed Buber, May and Elliott previously. 60th Buber's and Jung's hypotheses, however, were probabiy anticipated by a myth articulated in Maior Trends in Jewish Mvsticism (1954, p.256) suggesting that at the beginning of creation, God poured His divine light into bowk or vessets, but some of the vessels could not stand the impact of the light. They broke and the light was spilled. Salvation of the world required re-collection of the light and restitution of the broken vessels (1954, ~2%).

And the reason for ehburating on th6 point 6 Mo fou. The first of which is the remance engendered by Lowenfeld's use of the metaphor of 'sparks" to descrbe creat ivity in his (1961 ) chim that we "have to regard it as our sacred reçponsbility to unfold and devebp each individuai's creative abiiii as dim as the spark may be and kindie it whatever ilam it may conceivably devebp" (repnnted relatively recentiy in Drawina on aie Artist Within, 1986, p.8). And the second of which is that there k considerable support for the üea that people need myths to feel integrated with things and world(s) bigger than tkir own, and mis provides a second myth that cari be appropriated. Chapter Two suggested that since the myths found in The Bible have kenbosing ground to secular thought new secular myths are needed that encourage individuak to think of themsetves as limited divinities needing to becorne as mutually respons-able and responsble for both their own tive(s) and for Our shared and common (world(s)) as they can. And Jung provided a myth that is resonant wlh the conception of creativiîy king advocated in this thesis. Edward Edinger, for exampie, in The Creation of Consciousness (1984). describes the preceding myth as one in which : the created universe and its rnost exquisite flower, [huJmanri], make up a vast enterprise for the creation of consci6usness; ... each individual is a unique experiment in that process, and ... the sum total of consciousness created by each individual in his [or her] life tirne is deposited as a permanent addition in the collective treasury of the archetypal psyc he (p.23). The current interest in consciousness may rival that of creativity, fiself, since fi, too, has attracted attention in education, generalty, and art education, in particular, as well as in the fields of psychobgy and philosophy. But, be that as it may, the cuitivation of consciousness is also integral to the cultivation of the type of creativity being articulated in th6 thesis. 60th Betty Edwards' books Drawing on the Riaht Side of the Brain (1979) and Drawina on the AiMWflhin (1986), and Frederkk Franck books The Zen of Seeing (1973) and The Awakened Eve (1979) are examples of its advocacy in pedagogicai contexts. And the fact that 6etty Edwards' first book has been placed on recommended curricular reading lists in both the provinces of B.C. and Manitoba indicates that the idea of cuitivating consciousness in art education has reac hed some degree of acceptance. Aug menting Edwards' and FrancKs advacacies, however, is a Catholic art educator, Corita Kent. And aie

book she CO-authoredwith Jan Stewart, Learninci by Heart (1992). not onCy promotes the cultivation of consciousness but does sa from the perspective of an art teacher speaking from within a very consewative community. And as such, her advocacy can only aid in the proposal gaining exoterii acceptance and dissemination. Also promoting the cultivation of consciousness, but addressing more academic circles than Frank, Edwards, or even Kent is likety to, is Maxine Greene. Her (1991) efforts draw academic attention to it by not onty advocating the culovation of more intense modes of it, but also advocating the cultivation of States of the "wider awakenessw (pp.42-51, 1978) she links to Wolfe's "moments of kingw(p.196,1978) and contrasts with: "somnarnbufance", "mystification" and "anaesthesia". Greene's formal articulation of the concept of "awakeness", however, does follow on the heels of another, kss prolific writer, who, like Greene, articulates and advocates an existential paradgrn, oniy in his case, it is a conception that has been notably influenced by Martin Buber. That writer is Donald Vandenberg. And through his combined deference to the creation of consciousness in ûeina and Education (1971) and Greene's deferences to it quoting both Thoreau's introduction to Waiden (1978) and Aked Shultz. the claim that awakeness is integral to the realization of consciousness andlor authenticity in any and everything including creativity has been introduced into Western academic circles. For his part, Vandenberg claims that "the ontokgical difference between being-awake and being-in-a-drearn is ... the difference between existing authentically and existing inauthenticaliy (p.4). And mis statement not only indicates resonance between Vandenberg's claim and both Read's and May's proposals. since they al1 emphasue ontological considerations, but the fact that these three theorists al1 emphasite the significance of authenticity, as well, further substantiates the integral rok ascribed to it in the conception of creativity this mesis is ailicuhting and advocating appropriating into the prevailing paradgm in art education.

Vandenberg (1971) also goes on to state that: the ontological difference between being in a dream and king awake lies in the control the peson has over khat happens'. Dreaming is subjectiveiy experiinced as the world taking over and everything that occurs happens to one. One's own initiative counts for nothing - precisely as if one were in a dream" (p.4). And. since king asleep can be likened to seeing oneself as a victim of circumstances over which one has no control and for which one is not responsble, br those who see: empowering individuals to participate affectively and effectively (or responsively, responsibly, and rekctiveiy) in both the constructions of their own intersubjective live(s) and, axiomaticaliy, our shared and common world as the essence of education andlor creativity, being awake is fundamental. Teachers may well have been asking students to proclaim themseives "present" since formal schooling began. But, for some teachers, students being present in body and obedient enough to answer to their name is sufficient. Actualiy being awake enough to be attentive and engaged, however, is the prerequisite Por being "present" in the authentic sense being advocated in this thesis. And elaborating on his explanation of this degree of awakeness, Vandenberg contra* it with king asieep and expiains that:

on the other hand, acting in wide-awakeness 6 subjectively experienced as originating solefy from the center, the actor is motivated whol!y by what [s]he is making happen within a shifting totality of relevancies, within the world. His [or her] own initiative counts for everything ....The peson Merefore exists in the initiating and performance of intentional actions in wiâe-awakeness... People exist authentically.... when they are acting in the worü within full wideawakeness (1971, p.4). As such. Vandenberg not only emphasizes authenticity but ako introduces the idea of acting from one's center that Greene (1991) subsequently posits as part of aesthetic literacy, and that May (1976) posits as part of creativity. And, Vandenberg also reveak the particular signiîkance of his statements for this thesis' emphasis on seeing world making as archetypal creative activity and clairned to warrant cuitivation in art education as part of its pedagogical paradigm, by quoting Erwin Straus' clairn in The Primaw World of the Senses (1963) that: "the more wide awake one is, the more wodd there isn(p.3).

Henry David Thoreau

Greene's introduction to awakeness is quite dinerent from Vandenberg's but the essence is similar. She (1978) States, first, that "young peop le.... must achieve the kind of wide awakeness [that includes both] the ability to think about what they are doing [and the ability] to take responsibility " (p.50). And as such, her fint proposition suggesîs awakeness and reflectivity to be at ieast related, if not synonyrnous, wlh one another. She then goes on to propose that the teaching pmblem is threefold, invotving as it does "equipping young people wlh the ability to identify afternatives, and to see posibilities in the situations they conhont ... [as well as invoking] the teaching of princ~ies,possible perspectiüues by means of which those situations can be assessed and appraised, as well as the nom governing historical inquiry. ballet dancing or co-operative living, noms that must be appiopriated by persons desiring to pin particubr hurnan communities. [And] l [alsol involves enabling student to rnake decisions of principle, to reflect, to articuhte and to take decisive actions in good faiîh (1978, p.50). Vandenberg's sources, therefore, of Straus and Buber, on the question of awakeness, are different tom Greene's deferences to Henry David Thoreau's attempts to introduce the possibility of awakeness to the Western worid in his essays Walden" and "On The Duty of Civil Diçobedience". And for hk part, Thoreau introduces these essays stating that he does "not propose to write and ode to dejection, but to brag as lustiiy as Chanticieer in the morning, standing on his rwt, if on& to wake his neghbats up [italics added (1963, pl). And doing so he draws attention to the fact that his raison d'etre, like that of a Buddhist rnonk, was to: Wake his neighbors up". In "Walden", however, Thoreau (1963) ab laments that "the millions are awake enough for physical labor; but oniy one in a million is awake enough for effective inteliectual exeition, and one in a hundred million for a poetic or divine life" (pp. 66-67). And, since the existential phibsopher Martin Heidegger (1975) quoted the poet Holderlin to claim that 1 is onty "poetically man [thatj dwells" (pp. 21 3-229), 1 is disheartening to think that onty one person in a hundred million might be capable of such participation. Thoreau's pessimisrn abbecomes even more disheartening when he goes on to claim that "to be awake is to be alive" (pp. 66 -67) since, to the extent that: his, Greene's and Vandenberg's conclusions are accurate, king awake is obviousty desirable. Most signiftcantly, here, however, awakeness Ïs linked integralfy to this thesis' depiction of creatkity based on worid creation by Vandenberg's daim (via Straus) that "the more awake one is the more world there is" (1971, p.3). Thoreau (1963) does claim that "the othef nine hundred and ninety nine thousand people are in vary ing degrees of sieep (andlor experiencing the somnambulance that Greene

(1978) subsequenüy warns against). But he (1963) alço goes on to state that 'he has never met anyone (italics added) who was fully awake, and that if he did 'he would not know how he could bok hem in the face'. And not onty does this put his conception of awakeness into some perspective, but bordering on opümism, he goes on to conclude hg essay dechring that he "knows of no more encouraging fact than the unquestionable ability of man ta eievate his lile by a conscious endeavof (pp. 66.67). So Thoreau does, eventualty, suggest that people can leam to become more awake, more of tirne. And fi can be assumed that what can be iearned can be taught. This chapterls claim is that not onfy can more people learn to be more awake. more of the time. and thereby create more worid for themsefves and others, but they can learn to do so in the context of art educatian, as part of learning to be more aesthetically literate and creative. There was. prwumably. a tirne when someone who had experienced moments of awakeness (or" king", to use Virginia Wolfe's term) felt no responsibility to awaken others, and couid, antitheticaliy, indulge his or her lack of responsibiliîy with the antiquated adage that " ignorance S bliss". But times have changed. Ecologists, in general, and Barry Comrnoner. in patiiular, have not only announced that there is "no such thing as fiee lunch", but have ako claimeâ that "everything is connected to everything eise", as well, (as vehementiy as Zarathustra proclaimed the 'death of the Gods' in the previous century). And, Suzi Gablik makes similar points to those of the ecologists from an aesthetic and pedagogical perspective in The Reenchantment of Art (1992), when she advocates the cuftivation of a socioecological aesthetic and pedagogical paradgm. Gablik (1992) dismisses the potential of both the existentialists and the modernists to help engender such a paradgm. And her dismissal is not only unnecessariîy. nihilistically pre- emptive, but is also unconsbuctiveîy poiarizing. CounteWncing such dismisals, Never, is one of the potential bene& of articuiating aspects of existentid (and modemist) thougM that can help inform the paradgm Gablik (1992) advocates, in spite of pathways ta A her own tex! ignores. Returnirg to Thoreau. however, Thoreau (1963) not oniy empha~~e~h$ own conception of autfienticity, but goes sa far as 10 date that "moral reform is the effort to throw off sieep" (pp. 6667) and propose that %e must learn to reawaken and keep ourselves awake, not by mechanical aides, but by an infinite expectation of the dam which does not

forsake us in Our soundest sieep" (pp. 66-67). And I not oniy agree with Thoreau about the need to undertake the cunivation of awakeness and resistance ta its opposite of sleeping through one's Ii(in the interest of preventing dying never having realiy liied and never having contributed what one aione could have contributed to the wodd), but I posit doing so as creative activity that can be as personaliy gratifying as 1is socially beneficial. 60th of these points, however, have already been made in the context of outlining May's conception of creativity. And, since art works are not only capable of pointing to moments of such awake~e~~in the artiçYs Iives. but also capable of inspiring the co- authorship of such moments in appreciator's liies, the cuitbation of the ability ta appreciate has ako been advocated. The fact that appreciation manifest as CO-authorshipwas unlikeiy to require the degree of courage original authorship would. was acknowiedged. But, even ce authorship requires the presentness of setf to self and world that is the essence of the authenticrty integral to bath consciousness and creativity. And, even though Smlh (1987) dismisçed the iâea of cultivaling creativity in art education, he (1991). too, has been quoted advocating the cuRivation of more intense modes of consciousness. Increasingty, however, contemporaty art educators such as Kent in the text she CO- authorecl wiih Jan Stewart, in Learnim bv Heart (1992), and Colieen Bercsi (1987) in "Awareness, Awareness in Action", not onty advocate the cuRiation of increased consciousness and provide rationaies for doing sol but also provide mansof &ing sol as well. And, by quoting these authors, this thesis moves from simpiy advocating me cunivation of awakeness andlor consciousness as part of aesthetic Iiteracy and creativity, to illustrating howits cumation can be undertaken in art education. One rneans of doing so is a variation on a practice that b not onty thousands of years old but cross cultural as well, mat has been appropriated quite uniquely into the praxis of ait educators. And the second means of cultivathg awareness. awakeness, and authenticily is anothet adaptation of a practice aheady estabiished in art education, as well. For my part, I have already acknowiedged the aspiration to engender bath creativi manifest in appreciation, or CO-authoring,and manifest in original authoring, or making. To do so al1 three facets of Read's trinity of: appreciating, expressing, and obsewing have been claimed to be worth perpetuating. And obsewing has ken likened to "attending" and "noticing" by Greene and Lowenfeld. Fortunately, furtherrnore, for those who see king awake and conscious as fundamental to everything, such awakeness has a rneans of king achieved that is consistent with an activity already established in ait education, namely, contour drawing, since it is based on observation, attending. andlor noticing - in a state of engagement. And that exercise can, and often does, act as an 'alam cbck' for both professional artists and art students, in a rnanner consistent wlh the aspirations Thoreau articulated.

Contour Drawing as a Means of 00th Ascertaining and CultMing Awakeners

For many art teachers, contour drawing is already an integral aspect of their programs. And, even though such exercises are bound to be aimed solely at increasing domain based skilk when undertaken by some of teachers, they &O can be a rneans of creating awarenesses of present moments and enabling students to be more fuliy present b thernsehres, and therefore mare authentic, by both accident and design. Som art teac hers already use such exerckes to engender: awareness, presentness ancilor awakeness, as well as ta increase student's abilities to attend. The latter of which was claimed by Greene (1991, p.152) to be necessary for aesthetic literacy to be manifest as either expression or appreciation, as well as claimed to need !O be acquired by effort, rather than expected to be granted, or to emerge. as a resuit of destiny or biology. And, not only da both Lowenfelâ (1975) and McFee (1976) anticipate Greene's advocacy of cubating abilities to attend by advocating the cultivation of hoticing', but an even eailier art ducator, Kimon Nicolaides, in The Natural Wav to Draw (1941), not only advocated the cultiiation of awareness and the ability to attend, but ako proposed rneans of cuRivating them that are stiil a part of many teacher's art classes. Nicolaides' means included the formal introduction of students to contour drawing.

And he (1941) not onty claimed that "learning to draw $ really learning to see" (p.5).which anticipated an integral aspect of Greene's proposed aesthetic literacy, but he also explained that the 'sort of seeing he meant was obsewation that utilizes as many of the five senses as we can reach through the eye at one time' (p.5), and this anticipated Greene's suggested enhancement of sensory perception as part of cultivating aesthetic literacy. A relatively famous architect, Frank Lloyd Wright, extended this idea further by claiming that iearning to "see" is really learning to "W. And even though this fact is peripheral, the "seeing" they can both be assumed to be referring to is not only a means to the end of: 'seeing, hearing, feeling, and imagining more' Mat Greene (1991 ,p.lSO) claimed to be the special role of artists to promote, but one this thesis claims to an appropriate roie for art educators interested in engendering aesthetic literacy and /or creativity, as weti. Returning to Nicohides, however, before ewhining the exercise of contour drawing b his readen, he (1941) suggested that 'as you begin. you try to devebp the capacity of thinking about only one thing ai one Cme' (p2). And only after that does he advise shidents to focus your eyes on some point -- any point will do -- akng the contour of the model..... Place the point of your pencil on the paper. Imagine that your pencil is touching the rnodel instead of the paper. Wmout taking your eyes off the mode[, wal until you are ccnvincedthat the pencil is touching that point on the rode1 upon which your eyes are fastened. Then move your eye sbwl). along the contour of the mode1 and move the pencil sbwly dong the paper. As you do this. keep the conviction that the pencil is actually touching the contour. Be guided more by the sense of touch than by sght (p.9).

Similarly , but more contemporariiy, Cor la Kent also proposes contour drawing as an exercise than can enhance sensory perception in Learnina bv Head (1992). One of her assignments, for example, proposes that students: look at. see, and record such natural phenornenon as shadows. But. she (1992) warns her readers first that "it takes practice for us to recover this ability to see. or before that. the gifi of wanting to see bcause] for so many yean we have been learning to judge and dismiss, [to say] '1 know what that thing is - I've seen it a hundred times' -- and we've lost the cornplex realities, laws and details that surround us" (p.15). John Dewey (1934) had similarly disrnissed unconscious looking as mere 're- cognition" and warned against l decades ago. But Kent (1992) goes beyond warning agaimt it and proposes that we Yry to look the way the child looks -- always as if for the first time (p 1 5) She promises readen that if they penevere they will be rewarded by feeling Wir awakew[emphasis added] than [they] have feit in along tirne" (p.15). And, towards the end of koking and seeing more. Kent not only substantiates but extends both Greene's and Nicolaides' advocacies of learning to look and see by recommending looking at things for extended periiof time. She warns her readers, as well, that afler about five minutes they may think they have seen everything but if they persevere "after fifteen, or maybe twenty- seven, or maytx even fifty-eight minutes" it will be "like an explosion [and they] will see thousands of things they never knew were there" (p.16). As such, her exercises are means to Maxine Greene's solicited end of "seeing more" that resonate compatibiy with both Nicolaides' (1941) advocacy of seeing wlh as many senses as possible at once and Bercsi's advocacy of heightening âbiiii to perceive, as weli. And they also resonate compatibfy with the aesthetii literacy Greene was quoted advocating in the previous chapter that was chirned to be sinusoidaliy connected to creativity, if not be synonymous with it. An additional resonance between: Kent. May, and Greene, however, that relates to emp hasizing the qualitative nature of aesthetic experiences Greene (199 1) daims to be the focal point of its cultivation, is also engendered when Kent (1992) goes on to Say that "you will know that you could go on looking forever and never see it ail -- the rich texture of that same oid wall, the shadowy angles of the window ledge, and everything will ahvays be new" (p.l6), since that claim is consistent with both May's emphasis on continualiy bringing new realities into being, being the essence of creativity and Greene's emphasis on learning how to transform the ordinary into the extra-ordinary. And, their resonances are even further augmented when Kent (1992) concludes saying that "you will make new connections and relationships and becorne aware of subtle shading and implications [that] no amount of reading about looking can do for you ... pf youj just do it" (p.16), since both Greene and May ako emphasis the need to establish, or engender, relationships as part of aesthetic literacy and creativity, respectively. Anyone who has participateci successfully in such exerchas the ones descrbed by Kent and Nicolaides already knows that it is impossible to do so wilhout entering both the states of receptivity and integration May (1976) cbims to be integral to creativity. And the kind of attention required is ako resonant wilh the whoiehearted attention Buber advocated and chimed to be at least part of, if not ail of. creativity. Fortunateiy, thetefore, even though Mis experiential knowledge may, as Minger (1983. p.17) proposes, be unlikely to have rneaning for those without the expetince of it, contour drawing can provide that experience. Significanüy for this thesis, however, when they engender awakeness, these exercises also introduce students to what it can feel Iike to be creative, as May defines creativity, even if only at its most basic level. And, quite practicaliy, the products the students produce in this activiîy also reveal to aware teachers whether or not students have successfully engaged in the activily and whether or nat they are awake enough to be pfesent- to-themsehres-and-the-world. Teachers then have a way of knowing whether or not they have establshed comrnon ground, or a diabgue, between (themseive(s)) and their (student(s)). And the establishment of such diabgue is nothing iess than the establishment of the reciprocating pedagogical encounters the prevailing paradgm originally encouraged by ik initial deference to Buber's pedagogical paradgm that had encouraged the cutiation of creatiwity as 1-Thou dialogues, or experienceç of (comrnunion(s)) and community. Buber has been credited with initiating this paradigm into the Western world when he presented his keynote speech at "The Heidelberg Conference" of 1925 and posifed "education as diabgue" as the essence of creativity. And Maurice Friedman, one of Buber's biographes, claims this speech to have kenthe foundation of Buber's subsequentty famous advocacy of I-

Thou experiences. The advocacy of awakeness, however, goeç back at kast as far in history as the Eastern religious leader referred to as The Buddha since being awake is the goal of at ieast one branch of the religion The Buddha initiated. That branch is Zen Buddhism and the "Zen" stands for the meditation it claims to be the rneans by which participants are awakened, andior become more awake. Significantly for art education, generally, and this thesis in particular, one of the medlatian techniques Zen encompasses parallek the art practice of contour drawing. And that fact has been by embodied and perpetuated in both the texts of Betty Mwards (1979 and 1986) and Frederick Franck (1973 and 1979), as well as in the text by Corii Kent (1992) and the essay by Colleen Berai (1987). it is a supporter of rneditation, itself, however, who not only validates these art educators' appropriations but propels meditation into the context of the reciprocal social awareness that Read advocated, and engenders a bridge linking it to the awakeness aspired to. That advacate of meditation is Lawrence te Shan. In How to Meditate (1975) he proposes that: it is our fuliest "humanhood', the fullest use of what it means to be human that is the goal of rneditation" (p2). And as such, the goal of meditation paralkls the goal posited by the art educator, Mmund Feldman, in his book Becornina Human Through Art (1975). But for his part, Le Shan (1975) states, lirst, that rneditation is a tough minded, hard discipline to help us move toward this goal" (p.2). And he then goes on to claim, as well, that it is not the invention of any one person or one school. Repeatedty, in many different places and times, serious expbrers of the human condition have corne to the conclusion that human king have a greater potential for being. for living, for participation, and expression, than they have the ability to use. These exp brers have developed training methods to help us people reach these abilities, and these training methods... al1 have much in common (p2). From here he (1975) goes on to state both that "al1 the methods take work ... [and that there is] "no easy or royal road to the goal" p.2), before claiming, as well, both that "tbere is no end to the search; there is no position from which we can Say "Now 1 have arrived, I can stop workingm(p.2)- and that "as we work we find ourselves more at home in the universe, more at ease with oursehres, more able to work effectively at our tasks and towards or goal[s], closer to our ...[peers and] les anxious and kshostile" (pp.2-3). And, not oniy does king able ta accept the lack of teleology he is positing make fi possible to avoid the unnecessary 'angst" and "dread" usually associated with existential thought. but both the uncertainty and the Promethean nature of îiiseem "natural" after encountering Zen Budd hism and its medlation techniques that, like the Oriental syrnbol for crisis acknowledges the opportunity inherent in crisis to be akin to the opportunity presented by constructive experiences of nothingness. Most significantly for this thesis, however, Le Shan's rationale for meditation resonates compatibly with both Read's and May's reciprocal emphases on encouraging individuah (integration(s)) of self with self and self with (wortd(s)) as manifestations of aesthetic literacy and creativity. And this resonance is augmented when Le Shan (1975) reiterates that: "meditational programs have as a primari goal the tuning and training of that person so that [slhe can effectively move toward his [or her] goal"(s) (pp. 3-4) and then goes on to claim, as well, that "the increased abilily to act wholeheartedty and whole-mindedly, the wider perception of reality and the more coherent personality organization that it brings ... change the individual's actions and goais as much as good psychotherapy" (p.3.), since his claims resonate with: Buber's wholeheartedness. Kierkegaard's singlemindedness, and Vandenberg's claim of increased awakeness engendering more world. As such, Le Shan, from the vantage of a psychotherapist advocating mediation techniques, introduces a means of working towards the empowerment of individuals that is consistent with this thesis' goal of realizing creativity. And he does so in a manner that is consistent with Read's emphasis on reciprocity. Furthermore, when Le Shan gives directions for several types of meditation, one of which is a meditation of 'The Outer Way", he introduces a particular type of rneditation in which the only significant difference between the meditation exercise he describes, and Nicolaides' description of contour drawing, is that Nicolaides' students have a tool in their hand and a piece of paper to record their processes on, that Le Shan's students do not have. Le Shan (1975), like Nicolaides before him, ako starts by stating Mat much of the work of any form of meditation is "learning to do just one thing at a time' (p.61). And this emphasis on focussing, or attending, connects both Le Shan's and Nicolaides' propositions with Kierkegaard's claim that "purii of heait is to will one thing" (Barre!t,1962. p.16), and Buber's analogous daim that "depth of mind is to thinkone thought' (Barrett,1962, p.17). as well to Greene's emphasis on iearniq how to attend. For his part, however, Le Shan (1975). posits a "contemplativeameditation exercise in which participants first take: "an object and look at it. exploring it actively with ... [their] eyes as one might expbre a piece of velvet or a lump of alabaster by stroking it wlh one's hands' (p.53). And he telk them they must tiy to "learn to do this as nonverbally as possible, not talking in ... [their] heads about it..[and] essentialiy learning to look at sornething actively, dynamically, akrtly, but without words' (p.53). As such, not only does hiç exphnation parallel Nicolaides' for contour drawing, but this com bination of psychobgical and rneditational practices ako inboduces a rneans of airestng time sumciently to albw participants the opportunity to find 'the still point in the turning woM' that is the center Greene, May and Vandenberg have al1 alluded to. And finding it is not only something that: May. Greene and Vandenberg have al1 advocated. but il is also a means of engendering the space' both Greene and Heidegger claim to be necessary piecondition of aesthetic experiinces.

Colleen Lynch Bercsi

Comparabîy, another contemporary art educator, Colleen Lynch Bercsi, promotes enabling students to turn "the jurnbies" that consfitute their lies, mornentarily into "SM Iives", sirnply enough to eliminate the need to refer to such academic sources as Heidegger, in "Awareness, Awareness in Action" (Art Education January, 1987). And in this essay, the abili to be awake and in possession of sorne degree of conîrol, or agency, is not onîy posfied as the beginning of everything authentic, including authentic creativity, but contour drawing is credited with the potential to enable students to get a sense of king present and, tkrefore, a sense of kingauthentic. Significant, as well, however, because of its resonance with both Buber's proposed dialogues and Vandenbeg's proposed diabgue based pedagogical rehliwhps, Berai (1987) also asks rhetorically whether or not awakening both our own sensibilities and those of Our students, reciprocafîy. isnl 'what it's really al about?* (p.24). And with this question. she inspires (meaning 'breathes new Me into') the prevailing pedagogicai paradigm advocating reciprocdy by clarifying that cunivating perceptual awareness is not only part of culivating creativity but also part of establishing authentic diabgues. Doing sol she precludes monokgs. And then, quite practically, she ako claims that: oui responsbiiii as art educaton is awesome. We musi not only teach the basic skilk, develop aesthetic judgments, and encourage farniliarity with art and artists, but we must also deal with three very insidious problems that are rampant in the contemporary scene. Before any real teaching can take place. especially at the elementary and high school levels, we must combat, Sisual fatigue", "media bombardment", and "sensory overload" .... [which] goes beyond mere motivation. Students must learn to see as the artist sees, as if for the first time. A different focus on awareness must be introduced, and al1 of the senses must be retrained to revel in the joy of seiectiie sensory stimuli (p.23). That different focus of awareness is qualitative, according to Greene(l991). But, less rnercurialiy, Bercsi (1984) advocates both "sensing" in a manner resonant with both Nicolaies and Le Shan and the cutîivation of the "concentration" that meditation has kenclaimed to augment. And, resonantly with both of these authors and this thesis' emphasis on creativity as participating in world construction world, as well, s Bercsi's indication that the reason for making these efforts is to augment the amount of life one can expeiience. A goal of meditation is to participate in exercises to the point that the participation in life itself can become the exercise, or the means as well as the end, and the same not oniy can be said of exercises undertaken in art education, but has been said by Vernon A. Howard, in 'Useful Imaginings" (p.339,1991). And, not on4 was that goal evident in Nicolaides' clah that "art shouid be more concerned with life than with artw(1941,p.xiv). but 1 is still king perpetuated by claims such as Alain Arias-Mission's claim, in The Artist's Way (1992), that: "the purpose of art is not a rariîïed-intellectualdistillate - it is le, intensilied, brifliant W (p.5). And this thesis not only posits the possibility that empowering individuak to be creative is a means of enhancing their individual ives while ah,reciprocally, enhancing both the quantity and quality of consciousness in the shared and worid (that ought, logically, to enrich out shared and common world, as welf), but also claims that it is a means that can be undertaken appropriately in art classes. When meditation exercises are undertaken in art classes, however, and expected to constitute both a domain specific activity @cJ provide a means of access for students to achieve the awarenesses that ûercsi and the others have advocated, it is worth pointing out both that: the state of heightened awareness king called awakeness lingers for differing amounts of time after the activity has ceased, even a! this introductory level, and that in the wake of these experiences it is possible to continue to "look and seewwith the unaccustorned eyes of attentive tourists, children, andlor artists that is aspired to in many, if not most art curficulums, already. And as such, contour drawing is a rneans of achieving domain specik successes, as well as developing "heightened perception (p.23)". Greene has already been quoted advocating the cuitbation of heghtened perception. But. her (1989) quoting of part of an Anne Sexton poem claiming that to be "a key, a very large key, that opens something -- some useful door- somewhere - is surefy why we are here" (p.224) not only emphasizes mis, but illustrates her resonance with Bercsi, as well. For my part, I use contour drawing exercises as boü~a means of cultiiating the abilities to observe andlor attend and as a domain based end in itself, but recognize that atternpts to cuitivate such creativity are only as valuable as student's abilities to integrate them into their lived worlds. And 1 is therefore fortuitous that another tool exists that can help students to integrate those experiences (and others) into their lived worlds, or landscapes. "Sense and ldea Journals" are that tool. But, before "Sense & ldea Journak" are introduced, "sense diaries" and "&a pumW wiil be intrduced individually .

"Sense Diaries", "Ides Journalsa, and "Sense & ldea Journaka

Corita Kent (1992) introduces several art projects that are of a rneditative nature and she proposes that students keep them in a "Sense Diary". To introduce students to "sense diaries", she (1992) suggests that students spend at least fifieen minutes each day, for ai ieast a week drawing, writing, etc., everything they can about the changes in: sUe, shape, color, etc., of such phenornenon as shadows. And, since "sketch" books are already standard items in most art cuniculums, the extension of proposed materials to include sense perceptions is an obvious one that has the potential to both bring students into more direct contact with their own perceptions and to increase their awarenesses of them. A sense diav however, is not only "a tool that enables us to become aware of and retain details often bst or irnperfectîy remembered" (1992, p.18), but is also a means of seeing "the interrelatedm of things and how specifics from one subject may apply to the next" (p.18). And Kent

suggests, therefore, that along with sketches students "keep descriptions of things seen, heard or readn (p.18) in either their own words or, "if they find others they like bettef (p.l8), in those, before likening sense diaries to "expandable vauît[s] in which to store words, images and ideas" (p.18).

In 1993 The Manitoba Curriculum Guide For Art Mucation recommended using

"Ideas Journak". tt explained "idea journals" as: " working tool(sj for ... student[s) in the process of devebping ideas, responding to and making art " (pz). And it elaborated furaier, suggesting that idea journak have a "number of major functions", [of which four are:] 'the planning of projects; the gathering of resources and research materials; preliminary drawings and media experiments" (p.22) as well as, most significantly for this thesis, "expbring and documenting students' personal creative processes' (p22). So, on ils mos! basic ievel, "-&a journals" help 'students keep al1 required and exploratory material together" (p.22) since students are expected to include "al1 art-related written material and data relevant to particulai unils" (p.22) in them. But, along with such relevant data as: "teacher handouts, definlions, written research, opinions, quotations, evaluations and critiquing assignrnents, gallery reviews, brainstorming and webbing actiiities. relevant creative writing and any other significant written material" (pz), it (1993) suggests that these journals should rekct the development of visual ideas for the units being studied" (p.22) and include such things as: "prelirninary drawings, research sketches and photographie rnaterials, working photo collage, media experimenb and exercises, independent drawings, studies for Mure student-initiated projects, or any thing else of visual interest to the student" (p.22). It concludes with the suggestion that the idea journals no1 only provide "a very valuabie record of each students learning processes ... put they] are [ako] suitable for any art show, because they reveal the work invoived in the creative process to wider audiences of pers, parents, educators, administrators, and the general public" (pz). "Idea Journak" can, therefore, aid the dialoguing advocated and claimed to be synonyrnous with creativv in this thesis since, collectiveiy, the idea journal can encourage the integrafin of thegeugraphy of the art world students are encountering with studenrs lived worlds, and act, therefore, as source materiaf for the construction of their personal hndscape(s). Relevantfy, Vandenberg (1971) proposes that one advantage in designating the quabitive world of immediate experience lmdscq~and the sttuctured world of mediatecl experience geography s that these designations bok out at the worid w#h the experiencing king raîher than at him [or her]. They describe his [or her] world rather than objectrfying him [or her] and contributing thereby to the &nation between people. They enable one to see the "psychobgicai" and the "kgical" and to see them as simultaneous, concurrent element of the presupposlbn of human e>q>erience(p.100). But, even though "Idea Journals" offer both affective and efkctive means of enabling studenîs to become authentic, in the sense of being-present-to-viemsekes-and-Wir-wor(s) they can be irnproved upon by addressing sense perceptions, as well as ideas, and doing so in the endeavor's file, as well as in its content. The Guide (1993) did recognize the role of perception. And fi even advocated addressing it as part of cuniculurn. But, Istill t hink is has missed a potentialîy vlal connection by not specifically advocating the inclusion of sensoral perceptions and awarenesses of different States, or degrees, of consciousness in the journals it advocates including as part of art curricula. And, since the emphasis on remaining present-to-both-oneseu-and-theworld is integral to the authenticity advocated across the board in this thesis, combining the two proposals into "Sense 8 ldea Journals" is posited as a means of merging the best of both worlds by recognbing: mind, body and emotion, (or both conceptual and perceptual literacy), as well as encouraging the reflection claimed to be integral to the responsibility that is assumed to need cullivating along with respons-ability, as part of both the prevailing and proposed conceptions of creativity. Greene (1978) refers to the existential philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty's claims that "the life of reason develops against a background of perceived tealities [and that] to remain in touch wlh one's original preceptions is to be present to ones seC (p. 2). And Sense 8 ldea Journals are a rneans toward the proposed end of the authenticity advocated that simukaneousîy sewes the pragmatic end of king a phce to the keep such exercises as the contour drawings introduced previousiy, and the increasingly exoteric end of culiating both the awakeness and seeing more, that can be appropriateiy cuitiiated in educational environs. The end result of which is a record of paiticipants increasing abilities to attend that is as obvious to the trained eye as practice on a musical instrument S to the trained ear. But, it must be remembered that such exercises are just a beginning to ieaming how to see and hl more, that goes on forever, as scales and notes are a beginning to ieaming how to play and hear more, that goes on forever. This chapter has reiterated Read's idea that consciousness can and should be cultivated as part of aesthetic literacy, but noted that recognition of its integral roh in the prevailing paradigm goes back as far as Collingwood and Dewey. And. by quoting more recent proposals by Kent and Bercsi it has indicated the cultivation of increased consciousness to be consistent with current art educational practices and goals, as well. It has claimed such cultivation to be germaine to the cunivation of both authentic creativfty and aesthetic literacy. And "Sense and ldea Journals", generally, and contour drawing, specifically, have been introduced as two possible means of increasing: consciousness, abilfiies to attend, and/or awakeness. Al1 three of the preceding concepts been claimed to be resonant with: one another, May's existential "redefinition" of creativity, and Read's reciprocal paradigm. And they have ako al1 kenclaimed to be consistent with Jung's emphasis on the creation of consciousness that, as an extension of world making accepted as archetypal creativity, can be cuiüvated to enhance the world(s) of individuais and our shared and common world(s), simuttaneously, quite appiopriately in art classes. Bercsi's question as to whether or not awakening 'the sensibilitiis of our students, and our sefves, wasnY realiy what it's al1 about? '(1987,p.24)was rhetorical but it has been responded to anyway. And my answer has been "yss",since th& answer is consistent with the reciprocal nature of the student-teacher-relationship proposed as part of the prevailing paradigm based on authentic diabgue in which teachers consütute one of many comrnunities, or worlds, students can experience and use to contribute to their own (landscape(s)). This conclusion is consistent with Greene's proposal that teachers constitute "keys" that enaôle students to transcend their own limited experiences and empower themseives to transforrn ordinary experiences into extraordinary ones. And it is consistent with the proposal that, along with king and providing keys to worlds beyond the imrnediateiy present ones 8etty Redfern (1991) warns against Iimiüng students to, teachers must also teach students how to construct their own keys and seek out their own visions, so that they can become their own agents and the guardians of both their own and the planet's well-king. And th& amounts to teachers teaching students how to 'learn how to learn', as Greene (1989) emphasizes. In the introduction to this thesis Janus was posited as a plausible syrnbol for art education based on such goal as the preceding ones. And it was subsequentty claimed that aesthetics and aesthesia could be recognized as two sides of one Janusian face. In this chapter the additional associations of Janus as the symbolic keeper of the "keys" and guardian of new beginnings, as well as god of world making (according to Rothenberg (1976)), has been augmented by Greene's analogy of teachers king and engendering keys. And, pairing Janus with Prometheus' symbolic offering of the tire, or light, of consciousness, has now kenposited and claimed to warrant consideration, as well, for its potential to engender more cornprehensive symbolic representation of art education's potential to encourage affective and effective integration of individuals and their (world(s)). Attention andlor attending are both a means and an end in Zen and applying the Biblical parable suggesting that 1 is better to learn how to feh than to be given a fish (a parable suggesting that 'doing" has the hghest bng terni kaming vaiue). the skill of medita!ing has been posited as a key to iearning how to attend in such a way as to inspire and enable attending to pieces of art, as well as to one's life, in such a way as to be more awake and therefore able to engender more world for hth oneself and others. In art classes such aitending has been chirned to be manifestable as both appreciating and making art. And. to the extent that appreciating and making are both manifestations of authentic creativity, the ability to contemplate is a relevant skill that both can and should be cultivated in art curriculurns. even if only to still 'the jurnbie' and engender 'space'. momentarily. Ultirnateiy. Greene's and Vandenberg's emphases on awakeness has been posited as an existential extension that can augment the existing paradigm's recognition of a need for increased consciousness that can be appropriatety cultivated in art environs. And, since once awake one can begin to realize their own uniqueness. attention now turns to Buber's conception of unqueness and its intrinsic roie in the prevailing and proposed paradigms. Chapter Six

Uniqueness that Embodies Authentic Exktential landscapes As Essential To the Contemporary Conception of Creativity in Both The Prevailing and Propoeed Paradigrnt

In the introduction tb her book Bailin (1994) posits o@inaliiy as the Zrst of five salient features that are common (p.3) to the contemporary view of creativity. And, if her depiction of "originality" was resonant with the unqueness Read's proposal advocated in Mucatina-fhrouah-AR (1943,1958). that emphasis WOU#be accurate, rehtive to the contemporary conception of creativiîy em bodied in a prevailing paradgm in art education. Read's deference to Buber's depiction of creativity. in general, however, and his emphasb, therefore, on the particular conception of uniqueness Buber introduced at the Heideberg Conference of 1925, makes 1 clear that the two conceptions have next to nothing in common. Their difference is revealed when Bailin (1994) States that "the importance of the notion of creativity in contemporary society and the consequent impetus toward fostering originality are oflen manifested in terms of an emphasis on novew and divergence" [ialics adde4 (p.7) because, even though divergent thinking has, indeed, been cuitivated in the prevailing paradgm, 1 has usualty been cullivated in conjunction with its precedent, namely convergent thinking. And, it is achieving a balance between the two types of thinking that has recenred serious attention in public education, not divergent thinking abne. 'Noveity krthe sake of noveîty' has also never been generally adopted, and has in fact, onty been included at all, as adjuncts to core curriculum. For exampie, possible exceptions, such as Nichohs Roukes'

Desisn Svnectics (1988) and Art Svnectii (1982), have usually kenincluded in aM&n to, and not at the expense of, more traditional approaches to art curriculum. And, public art cuniculums have continued to advocate mixes of: skiil building, awareness building, and knowledge building, abng with new emphases on culivating creative thinking and working skilis, as tky have continued to emerge and evotve. Traces of Buber's concephion of uniqueness, on the other hand, can be kund in the majorii of the pedagogies that have contrbuted to the prevailing paradigm in art education, and is certainiy manifest in the pedagogies of: Lowenfeld (1975), Read(1956), Rowland (1976) and hkFee(1W6), as well as the one Feldman expressed in Becamina Human Throw h Art (1975). And, as such, it is embadkd in the paradigms generated by at least kur of the cornerstones of contemporary art education. lt was, however, Herbert Read's anticipatory emphasis on un~menesshing cuhYvated rec@ruca#y wM s9cbl conscYIusness, in his text (1943,1958) citing the explanatiin of unqueness Buber had expounded at The Heidelberg Conference of 1925 when addressing the topic of "The Unfolding of Creativity In the Child" as an explanatian of creativity, itself, that is at the heart of the prevailing paradigm. That conception of uniqueness.cum-creativky is as that w hich makes a person or thing of value in &e#[ialics added], that which is unrepeatabie and for which na other value can be substituted, that which is not a matter of usefulness or function but, however much it may exist in relation to the others. is an absolute center in itseif (Friedman, Encounter on the Nanow Ridae, 1991, p.47). And, since aie emphases on value and king an absolute center in and of -if, has na relation to emphases on divergence, or novelty brthe sake of novelty, there is a schism separating that conception of unqueness and the conception of originaiii express& as rnere divergence, or navelty, that Bailin (1994) posited as integral to the contemporary conception of creativity. That difference does not, however, mean that the prevailing paradigm in art education would be exempted from Bailin's general reMaüon and dismissal of the contemporary conception of creaüvity (air- quoted), since the contemporaiy concepth still includes emphases on individuals and theU proceses (even though those emphases have been revealed to be part of a tnnity that includes: prducts, people and processes, and claimed, therebre, to expand upon, rather than eliminate, emphasis on products.) Particuiarly significant br this thesis, however, is the fact that this misunderstanding is another one that the inclusion of specific rekrences Io existential thought can chnfy. And Buber's conception of both creativity, in general, and uniqueness, in particular, are cbimed b be able to contrbute to this clarification. That clarification does not alter the fact that many supporters of traditional conceptions of creaüvity still refute both the idea that individu* shaping their own hes should be deemed creative at dl, kt abne deemed quintessentialiy creative. But, at the least, the clarification does have the potential to ptevent the perpetuation of some of the misleadhg information king dismeminated, regarding the nature of the conception of creativity embodied in the prevailing pedagogical paradigm in art educatbn. lt must be admitted that king 'misunderst& on this point is not surprising since the fact that a variety of deiinitions of "orginaiii" exist, couples with the fact that there is an emphasis on authentic@ in the conception of uniqueness Buber initiateci and Read perpetuated, and Bennett Reirner has already been quoted posiüng authenticity as aie "rnost confusedaaspect of aesthetic dialogue (p.336). And, the existential claim that authenticity, like consciousness, is experiential, also increases the likelihood of confusion since such phenomenon need to be experienced before they can be understood, and maybe ab experienced before they can even be imagined. Augrnenting misunderstandings even further, however, is aie fact that the word "novel" is used in dicüonarii as a synonym for the word "ofginai" even though the word "novel" has none of the associations of 'going back to sources', beginning', 'starting points', or 'birth' that the word "original" has. And, since the words norigin" andlor "originar do not have any associations comparable to the transiency and cheapness of ob'jkund in the "noveity" shops the word "nover has corne to be synonymous wlh, "uniqueness" is a more appropriate ascf~tbnkr the concept embodied in the contemporaiy conception of creaüviîy -- especially since Martin Buber applies his trademark consciefiaousness to h# use of hnguage and there is no mstake possible about what he means by uniqueness. Unbrtunateîy neaher Buber's pedagogÉal appSition of diakgue nor Ir dependence on unqueness enpys the acadernic renown of the 1-Thou relationships he iater depicbed, even though his birapher, Friedman, claims the former to have anticipated the latter in tiicounter on the Nanow Ridae (1991). Mnging Buber's cldm of unqueness king integrai to the diakgueing that constitutes creativity to the forefront of the prevailing pedagogical paradigm, however, couid change that. And, doing so is mther of the extensions existentiai thgM is clairned to have the potential to engender since, even though Read defened to it ta explain creativity, th& aspect has never yet taken precedence in that paradigm's perpetuation. Even if the authentic dialogue that is the essence of Buber's relaüvely famous I - Thou concept does need to be experienced, initially. to be understood, ad ciasses have already been clairned to be able to provide those introductory expetinces by teaching students how to 'Sien with their eyes' and see with many senses at one time. And, wknthe contour drawing exercises introduced in the previous chapter are used to provide encounters- with-things that not onty reveal the unqueness of the things king studied, but potentialty reveal the uniqueness to be found in al1 things by extrapolaüon and anabgy , such initial expeiences are made ubquitousîy availabk. "Sense 8 kaJournalsu have been posited as a means of acknowledging and cuttiuating uniquenesses in art classes. And such joumals can not only hep make student more aware of ttieir own unqueness but they can ab enhance student's emrging awarenesses of the fact that their peen also have their own uniqueness to cultivate and communkate, as wefl as cornmonalties, or geography, to share. This awareness and communication, furthemiore, is abthe beginning of the mrnmunm Buber posited as the mite of compulsion at the Heideberg conference because understanding uniqueness is the necessaiy prerequisite brthe undestanding of diabgue, for one can be ûuiy open and ready b meet others only l one stands on the ground of one's unqueness and ôeepens that ground through each new meeting (1991, p.49). And, prior to making th6 chim, Buber had aiready posited that: 1 is not freedom and the release of instinct that are decisive for education ... but the educaîke forces ttiaî meet the released instinct. Roponents of the old authoriüarian theory of education do not understand the need for freedom and spontaneity . But proponenls of the new, freedomcentered educational theory misunderstand the rneaning of freedom, which is indiinsable but not in itself sufiicient for true educaion. The opposite of compulsbn is not freedorn but communion (p.187). Not only cm (communion(s))augment uniqwness but, to the extent Mat Kenneth Beene's conclusion in "Technobgy and Community" S correct about "community, in a normative sense of that term, as an association of people, mutually and reciprocalty invoived wilh each other, canng for each other, aware of the human effects of their action ...committed to king responsibie brthese effects, [being] dangerously missing both in our institutions of formal educaüon and in the society which environs these institutions (1975, p.156) integrating Buber's depiction of unqueness and advocacy of rnanitesüng it in diabgue could mitigate a dangerous social condition. In the existential approach outlined, however, il can not be brgotten that unique sehe(s) are the reakation of unque moments in tirne and phce (called "bcations"), or th& everyone is recognked as king born with a unique set of genes, into unque families, and bound to enter into relatively unque: communities, cultures, countries, etc. mat will influence eac h of hem ta differing degrees. (And buseexistence preœdes essence, even identical twins will differ because their experiences are bund to ditler.) Quintesçentialty, however, individuais, are ako understood to reciprocally influence the wor#((s)) they encounter b varying degrees. Som, br exarnpie, wiU visbty change whole worlds whüe ohers w3 only rnake imperceptbie changes. But, either way, this ôelief is still resonant with Read's proposed emphasis on recipmcity in education. There are, however, stiil conceptions of creativity being promoted that require individuab to effectiveiy change at least one outer worîd to be considered %reativem.And the fact that those that do are equating creativity with a definition of "genius" that labek those who bansbrrn their fields "genii" does not change the orginal fact 00th Robin Barrow's and Sharon Bailin's books, brexample, support this more traditional position, directîy, as does Smith's, less directly . Bailin's and Smith's proposed emphasis on the disc~linehas akeady been noted but their peer's, Robin Barrow's comparable advwacy, has not In the book he co- authored with Ron Woods, Introduction ta Philosophies of Mucation (1975)' Robin Barrow devotes a chapter to the subject of creativity. And in that chapter he takes exception to the idea that a chiid's work can be Iikened to a Shakespeare's. From the perspectives proposed in this thesis, however, not onty cana child's efforts be likened to aiose of accomplished artists, but they rnust, because al1 creativity exists on the saine spectrum and what makes a Shakespeare creative in this perspective is the authenticity [s]he realizes, just as what rnakes a child's work creative is the authenticity (s)he reakes. And, even though it is acknowledged that is unlikeiy for a child to have acquired the: skilis, knowieâge and/or integrated uniqueness that would enable his or her work to rival the mature artisrs reverberaüons in our shared and cornmon (world(s)), it is not deemed impossible. And the child's efforts still exist on the same continuum as those of the mature artist, even if they representing an eailier stage of development. Or, more accurateiy, they exist on the same continuum to the extent mat they are bai wholehearted and conscious manifestations of aü that an individual laiows and can express at that moment in time. since as such. the produd, what ever fi might be, is not only "the best" that person could engender then, but atço the communication of a "slice of his or her Me" anaor "hndscape". Nelher Bailin's nor Barrow's depictions of creativity see suc h manikstations comparably since they believe that creative products must be vaiued by external representatives of a dbc~iineto be considered creative raaier than deemed so by ~~latke)y ordinary. snguhr individuak. The conception of creativity that has been evoiving in ad educadon since Read quoted Buber, however, has not only placed emphaslç on emraging as rnany people as possible to arrive at the point of king wliiand abie to contribute al they can, to as many moments and situations as they can, but it has ako phced ernphasis on encouraging indiiiduak to be both responsive and reliective enough to responsbly asyln value themselves. And Mat, this thesis is suggesting, is as 1 shuH be. Only it not only shouki be more efkctivelyso, but can be more elkctively so if the prevailing paradigm integrates aspects of exktential thaught to ground and enhance the insufficient humanistic idealisrn currently undemining it.

A proponent of exktential orientations, Maxine Greene, in the introduction to Landscaws of Learninq (1978), stated that her 'pnmary interest was to draw attention to the multiple realities of our cube in such a way as to amuse readers to pose cranal questions of their own' (p.1 ). And. bebre explaining that the successful gmunding of mie in their hed lives is what she meant by "Ian&capesn (p.2) she stated that il was her "view that persons are more iikety to ask theu own questions and seek theY own transcendence when they feel themselves O be grounded in their personal historks, their üvd hres" (p2). But, having said bat, and named her book aRer the concept, liltle other attention was paid to the idea of hnôscapes, except to qwte Maurice Merleau-Ponty stating tha! ''the Me of remdeveiops against a background of perceived realiiand that 70 remain in touch with one's original preceptions is to be present to ones ser @2)as noted previousiy. Fortunatety, theretwe, given the importance A can be assumed to have, Vandenberg ebborafed on the concept of hndscape in Beina and Mucation (1971). Merleau-Ponty's term Rr Greene's hndscapes appears to be "primordial" but, unlike Greene, Vandenberg (1971) credii John Dewey with coining the term "hndscapea(p.99). before contrasling bntlscrlpes wiîh pography and advocating the cuitivatbn of them both. He abclaims thd landçcape can be used "quite literally" to describe the buter pole" of prereflective, nondiscursive consciouçneçs" (p.84) that consütutes "the world that the child lives in immediate relation with when he is üving directiy into the world, before he distances hirnself from the world through iearning of names of things" (p.84). And, like May, Vandenberg warns that even though experiencing such landscapes can conditute a degree of ecstasy (p.84) (comparable to ones May associates with creatiiity and advocates cultivating to mitigate the subject object splt that plagues much of western culture), geography weds to recognized, as wei, in order to engender the suprarationai state aspired to and prevent the lac k of "horizon" that resuiîs when bndscape is overemphasizeâ or indulged in exclusiveiy . Vandenberg (1971) also refers to the successful integration of both hndscape and geography by Heideggets term of uâwelling". And, since the implications of that term are resonant with Maitin Bubeh emphasis on dialogue and imply Hedeggets precedenî setüng use of hyphens to represent the integration of individuak-wth-the-world,yet another extension possible through integrating aspects of existenüal thought, has been Cllroduced. Vandenberg's (1971) own emphasis on the necessaiy redprocity of the two realms, however, also substantii and extends Wsemphasis on both, as well when he (1971) clarifies the existential position by stating thd even îhough it is Iandscape, as distingulshabie hmthe geography, that sunounds him [or her] a& [slhe has iearned the names of things that are embod'i in "ordinary 4nguagea ... the human world, the woriâ as correlaîe of individual consciousness, ir both bndocape and gmgraphy [and is] correiative to both the prereflectiw and the reile!ctii planes of consciousness [emphasis addedj (p.84). And, not oniy was Betty Redfem (1991) already quoted waming against augmenting the soiiislic individual worlds that Vandenberg (1971) chims to result from failing to integrate gagraphy with the individuds perewe iandscape, but Rolb May's (1976) reûefinition of creaüvity was &O quoted comparably warning against soliism when 1 dsmissed creativity that knlbaianced by integration witb the objective pole presenteû by the shared and comrnon world as escapist. For iîs part, art education can help establish the balance rekrred to as dwelling by creating awareness of the uniqueness ernbodied in a work (such as Vincent Van Gogh's painting, "Starry Nighr (1889)) and enabling Sudents to understand (work((s))) as one artist's unique depiclion of something that has muiûple realiües, of which each student's world(s) are one. 'Sany Night" (1889) has been posited as an exampie of one artist's depidion of: God ness, dwinity, and/or peak experience and teachers can extend expbrations of that painting's: formal, stylistic, expressive, and historiial signikances with student projects that encourage studenîs to identify theit own and each othets comparable experiences, as we# as means of communicating them. bingso encourages CO-historicizingas bath Vandenberg (1971 ) and Heidegger depict it since student(s) awarenesses of both the commonaîîy of such expiences and thei personal epiphanai natures can be augmented by such expbrationsI reciprocalb with their "geographicaf knowledge and skilis. And, such CO-historizingab rehtes to Ponty's aâvocacy of king able to go brward and bachard in time htersub~ely that, in tun, rehtes to this thesii suggestion that art teachers adopt the symboiism associated wlh the god Janus' abiiii to see into the past and the Mure while &hg in the present and guarding, or protecting, the gateways and keys to new ôeginnings. And, less metaphoricaliy, this thesis suggests that the current poiarity between pedagogical paradigms is unneceswy since approaching a masterpiece in the manner described meeîs and exceeds both the criteria Smith aiticuiated in Gccellence in Art Mucation (1987) and those aspired to in most other paradigm. Such propcb, furthemore, can be devebped in the "Sense8 &a Journals" introduced in the previous chapter to encourage the gathering together of the (ragmenîs and "%evered parts suffcienüy to unify studenrs lNed worids' that Greene (1978, p.185) advocates by quoting Vuginia Woife. And, reflecting upon what has been depicted throughout history on universal themes opens the door to the possibility of students seing where they are both like and difFerent from aieir pers and ancestors which is consistent with the goals of devebping senses of: unqueness, cornrnunity, communion, and specieshood (or CO-hiçtoriciring).Al1 of which can be cultivated in art classes as the unqueness and reciprocai social consciousness Read advocated cultivating, and augmented by cultiiating the integration of the responsibility that existentialists chim to be the flip side of freedom, as well as respons-ability. Reciprocal reçponse and responsibility b the focus of the next chapter but, kfore moving on to elaborate on the potential role of that exlsteritial postulate the conception of uniqueness depicted by Saint kupery in The Lime Rince (1943) bars introducing since it is an integral component of a contemporaty myth Mat addresses questions regarding the natures of both unqueness and responsibiiii consistentîy with this thesis' depiction of creativiîy Mile abaddressing GabliUs (1992) daim of out secular worîd needing new myths. St Exupery's Little Prince

In the tale of The LiPrince (1943), Saint Exupery's hero leaves his world of a minute planet 'no bigger than a house' to go on a quest. Doing so, he ieaves behind his planet's only other inhabitant, a rose he believes to be "unique in al1 the woridw(p.62). And the hero is heartbroken when k happens upon a rose garden on one of his adventures because it causes him to believe he was mistaken about his rose's unqueness. Through the hep of a bx, however, he iearns three iessons. He iearns that "to tame" means 70 establish ties" (p.M)(like Wolfe's engendering of relationships constluting creativity and existential "appropriation" understood as making something one's own). He iearns that one becornes forever responsibîe br what one tames, as well as that along the cammn "geography" his rose shares with other roses his rose is still unique because of her relationship with him and his wlh her. And, abng with learning that the conscientious care he invested in the relationship contributed to bath of their uniquenesses he iearns that "it is only with the heart that one can see rightty; what is essential is invisible to the eye" (p.70). I happen to prefer the clairn that 'it is only with the sou1 that one sees clearly', attributed to the phenomenologist, Husserl. But the ongoing popularity of Saint fxupery's Little Prince can help disseminate the conception of uniqueness introduced by Buber, in 1925, and cited by Read, in 1943. And, since this modern rnyth also conveys the idea of creativity including responsibility, as well as uniqueness, that s the concept this thesis' now turns its aîîention to. Chapter Seven

Responsibility, Geognphy, and the Possibility of "DwallingU as Aspects of Social Consciousness and Creatiiity

The prevbus chapter focusseci on the un@enessRead (1943,1956) advocated cuîtivating as part of his concepians of education, in general, and aestheüc likracy, in parücular. And, since Read had cüed the coneepüon of unqueness Martin Buber introduced in 1925 as an explanation of creat~ity,drawing attention to that fact was posited as an obvious rneans of cuttivating both respons-ability and responsbiiity in students while also substantiating and extending the parameten of the prevailing pedagogicai paradigm. Vandenberg's (1971) and Greene's (1978) comrnon advocacy of cultivating uniqueness metaphoricaliy as personal landscapes was introduced and claimed to engender anottier means of substantiating and enriihing the prevailing paradigm in art education because both their depictions acknowieûge the need to cultivate both awarenesses of awakeness and geography as the correlate of landscapes. And these Mo awarenesses were claimed to be consistent with the social consciousness Read (1956) advocated cultiating reciprocaliy with uniqueness as part of the pedagogical paradigm he proposed, before the chapter concluded with an excerpt from Saint Exupery's Lime Prince embodying both the conceptions of uniqueness and responsibiiity being articulateci and advocated in this thesis. This chapter shifts emphases from the uniquenesses of individuak that can and should be cultivated as an integral component ~f creativity to the social consciousness Read (1956) advocated cuitivating reciprocaliy with it. it claims social consciousness to be consistent with both Jean Paul Sartre's proposition that the fiip side of heedom is responssbilify and Buber's that the opposite of compulsion is communW. And 1 claims Heidegger's existentially oriented docacy of dweUhg as a way of kingto have anticpated the integrated states depicteci by May as ecstasy, and be resonant with Buber's 1-Thou communions. Ullinatety. the: responsibüity. community, communion, and dwelling these four existentiaily oriented auoiors introduce are claimed to have the potential b booi substantiate and extend the conception of creativity embodied in the prevailing paradigm in the direction of the more integrated and integraüve paradgm claimed to be both warranteci and possible in this thesis.

Being encouraged and enabled to respond has kendemonstrated to have been a recognized part of most academicians' proposed pedagogies in ait education for the last hal century under the mandate of increasing perceptual abiîii. For Ponty, perception is synonymous with consciousness and the cultivation of one is therefore the cuîtiiation of the other, as well. And the cultiivaüon of perceptual abilitii can be seen as the cutüvation of respons-abiiii. Responsibiliîy, however, can be seen as respons-ability's Siamese Win in lght of Jean Paul Sartre's daim in Wstentialism and the Human Ernotions (1945) that: the [wolman who invoives him [or her] set and who realizes that [sjhe b not oniy the penon [sjhe chooses b be, but also a law-maker who is, at the same time. choosing al1 mankind as well as him [or her] self, cannot escape the feeling of his [or her] total and deep responsibilii (p.159). And, quintessentiatîy for thk thesis, Sartre atso daims that when people deny this responsibility they are king inauthentk. This thesis has avoided any references to exiçtential thought that do not speciîically relate to creativity as it is king explained and advocated in this thesis. since it is about creativity and its cuitkation rather than existentialism, per see. And even the fact that the unqueness of individu* and his or her experiences of the worü are recognized as the sine qua non of existentid thought has not been rekrred to previousty. tt is, however, deemed worthy of pointing out, now, both that the existential ethicai maxim amounts to asking orieself "what would happen if everyone thougM or did what I am thinking or doing?" and that as such, as much as existentialism has been jusüfîably famous for being about "the solitary one" since Kierkegaard emphasized that individuals who could, shouM, stand against the crowd, it is ab about "everyone'. And the reason bracknowtedging this point 6 the bebf that this communal aspect of existential thought is one that needs to come to the forefront to prevent further perpetuaüons of unneceççary misunderstandings and dismissab of existentialiçm, such as Gablik's in The Reenchantmen? of Art (1992), since those dismissals ciose doonvays and elhinate keys that inclusions can open and engender. Sartre (1945). br example, goes on to date that: 101 every man [or woman] everything happens as if al1 of [hulman kind had its eyes lixed on him [or her] and were guiding itself by what [slhe does. And every [wolman ought to ask him [or herlself "Am 1 really the kind of [wolman who has the right to act in such a way that humanity might guide itseif by my actions?"(p.l60). And îhis statement engenders a connection between: 'the recreation of humanity king dependent on the recreation of individuab' Eiliott (1991) claimed, Readk advocacy of al1 educatiin cuitivating social consciousness reciprocally with uniqueness, and May's redefinition of creativity as the' encounters of intensively conscious individuals with the wodd that briry some new reality into being' (1976, p.56). Sartre, however, aiso daims that people are "condemned to be free. Condemned to be free because we did not create oursehres, yet in other respects are free, because once thrown into Vie world we are responsibk for everything we do" (1945, p.161). And Mough hs words are simple enough, there are two important concepts intertwined in them. First, by king lhrown into the woild" he does not man being born in aie üteral, bidogical sense. Without any reiigious references he means "born again" in a figurative sense. He means being bor n into an awareness of consciousness, generaliy , and of one's respombilii (as he defines it), specificaiiy. As such, once awakened by king Yhtown Mo the woild', we becorne unavoidably responsible for: contributing to 'the wtioie' we call "humanity" by living up to our own unique potent ial(s) ancilor dong and kingthe best we can do or be. And doing so, we contniute axiornaticaiiy to the enhancement of the world in a manner consistent with bth May's claim of courageous. conscious. cornmitment constiiuting creativify and Jung's consciousness myth s-ng the same. Failing to do so once awakened, however, we contrbute negativeiy to 'the whole', sleep airough our lives, fail to contrbute what we abne could, and enter a state Sartre calk &ad hrïh and theobgy calls accidk, or the sin of failing to be al1 one can be.

Also worth noting at this point is that the kaof responsibility in and of itsetf 6 not necessariiy at odds with Bailin's (1994) claim that the purpose of creativity "is to promote the devebpment of the traditions of knowledge and culture" (1994, p.131). But, for existentialii (and humanistic psychobgists) the individual and his andlor her conscious experiences, not the traditions or the artifacts that appear to be the emphases in: Bailin's (1994); Barrow's (1975); and Smith's (1987) proposais, remain the sine qua non. Freedom and responsibiîii being integral to one another is also intertwined with the existentialist assumption that there is no such thing as either fixed human nature or destiny. There are oniy choices, as May has pointed out, as well as "contingencies". There are some "situations" over which we have had and can have, lrttle or no control, since there is a relativety objective world into which we are born that contibutes to our unique bcatbns in tirne and place. We can, however, participate to vary ing degrees in a myiiad of choices that will inform our nature(s) and INes, and can be understood îo be paiticpating in the construction of both when we do so. if we do so conscbusly, fuitherrnore, both May (1976) and ElEotl(1991) propose that we consider ourseives creative, since particpatrig consciously in the thousands of minute choices needing to be made every day is one way of understanding creaüvity that to some, perhaps inlinitesimal extent, helps or hinders the future(s) and woildiq of the woild (whether participation 6 by design or by default). And, if we do not act intentbnally, by design, we can expect to Bnd oursehes at the mercy of greater wills and extemal mornentums, as weii as at the mrcy of our own unconscious impuises if we do not make the effort to make them conscious. When Sartre (1945) spoke of king 'ïhrown into the worlâ", his hypothesis was also resonant with the awakening of our conscibus selves that Thoreau had advocatd eariier, even though both the fact that we 1) have had no active part in shaping what we inherit because the common worid has kenshaped before out individual arrivais by a muniof factors, and that 2) even once 'awakenedw to the possbilities created by Our freeâom we remain limited by factors beyond our control (such as: place, time, resources, gens, etc.), causes Sartre to claim that we are wcondernned"to be free. And for him, we are further "doorneda, both because we can aiways imagine more than we can do or bel and because we cm never venfy what we do do by îixed standards and rnust therefore act abne, even when acting in chosen concert. More contemporarily, however, May (1976) speaks for the "Yeah saying existentialists" (such as Buber and Marcel) when he goes from claiming both that "in human beings courage is necessary to make beihgand becoming possble [and that] an assertion of the self, a commlment, is essential if the self is ta have any realityn (1976,p.5), to stating that he recogn~esthat there can be pyin that freedom, as there can be pyin even the smailest contribution to the reconstructions of the worid. And, to the extent the latter s true, wuragesus comm#ment is essential to reaiize the proposed conception of creativrty and it is therefore worth repeating May's cbim that:

the distinction between human beings and the rest of nature rithat] the acom becomes an oak by means of automatic growth; no commitrnent is necessary. The kitten simiiariy becomes a cat on the bas6 of instinct. Natore and behgare identical in creatures like them. But a man or wornen [sic] becornes hitly human oniy by hiç or her choices and his or ter commitment to them. People attain wtth and dgnw by the mulatude of decisians they make fmm day ta day (1976, p.5). This quote distik the essential difference behveen the proposed existential extensions of the prevailing paradigm and the largely humanbtic thought that inéonned the original paradigm, namely that creativity that was originalîy assumed to be more, rather than les, biobgicaiîy destined in humanistic frarnework, but understood to need both courageous commitment and imagination to redire it, in existential conceptions.

May s an existential psychologkt who opens Couraae to Create (1976) on a Sartrian note proposing fiisl, that "we are calied upon to do something new, to anfront na man's hnd, to push into a forest where there are no well-wom paths and from which no one has retumed to guide usn (p.2). And then claiming that failing to do so we will not oniy have "capitulated to the blind juggemaut of history and lost the chance to rnold the Mure into a Society more equitabie and more humane" (p.2) but, having faiied to express our own ofginal ideas and failed to make our "contribution to the whole" (p.2), we will also have betrayed ourseives and "our community" (pz). May does, however, end his first chapter more optimisticalty by proposing that "whatever sphere we may be in there is a profound joy in the realization that we are helping to form the structure of the new worid" (p.32), and clarifying that mis is creative courage, however, minor or foduitous our creations may be" (p.32). Chapter Three abclarii that something as mimr as appreciating çorneone's work can be honored as emerging creativity in the conception advocated. And th6 chapter illustrates that we stil can and shouid culivate respombilii as part of social consciournas, to be consistent with authentic creativity in which the art world b part of an objective pole compcised of geography that must be integrated with individuai(s) hndscape(s) in ads swh as appreciating. 11 illustrates that doing so is consistent wiîh both Buber's emphasis on creaüvity as comcbus diabgue and Read's emphasô on aesthetic literacy being culavaîeâ within a framework encouraging rec@malernphasô on unqueness and sociai consciousness. And ta do xr aie role of geugrq~hyrelative to hndscape in art education is clariiand then Hedeggeh advaracy of building dwelling Minking is noted.

Geography

In Art Culture and Environment (l97ï) June McFee claims that "everyone influences the quality of the shared environment" (p.10). as well as that "the ways people relate ta one another and to nature creates the patterns within which they he" (p.10). She then proposes that "the qualii of the environment depends on peopîe's abiliîies to use their design senslivity. their social responsibility, and their ecoiogical concerns together to sotve environmental problems" (p.10). And she concludes that "when this is done, art is not an appendage. but an integral part of decision-making" (p.10). The signiikance of which is that as such, the conception of creativity she has articulated is one in which saciai consciousness iç required and responsibility is explicitfy advocated. Not everyone shares this perspective. as both Smith's reMation of any rtierapeutic" or "extra-aesthetif approaches to art education and Bailin's refutation of including emphases on peop andior process in conceptions of creativity indicates. But. anything deemed "good" by sorneone can be considered aestheüc on sorne kvel. as even Smith (199 1) acknowledpes when he States that: "practically anything can be cansidered hman aesthetii point of view (p.3)". And, not oniy are McFee's goals definitely aesthetic, since they aspire to enabie people to participate in making the world a %etter"ancilor more "beautifui"place, but bUth McFee's additional chims that "every person has a reqmsn;biIAy [ilics added] to leam how to deal with his or her environment, and Bhat] since design is a key eiement, 1 is important that everyone learn how design qualities relate to the functbn of things" (lgï7,p.l O), alço augment the ernphasis on cutivatmg social consciousriess introduced into oie prevailing pedagogical paradgm in art educatbn by Read's advocacy of % Lowenfeld, as well, as recentty as 1975, suggested (in conjunction with Brittain) that: the purpose in devebping aesthetic grawth is not to honour the work of past nor present artists, nor is it to teach the vocabulary of art, but rather the purpose is to encourage and to develop the aesthetic response of an indiliidual to hiF [or wpa&ular workl [italics added] (1975, p.398). And as such, even though Lowenfeld's pedagogy ernphasized cultivating individuak unquenesçes within social and political conte* more than McFee's emphases on creating awarenesses of the shared and cornmon world and empowering people to affect it, both of their emphases anticipated the kind of transformations Gablik (1992) and Greene (1978,l989,l99l) advacate cukiivating in art education, currentiy. The Manitoba Curriculum Guide for Art Education (1993) ako propek art education in this direction by proposing that unas encouraging awareness of both natural and man-made environments follow those cuttivating awareness and communication of individual's own Iived world(s). And it ako proposes including at least one un l on the effect advertising has on people as individual(s) and groups, that not only encourages individuak to assume responsibilii brtheir knowledge bases in addition to encouraging the refiections and integralions already outlined when their pro- "Idea Joumals" were introduced previously, but initiates students into the practice of demysMying kirworiâs that Greene(1978) recommends. Placing comparable emphases on cuitivating rights and responsibilities reciprocally in educational contexts in Visual Education and Bevond (1976), Kurt Rowland chims that: art education must fall into line with one of the most important aims of al1 educaüon, namely, to M the individual to achieve his [or her] own potential and to link hirn [or her] seîf creativety with his [or her] environment (p.12). And, when he clarifies that he does mean to suggest "simply accepting [the] environment for better or worse but, [contributing] to it, if possible in his (or her] individual fashion, in ways consistent with hS [or her] pemnality' (p.12). he not onîy emphasizes balancing the cuitivation of individual's uniquenesses and their social consciousness consistently w ith the proposai in prevailing paradgm, but he does so in a manner that resonates cornpatibty with this thesis' emphasis on world construction as essent ial creativity, thereby echoing Nietzsche's advocacy of self overcoming, as well. As such. two of Nietzsche's contributions to the contemporary conception of creativity have kenclaimed to be worthy of consideration at the least, and potentially appropriation into a more integrated and integrative form of the prevailing paradgm. as well. His advocacy of ecstasy was noted for its balanced emphases on uniting the Apolbnian and the Dionysian aspects of people and claimed to have the potential to bot h engender temporary iesolutions of the prevalent subject-objed split andgive people the opportunity to function in May's supra-rational states (refened to eîsewhere as divinia grazia (1989), sprezzatura (1989) and divine madness (1989)). And, R.K. EllioWs crediting of Nietzsche wlh transkrming the divine myth of creation into a myth that was appropnable by a secular public was ako noted. Saint Exupery's Little Prince (1943) was claimed to have put both uniqueness and responsibility into another, perhaps more palatabie, contemporary mythobgical context. And the fact that his rose was unique because of het relatianship with him and him with her, almg the lines of mutual transformation both Buber and Jung acknowledge as creativity was ako noted. But, when the littb prince encountered the rose patch he encountered roses as ge@r@hy and the roses in the garden were a combination of facts such as: sues, cobrs and scents (as a scientist might encountenng them in the process of anaîysing them). And, while the rose he had Mt behind on the minute phnet that had been his whok world had: s~e, color, and scent, too, such facts were transformed by his imagination as a resuft of his committed, caring relationship wah it. The essential point being that the little prince had iearned to see his rose as both landscape and geography, and thus the pûssbility and desirability of both were revealed.

Building Dwelling Thinking

Martin Heidegger made many contributions to aie existential philosophy he is associated with. One of those contributions was his use of hyphens to comrnunicate the potential integration, or connectedness, of people and their worM(s) depieted as "being-in-the-worlda. And his emphasb on integration both substantiates and extends the integration Read's proposed in Educatinq Throuah Art (1943). Heidegger's conception of CO-historiiizingwas already noted briefiy, and claimed then to have anticipated the possibildy of using art works to engender it. His depiction of Care, however, also referred ta as "Sorge" andfor "Concern", comparable Io that rnankst in the relationships the little prince engaged in with both a rose and a fox he tamed, were not elaborated upon, and except to note that Heidegger voiceâ the need for suc h care and anticipated the paradigm Gablik subsequentty praposed without any such acknowledgement, no more will be said about it now. Instead, Heidegger's more unique advocacy of culivathg dvelhg minking in 'Building Dwelling Thinking', in Poetrv. Thouaht and Lanauaae (1971), that arnounts to advocating the transformation of geography into landscape so as to engender senses of: place, time, and beionging that resonates compatibfy with Read's emphasis on integration in his proposed paratigm, is introduced. One of the exampies Heidegger (1971) used to explain what he meant by "dwelling thinking" was, both literalty and figuratively as well as geographicaliy, a concrete bridge that cannected two points of land othenivise separated by a river. He explained how he used a combination of imaginings and memories (in other words his own landscape) to imbue that particular bridge with meaning that was unique to him and transcended its geographic facticity, as well as to albw him to share in cuttural community memories featuring that bridge through associations with some shared experiences he had actually lived and others he only knew through histoiy. And, since he actually used the bridge for the function it was designed to serve, namefy, to get people from point "A" to point 'B", as well as to orient himself in time and space in both the present and CO-historicallywfh the past, his example is one of fandscape and geography functioning together in an integrated and integrating manner. The importance of which is to illustrate bath how any person, place, or thing can be imbued wlh qualities by a perceiver that effect transformations, and that such transformations encourage and facilitate feeling oneself to be "dwelling" in, and belonging to, or otherwise connected with: the piesent, the past and the yet ta be future. The establishment of such a relationship, furthermore, even if only for a moment, constitutes: an 1-Thou relations hip according to Martin Bu ber, ecstasy according to May, and creativity according to this thesis. And encouraging students to establish such relationships by the acts of mauthoring andlor co-histaricizing is a means of encouraging the augmentation of their personal landscapes that is well suifed to art education. Clairning to be a 'child of the universe with a right to be here' has becorne a cliche. Claiming any right to have encumbering responsibilitii is, however, just as plausible, since both rights and responsbilities are constructs. And the latter claim has not becorne cliche. Such reciprocw is claimed, here, to be an idea that is still hovering on ale horizon, waiting to appropriated into effective pedagogical praxis, after having been advocated in theory for three quarters of this century. And responsbilii, abng wfih whole-hearted courage and comrnlrnent manifest in authentic dwelling, is claimed to be another aspect of existential though that can substantiate and enrich the prevailing paradgm. Imagination, however, was not only implicit in both the conceptions of

responsibility and dwelling outlined in th& chapter, but claimed by Greene (1991) to be the akhemical component that transforms al1 sense data into rneaningful conceptions, as was noted in Chapter Four before explaining that further elaboration on the role of imagination in contemporary conceptions of creativity would be deferred to albw it its own chapter because of its significance. The next chapter is thatchapter and it is to aspects of imagination that are unique to the prevailing and proposed paradigms that attention now turns. Chapter Eight IMAGtNATlON (Glimmerings, From Kant to Kent )

Chapter Seven introduced the existe- conception of responsibibîy outaned by

Sartre and chimed that it was rasonant with both Read's aûvocacy of cultwating social consciousness reciprocdîy with unqueness in aleducational efbifs and May's emphasis on creativity as intensively conçcious individuak paiticipathg in constructions of their world(s) (such that the objective pole representing the geographkal worki was integrated wM the subjective pdes representing individual(s)). Because of Saiire's ciam of rasponsbility king the Iip siôe of freedom. integrating it Vito the prevailing paradigm in art education was ciaM to have the potential to mitgate a tendency to cultivate creaüvity with unbabnced emphases on uniqueness andlor freedom at the expense of social consciousness and commined participation. Heideggeis daim that we could buad dwelling thinking that wouîd encourage responsibilii by cultivating feelings of co-authorship and bebnging to both unque times and places. and shared times and history, was cited as a means of mitgatirig th& tendency. as well. And, Heidegger's proposition was clairned to have the potential to not only extend othenivise personal landscapes into more commonfy shared worids but encourage the creatbn of culiure and specieswide CO- historic~ing.as well. The "Sense& ldea Journais" introduced previousîy were claimed to be an appropriate means of undertaking its cultivation in the context of art education. And. appreciaüng aspects of. and aiüfacts from ad history. integratively, was claimed to be mther appropriate means of undertaking its cultivatbn in ait classes. before Heidegger's example of the bridge by which he orienteci himsetf in time and place, booi in Me present and historiialty. was used to connect the previous chapter to this one, since P demonsbated that imagination is reguired to give the concept of dweling rneanirg. Actualîy, according to both Gyorgy Kepes' conception of creativity in which even perception is a creative act, and Greene's conception of aesthetic literacy (both introduced previously), not just dwelling, but any and everything requires imagination if sensations are to be transformecl Yit6 meaningful: imagery, ideas, andor conceptions. That breadth, however, as well as the fact that the bngevity of hypotheses about the nature of imagination rivals those about creativrty, was already noted to explain not elaborating on imagination's integral role in the conception of aesthetic literacy outlined and advocated in Chapter Four. And, the fact that Mary Warnock (1976) opened lmauination stating that "imagination is [such] a vast subject ...[t bat] it rnay seem rash to treat it in a relativeîy srnall book" (1976, p.9) suggested that even attempting to address it in only a chapter could be Herculean. But, since Warnock also stated that 'imagination is generally agreed to have a crucial part to play ... pn] the context of creative art, and the production and aie appreciation of works of art" (1976, p.35), it would be negiigent not to at least try to do justice to imagination's integral role in the conception of creativity king articulated and advocated in this thesis. And, her cldm that the sense of 'imagination" in which phikmphers are interested when they are analysing perception or the understanding of general terrns is entireiy difkrent from the sense of the word in which criiics or aestheticians are interested; and it is further heid that both these senses are difterent from that in which, in ordinary Me, we may speak of an object as imaginary ....(p.35) reduces the rashness of the task relative to the setf Iimiting scale of undertaking elaboration only of imagination's unique roles in the contemporary conceptions of creativity king articulated and advocated in this thesis. And her conclusion that it is obviousty true that there are many different contexts in which the concept of imagination has a function; and it would be futile to insist on a common identicai rneaning of the word in every instance of its use" (p.35) makes this chapteh attempt to address imagination onfy as it relates b the conception of creaüvity advocateâ in this thesis seern pbusbie, since the manner in which 1 reiates to th6 thesis' advocacy of appropriatii the concept of authentic creativity into the prevailing pedagogicai paradgm h art education 6 only threebid. One aspect of & howvef, transforming the ordinary into the extraadinary, does tale such a difkrent fomi in John Dewey's vision than it takes in Maxine Greene's that both depict'i are aclaiowledged. The specific ways imaginaüon relates to the conception of creativity king advocaîed in this thesis are resonant with those mat have emerged in existentid philosophy. Maxine Greene, however, appears to have begun an appropriation of that phibsaphy's conception of imagination that begins where Kant ieft off and introduces three new face&that could facilitate the prevailing paradgm's cultiiaüons of both uniqueness and social consciousness more afkcüveiy and enectiieiy. Those three facets are encouraging and enabling people to: 'futurize', 'transfomi the ordinary into the extra-ordinary', and construct responsive and responsibie personal landscapes (authenticalty). as part of cultivating imagination. They are aU based on 'leaping a gap' between one point another, like the literal and figurative bridge in Heidegger's example of his own building of dwelling thinking. But, since that gap has been acknowkdged by many, More g~ingGreene the credit I think she is due, and explaining how her proposais cou@ effect praxis in art education, acknowiedging some initial contributions to the conception of imagination that has evotved throughout the last halfcentury in North American art educatbn is warranted.

Pedagogical Precedents

The conception of imagination that has evohred abng with the conception of creativity and dominated education and psychoiogy for the last haîf century appears to have been iniüated by John Dewey (1934) when. in Art as ExDerience (1934). he stated thaî al 'aesthetii experience is imaginative' and went on to propose both that: "this fact, in connection with a false iôea of the nature of imagination, has obscured the larger fat th& ail conscibus experience has of necessity same degree of imaginative quaiily' (p.272), and thaî Wiwhile the rwts of every experience are found in the interaction of a live creature with ils environment that experience becmes comcious, a matter of perception, only when meanirgs enter 1 mat are derived from prbr expetices' (p.272). And signihcantiy for this thesis, h6conclusion was aiat 7maginaîbn is the only gaîeway through which mese meanings can Ihd Mi way in

to a present interaction, or rather, the conscious adjustment of aie new and the O# 6 imagination (p.272). since the conscious adjustrnent he calk imagination b both the means of ttansforrning geography into hndscape and integral to the conception of creativity being articulated and posited as a means of transfonning the prevailing paradigrn into a more integrated and htegrative one. Sgnifkanüy as well, and regardless of how he might object posthumousiy, Dewey can be credited with laying the foundation brthe god Janus' guardianship of gateways to new beginnnigs (using eyes to the: past, present and Mure) king poçited as an appropriate symbol for art educaion when combined with a Promethean facilitation of consciousness. On the heek of Dewey, however, R.G. Collingwood, in Princbies of Art (1938,1958, 1975), stated that We activity of consciousness ... converts impression into idea, that is crude sensation into imagination' (p.215). And, in a chapter parallehg one in WamUs more recent text, Collingwood (1975) went on to clam that 'regarded as names for a certain level of experience, the words consciousness and imagination are synonyrnous: they stand br the same thing, nameîy the level of experience at which th6 conversion mursn(p.215). Fwe years bter Herbert Read (1943.1 W),claimed that: we are endoweâ, that is to say with free will, and in virtue of this freedom we strive rather to avoid the fixed and regular batures of the hws of nature, and to express instead a worûfofourown-a worklrîics added] which is a reflectbn of our feelings and emotions, of that cornplex of instinct and thoughts which we cal1 the personalii (p.30). And il is his depiction of imagination that most obviously anticipates th& thesis' proposed appropriation of the &a of world-making as archetypal creaüuity inb the prevailing pedagogkai paradgrn in art education. More recenüy, William Fkming (1980) credits the poet Car1 Sandburg wih expresskg art and arüsts' perennial concem with fie nature of creatnrity when he expressed his own "wondering when the borderiand of drearn and kgic, fantasy and reason, where the roots and tentacies of mind and personaiity bat and dWsuddeniy crystallizes into =ascheme, a form, a design, an invention, a machine, an image...." (p.5). The person I credit, however, with expressing the pedagogical conception of it closest to my own, is Greene. And il is ako Greene (1991) who aiüculates the existential perspective on imagination th6 chapter claims to be both resonanî with the conception of creativiîy outlined and most likely to not only substantiate but abextend the ernphasis on imagination impkit in the prevailing paradgm in art education. Bekre rnoving on to Greene's triadic extension of the concept however, one more person's contrbutions to the current d'iursewarrant noting since her depiction of Emmanuel Kan& conception of imagination suggests Greene's conception of imagination to be consistent with a foundation that is already well established. And that person is Mary Wamoc k.

Mary Warnock

For her part, Wamock (1976) begins her book reviewing the history of the rebtionship between imagination and perception in a chapter that paraltek one in Colingwood's Rinci* -of Art (1938). And, while both of these authofs research indicates the perpetuators of the prevailing pedagogical paradigms' emphases on the primacy of perception to have been warranted, both Warnock and Greene ako acknowiedge the essentialness of imagination. Greene, for example, abr reiterating the primacy of perception, clarifies that "there is ako the capacity to imagine. There is the whole matter of imaginative awareness that is abrequired if works of art are to be ac hieved. Imagination has bng been perceived as a mode of effecting relationsh@, bringing (as Virginia Wolfe once put it) several parts together, making metaphors creating new inkgrations and unities. Perceiving affects the pattern, the configurations of what we see, but imagination transbrms riics added] what is perceived (199 1, p. 156). 00th needing to kam MWto attend and how ta perceive were akeady addressed in Chapter Four, and chimed then to be aspects of existentid thought inboduced by Greene that couM augment Read's advocacy of cultivating aesthetic literacy by propelling it into a contemporized framework and clarifying that enhanced perception and conception would not happen naturally, but must be grasped for by attentive individuals. And in this chapter Greene's depiction of imagination is claimed to be yet another possible extension of the prevailing paradigm that can be accomplished by integrating aspects of existential thought relating to the cuftivation of imagination. The ability to transform geography into landscape was claimed to be essential to the proposed conception of creativiiy in Chapter Six, and then reintroduced in Chapter Seven as an aspect of becoming responsble for creating rneaning in one's own irnmediate liîè that couid be understood as building dwelling thinking and CO-historicizing,as well as understood to be as socialiy beneficial as it was personally gratifying. 00th transformations were claimed to be consistent with the world making emphasis in the contemporary conception of creativity May (1976) has kencredited with introducing that, in tum, contemporizes Read's suggestion that al1 education must cuttivate uniquenes and social awareness. reciprocally. But even though al1 these trambrmaüons depend on imagination, L integral role was only menîbned in passing. For her part, Warmk (1976) credik the phib~her,Emmanuel Kant. with clarilym that: "it is imagination which has emerged as Mat which enabies us to go beyond the bare data of sensation, and to bridge the gag between mere sensation and intelligible thoughr

(p.34) And. not only does this statement resonate compatibly with the conceptions of imagination credited to the early art educators inttoduced previously, but 1ab re~0nateS compatbiy with both Greene's claims that we need to educate peopie towards 'the ieaping of ponds' (1991). and that we need a new pedagogical paradgm that enables people 10 understand how they can reach out rom their unique bcation(s) to participate in world (construction(s)). And, since the ability to liRurUe is integral to both Greene's depicüon of imaginabon and imaginations' rob in the proposed translonatbn of the recpmcal pedagogcal paradigm into a more ntegrative paradgm, 1 is fortunate that at bast one province in Canada has made the iriclusion of this abiiii into a provincial goal.

The province of Manitoba's Curriculum Guide for Art Education (1993) has already been acknowledged for advocating the cuttiiation of perception, in particular, as well as for advocating the culovation of creativity, in general. Facilitating the latter, rec~rocally,has been encouraged through studio based art activities that devebp domain based knowledge and skilk while encouraging students to move tom microcosmic awarenesses of their wninner worlds, or personal landscapes, (in units such as one entitled "Who Am I?"), to increased awarenesses of the world(s) engendered by their intermediate communitie((s)) and otheiwise shared geographical bcation((s)), (in units such as "InsideIOutside). and from there to increased awarenassss of, and üeally ako participation in, the ongoing consmiction of our shared and common (world(s)). Wiithe integration of dl them attempted through students' use of ldea Journals. Most critically for this chapter, however, abng with promoüng the culivation of imagety appropriate to each of the units noW, this Guide (1993) also has a unl entitled "Future Perfect?" that encourages students to firs! imagine, and then gbe form to, aspects of an imagined perfect world, set çome time in the Mure. By requiring students to actually do something in the present that makes thei petfect Mure worid melikely to be realeed. rather than just fantasizeâ about, students not only begin to imagine what alternathe futures might be like (which is essential for change to occur intentionally). but are ako empowered to begin bringing something into being and experiencing responsible creativity.

And, such responsbly manifest creativity 6 integral to EUiott's existentially oriented claim that the reconstruction of humanity begins with the reconstruction(s) of individual selve(s) introduced in Chapter Two and posited as the essence of the rationale for integrating existential conceptions of creativity into pedagogical paradgms. The majoriîy of art teachers will be inclined to design their own routes to such ends, and ideally they will encourage students to invent their own relevant projects. An annual school wide theme, however, chosen by administrators, did provide an opportunity in one school to cultivate communriy, in the forrn of multiple dialogues, when "endangered species' was the theme selected for the school year and the subsequent sale of students' art works (that had taken the brm of calenders) resuned in proceeds that went to buy rain forest to be heu in reserve, as the art classes' take off on the theme. The majority of participating students acknowiedged feeling connected to the present world(s) of: their classes, their school, and aspects of their phnet And, along with expressing piide regarding their efforts, most ako expressed optimism about what they could contribute in oie Mure, as weU. Opportunities such as the preceding one, to cultivate student's uniquenesses and their social awareness, reciprocaly, are endless. And they do mt have îo be the maMay of a program to be effective. But 1 is recognized that even one such project, ever, wouid be one too many FM some art educators. In some cases that wouid be because it would be tm 'politicai' a rok fw their conception of art education, and fw others it would simpiy be moving too far towards, or too far away hm, other aspects of the theory and/or practice the teacher embraces, or rejects. Those who leans towards exclusive emphasis on high art, kw example, or the Roman model frarned by Aspin (1991),would likely bok askance upon them, as presumably would Bailin andlor Smith. But, for my part, I consider such projects to be in keeping with Che culthration of the conception of creativity that has been evohring throughout the last haif century in art education and culminating currentty in Gablik's Reenchanûnent of -Art (1992) and Kent's Learnina by Heart (1992). And Icredl such projects with the potential to engender awarenesses of the potential for a more integral roie for art in both education and everyone's lives, in keeping with Rowland's and McFeets aspirations for the same. So, 'Athenian' as the roots of my conception of art education may be, alluding in th6 instance to both Aspin's claims of emphasis on social involvement and deference to Dionysian encouragement of everyone achieving an identification with the Divine as being Athenian (p.254, l99l),1 see art teachers' roles as including the encouragement and empowerment of students to achieve both. And, since this conception is consistent with both May's (1976) redefinlion of creativity and Read's proposed pedagogical paradigm (1%6), this thesis has proposed perpetuating them together, in a contemporarily integrated form for the purpose of encouraging and enabling individu& to becorne more integrated, both within themeives and with their (world(s)), with aspects of the arts used as the means. Towards this end, however, in addition to iearning how to Murize, Greene's advocacy of learning how to 'transfbrrn the ordinary in the extraordinary is chimed to offer another extension of the prevaifng paradgm that can heip tiansbm it into a more integrative one that GabüKs advocacy of reenchantrnent (1992) substantiates in principk, much as GabiiKs promotion of introducing a socioecdogical paradgm into art education substantiates the advocacy of acquiring the abri to Murize.

Transforming The Ordinary lnto The Extr~rdinary

Transformation of the ordinary into the extraordinary is an aspect of imagination that was implicit in the meaning Heidegger credited himself wiVi engendering for the bridge he referred to to expiain his proposeci buadiof dwelling thinking. since his conception was made possible by his use of imagination and wouM have been impossible to conceive of, without Y. Wthout imagination, a bridge is just construction materials mnnecting twa points of hnd that serves the function of convey ing things between îwo points. Using his imagination and memory to create meaning, however, Heidegger created a landscape out of the existing geography of the bridge. And most people do this to varying degrees al1 of the time, on a minute to minute and day to day basis. The mental activity Heidegger described, however, is credited with being creative because al1 acts of perception are, according to Kepes, creative, as are al1 acts of appreciation, according to: Collingwood (1938), May (1976), and

Fleming(l980). But, as well as king a transformaüve adof imaging that 6 a point of creativity in the contemporary conception, Heidegger also gave meaning to the action that helped him integrate himself more meaningfuliy with his lived woild than he had been prbr to it, and called the activity dwelling thinking. As such, not onjr had he consciousiy brought a new reality into king as a result of his encounter with the bridge, for himseif, he had also brought the potential of a new reality into king that others couid share, which was participation in a creative activity that culminates in the construction of dwelling thinking. There are representors of other conceptions of creativi that would not consider the personal act he descriôed creative because it had no obvious reverberations br anyone but himself, but his hbeling of it and pubiishing it in a book that acquired a quantifiabie readership wouid be hard for even the traditiinalists to deny kingcreative. But thk thesis still posits them both as existing on the same contemporary continuum as aH creative acts based on the previousiy intioduœd criieria. The act Heidegger descrbed, furthermore, ako made both an ordinary activity (the crossing of bruâge), and a rebtively ordinary Mdge, at lead slightly extra- ordinary. And it made the bridge unique, as well, in the sense that St. Exupery's lmle prince's rose was exphined to have kenmade unique by the 'tüe prince's relationsh~with her. If Heidegger had been an amrather than a philosopher, he could have bito convey what he imagined, saw, heard, felt, etc. visually, but instead, he did it linguistically. And doing so, abng with giving imaginary brm to a bridge most of hk readers will oniy ever conceive of based on their own landscapes, wlhout ever encountering the real thing, Heidegger took the risk associated with any kind of artistic creativrty and attempted to communicate both his specific imaginative encounter and the multitude of comparable encounters possible for those who participate in their own building of dwelling thinking. A relatively famous painter, Degas, is known to have maintained that he had no doubt that the thrill he got from painting was the same thrill thieves go1 hmstealing. And. to the extent he is correct, and the thrill is the same, his daim indicates that teachers can choose to educate students towards achieving the comparable heightened awareness May claimed to be the epitome of creative activity manifest as ecstasy, constructiveiy. And participation in building dwelling Winking can be one of the means of engendering it. People, furthermore, can and often do, participate communally, as well as individually, in such undertakings. Exampies of doing so include peopie's authentic participation in perpetuating rituals and myths they have appropriated, andlor imbuing objects and experiences wlh meaning. For her part, Greene (1989,1991) proposes cultivating the abri lo bansbrrn the ordinary into the extra-ordinary as an integral aspect of aesthetc literacy in al1 environments that aspire to cuttiiate aesthetic literacy. And Gablik's book atso refers to and advocates encouraging such activities, as well, anhough she calk them "re-enchantments'. In that book, Gablik (1992) also provides exampies of art works she credits with succeeding in transforming the ordinary into the extra-ordinary fw participants anaor viewers. But Kent

(1992) goes a step further than Gablik pedagogically , and provides a hamewoik bcreading rneaningful celebrations in educationai contexts, especialty art based ones. Another author, writing in her case to challenge what she believes to be the four tenants of traditional Western aesthetics, Lynn Hart (1991), in "Aesthetic Pluralism and Muff icubral Art Education', describes a riiual religious activ'rty Kumaoni women particpate in that might put this issue into more perspective relative to this thesis. Her point is that such ritual activities as the religious sand painting her subjects participated in can, and shouid, be considered art and/or creative. Art and creativity are not necessarily one in the same thing hom the perspective of this thesis, as introducing May's four types of creativity in Chapter Th ree illustrated. Authenticity is the emp hasis and activities are aut henticaily creative relative to the degree of presentness of the participant to both him or herseIf and h6 or her (world(s)), as well as relative to his or her ability, or lack there of, to bring some new reality into king through the encounter, or endeavor. The Kumaoni women in her essay, therelore, could be creative within the contemporary conception of creativity king articulated and advocated if they appropriated the activw (meaning made it their own by bringing some new reality into being for themseives) regardless of the fact that the ritual they participated in was both repetitive and transient. Alternatively, however, if they were not absorbed in the experience, did not encounter and integrate some aspect of their world, were not conscious of bringing some new reality into king and taking responsibility for doing so, andlor did not experience some degree of integration of themself with their (worid(s)), they would not be king creaüve, as creative has been perpetuaîed, or as it is king proposecl 1 be perpetuated, since the one tenant of Western aesthetics Hart chaknges that is not king simihriy dkmissed, here, is the emphasis on uniqueness - because, even though objects need not even be produceci, let abne he unique in the contemporary conception, the experience or encounter must be. And aîthough the "new reality" required might be one only the participant s consciously aware of (as in a communion), or might be one that is shared as part of a ritual engendered by diabgue that contributes to the creation of community, aie elements of unqueness and authenticity are still required. Otherwise, such activitii are expected to be simpîy rote, or mystification, or bath. And as such, the Kumaoni women's experience might or might not be creative by contemporary standards, since in order to participate in the activity authentically the participant must consciousiy transform the experience by his or her powers of imagination, and that includes putting his or her whok self into the activity and both transforming it and king transforrned by it. Hart's point is that emphasis on: permanence, unque objects, and painting, as well as the authorrty of the maker run counter to encouraging a necessarily pluralistic view. This thesis, however, is claiming that the latter is not oniy mcounter ta encouraging a pluralistic view, but necessary to it, because otherwise the individual is still second to the norms of a discipline. And Peter Abbs claim in The Svmboiic Ordet (1989) clarifies this since, from his perspective it is necessary to "insist on the recognition of values and realiües which transcend usw(p.270) whiie th6 thesis, alternatively, proposes that the uniqueness of individuais is a value and potential reality that transcends those of disc~iines.And as such, it is understood to epitomize pluralism by recognizing each person as nothing iess than an intersubjective world. Wihin the parameters of the contemporary conception of creativity it has been illustrated that one can have an aesthetic expetince which is highly imaginative, but oniy minimally creative. and vise versa, shce creativily, as 1has been depicted, not only requles the conscious integration of one's imaginings into some new realw that is given form, but usually requires courage expressed as commitment, as well. The experience of king creative has been cbimed to exist on a hierarchy that begins wlh perception but is ako relative to the degrees of integration of both the external pole (referred to aiternatively as: objectivity , responsbility, and geography ) andt he inner pole referred to as uniqueness and hndscape. even though Ït must be rernembered that: pemnalii. actions. and Uved worîd(s) are al1 recogn~edas king capable of comtituting creativity. And an aesthetic experience couid, therefore, be creative on& in the sense of having forrned the image that Gyorgy Kepes instituîed as the starting point of creativity in the contempocary conception of creatiuity being outlined in th6 thesis. and while 1 might be highly imaginative. it mght only constitute escapist creatiiity, relative to boai May's and Read's emphases on the reciprocal cultivation of uniquenes and social consciousness, and th6 thes6 proposed emphasis on authenticity. May (1976) labeled imagination that wandered idty instead of kingintegrated and given form escapist creativity because it lacked the encounter with the world that both authenticcty as a concept, and his redefinition of creativity (p.56) require. Labeling such creativity simply "inauthentic", however, may be more constructive than hbeling it "escapiçr, since labeling it "escapist" risks engendenng more polarizing conceptions. And not only are such polarities not likeiy to be constructive but, since May (1976) does acknowledge childrens' play as being potentially creative and an appropriate cultivator of more mature versions of creativity, both 'immature' and 'inauthentic' appear to be both more factual and less judgmental terms than 'escapist". And, both of them ako still impiy the inclusive creativity continuum posited previously. that using the term "escapist" does not. For rny part, like Kepes (1944), like Collingwood (1938) before him. and Eke William Fleming (1980) after both of them, I accept that "al1 creative activity begins in the mind's eye and ear of the artW (1980). But, Iike Fleming and May (1976). and unhke Collingwood, I ah believe that 'a work of art that does communicate is still borna(1 980, p.18). And not only has Fieming's statement led me to wonder if there isnt a connection beîween the "stül birlhs' he refers to art that fails to communicate as and the silent vibrations that some Zen koans allude to when they ponder 'the sound of one hand clapping', but it has Jed me the conclusion that there is a connection. And ironic as it may appear, that connection is one deriveci frorn John Dewey's Art as Gmrience (1934).

John Dewey as the Portent of Imagination as The Connectoi of Peopk Wlh Meaningful Rituak and Ancesûy

Three of Greene's possibk extensions of the prevailing paradigm's conception of imagination, as they relate to the conception of creativity articulated in th6 the~6,have been introduced. As well as recognizing the primacy of perception in acts of conception accomplished by imagination so that people are both encouraged and enabied to: see, heu. feel and imagine more, thus extending their landscapes, they include both her advocacy of cuhating the abilities to transform the ordinary into the extra-ordinary, or enchant one's own life, and her advocacy of culüvating the ability to Muriie. understood to mean envisioning future(s) and working to make aspects of them a reality. And as such, three additional existentiaib orienteci extensions of the prevailing paradgm have been introduced that can both substantiate and augment 8. The first extension was claimed to be cultivatable in "The Sense 8 ldea Journais' introduced prevbusly. Corita Kent was given credit for providing teachers with a means of transforrning the ordinary into the extra-orâinary in art classes in her book. And the Manloba Curriculum Guide for Art Mucation (1993) was also credited with introducing a unit that could cultivate Muriring. John Dewey's proposai in Art as Exterience (1934), however, of art king essentialty an enriching and integrative experience that contributes to the creation and perpetuation of culture(s), was certainly setiously made d the time and has stood the test of time well enough to still be able to augment conternporary conceptions of creativity. And, since one of his propositions also anticipated the role imagination is king daimed here b have the potential to play in the cultiation of creativity, its reiteration ends thk chapter. Dewey (1934,1958) not onfy suggests that institutions can 'penetrate bebw his [or her] outward action into his [or her] purposes and satisfactions. [but absuggests that] expression of experience is public and cornmunicating because the experiences expressed are what they are because the experiences of the living and the dead have shaped thern ..." (p.270). And with these words Dewey intimates the power of education, in general, and art education, in particuhr, to augment individual's abilitii to imagine and thereby connect with their ancestral hstory in a way that is only possible through imagination. This possibility, in turn, opens the door to connecting peopie with both the idea that they are, whether consciousiy or not, part of the unfoiding of the world, or the worlding of the world, and that they can, by intention, influence the world as sureiy as they are king influencecl by a. They suggest, in fact, that people can take the claim that 'a thousand ancestors have dreamt of them', expressed by the pop singer Ricki Lee Jones' on her "Traffic From Paradise" album, to their individual karts since these words imply the potential Mure influences everyone can engender, as well as the certainty of past one(s) they are bound to be shaped by. And, such historical integrations cannot heb but mitgate the alienation currentfy being hrnented almost universaliy, of peopie from themsehres and/or their (worid(s)). 00th Gablik (1992) and Greene (1978) lament that so many people are feeling disconnected from the world. And as such, in spite of antidotes such as the one Dewey proposeci more than haif a century ago, when he chimed that imagination can connect people to the whok of history if they can only manage to 'put themsehres in the pichire,' reiteration of thb point is wananted in the interest of rnitigating alienation, as well as in the inter- of both encouraging and enabling people to connect themsetves to their worlds by 'putling themJehies in the pkture'. And, to the extent that they can engage supraratbnal& with an artifact, even appreciating art offers entrees to achievirg suc h integration(s), however temporarily . Van Gogh's painting "Starry Night" (1889) was chosen previously to illustrate how a partcular art work could not onfy connect students with formal aspects of the art world but could abbe used as an irnpetus brintegrating aspects of the art wodd aWor the artisî's pmjected world with studenrs lived world(s), or landscapes. And similarty, using the same example, Sudents who succeed in identifying some of their own values (such as, in this scenarii, what they hoid sacred, beautiful, or most worthwhiie), as well as howtheir feelings and ideas can be communicated to others, will have explored both motivatjons for making art pieces and metho& of making them, that together constitute two out of three of the aspects of creativity Amabiie (1989, p.36) claim to be Iikeîy to engender creativity (iintegrated by individuals.) Of particular significance br th& thesis, however, because of its emphasis on world making as archetypai creatbii, appreciators can ako be enabied to perceive themsehres as rnemkrs of both cuttural communities, or worid((s)), and the human comrnunity, or (worM), and to feel integrated with them both through the use of their imaginative powers. And, since Read promoted such integration in the paradigm he proposed, it is claimed here to warrant perpetuating, but perpetuating in mnjunction wlh both Greene's recommendations and those of Kent and Manitoba's Curriculum Guide for Art Education (1993) to help give the goals form. Toward this end as well, using an artifact such a painting, in conjunction with a collection of other works trying to communicate something on a common theme, is a means of illustrating how some themes (such as love, war, chiidren, pets, food, etc.) have been common throughout time, whik others are unique to individual: artkts, tirnes, or culures. And, appreciating works can engender acts of co-historicization experienced as the immediately graûfying: "ahhh", "ah-haw, or "ha-haWexpiences Koestler, in The Creative Act (1976). claims to be three possible responses to creative experiinces. whiie ako providing entrees that encourage students to identify and communicate what currenüy influences them, as well as bwl doa so, that cm. in turn. enable students to recognize and integrate other encounters they subsequenüy experience and choose. ldentifying what influences thern, furtherrnore, is the first step to the demystification Greene (1978) claims being awake andlor conscious to be contingent upon. And, such identification cm inliate both learning how to be authentic and how to recognize auîhenticity. as well as how to enchant or reenchant: themseives, their world((s)), and the (world((s)))of ot hers. When cuîtivating creativity as the maximaliy conscious parüc@ationin responsive and responsible worid constructions proposed in this thesis the more possbilitii of what it can mean to be human that student encounter the more data they are understood to have informing conceptions of who they want to be and what they would like their (world(s))to be like. Such identification has already ken claimed to be appropriately undertaken in art education, and to be facilitatable by the use of "The Sense 8 ldea Journais" introduced in Chapter Fie. And. not only can students capable of imagining echoes of ancient voices augmenting the voices experienced literally be assurned to be more likely to feel a connectedness with the evolving world !han those for wham history S silent, but they can ab be assumed to have more data from which to re-construct their own landscapes that, in turn, can be assumed to engender more consciousnesç generally in the world. Abng with connecting individu& backwards in time towards anceston painting on cave walls and constructing things from found objects towards the present, art and art education have ako been shown to be a means of connecting people to a myriad of possibilities that may not exist yet, but are conceivable. And. in light of th& possbility. both John Dewey's claims that: "the union of Ipeopiej with one another is the source of the rites that from the time of archaic man to the present have commemorated the crisis of birth, death, and marriage (p.270-271), and that 'ad is the extension of the poser of rites and ceremonies to unRe mple], through a shared œlebration, to aU inciden& and scenes of Ra (p.271), still warrant consideration when planning art curriculums that aspire to culivate constructive imagination. Van Gogh was noted previously as a producer of domain specific artifacts but I have used his painting of 'Potato Eatersa (1885). as well as "Starry Night' (1889), to open discussions about such rituals as family me&, and extendecl the discussion forward as far as such contemporary artifacts as Judy Chicago's r)inner Party". And similarly. I have used Breugars 'Wedding Feast' (1568) where, abng with studying the painting in its own tight, Ihave used 1 to inspire refiection on social phenomenon. which in this case. was both wedding ceremonies, then and now. and matriagotype reiatiomhpb, then and now. By reflecting on whaf was communicated, as well as how it was communicated, and then identifying what: ceremonies. syrnbols, relaüonshipa, etc. have value for them. their culture(s), etc., as well as how, or if,to undertake to honor andior perpetuate what they value, students are provided with the opportunity to establish value for themseives. And even though Greene (1991) has alreaûy been quoted claiming that

aesthetic perception 6 a mode of viewing that can on!y be persona/& undertaken, by an individual present to himself or herseif. To be 'at the enter of realitya, really seeing P is to grasp what surrounds from one's own center. and in so grasping. to be conscious of one's consciousness. it is in th& sense that the artistic-aesthetic domain brings us in touch with Our authentic visions, albws us - as unque individuals - to be (p.157) , her claim is repeated here because, to the extent that she is correct, not even the aesthetic literacy Smith aspires to promote. kt abne creaüvity based on conscious presentness-to-both oneseîf-and-thôworld, seems likely to be achieved without educators facilitating the personal engagements described. This point was anticipated by both Dewey's claims that il is not necessary that 'communication should be part of the deliberate intention of an adkt ... but its function and consequence are to effect communication, and ... this is not by externat accident but from the nature [slhe share with othefs' (p.270), and that 'every intense experience of friendship and affection cornpietes itself artffticaüy" (p.270). And while il is unlikeîy that Bailin (1994) would see the preceding completion as eüher "great" or 'significanî" enough b warrant king called creatiie, t see it as both, as does the poet Emiiy Dickenson (1986), who States that for her, every person can be considered a world, as can every irinûship. Her emphasis on worlds and world making, however, brings this chapter back to the archetype beiicîaimed to warrant contemporization and perpetuation in the prevailing paradigm in art education relative to creativity, and it ako ends the existential extensions this thesis is advocating be considerd for appropriation. And, since the hst two chapters address the psychobgicai foundations the prevailing paradigm can be assurned to based on, as well as offer a rationale for: their qualified perpetuation, in the case of Car1 Rogers' contributions. and acknowledgernent, at the lest, in the case of Abraham Maslow's, they are both claimed to need to be acknowledged for the same reasons the prevailing paradigm in art educaüon was chirned to warrant reconsideration. Rogers' claimed need for internai locii of values to be present in order to realize the contemporary conception of creativq links his proposal with the last point made in this chapter. And so it is to this proposal, and five more of his contributions to the prevaifing and proposed paradgms that the attention of this thesis turns, before addressing aiose of Masbw. Chapter 9

Six of Carl Rogers' Contributions to the Contemporary Discoume on Creativily

Even though Read only addressed the work of Carl Jung and the Gestalt psychobgisîs in Mucatina Through Art (1943) he can still be credileû with opening a dmrway to the inclusion of any aspects of psychology that coutd hep realize aie goal of cuitiiating consciousîy unique Md responsibie cilizens in the context of art education. The opening of this doorway is the fiRh facet of Read's proposed pedagogy claimed to warrant rmnsideration for appropriation into a renewed paradgm in art education. And Read is credited with laying the foundation for this thesis' advocacy of the continued appropriation of relevant aspects of both of these two schools of psychobgy into the prevailing and proposed paradgms, as weII as those of some contemporary aspects of both humanistic and existentid psychobgy, such as: the redefinlion of creativity Rolb May introduced in 1976 that was already daimed to contemporize the existentid definition of creaüvity Martin Buber posited in 1925, at the Heidelberg Convention, and Read subsequently perpetuated (1W,l 958) by quoüng it to define creativity in his text.

In Achievina Extra-ordinary Ends, Bailin (1994) claimed that the last fity years in both education and psychobgy have been "misleading at best and dangerous at worst" (p.2). But this thesis has suggested, altematively, that both of these disciplines have been more 'rnisunderstood' than "misieading" and 'insufficient' at both their best and worst, rather than "dangerous". tt has, in fact, gone so far as to propose that the contemporary efforts of psychologists and educators alike, to corne to terms with creativity, are likely to be: perçonally, professionaliy, and politicaliy necessary stepping stones to the ends: Greene, Bercsi, Gablik, and Kent have advocated contemporarity, that update the earlier, comparable, advocacies ot Dewey. Collingwood. Read. Lowenfeld, McFee, and Rowland that toge-, engender a multifaceted, but nonetheless. coherent paradgm, that is more likeiy to be dangerous to ignore than to renovate and appropriate. To chrify these points, th& chapter outlines Cari Rogers' humanistic theory of creativity that was first publkhed in 1954 in the scientific journal, A Review of General Semantics. in an essay titled simply Towards A Theory of Creativity". And 1does so because Rogers' proposal not oniy introduced a conception of creativity that anticipated the one king advocated in this thesis, but absheds hgh?on a potential shortcoming of the preceding prevailing paradgm in the process of introducing the possibili of four precondbns that mght make oie culovation of creativity more ubquitousiy successful.

A Conception of Creativity that Proposes a Trinity Composed of: Peoph, Processes, and Products (Relative to Environments)

By paraphrasing Greene (1991) quoting Shultz it has already kenacknowkdged that no one definition of creativity is likely Io be any more able to sumrnarize such a multifaceted and wialiy infiuenced phenomena as creatiwity Man of ait. And as such. nelher Car1 Rogers nor any one else is not expected to have depicted a complete picture of creativity. His 1954 definition and explanalion of creativity, however, has not only managed to maintain a presence for almost half a century, but has continued to widen its sphere of influence, as well. After appearing in Me scientific journal noted. for example. it re-ernerged a decade later in LiLinderrnan and Herberhottz' Develooinu Perce~tualAwareness (1964). It was quoted in full another decade later in Hausman's and Rothenberg's Creativity Qwsüon (1976). And, even though in the latter it was cited as an example of an "alternative" approach to creativw. almost two more decades later still. and decidediy less alternatively, hîs definition of creativity was not only quoted in the 1993 Curriculum Guide for Art Education published by the province of Manitoba, but appears to have informed that gude, as weU. As such. Rogers' conception of creativity is definitely still infiuencing the evolution of art education, more rather than less for the better according to th& thesis, and in spite of those who eschew it. For his part, Rogers defined creativity as: a nprocesswin which there "is the emergence in action of a novel relational product, growing out of the onqueness of the individual on the one hand, and the materiab, events, people, or circumstances on hs [or her] life on the othef (1976. p.296). And as such. at the very ieast. Rogers gives everyone sornething to respond to. whether they agree with it or not, thereby encouraging dialogue. His

definition, however, &O anticipated the exiçtentially orienteci redefinition of creaüvily posited by May in Couraoe to Create (1976) mat defined creativity as 'the encounters of intemively conscious individuais with their world'[s] ... that bring %me new realiîy into king' (p.56) that has infor med this t hesis -- even thoug h it must be acknowledged that Rogers' conception of creativity is based on the potentialfy fallacious humanistic assumption that being creative is ouf biological destiny and needs, therefore, only of the removal of impediments to it, to be

realized. And t his belief b sig nificant because, as such, it lacks bot h May's emphasis on the intensive consciousness this thesis has claimed to be essential to the authentic creativity it advocates, and May's recognition of a hierarchy that is not oniy based on personai ecstasy resulng from new integratiom, but ako on the degree of reaked cornmitment and subsequent integration of the experiince of king creatiie into our shared and common (world(s)) as well as those of individual's hed he(s). world (s), or landscape(s). The acknowledgrnent of which is important because it only by king inclusive that unnecessary and unconstructive polariiation can be avoided, and Read's paradgm becorne more likefy to be realized than dismissed. The dilferences between the two, however, are seen to reveal a humanisticaliy inspired shortcoming that continues to undennine the potential of the prevailii pedagogicai paradgm in ait education to realize iis reciprocal goals. that the appropriation of existentialiy oriented extensions of A could mitigate. At ieast as sgnikant, however, for both this thesis and the evobing d&course orr the nature of creativity as Rogers' definition and revehtion of the potential shortcoming of the prevailing paradigm are, are the Cour preconditions Rogers clairned to be precursors to engendeting creativtîy on the ubiquitous belaspired to in public education. &fore introducing and advocating the cuiliiation of at ieast an awareness of the possble necessity of these four precondiions, however. two points warrant pointing out. The first point is that Rogers' emphasis on a: person, proces, product trinity clarifies that prodwls are süll considered relevant in the conternporary conception of creativity in spite of clairns to the contrary . And the second suc h point is that the nature of products that can be considered creative is simpty more inclusive in the conternporary conceptins of creativity than they tend to be in traditional conceptions of it. So they are significant, as well, because they dernonstrate resonance between the humanistic conception of creatiiity outiined by both humanistic psycholog& and the exktential conceptions of it already introduced and claimed to warrant substantiating and extending in the prevailing and proposed paradigms already outlined in this thesis. Rogers, in fact, went so far as to state that for him: as a scientist, there must be sornething observable, some product of creation. Though [someone's] fantasies may be extremely novel, they cannot usefully be defined as creative unles they eventuate in some observable product-unless they are symbolized in words, or wrilten in a poern, or translated into a work of art, or fashioned into an invention (1976, p.296). And he then went on to anticipate Rollo May's redefinitiin of creaüvity by including "new formings of one's own personality" (p297) on his list of potentially creative products, as well as to emphasize the mess of creativw rather than its puduc&, in keeping with the de- emphasis on proâucts proQosed by both Vibr Lowenfeld and Rolb May, and perpetuated as recenüy as 1993 in Manitoba's Curriculum Guide for Ait Mucation. Worth pointiig out as

well, however, 6 mat this de-emphasis on products is in favor of im/udingequalemphases on people and processes rather than excluding products. And Ehis remains true krboth the

proposed paradigm and the prevailing one,even though existential'i never regard the peison as an object, perse, as Eliiitt's proposal (1991) mght ieaû readers to erroneously conciuôe. They portray people, instead, as the embudirnent of their actions and subjectiïity, as well as essentialfy on-going processes, or constructions. That said, however, and having ciaimed Rogers' definition of creativity to still warrant consideration, in spite of the potentialty fallacious destiny based assumption 1 is based on, ths chapter shifts its focus to addressing the four preconditions Rogers' daims ta be wofth cultivating as precursars to realizing creative potential by beginning with Ragers' advocacy of cultivating internal bcii of values. And the reason for beginning with that proposed precursor is bath because Rogers daims that the reaiization that *the source or kcus of evaluative judgement ... rij internal mght be the most fundamental condition of creativity" (p.300), and because it was alluded to in the conclusion of the previous chapter.

Interna1Locus of Values

Having an internal bcus of values, according to Rogers, means that "îhe value of a creative product is, for the creative person, established not by the praise or criticism of oîhers, but by ttim [or herj seif" (p.300). And at first glance this statement appears antithetical to Bailin's daim that it b "the overall ahof a d&@Iine, Is (iialii added] overarching problems and guiding methodobgy, and ils ['~licsadded] general criteria for assessrnent.... mat are] The bas& for detenining the significance of creative produds, even those that depart from the tradfiions (1994, p.34-35). Rogers, however goes on to quaiify hb position and to clanfy that he does rnean that [slhe is oblivious to, or unwilling to be unaware of the judgments of others. tt is simply that the basis of evaluation lies within him [or her) seK.if to the person it has the 'feer of king 'me in action' of king an actualizaüon of potentiality in him [or her] selwhich therebre have not existed and are now ernerging into existence, then it is satisfying and creative, and no outside evaluation can change that fundamental fact (p.301). And as such, not only is Rogers Wsuggesting rejecting the existence of objective truths, or extemal standards that Bailin (1994) defers to, but the standards accepted by varinus disciplines actually constitute necessary aspects of the geography that, in tum, constitutes shared and comrnon (world(s) in both Rogers' conception of creativity and in the existential ones already quoted. Rogers is best understood to simpîy be proposing that people boai cm and should personake, or appropriate truths (in the sense of making them their own), rather than regurgitate those of others inauthentically. And in existential terms, therefore, internai kxii of values have already been introduced as: appropriation, making sornething one's own, andfor inwardness, and already kenclaimed to be worth perpetuating as existential extensions posited by Kierkegaard (1813 -1855). Objective loiowledge, however, has ako been referred to in th& oiesis as 'geography' and clairned to be a necessary counterbalance to subjectiive knowledge, or the personalized 'landscapes' that couid resuit in solipsism if not included, because it is 'geography' that enables people to be 'at home' somew here specifk rather than 'eveiywhere', and geography that engenders the 'horizons' by which people can orient themsebes in tirne and space-but landscapes that ground them and give them rneaning. And, intemal bcii of values are recognited as a necessary component of landscape that gives meaning to the geography that is otheMnse just hagrnentary fact(s), as yet another of Saint Exuperyts Little Prince's advent ures, in this case his encounîer with a businessman who incessantly counts and clauns stars without having any kelings lor them (pp.4I3-47,1943) illuminates. These intemal values are associaleâ with the personal hndscape(s)Greene introduced and advocated cultivating, and they imply the desirabiiity of achieving a babnce behrveen, and integralion of, subjet%~e and objective knowledge. And as such, Rogers' advocacy of the cultivation of intemal bcii of values as the ability to detemine values for oneself S articulating an essential aspect of the contemporary paradgm king advocated in thk Viesis. 70 illustrate how such a balance cm be cuftiiated in the context of art education the introduction of students to such art works as Van Gogh's "Stany Nghl" (1889) andlor Bruegels 'Wedding Fe& (15689) have been introduced to reprentthe my riad of potential means of encoutaging and enabling students bo acquire increased awarenesses of: what they and üwir pers value cunentiy; what has been valued by oüters airoughout history; and how the communication of what: is, has ben, and might be valued not onfy has, but abcould, be accomplished.

It is plausible to argue that Rogers' interna1 loci of values and the authentcrlw

Bennett Reimer (1991) posited as one of four characteristics of dl quaMy art works are at the

kast, similar, and perhaps even synonymous. And, to the extent that this hypothesis is accurate. the "qualily" Bailin (1994) aûvocates cuttiwating actually depends on the successful cultivation of the unqueness of individuab and their unique means of expressing it -- even though she proposes addresing only great products and significant achievements.

Significantiy for both the potential cultivation of creativity, generaliy, and th& thesis, in particular, Reimer king accurate would also imply that to the extent that we returned to the traditional conceptions of creativity emphasizing onîy the production of great products deemed valuable by externd sources we wouid &k faihg to maximize the creative potential of the greatest number of students. And such maxirnization is not oniy in keeping with democratc ide* but, by gnoMg the authenticity deemed integral ta qua@ in all creative endeavon in the proposed paradigm we would also risk aknating even more students from their own intnnsic motivations and iÎÎwoild(s) than already are thus aknated, and unnecessariiy perpetuate the subject-object split lamented by so many.

Because she promotes the idea of creativity oniy having value relative to a discipline,

Bailin (1994) iaments the tendency to encourage everyone to do everything from coolong to bving, creativeiy. For my part, however, dong with encouraging ubquitously manifest creativity, I can not help but think Mat the internai bci of values Rogers advocates cuultivating relates to both the cultivation of authenticity Bennett Reimer (1% 1) advocates and the authenticity advocated cuitivating ubiquitousiy in this thesis. And, since it is oniy in concert with internal locii of values that 1 can envision the increased awakeness and responsive responsibility necessary to engender more ubiquitousiy manifest authentic creativity of the kind outlined and advocated in this thesis, I am inclined to give Rogers the benefits on any doubts about the importance of its cuitbation, in the interest of everyone becoming as wholeheartediy and consciousiy responsive and responsble in al1 of their activities as they can be.

Fundamental, however, as the cultivation of internal bcii of values are for the integrated and integrating paradgrn king proposed in thS thesis, three other preconditions Rogers advocates cultiating are abimportant. The second of the precursots he claimed to be a necessary precondition of creativity 6 openness or extensblial#y. Lowenfeld advocated culüvatirig openness as part of the creative proœss in cm and Mental Growth as earty as that text's first publication in 1949. But, unlike Lowenfeld's relativeiy unexplainec! solicitation of opennessr Rogers (1976) expbins that hiuse of this terrn rneans: a permeability of bundaries....EN ith each stimulus king1freely relayed though the nervous systern without king distorted by any process of defensiveness .... [and mat] instead of perceking in predetermined categories .... the individual 6 aware of this existential moment as it is (p.300). And as such, not only is Rogers more articulate about what he means by openness than Lowenfeld was, buhis advocacy of cuîtivating openness, like that of the interna1 bcii of values, anticipates another aspect of May's subsequent depiction of creativity, since the recepfivdy in May's conception of creativity (p.91,1976) parallels Rogers' solicitation of openness. Rollo May (1976), however, applies his conception of receptivity specifically to art in such a way as to extend both Lowenfeld and Rogers' earlier advocacies by clarifying both that "the receptivity for openness] of an artist must never be confused with passivity, [and that] receptiiity b the holding him [or her ] self alive and open ..." (p.91). And as such, Rogers' openness resonates compatibly wfth both May's emphasis on intensive consciousnea. and the awakeness noted more generaliy in Chapter Fwe for king advocated by a variety of art educators ranging frorn Edwards and Franck, to Bercsi and Kent, and frorn Greene and Gablik, to Smith. it is Kurt Rowland, however, in Viual Education and Bevond (1976). who most succinctiy advocates the balance this thesis promotes encouraging, when he sumrnarizes the goals of his persstating that any individual sensitive to his [or her] environment and to every elernent of which it is composed, may react naturally and whobheartedly, so that [slhe establishes an organic relationship wlh his [or her] environment in which both his [or her] own character and that of his [or her] environment are involved (p.12). Rowland's explanation is, however, a synthesis of Read's emphasis on reciprocity, that îs, in turn, consistent with Rogers' emphasis on the: person, process, proâuct trinity that is not oniy influenced by environments, but ako influences environments. And, since the facts that such: openness, receptkity and/or sensitivity not oniy can be cunivated, but have been recogn~ably cultivated for at least half a century in art education (by means of such exercises as the contour drawing outlined in Chapter Fwe), combine with the fact that intensmed consciousness is stil being actiely advocated in books such as Gablik's The Re-enchantment of Art (1992) and Kent's Learnina bv Heart. (1992), to suggest Rogers' clarrty on this point to be worth continued consideration, at the leas?,and potentialty, acknowiedged appropriiin of it into the prevailing paradigrn, as well. The emphasis on openness, andlor receptivv, however, also serves to ernphasize the apparent disparii between Bailin's and Rogers' conceptions of how to cultivate creativw. Bailin, for exarnple maintains that there is no distinctive process which is different from our ordinary processes of thought, and that there are consequent problems with the derivative notion of a distinctive creative personality. Thus the only coherent way in which to view creativity is in terrns of the production of valuable products (1994, p.61). Maxine Greene (1978), on the other hand, suggests the awakeness that is either synonymous with, or integral to, the openness Rogers advocates cultivating in efforts to realize creative potential, to be quite a "distinctive thought process". And, even though she does so in a variety of phrasings, at least one is accomplished by quoting Thoreau's estimate of how very few peopie are even parîialiy awake, kt aione awake enough for poetic INe(s), despite their potential to become so. (And these poetic [ives happen to be synonymous with the ones Heidegger refend to as dwelling and this thesis advocated cultivating as ubiquitousîy as possible.) The reason, however, for reiterating these three face, is that to the extent that: Greene, Thoreau, eastern mystics and Vandenberg are al1 correct about the relative rarily of the state calied: openness, awakeness, andior receptivity by the different authors, it seems iogical to conceive of it as a relativety 'extra-ordinary' state of king, rather than an ordinary one, for most people, most of the time, regardles of ciaims regarding its potential to becorne more normative, by the active cuttivation of it. Recognizing the current rarity of openness by any name, however, and then cuitivating it ubiquitously, rather than ignoring or denying it, does appear to be a logical first step in increasing its presence. And how that might be achieved in art education was explained in Chapter Fwe. But, to the extent that the openness Rogers advocated cult~ating to encourage the realization of creat~epotential(s) is still the exception rather than the ruie, for most people, most of the time, Bailin's depiction of the contemporary view of creaüvity as one that includes the solicitation of a state, or mode, other than an ordinary one explainable as excellent thinking, or skill resolution, is accurate. And, since both the prevailing and proposed paradigms encourage transcendence understood as going beyond ordinary by acts of will and imagination, the emphasis on transcendence Bailin (1994) attributed to the contemporary conception of creativity is ako accurate. No apologies, however, are made for either of these aspects of the prevailing and proposed paradigms since they are believed to be imperative to the successful creation of meaningful lives that can be enchanted, in accordance with bath Gablik and Kent's contemporaty advocacies of the sarne. lt would be possible to daim that the openness Rogers advocates cuitivating is an aspect of the "excellent thinking" Bailin (1994) solicits, but doing so could, and probably would, both minimize the significance of the concept and mwate L potential to faciiitate the kind of creativity that could be integrative enough to mitigate, rather than perpetuate. the Cartesian split that resuls from separating thinking fmm feeling. andlor overemphasiu'ng thinking rehove to feeling. And the resolution of this split is one of goak the contemporary conception of creativily claims to have the potential to achieve that culivating openness as "radically" as possible can help realae. Rogers' claim of openness and interna1 bcii of values constituting two precumrs to the Iikely emergence of creativity gives teachen who aspire to culliate the authentic creathrii depicted in this thesis two concrete sensibilities they can undertake the cuîtivation of. Rogers. however, ako claimed that two other pieconditions could and should be cutiiated by those aspiring to cultivate creativity. The more significant of which is, according to Rogers. psychobg&al saety.

Psychological Safety

Rogers (1976) breaks his conception of psychobgCaIsakly into bur parts. He introduces the "freedom" cornponent first, and explains that by freedom he (1976) means "permission to be free". to think feel. be. "whatever is most inward within him [or her] self

(p.304 ). And as such, even though the advocacy of the rehted concept of "YMiardness" has already been credited to the existentid phibsopher Kierkegaard, Rogers contemporizes the concept abng the lines of Kepesian creativity by stating that the "spontaneous juggling of percepts. concepts and meanings" are. for him. "a pari of creativity" (p.304). And, their resonance estabibhes a bridge between exslential inwardness and Rogers' humanistiialîy based conception of psycho bgical safety . Since, however, the authentic creativily ariicubted and advocated in th6 thesis is understood to require courage and cornmitment, when Rogers advocates culiating psychobgy salety it implies cuitiiating the kind of courage that art education can effect by providing environments that aJbw students ta fail consf~ctiVe3(so they can exprieme tuming their inevitable missteps into advantages. And the abihty to do is, according to

Gardner in Creatina Mincis (1997). as weA as Rogers, a fundamental aspect of being creatiue. Enabling students to taie risis in ways that enable them to learn that failures can be more constructive îhan successes in instances wkre they leam from theu experience and bnng some new reality into king as a resuh of it. And learning th6 is an aspect of psychobgicai safety that students can Mtexperience and then cornmunicate in the "Sense 8 lâea Journak" introduced previousiy, since "Sense 8 ldea Journals" are a rneans of documenthg processes that can help students identify aie sources of both their successes and fadures through refiection, as well as a rneans of transbrming the failures into successes. Such journals, furthermore, can not onfy augment, but sometimes even replace other producîs, thereby putting ernphasis on cutiivating the abifii to leam from one's mistakes specikalty, and more generally iearning how to leam, as well. Something Rogers, the art educators, and even Martin Buber overboked, however, is the need for the courage Rolb May (1976) advocates cuitiiating by going from stating that "a choice confronts us" (PA),ta asking whether we shall, "as we feel our foundations shaking, withdraw in anxiety and panic? [or], aightened by the bss of our farniliar mooring places become paraiysed and cover our inaction with apathy?" (p2),and then warning his readers that if we do these things we will have surrendered our chance to participate in the forming of the Mure. We will have fodeited the distinctive characteristic of human beings - narnely, to influence ouf evolution through our own awareness. We will have caplülated to the

blind juggemaut of history and ktthe chance to mold the Mure into a society more equitable and humane (p2). As such, Rogers antkipated the iess pedantic suggestion proposed anabgously by the poet, Robin Blaser, on a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation program, when he cbimed that the ide of artists is to "ieap into the world and remake a". Greene (1978) had anticipateci such a suggeshon when she addressed a need for the praxis she subsequenüy expiained as being: 'in touch with our own landscapes, king conscious of our evohring expiences, and aware of the ways we encounter our woild(s] (p.2), before going on to claim that it is The imaginative ieap that can lead to the leap that is praxis, for] the effort 10 remake and transcenda (p. 223). And as such, to the extent that educators succeed in encouraging and enabling students to undertake such reconstructions, they are encouraging and enabling their students to experience what it means to an artist in both Blaser's and Greene's terrns, and what à feek like to be creative in May's terms. More optimisticaliy than some exisîentialii, however, May (1976) suggests both that we can aH "seize the courage necessary to preseive our sensitivity, awareness, and responsibility in the face of radical change" (p2), and that we can al1 barn to consciousîy "participate, on however small a scale, in the forrning of the new society" (p.2), in such a way as to bring ourseives py and expand the consciousness of the shared and common world. The societies that students participate in constructing, however, whether by design or defauit, are ones they do or don? choose responsibiy, at least partly because of the:information, encouragement, and empowerment they do or don7 receive fmm their teachers, in the kind of pedagogical diabgues:first Buber, then Read, and then Kent, have posited as the essence of creativity. And, teachers aspiring to engage their students in them, can expect more success A they are aware of and cultivate the psychological safety Rogers daims to be as a precumr to the likeiy emergence of such creativity. From Rogers' perspective, aie unirnate psychological sabty, however, is when "1 accept you, but know nothing of you ... see what you are doing from your point of view, enter your private world and see it as it appears to you -- and süll accept you - then th& is safety indeed" (p.304). He (1976) also clairns that : oniy "in th6 climate cmyou permit your real seif to ernerge, and to express itseif in varied and novel forms as it relates Isetf to the woriâ" (p.304). And the fact that this clah resonates compatbly with Buber's earkr emphasis on authentic dialogue as creativity clarifies that it is yJ meant to be just another way of expbining the revehüon of one's personai hndscapes to the world, rnonobgicaily or solipsisticalty, but is meant to be a pathway to engaging wah Me woM in reciprocal diabgues. This point becomes clearer, however, w hen Rogers gaes on to qualify the freedom he is advocating be cultivateci by stating, first, that this freedom should ato be confused with license, and then second that "sornetimes behavior has to be modified to adjust to society" (p.304). And, it becornes unmistakabk when Rogers (1976) goes on to explain that the perrnissiveness he prescrbes should "not to be confused with sofiness or indulgence or even encouragernenr (p.304), because the freedom he is advocating S: permission to be tee, which abmeans mat one is responsibk [ialics added). The individual is fie....freeto bear the consequences of his or her mistakes as well as of his or her achievements. It is this type of freedom responsibly to be that is the influence of the specific person, of the "1" (p.301). These words suggest psychobg ical freedom to resonate compatibly w ith the conception of responsbility already outlined and cbimed to warrant introducing into the discoune inknîng the prevailing paradigm in art education in Chapter Seven of th6 thesis, where it was ab claimed to be resonant with Read's advocacy of reciprocity. 00th concepts, however, ako then corne forward in tirne since Rogers goes on to States that: reality exists in a multiplicity of confusing facts, but I bring a structure to my relationship to reality; I have my way of perceiving reality, and it is this disciplined personal selectivrty or abstraction which gives to creative products their aesthetic quaiiîy (~301-302). This concept resonates compatibty with NovaUs quoted claim of ait sane people participating in the construction of their (world(s)) by putling structure into them. And, significantly for this theso. as well in additkm to Rogers' advocacy of responsible andior psychobgical freedom, is his daim that the teachets ability to grant empathk u&rstandhg rnight be integral to the likelihaod of their king able to foster creativity (p.W), since this daim substantiates the pedagogicai encounters boai Donald Vandenôerg (1971) and Martùr Buber (1925) have already been quoted adrocatiq. And in this scenario art teachers are ciaimed to be in reiativeiy unque positions to engender authentic creativity because they are in positions to emphasize processes as much as products if they choose to. Most art teachers wiil be inclined to design their own means of achieving such ends but "The Sense & idea Joumals" introduced previousfy are one plausible means of acknowkâging and emphas~ingprocesses since they can be used to grant credit loi proje& that have technically "failed", but kenreîlective!y recorded. And granting credd brprojecîs students have invested sufficient energy in to have resuîted in a successful project, had they not chosen to take a risk, is one way of encouraging them to take risks. Not only is thb an especia!îy important consideration in light of Gardener's claim in Creatina Mi& (1997) that the abiiii to turn adversity into stepping stones to success is a commonatîy among creative people but th6 claim ais0 happens to be resonant with the fact that an Oriental symbol br crisis includes the syrnbol for opportunity. More immediateîy significant br mis thesis, however, is the possibility that learning to turn "failures" into successes by refiection and subsequent application is a means of culüvating the psychobgical safety in pedagogical contexts that may be a preconditiin to cultivating creativrty, more ubiquitously. One more opportunity, however, is also claimed by Rogers to be a precursor to releasing creativity. And, since that possible precondition is especialty congruent with art curricula and praxis mis ktprecondition is addressed before turning it to Abraham Masbw and his unique substantiations and extensions of the cbims made in ttiis thesis. That

precondition G the abilii to loy, or play, wiîh ideas.

Toying with an Mea.

When Rogers (1976) posits the abilii to "toy with an idea" as the last of four preconditions likety to be necessary for creatnre potential to be released he is rot only claiming the ability to literalty "play" with ideas to be likely to be integral to king able to be creative but is also advocatting the cultiiation of the ability to defer judgrnent and avoid premature closure that art educators such as McFee (1977) and Lowenfeld (1976), as weU as psychoiogists such as J.P. Guilbrd, have subsequently advocated cultivating as creatiue working skilk so successfuliy that they have acquired the label of "divergent" thinking and become synonymous with sorne conceptions of creativity . Bailin (1994) takes exception to their infegration and refutes their claimed necessity in the cuitivation of creativity. But, even though she does so to her own apparent satisfaction, her arguments leave me unconvinced. And attempting to culivate both the divergent and convergent thinking skills the prevailing paradgrn proposes, in the ongoing effort 10 be inclusive and balanced, seems bgical to me. And doing so by such low key tactics as requiring students to consider a variety of options before chming their projects and methods of execution and aibwing them time to expbre their rnethods and materials without predeterrnined ends before beginning (the htter of which can simulaneousîy enhances sensory perception, as well) seems to be quite appropriate praxis for att educators -- at least until proven othennrise. Rogers does state that the ability to toy with things is probabty the least important of the four preconditiins he proposes (p.301). lts role, however, is still well documented in other psychologists' and educators' work In the field of art education, for example, June McFee (197ï) advocates cultivating divergent thinking by quoting Wallach and Kagans' conclusion that creat~ityincludes meabilities to make many unique associations in phyful, open waysw (1965, p.356). And then, based on a combination of her own studies (1968) and aie precedent established by J.P. Guiloord (1956), she (1977) goes on to chim that "creative stuâents were not seeking cbsure or "correct" answers as much as being invoived wiîh the creative process" (1977, p.356). And, most significantîy for ai& thesis, the abilito be open and to "play" is more rather than îess synonymous with May's suggestion that the degree of intense absotptbn foreshadowed in childrens' imaginative play k a detennining feature of Mure, mature creative encounters that can culminate in the integrative and suprarational ecstasy sought. Furthermore, since only those who cm "play" have bendeerned fully human by some philosophers, those who believe th&, abng with those who believe Mmund Burke's (1979) suggestion that art can and should help people learn to become more fully human, will be inclined to include aspects of play in their cuiriculums, even if they stop short of encouraging the ecstasy aspired to dir- andlor indirectty by: May, Greene, Gablik, Bersi, and Kent. All of whom have aâvocated it. And al1 of whom aim to realie as much human potential as possible. Therefore, to the extent that one must play to be fully human, encouraging the abilii to play has a place in bath the prevailing and propoçed conceptions of creatiiity in art education. Rogers' ernphasis on being able to play concludes the four spec'k preconditions his (1976) depiction of creativity proposes nurturing in the interest of cultivating creativity ubquitousiy. Those preconditions combine with his definition impiying that everyone can and should become as creative as they can, to substantiate this thesis' daim of the ubquitous cuRivation of creativity king possible in pedagogical contexts, especialfy art classes. And his proposal that creativity is a trinity made up of the interactions of: people, processes and products acting in relation to environments (or world(s)) that not on4 need not be concrete but could, aiternativeiy, be actions, combines with the preceding proposais to constitute the sa contributions to the contemporary discourse on creativiîy he is credited with in this chapter. All of which are clairned to warrant the ongoing consideration and appropriation they have, in fact, experienced. As such, even though Rogers (1954, 1976) took a posaiin that is antithetical ta the existential one clairning 'existence to precede essence' when he stated that 'the mainspring" of creativity appeared, to him, 70 be man's tendency to actualire himself. tu becorne his potential#ksU(p.298),and then went on to claim, as well, that creativiîy is a: "directional trend which is evident in al1 organic and human lie - the urge to expand, extend, devebp, mature - the tendency to express and activate ail the capacities of the organism" (p.298). suggesting hurnan nature to evohre like acorns towards oak trees so antithetically to May's claim, his propositions are still suggested to warrant the consideration Greene and Shuk propose granting al1 seriousiy made proposais, since they were undeniabfy seriously made. And, relative to thesis, not only are they important because of their potential ta introduce specific characteristics teachers can organize their curriculums around cultivating when atternpting to cultivate creativity but, since no one realty knows what is, andlor is not intrinsic to human nature, teaching with as open ended a base as possible appears to be the most likety means of cuitivating creativity as ubiquitousty as possible. Worth pointing out, however, before moving on to the last chapter outlining Abraham Maslow's contributions to the discourse on creativity that not only substantiate and extend both Rogers' and Read's contributions, but those of the existentialis, as well, is that Martin Buber's claim that 'necessary as freedom is, in and of itself, it is not sufficient for authentic education', has been recognized consistentfy in the proposed pedagogies of al1 the art educators noted in mis thesis. And th6 thesis proposes that whik the existential advocacy of the cuhation and integration of both landscape and geography are integral to the bigger goal of encouraging and empowering consciously responsive and responsible individuais ta participate constructively in the shared and common worid, that goal can be manifest on the smaller scale of the class room and, at the classroom level, this takes the form of encouraging and empowering students to both see as art& see, have seen, and cari see; as well as make, as artists have made and can make; so that everyone, potentialîy, can leap into the world and remake it in their own images. Doing so. they are helping to create 'the uncreated conscience and consciousness of our race' that James Joyce attributed to his antihero in The Portrait of the ARist as a Younci Man (1982). And students can undertake this by using classroom experiences to become consciousiy, constructively and reflectively creative in the process of increasing their domain based, knowledge and skill bases and integrating the new knowledge and skills into their lived Iives, worids, and landscapes - as part of the ongoing construction of CO-history.

Outlining a comparable goal in 1968, Abraham Maslow ( "the fathern of the humanistic school of thought Rogers is associated with) proposed that humanistic psychology integrate aspects of existential thought to mitigate some of Isshortcornings. And the potential validity of appiying that proposal to the prevailing paradigm in ait education has inbrmed the Myof this thesis. So it is to those suggestions that this thesis now turns its attention in the last chapter prior to itç conclusion. Six of Abraham Masbuts Contributmm to Emrging Theorïes of CtestivRy

Six of Cari Rogers' contributions to the dimurse on creativity chimed to be worthy of consideration at the lest and potentially perpetuation as part of the prevailing and propoed paradigms in art educaîion, as well, were the focus of the last chapter. Those sa contributions were: his triadic definition of creativity, his maintenance of the ubiquitous potential for creativiîy to be manifest, and his identification of four abiiiithat might be precursors 10 the cultivation of creativity on anything other than a hit and miss basis. And, his propositions were claimed to be no less valuable, today, than they were when firçt proposed, almast half a century ago. The Mer"of the humanistic schooi of psychobgicai thought Rogers is associated with, tiowever, Abraham Masbw, went on to make additional contributions to the discourse on creativity that not only substantiate and extend those of Rogers but also substantiate and extend those credited to the existentialists defened to in this thesis, as well as honor Herbert Read. Six of his substantiationcum-extensions are identified in this chapter. First, he in1roduced two distinctive types of creativity and labeled them primay and secondary in such a way as to anticipate the distinctions between traditional and contemporary conceptions of creativity Elliott (1991) has been credited with. For doing so, Maslow can be credited with rninirnizing the potential emergence of more unnecessary and unconstructive polariiations between supporters of the two conceptions by claiming in Towards a Pwcholocrv of Beinq (1968) that it is when both primaryand secondary creativty are integrated that "great works" (such as those required in both Bailin's (1994) and Barrow's (19?7)conceptions) are most likely to emerge. And as such, as well as minimizing potentiai polarkation, he ako proposed an inclusive, rather than exclusive, or Athenian rather than

Roman, paradigm. That inclusiveness, however, 6 only the first of at least sa notewoithy plopos*. A second notewoithy proposal is his claim in The Furthest Reaches of Human Nature (1971 ) that the pedagogy Herbert Read outlined in Mucatina Throwh Art (1943) was the anb existing pedagogy worthy of further consideration. His claim was based on his belief that fi abne could iead the way to a necessary new paradigm (pp.57-58) abng the lines of the integrative and integrated one he was advocating. And as such, Masbw anticipated the emphasis on Read's proposais that this thesis has advocated perpetuahng in a coniemporized form. But, transcending the limited significance of substantiating a student's thesis, Masbw's claim drew mare exoteric attention to art education's potential to assume a key rote in changing educational praxis, first. and eventual changes in broader societies, as well. And, since this claim has kenreiterated more recentîy by: Rowland (1976), McFee (19ïï), Greene (1978) and Gablik (1992). drawing attention to the potential of art education to becorne a means of encouraging and enabling people to becorne poiitical without indulging in propag anda is posited as Masbw's second significant contribution ?O the evoiving discourse on the nature of creativity, and how to cultivate it. Earlier in his career, Maslow (1964) had conternporii the conception of "peak experiences" by poçiting them as ubquitousîy accessible transcendent experiinces of unification and those experiinces were synonymous with the type of creativity he later (1982) labeled pdmary and claimed to be ubquitously accessible. Not onîy, however, were the peak experiinces he referred to claimed to be akin to the peak experiinces previously assumed to be the prerogatives of a Iimited and/or esoteric few, but Masbw(1964) likened Mmto relativety comrnon experiences comparable to the aesthetic entrees Greene (19%) arkuiated and claimed to warrant addressing and cutivating as pait of art education in the name of the aesthetic îiiracy (as already mted in Chapter Four). And so,to the extent that peak experlences are, in fact, akin to aestfiek momenfs of intensive consciousness consistent with both Greene's and Smith's goab for art education, the type of creativity Maskw cab "primary" is, at the very least, synonymous with the aesthetic îiiracy posited by Greene and already ciairned here to be worthy of being considered a significant contribution to the discourse on creativity. it is, however, because of the fad that seeing primary creativity as a form of creativity suggests creativity to be ubiquitousiy accessible that il 9 claimed 14 be a third sgnilicant substantiation and extension of Rogers' earlier ciaim. Masbw's distinctions between primary and secondary creativity, coupkd with the daim that boalare necessary if great works are aspired to, is consistent with this thesis' advocacy of perpetuating both Read's emphasis on reciprocity and the existenüal emphasis on authenticity , together, as part of ait education's conception of creativity. And as such. not oniy can Maslow be credited with advocating an integraüve and integrated almcst half a cen tury ago t hat is resonant with the one being advocated here, but he can abbe crediled with anticipating a means of reaking il. Which he did by proposing the perpetuation of a Readian paradigm. The additional fact that he specifically advocated integrating the humanistically oriented paradgm inbrming hb own branch of psychobgy with aspects of existential thought to substantiate and augment them both, however, is what is posled as a fourth signifcant contribution to the evotving discourse on creativity. in general, and to this thesis. in particubr, because appiying his proposal to the prevailing paradgm in art education was the impetus for thb thesis (even oiough the fact that Read had cited an existential conception of creativity to define its role in the paradigm he proposed was already acknowiedged to have paved the way (Or & appropriation in the field of art education). Along with hk proposed integralion of relevant aspects of existential thought, and hb contemporization of the peak experiences claimed to be ubiquitousiy accessible and integral îo a type of prirnary creativv hbeied "prirnary", however, Maslow acknowfedged another type of creativÿ that he dislinguished from the: subpcûve, experience based. primary type of creativity that he labeied nsecondary"creaüviîy and claimed to be as integral to the prduction of "great" products as primary creativity was to making such products meaningful for individuais. And, whiie the reciprocity implied by Masbw's dual recognition is important, 1 is not onîy the recigrocity in his recognition of the potentiaî desirabiiii-cum-necessity of integrating primary and secondary creativity if great works are aspired to that is important. Important, as weR, S the fact that his hypotheçis opens the door to the advocacy of individuals cuhating secondary, educated natures to augment their inhented, primary ones. His distinction between primary and secondary creativity does this by making it plausible to see these types of creativity as analogous to the primary and secondary natures iâentiby G.H. Bantock. in hS1989 essay The Arts in Mucation " clairning the transcendence of primary natures towards secondary ones to be integral to realiting the Renaissance conceptions of sprezzafura andor divin& grma - since such transcendence s comparable to the: ecstasy, suprarationakrn, and integration already claimed to need recognition in the prevailing paradigm, and claimed to warrant perpetuation as part of creativity, as well. And the potential integration of both first and second natures and primary and secondary creativity can facillate the "resacralizing" Masbw daims to be necessary that is posited as his sixth unique contribution to discourse, as well as, potentialiy, the proposed paradgm.

Peak Experiences as Primary Creativity

Maslow (1964) stated that experiences that were once considered "revelations" or "mystical illuminations" experienced only by a few could actually al1 be "subsumed under the headings of peak-experiences, or ecstasies, or transcendent experiences" (p.380). And as such, his claim that the nature of al1 peak experiences are essentially the same, no matter wh has thern, when they have them, or where they have them, effectively demystified and democratized something previousty reiegated to esoteric realms. He went on, however, to aIso define peak experiences as "expression[s] of an integrated person ... [or] transient unifying within the person" (pp.143-44) and claim that they were "perfectly natural, human peak experiences of the kind that can easily be examined today" (p.380). And though he clairned that 'peak experiences were ubiquitousty accessible, he ahcbimed that many people stiIl choose not to engage them because: they are: "afraid of them, ... suppress îhem, ...turn away from them, or sirnpîy ""brget"" them" (p.382). The significance of which is threebid for this thesis to the extent that Greene's depiction of aesthetic experiinces including: "sunsets, mooniiec ked woods [etc., that] everyone has some mernory of (199 1,pp. 152-1 53) is accepteci and Maslow's claim that everyone can experience peak experiences is substantiated. First, aesthetic experiinces then warrant acceptance as a type of creaüvity that Maslaw has labeied primary. Second, everyone is capable of being creative in this consciously, responsive, responsibie, and reflectively, integrative respect. And third, ait education and psychology are linked by their mutual interest in cukivating such unlïiveexperiences wheiher they are called prirnary creativity, ecstasy, or something else entirely, both because Maslow explains peak experiences as "expression[s] of an integrated person ... [andlor] "a transient unifying wiîhin the persona(pp.143-44) and because such unification is resonant with Read's earkr emphases on unity and integration (pp.143-44). that iç, in turn, resonant with May's comparaMe emphasis on ecstasy unitive enough to undercut the subjectsbject, or Cartesian, spli. Writing more than a decade aRer Rogers. Maslow substantiates the majorii of Rogers' proposak (with the noteworthy exception of his dubious emphasis on biological destiny). He ako, however, articulates a new way of boking at the essential diference between contemporary and traditionai views of creativily. He accomplishes this feat by, fiist, distinguishing between a prirnary and secondary type of creativity, and then acknowledging them both. He observes. for example, that when "the secondary processes take over frorn the primary, the voluntary regression into our depths is terminated and the necessary passivity and receptivity of inspiration. of a peak-experience. gives way to activity. control and hard work" (p.143). And he acknowledges that it is secondary creativity. rather than primaIy, thal resuits in "a hrge proportion of the produdion-in-the-worId, the bridges. the houses. the new automobiles. even many scientific experiments, as well as much iiterary work" (p.144). Aller which he clariks that as far as he b concerned. "a peak experience happem to a permn bu] the person makesthe great product "(p.143).

Then, atler observing that secondary creativity is "based mostly on the secondary thought processes ... [and usualîy] "the consolidation and devebpment of other peoples ideas" (p.144). Masbw acknowledges that he has 'investigated the first phase only, investigated only that which comes easity and without effort as a spontaneous expression of an integrated person or of a transient unifying within the person" (pp.143-44). But. he also explains why.

He claims that since 9he great work needs not only the flash. the inspiration. the peak- experience" (p.144). but also 'needs hard work, lûng training, unrelenting criticisms. perfectionist standards .... comparisons. judgements. evaluatkns. cou. calculating rnorning- after thoughts. seiections and rejections" (p.143) .... "the great work needs great taknt which is irrelevant tom(p.144) his concern. And, his disclaimer has implications for art education because even though talent is often associated with art, and is hopefully nurtured when encountered, talent has been al1 but irrelevant to the concerns of art educators in public settings, as well, since Lowenfeld's first admonition to 'fan whatever sparks of creativity exisî, no matter how minimal, in al1 sîudents' in Creative and Mental Growlh (1947). Quintessentialty, however, Masbw (1968) goes on to conclude that "creatiuity which uses both primary and secondary processes easily and well, in good fusion or in good succession, is the kind from which the great work of art, or philosophy or science cornes" (p.144). Since as such, he not onîy acknowledges the need to cultivate both types of creativity if "the great" products associated with traditional concept ions of creativity (such as those of: Ralph Smith (1978), Sharon Bailin (1994), and Robin Barrow (1971)) but. Maskw also recognizes the need to emphasize the individual's processes that have been being addresed in art education since Lowenfeld's Creative and Mental Growth (1949) suggested a

variety of skills that could, and should, be cultivated to encourage it. As such, Maslow implies a middle ground, with an integrated form of creativity, to be the most likely means of achieving "great works", even ttiough he has no such aspirations himseff. And, to bridge the gap between such an integraüve paradgm and the abili of the existing humanistically oriented paradigrn to realize one, he proposes integrating aspects of existential thought to mitigate emerging shortcomings in the predorninantiy humanistic paradigm. So fa, this thesis has claimed that if art teachers undertake comparable integrations to those proposed by Maslow, they are most likeiy to be able to cultivate student's awarenesses of: their own unique world(s), such shared world((s)) as the art world when the teacher is an art teacher, and the most shared world of them all -- oui common planet -- for the mutualty gratifying end of enhancing the personal and social consciousnes that enables students to engage aspects of their world(s) imaginatively. so they can leap in and responsivety, responsibly and reiiectiveîy help transbm those (worid(s)) in theK own images. And seeing primary and secondary creativity as correspondents of primary and secondary natures is now claimed to open the door to this possibüity wider.

The Existential Connection

In Towards a Psvcho~of Beinq (1982). Masbw iisted meen potentially valid integrations of existential thought that he not onty claimed could and stiauid be mtegiated inb the humanistic paradigm to mitgate emerging shoilcomings, but he clairned mus in fad. be integrated in the interest of engendering a more effective paradigm than elher the humanistic or existential ones had proven to be, alone. And as such, Masbw can be credited with laying the foundation for ttik thesis in 1982, even though Buber's 1925 advocacy of education as dialogue is credited wlh anticipating it, as well. 00th Masbw and Rogers did suggest that poiiial and public well being were likeîy to be by-products of the increased respons-ability and responsbilii they advocated cularating but both were ahpracticing psychologists wth a common goal of cultivating personal, rather than public. or political, well being. And neither of their goals included facilitating the production of "great products". Their common goal was the facilitation of "self realization" in individuak and Masbw's clarity about what is meant by theu use of the terni 'self realization" both substantiated and extended Rogers' earlier, more mercura advocacy of il. He e60 extended Rogers' conception of creativity in such a way as to minimee unnecessary and unproductive polarùations thzt would be likefy to occur behreen conceptions of traditional and conternporary creatiity had they not both kenincluded in his proposal. And, Masbw promoted even more darrty when he explicitly opened the relativeîy new doorway to an existentially oriented paradigm and made another unque contrbution to the discourse on creativrty and how to effectively cultivate 2. Masbw extended the passbilii engendered by such an Litegration by acknowledging the integral role of the secondaiy creativity that this thesis is pasithg as analogous to Cdividuals seconlaiy natures and bom oniy of educabjon. The point of whidi 6 mat their king anabgous entrenches the necessitity of educaing to reveai, or engender, creativity.

Sptezzatuta and Divinïa Grant As Logical Extemkns of Successfuly lntagnting 60th Out Fitst and Second Naures and our Primary and Secondary Cmtivity

Masbw (1968) advocated the integratbn of primary and secondary creativity when goals include 'great achievements', and for my part, I propose that the integration of these two types of creativity paraliek the potential integration of the first and second, or inherited and createdlor educed naturets) that Bantock (1989) posits. But, like hthMasbw and May, I ako propose the mlegralion of our: primitive, Pagan, pre-reflective or ODnysian seke(s) with out: secondary. educated, refiective, and/or Apolbnian selves. as the essence of such transcendence (in keeping wilh May's deference to Nietzsche's emphasis on unitinq the Dionysian and Apol bnian representatives of ou r two natures). Since Chapter Three, however, already reiterated May's emphasis on encouraging an integralive, suprarational ecstasy that baianced both our natures, rather than suppressing primary ones in favor of our secondary ones, liielse need be said about this point except to acknowiedge that Bantock introduced a paraliel conception of primary and secondary natures and reiterated thal human beings could and should be understood to be madethrough their own conxious chaices and efforts. Bantock (1989) made the latter point by quoting both the Renaissance philosopher, fiasmus, suggesting that 'men are not bom but made" (p.154) and Philip Sydney proclaiming that in the course of peoples' devebpment they must "grow into another nature, they must transcend the primitive nature of the child, or the baby, and must be formed thmugh cullural artifice' (p. 154). Bantock's emphasis on past models, however. illustrates another shortcoming that resuüs (rom the humanistic piecedent that integrating exbtential approaches could mitigate. That shodcoming is the lack of attention paid to the roie of individual(s) inventinq future possibilities. And, both alternatively and augmentatively, existential approaches recognizing individuai's roles in that endeavor such as the one kund (however accidentally) in Manitoba's Curriculum Guide's "Future Perfect" (1993) project and Greene's advocacy of leaming to futurize kingconsidered a cornponent of imagination. have already kenintroduced and clairned to have the potential to mlgate this shortcoming. Consistently , as well, Bantock posits that 'art is a way of categorizing the world, that in some sense exercises a brmative element over that categorization' (p.154). But, his apparent suppoit of the Renaissance emphasis on molding the child to a preordained. a preestablished pattern"

(p.148) is at odds with the existential postulate that 'existence precedes essence' and this thesis emphasis on self construction based on personai choices.

Bantock's deference to the Renaissance conception of art and creativity, generally, however. and to its emphasis on social integration. in paiticular, is still more iather than iess consistent with Read's proposed paradigm, as well as with both Eliiitt's and May's existenthl extensions of it. And it is, therefore. especially unfortunate that Bantock misrepresenb Read by quoting him out of context stating that We secret of our collective ik is to be traced to the suppression of spontaneous creative abiiity of the individuai" (p.153) - since Read's debence

to Buber preckides the emphasis on uninformed spontaneity implied.

The significance of this misrepresentation, furtherrnore, for this thesis, is two kîd.

First, Bantack's subsequent daim that one of the fundamental issues for educationalffts br

Our times" (p.153) is the 'romantic progressivism, manifested in child-centredness and a

concern for lifting restraints and allowing self-expression that was at ieast an attempt to

reinstate the centrality of the arts as forms of impulse release" (1989, p.152) ... , makes him

appear oblivious to Ihe diabguearticulated and advocated by MnBuber, as an aliemaüve 10

both authoritarian and chiid centered education in his 1925 clarification of the fact that:

necessary as freedom is for education and creativity, it is not, in and of itself, sufficient to

engender creativity, or to pass for education. And, Buber as well as Read, since Read

deferred to him, also maintained mat students must eventually encounter the real values of the

teacher in order to experience and integrate authentic pedagogical encounters. fhe fact,

however, that Bantock appears to advocate the cultivation of a pedagogy that is compatible

w ith existential approaches ta education, without awareness of their precedents (as Gablik

(1992) has also done), indicates that in spile of an earlier îack of resonance between existentid

approaches to education and prevailing conceptions of creativiîy , the delayed echo suggests

"the fundamental issue for educationalists" to have remained unresohred, and for it to be time to remnsider, rather than dismiss, earkr propos&.

Bantock is noteworthy, in his own right, because of his articulation of the secondary natures that can be related to the secondary creativity Masbw introduced and claimed to be necessary if great products were to be engendered. But, Bantock's claim that "the line between natural and civilized could be erased, or coliapsed, by seeing people as being "bom with certain propensities" (p.154) that can be transcended as a result of encounters with civilized, and/or civilking, experiences (such as those available through education), also clarifies humanistic positions without underrnining existentid ones. And, Bantockalso extends the claims of the existentialists, as well as those of both Maslow and Read, by introducing the

Renaissance conceptions of spreuatura and divinia grazia to the current discourse on the nature of creativity, and explaining thern succinctly as manifestations of "the 'spontaneity' that cornes frorn deep absorption of previous experience ...[ rather than] simply primitive impulse release" ( 1989, pp.152-153). And, such divine grace, or divinia grazia, in secular worlds, is resonant with the ecstasy, suprarationalisrn, and integration already claimed to be integral to creative experiences, as well as with both Buberian 1-Thou experiences and Heideggerian dwelling.

Chapter Three clairned Aspin's conception of ecstasy to be unnecessarity polarking because it acknowledged oniy the Dionysian aspects of experiences king integral to ecstasy while May's conception of ecstasy, ahernativefy, encouraged both literal and figurative integration by advocating the culüvation of both the Apolbnian and the Dionysian as part of the state, or mode, called "suprarationalism*. And, since sirnilarly to Aspin, Bantock (1989) wriies of a need to "outgrow" our primitive selves, rather than suggesting integrating them into Our present and Mure sebes(s), he too irnplii unnecessary and unconstructive pohrizations that, alternativeîy , harnessing the role of imagination to the creation of ritual and rites, etc., as part of the range of potentialiy humanizing expiences avaihble to people, has been chmed to be able to mitigate. Towards this end. May's conceptions of ecstasy, in particular, and creativity, more generally, have been claimed to have the potential to engender both communions, at individual (level(s)), and commun@, at cultural and historical (level((s))), in educational settings such as art chsses.

Both the rec#rocrty and absorption Bantoc k advocates cuit ivating can be seen as comparable to both Reads iess obscure advocacy of integration and the supraralionaktate

May described. Just as both can be seen as resonant with the refkctive States of: sprenatura and divin& grazia that Bantock implies are the exclusive domain of artists suc h as

Da Vinci, that both Maslow and Rogers have claimed. antithetically, to be potentially ubquitous peak experiences. And contemporariîy, tky can al1 be understood to indicate no more and no less than being sufficientîy open and consciously awake to respond wholeheartedly and suprarationalfy (rneaning with al1 one's: intellectual, ernotional and volitional maturity) to encounters with the world. The integration of characteristics associable with both our first and second natures is therefore advocated here, and claimed ta resonate compatibiy with the integration of the primary and secondary creativii Maslow claims to be a potential means renewing an optimistic, but insufkient, humanisücalty based paradgm.

Spreuatura andlor divinia grazia in secular conte&, however, are abclaimed to parallei the lad of Masbw's contrbutions to the evolving discourse on creativity to be posited in th& thesis. Which is his articulation and advocacy of the secular "resacralizingnclaimed, here, to be reçonant with both Greene's emphasiç on leaming to transkrm the ordinary Wito the extraordinary and Gablik's ernphasis on reenchantment. And such "resacralitingnis posiîed as Masbw'ç sixth pro~osalworth reconsidering, ai the least, and potentiaîly appropriab'ng and perpetuating h a renewed pedagogw paradqm, as wei.

"Resacralizing" as Tnnsforming the Ordinary into the Extra-ordinay

Masbw's daim that the secular world needs to find ways of 'resacralaing' resonates compatbiy with Dewey's eadier ernphasis on art as a means of estabbhing and perpetuatifg ritual and community, as weii as more contemporarity with: Greene (1989), Gablik (1992), and

Kents' (1992) emphases on carnivals as means of 'resacralizing'. And, even though such an emphasis on communal spirituality dates back at ieast to 8uber, and argueabîy Nietzsche as well. it b still the sMb and iast contribution Masbw is credited with introducing in this Mesis.

His advocacy of it anticipated BantocKs (1989) asking "why seek the extra-ordinary ?

Why not try to explore and transmute the ordinary, the everyday?..."(p. 158), before saying that for him

'the reflection of the moon in a piece of broken bottle sums up ... this notion of the

ability of the great, the really creative artkt to transrnute the everyday. Mooniight and

broken bottle, common places of our experience - but the combination of the two sums up this ability of the artist to take the real, the everyday, the rnundane, and

transfomi 1 by making il syrnbolic of a brger whole (1989, p.158).

Masbw's advocacy of resacralaing anticvatecl Greene's (1991) chim of such transkmiabioris

being ubiquitousty experiencabie moments of aesthetic literacy, claimed not, thmefore, to be

the exclusive andlor esoteric domain of atiiandlor mystics. And this thesis has already

quoted both Kent and Bercsi making similar claims for art education, generally, and for

creativty, in particulai, as well as gone back to: Dewey, Collingwood and Kepes to make the

point.

Maslow's hypothes~ed"hierarchy of needs" is far more famous than any of his six propositions cited in this thesis and claimed to be signifcant for art education. And it suggests his goal of self actualuation to be 'meta goal' that is the pinnacie of the hierarchy and positioned Iike a star because it is only expected to be striven for after other, more basic needs are met. This thesis, however, has claimed, aiternatively, that such realizations are educable and once educed, usable as means of encouraging people to become more conscious, more of the time, until self actualization becomes as essential a need as any other, if it wasn't already - and the unexamined Iife ceases to be worth Iiing (or, more accurateiy, recognized as not king lived)-- as well as an end itself. And this is the 'different kind of breathing' ac knowiedged in this thesis' introduction - conscious appreciative breathing.

The existential paradigm claimed to warrant integration into the prevailing paradigm advocates always being aware of the fact that one could be mistaken and recognizing this means manifesthg Care when attempting to cukivate what rnight be metagoais. ît is a gNen

that the proposed paradgrn will not be of intetest to everyone, if only because 1 is based on

experiential knowledge that sorne would-be Mure paiticipants won? have encountered yet.

But, since art and artists both have had a long history of association with the idea that they

can give form to ideas that exist at the outer edges of sockty. art educators who chose to are

in a position take on the role of providing and encouraging such experiences as part of theit

curriculum while enhancing the acquisition of domain based skik and kiwiwiedge that students

can integrate into their lived worlds, for the reciprocai purposes of augrnenting: uniquely lived

world(s), membership in the art worid, and our shared and common worlâ. And this can be

achieved by no more, and possibîy no less than: encouraging, enabling and empowering

students to be consciousiy more respons-able and responsible in the name of a type of

creativity that promotes the integration of individuak in such a way as to beget suprarational

ecstasy that can temporarily undercut the subjectsbject split. And this can be accomplished

within the contexts of art education using a well entrenched paradigm inliated by Herbert

Read's Educatina Throuah AR (1956), according to Abraham Masbw.

This chapter has elaborated on six of Maslow's contributions to the emerging

discourse on creativity. Those proposais have included: hk proposal that integrative peak

experiences are the essence of a type of primary and subjective creativity clairned to be

oniversally accessible; his proposal of another secondary type of creativity tequiring the cuîtivation of: skills, knowiedge, commlment and reflection king necessary to augment primary creativity if 'great products' are the goal and/or solbism is to be avoided; his claim that the integration of both types of creativrty is the way to achieve balanced creativity that has meaning for both individwl(s) and the worlds they inhabl. that was in turn clairned to suggest education to be an imperative aspect of realizing creative potential if the types of creativity are. in fact akin to the primary and secondary natures Bantock introduced; his claim that integrating aspects of existentid thought cm miügate insufkiencies engendered by the humanistic influence on paradgrns in psychology, that cm, in tum. be applied to education; his advocacy of perpetuating the conception of education Read (1956) articulated and advocated; and his advocacy of the resacralùingthat was claimed !O be likenable to both

Greene's advocacy of learning to transfomi the ordinary into the extra-ordinary as a part of becoming aesthetic literate and consistent with this thesis' depicüon of creativity as essentialiy worid creatiin. as well as consistent with both GabliKs ernphasis on leamhg how to reenchant and BantocKs encouragement of cultivating divinia grazia andlor spreuatura. And. having made these points, il is now possible to conclude this thesis. Chapter Eleven Conclusion "We're Wonderful One rimes One"

This thesis has addressed sorne current criticisrns of contemporaty collceptbns of creativijr, relative to a prevaling pedagogical patadigm in ait education's conception of it. It has suggeskd the conception embodied in that paradigm to have been more msUndem&md than "misleading" and ta have been insuffLient at both As besî and worst, rather than "dangerousa, as at least one critic has chimed. tt suggested that conception to be sound enough to warrant contemporizhg in a more integrated and mtegrative version of that paradigm. And it has posited that transbrrned it could mitigate the much hmented subject- objective split indicative of the current alenation of individuak from themseives and th& (world(s). That paradigm's emphasis on the integration of individuals king an integral aspect of creativity has been traced from its inception in Herbert Read's proposal in Mucatinq Throuah Art (1943) emphasizing 1 to ils current emphasis in Maxine Greene's most recent book, Releasing the lrnaaination (1995). The fact that Read distilled that emphasis into the daim that al1 education shouki promote the cultnration of unqueneçs and social consciousness, reciprmaliy, was noted. And that daim was reiterated so ofien that it was usuaiiy abbreviated to either 'the reciprocal paradigm' or 'pedagogicaî reciprocity'. Maxine Greene's advocacy of the inkgration of individuals within themsehes and with their (world(s)) kingconsidered an appropriate focus tw art education was chimed to have been implicit in the new paradgm she chims we need that will 'enable peopie to reach out from their unque bcations to participate in the constructions of our shared and cornmon world' in Landscapes of Leaming (19781, where she ciaimed that could augment the reakation of democracy as well. And, Greene was absuggested b both substantiate Read's inceptive c him and corntemporite it. The "redefinition" of creativity 'as: the encounters of intensively conscious individuak with theu (world(s)) mat result in some new rea&ty being brought into king' (p.56) aî bast for the parîicipating individuak that was introdwd by the existentid psychobgist Mb May, in Couraae to Create (1976), was cited as the potential nexus of a meaningful and effective transformation of Read's original paradgrn into Greene's pioposed one, as bng as all seven aspects of his conception (consciousness, receptivi, absorption, integratïve and suprarational ecstasy, integration of self with world, and committed courage) were recognized. And bath R.K. Elliott's broader based support for existentid conceptions of creativiîy and his depiction of them kinga transformation of the bibkal depiction of archetypal creaüvity manifest as world creation in 7he Divine Myth of Creation" were claimed to suggest Read's paradigm to have kenappropriate in the past, and still worthy of selective appropriation in the present. Fwe of Read's proposais were eventualty clairned to wanant appropriation. The first thern was the prtspoçed reciprocal paradigm. The second was his anticipation of the existentid integrations claimed in this thesis to have the potential to extend his paradgm because of h6 deference to Martin Buber's existential conception of creativity as: authentic diabgue. The third aspect of his proposa1 claimed to warrant perpetuation was his identification of the essentialness of cultivating uniqueness, but doing so in conjunction with the social consciousness later chimed to be resonant with: Sartre's depictbn of "responsbility", Heidegger's clairn of cuiüvating such responsbility through the culivation of "dwelling thinking" and Care, and Vandenberg's daim of "geography" (representing the relatively objective world) needing to be integrated by individuak with their subjective "landscapes" br authenticny to be possible. His promotion of aesthetic literacy cultivated as: observation, appreciation and expression being the kart of art education wàs chirned b be a burth point worth perpetuating, even though Greene was credüed with exknding hsconcwn of aestheoc literacy by clarifying that aesthetii Iiteracy: rested on the prirnacy of enhanced perception, required the culüvation of imagination to banskmi perceptions into augmentative conceptions, required the culhjvation of the ability to attend; constituted a domain much biirthan the art world; and requued individuais to be authentically present. And the finh of his proposab chimed to warrant perpetuation was the inkgration of relevant psychobgicalpeapectkes into art praxis, that both hS deferences to Cari Jung and Gestalt psychobgids, and bis inclusion of a need for increased consciousness as part of the aesthetic literacy he advocated, were claimed ta have anticipated - everi though his speciiic deferences were claimed to be extended by existential aspects of May's work as well as by the inclusion of proposak made by both Abraham Masbw and Car1 Rogers that were ehborated on in Chapters Nine and Ten. Two theorists, as well as one educator, however, were clairned to have anticipated aspects of Read's proposal. They were John Dewey, R.G. Collingwcod, and Gyorgy Kepes. And four art educators, in parücular, were claimed to have refined Read's initial proposal. They were: Viktor Lowenfeld, Kurt Rowland, June McFee, and Edmund Feldman. And these four art educators' refinements were clairnecl to have been even further refined more iecently by : Maxine Greene, SuiGablik, and Corita Kent, and Calken Bercsi -- even though Maxine Greene received the lion share of that credit. She was, krexample, credited with the extensions of Read's depiction of aesthetk literacy, as noted. But she was ais0 credited with both extending everyone's depiction of imagination by not only clarifying that it was needed to empower transformation of perceptions into conceptions and that its augmentation was grounded in augmented perceptual abiiii, but abintroducing emphases on cultivatirtg the abilities to "futurire" and to ieam how to transform the ordinary into the extraordinary. And, even though it was Vandenberg who was credited with suggesting that we can make 'me worid' by king more awake, it was Greene who was crediied with drawirg attention 0 the need br ricreased awahess more exokrically than Vandenberg. as well as cfedled sirnilai(y with introducing the idea of peopie's lived woild(s), or personal histories, constauthg "landscapes' that need lo be inbrmed by the integr- of the 'geography' that rnakes up ouf brgest shared and oommon world, as wei as smailer ones- such as the ait world - br the recfprocal puiposes of augmentmg individuab woild(s) and, axiomatkaIty. augmenthg the world((s)) they contribute to. And, ukimately it was Greene who was credïed with pkieing

contemporary emphass on the need to cultivate responsbiiii as weil as wei as respûrs- abiiii in ait education, as did McFee and Rowland both belore her, consistently with Ws original proposal. The fact that Greene made cases br existential approaches in her many books was not emphas~ed. And instead, tti'i thesis claimed that: Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on aug menting percipience; Kierkegaard's emphasis on "appropriationn;Sartre's emphasis on "responsibilitya,Nietzsche's emphasis on ecstasy as the uniting of ttie Dionysian and Apolbnian and self overcoming; Hedeggets emphasis on: "caren, buiiding "dwelling thinking', king-in-the-worüand CO-historicizing;and Mn6ubets emphasis on uniqueness and dialogue (as well as everyone's on authenticity as presentness-to-both-eV-and-world),muld aU effectively and affectively substantiate and extend the prevailing paradig m. Read (1943) deferred to Marün Buber to define creativii and was therefore credited wit h opening the door to integrating related aspects of existential thought into the proposed reciprocal paradigm. But it was Abraham Masbw, the "father" of humanistic psycholcgy, who was credited with proposing exidential thought's formal inmduction into the prevailing paradgrn by proposing such an integratbn to mifgate emerging shortcomings in h6own humanistic paradigm - the paradigm that had inforrned the prevailing one in art education. And Masbw's peer, Cari Rogers was credited with defining creativly as a ubiquitously possible binity that was brought into king by the integration of: people, processes and products in the contexi of envuonrnents, brthe fint time in 1954, as wel as crediteâ with claiming that: openness, psychological safety, intemal loci of values and the abiiii to play with an idea mght al1 be necessary precondïions that can be culavateâ in the interest of evetyone's creatiuity being augmented. Rogers' emphasis on bidogy was ciaimed to be a shortcornhg h both he psychobgical and pedagogical paradigrns that recognizing the existenthi postulate of 'existence preceding essence' as potentially correct couid rnitgate, since doing so, at the least, suggests hedging ail bels. That recognition was claimed to suggest the need to cultivate the committed courage May ciaimd to be integral to creativw if we are to encourage intensiveiy conscious individu&, res~onsiveiyand responsbiy partic@aüngin the constructions of the (world(s)) they envision. And people doing so were posaed as the mas( extraordinary of beings. Such participation was posited as the essence of creativity when archetypal creativity is understood to be manifest in world creation, as well as desirable to the extent that me recreation of humanity S deerned necessaiy and the recreation of hurnanity accepted as dependent on the recreatbn of individuak (one at a time).

Bailin's (1994) proposal was that creatïvity should be culovated consbtentty with the need to perpetuate traditions of laiowiedge and culture. And this thesis has agreed with this proposal but dbagreed with her proposed way of doing so, which was to emphasize pmducts deerned great by external bodies at Me apparent potential expense of addressing individuais and their processes. Attemativeiy. this thesis defetred 10 Rogers' emphasis on the cultivation of intemal bci of values and cbimed thern to be akin to Kierkegaard's ernphasb on appropriation understood as making sornething one's own. And, based on the belief that only people present to thernsehres in this way can, and/or will, be heM responsble, such responsibili was claimecl to necessary both for indiiiduals to meaningfuity augment theu own (worid(s)) and for dernocracy to be more fuliy manifest. îî claimed that rather than dom pby the individual and hb or her processes, aie individual must remain the busthe prevailing paradigm advocated when the recreation of humanity k undersbod to depend on the recreadion of individuals recreating themsek and theu worlds- and participating conçciously in those reconstructions is understood as the essence of creatiiity. That creativiiy, manifest on a personal level is prirnaiy, unitive creativity and, manifest on a secondary level, it connects people to their (worid((s))) and enrkhes evetyone's shared and (mmmon wrld((s))). Primary and seeondary creaüvity were posaed as analogous to secondary and pmiary natures. And their inkgration was posited as a means of reaiiiing the Renaissance conceptions of spreuatura and or divinia grazzia, understood as activities so wel leamed that their manifestaion amountç to tramendence brthe individual and the appearance of grace to observea. Seeing thb integratbn as both possibie and desùabie was claimed to miügate tendencies to polariie conceptions that trying to perpetuate either primary or secondary creativity abne was thought likely to risk. And the mtgation of tendencies to polarize, was noted for having been one of the goak identlfied as worth pursuing by John Dewey half a century ago when he suggested in Art as Exmience (1934) that ad was the rneans by which culture was both establiçhed and perpetuated, as well as that that perpetuation must be personalty undertaken. So, ironic as 1 may appear, to the extent that ûewey was (and is) correct, it is onty by including contemporary concept ions of creativity's inclusion of emphasis on individuais and proceses that traditional conceptions of creativity are likeiy to be realized with any consistency. Dewey's emphasis on presentness was shared by othen noted throughout the thesis. And not only was Greene was credited with making 1 a component of aesthetic Iiteracy, but an entire chapter was bussed on it. b perceived essentialness, furthermore, was the reason that quaiiiations were noted when agreeing with Ralph Smlh's chm in ficelience in Art Mucation (1987) that art education needs to Vitroduce students to masterpieces, since in this thesis, those introductions were not onîy chimed to be wananted because aiey were representatives of the art world and representative of aspects of our shared and common worid but also because "encountering" and "appreciatingmthem couid extend both the lived wor#(s) of students and the woriâ's cumulative degree of consciousnas when individual's integrahw of the expetinces are the focus. And the emphasis on the latter was reason that Prometheus was cîaimed to an appropriable qmbdfor ait educatbn, abng wilh Janus, since Janus boked to the past and present as part of beiia guardian of new beginnings that imluded worids and Prometheus represented the acquisition of consciousness and the perpetuity of the stmggb. And, dong with the godiy duo, the fact that Saint Exupery's Little Prince (1943) is a relat ivety contemporary rnyth encouraging reciprocity comparable to Read's was noted, since Suzi Gablik (1992) clairned we need new myths b embody the wcbecobgical pamdigm she advocates, and that story was thought to offer more accessible illuminations of: uniqueness, responsbility, and irnaginabjon than the proposed contemporizatbns ot the divine myth of creation. Jung's comciousness myth, or even the promotion of Romthean andior Janus-type roles. Carl Rogers was claimed to have aiüculated sgnkant contributions to Me emerging discourse on creaüvity that were worthy of consideration, at the least. and potentially selective appropriation and perpetuation, as well. And six of Abraham Masbw's subsequent contributions to the emerging discourse were credited with extending six of Roger's as well as substantiating the inclusion of rehted aspects of existentid thought to milgate shoitcomings in the prevailing paradgm so successfulty as to warrant perpetuaüng it in a new more integrated and integratbe Rrm. He was, for exampie, credited with chming what was meant by the self realoatbn, or actualization, integral to the branch of psychobgy he and Rogers were both associated wlh, as well as credited with both introducing phary and secondary creaüvity and articuhting the desirability of integrating both when great produc& are aspireâ too. His identikation of primary and secondary creativity was credüed with opening a door & seeing them as anabgous to the first and second natures G.H. Bantock posiîed in 'Arts h Mucation" (1989). This. in tum. was c)aimed to suggest t hat encouraging the integration of piirnary and secondary creativity, abng with pBmary and secondary natures, couiâ facilitate the culticration of the suprarational ecstasy May (1976)chimed to be a resuh of authenticaiiy manifest creativity. And such authenücaily manifest creaüvity was chito be resonant with eatiier aspirations towards diuinia grazia ancilor sprezzatura reinterpreted kr secuhr society. Together, they were all claimed to appropriateiy encourage indiiduals to assume limited divinity and the associated powen of creaüon. even Mough Masbw(lW1). in particular, was credited with enhancing the perceivecl role of art in education by proclaiming Read's paradgm - and Read's paradigm abne - to be worth perpetuating in efbrts to engender an effectiie and affectivenew paradigm. And this thesis has ptaposed folbwing Masbw's advice regarding both more rather than lesperpetuating Read and cultivating both primary and secondary creaüvly. recipmcally. as well as regarding his proposed integration of related aspects of existenthl Wug ht to extend the original paradgm - even though these appropriations have kenqualified as needing to recognize the art world as a world with ils own unique entrees that cm. and should. be addressed in art education (as Rabh Smith has been credited with pointing out in Excellence in Art Education (1987)). Traditional art teachers cm,of course, continue to &us on the limled dornain of the art world, itself. But they do so at the risk of minimizing the potential participation of more people in the domain, as well as at the risk of further minimizing the potentially integrated and integrative role art education could assume in both educational and cuitural contexts. And, potentially tragically, they also do so at the potential expense of experiencing the reciprocaliy synergizing dialogues possible with their (studenî(s)) and their respective (world(s)). Al of wh Ch contributes to this thesii' advocacy of perpetuating the idea of individuais as the sine qua non of eveiything, with the potential to appreciate and parücipate in disciplines, as well as potentiaily transcend them, that mu3 now, more than ever beliore, attempt to realize potentials to becorne as consciously responsbb br shared and cornmon (world(s)), as krpersonaiy hed one(s). That is why th b thesis has chimed Read's reciprocity to still be appropriate br art education, and especially so when creativrty is culhated as authentic creativity and manifest as responsive and responsble wtiolehearted participation in the conscious construction of some aspect of individual's (world((s))). And the fact mat th& chim aqpeais to be somewhat of a hushed reverberaüon, perceptible in domains ranging from: philwophy to psychokgy, and poetry to education, is the ream this thesis has refened to so many of the contributions to it as reçonances that augment one anoher, in the hopof contrbuting to both Meir audbiliiy and their visibiiii - and if not succeeding, at least eschewing their sikncing. References

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