International Studies Quarterly (2017) 0,1–11

Responsibility to Perfect: Vattel’s Conception of Duties beyond Borders

LUKE G LANVILLE Australian National University

Mounting evidence suggests that non-consensual military intervention is most often a poor instrument for alleviating mass suffering. Thus, a growing number of scholars and practitioners argue that the international toolbox for protecting popu- lations should also contain non-coercive tools for assisting states and enhancing their capacities. But while studies of the history of military intervention proliferate, past thinking about duties of assistance and capacity-building remains relatively neglected. This article seeks to rectify this state of affairs by analyzing and seeking insights from the detailed treatment of non-coercive means of discharging duties to others offered by the eighteenth-century Swiss jurist and diplomat Emer de Vattel. Drawing on Leibniz’s conception of “perfection,” Vattel argued that states have duties to contribute to the perfec- tion of those beyond their borders insofar as they can without doing an “essential injury” to themselves. While some of his claims about duties may be uncontroversial today, others remain subject to ongoing contestation, and still others have been forgotten and demand renewed attention. Crucially, while Vattel acknowledged the need for prudence, he also de- manded that states be willing to make sacrifices for the sake of vulnerable strangers. He framed the cultivation of ever greater ability to assist others as a fundamental aspect of a state’s own self-perfection.

Heated and ongoing debate about how to best contribute to Protect (R2P) increasingly emphasize that the toolbox for to the protection of vulnerable people beyond borders has, preventing grave suffering andmassatrocitiesoughttocon- in recent years, prompted a turn to history. Scholars look tain a range of non-coercive tools. These should aim at as- particularly to the record of the theory and practice of mili- sisting states and enhancing their capacity to protect their tary intervention. They scour past ideas and cases for populations. Advocates of R2P, for example, highlight the present-day insights (Bass 2008; Simms and Trim 2011; importance of “pillar two” efforts by international society to Recchia and Welsh 2013). However, for all the discussion provide the assistance and support necessary to reinforce about intervention, nonconsensual resort to force for the the “pillar one” efforts of states to protect their own popula- purpose of protecting populations remains a rare occur- tions. This, they contend, should reduce the number of oc- rence (Bellamy 2015). This is, in my view, as it should be. casions that require “pillar three” coercive measures to Scholars and practitioners increasingly recognize that, in the enforce protection (United Nations 2014; Sharma and absence of host-state consent, coercive intervention is usually Welsh 2015). However, while histories of the idea and prac- a poor instrument for alleviating mass suffering. With some tice of military intervention continue to proliferate, past important exceptions, intervention tends to increase the suf- thinking about duties of assistance and capacity-building re- fering of civilians in the short term and proves inadequate mains relatively neglected.2 We need to also retrieve and for securing peace in the longer term (Peksen 2012; Wood, seek insight from these historical deliberations. Kathman, and Gent 2012).1 Interventions are also politically The eighteenth-century Swiss diplomat and jurist Emer fraught. They strain relationships among great and rising de Vattel (1714–67) considered duties of assistance and powers, and they undermine cooperation on other pressing capacity-building in particular detail. Vattel’s treatment of matters within regional and international organizations. And questions of military intervention in his work The Law of even when successful, “military intervention is a particularly Nations (1758) is well explored, even if debate continues as expensive way to save lives,” and, as such, creates consider- to how it should be interpreted (Zurbuchen 2010; Pitts able opportunity costs (Valentino 2011, 66). 2013; Rech 2013).3 His engagement with questions of duties With these limitations in mind, scholars and practitioners of non-coercive aid and assistance, in contrast, remains rela- of humanitarianism, peacebuilding, and the Responsibility tively neglected.4 The tension that Vattel grappled with in his discussion of these duties was not the tension between

2A growing literature explores nineteenth- and twentieth-century ideas and practices of humanitarianism, particularly grappling with their ties to im- perialism (Barnett 2011; Tusan 2012; Everill and Kaplan 2013; Sasson 2016). Luke Glanville is a Fellow in the Department of International Relations at Little, however, reaches further back to consider, for example, the early mod- Australian National University. He is the author of Sovereignty and the ern and Enlightenment treatises on the law of nature and nations that so exer- Responsibility to Protect: A New History (Chicago University Press, 2014). cise scholars of humanitarian intervention. Author’s note: I am grateful to Alex Bellamy, Richard Devetak, Toni 3While some scholars read Vattel as a defender of non-intervention Erskine, Cian O’Driscoll, Joanne Wallis, Mary-Louise Hickey, two anonymous (Zurbuchen 2010), others see him as an apologist for “international adventur- reviewers, and the editors of ISQ for helpful comments that strengthened this ism and exploitation” (Tuck 1999, 195), and still others simply declare him article. charmingly inconsistent (Wight 1966, 119). 1For more optimistic assessments that outline particular circumstances in 4Two works that at least offer useful overviews of tensions between cosmo- which military intervention might be effective, see Krain (2005) and Seybolt politan and statist duties in Vattel’s work are Linklater (1990, 80–96) and (2007). Hurrell (1996).

Glanville, Luke. (2017) Responsibility to Perfect: Vattel’s Conception of Duties beyond Borders. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1093/isq/sqx018 VC The Author (2017). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected] 2 Responsibility to Perfect: Vattel’s Conception of Duties beyond Borders sovereignty and interference characteristic of many article concludes by outlining how Vattel’s conception of Enlightenment discussions about military intervention and a responsibility to perfect can make a valuable contribu- given so much attention by scholars today. After all, he tion to debates about duties to assist and protect the vul- made clear that duties of assistance and capacity-building nerable today. should never be performed without the consent of the re- cipient sovereign state. Rather, he grappled with the tension Vattel’s Intellectual and Political Context between the duties of states to help others and their duties Vattel was not the first theorist to contemplate to help themselves. duties to extend non-coercive assistance to foreigners in Vattel’s model for working through this tension was times of need. Certainly, from the sixteenth century on- grounded in a notion of “perfection,” which he took from ward, the leading deliberations on the principles and laws the natural law writings of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and that should guide relations between states tended to focus Christian Wolff. All states have a duty to contribute to the on the rights and duties of coercive intervention, war, and preservation and perfection of other states, he claimed, in- conquest.5 This is not surprising given the context of dev- sofar as they can do so without neglecting their duties to- astating wars that accompanied the end of ecclesial unity ward themselves. He explained that the perfection of other states involved providing for their necessities and and the emergence of the territorial sovereign state within conveniences, helping them secure peace and justice, and Europe, as well as the intense and often violent competi- contributing to their capacities to achieve these things for tion among imperial powers for markets and territory be- themselves. These tasks are central to the humanitarian- yond Europe. However, many of these treatises on the ism, peacebuilding, and R2P agendas today. “law of nature and nations” also gave detailed consider- Crucially, Vattel did not conclude that a state should as- ation to non-coercive means of discharging the “offices of sist others only if it cost them nothing to do so or only if it humanity” that nations were said to owe to each other. advanced certain short-term interests. Rather, he argued During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, construc- that states should prioritize the urgent or substantial tions of these offices, or duties, tended to require nations needs of others over their own non-essential needs and to make use of their own domain for the benefit of others. that they should be willing to embrace a measure of self- They involved duties to engage in commerce and to pro- sacrifice for the sake of vulnerable strangers. vide safe passage, hospitality, and refuge (Cavallar 2002). Furthermore, he insisted that the perfection of others and Perversely, in the hands of some, such as the Dutch jurist the perfection of oneself were not mutually exclusive. He , they were framed so as to justify a right of suggested, as others had before him, that some long-term war by European powers against peoples of the East material utility could be derived from assisting vulnerable Indies and the Americas who failed to perform them. others. But he went further, arguing that contributing to Others, such as the German jurist Samuel Pufendorf, sub- the perfection or well-being of others was, in an important sequently denied the compulsory nature of these duties ideational sense, constitutive of the perfection of oneself. and thus made clear that their violation did not constitute Such an effort to resolve the tension between duties to just grounds for imperial conquest (Grotius 1925, II.2, others and duties to ourselves demands renewed consider- 186–205; Pufendorf 1934, III.3, 346–78; Tuck 1999, ation today. It represents a powerful counterpoint to wide- 78–108, 140–65). In the eighteenth century, theorists such spread calls for governments to focus solely on the needs as Vattel began to deliberate duties of mutual aid and as- of their own populations and not on the needs of stran- sistance that required states not only to make use of their gers and foreigners beyond borders. own domain but also to take non-coercive action beyond This article analyzes and draws insights from Vattel’s their borders for the benefit of vulnerable peoples. conception of duties beyond borders across four sections. What were the key intellectual currents and political cri- First, it outlines the intellectual and political context of ses that prompted and influenced Vattel’s treatment of his study of the law of nations. It shows how his arguments duties beyond borders? Protestant natural law theorists of about duties beyond borders were prompted intellectually the early Enlightenment proffered a range of rival visions by his embrace of a Leibnizian understanding of natural of the aims and possibilities of law and politics (see obligations and politically by his hope to secure the well- Hochstrasser 2000; Hunter 2001; Haakonssen 2006). being of small European powers vulnerable not only to Some, such as Thomas Hobbes and Pufendorf, responded the predations of larger powers but also to famines and to decades of violence and instability, both within and be- other calamities. The second section examines his use of tween states, by positing systems of natural law that sought Wolff’s distinction between the necessary and voluntary merely to facilitate the maintenance of peace and order. laws of nations. It explains how Vattel conceived the duty The purpose of law and politics, for them, entailed the re- of a state to contribute to the perfection of those beyond straint and pacification of humanity. They defended the its borders as internally binding on the conscience of the absolute authority of the sovereign ruler within the state state, even if not externally enforceable by others. and the indefeasible rights of states to defend their liberty The third section expounds Vattel’s model of the duty and independence against external threats. of states to preserve and perfect others. His model empha- Whereas Hobbes rejected the Aristotelian claim that sizes the need for prudence, but also demands that states humans were naturally sociable, Pufendorf sought to pro- be willing to make sacrifices for the sake of others. tect himself against charges of Hobbism by grounding his Indeed, it frames the cultivation of greater ability to assist system in a fundamental law of human sociability. But this others as a fundamental aspect of a state’s own self- sociability was driven by considerations of utility. The justi- perfection. The fourth section examines his principle of fication and purpose of sociability, for Pufendorf, was non-interference and his insistence that perfection should merely the Hobbesian end of securing one’s own not be imposed on other states without their consent. It shows that, while he called for the provision of non- 5In addition to the humanitarian intervention literature cited earlier, see coercive and consensual assistance to the vulnerable, he studies of these works by Tuck (1999), Muthu (2012), and Pagden (2015), largely rejected efforts to forcibly remake the world. The among many. LUKE GLANVILLE 3 preservation in a dangerous world (Palladini 2008; the University of Geneva in the 1730s. Burlamaqui’s teach- Christov 2015, 143–210). When Pufendorf applied the law ing drew heavily on the work of Pufendorf, but it was of sociability to relations between states, potential duties grounded in foundational principles that mirrored more of mutual aid and assistance tended to quickly give way to closely those of Leibniz. He insisted, for example, that the the strict duty of states to prioritize their own security and laws of nature existed not to restrain the passions of man interests. This marginalization of duties to others pro- and merely facilitate his survival, as Hobbes and vided the grounds for him to reject some of the justifica- Pufendorf suggested, but “to conduct him safely to the tions for imperial conquest offered by earlier theorists, as end, which every one has, and indeed ought to have, in noted earlier. But it also led him to draw some callous view, namely, true and solid happiness” (Burlamaqui conclusions, including the claim that states could justly 2006, I.1.1, 31). expel foreigners in times of famine for the sake of their Vattel’s (1741) first book provided a detailed defense of own citizens (Pufendorf 1934, III.3.9, 365–66). the philosophy of Leibniz. Living in the Swiss principality In contrast to Hobbes and Pufendorf, whose natural of his birth, Neuch^atel, ruled at the time by , he law theories were so focused on the preservation of peace dedicated the book to his king, . He and order, others, such as Leibniz and Wolff, embraced sought but failed to secure a diplomatic position in the the Aristotelian-Thomist claim that the law should aim Prussian court and instead accepted a promise of employ- higher and seek to facilitate the natural human inclin- ment by Count Bru¨hl, first minister of Elector Friedrich ation to perfection. They understood perfection in terms August II of Saxony. While he waited for Bru¨hl to call on of completeness or wholeness. They offered expansive vi- him, Vattel spent several years in Neuch^atel, studying the sions of the ends of social life that required individuals to works of both Leibniz and Wolff and composing a collec- pursue the perfection, good, and happiness not only of tion of essays, which he published in 1746. The collection themselves but also of others. Across numerous essays and included an Essay on the Foundation of Natural Law and on letters, Leibniz produced a theory of natural law that the First Principle of the Obligation Men Find Themselves Under grounded moral action in the pleasure and perfection to Observe Laws. This Essay offered a distinctly Leibnizian that individuals derive from benevolently promoting the explanation of the obligation of individuals to obey nat- perfection of others (see Leibniz 1972, 45–84; Brown ural law. It emphasized the happiness and perfection that 1995; Riley 1996). He rebuked Pufendorf for basing his one derives from obeying the dictates of reason and con- natural law on selfish calculations of utility. Individuals forming to the demands of justice (Vattel 2008, 747–71). should instead seek to love their neighbor and “procure Apart from a brief stint as Saxony’s permanent minister good for everybody,” insofar as they can, he declared to the Swiss Republic of Berne, Vattel remained in (Leibniz 1972, 83). Individuals will derive lasting pleasure Neuch^atel for several more years. Here he wrote his most from pursuing the perfection of others and in so doing famous work, The Law of Nations, which he published in will further the perfection of themselves. 1758.7 As we will see, he grounded his law of nations in Wolff undertook to elaborate and systematize Leibniz’s the Leibniz-Wolffian conception of perfection, recom- ideas and apply them to relations between states. In The mending that nations contribute to each other’s perfec- Law of Nations (1749), he bluntly rejected “the perverse tion insofar as they are in a position to do so without idea ... that the mainspring of the law of nations is per- neglecting their duties to themselves. However, he also sonal advantage” (Wolff 1934, II.163, 87). He insisted, endorsed Pufendorfian claims about the material utility instead, that every nation ought to “have the fixed and derived from acting in this way. lasting desire to promote the happiness of other nations” Kapossy and Whatmore (2008, xii) rightly note that, (Wolff 1934, II.162, 87). Just as “every man ought to love while “a subject of the king of Prussia by birth, and a ser- and cherish every other man as himself,” he claimed, vant of the elector of Saxony by profession, Vattel was first “every nation too ought to love and care for every other and foremost Swiss.” He cherished this Swiss heritage. “I nation as for itself” (Wolff 1934, II.161, 86). Wolff was born in a country of which liberty is the soul, the acknowledged that every nation was bound to preserve treasure, and the fundamental law,” he declared in the and perfect itself. But he also insisted that “every nation preface to The Law of Nations, “and my birth qualifies me owes to every other nation that which it owes to itself,” in- to be the friend of all nations” (Vattel 2008, Preface, 20).8 sofar as it can perform it without neglecting its duty to it- His primary purpose in writing the work seems to have self (Wolff 1934, II.156, 84). The perfection of a nation been to advance the security and well-being of the small involved the accomplishment of “a sufficiency for life, Swiss principalities and republics amid the large and often tranquility, and security.” He elaborated: “sufficiency for predatory militarist and commercial powers of Europe, life consists in the abundance of those things which are particularly France and Prussia (see Kapossy 2010; required for the necessity, advantage and pleasure of life, Whatmore 2010; Toyoda 2011, 161–90). Some Swiss theor- and in the means of happiness ... tranquility consists in ists, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, recommended isola- freedom from fear of injuries, and security in freedom tionism as the means of protecting Swiss liberty. But Vattel from fear of violence, especially from the outside.” Every argued that the freedom and welfare of vulnerable states nation was bound to contribute to each other’s accom- could be better advanced by binding Europe more tightly plishment of these things insofar as it was in a position to together through the cultivation of mutual commitment do so and the other was unable to attain them for itself to the common good (Kapossy and Whatmore 2008, xiii; (Wolff 1934, II.177, 92). Christov 2013). He famously celebrated that Europe was Vattel knew these rival conceptions of natural law well “not, as formerly, a confused heap of detached pieces, and was most positively disposed to the philosophies of each of which thought herself very little concerned in the Leibniz and Wolff.6 He studied the law of nature and na- tions under the tutelage of Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui at 7The full title of the work was The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns. 6For more detailed discussion of Vattel’s intellectual and political context, 8Hereafter, citations to Vattel’s Law of Nations (2008) are made simply with see Kapossy and Whatmore (2008), Toyoda (2011, 161–90), and Rech (2013). section and page references. 4 Responsibility to Perfect: Vattel’s Conception of Duties beyond Borders fate of the others.” Rather, it had been made into “a kind the happiness and perfection of all the others.” However, of republic, of which the members—each independent, this duty needed moderating by the duties of nations to- but all linked together by the ties of common interest— ward themselves: unite for the maintenance of order and liberty” (III.3.47, 496). But the duties that we owe to ourselves being un- It is often emphasized that Vattel argued that the com- questionably paramount to those we owe to oth- mon good could be further promoted through greater ers,—a nation owes herself in the first instance, commitment to international commerce, the balance of and in preference to all other nations, to do power, and the formation of coalitions to suppress ambi- everything she [lawfully] can to promote her own tious and aggressive powers (see Nakhimovsky 2007; happiness and perfection ...When therefore she Devetak 2011; Rech 2013). It is less commonly acknowl- cannot contribute to the welfare of another na- edged that he insisted that the common good should also tion without doing an essential injury to herself, be advanced through the cultivation of concern for vul- her obligation ceases on that particular occasion, nerable and oppressed peoples and the development of capacities to provide mutual aid and assistance in time of and she is considered as lying under disability to need. perform the office in question. (Prelim. §§10–14, Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 72–74) Europe repeatedly confronted not only problems of do- mestic tyranny and international aggression but also debil- The “second general law” of the society of nations, in itating natural disasters and famines. Oftentimes, the turn, was respect for the natural liberty and independence latter triggered the former (see Wheeler 2008; Parker of each nation. Consequently, a nation must always retain 2013). Such urgent crises led Vattel, who appears to have the right to judge for herself what her conscience pre- had no experience in colonial matters, to naively embrace scribes and “to examine and determine whether she can the Lockean “agricultural argument,” which justified perform any office for another nation without neglecting European occupation of uncultivated lands in the the duty which she owes to herself.” In all cases that de- Americas (see Cavallar 2008; Anghie 2011). But it also pend on such judgment, “no other nation can compel her prompted him to outline demanding duties of mutual as- to act in such or such particular manner: for any attempt sistance among European states. He followed closely at such compulsion would be an infringement on the lib- Wolff’s framework for such duties. Vattel took his asser- erty of nations” (Prelim. §§15–16, 74). tions about the “imperfect” nature of these duties and the Underpinning this claim that duties to contribute to right of states to judge for themselves the extent to which the perfection of other nations cannot be compelled was they could perform them without neglecting their duties a distinction between the “necessary law of nations” and to care for their own needs directly from Wolff. But the “voluntary law of nations,” which Vattel borrowed Vattel, consciously writing not only for fellow philosophers from Wolff. The necessary law consisted in the direct ap- and jurists but also for sovereigns and their ministers, pro- plication of the law of nature to nations. Although intern- vided more practical detail and offered more instructive ally binding on the conscience of nations who were abso- examples than Wolff, whose geometrical method for writ- lutely bound to observe it, this law was not appropriately ing moral philosophy was notorious for its tedious prolix- subject to enforcement by other nations. The voluntary ity (see Preface, 10–20). While much of the groundwork law, in contrast, delineated that which was externally bind- had been laid by Wolff, it remained for Vattel to present ing and enforceable. While it “flows from the same source, to a wide audience an expansive and compelling vision of and is founded on the same principles” as the necessary duties for the protection of vulnerable peoples beyond law, it needed modifying and regulating so as to avoid borders. states constantly taking up arms to punish the supposed wrongs of others (III.13.192, 592–93). The Necessary and Voluntary Laws of Nations Wolff famously suggested that this voluntary law was promulgated by a fictional supreme state (civitas maxima). Nature has established society among individuals, Vattel The supreme state comprised all nations and enjoyed declared in the Preliminaries to The Law of Nations. The “some sovereignty” over them all (Wolff 1934, Proleg. “general law” of that natural society is that “each individ- §§7–21, 11–17). Vattel vigorously rejected this idea. Such ual should do for the others every thing which their neces- a fictional body was not necessary for regulating the neces- sities require, and which he can perform without neglecting sary modifications to the natural law, he claimed. Rather, the duty that he owes to himself.” This was “a law which all “all these alterations are deducible from the natural lib- men must observe in order to live in a manner consonant erty of nations, from the attention due to their common to their nature, and conformable to the views of their safety, from the nature of their mutual correspondence, common creator.” It was also “a law which our own safety, their reciprocal duties, and the distinctions of their vari- our happiness, our dearest interests, ought to render sa- ous rights, internal and external, perfect and imperfect” cred to every one of us.” While individuals were free to (Preface, 16). unite with each other to form separate “states” or “na- While nations are always internally bound by the neces- tions” (he tended to use the two terms interchangeably), sary law to obey their conscience, the external obligations they could not thereby liberate themselves from their produced by the voluntary law needed division into per- duties to humankind. Rather, in so uniting, “it thence- fect and imperfect duties.9 A nation can be rightly subject forth belongs to that body, that state, and its rulers, to ful- to compulsion for violating perfect duties that correspond fil the duties of humanity towards strangers.” Just as na- to the perfect rights of others, such as a right of freedom ture has established society among individuals, so too has from injury. But an imperfect duty, which depends on the nature established a “great society” among nations. The “first general law” of that society is that “each individual 9The distinction between perfect and imperfect duties was first developed nation is bound to contribute every thing in her power to by Pufendorf (1991, I.9.4, 69). LUKE GLANVILLE 5 judgment of the duty-bearing nation, should not be sub- would mean “opening the door to endless discussions and ject to compulsion. The other nation has merely an im- quarrels” (III.13.196, 595). The voluntary law, therefore, is perfect right to its performance, which entails a right to not a concession to the exigencies of national self-interest. ask but not to compel (Prelim. §17, 74–75). He explained: Rather, it is a concession to the need to maintain interna- tional peace and security: A nation then is mistress of her own actions so long as they do not affect the proper and perfect as the necessary law is always obligatory on the con- rights of any other nation,—so long as she is only science, a nation ought never to lose sight of it in internally bound, and does not lie under any exter- deliberating on the line of conduct she is to pur- nal and perfect obligation. If she makes an ill use sue in order to fulfil her duty: but when there is of her liberty, she is guilty of a breach of duty; but question of examining what she may demand of other nations are bound to acquiesce in her con- other states, she must consult the voluntary law, duct, since they have no right to dictate to her. whose maxims are devoted to the safety and ad- (Prelim. §20, 75; see also §§9 and 21, 71, 75–76)10 vantage of the universal society of mankind. (Prelim. §28, 79; see also Preface, III.12.192, 16– Some scholars conclude that, while Vattel deployed the 17, 593) language of universal duties that flowed from nature, his arguments about the voluntary law ultimately amounted Moreover, while Hunter (2010a, 123) suggests that Vattel to a justification for action guided by calculations of rea- argued that “there can be no universal principle of justice son of state. T. J. Hochstrasser (2000, 181–82), for ex- governing ... transactions in the society of nations,” Vattel in ample, suggests that “this distinction between a necessary fact made no such argument. Certainly, Vattel suggests that it and voluntary law of nations is effectively an endorsement does not belong to others “to pronounce a judgment on the of current state practice camouflaged by the supposedly contested question.” But he also makes clear that there is al- self-enforcing sanction of conscience ... Vattel told pro- ways a just and unjust side and that “The party who is in the fessional diplomats what they wanted to hear” (see also wrong is guilty of a crime against her own conscience” Tuck 1999, 191–96; Armitage 2013, 154–71). Ian Hunter (Prelim. §21, 76). The voluntary law insists that no state has a defends Vattel against such charges. He argues that the right to compel another to perform its imperfect duties. But Swiss jurist did not seek to defend the doctrine of reason this in no way means that states should consider themselves of state, but nor was he the champion of a principle of morally free to act as they choose. Their casuistic reasoning universal justice. Rather, he sought to hone the “art of about how to weigh their duties to others against their duties diplomatic casuistry” in which “the natural-law principle to themselves in a given situation must be aimed at determin- of cosmopolitan mutual perfection is continuously ad- ing the just course of action.11 And crucially, as we will see in justed—moderated, adapted, suspended—in relation to the next section, Vattel provided sovereigns and their minis- the divergent maxims and exigent circumstances of na- ters with clear principles and guidelines as to how such tional self-interest” (Hunter 2010a, 125–26; see also cosmopolitan and national duties should be weighed. Hunter 2011, 2013). Hunter’s argument usefully directs us to the fact that The Duty to Preserve and Perfect Other Nations Vattel sought to present a model for how diplomats Vattel devoted the second of the four books of The Law of should weigh their duties to others against their duties to Nations to expounding a wide range of duties that nations themselves on a case-by-case basis, weaving between the owed to others and considering how they should be extremes of universalism and statism according to the cir- weighed against duties to themselves. “The following max- cumstances at hand. However, Hunter at times takes this ims will appear very strange to cabinet politicians,” he argument too far and exaggerates the extent to which began, “and such is the misfortune of mankind, that, to Vattel let states off the hook. He presents Vattel’s volun- many of those refined conductors of nations, the doctrine tary law as a concession to the exigencies of national self- [of the duties of nations to others] will be a subject of ridi- interest. He claims that Vattel’s model of “diplomatic cule.” Nevertheless, he declared, even if we should not al- casuistry” establishes a “bi-polar field of judgment” in ways expect sovereigns and their ministers to discharge which “the ‘consciential’ obligations of cosmopolitan mu- their “offices of humanity,” it was worth boldly spelling tual perfection are suspended when they conflict with the them out, not only with the desire of convincing some, maxims of national welfare in the domain of ‘external’ re- but also with the hope of shaming others into compliance: lations” (Hunter 2010a, 124). “even those who relish them the least, are thereby laid But this is not what Vattel argues. The difference be- under a necessity of keeping within some bounds, lest tween the necessary and the voluntary law is not that the they should forfeit their characters altogether” (II.1.1, former is solely concerned with cosmopolitan duties and 259–61).12 the latter adds consideration of national welfare. Vattel makes clear that the weighing of cosmopolitan duties 11My argument here accords with Jouannet (1998) and Zurbuchen’s against national duties is already a feature of the necessary (2009) claims that, for all the liberty and independence that Vattel granted to law and a matter of internal conscience. The difference states, he always maintained that they were bound by universal principles of between the necessary and the voluntary law is that the lat- justice. See likewise Koskenniemi (2011), who notes how Vattel deployed a language that was at once realistic and idealistic. ter adds that no nation has the right to question another’s 12 judgment or to accuse it of violating its conscience. Vattel This might be fruitfully read as an early recognition of a distinction be- tween logics of appropriateness and logics of consequences, or between the explains that, if the law permitted nations to so act, it constitutive and regulative impacts of social norms. Elsewhere, he likewise anticipated contemporary constructivist claims about how to detect such 10It was in this context that Vattel famously defended the equality of states, norms in the discourse of actors, even in examples of violation: “Pretexts are declaring that “A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less at least a homage which unjust men pay to justice. He who screens himself a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom” (Prelim. §18, 75). with them shews that he still retains some sense of shame. He does not openly 6 Responsibility to Perfect: Vattel’s Conception of Duties beyond Borders

He took the “general principle of all the mutual duties He invoked the example of “little states in ” of nations” directly from Wolff: “One state owes to an- who ordered public collections to succor villages of neigh- other state whatever it owes to itself, so far as that other boring countries that had been ruined by fire, “the differ- stands in real need of its assistance, and the former can ence of religion proving no bar to the performance of so grant it without neglecting the duties it owes to itself” humane a deed.” He likewise endorsed the “noble gener- (II.1.3, 262). He framed this in Leibnizian terms of pro- osity” of England, whose parliament responded to the moting the perfection and happiness of others. But he Lisbon earthquake of 1755 by voting for the provision of founded it on Pufendorfian considerations of self-interest. one hundred thousand pounds worth of assistance, half in It is the inability of individuals to supply all their wants money and half in ships laden with food, clothing, and and to preserve and perfect themselves on their own that tools, for the relief of the suffering people of Portugal obliges them to extend to each other mutual aid and as- (II.1.5, 263–64). The official record of the House of sistance. And those same duties that individuals owe to Commons debate notes with pride this generous assist- each other are, in a way, also owed by nations to each ance provided at a time “when the People of England were other. However, he offered two observations to relieve themselves greatly distressed for want of Corn” (House of those readers “who might be alarmed at this doctrine, as Commons 1770, 185). Vattel asserted that Protestant totally subversive of the maxims of sound policy”: England’s generosity convinced the Catholic Portuguese that “an opposition in belief and worship does not re- strain the beneficence of those who understand the claims 1. Social bodies or sovereign states are much 14 more capable of supplying all their wants than in- of humanity” (II.1.5, 264). The obligations to perform these “offices of humanity,” he explained, were “solely dividual men are; and mutual assistance is not so founded on the nature of man.” No nation can refuse necessary among them, nor so frequently them to another on the grounds of difference of religion. required ... Rather, “to be entitled to them, it is sufficient that the 2. The duties of a nation towards itself, and claimant is our fellow creature” (II.1.15, 268).15 chiefly the care of its own safety, require much Crucially, Vattel added that a nation is bound not only more circumspection and reserve, than need be to contribute to the perfection of other nations by provid- observed by an individual in giving assistance to ing for their necessities and conveniences and helping others. (II.1.3, 262) them secure peace and justice. It is also obligated to, “oc- casionally, and according to its power,” contribute to the But despite these two considerations, Vattel proceeded capacities of these nations so that they can better procure to outline a range of ways in which states ought to dis- such things for themselves. Thus, for example, if a nation charge their duty to preserve and perfect others. As should seek instruction in the sciences or in wise laws, a noted earlier, in contrast to earlier theorists who tended learned nation ought not to refuse these things. The of- to focus on the duties of states to make use of their own fices of humanity, then, are not owed only in times of cri- domain for the sake of others, Vattel also gave substantial sis. Rather, they should be discharged whenever possible, attention to the duties of states to step beyond their bor- so that nations may be made more capable of preventing ders and extend aid and assistance to vulnerable out- or responding to crises themselves (II.1.6, 264–65). siders. He began by outlining the duty to take up arms to Such a claim is echoed today in calls from scholars and aid a neighboring nation unjustly attacked by an aggres- practitioners of humanitarianism, peacebuilding, and R2P sive enemy (II.1.4, 262–63). Many before him had done for more substantial and effective international efforts to thesame(seeGrotius 1925, II.25.4–6, 581–82; Pufendorf strengthen the capacities of states and societies so that 1934, VIII.6.14, 1305–7). But, in a break from earlier the- they might be better able to prevent the emergence of hu- orists who tended to focus on such duties of war, Vattel manitarian crises, the descent into civil war, and the oc- added that nations ought also to provide non-coercive as- currence of mass atrocities (see, among others, Juma and sistance to others afflicted with “famine or any other Suhrke 2002; Richmond 2014; Sharma and Welsh 2015). calamities”: Such calls push against a tendency to conceive of duties beyond borders as being generated by crises.16 It is rela- tively easy to articulate an urgent duty and therefore to if a nation is afflicted with famine, all those who mobilize political will for international action in response have provisions to spare ought to relieve her dis- to crises that have already erupted. It is more difficult to tress, without however exposing themselves to want expound an ordinary and ongoing duty and motivate ...To give assistance in such extreme necessity is so essentially conformable to humanity, that the duty 14On the generous provision of aid by Britain and also Spain in response is seldom neglected by any nation that has received to the Lisbon earthquake, and the comparative reluctance of France and the the slightest polish of civilization. (II.1.5, 263) Netherlands to assist, see Shrady (2008, 45–47). 15It is worth noting the universal language being deployed here. Vattel tended to draw his examples from within Europe for two reasons: it was the He cited the example of Henry IV of France, who he context that he knew best, and his particular concern was with the relatively (somewhat misleadingly) indicated facilitated the supply small Swiss republics who had limited capacity to extend their assistance fur- of food to “obstinate rebels who were bent on his destruc- ther than to their near neighbors. We will see that, insofar as he considered tion” during his Siege of Paris in 1590.13 duties with respect to the non-European world, his concerns lay with the in- “Whatever be the calamity with which a nation is af- justices of European imperialism, emphasizing that European assistance should not be forcefully imposed upon unwilling non-Europeans. flicted,” Vattel declared, “the like assistance is due to it.” Nevertheless, the fact that he grounded his arguments in “the nature of man” and insisted that they extend to all who are “our fellow creature” makes clear trample on what is most sacred in human society: he tacitly acknowledges that that he conceived his duties as applicable to all states and peoples (II.1.15, a flagrant injustice merits the indignation of all mankind” (III.3.32, 486–87). 268). 13In fact, the military strategy deployed by the Duke of Parma against 16For an example of the language of “a duty-generating crisis,” see Erskine Henry allowed Paris to receive the food supplies (Jones 2001, 207). (2014, 139). LUKE GLANVILLE 7 international action to build capabilities and resilience Today, many nations appear increasingly unconvinced and to empower societies so that they are better able to by arguments in favor of the material benefits of sociabil- prevent such crises from occurring in the first place. ity and are instead turning inward. This is exemplified in Much attention is given to the need for states to respond the British people’s decision to withdraw from the to cases like Libya (2011) in which atrocities are already European Union and US president Donald Trump’s ef- occurring. Less is given to cases like Kenya (2007–2008) forts to implement an “America First” program. In such a and Guinea (2009–2010) in which international actors context, Vattel’s Leibnizian appeal to the ideational bene- can play a significant role in preventing possible atrocities, fits of contributing to the needs of those beyond borders or to a range of other cases in which international actors may well be worth reinserting into public debate. Indeed, can engage in ongoing action, empowering locals and German chancellor Angela Merkel’s efforts in 2015 to en- helping strengthen governance, enhance security, and courage the German people to recognize the “happiness” promote justice, such that future crises might not and “pride” that could be derived from bearing a measure emerge.17 Practices of capacity-building and prevention of vulnerability and sacrifice in order to assist refugees are in many instances just as complex and precarious as fleeing the Syrian crisis arguably represents an example of forcible intervention. But they are usually much less costly such a Leibnizian appeal to the ideational benefits of per- in terms of blood and treasure and much less destabilizing forming the offices of humanity (Yohannes 2015; The at local, regional, and international levels. States would do Guardian 2015). well to heed Vattel’s call to recognize a duty not only to Of course, Vattel was sure to remind his readers that na- contribute to the urgent needs of others in times of crisis tions must always retain the right to judge for themselves but also to engage in routine efforts to contribute to the what they can and cannot contribute to the preservation capacities of others to avert or effectively respond to emer- and perfection of others. While every nation has a perfect gent crises themselves. right to ask another for assistance, the nation that receives Vattel further insisted that a nation is bound not only the request for its kind offices has “a right of judging to seek to benefit others when it is in a position to do so. whether the case really demands them, and whether cir- Rather, for a nation to truly perfect itself, it should strive cumstances will allow her to grant them consistently with to cultivate ever greater capacity to promote the perfec- that regard which she ought to pay to her own safety and tion and happiness of others (II.1.13, 267).18 Nations, interests.” A nation that refuses to perform such duties then, are not called to simply weigh their duties to others without good reason “offends against equity ... but against their duties to themselves as if they are mutually thereby no injury is done; injury or injustice being a tres- exclusive. Rather, their perfection of others should be pass against the perfect right of another” (II.1. 9–10, 266). understood as in some way constitutive of the perfection Consequently, the offending nation should not be subject of themselves. Vattel thus applied Leibniz’s argument to compulsion. Vattel also emphasized that nations need about individuals to states.19 to exercise prudence when considering what they can do Leibniz (1972, 83, 197) urged individuals to recognize for others. After all, the law of nature does not oblige that they would derive enduring happiness from pursuing good nations to become “the dupes and prey of the wicked.” Nor does it command that they strengthen the perfection of others, and in so doing they would fur- enemy nations who have intentions of “plundering and ther their own perfection. The “true interest” of individ- oppressing” them. Likewise, a prince should be careful uals, he insisted, lay not in the pursuit of material utility not “to obey without reserve all the suggestions of a noble but in the pursuit of happiness and perfection—under- and generous heart impelling him to sacrifice his own stood in the Thomist sense of completeness or wholeness. interests to the advantage of others.” The prince’s first pri- This happiness and perfection was advanced by contribu- ority is to care for “the nation who has committed herself ting to the good, well-being, and perfection of others.20 to his care” (II.1.16–17, 268–71). Vattel by no means rejected the pursuit of material utility But Vattel did not thereby let states off the hook. While as a motivation for right action. Indeed, he endorsed states were not rightly subject to compulsion for the per- Pufendorf’s embrace of material utility as the grounds for formance of their duties to others, they were still morally sociability among states. But Vattel also adopted Leibniz’s culpable for violating them. And while they needed to ex- notion of individual perfection and applied it to the col- ercise prudence when weighing their moral obligations, lective. He encouraged states to recognize not only the this in no way justified unreasonably neglecting the needs material advantages but the ideational benefits that they of others. He suggested, by way of example, that Russia would derive from contributing to the perfection of had recently carried out a “prudent performance” of its others. He suggested that this should motivate them to duties. She had “generously assisted Sweden when threat- not only give of their existing resources but to strive to 21 ened with a famine,” but refused to allow other nations to cultivate ever greater capacity to give. purchase corn that she needed for her own people (II.1.9, 266). He offered a similar suggestion when he turned to 17 For critical reviews of the Kenyan and Guinean cases of atrocity preven- discuss the imperfect duty to admit refugees. He recom- tion and of a range of international peacebuilding projects, see Sharma mended that, while states should exercise prudence when (2015), Kikoler (2015), and Richmond (2010), respectively. 18He elsewhere added that nations should also strive to cultivate peace contemplating what this duty demanded of them in a with one another so that they are in the best position to “perform those mu- given instance, “this prudence should be free from un- tual and sacred duties which nature enjoins them” (IV.1.2, 652). necessary suspicion and jealousy” and a nation ought 19For broad discussions of Vattel’s understanding of the state as a “moral “never to lose sight of the charity and commiseration person,” see Whelan (1988) and Holland (2011). which are due to the unhappy” (I.19.231, 227). 20 It is worth noting that Leibniz highlighted both the temporal pleasure Moreover, he made clear that, while a state should pay that individuals can gain from contributing to the well-being of others and attention to its own safety and interests, it should never- also the spiritual pleasure that they gain through loving their neighbor in the imitation of Christ. theless be willing to bear some cost and inconvenience for 21Vattel (2008, 747–71) offered a detailed defense of Leibniz’s argument the sake of the vulnerable beyond its borders. Certainly, a about self-perfection in his Essay on the Foundation of Natural Law. state was under no obligation to contribute to the welfare 8 Responsibility to Perfect: Vattel’s Conception of Duties beyond Borders of another if this would require doing “an essential injury one’s own choosing would constitute a violation of their to herself” (Prelim. §14, 74). But it ought not to refuse to natural liberty and independence. He admonished those aid others out of fear of “a slight loss, or any little incon- “ambitious Europeans who attacked the American na- venience: humanity forbids this; and the mutual love tions, and subjected them to their greedy dominion, in which men owe to each other, requires greater sacrifices.” order, as they pretended, to civilize them, and cause them While states should weigh their duties to others against to be instructed in the true religion.” The Europeans’ pre- their duties to themselves, it was by no means the case text for war was “equally unjust and ridiculous” (II.1.7, that reason of state simply trumps the good of others: “a 265).23 nation ought on all occasions to regulate her conduct by Vattel accompanied this argument with a more general reasons proportioned to the advantages and necessities of rejection of the right of states to interfere in each other’s others, and to reckon as nothing a small expense or a sup- affairs. From the liberty and independence of nations flow portable inconvenience, when great good will thence re- a right of each to govern itself as it thinks proper, he in- sult to another nation” (II.10.131, 326). It is instructive to sisted. This sovereign right is one that others “ought the compare this sentiment with Grotius (1925, II.25.5, 581), most scrupulously to respect, if they would not do her an who proposed a much more restrictive conception of injury” (II.4.54, 289). Even if a sovereign should treat his duties beyond borders, recommending that sovereigns subjects with severity, no outsider may oblige him to alter come to the defense of friends who are unjustly attacked his conduct. The Spaniards violated this law when they only if such aid “can be rendered easily and without loss.” acted as judges of the Inca ruler Atahualpa, he claimed. Vattel elaborated on his theme of self-sacrifice in powerful Had Atahualpa injured the Spaniards, they would have terms: had a right to punish him. But he was not accountable to them for the crimes of polygamy and human sacrifice of A nation is under many obligations of duty to- which they accused him (II.4.55, 290). wards herself, towards other nations, and towards Vattel suggested a crucial exception, however: “But if the great society of mankind. We know that the the prince, by violating the fundamental laws, gives his duties we owe to ourselves are, generally speaking, subjects a legal right to resist him,—if tyranny becoming paramount to those we owe to others; but this is insupportable obliges the nation to rise in their own de- to be understood only of such duties as bear some fence,—every foreign power has a right to succour an op- proportion to each other. We cannot refuse, in pressed people who implore their assistance.” Like many before him, he offered James II of England as an example some degree, to forget ourselves with respect to of such a tyrant, who sought “to overthrow the constitu- interests that are not essential, and to make some tion, and to destroy the liberties and the religion of the sacrifices, in order to assist other persons, and es- people.” The nobility and patriots of England, having pecially for the greater benefit of human society: determined to resist the tyrant, appealed to the United and let us even remark, that we are invited by our Provinces for assistance, and William of Orange was right own advantage, by our own safety, to make these to respond to their plea: “for when a people from good generous sacrifices; for the private good of each is reasons take up arms against an oppressor, it is but an act intimately connected with the general happiness. of justice and generosity to assist brave men in the de- What idea should we entertain of a prince or a na- fence of their liberties” (II.4.56, 290–91). tion who would refuse to give up the smallest ad- Vattel indicated that such interference did not consti- vantage for the sake of procuring to the world the tute a violation of the liberty and independence of the inestimable blessings of peace? (II.18.332, 454) state. This was because, in such instances, “the bands of the political society are broken, or at least suspended, be- Having made this point clear, Vattel was, as always, will- tween the sovereign and his people.” Thus it remains for ing to supplement his Leibnizian understanding of duties other states to judge for themselves whether the sovereign of mutual perfection with a Pufendorfian appeal to the or the people have justice on their side and to grant their long-term utility derived from assisting others. The “sacri- assistance accordingly (II.4.56, 290–91; see also II.4.62, fices” that states were required to make for the sake of 295). A further exception to the principle of non- others were not contrary to their interests, he insisted, interference that he permitted was the right of war against since “it is natural to think that others will behave in the those beastly rulers and mischievous nations, both from same manner in return; and how great the advantages within Europe and beyond, who disturb the peace, tram- that will result to all states from such a line of conduct!” ple on justice, and willingly disregard the law of nations. (II.10.131, 326).22 Such monsters do an injury to all nations, he claimed. Therefore, nations may rightly form a coalition to chastise No Right to Impose Perfection on Unwilling Others them and deprive them of their power (II.4.53, 5.70, III.3.34, IV.2.5, 289, 297–98, 487, 653–54). While a nation has a duty to promote the perfection of Certainly, these were significant exceptions to the prin- others insofar as it can, such perfection should never be ciple of non-interference, and it is understandable that forcibly imposed against the wishes of the recipient na- scholars give them so much attention (see for example tion, Vattel declared. To thrust one’s good offices on an Pitts 2013; Rech 2013). These exceptions aside, however, unwilling nation and compel them to receive assistance of Vattel tended to prioritize the need to respect the liberty

22 and independence of states. While his willingness to allow He highlighted, for example, the immediate benefits derived from ex- states to judge for themselves whether they have just tending residence to refugees, noting that a sovereign can turn “his charity ... to his own advantage, to the increase of his power, and to the greater benefit grounds for war in a given instance may strike us as of the state. What a difference is observable in Brandenburg since the settle- ment of the French refugees!” (II.10.136, 329; see similarly Pufendorf 1934, 23He supplemented this rejection of the right to impose perfection with a III.3.10, 366). Such arguments are increasingly heard again today (see for ex- scathing critique of Grotius’s notion of the right of sovereigns to punish grave ample Betts et al. 2014). violations of the natural law wherever they may occur. LUKE GLANVILLE 9 troubling today, the principles that he outlined to guide treated with hostility because he has arrived on the land states in their decision-making set quite a high bar to of another” (Kant 1996, 8.354, 357, 360, pp. 326, 328–29, intervention (see Zurbuchen 2010). He detailed a de- 330). manding set of duties to preserve and perfect the vulner- Preoccupied as he was with the problem of war, Kant able beyond borders, but for the most part he recom- suggested that morality required not the establishment of mended that these duties be discharged without resorting a “friendly” community of nations, but merely a “peaceful” to force. He claimed that the values of state liberty and in- one (Kant 1996, 6.352, 489). Thus, while he accorded to dependence and the interests of international peace and nations stringent negative duties to refrain from interfer- security should be prioritized over the desires of powerful ing in each other’s affairs, the positive duties that states states to set themselves up as judges of weaker others and were said to bear in their relations with each other in his to seek to civilize or convert them without their consent. ideal “cosmopolitan constitution” were remarkably min- Only if others were willing to receive aid and assistance imal (Kant 1996, 8.358, 329). should a state provide these things. Given what we increas- Present-day Kantians seeking to explain why states ingly understand about the difficulties of achieving good might have duties to care for the vulnerable beyond their rather than harm via non-consensual military interven- borders tend to derive such duties from Kant’s founda- tion, such a model of mutual duties of consensual and tional principles and maxims. In doing so, they must ei- non-coercive assistance demands renewed attention today. ther ignore or awkwardly explain away the fact that Kant himself implicitly rejected such duties.25 As fruitful as Conclusion some of this work is, it would serve us well to reengage Ever since John Rawls (1971) first developed his “Kantian” with those theorists that the German philosopher was so theory of justice, theorizing about matters of global justice quick to dismiss. These include Vattel, who not only has tended to proceed on the assumption that Immanuel embraced duties to assist and protect beyond borders but Kant can be read as setting the terms of debate. This gave sustained attention to their nature, scope, and impli- implies no real need to grapple with the ideas of those cations. Certainly, Vattel’s ideas bear clear marks of a his- philosophers, jurists, and theologians that preceded him. torical, regional, and political context very different to Kant has thus largely succeeded in his effort to supersede ours. They are grounded in metaphysical assumptions all earlier theorists and to position himself as one who that we may not all share. But scholars increasingly recog- transcended his historical, regional, and political context nize that this is no less the case with Kant, despite the and provided a timeless, universal, and pure framework German’s pretensions to the contrary (Hunter 2010b; for moral reasoning (see Hunter 2001). In his essay Maliks 2014). For all the distance between him and us, Toward Perpetual Peace, published in 1795, the German Vattel’s conception of duties beyond borders contains sev- philosopher famously dismissed Grotius, Pufendorf, and eral profound insights that can help us as we think about Vattel as “sorry comforters,” whose “code, couched philo- what we owe the vulnerable today. sophically or diplomatically, has not the slightest lawful From Vattel’s rich treatment of duties, we might high- force and cannot even have such force (since states as light three ideas in particular that may fruitfully inform— such are not subject to a common external constraint).” or challenge—some of the parameters and assumptions of While these earlier theorists may have outlined clear prin- present-day debate. The first is his claim that states are ciples on the use of military force, he suggested, “there is obligated not only to contribute to the perfection of no instance of a state ever having been moved to desist others in times of crisis, but also to seek to build the from its plan by arguments armed with the testimony of capacities of others so that they are better able to care for such important men” (Kant 1996, 8.355, 326). He sought themselves and to prevent crises from emerging in the to remedy this by proposing a set of binding and enforce- first place. This idea is remarkable for its prescience. It is able articles that, if adopted, would establish and guaran- increasingly well understood by theorists of humanitarian- tee perpetual peace between states. ism, peacebuilding, and R2P. But, in practice, interna- Given the reliance on Kant—or at least “Kantian” rea- tional society can still do much more to implement the soning—by so many theorists of duties beyond borders kind of routinized programs for capacity-building in weak today (see, for example, Bagnoli 2006; Brown 2009; Roff and fragile states (in addition to non-routine responses to 2013),24 one might expect to find the great theorist of attention-attracting crises) that Vattel recommends. cosmopolitanism likewise lamenting that Vattel’s treat- The second relates to his suggestion that states should ment of the duty of mutual perfection also offered “sorry be willing to bear a measure of sacrifice for the sake of vul- comfort” to those vulnerable peoples who stood in need nerable outsiders. State leaders today commonly empha- of its performance, since this duty was similarly immune size that their engagement with global duties needs to to external enforcement, and proposing a set of binding conform to their national interests. When they discharge and enforceable duties of mutual aid and protection in its duties that do not seem to advance their short-term inter- place. But he did no such thing. When Kant came to out- ests, they tend to emphasize the gaining of longer-term line his conception of the rights and duties that states benefits, noting that grave suffering, injustice, and in- were to wield in his “league of nations,” such duties were no- stability in one part of the world can have global conse- where to be found. Rather, even though he asserted that quences.26 Vattel certainly endorsed such an the community of nations had developed to the point that “a violation of right on one place of the earth is felt in all,” 25Such notions of duties, after all, were known to him via the work of Vattel, among others. he insisted that “Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to 26 conditions of universal hospitality,” and he claimed that See, for example, Barack Obama’s (2013, 2015) insistence in 2013 that he needed to measure humanitarian and security concerns in Syria “against this involved merely “the right of a foreigner not to be my bottom line, which is what’s in the best interest of America’s security,” and his claim in 2015 that, in a globalized world, it was in the interests of all to 24O’Neill (2000, 65–80) highlights the importance of distinguishing Kant’s have concern for “the plight of the powerless, the plight of refugees, the own ideas from present-day “Kantianism.” plight of the marginalized.” 10 Responsibility to Perfect: Vattel’s Conception of Duties beyond Borders

“enlightened” understanding of self-interest. But he also CAVALLAR,GEORG. 2002. The Rights of Strangers: Theories of Hospitality, the went further. He appealed to states to be willing to sacri- Global Community, and Political Justice Since Vitoria. Aldershot: fice their interests to a degree for the sake of vulnerable Ashgate. outsiders, so long as in discharging their duties to others ———. 2008. “Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel: Accomplices of European Colonialism and Exploitation or True they did not do an “essential injury” to themselves. Such a Cosmopolitans?” Journal of the History of 10(2): claim is echoed in Merkel’s appeal to Germans to em- 181–209. brace the element of self-sacrifice involved in opening up CHRISTOV,THEODORE. 2013. “Vattel’s Rousseau: Ius Gentium and the Germany’s borders in 2015, declaring that “Germany is a Natural Liberty of States.” In Freedom and the Construction of Europe, strong country—we will manage” (BBC News 2015). Vattel vol. 2, edited by Quentin Skinner and Martin van Gelderen, insisted that states are not bound to help others only in 167–87. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. those instances where they can do so without trouble and ———. 2015. Before Anarchy: Hobbes and His Critics in Modern International inconvenience. Rather, the care of one’s own interests Thought. New York: Cambridge University Press. should be in proportion to the needs of others, and a DEVETAK,RICHARD. 2011. “Law of Nations as Reason of State: Diplomacy and the Balance of Power in Vattel’s Law of Nations.” Parergon state should not hesitate to sacrifice its interests a little in 28(2): 105–28. order to help others a lot. 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